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MeaningDiminished TowardMetaphysicallyModest Semantics
KennethA.Taylor
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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©KennethA.Taylor2019
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Thisbookisdedicatedtomyamazingparents, SamandSerethaTaylor,inabidinggratitude fortheirconstantandlovingaffirmation
1.SemanticAnalysisandMetaphysicalInquiry1
2.TheMetaphysicalModestyofNarrowlyLinguistic Semantics18
3.TheWayofIdeasandtheWayofReference38
4.SomeConsiderationsagainsttheWayofIdeas76
5.ModestyasIncompleteness:FeatureorBug?105
6.AgainsttheMetaphysicalTransparencyof SemanticAdicity123
7.MetaphysicalEmbarrassment,Indefinite Modifiability,andRulesofUse142
8.Conclusion:AWayForwardinSemantics andMetaphysics164
Preface
Thisbookwassomethingofanaccident.Itbeganitslifenotasa book,butasonesectionofamedium-sizedchapterinanentirely differentbook mybookinprogress ANaturalHistoryofNormativeConsciousness.Gradually,itbegantotakeonalifeofitsown. Thatisbecausemyoriginalambitionforthismaterialwasrather modest.Ihadhopedtobrieflyexplainandjustifythepaucityof semantictheorizingaboutnormativelanguageandthoughtcontainedwithin ANaturalHistoryofNormativeConsciousness.No doubt,thesemanticanalysisofnormativethoughtandtalkisa fascinatingenoughtopicandverymuchworthexploringinitsown right.Itiscertainlythefocusofmuchmeta-normativetheorizing.But whenpursuedasawayofgettingatthecorrect metaphysics ofthings normative,Iconfessthatsemanticanalysishasalwaystendedtoleave merathercold.Letthesemanticsofnormativelanguagebewhatit will,Ihavecometobelieve,thatdoesverylittletosettlethecorrect metaphysicsofthingsnormative.Ihadhopedinpartofanearly chapterof ANaturalHistoryofNormativeConsciousness todemonstratethatmyaversiontowhatIsawasamisguidedapproachtothe metaphysicsofnormativityismorethanamatterofidiosyncratic personalphilosophicaltaste,butisrootedinsound,defensible,and principledviewsaboutthenatureandlimitsofsemanticinquiry, especiallyinrelationtometaphysicalinquiry.Sincemychiefaim fortheenvisionedhalfchapterwasnottohaveanelaborateand potentiallydistractingargumentoverphilosophicalmethodology,but mainlytoclearthegroundforthetaskofgettingonwiththe metaphysicsofthingsnormative,Ihadhopedtostatemyreasons formostlyignoringsemanticissuesaboutnormativethoughtandtalk inrathershortcompass.
Forbetterorforworse, ANaturalHistoryofNormativeConsciousness evolvedintoaratherlargeandunwieldything.Itsprojected
completiondateisstillsomewhereintheindefinitefutureasofthis writing.Iwasthereforedelightedtobeinvited,afewyearsback,by mythencolleagueAlexisBurgesstowriteafree-standingessayonthe topicofsemanticsandmetaphysicsforavolumeonmetasemantics thathewasthenputtingtogetherwithBrettSherman.Itstruckmeas agreatopportunitytostatemycaseforwhatIhadbythencometo thinkofasmetaphysicalmodestyinsemanticsonitsowntermsand inawaythatwasatleastsomewhatindependentofthelargerscale ambitionsof ANaturalHistoryofNormativeConsciousness.Ieagerly acceptedthechancetoexpandonthebriefargumentthatIhad originallyenvisioned.Ofcourse,Istillhopedtoarguemycaseina crispandtothepointmanner.Ienvisionedtheessayasasmallside taskandhopedtocompleteitinafewmonths tops.Butafunny thinghappened.Myappreciationoftheargumentativeanddialectical burdensthatIhadtakenonbegantodeepenandsprawl.Thehorizon begantorecederatherthantodrawnearer.Astimepassed,Alexis andBrettgrewmoreandmoreimpatientwithme. “Couldyougiveus datecertainwhenitwillbecompleted?” theyaskedgently,but insistently. “Maybeinanothermonth,” Ireplied,hopefully,but uncertainly. “Thatwouldbegreat,” theysaid.Iamnotsurethey reallybelievedme.Itdidfeelasthoughtheywantedto.Iworked away,withfairlyrelentlessdetermination,atthetaskoftamingthe argument.Despitemybestefforts,however,themonthcameand went.Istillhadnotmanagedtowrestletheargumenttoaclose. WhenIinformedAlexisandBrettofmyfailure,theyrespondedwith whatseemedlikesincereregret,buttheytoldmethattheyreallymust moveonwithoutmyessay. “Iperfectlyunderstand,” Isaid. “Iamsure thatIwillbeableto findahomeforitsomewherewhenitis finally done.” Thatwasnotexactlyadisingenuousstatementonmypart,but IcouldnolongerevenglimpsethehorizonfromwhereInowstood. Icontinuedworkingonthemanuscriptformostofasabbatical yearduringthe2014–15academicyear.Ipresentedbitsandpiecesof itinfrontofvariousaudiences,includingataconferenceinhonorof mylatedissertationadvisorandmentorLeonardLinskyattheUniversityofChicago,andadepartmentalcolloquiumattheUniversity
ofCaliforniaSanDiego.Inaddition,anearlycompletedraftofthe manuscriptwaspresentedasaseriesoflecturesattheInstitutefor PhilosophyandtheHumanities,attheUniversityofCampinasin Brazil.Iamgratefultotheseaudiencesfortheveryvaluablefeedback Ireceived.Bytheendofmysabbatical,Ihad finallymanagedtowrite whatfeltlikeacompletedraft.Buttherewasonesmallproblem. Whathadoriginallybeenintendedtobeashort,crisparticlehad balloonedintoamanuscriptofabout40,000words.Itwasalmost certainlytoolongformostjournalstopublishasastandalonearticle. ButIfeareditwastooshorttobeabook.Ibegantoworrythatthe manuscriptoverwhichIlaboredsomightilywouldbeanorphan, withnohometocallitsown.Frankly,Ihadnoideawheretosendit orwhomightbewillingtopublishsuchathing.Ididwhatanyselfrespectingphilosopherinneedofadvicemightthinktodothesedays. IsharedmyconundrumwithmyphilosophicalpeepsviaFacebook. Someurgedmetochopthemanuscriptupintoseparatearticles.That seemedlikethewrongthingforthismaterialsincethemanuscript representedasinglemiddle-sizedthought,theoverallforceofwhich wouldsimplybelostifitwaschoppedupintoshorterbits.Others offeredideasofjournalsthatmightpossiblypublishsuchalong article.Butfrankly,theyallseemedlikelongshotstome.And Icouldnotbearthethoughtofenduringrejectionafterrejection mainlybecauseofthelengthofthething.Still,eventhoughIhada gnawingfearthatthemanuscriptmightneverseethelightofday, IrefusedtoletmyselfbelievethatIhadsimplywastedmytime.
Thenthedarknessbegantodissipate.Ihadalivelyphilosophical discussionwithanumberoffriendsandcolleaguesabouttheimportanceofframingthemanuscriptintherightway.Considertwo identicalmanuscripts,someone,Idonotrememberwho,saidto me.Lettheonemanuscriptbemarketedasalongarticle,whilethe otherismarketedisashortbook.Hereisaprediction.Theidentical manuscriptmarketedaslongarticleislesslikelytobereadthanthat verymanuscriptwouldbeifitweremarketedasashortbook.That struckmeascorrectinsight.Anditconvincedmetothinkofmy manuscriptnotasanoverlylongandramblingarticle,butasa
succinctlywrittenandarguedshortbook.Ofcourse,thetrickwas gettingapublishertoseeitthatwaytoo.Fortunatelyforme,Peter Momtchiloffcametomyrescue.Hewasveryopentotheideaof publishingashortandsuccinctbookontherelationshipbetween semanticandmetaphysicalinquiry.Ihappilysentittohim.Hein turnsentitouttothreeanonymousreferees.Twoofthereferees respondedfavorablynotjusttothecontentofthebook,buttoits length.Tobesure,thethirdrefereeclearlywantedmetowriteamuch longerbook,onethatdottedmorei’s,crossedmoret’s,andengaged ingreaterdetailwithawiderrangeofbothopponentsandfellow travelers.Formanyreasons,Ihavechosennottowritesuchabook. Chiefamongthemisthatsuchabookwouldbemuchlongerand wouldprobablystillnotbecomplete.AndIreallydowanttogeton with finishing TheNaturalHistoryofNormativeConsciousness from whichthecurrentbookoriginallysprang.
Still,itisfairtosaythatthebookthatthethreeanonymousreferees firstreadwasrathershorterthanthisbook finallyturnedouttobe. Thatismainlybecausethebookexpandedsomewhatinresponseto theirverysharpandhelpfulcomments.Iowethemconsiderable gratitudeforthosecomments.Isupposethedownsideisthatthe bookisnolongeranextremelyshortbook.Itcertainlyistoolongto beevenaverylongarticle.Still,itremainsaprettyshortbook.There iscertainlymuchmoretosayaboutthesetopicsthanIhavesaidin thisbook.Ihavetriedprettyhardtofocusontheoverallshapeofthe forestratherthanonthe finestructureofthemanytreesintheforest. Asaconsequence,myargumentstendtobepitchedatafairlyhighly levelofabstractionandgenerality.EvenwhenIdozoomcloserinto focusonsomeparticulartreeintheforest,Ipickmytargetcarefully. Idonotapologizeforthatchoice,thoughitmayleavesomeunsatisfied.Icertainlycouldhavewrittenabookthataimedtobemore comprehensive,moredetailed.Again,thatwouldhavebeenamuch longerbookandabookofaratherdifferentcharacter.Ihavechosen nottowritesuchabook.
Thisbookisintendedtobeasmallcontributiontowardthereorientationofphilosophyawayfromaprioriconceptualandlinguistic
analysis,especiallywhenitcomestomattersofultimatemetaphysics. Idonotclaimtobethe firsttoengageinsuchareorientationand Icertainlyhopenottobethelast.Onmyview,thekeytoprogressin metaphysicsliesnotwiththeinterrogationofourlanguageand/or concepts,butintheinterrogationofrealityitself.Thisis,inasense,the oppositeofKant’sCopernicanrevolution,whichsoughttoplacethe interrogationofourrepresentationsandrepresentationalcapacitiesat thefoundationsofmetaphysicalinquiry.Butthatway,Ibelieve,lies onlyphilosophicaldarknessanderror.IrejectnotjustKant’sCopernicanrevolution,butalsothemorerecent,butstillkindred,linguistic turn.Letusnotinterrogateourrepresentationsandconcepts,Isay.Let usratherinterrogatetheworld.Ofcourse,boththelinguisticturnof theanalyticphilosopherandtheCopernicanturnofKantweredriven atleastinpartbytheworrythatwephilosophershavenootherchoice, savetointerrogateourrepresentationsifwewishtoachievemetaphysicalinsightintomattersofultimatemetaphysics.ButIdisagree. Thekeytoachievingmetaphysicalinsightintotheultimatestructure oftheUniverse,Isuggest,istointerrogatethedeliverancesofscience initssprawlingtotality.Idonotmeantosuggestthatphilosophy reducestoscience.Theclaimisratherthatwecansuccessfullychart thevastandlayeredlabyrinthofexistenceinitstotalityonlywiththe aidofscienceinitstotality.Butthephilosophicalinterrogationofthe deliverancesoftotalscienceisnotjustsciencebyanothername.Ido nothaveinmindacrudescientismwhichreducesphilosophyto science.WhatIhaveinmindisstilladistinctivelyphilosophical undertaking.AndItakethatundertakingtobetantamounttogenuine metaphysics.Itisjustthatonmyviewmetaphysicsshouldcome “after” physicsandsciencemoregenerally,ratherthanbeforethem. IamtemptedtocallthistheAristotelianorderingofscienceand metaphysics,sinceitwasAristotlewho firstplacedmetaphysics “after” physics.Ametaphysicsthatfollowsuponratherthanprecedes sciencewillnecessarilybedeeplyintertwinedwithscience,butitwill stillnotsimplybescience.Nowmygoalinthisbookisnotsomuchto dometaphysicsinthisAristoteleanvein,buttolaythenecessary groundworkforfutureworkinthatdirection.
1 SemanticAnalysisand MetaphysicalInquiry
Thisbookisabouttherelationshipbetweensemanticanalysisand metaphysicalinquiry.¹Metaphysicaltheorizingisoftenboundup withsemanticanalysesofvarioustargetexpressions,modesofdiscourse,formsofthought,orconcepts.Considerjustafewprominent examples.Inalandmarkworkbothinthephilosophyoflanguageand inthemetaphysicsofnaturalkinds,Kripke(1980)urgesustobelieve thatnaturalkindsaremetaphysicallyconstitutednotbysuperficial
¹ThroughoutIuse “semantic” analysisasabroadcovertermencompassingboth whatmightbecalled linguistic analysisoftheexpressionsofourlanguageand conceptual analysisoftheconceptsthatsuchexpressionsexpress.Conceptualanalysis islanguageindependent,sincethesameconceptmaypresumablybeexpressedby expressionsindifferentlanguages.Evenstickingwithasinglelanguage,weperhaps shouldnotequatesemanticandconceptualanalysis,sinceawordmayhavea semanticfunctionthatisnotexhaustedbytheconceptthewordexpresses.One couldhavetwowordsinthesamelanguagethatexpressthesameconceptbutdiffer intheirtotalsemanticfunctions.Onsomewaysofthinking, ‘and’ and ‘but’ differin thisway.Onemightalsohavetwowordsintwodifferentlanguagesthatexpressthe sameconceptbutdiffersemanticallyinsomeotherway.Imaginealanguagethat containeda ‘but’ likeexpressionbutno ‘and’ likeexpressionandanotherlanguage thatcontainedan ‘and’ likeexpressionbutno ‘but’ likeexpression.Clearlyin translatingfromtheonelanguagetotheothersomethingmightbelostinthe translation.Forthemostpart,wecanaffordtoignorethedifferencebetween linguisticandconceptualanalysis thoughtherearepartsoftheargumentwhere thedifferencedoesmatter.Ihopeitisclearfromcontextwhenthisisso.Ishouldalso saythatmanyofmyclaimsaboutthescopeandlimitsofsemanticsarenotsomuch claimswithinsemanticsproper,butclaimswithinmetasemantics.Again,Iwill generallyletcontextindicatewhenIamengagingin firstlevelsemanticinquiryand whenIamengaginginmetasemanticinquiry thoughtheremaybetimeswhenitis importanttoexplicitlyaddressthedistinctionbetweensemanticsandmetasemantics.
appearancepropertiesbutbyinternalessences.Andhedoesso largelyonthebasisofthesemanticanalysisofnaturalkindterms. Davidson’s(1967)metaphysicsofeventsturnsheavilyonhisanalysis ofthelogicalformofactionsentences.Semanticanalysesoftemporal languagehaveplayedcrucialdialecticalrolesinthedebatesoverthe metaphysicsoftime,whilethesemanticanalysesofbeliefandknowledgeascriptionshave figuredcentrallyindebatesaboutthemetaphysicsofbeliefandknowledge.²Fromthemetaphysicsofmodality tothemetaphysicsofmorality,semanticanalysishasbeenthoughtto beatleastakeyplankinbuildingacorrectmetaphysics.
Idonotdenythatsemanticallyinfusedmetaphysicalinquiryhasa distinguishedandhonorablepedigree.Insomeformorother,ithas beenpracticedinnearlyeveryepochofphilosophy fromantiquity downtothepresentday.Theentanglementofsemanticsandmetaphysicalinquiryreachedapeakatvariousstagesoftheso-called linguisticturninphilosophy.Witnesstheproclivityofthepositivists todismissmetaphysicalquestionsasmerepseudoquestions and thislargelyonthebasisofcertainviewsaboutthenatureoflinguistic meaningand/orconceptualcontent.Withthelinguisticturnthe studyoflinguisticmeaningand/orconceptualcontentcameto occupycenterstagenotjustwithrespecttometaphysicsbutwith respecttomanyotherareasofphilosophyaswell.Frommetaphysics andepistemology,toethicsandaesthetics,manyphilosophicalquestionscametobeseenastantamountto oratleasttosomehowturn on questionsaboutlinguisticmeaningand/orconceptualcontent. Somewentsofarastoheraldthephilosophicalstudyoflanguageas thenew firstphilosophy twentiethcenturyphilosophy’sanswerto themetaphysicsoftheancientsandtheepistemologyofthemoderns. Thisoverweeningexuberanceforthestudyoflanguagewasnodoubt
²See,forexample,Ludlow(1999)foradefenseoftheviewthatthesemanticsof tensedlanguagegiveusimportantinsightsintothemetaphysicsoftime.SeeStanley (2011)foranaccountofthemetaphysicsofknowhowthatturnsheavilyonsemantic analysisofascriptionsofknowhow.Examplesofattemptstobuildmetaphysical theoriesonthebasisofwhatmightbecalledasemanticevidencebasecouldbeeasily multiplied.
bornofphilosopher’scollectivefascinationwiththesuddenemergenceofanewandpowerfultool themodernpolyadicquantificationallogic.Thosemusthavebeenheadydaysindeedfor philosophicalstudentsoflanguage.Themetaphysicallyinclined amongthemmusthavefeltthatby finallyhavingthetoolstouncover thelogicalformshiddenbeneaththemisleadingsurfacegrammarof languagetheywereunravelingnotjustthemysteriesoflanguagebut thehiddenstructureofthoughtandultimatelyevenofrealityitself.
Admittedlybothsemanticanalysisandthephilosophyoflanguage moregenerallyhavedescendedfromtheloftyperchof firstphilosophyinthemindsofmostcontemporaryphilosophers.Nodoubtthis demotionhasinparttodowithachangeinthefocusofcontemporaryphilosophicalsemantics.Thosewho firstexecutedthelinguistic turnwereinterestedlessinthelanguagesofeverydaylifeandmorein certainpristinelogicalcalculi withlanguageasitmighthavebeen, haditbeeninventedbylogiciansormathematicians,orperhapseven metaphysicians.Gradually,overtime,philosophicalsemanticscame tobemorefocusedonlanguagesastheyactuallystand.Andonceone hasshiftedfocusawayfromlanguagesunderstoodaspristinelogical calculiandtowardnaturallanguagesastheyactuallystand,itis hardertoseethelanguageofeverydaylifeasanidiom fitfor “limning thetrueandultimatestructureofreality” Quine(1960).Nodoubtthe temptationtoelevatethephilosophicalstudyoflanguagetothestatus of firstphilosophyis,asaconsequence,greatlydiminished. Yetdowntothisveryday,thereremainmanyasemantically mindedmetaphysicianandaswellasmanyametaphysicallyminded semanticistwhostillseemtobelievethat,attheveryleast,semantic analysiscanserveasadecisivepartoftheevidencebaseofultimate metaphysics.Noristhisanentirelyunreasonablethought.Evenifitis notrightlyregardedas “firstphilosophy,” semanticshashadalong andcontinuinghistoryofpurporting,ataminimum,tocurbmetaphysicalpretensions.Thistendencyreacheditszenithinthelogical positivists,whowereeagertoconsignmetaphysicstothedustbinof gibberish.Butthepositivistswerebynomeansthe firsttoexhibita semanticallyfueledhostilitytowardmetaphysics.RememberHume’ s
admonition,basedlargelyonwhatwewouldnowseeassemantic considerations,toconsigncertainbooksofabstrusemetaphysicsto the flames.Remember,too,themoremetaphysicallysanguineanalyticfunctionalismofSmart(1959),Armstrong(1968),andLewis (1972).LikeHume,thefoundingfathersoffunctionalismwereno friendsofextravagantmetaphysicalhypothesesaboutthemental. Theiraim,however,wasnottoconsignmetaphysicstothe flames, butthemoremodestoneofshowingthatapriorisemanticanalysisof ordinarymentalisticvocabularywasinsufficienttodecisivelysettle metaphysicalquestions.Thoughapriorisemanticanalysisofmentalisticvocabularycertainlyhadanimportantroletoplayinthe overallinquiryintothenatureofthemental,decisivelysettlingthe metaphysicsofmindwas,ontheirview,ataskbetterlefttothe advanceofempiricalinquirywritlarge.Irecountthisbriefand woefullyinadequatehistoryoftheentanglementofsemanticsand metaphysicsbywayofacknowledgingthatthereisnosingleorsimple storytotellabouttheexactrelationshipbetweensemanticsand metaphysics.Semanticshasplayedamultiplicityofdialecticalroles, fromthedestructivetotheconstructive,withrespecttometaphysical inquiry.Nodoubt,itwillcontinuetodosoforsometimetocome, whateverprotestationsImyselfmayoffertothecontraryhere. Butthereisaquestionwellworthaskingthatistooseldomasked. Whyexactlyshouldsemanticsbeexpectedtoplay any significant dialecticalroleinmetaphysicalinquiryatall?Theaimofultimate metaphysicsistoproducea finalandcompleteinventoryofwhatthere is,includingaccountsofthemetaphysicalnatureofwhatthereis.³
³IspeakthroughoutthisbookofwhatIcall “ultimate” metaphysics.Byultimate metaphysics,Imeantheinvestigationoftheobjectivemetaphysicalstructureofthe mind-independentworld.Ultimatemetaphysics,asIconceiveofithere,investigates notjustsuchthingsasthenatureoffundamentalreality,butalsothenatureand existenceoflessfundamentalrealitiesthatpresumablyhavetheirexistencethrough the “arrangement” ofthefundamentals.Itisnodoubtcontentiouswhetherthereis suchathingastheobjectivemetaphysicalstructureofthemind-independentworld.If thereisnosuchstructure,thentherelationshipbetweennaturallanguagesemantics and “metaphysics” mightwellbethoughttohaveanentirelydifferentcharacter.For thepurposesofthecurrentargument,Imostlyjusthelpmyselftotheassumptionthat
Theaimisnottoproducemerelyapassinginventoryofwhatwe eithertacitlyorexplicitlycurrentlytaketheretobe.Comparemetaphysicalinquirywithscientificinquiryinthisregard.Sciencetooseeksa final andcompleteinventoryofwhatthereis atleastofwhatthereisinthe naturalorder which,Iwillconcede,ifjustforthesakeofargument,may ormaynotbethetotalityofwhatthereis.Butinclearcontrastwithmuch thatgoesoninmetaphysics,sciencepayslittle,ifany,explicitandselfconsciousattentiontoeitherthesemanticanalysisofnaturallanguageor toconceptualanalysisoftheordinaryconceptsweusenaturallanguageto express.Withbarelyapausealongthewaytoanalyzenaturallanguageor itsexpressedconceptsandmeanings,sciencehasmadeastounding progressoverthecenturiesonsubjectsrangingfromthenatureoflife tothenatureofmattertothenatureofthespace-timecontinuum.Andit hasdonesomostlywithoutcastingevenasidewardgazeinthedirection ofsemanticorconceptualanalysis.
Forandonlyforthespaceofthecurrentargument,Iamwillingto concede,ifonlybegrudgingly,thebarepossibilitythatphysics andmetaphysicsmayperhapsbethoughttobeentirelydifferent undertakings,deployingentirelydifferentmethodsinthepursuitof entirelydifferentexplanatoryaims.⁴ Thattemporary,grudging,and theworlddoeshaveanobjective,mind-independentstructure.Isavedebateswith thosewhodisagreeforanotherday.
⁴ Iintendtheargumentsofthisessaytobelargelyneutralontheexactrelationship betweenultimatemetaphysicsandscientificinquiry.Myownleaningstendtoward thethoroughlynaturalistic.Thatis,Iseemetaphysicsasbroadlycontinuouswith science.Butnothinginthemainargumentofthisessayhangsonthethoughtthat metaphysicsmustnecessarily reduce toeitherbasicscienceortotalsciencewritlarge. Idostronglysuspectthatsubstantiveprogressinmetaphysicsismorelikelytofollow uponthantoprecedeandconditiontheprogressoftotalsciencewritlarge.Since IbelievethetotalorderofthingsmaywellbedappledinthesenseofCartwright (1999).Iwouldprobablysubstitute “totalsciencewritlarge” for “physics” inthe followingquotefromMaudlin(2007) whosaysthat “metaphysics,insofarasitis concernedwiththenaturalworld,candonobetterthantoreflectonphysics.Physical theoriesprovideuswiththebesthandlewehaveonwhatthereis,andthephilosopher’spropertaskistheinterpretationandelucidationofthosetheories...when choosingthefundamentalpositsofone’sontology,onemustlooktoscientificpractice ratherthantophilosophicalprejudice.” Iseetotalscienceasvastandlayeredlabyrinth suchthatonlytakeninitssprawlingtotalitydoesitrevealtousthenatureofthat
provisionalconcessionleavesopenthepossibilitythatwhatissauce forthephysicalgoosemaynotbesauceforthemetaphysicalgander. ThoughIdoubtthatthisistrue sinceIbelievemetaphysicstobe broadlycontinuouswithscience Iwillnotstoptocontestthatpoint here atleastnotdirectly.Myaimistolookatmatterstheotherway around fromthepointofviewofnaturallanguagesemanticsand whatitmightpossiblycontributetotheadvancementofultimate metaphysics.Myquestion,inotherwords,isnotsomuchwhatis ultimatemetaphysicsthatitmightlearnfromnaturallanguage semantics,butrather,whatisnaturallanguagesemanticsthatit mightcontributetoultimatemetaphysics.⁵ Myanswerwillbethat whichexist.Itmaybethatthelayersofthelabyrinthmayultimatelycollapseintoone. Butthatisnotthesortofthingthatwecanknowinadvance.Nowthethoughtthatit isonlyvastandlayeredlabyrinthofscienceinitstotalitythatrevealsbothwhatexist andthenatureofwhatexistsneednotamounttoacrudescientism,whichsimply reducesmetaphysicstoscience.Thispictureisstillconsistent,Ithink,withthe possibilitythatmetaphysicsinvolvesadistinctivemodeofreflection,notsquarelyat homewithingroundlevelphysicsoreventotalsciencewritlargemoregenerally,even ifitisatitsmostpenetratingwhenittakesasitsmaininputnotourcommonsense intuitionsbutthetotaldeliverancesofsciencewritlarge.Theideahereisthat metaphysicsoughttobeinthebusinessof interrogating thedeliverancesoftotal science.Oneofthethingsthatmetaphysicsmaytakeonasitsdistinctivecontributionsisthatofconstructingconceptualladdersthathelpusnavigatefromagiven locationinthelayeredlabyrinthtootherlocationsinthelabyrinth.Butfullyspecifyingthenatureofmetaphysicalinquiryoranoptimalmethodologyformetaphysics isbeyondthescopeofthisbook.Again,myproximalconcerniswithunderstanding whatsemanticscanandcannottellusaboutmetaphysics,whateverexactlywetake metaphysicstobe.
⁵ Istressthatmyconcernhereissolelyonthesemantics(andsyntax)of natural languages,moreorlessastheystand.ForallIhavetosayhere,itmightwellbe possibletodesignordevelopasortofideallanguage,specificallysuitedforthe enterpriseofmetaphysics.Somemetaphysiciansliketotalkofthelanguageof Onotologese,forexample thelanguagesomemetaphysicianspurporttotalkinthe so-calledontologyroom.OnemightsupposethatOntologesewillhavewhatSider (2011)callsa “metaphysical” semantics.Asemanticsismetaphysical,accordingto Sider,onlyifitsmeaningsarewhathecalls “jointcarving.” Strikingly,Siderseemsto grantthatthelinguisticorcognitivesemanticsofnaturallanguageneednotbejoint carving.Thatclaimisentirelyconsistentwiththeargumentsofthisessay.ButSider alsoseemstowanttosaythateverylanguage atleasteverylanguageinwhichtruths canbeexpressed has,oratleastcaninprinciplebegiven,metaphysicalsemantics. Butthatisnotsupposedtoentailthatwecanactuallycarryoffthattrickatanygiven moment.Iamnotentirelysurewhattomakeofthisclaim.Thepointseemstobethat
naturallanguagesemanticshassurprisinglylittletoaddtodebates overmattersofultimatemetaphysics.⁶ Idonotmeantosuggestthat weoughttostopdoingeithersemanticsormetaphysics.Semantics
allnon-fundamentaltruthscanultimatelybeshowntohold “invirtueof” more fundamentaltruths,wherethefundamentaltruthsareexpressibleonlyinalanguage whosesemanticsisperfectlyjointcarving.Theideaseemstobethatifwecould articulateametaphysicalsemanticsforanaturallanguage,wecouldmakeexplicit howthenon-fundamentaltruthsthatwemanagetoexpressinourlanguageare groundedinthefundamentalones.Orsomethinglikethat.Heretoo,Iamnotentirely surewhattomakeofthis.Ataminimum,itseemstomeunlikelyintheextremethat wecouldeverfullyspecify,byapriorispeculationalone,whatajointcarvinglanguage mustlooklike.ThatisbecauseIsuspectthatthecapacityoftheexternalworldto metaphysicallyembarrassourattemptstocarveupitsjointsshouldnotbeunderestimated.Iamopentothepossibilitythatasinquiryprogressesour(encyclopedic) representations(asIcallthembelow)willbecomeprogressivelymorerefinedsoasto bebettercognitiveinstrumentsforcognizingandrepresentingtheultimatemetaphysicalstructureoftheworld.Whatwewilleventuallywanttosayaboutthe relationsbetween,asitwere,ascientifically finished,highlyevolvedencyclopedic representationalsystemandthenativesyntaxandsemanticsofnaturallanguageis uncleartome,tosaytheleast.Itcould,Isuppose,turnoutthatnaturallanguagewas allalonginadequateforexpressinganytruths,butonlywhatIbelowcalltruthsimilitudes.Thatwouldcertainlyshowthatitwasadeepandseriousmistaketothink semanticanalysisofitsconstructionswasanysortofguidetoultimatemetaphysics. IamnotsurethatIampreparedtogothatfar,however.
⁶ Iamnotaloneinurgingsomethinglikemetaphysicalmodestyforsemantic theorizing.TworecentexamplesareHeil(2003)andDyke(2007),thougheachis reallymoreconcernedwiththenatureofmetaphysicsthanthenatureandlimitsof naturallanguagesemantics.Dykeattackswhatshecallstherepresentationalfallacyin metaphysics the “generalphilosophicaltendencytoplacetoomuchemphasisonthe significanceoflanguagewhendoingontology.” Shedoesnot,however,discussthe differentmetaphysicalpretensionsofdifferentapproachestothesemanticsofnatural language.AndthatisoneofthemainthingsIattempttodohere,indistinguishing referentialsemanticsfromideationalsemanticsandthewayofreferenceinmetaphysicsfromthewayofideas.Heilalsourgesmetaphysicianstorefrainfrom attemptingtoreadtheirontologiesoffofthestructureoflanguageonthegrounds thatonecoulddosoonlyifwhathecallsthe “picturetheory” ofrepresentationswere true.Heildoesnotclaimthatthepicturetheoryisanybody’sexplicitviewaboutthe semanticsandsyntaxofnaturallanguage.Nordoeshereallysayexactlywhatabetter approachtonaturallanguagesemanticswouldlooklike.Hismainclaiminthisregard isthatthepicturetheory,thoughfalse,isimplicitinmuchmetaphysicaltheorizing thatstartswithananalysisoflanguageandmovesoutwardtotheworld.Andwithout themistakenpicturetheoryhoveringinthebackground,heseemstothink,many extantmetaphysicalargumentswouldloseplausibility.IsuspectthatbothwhatIcall referentialistsemanticsandwhatIcallideationalsemanticsinthisbookmightwell countasversionsofthepicturetheorybyHeil’slights,despitethefactthatone approachtendstoleadusdownthepathofmetaphysicalimmodesty,whiletheother
andmetaphysicsareworthyenterprises.Ilongforneitherthedays whenmetaphysicalquestionswereregardedasmerepseudoquestionsdevoidofcognitivecontentnorthedayswhenallmeaningfulphilosophicalquestionsweretakentobequestionsabout linguisticmeaningorconceptualcontent.Myultimateclaimisa rathermodestone.Itisjustthatthesemanticanalysisofnatural languageand,correlatively,theconceptualanalysisofconceptshave muchlesstoteachusabouttheultimatemetaphysicsoftheworld thanacontinuingstreamofphilosophersoverthecenturieshave sometimeseemedtoimagine.
Atabareminimum,itmaybethoughttobecommonground amongbothmetaphysicallymindedsemanticistsandsemantically mindedmetaphysiciansthatsemanticanalysismightatleastserve, approachtendstoleadonamoremodestytrajectory.Ifthatisright,thenperhapsthe picturetheory,atleastasHeilunderstandsit,maybetoocoarseadiagnostictooltodo muchworkindistinguishingmetaphysicallymodestfrommetaphysicallyimmodest approachestonaturallanguagesemantics,atleastasIconstruethatdistinction.It shouldalsobesaidthatbothHeilandDykearemuchmorefocusedondefending theirfavoredapproachestoontologythanonexploringthemetaphysicalpretensions ofdifferentapproachestothesemanticsofnaturallanguage.
ItshouldalsobenotedthattheextremesemanticminimalismofCappalenand Lepore(2005)andBorg(2004)andBorg(2012)alsorepresentsanapproachto semanticsthatismetaphysicallymodestintheextreme.Asamatterofprinciple, thesemanticminimalisttendstopushoffintometaphysics’ manyissuesthatnonminimaliststaketobesquarelypartofsemantics.Forexample,contextualistsand otherstendtothinkthatthereisnosuchpropositionasthepropositionthatJohnis (barely)ready.ThatisbecauseitclearlytakesonethingforJohntobereadytoeat, somethingelseentirelyforJohntobereadytoleave,andstillsomethingelseforJohn tobereadyfortheexam.Typically,non-minimalistswantasemanticsthattreats ‘ready’ ascontext-sensitive,whileexplaininghowthecontextinvariantmeaningof ‘ready’ interactswithvariablecontextualfactorstoproducetheprecisesemantic contentof ‘Johnisready’ asitoccursinparticularcontextsorspeechsituations. Theminimalisttendstothinkthisisamistakenapproach.Itisnotthejobofthe semanticists,sheclaims,toexplainthemetaphysicsofparticularformsofreadiness. Semanticshasdoneallitcandowhenithasgiventheminimalandinvarianttruth conditionsofasentencelike ‘Johnisready.’ Thoughminimalismnaturallyleadsto metaphysicalmodesty,Isuspectthatonedoesnothavetogoallthewayoverto semanticminimalismtothinkthatsemanticsshouldbemodestinitsmetaphysical pretensions.Myownparametricminimalism,defendedinTaylor(2001)andTaylor (2007a),isacaseinpoint.ButIdonotintendtoadjudicatethatissuefullyinthis book.
ifnothingelse,asasortofpropaedeutictometaphysicsproper.For example,semanticanalysismightbethoughttohavethepowerto elucidateourontologicalcommitments.Andoneplausiblepathto discoveriesinultimatemetaphysicsistostartwithanelucidationof ourontologicalcommitmentsandtheninvestigatewhetherthose commitmentscanbemadegood.Thereisnodoubtsomethingto thisthought.Butitshouldbenotedstraightwaythatevenifsemantic analysiscansuccessfullyrevealourcollectiveontological “commitment” totheexistenceofx’s,thatdoesnotyetdecisivelyshowthatx’ s exist.⁷ Nordoesittellusabouttheultimatenatureofx’ s presuming thattheydoexist.Moreover,bothdeterminingwhetherourcommitmentscanbemadegoodanddeterminingthenatureofthattothe existenceofwhichwe findourselvescommittedwouldseemnottobe tasksforsemanticanalysisbutforscientificand/ormetaphysical inquiry.Wemightsomehowconvinceourselvesviasemanticanalysis ofmathematicallanguageandmathematicalthoughtthatasour practicesgotheycommitustotheexistenceofnumbers.Butthat onitsownwouldnotsettleanysubstantiveissuesabouteitherthe actualexistenceortheultimatenaturesofnumbers.Determining whethernumbers,iftheyexist,areabstractorconcrete,totakejust oneworry,wouldseemtorequiremorethansemanticanalysisofthe languageofmathematicsonitsowncouldpossiblydeliver.Itwould seemtorequireastraight-upmetaphysics.Butifthatisright,
⁷ Talkofontologicalcommitments andthelinguisticencodingofsuch commitments bringstomindQuine’s(1948)admonitionthattobeistobethe valueofaboundvariable.Butitisnotclearthatallquantifiersarecreatedequalwhen itcomestocarryingontologicalcommitment.Forexample,itseemsformallypossible to “quantifyover” objectsthatdonotexist.Manysentencesputativelyquantifying overnon-existentobjectsseemnotjustsyntacticallywellformed,butalsoatleast pragmaticallyassertible,andmaybeeven flatouttrue.Attheveryleast,manyenjoy whatIbelowcalltruthsimilitude forafullertreatmentofwhichseeTaylor(2014). Forfurtherdiscussionofnon-ontologicallycommittedquantification,seeHofweber (2005),Yablo(1998),Azzouni(2004).Onecouldholdthatontologicalcommitmentis notreallyapropertyofalanguageassuch.Itisreallyapropertyofus,inouruseof language.Somebitsoflanguagewesometimesuseinanontologicallycommittedway. Butwecanalsousestructurallysimilarbitsoflanguageinanon-ontologically committedway.Languageonitsownneitherforcesnorprohibitsontologicalcommitmentonourparts.
metaphysicalinquiryintothe nature ofnumberswouldseemtobegin preciselywheresemanticanalysisofmathematicallanguagemightbe thoughttocometoanend.Thesamegoesforthebare existence of numbers.
Consideracaseofadifferentkind.Supposethatonewantsto knowwhethertherearesuchthingsasobjectivemoralfactsandthat onewantsalsotoknowwhere,ifsuchfactsdoexist,theysitinthe overallorderofthings.Mighttheobjectivemoralfacts,ifthereare any,besomehowdeterminedby,ortouseamoreaucourantphrase, “groundedin” thenon-moralfacts?Orwouldtheputativemoral facts,shouldtheyexist,besuigenerisandirreducible?Itwouldbe surprisingtobetoldthatsemanticanalysisofmoralthoughtand talkcould,onitsown,directlyanddecisivelysettlesuchdeepmetaphysicalissues especiallysincemostphilosophershavebynow longsinceabandonedanyattempttoshowthatmorallanguage analyticallyreduces tonon-morallanguage.Butevenifanalytic reductionisnolongeronthetable,itisperhapsnotentirelyunreasonabletosupposethatby findingout,viasemanticorconceptual analysis,whethermoralstatementsandthethoughtsweexpressin makingsuchstatementsare,bytheirsemanticnatures,truthaptor,in thealternate,functionmerelyexpressively,wemighttherebyput ourselvesinapositiontoatleastsettlewhethermoralthoughtand talkdoesordoesnot purport tobetalkandthoughtofaworldof objectivefacts.⁸
⁸ Themeta-ethicalliteratureonthesemanticsofmorallanguageandthoughtisby nowtrulyvoluminous.Onemakessweepinggeneralizationsaboutitatone’speril. Historicallyspeaking,though,meta-ethicsisadomaininwhichlargelysemantic argumentshavebeenwidelytakentohavemoreorlessdirectmetaphysicalsignificance.Theearlyexpressivistswereparticularlypronetohastilyinferthefalsityof moralrealismfromananalysisofwhattheytooktobethepeculiarsemanticsofmoral language.Tobesure,moralrealists,whowerewonttonoteinresponsetononcognitivismthatwedo,infact,takesomestatementsofmoralitytobenotjusttruth aptbut flatouttrue,werelikewisetoohastytodrawmetaphysicalconclusions this timefromtheallegedfailureofacertainsortofsemanticanalysisofmoraldiscourse. Inmorerecenttimes,meta-ethicaldebateshavebecomesignificantlymorenuanced. Inparticular,theyhavetendedtoevinceagrowingappreciationofnotjustthe
Butnowsupposefurther,atleast inarguendo,thatafterthorough semanticandconceptualanalysisweweretoconcludethatthecorrect semanticsforourmoralthoughtandtalkismerelyexpressiverather thanfactstating.Ataminimum,wemightthenreasonablyconclude thatnothinginthebaresemanticnatureofourthoughtandtalk requires ustosupposethatthereexistsaworldofobjectivemoral facts.Thoughitwouldbehastytoconcludeonsuchgroundsalone thattherearethereforenoobjectivemoralfactsintheultimate inventoryofwhatthereis,wewouldatleasthaveshownthatneither ourlanguagenortheconceptswedeployinusingourlanguagegive uspositivereasontopresumethatthereareanysuchfacts.
Orsuppose,inthealternate,thatthoroughsemanticanalysisleads ustoreachadifferentverdictaboutthesemanticcharacterofour moralthoughtandtalk.Supposeitturnsoutthatsemanticanalysis revealsthatmoraldiscourseandthoughtdopurporttobefactstating ratherthanmerelyexpressive.Wemightthentakeourselvestohave aninitialbasisforsupposingthatourthoughtandtalkpresuppose thattherearesuchthingsasmoralfacts.Wecangrantthispoint,it shouldbesaid,whileconcedingthatitwouldbetoohastytoconclude thatthereforetherereallymustbesuchthingsasobjectivemoralfacts
semanticsubtletiesofmoralthoughtandtalkbutalsoagreaterappreciationofthe potentialgapbetweensemanticpremiseandmetaphysicalconclusion.Still,takenin theaggregate,itseemsfairtosaythatmeta-ethicsremainsanarenainwhichclaims aboutthesemanticanalysisoflanguageandorthoughtandclaimsaboutthe metaphysicsofmoralitytendtobetightlyinterwoven.Thisisnottodenythat somedotakegreatcaretodistinguishsemanticclaimsaboutmorallanguageor moralconceptsfrommetaphysicalclaimsaboutthenatureofmoralreality.Two casesinpointareGibbard(1990),(2003),(2012),andalsoWedgewood(2007).It shouldalsobesaidthatthesemanticsofmorallanguageand/orthoughthasbecomea fascinatingsubjectinitsownright,promisingtoopenupnewvistasforsemantics, whateverexactlysuchsemanticanalysisentailforourviewsabouttheultimate metaphysicsofmoralreality.See,forexample,Schroeder(2010)fordetermined attemptstoexploreanexpressivistsemanticsofmoralthoughtandalsoSchroeder (2008)foramorewide-rangingintroductiontotheinsandoutsofsemanticissues confrontingnon-cognitivistsmorebroadly.Stillitremainstomymindverymuchan openquestiontowhatextentourunderstandingoftheultimatenatureofmoral realitymustrelyonthesemanticanalysisofmoraldiscourse.Foranapproachtothe metaphysicsofnormativitythatlargelyeschewssemanticanalysis,atleastsemantic analysisofanideationalkind,seeTaylor(2015a).
