RepressionintheDigitalAge
DISRUPTIVETECHNOLOGYAND
INTERNATIONALSECURITY
SeriesEditors
BENJAMINJENSEN
MarineCorpsUniversityandCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies
JACQUELYNSCHNEIDER
HooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity
BRANDONVALERIANO
MarineCorpsUniversity
otherbookintheseries
LeveragingLatency:HowtheWeakCompeltheStrongwith NuclearTechnology
TristanA.Volpe
Surveillance,Censorship,andthe DynamicsofStateViolence
ANITAR.GOHDES
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DOI:10.1093/oso/9780197743577.001.0001
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780197772614.001.0001
Marquis,Canada
Acknowledgments
Thisbookwouldnothavebeenwrittenwithouttheintellectualand emotionalsupportofmanyfriends,collaborators,andcolleagues.
IamdeeplygratefultoSabineCareywhoexpertlyguidedmyworkon thistopicfromtheveryfirstday.Ihavebeenluckytomovefromworking underherguidanceasaPhDstudenttobecomingco-authorsandtrusted colleagues.Hergenerousmentorshiptaughtmethatitisnotenoughtojust beagoodresearcher:weneedtokeepworkingonmakingtheacademya placewheremoreofuscanthrive.Iintendtopayitforward.
Overtheyears,manybrilliantcolleaguesandmentorsprovided detailedcommentsandsuggestionsthathelpedshapethisbook.Pablo Barberá,KanishaBond,JessicaMavesBraithwaite,MikeColaresi,Kathleen Cunningham,ChristianDavenport,RonDeibert,ChrisFariss,Tina Freyburg,LisaGarbe,ChristianGlaessel,KellyGreenhill,StathisKalyvas, RoxaniKrystalli,WillLowe,JasonLyall,NikolayMarinov,WillMoore,Rich Nielsen,SarahParkinson,MaschaRauschenbach,MollyRoberts,Espen Rød,AdamScharpf,LiviaSchubiger,NilsWeidmann,andYuriZhukovall contributedtothedevelopmentoftheideaspresentedhere,andIthankthem fortheirgenerosity.AspecialthankyougoestoEricaChenoweth,Cassy Dorff,KristineEck,andJoshKertzerforencouragingmetonotgiveup whenIwasstuck.ThankyoutoDaraKayCohenforprovidingawonderful intellectualhomeduringmypost-doctoralfellowship.
MyHRDAGfamily,PatrickBall,MeganPrice,KristianLum,TarakShah, MariaGargiulo,withwhomIhavebeenfortunatetoworkforoveradecade: thankyouforteachingmehowtothinkcriticallyaboutthequantification ofviolence,howtostriveforscientificrigorinthenameofaccountability andjustice,andforteachingmetechnicalskillsIuseeveryday.Ouryearsof collaborationallowedmetoinvestigatemanyofthequestionsinthisbook withsoundempiricalfooting.In2020Iwasfortunatetoworkwithandlearn fromSophieDyer,SamDubberly,LikhitaBanerji,MattMahmoudi,Raha Bahreini,andMahsaAlimardani:thankyouforallyourinsights.Thank youtoRamaPadmanabhanandAlbertoDainottiforhelpingmeworkwith theIODAdataonInternetshutdowns,andtoAllisonKohfortheexcellent researchassistance.ThankyoutoDaynaSadowforproof-reading.
IamgratefultotheserieseditorsBrandonValeriano,JackieSchneider, andBenJensen,aswellastoAngelaChnapkoatOUPformakingthe publicationprocesssosmooth.EarlierversionsofpartsofChapters5and6 draw,withpermission,frompreviouslypublishedwork.ThisincludesAnita R.Gohdes(2020)“RepressionTechnology:InternetAccessibilityandState Violence,” AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience 64(3):488–503,andAnitaR. Gohdes(2015)“PullingthePlug:NetworkDisruptionsandViolenceinCivil Conflict,” JournalofPeaceResearch:52(3):352–367.
Katha,Tarik,Anja,Amina,Peter,Shira,Moritz,Domi,Basti,Kristian, Sam,Nina,Zara,andGabi:Iamindebtedtoyouforputtingupwithme talkingaboutthisprojectoverthemanyyearsittookmetocompleteit. Thankyouforyourfriendship,care,andgentlepatience.ThankyoutoZara Rahmanforthejoyfuldaysspentco-workingasIfinishedthismanuscript. AndtoSarah,Marci,andEddieforkeepingmegoing.Iamimmeasurably gratefultoandforLukas:thankyouforeverything,andmore.
ThisbookisdedicatedtomyparentsCatherineandRolfGohdes,to whomIowesomuch.Thankyoufortheunconditionalloveandsupport.
ListofFigures
1.1AveragenumberofindividualsusingtheInternet,byregimetype 1990–2017. 2
1.2DevelopmentofInternetpenetrationinSyriaandIran. 11
4.1Individualsources,andintegrateddata,overtime,Syria, March2011–April2015. 74
4.2Densityofreportedkillings,bygovernorate,Syria,March2011–April 2015. 74
5.1NationwideInternetshutdownsandchangeinaveragenumberof killings,bygovernorate. 89
5.2AveragedailynumberofdocumentedkillingsinSyriainthedays leadinguptoanationwideInternetshutdown,aswellasthedays followingashutdown. 90
5.3Expectedchangeindailydocumentedregimekillingsduringa shutdown. 92
5.4Time-shiftedplacebotest,nationwideshutdown. 93
5.5Reportingpatternsofviolenceinthethreedaysbefore,during,and threedaysaftereachshutdown. 95
6.1Network(mobilephones,3G,and2G)accessibilitybySyrian governorate,June2013–April2015. 101
6.2Targetedanduntargetedviolence,observedandestimatedcounts, overtime. 103
6.3ArmedgrouppresenceinSyria—communitylevel,January2014and 2015. 107
6.4Percentageofviolencethatistargeted,bytypeofcontrol. 108
6.5Expectedproportionoftargetedkillings,givenInternetaccessibility anddifferentlevelsofgovernmentcontrol. 109
6.6Expectedproportionoftargetedkillings,givenInternetaccessibility andwhetheraregionisinhabitedbytheAlawiminority. 111
7.1NormalizedInternettrafficinIran,November15–25,2019. 122
7.2AveragenumberofdailyconcurrentTorusers. 127
7.3Boxplots,dailyconcurrentTorusersbeforeandaftertheshutdown128
8.1PercentofcountrieswhereatleastonenationwideInternetoutage wasmeasured 134
8.2MarginaleffectofnationwideInternetoutagesandrepression,global analysis. 139
2.1Conceptualizingcensorship.
4.1Summaryofempiricalapproachtostudycybercontrolsand repressionintheSyrianconflict.
5.1Expectedeffectsfornetworkdisruptionsandviolence.
5.2NationwideInternetshutdownsanddocumentedregimeviolence.
6.1Internetaccessibility(3G)andviolentrepression.
8.1Networkdisruptionsandstaterepression.
Introduction
Ifthepasttwodecadesofworldwidedigitalexpansionhavetaughtus anything,itisthatInternetaccessisdeeplypolitical.Fewcountrieshave beenleftuntouchedbythedigitalrevolution,andmanyhaveseencontentiouspoliticalprocessesoverturnedbymassadoptionoftheInternet. Unsurprisingly,policy-makers,researchers,andpunditsalikehavemade far-reachingclaimsabouttherolecyberspaceplaysineitherpromoting orendangeringthepursuitofdemocraticpolitics.In2009,theUSState Departmentperceivedtheroleofsocialmediaplatformsinthefightfor democracytobesocrucialthatitrequestedTwittertorescheduleplanned maintenanceworkinordertoprovidefullaccessibilitytoIraniansrallying inpost-electionprotests(LandlerandStelter,2009).Whencivilianuprisings spreadlikewildfireacrosstheArabworldatthestartofthe2010s,some observersdeclared“therevolutionwillbetweeted”(Hounshell,2011;Lotan etal.,2011;Else,2012).Inrecentyears,theoptimismoftheearlydays ofmassInternetusagehassignificantlydampened.Onlineinformation operationsaimedatinterferingwithdemocraticelectionsarebecoming commonplace(Benkler,Faris,andRoberts,2018),andthegrowingnumber ofdigitalhatecampaignsaimedatstokingethnictensionsarecastinga lightonthewaysinwhichonlineaccessmayamplifysocietalcontention (Stevenson,2018).
AmidstevolvingdebatesaroundtheInternet’simpactonpolitics,the percentageofindividualswithfixedormobileaccesstotheInternethas exploded.Figure1.1providesuswiththeaverageshareofindividualsusing theInternetbetween1990and2017,dependingonthedegreetowhichthe countryisgovernedthroughdemocraticinstitutions.Whatisstrikingis thatalthoughliberaldemocraciesweretheearliestadoptersoftheInternet, autocraticcountrieshavebeenmakingstridesincatchingup.Intheearly 2010s,liberaldemocracieshadmorethantwiceasmanyindividualsusing theInternetthananyothertypeofpoliticalregime.Initially,someautocratic leaderswerequiteskepticalofintroducingmassaccesstotheInternet,as thiswouldcreatechallengesinregulatingunwantedcontent(Deibertetal.,
Fig.1.1 AveragenumberofindividualsusingtheInternet,byregimetype 1990–2017.RegimetypedataisfromtheV-DemRegimesoftheWorld Measure(Coppedgeetal.,2021).Country-levelInternetpenetrationdatais collectedbytheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU,2022).
2008:361).Butoverthepastdecade,non-andsemi-democraticcountries acrosstheworldhaveworkedhardtoclosethisgap,andsomearenow easilyoutpacingtheirdemocraticcounterparts.In2019,Bahrain,Kuwait, andQatarreportedthatmorethan99%oftheirpopulationwereonline, numbersthatonlyaverysmallnumberofliberaldemocracies(suchas Iceland,Denmark,orNorway)cancompetewith.
Throughoutthistime,governmentshavemaintainedsubstantialdecisionmakingpowerovertheircountry’sdigitaldevelopment.IfInternetaccess, andinparticularsocialmedia,offersaformofempowermenttononstateactorsthatcanhelpstartrevolutionsandsowtensions,thenwhat explainsthiscontinuedworldwidedigitalexpansion?Prospectsofincreased economicprosperityarecertainlypartofthestory(WorldBank,2016). Butthesedevelopmentsalsopointtoanincreasingrealizationthatnetworkaccessibilitycouldprovidepreviouslyunseenopportunitiesforpoliticalcontrol.Governmentsacrosstheworldhavebeenworkinghardto expandInternetaccessfortheirownpeople,andmanyhavesimultaneously
investedinandrefinedawholearsenaloftoolstocontrolthedigitalflow ofinformationintherealmoftheirauthority(seeKalathilandBoas,2003; Deibertetal.,2011;Feldstein,2021).Recentscholarshiphasshownthat higherlevelsofInternetaccessinautocraciesfavorgovernmentsbyreducing thelikelihoodofmassprotests,butthatthoseproteststhatdogetoffthe groundaremorelikelytocontinuewheredigitalaccessishigher(Weidmann andRød,2019).Andthepervasiveuseofonlinerestrictionsimplemented by—forthemostpart—illiberalgovernmentswhenencounteringdomestic challengessuggeststhatleadersmustperceivethefreeaccesstoandexchange ofinformationonlineasathreattotheirpoliticalstability.
Asaresult,thereishardlyaweekthatpasseswithoutreportsofpolitical protestsbeingaccompaniedbyaccusationsofstate-orderedtamperingwith citizens’accesstotheInternet.Thesophistication,context,length,coverage, andlocationofsuchcontrolsvaries(Gohdes,2016;Taye,2019).Forexample, inIndia,theInternetisfrequentlyrestrictedinJammuandKashmir,butcan beaccessedregularlyinotherpartsofthecountry(Rydzak,2019).Following themilitarycoupin2021,Myanmarimplementednightlydigitalcurfewsto preventcitizensfromgoingonlineafterwork(Padmanabhanetal.,2021). In2014,Turkey’sprimeministerErdoğanblockedaccesstoTwitteramidst leakssharedontheplatformthatallegedlydocumentgovernmentcorruption(Rawlinson,2014).AndinJanuary2022,theKazachauthoritiesshut downtheInternetamidstmassprotestsagainstthegovernment’sdecisionto liftpricecapsonliquidnaturalgas(Hu,2022).
TheseexamplesindicatethatcontroloftheInternetisnowpartandparcel ofstates’strategiesaimedatmaintainingandincreasingtheirauthority.They alsoshowthatvisibleformsofonlinerestrictionstendtoberelativelyshort. Fullshutdownsaremostlylimitedtoafewdays,specificregions,ortimes ofday.Specificappsorsocialmediawebsitesmaybeblockedforlonger,but usuallynotwithoutsignificantpushback(Tufekci,2014;HobbsandRoberts, 2018;AkbariandGabdulhakov,2019).Whatthissuggestsisthatdigital controlsaremostusefulwhentheyareupdatedandadjustedaccording tothelevelofpoliticaltensionsfeltbythegovernment.WorkbyMolly Robertsoffersimportantinsightsintotheadaptivelogicandsophistication ofonlinecensorshipstrategiesinChina.HerexplorationoftheChinese censorshipmodelshowshowdigitalcontrolsaremostlikelytobesuccessful insupportingpoliticalstabilitywhentheyarebasedonthe management ofsensitivecontent,notontheoutrightandoverall ban thereof(Roberts, 2018).Forexample,China’ssocialmediacensorshavebeenfoundtobe
mostactiveduringcollectiveactionevents,andaremorelaxaboutgeneral criticismdirectedatthestate(King,Pan,andRoberts,2013).
Justbecauseonlinecontrolsarenotalwaysvisibledoesnotmeanthat theyarenotbeingused,nordoesitmeantheyareineffective.Thetypes ofdisruptiverestrictionsjustdescribedhavebeencomplementedbyan evergrowingsectorofmonitoringandsurveillancetechnology,ofteninthe nameoffightingcrimeandpreventingterror(AndrejevicandGates,2014; Choudry,2019;Hegghammer,2021).Suchsurveillancetechnologyisby nowubiquitous,havingdevelopedfromhome-grown,crudepiecesofsoftwaretoencompassingaboomingmarketforoff-the-shelfandcustom-made softwareleveragingcutting-edgetechnologyaimedatinterceptingandanalyzingindividualandmassbehavior.ThePegasusprogramsoldbytheNSO grouptodozensofcountriesacrosstheworldisonlyamorerecentexample ofgovernmentsinvestinginsoftwarethatallowstheinvisiblesurveillanceof digitaldevices(Marczaketal.,2018;Kirchgaessneretal.,2021).
Controlofdomesticcyberspacehasbeenmostheavilystudiedinlarge authoritariancountries,notablyChinaandRussia(e.g.MacKinnon,2011; Gunitsky,2015;Kerr,2016).Butrecentworkhashighlightedthatdigital controlsarebecomingincreasinglyattractivetoolsforleaderswhoseek popularlegitimacythroughelectionsthatareatleastsomewhatcompetitive.Inhisrecentbook,Feldstein(2021)providesanoverviewofdifferent Internetcontrolsandthepervasivenesswithwhichtheyareusedacrossthe world.Hisfindingssuggestthatautocraciesmostheavilyengageinonline censorship,surveillance,andmediamanipulation.Buttheyarenottheonly ones:democraticcountriesandthosethatcombineelementsofdemocratic rulewithauthoritarianmethodsarealsoactivelyengagedinthesepractices, andinterestinimprovingtheircapacitiestoengageindigitalcontrolhas onlygrownoverthepastdecades.
Takentogether,thesefindingssuggestthatdigitalcontrolssuchasonline surveillanceandcensorshiparebothattractiveandpowerfultoolsthathave thepotentialtohelpgovernmentspreventandmanagepoliticaldissent. Theyalsopointtothefactthatfewcountriesengageinconsistentorrigid controls.Digitalresponsesareinsteadadjustedtopoliticaldevelopments, includingelections,protests,orotherformsofpoliticaltensions(Freyburg andGarbe,2018;Lutscheretal.,2019;Stukaletal.,2022).Thepervasiveness anddynamicadaptationofthesedigitaltoolsraisesimportantquestions regardingstates’overallresponsestopopularthreats.Whatistherelationshipbetweenonlinecontrolsandmoretraditionalmethodsofstate
control?Whatroledoweexpectcensorshipandsurveillancetotakeonina state’sbroaderrepressivestrategy?Researchonviolentstaterepressionhas consistentlyshownthatdomesticthreatsintheformofdissent,protest,and insurgencyarethebestpredictorsforviolentstaterepression(Davenport, 2007a;HillandJones,2014;Chenoweth,Perkoski,andKang,2017).Have onlinecontrolsaffectedthenatureoftraditionalcoercivestatebehaviorin thefaceofdomesticpoliticalcontention,andifsohow?Therelationship betweenmodesofonlinecontrolandstates’strategiesofviolentrepression isthesubjectofthisbook.
1.1Argument
Iarguethatcybercontrolspresentthemselvesasnaturaladditions togovernments’arsenaloftacticsaimedatsupportingtherepression ofchallengestostateauthority.Iusethetermsonlinecontrolsandcyber controlsinterchangeably,andconceptualizethemasactivitiesundertaken byoronbehalfofstateauthoritieswiththeaimofeithermonitoring, filtering,orblockingcommunicationandinformationontheInternet. Idistinguishbetweencontrolsthatareprimarilyintendedtosuppress information,andthosethatareprimarilyintendedtogatherinformation. Whilewemightassumethatcybercontrolsareemployedinnon-random waysbygovernments,itisnotimmediatelyclearinwhatwaytheywouldbe connectedtoviolentformsofrepression.Tounderstandtheirroleinstates’ repressivestrategiesitisnecessarytostudyhowtheyhavechangedthe mechanismsofaccessandcontroltoinformation—forbothstateandnonstateactors.Ithenshowhowtheinfrastructureofonlinesurveillanceand censorshiphastransformedtraditionalformsofgatheringandcontrolling informationforthepurposeofraisingthecostsofcollectivemobilization.
Traditionalformsofin-person surveillance relyonsingle-purposeinfrastructurethatisextremelyresource-intensiveandrequireslong-terminvestmenttoyieldhigh-qualityandactionableintelligenceforstatesecurity forces.Onlinesurveillancereliesonmulti-purposeinfrastructurebyexploitingthemassadoptionoftheInternetasameansofobtainingaccesstonew domainsandtypesofinformationonpotentialthreats.Thedrawbacksof relyingontheInternetforinformationgatheringaretwofold.Whilethe infiltration,interception,andultimatecontrolofonlinecommunication andcontenthastransformedandenhancedthesurveillancecapabilitiesof
manysecurityservices,theinfrastructureitmakesuseofalso democratizes informationaccess,therebyinadvertentlybenefitingnon-stateactors.Second,filteringorblockingaccesstotheInternetcandirectlyaffectonline surveillanceefforts.OnlinesurveillancerequiresacertainlevelofInternet accesssothatindividualscanexchangetheirideasandplansonline,which stateactorscanthenmonitorandanalyze.
Importantdifferencesarealsoapparentwhencomparingtraditionalcensorshiptoonlinecensorship.Traditionalmediacensorshipusuallyinvolves shuttingdown,regulating,andrestaffingnewspapersandothermediaoutlets(VanBelle,1997).Anestablishedmethodtostopindividualdissidents fromspeakingoutagainstthegovernmenthasbeendeterrencethrough repressionandintimidation.Whilebothofthesestrategiescontinuetobe popular,onlinecensorshiphasaddedamorecentralized,low-cost,and responsiveformofcontrollinginformation.Idiscusshowvariousforms offilteringandblockingInternetaccesshaveprovidedgovernmentswith amethodtosimultaneouslycensormediaoutletsandindividualsina responsivemanner.
MassaccesstotheInternetthuspresentsgovernmentswhofearfor theirpoliticalsurvivalwithasetofresponseoptions.Whenfacedwitha politicalthreat,theycaneithertemporarilyrestrictorblockonlineaccess inanattempttodiminishoppositiongroups’mobilizationandoutreach capabilitiesortheycanopttocontinueorexpandmassaccesstoonline informationandmonitorittotheirownadvantage.Whilecensorshipand surveillancearenotalwaysmutuallyexclusive,censorshipweakensastate’s abilitytoobtainhigh-qualityinformationthroughonlinesurveillance. Iarguethatthetypeofonlinecontrolstateschoosetoimplementis inevitablylinkedtotheircapacitytoactinotherareas,onebeingtheexertion ofviolence.
ThetheoreticalargumentIpresentinthisbookshowshowthechoiceof Internetcontrolislinkedtothe type and scale ofstate-sanctionedviolence usedagainstperceiveddomesticthreats.Choosingeithercensorshipor surveillanceasaformofdigitalcontrollimitstheuseofsomeformsof violenceandenablestheuseofotherforms.Wherestateshavechosen torespondtocriticaldomesticthreatsthroughademonstrationofvisible controlintheformofcensorship,theywillalsobemorelikelytovisibly demonstratetheirauthoritythroughaheighteneduseofviolentrepression. Censorshipseverelylimitsthechoicesforviolentactiononthesideofthe governmentbycensoringitsownaccesstohigh-qualityintelligenceon
precisetargets.Duringperiodsofcensorship,state-sanctionedviolenceis likelytoaffectthedomesticpopulationindiscriminately.
Inconstrast,onlinesurveillanceislikelytosupporttargetedactsof localizedviolenceagainstthoseidentifiedascriticaltothefuturesuccess ofoppositionmovements.Repressivegovernmentsarekeenlyinterestedin understandingwhichindividualsandgroupstheyshouldfearthemost, whetherthethreattheyfaceisincreasing,andtowhatextenttheirchallengershavebeenabletoorganizedissentsuccessfully.Theavailabilityof high-qualityinformationregardingtheintentionsandlocationofoppositionleadersenablesstatestousetargetedviolence.Digitalsurveillance measuresarelikelytobelinkedtotheuseoftargeted,individualizedstatesanctionedviolence.
Anumberofobservableimplicationscanbeformulatedbasedonthis distinction.Whenandwherecensorshipislowandthepredominantformof onlinecontrolissurveillance,weshouldexpecttoseemoreindividualized campaignsofviolence,suchastargetedinstancesofarrestandtorture,orthe targetedassassinationofindividualsdeemedthreateningtothegovernment. Ithereforeexpectthatstateforceswillbemorelikelytoemploy targeted campaignsofviolentrepressioninareaswheretheygrantcitizensunhindered accesstotheInternet.Shutdowns,blockingofapplications,andincreased filteringofspecificwebcontentarelikelytogohandinhandwithincreasesin indiscriminaterepression.Wherethegovernmentisheavilycensoringboth accessandcontentoftheInternet,weshouldthereforeexpecttosee more intenseandfrequentuseofviolence bystateforces.
Scopeconditions
Thisbookfocusesontherelationshipbetweendomesticonlinecontrols andviolentstaterepression.Theargumentspresentedhereprovideinsights intounderstandingbroadertrendsinvolvingcybercontrolsandcontentious politics.Thereare,however,anumberofscopeconditionsthatapplytoboth mytheoreticalargumentandsubsequentanalyses.
ThefirstscopeconditionisthatIexpectmytheoreticalargumentto mostdirectlyapplytocountrieswithnon-democraticformsofgovernment. Ibuildoninsightsfromanumberofdifferentfields,includingresearch onauthoritariansurvival,staterepressionandhumanrights,thelogicof violenceincivilconflict,andInternetcensorship.Traditionally,muchof
thisresearchhasfocusedonnon-orsemi-democraticinstitutionalcontextswhereleadersaremorelikelytooptforviolentstrategiesofcontrol. Non-democraticstatesaremorelikelytoviolatehumanrights(Davenport,2007b;Carey,2010)andengageintraditionalanddigitalformsof censorship(Whitten-Woodring,2009;Stier,2015;Hellmeier,2016;Bak, Sriyai,andMeserve,2018).Atthesametime,growingevidenceinthefield ofstaterepressionandinthestudyofdomesticcybercontrolssuggests bothmodesofcontrolarealsobeingusedindemocraticcountries.Recent workondigitalrepressionhashighlightedhowcountriesthatcombine elementsofdemocraticandautocraticinstitutionsalsoengageincensorship, manipulation,andsurveillanceoftheirdomesticcyberspace(Feldstein, 2021).Democraticcountrieshavealsobeenfoundtomoreactivelyemploy violentrepressionwhenandwheretheycandenytheirwrongdoingand evadeaccountability(Conrad,Hill,andMoore,2018;CareyandGohdes, 2021).Eventhoughtheprimaryfocusisonautocraticcountries,Iexpect thatcertaininsightsfrommytheoreticalargumentcanbegeneralizedin ordertoalsoexplaindynamicsofcontrolandrepressionincountriesthat atleastallowforminimumlevelsofpoliticalcontestationandparticipation (Dahl,1971).
Inmyanalysisofastate’sperceivedthreats,Iprimarilyfocusonpopular challengestocentralgovernmentauthority,whichisthesecondscopecondition.Inherworkonunderstandingstates’coerciveinstitutions,Greitens (2016:19)distinguishesbetweenexternalandinternalthreatstoaregime’s stability.Statesthatfaceinternalthreatsmaydealwithsecessionistclaims, ormaybeconfrontedwithchallengestothecentralgovernment’sauthority. Challengersattemptingtoattackthecentralgovernment’sauthoritymaybe basedwithintheeliteandoperatethroughthemeansofacoup,ortheycould bebasedinthebroaderpopulationandbemobilizedinapopularrevoltor aninsurgency.Governmentsareusuallyconfrontedwithmultiplethreats, andtheirstrategiesofmaintainingcontrolarelikelytoreflectthat.The argumentIpresentinthisbookfocusesonthewaysinwhichcybercontrols canadvanceagovernment’spowerovertheirpopulation’sinformation infrastructurebyeitherwithholdingsaidinfrastructure,orprovidingitfor monitoringpurposes.Asaconsequence,mytheoreticalexpectationsare morelikelytoapplyininstanceswheregovernmentsareintentondefending themselvesagainstinternal,mass-basedthreats.
TheargumentIadvancefocusesonhowthestate-orderedmonitoring anddisruptionofonlineinformationareassociatedwithcoercivestrategies. Idonotexplorequestionsrelatedtotheproductionandmanipulation
ofinformation.Agrowingnumberofstudieshighlightimportantways inwhichgovernments,inparticularsemi-democraticgovernments,make useofsocialmediaforpropaganda,disinformation,andharassmentcampaignsagainstjournalistsandoppositionmembers(Pearce,2015;Nystand Monaco,2018;Sinpeng,2020;LuandPan,2021).Therelationshipbetween theseformsofmediamanipulationandviolentstatecoercionisanimportant topicforfutureresearch.
1.2Evidence
Thisbookseekstodocumenttheprevalenceofcybercontrolsandtheirrole instates’repressivestrategiesbyprovidingbothdescriptiveandmultivariate evidencefromarangeofcontexts.Thetoolboxofcybercontrolshasevolved overtheyears,andtheeasewithwhichsomeofthesemethodscanbe appliedhasalsochanged.InChapter2,Ipresentanoverviewofsome ofthemostpopularandwidelyusedformsofcybercontrolsforlimiting andgatheringinformation.EvidenceinChapters4–6examinestheSyrian government’suseofcybercontrolsandviolentcoercioninthecontextof thecivilconflictthatcommencedin2011.Chapter7shiftsthefocustoIran totracetheroletheInternetshutdownplayedintherepressiveresponseto nationwideprotestsinlate2019.SyriaandIransharesimilaritiesintheir desiretomaintainandexpandcontroloftheirdigitalinfrastructure.While Iran’sgovernmenthasrepeatedlyfacedmasspoliticalprotest,thelevelof domesticupheavalandthedegreetowhichtheregime’spoliticalauthority waschallengedthroughoutthedecadeofthe2010sfundamentallydiffers fromSyria.
Movingbeyondindividualcases,Iconcludetheempiricalsectionofthe bookwithaglobalcomparativeanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenInternet shutdownsandstaterepression.Theglobalcomparativeinvestigationof Internetshutdownsandrepressionallowsmetotestsomeofthetheoretical expectationsbeyondindividualcases,therebycontributingtotheexternal validityofmyargument.
RepressiontechnologyinSyria
TheSyriangovernmenthasweaponizeditsdigitalinfrastructureforpopulationcontrolsincetheintroductionoftheInternetforthegeneralpublic
in2000.TheBaathiststateformedbythecurrentpresident’sfatherhasbeen describedasanauthoritarian-populist(Hinnebusch,1993:246)andhighly personalizedregimethathasjustifieditsrepressivecontroloversociety throughtheconstantinvocationofexternalanddomesticthreats,most notablythethreatsposedbyIsraelandpoliticalIslam(Wedeen,1999,2019).
Syria’srepressivestrategyisinstructiveforstudyingtheinterplaybetween onlineandofflinerepressionasitwasarguablythefirsttoemployafullarsenalofdigitalcontrolsinconjunctionwithmassrepressioninthecontextof alarge-scalecivilconflict.Intheearlyyearsoftheconflict,itwasfrequently referredtoas“themostsociallymediatedcivilconflictinhistory”(Lynch, Freelon,andAday,2014:5),witheventspainstakinglycaptured,documented,andcommunicatedviatheInternet.Fromtheearliestdaysofthe Syrianuprising,activistswithinandoutsidethecountryusedcountless socialmediaaccountstoinformeachotheraboutmilitaryoperationsand massacresandtohelporganizeandcoordinatetherevolution(Shehabat, 2012;Poulsen,2013;Pearlman,2020).Citizenjournalistshaverecorded hundredsofthousandsofYouTubevideosofpeoplekilledandinjured inmorgues,hospitals,andmarketplaces(MillerandSienkiewicz,2012). Theamountofuser-generatedcontentissovastthatmorehoursofdigital materialnowexistondocumentingtheconflictthantheconflicthasbeen long(DeutchandHabal,2018:50).TheAssadregimehasusedanarrayof methodstospyonthecountry’spopulation,suchastheuseofcommercial spyware,DDoSattacksbytheSyrianElectronicArmy,andevendetaining individualsinordertoobtainFacebookandTwitterpasswords.Ithasalso fullyorpartiallyshutdownInternetaccessonafrequentbasis,thereby cuttingmillionsofpeople’saccesstocommunication.
SincethestartoftheSyrianconflictmorethanadecadeagotherole ofdigitaltechnologyinwarfarehasonlygrown,andstrategiccommunicationbyconflictactorsonvarioussocialmediasiteshasbecomethe norm.Interestedobserversarenowaccustomedtofollowingkineticwarfare throughsocialmediaandotheronlinespacesfromanywhereintheworld. Militariesandinsurgentsalikehavebecomeawareoftheimportanceof digitalimageriesandstory-tellinginkeepingboththeirdomesticandinternationalaudiencesengagedand(dis)informed.Studyingoneoftheearliest instancesofdomesticconflictwherebothstateandnon-stateactorswere heavilyengagedinonlineactivitywhilefightingofflineisinstructivefor ourunderstandingofthewaysinwhichstatescanweaponizetheircontrol overdigitalinfrastructure.Understandingthemotivationbehindnetwork
manipulationsinstitutedbyregimesfearfuloftheirpoliticaldemisewill becomeanindispensabletoolforourtheoreticalandpracticalunderstandingofconflictdynamics.LearningfromcurrentcasessuchasSyriaisan importantplacetostart.
InternetinfrastructureandusageinSyriaandIran
IntheearlyyearsoftheInternet,SyriaandIranhadsimilarlyslowgrowth trajectories,asisevidencedbythedepictioninFigure1.2ofthepercentage ofeachcountry’spopulationthathasaccesstotheInternet.Thistrend changedin2013whenIranovertookSyria,andbytheendofthedecade itspenetrationlevelsweredoublethoseofSyria.Inbothcountriesforeign socialmediaandmessengerappssuchasSkype,WhatsApp,Telegram,and Twitterhavebeenpopularamongyoungandtech-savvyusers(Abadpour andAnderson,2013;Brownlee,2018).Alongsidecontrolofthedigital infrastructureandimplementationofwide-reachingwebfilterstheregimes inbothcountrieshaveactivelybuiltandexpandedtheirabilitytoengagein targetedandmasssurveillance.
SyriaandIranbothfallintothecategoryofcountriesthatexhibithighlevelsofcentralizationwhenitcomestotheirdomesticInternetinfrastructure.
In2012,Renesys1 estimatedthat132countriesworldwidewereatsevereor significantriskofexperiencingInternetshutdowns(Cowie,2012)duetothe
Fig.1.2 DevelopmentofInternetpenetrationinSyriaandIran.Country-level InternetpenetrationdataiscollectedbytheInternationalTelecommunication Union(ITU,2022).
lowdiversityintheirtelecommunicationssector.InbothSyriaandIranthe telecomsectoriscentralizedinwaysthatputsthecontrolofaccesstothe Internetintothehandsofafewdecision-makers(Cowie,2012).
In2011,theyearofthecivilianuprisinginSyriaandtheimplementation ofitsfirstnationwideshutdown,SyrianaccesstotheInternetprimarily dependedononeprovider,thestate-ownedSyrianTelecommunications Establishment(STE)(Cowie,2011b).Inthesameyear,71countrieswere estimatedtohavefewerthantenserviceproviders,whichincludedIran. Iran’sdomesticInternetinfrastructurehassignificantlydevelopedoverthe pastdecade,yetdespitethesedevelopmentsandthegrowinginfluencethe countryhasachievedthroughnetworkprovisionintheregion,itsaccessto theglobalInternetremainsdependentontwoentitiesthatessentiallyserve aschokepointstothedigitaloutsideworld(Madory,2019).
Methodologicalapproach
Investigatingcybercontrolsandrepressivestatebehaviorisacomplicated endeavor.Somecybercontrolsrequirerelativesecrecytobeeffectivewhile othersaremeanttobeobservedandfeared.Likewise,stateviolencecanbe overtlyusedagainstpublicprotesters,oritcanbeclandestine,suchaswhen dissidentsarequietlyarrestedintheirhomesinthemiddleofthenight.State actorshaveincentivestohide,obfuscate,outrightdeny,orevenoverstate theirrepressiveintentionsandactions.
TheevidenceIpresentinthisbookdrawsonqualitativeandquantitative datafromavarietyofsources.Itmighthavebeenusefultointerview seniormembersofgovernment,ofthesecurityservices,thesecretservice, andthetelecomsectoranditwouldmostcertainlyhavebeenhelpfulget accesstoarchivalmaterialontheprocurementofcensorshipandsurveillancesoftwareaswellasonmilitarystrategy.However,seniorfiguresin authoritariancountriesaregenerallynotavailableforcommentontheir repressivestrategies,andwhileIwasabletodrawonsomedocumentation onITprocurement,archivalmaterialsareeitherlimitedortendtoonly becomeavailablewithregimechange.Theevidenceinthisbookbuildson thecollectionandanalysisofamultitudeofsources,suchasinformationcollectedbyhumanrightsdocumentationgroups,mediasources,andnetwork measurementdata.
TomeasurestaterepressionintheSyrianconflict,IdrawonindividuallevelreportsofkillingsfrommultipleSyriandocumentationgroupsand makeuseofrecentinnovationsinquantitivetextanalysistoclassifythemas targetedoruntargetedviolence.Thisdistinctionallowsmetostudychanges inthetypeofviolencethatgobeyondmerelymeasuringscale,thereby contributingtowardsamoredifferentiatedunderstandingofrepression(see HooverGreen,2019;Bagozzi,Berliner,andWelch,2021).Post-sampling estimationintheformofmulti-recaptureestimationhelpsaccountfor violencethatwentunreportedinthechaosofwar.Wheninvestigating changesinthenatureofrepressionusedbytheIranianauthoritiesduringthe protestsinNovember2019Idrawonquantitativeandqualitativeaccounts ofviolenceastheywerereportedbyIranianandinternationalhumanrights groups,aswellasininternationalmediareports.Theglobalcomparative analysisinChapter8drawsonnetworkmeasurementdatatoclassifyInternetshutdowns,andonthePoliticalTerrorScale,astandards-basedmeasure ofrepressionthatcodeshowwidespreadstaterepressionisinagivencountry inanygivenyear.
Thisbookpresentsevidenceontherelationshipbetweencybercontrols andrepressionatvaryingobservationalunits.InChapter5,theinvestigation oftheSyrianconflicttracesInternetshutdownsanddailychangesinviolence atthenationalandregional(governorate)level.InChapter6,IanalyzebiweeklylevelsofInternetaccessibilityandstrategiesofstateviolenceatthe regionallevel.TounderstandthequalitativeshiftsinrepressioninIran, IinvestigatechangesbeforeandduringthenationwideshutdowninNovember2019.Thischapteralsolooksatchangesinonlinebehaviorsbycomparingusageofapopularcensorshipcircumventiontoolsbeforeandafterthe shutdown.Finally,inChapter8,Ileavethesubnationallevelandconstruct yearlyindicatorsofInternetshutdownsusingnetworkmeasurementdata, andstudyitsco-occurrencewithstaterepressionacrosscountries.
TheinvestigationofInternetcontrolsandviolentcoercionrelieson observationaldata,whichcomeswithchallengestomakingcausalclaims. Experimentalapproacheshavebeensuccessfulinstudyingpublicopinion towardsdigitalcontrolsandexposuretostaterepression,butexperimentally manipulatingorelicitinginformationaboutrepressivestatebehavioris,in mostcases,eitherunfeasibleorunethical.Iaimtoprovideinsightsinto thisunderstudiedareaofstatebehaviorbyempiricallyapproachingthe researchquestionfromamulti-methodperspectivethattestsaspectsofthe
