Germany’s Renewed Commitment to NATO

By David Oliver

The A400M tactical transport is one of the Luftwaffe’s aircraft that suffers from low serviceability. © David Oliver

At one of the first press conference after his election, Germany’s new Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized these goals. “The trans-Atlantic relationship and our cooperation as part of NATO remain steadfast,” he said. “We commit to a community of democracies across the globe and I am very grateful to President Biden for emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and, at the same time, we are committed to what unites particular nations: the idea of freedom, the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights.”

However, in recent years the Luftwaffe’s fleet of A400M transport planes were unavailable for deployment due to repairs, and other equipment including fighter jets, tanks and ships, was outdated and in some cases not fully operational because of bad planning or shortage of spare parts and maintenance problems. Also some air force pilots were unable to train because too many aircraft were being updated or repaired.

In 2020 military spending fell by 1.4 percent and upon taking office in December 2021, Chancellor Scholz and the new coalition had made no proper commitment regarding increasing military expenditure, as it was only said that 3 percent of the country’s GDP would be invested in diplomacy, development and defence. The war in Ukraine, however, changed the dynamic in Berlin, and Germany soon became one of the main drivers of Europe’s rising military budgets.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz first announced on 27 February 2022 that his country would sharply increase defence spending to more than 2 percent of its economic output, an effort which, ironically, Donald Trump and others had failed to impose on Berlin previously. “We need planes that fly, ships that sail, and soldiers who are optimally equipped for their missions,” Scholz said at the time, vowing that Germany would in the future adhere to the NATO goal of spending 2 percent of its annual economic output on defence. Germany is now expected to dedicate roughly € 100 billion on military investments in 2022, while its entire defence budget for 2021 was around € 47 billion. Scholz also announced on 14 March his government’s plan to purchase 35 Lockheed F-35A Lightning II aircraft in order to replace its ageing Tornado fleet in its nuclear delivery role. Germany will also buy 15 Eurofighters to replace the Tornado ECRs in the electronic warfare role.

“It is a regrettable signal when European defence contracts are awarded to nonEuropean companies”, said Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury commenting the purchase of F-35 jets by Germany, and during a meeting between the French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly and her Spanish counterpart Margarita Robles, the ministers both mentioned their concern as to the pervasive delays and disagreements in the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)

The Lockheed F-35A Lightning II will replace the Luftwaffe’s Tornados in the nuclear delivery role. © Bundeswehr

Germany’s F-35A’s will be assembled at the Italian F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out line operated by Leonardo and Lockheed Martin in Cameri, Piedmont. © Italian Air Force

programme following Germany’s request to acquire the F-35. In an effort to assuage French concerns, Germany’s new defence minister, Christine Lambrecht echoed Scholz in stressing continued German support for the joint FCAS programme.

The F-35 purchase was also a major setback for Boeing whose F/A-18 was favoured by former German defence minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer to replace the Tornado. The Bundeswehr had previously announced that it would replace the current fleet of 93 Tornados with a combination of 30 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to perform the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) nuclear delivery role, 15 EA18G Growlers to replace the Tornado ECRs and up to 90 additional Eurofighter Typhoons, which will not only replace the Tornado IDS in the conventional strike and reconnaissance roles but also the older Tranche 1 Eurofighters in Luftwaffe service. Two key political factors had shaped what, in many ways, should have been a straightforward decision for Germany. In January 2022 Boeing issued a request for information to more than 10 German companies to solicit bids as part of its F/A-18 Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler offering to the Luftwaffe. However, defence analysts have seen the purchase of F-35s by Germany as a good signal for German-Italian cooperation because of the workload it brings to the Italian F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out line operated by Leonardo and Lockheed Martin in Cameri, Piedmont.

Following Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ announcement of a € 100 billion investment in defence, the Luftwaffe now appears to be set to be the biggest beneficiary of this special fund, with around € 40 billion for it alone.

In September 2020 the Bundeswehr wanted to start a new competition for a heavy transport helicopter after finding that offers from Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky division for the CH-47F Chinook and the CH-53K King Stallion, respectively, were too expensive. The two companies had delivered their initial proposals for the programme, aimed at replacing Germany’s ageing fleet of 70 Sikorsky CH-53G helicopters, in January 2020. The surprise decision halted an acquisition race that was scheduled to see a contract awarded in 2021. A request for a second proposal was expected by the end of

An additional 15 Eurofighters will be acquired to replace the Luftwaffe’s Tornado ECR fleet in the electronic warfare role. © Bundeswehr

The Luftwaffe’s fleet of Sikorsky CH-53G heavy assault transport helicopters, the first of which was delivered in 1979, will be replaced. © David Oliver

After a protected four-year competition, the Boeing CH-47F Chinook has been selected to replace the Luftwaffe’s CH-53G fleet. © David Oliver

that year. On 24 April 2022 it was announced that Germany will buy 60 CH-47F Chinook heavy transport helicopters from Boeing worth around € 5 billion as it upgrades its military armed forces. The helicopters could be delivered in 2025/26 at the earliest.

Germany has yet to address the Luftwaffe’s lack of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Germany already operates several models of reconnaissance drones, including the German-made EMC Aladin close-range battlefield mini-UAV, the Airbus Defence and Space KZO tactical UAV, and the Israeli-made Heron 1 medium-altitude, long-range UAV. However, none of these are armed. In 2020, plans to acquire armed Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Heron TP UAVs failed through Germany’s long-standing impasse over the introduction of armed UAVs that meant that roles that could have been handed off to remotely operated systems had until then been met by crewed platforms. It has also meant that the armed forces have built up no experience of armed UAV operations to help inform decision-making and planning. The arming of Heron UAVs could have be seen as a first step for the Bundeswehr to lay the groundwork for the introduction of additional UAV platforms capable of operating in non-permissive environments in the coming decade.

However now, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the hesitation about arming the UAVs has been overcome. The German authorities have determined to arm the UAVs that it will lease from Israel with precisionguided missiles also manufactured in Israel. Arming the UAVs will cost an estimated € 152 million.

Germany’s new defence investment could be the impetus to solve one of its protracted programmes, the Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem (TLVS), its future air

The Airbus D&S KZO high-speed tactical UAV is operated by the German Army. © David Oliver

Airbus Defence and Space operate five IAI Heron 1 medium-altitude, long-range UAVs for the Luftwaffe. © Bundeswehr

and missile defense (AMD) system. In 2015, Germany decided to procure the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a joint missile defence project of the United States, Germany, and Italy originally designed to replace its Patriot system, but this system was then abandoned.

Currently the Bundeswehr is equipped with Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries that were ordered before the end of the Cold War and have been in service since 1989. The medium-range Patriot system serves to protect theatre of operations, troops, military bases and population centres. Over the last 20 years, some of the German Patriot batteries have been gradually decommissioned, while others have been upgraded. Since early 2013, the Luftwaffe has been operating twelve Patriot batteries, with additional two batteries for training, with PAC-3 upgrade. The batteries have dual capabilities for air defence to counter aircraft, helicopters and UAVs within a range of 68 km, and for missile defence to intercept short-range ballistic missiles up to 1,000 km within a range of around 15-45 km at altitudes of up to 20 km. However, the economic viability of Germany’s

Patriot batteries is diminishing, they were planned to be decommissioned between 2020 and 2025. With no replacement in view, in June 2019 the Budget Committee of the German Parliament approved the upgrade of the remaining Patriot air defence systems to Configuration 3+, currently the most modern available, at a total cost of around € 120 million.

Then on 28 March 2022 the German Ministry of Defense announced that it was to acquire Israel’s Arrow 3 anti-missile system to enable the country to equip itself with an anti-ballistic missile shield. The Arrow 3 is jointly funded, developed and produced by IAI in Israel and Boeing in the United States. The system provides exo-atmospheric interception of ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads. Its ability to reach an altitude of up to 100 km means it can also intercept missiles able to leave the atmosphere. The range of the Arrow 3 system of approximately 2,400 km means it can be stretched over neighbouring countries implying that Germany could play a key role in the security of Europe. The systems would be set up in three locations in Germany and the “shielded” countries could include the Baltic States, Poland and even Romania, a factor which would likely offer huge political leverage to Berlin in the region. The installation of such a purchase would cost Germany some € 2 billion and the anti-ballistic missile system could enter into service in 2025.

Although the Luftwaffe is to receive the largest amount of the new defence budget plan, there are several programmes that will be of benefit to the German Navy including the development of Type 212 submarines and the future naval strike missile, the acquisition of new NH-90 Sea Lion and Sea Tiger helicopters, three Class 424 Auxiliary, General Intelligence ships and the refurbishment of oiler vessels as well as the modernisation of minehunter vessels’ systems. It is not clear as to whether the new defence funding includes the € 1.43 billion contract signed in 2021 for five Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft to replace the German Navy’s P-3 Orion fleet from 2024.

For a long time Germany maintained a policy of refusing to send weapons into conflict zones, although it has sold them to countries in the Middle East, but it is now sending antitank rockets, surface-to-air missiles and other equipment to Ukraine while bolstering its own armed forces to the greater extent than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

Germany is to order the Arrow 3 anti-missile system manufactured by IAI and Boeing to replace its Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. © IDF Five Boeing P-8A Poseidon multi-role maritime aircraft have been ordered to replace the German Navy’s P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. © Boeing

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