ELABORATE October 2022 by Mazin Abusin

A N EN GAGIN G CONTENT THAT FA CI L I TATE S D I S CUS S I ON A ND P ROMOTE S D IAL O GU E

Elaborate SUDAN

ISSUE 24, OCTOBER 2022

FROM McNAMARA TO MALPASS Sudan and the World Bank Group

A JOURNEY INTO THE UNKNOWN Sudan Youth Migration to UK

ABDELKAREEM ALKABLY

SUDAN AND TURKIYE An Intelligent Partnership

SHOWCASING SUDAN BY THE SERPENTINE A look into Kamala Ishaq

‫وافترقنا‬

THE OPTIMIST Why Dr. Gebreil Ibrahim is bullish on Sudan

A CLOSER LOOK: MICROFINANCE UNIT (MFU) AT THE CENTRAL BANK OF SUDAN

approach to attain high growth rates, the Group invests strategically, enabling its subsidiaries to apply optimal business practices and pursue new prospects in local and regional markets. CORE's Mision; focuses on long-term results through high-quality, stable, and diversified business activity. Our guiding tenets are Values, Culture, and Ethical Codes. CORE sees sustainable development as a future imperative. To ensure long-term prosperity and value for our community, we incorporate environmental, social, and ethical principles.

Member of the UN Global Compact Local Network. “CORE / /: A purpose to achieve strength in diversity.” CORE is expanding business footprint by acquiring Five Aviation the pioneer freight forwarding in Sudan. Five is the first Accredited GSSA, IATA cargo agent & FEDAGSA/ TIACA/ WCA networks' member.

Five is the cargo GSA in Sudan for Qatar Airways. UN registered logistic vendor as a regional air charter.

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Nubian Meroe Pyramids in Sudan (2500 - 1500 BCE)

www.core-group.org

BIG THINGS HAVE CORE. October 2022 | Elaborate | 3

KCV, the ICAO certified cargo terminal is operated by Five.

CONTENTS

OCTOBER 2022

16 50 54 IN THIS ISSUE…

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TRENDS - AGRICULTURE TECHNOLOGY Overcoming the Barriers to Technology Adoption on African Farms

HALL OF FAME Kamala Ibrahim Ishaq FEATURE Why so many Sudanese are prepared to risk their lives to reach the UK

CITIES Suakin - The Place of

all our Beginnings

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS The Sudanese Turkish Relationship

INVESTMENT Sudan: A Closer Look at the Investment Act of 2021

ECONOMY When the financing stops: the World Bank, Chad, and shades of engagement

SECTOR FOCUS Sudan’s Grain Divide

OBITUARY The Departure of the Sudanese Song Genius

WORLD FOOD DAY

SUDAN RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK Sudan National Resilience And Recovery Framework

EDUCATION Sudan’s Education Dilemma between Costly Excellence and Affordable Averageness

EDITOR IN CHIEF WORD

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ENTITY STORY The Microfinance Unit at the Central Bank of Sudan Actively contributing towards Economic and Social Development

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Elaborate Sudan

EDITORIAL Editor-in-chief Mazin Abusin mazin.abusin@sommarconsulting.com Art Editor Maha Al Khulaidi maha.alkhulaidi@sommarconsulting.com Designer Ifteqar Ahmed Syed ifteqar.syed@sommarconsulting.com Junior Editor Riham Elwali riham.elwali@sommarconsulting.com Picture Desk Loay Dirar loay.dirar@sommarconsulting.com Editorial Secretary Samah Yousif samah.yousif@sommarconsulting.com ADVERTISING Sales Manager Hiba Bani hiba.bani@sommarconsulting.com Business Development Manager Hala Abusin hala.abusin@sommarconsulting.com MANAGEMENT Publishing Manager Wadah Eltayib wadah.eltayib@sommarconsulting.com Licensing Director Abdelraheem Mohammed abdelraheem.mohammed@sommarconsulting.com Circulation Manager Hanadi Eltohami hanadi.eltohami@sommarconsulting.com Production Manager Rwan Mamoun rwan.mamoun@sommarconsulting.com

Publisher

SOMMAR

C O N S U LT I N G www. sommarconsulting.com

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THE “ELABORATE” WAY t is undoubted that the events in the recent years have placed insurmountable challenges onto Sudan. in the last decade alone, Sudan’s economy has witnessed the consequence of the fall of a generation lasting regime, two short-lived presidents, three transitional governments, at least four military take-over attempts of which the last has succeeded, climate-change induced floods (reportedly, the worst in over three decades), and a worldwide pandemic. Through this publication, and during these difficult times, the editorial team is aiming to guide and facilitate the deliberation of our country’s current affairs, promoting dialogue between Sudan and the International Community, motivating all stakeholders to get involved in the process of institutional nation building as well as advocating for practical solutions. ELABORATE aims to achieve this through the provision of accurate, impartial, wellbalanced business, technology, science, politics, & health news and analysis related to Sudan. We feel it is important that we share with the readers our editorial policy and explains how we select and review the content and tools you see on our publication, how we distinguish advertising and sponsored content from news content, how financial or other influences from outside our team affect our magazine, and how you may contact us to ask questions or comment on the content. ELABORATE is committed to providing you with balanced, accurate information. We employ editorial professionals who are responsible for content selection, development and maintenance process. We recognise the importance of maintaining a clear separation between our independent editorial content and any materials that are advertising or any content that may be influenced by our sponsors. We also have organised the operations of our publication to provide for appropriate separation of our education and promotion programs from an editorial perspective. All material on our publications that we present as our own is either created by us or is obtained from content providers whose editorial processes we have evaluated and found to be acceptable. The material we create is written either by our staff writers or freelance journalists whom we commission. Our content is usually evaluated by our editors and all submitted content is reviewed for reasonable balance and whether the sought objectives are met by the content. Sources for third-party editorial content include research houses, government agencies, not-for-profit organizations, universities, and key stakeholders that provide news and information about all the topicss we cover. Our editorial staff reviews most content from outside sources for accuracy, balance, completeness and timeliness before we make it available through our magazine. Currently, ELABORATE, like most publications, does financially rely on advertising and sponsorship,. With respect to sponsorship or other financial relationships, we clearly separate sponsored content from non-sponsored content. We hope you will have an enjoyable time reading our publication showcasing the success stories that will inject a positive, albeit sensible, outlook for the future of the country. We hope to be your trusted source of reference, providing you with the right balance of current affairs coverage, as well as reflections on Sudan’s culture and society stories. We believe in a better future for our homeland, and this publication can offer you a credible, as well as a hopeful, narrative of Sudan. We welcome any comments, questions, or complaints you have about this editorial policy or our publication. We also encourage our readers to provide the editorial team with their valuable contributions and expanding on the ideas we share in our articles so we can all construct an all-encompassing model of our country’s future. Please feel free to contact us by sending an email to info@sommarconsulting.com EDITORIAL TEAM

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ABOUT SUDAN Prices of Petrol and Diesel Fall in Sudan

Petrol prices in Sudan fell on Tuesday from 700 Sudanese pounds to 522 pounds ($0.9235) per litre, the country’s energy ministry said in a statement following its monthly pricing review. Diesel prices also decreased slightly from 687 Sudanese pounds to 672 pounds per litre.

Sudan delays school opening amid floods

Sudan has postponed opening schools due to the floods affecting many parts of the country. The school academic year, which was due to begin in the month of September across the country, has now been pushed to 2 October. At least 623 schools have been affected by the floods and the delay in the school calendar is to allow their reconstruction and rehabilitation. Heavy rains and flash floods have killed over 100 people and destroyed thousands of homes in more than a dozen states in Sudan in recent weeks.

Sudan officials warn of disease from unidentified bodies

Sudanese medical officials warned Monday that more than 1,500 unidentified bodies piled up in several of the country’s morgues could lead to an outbreak of disease, amid accusations the government is covering up their causes of death

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More than 50 Sudanese pro-democracy groups have agreed on a new draft constitution, in one of the greatest shows of unity from the country’s opposition since the 2019 popular uprising

As food prices in Sudan soar, malnutrition worsens

Kamala Ibrahim Ishag Review – Memory Maps and Rumours of Djinns from Mystical Sudanese Painter

Inspired by William Blake and Francis Bacon, Ishag traces winding webs of families and friendships with depictions of plants, neighbourhoods and – her main subject – women. Kamala Ibrahim Ishag: States of Oneness is at the Serpentine South Gallery, London, until 29 January

Sudan’s democracy groups approve charter opposing army rule

Sudan representative appointed as UN Coordinator for Black Sea Grain Initiative

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has appointed Sudan’s representative Amir Mahmoud Abdulla as the UN Coordinator for the Black Sea Grain Initiative, according to a statement issued by the Secretary General’s office on Friday. The new coordinator will replace American Frederick J. Kenny, who has held the position on an interim basis since the deal was struck. Amir Mahmoud Abdullah has worked for the UN World Food Program since 1991, and since 2009 has served as Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of WFP.

At least three million children under five are malnourished after a series of humanitarian crises. According to the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), staple food prices are 250 to 300 percent higher than they were least year.

KSrelief Distributes 8 Tons of Food Baskets in Sudan

The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSrelief) distributed 8 tons of food baskets to those affected by torrential rains and floods and the most needy families yesterday, in Gezira State, Sudan, benefiting 1,022 individuals.

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TRENDS

AGRICULTURE TECHNOLOGY

OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION ON AFRICAN FARMS LOUISE FOX AND LANDRY SIGNÉ

ub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural sector is widely recognized to have vast, under-utilized potential. Land and labor productivity are low compared to other regions and have barely increased over the last 20 years. Low productivity has created widespread rural poverty and food insecurity, so the potential for productivity increases represents an opportunity to boost inclusive growth. Scholars, development organizations, and some entrepreneurs have identified digital technologies associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution—the broad shift toward greater machine autonomy, improved analytics, greater connectedness, and advanced robotics— as one potential path toward overcoming these productivity challenges. Anecdotal 10 | Elaborate | October 2022

evidence from well publicized start-ups— such as Hello Tractor, a tractor-sharing platform started in Kenya, and Zenvus, a Nigerian soil mapping company— have fueled a narrative that digital agriculture represents the key to delivering productivity gains to African start-ups. Yet as a recent FAO report admitted, hard evidence that digital agriculture is delivering on this promise is difficult to come by, as long-standing challenges persist in preventing to unlock fully the potential of these technologies. In a recent report, we use new data and trends in output and employment, review the main productivity issues that are preventing transformation in the African agricultural sector, and ask how Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR)

technologies might address them and unlock better job opportunities. The optimistic narratives around African farmers’ adoption of technology often overlook the more long-standing challenges they face that are preventing the adoption of much older productivity-increasing technology, such as fertilizers and conventionally produced hybrid seeds. For digital agriculture to be effective and transformational in Africa, a concerted effort to address Africa’s longstanding agricultural productivity challenges is needed. What is the digital agriculture narrative about? The technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) offer significant productivityand income-enhancing potential on the farm

and post-harvest. Possible applications include: • Farmer-tailored digital information platforms could help farmers quickly obtain knowledge, such as how to acquire and use new technologies (extension information), weather advisories, prices and buy offers from traders, and how to rent agricultural equipment, such as tractors. • Internet-connected sensors (internet of things, or IOT technology) could help farmers track soil composition, crop growth progress, weather effects, and the presence of disease, allowing farmers to react swiftly to problems such as a lack of water or nutrient deficiencies. IOT technology can also monitor post-harvest storage

conditions to ensure that spoilage does not occur. • High-productivity, disease-resistant seed varieties developing using CRISPR gene-editing technology could reduce risk to farmers while increasing yields. These applications are currently in wide use in developed and emerging market countries in other regions, but aside from some technologies like mobile phones used to connect suppliers and traders, most African farmers are not using contemporary technologies like these. And where they have been used, evidence has now emerged that, although access to mobile phones has improved market performance in agriculture at the macro level, the impact at the micro-level is heterogeneous. At the micro level, mobile applications have not systematically improved farmgate prices or on-farm earnings for the average farmer, although they have in some cases reduced price dispersion, especially for perishable crops such as bananas, suggesting that some farmers, possibly in more remote areas, have benefited. Why have 4IR technologies spread so slowly on African farms? One reason for the slow pace of

technology diffusion among the African agricultural sector is limited internet access. In rural areas, less than 30% of adults in rural areas report having access, mostly to mobile broadband at 2G and 3G speeds, which is not fast enough for many applications. Without access to information about technologies that might improve yields and without the internet speeds to run the relevant applications, technological developments aren’t reaching those who need them most. Other perhaps more important obstacles to technology diffusion are agricultural policies and contexts that make technological adoption unappealing for farmers. Producers adopt new technologies when they solve a current, urgent production problem at an affordable cost. However, contextspecific constraints lead many producers to conclude that the risks inherent in the new technology outweigh the benefits. These constraints include the cost of the technology, a lack of information on how to use the technology, poor access to markets, or expensive or lacking complementary inputs (such as energy, water, or transportation). According to recent surveys of the state of agricultural technology adoption in Africa, contextspecific constraints have hindered the October 2022 | Elaborate | 11

TRENDS

PROFILE

AGRICULTURE TECHNOLOGY

adoption of existing technology (such as fertilizer and hybrid seeds) and will probably limit the adoption of 4IR technology on the farm in the near future. These challenges include: • Limited supplies, high prices, and uncertain quality of modern inputs, increasing the risk associated with technology adoption. • Uncertain and limited rainfall and lack of irrigation and other systems of water management. • Lack of secure land tenure, which deters on-farm investment and is leading to declining soil fertility. • Poor roads and minimal information and telecommunications infrastructure, resulting in high transportation costs and greater information frictions and marketing transaction costs, causing farmers receive a smaller share of the final product price. • Low public investment in agriculture, especially in research and development (R&D), so that there are few sciencebased options that can be tailored to sub-Saharan Africa’s many microclimates. Green shoots of progress The past 20 years have brought important changes to African agriculture. Africa recorded the highest average annual production growth rate of all regions in the world—nearly 4%. Although much of this increase was based on land expansion, a number of African countries recorded positive total factor productivity growth (that is, more output per unit of inputs), including Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Innovation in the production of high valueadded export crops, such as cut flowers in East Africa and pineapples in Ghana, contributed to productivity improvements, though innovation and productivity improvements in food crops have lagged. As a result, outside of South Africa, the labor and land productivity of African farmers remains well below levels found in other developing regions. What can be done? Agriculture remains an important sector in African development strategies. Growth 12 | Elaborate | October 2022

Governments need to continue to support agricultural research and development, an investment with very high rates of return. Donors and supporters should work with research institutes to help deploy technology advances such as CRISPR to speed up the process and allow the effective development of high-yielding and disease resistant seeds. in agricultural production supports both sustained economic growth through structural change, as well as poverty reduction. Productivity advances are desperately needed, but will be challenging to achieve. A recent survey of research on African agricultural technology use and productivity gains concluded that much more remains to learned about how to increase technology adoption and productivity on African farms. The authors suggest that given the multiple constraints farmers face, multi-faceted interventions at the local and national level may be required. In thinking about how to encourage technology adoption on African farms, we suggest that: • Governments need to continue to support agricultural research and development, an investment with very high rates of return. Donors and supporters should work with research institutes to help deploy technology advances such as CRISPR to speed up the process and allow the effective development of high-yielding and disease resistant seeds. • Energy and transportation infrastructure investments in rural areas should remain a high priority. Whole supply chains are disrupted when power is unavailable, goes out, or

perishable items are not able to reach their destination in a timely manner. • Given the heterogeneity of farmer conditions and needs, NGO- and private sector-led farmer-tailored programs may be required, whether related to land and farm management, access to markets, access to finance, value chains, among others. Local governments can help support this approach. Stakeholder attention should be directed at fostering, evaluating, and, if successful, scaling up these programs. • Innovators and entrepreneurs need to develop and scale appropriate technologies that address the most urgent challenges faced by farmers and are affordable enough to be systematically used in a productive manner. At the same time, expanding access to ICT services in rural areas should be a priority even if the benefits for farm incomes are elusive for now. Helping households to shift their working hours into more lucrative activities off the farm has widespread, long-term benefits. And if more intensive, context-specific, local agricultural research is able to achieve new breakthroughs, ICT platforms can help spread the message. Eventually, when other farm productivity constraints are reduced, and the cost of new technologies is reduced as well, the digital revolution could eventually benefit African farmers. Louise Fox is a nonresident senior fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI), which is part of the Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution. Landry Signé is executive director and professor at the Thunderbird School of Global Management, a senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution, a distinguished fellow at Stanford University, and founding director of the Fourth Industrial Revolution Initiative. This article was originally published in Brooknigs’ Tech Stream back in June 2022 https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/ overcoming-the-barriers-to-technologyadoption-on-african-farms/

FARMERS COMMERCIAL BANK (FCB)

armer’s Commercial Bank (FCB) was established in 1/8/1998 as a result of the merger of two Banks, namely Sudan Commercial bank (SCB), the first Sudanese national bank, which was established in 1960 and Farmer’s Bank for Investment and Rural Development (FBIRD) which was established in 1992; with the aim of developing the agricultural sector and other sectors related to agriculture. After the merger, (FCB) became one of the biggest banking institution in the country with regard to the number of shareholders. The bank aims at achieving strategic goals in the promotion of agricultural, industrial and trading sectors in general in addition to providing finance services to all other economic activities. VISION Farmer’s Commercial bank (FCB) strives to become the trusted bank of choice , a leader in the field of digital banking and social development with a positive and tangible impact on the Sudanese community and a renowned global presence.

MISSION To attract, develop and retain the best banking talent to deliver worldclass products and the highest quality

service to our customers; to support the communities in which we operate, and to adhere to our core values of passion, integrity, conservation, and knowledge.

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OCTOBER 16

WORLD FOOD DAY World Food Day is an international day celebrated every year worldwide on 16 October to commemorate the date of the founding of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in 1945. The day is celebrated widely by many other organizations concerned with hunger and food security, including the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. World Food Day (WFD) was established by FAO’s Member Countries at the Organization’s 20th General Conference in November 1979. The Hungarian Delegation, led by the former Hungarian Minister of Agriculture and Food Dr. Pál Romány, played an active role at the 20th Session of the FAO Conference and suggested the idea of celebrating the WFD worldwide. It has since been observed every year in more than 150 countries, raising awareness of the issues behind poverty and hunger.

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INTERVIEW / DR. GEBREIL IBRAHIM

IN CONVERSATION WITH:

SUDAN’S MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING Sudan’s Minister of Finance and Economic Planning tells ELABORATE Magazine about the country’s future policies and plans Q1: ELABORATE MAGAZINE (EM): You have assumed the office fairly recently and you hold a challenging, yet exciting portfolio. Could you share your current priorities and future objectives with our readers? When I took over back in February 2021 it was a tough time and things continue to be very challenging since then in terms of the global economic situation as well as here in Sudan. I have two major priorities that I and my team are working towards. I want to first work on the stabilization of the economy and the budget, by being especially careful on government spending; and I am also looking towards the post-pandemic era and how we will kick-start the economy again. Sudan, like most other countries, was hit hard by the pandemic with the near total shutdown of most economic sectors for almost one year which had a very devastating effect on us. The Government strategy ever since has been all about trying to re-launch various economic activities while keeping the country safe; and focus on diversification of the economy. We are particularly looking into the area of poverty reduction through a number of measurements consisting of building human capital by spending more on education and health services, providing potable water for all citizens, redirecting subsidies to those who really deserve it, directing more resources towards SMEs and small farmers, creating jobs for the youth though encouragement of investment in infrastructure, agriculture 16 | Elaborate | October 2022

industry, and services. SMES will play a pivotal role in job Creation. It is also imperative that we increase our tax revenue that is at present among the lowest in the world standing only at 6% of the country’s GDP. In order to be able to provide satisfactory public services and engage in development projects, we will work towards doubling this figure to 12% by the close of 2023. Achieving this will entail that the Government, in its entirety, move robustly towards digital transformation. We are also looking into how to connect producers with consumers to encourage domestic investment and eventually attract foreign direct investment. There is a dire need to build our infrastructure namely roads, ports, airports, railways, power plants, and provide clean water supply. All this require resources which Sudan doesn’t have enough of at the moment. Adopting a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) approach with foreign and local investors might be the way around this. This approach will also support our plans in reversing our current trade balance by increasing the various sectors’ productivity and adding value to our exports. All these require parallel sweeping economic reforms that will stabilise the economy, reduce inflation (standing at 117% at present), increase tax revenues, control expenditure and direct resources towards public services and the productive sectors namely agricultural sector, where we believe to have a big comparative advantage. October 2022 | Elaborate | 17

INTERVIEW / DR. GEBREIL IBRAHIM

CO O RDINATE D EFFO R T

Q2: Sudan has recently emerged from international isolation and was poised to become one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, but last year the economic and political situations deteriorated relative to what was planned. What’s holding the country back from your perspective? In numerous instances from across the World; it was proven that imposing blanket economic sanctions on countries have minimal effect on the ruling elite; but adverse one on the most vulnerable sectors of the sanctioned populations. Sudan economy suffered a lot from such sanctions for so many years and I can hardly say we fully recovered. During the period 2020 to 2021 the Country has made significant strides in reestablishing relations with the International Financial Institutions (IFI) and worked hand in hand with them to reach the “Decision Point” in the HIPC Initiative which meant opening the door widely for new sources of grants and concessional finance. Recent political developments, since October 2021, have resulted in a slight recess in our relations with the IFIs and some opted to freeze its funding for key and vital projects. Despite all this; the good news is that we found ourselves in a situation where we 18 | Elaborate | October 2022

With the current level of complexities facing our nation; we expect Development Partners to engage us against an innovative enabling framework of cooperation started looking into how we can rely on our own resources to make ends meet albeit with huge difficulties. The IFIs promised to resume their engagement with Sudan as soon as there is a civilian government in place. We highly appreciate this promise but we have to be proactive and always seek practical alternatives which we are already looking at with other potential partners. I mentioned in the previous question how important and vital for us to have a national vision , and when we all unify our goals and align them to this single vision, you can agree on an agenda that is not ideologically driven. We need to build institutions that can outlive ministers and politicians. From my personal perspective; ideologically-driven actions and decisions are probably one of the biggest retardant to transformation in our country.

Q3: How do you expect the new 2023 budget to affect the country’s economic position? We are building our national budget for the 2nd consecutive year entirely based on domestic resources. I am a great believer in designing a system that requires us to live within our means; this is how successful nations are built. This means that the 2023 Budget will focus on providing operational resources for both Federal and State government to facilitate public services provision rather than augmenting new development projects. This also means exerting extra efforts to increase government revenues without increasing the economic hardships of the population by broadening the tax base and bringing state owned companies under the full control of the Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. The Challenges are October 2022 | Elaborate | 19

INTERVIEW / DR. GEBREIL IBRAHIM vast and the healthy engagement with the IFI’s will relatively make the job smoother as there are both financial and political aspects to these challenges. In the majority of countries’ constitutions, members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to their respective legislative bodies. In normal political circumstances, the budget represents that collective responsibility. However, in our present situation we need to improvise a little bit, and it is my duty as Minister of Finance to persuade the current Cabinet to operate within our present means and work towards consensus to develop a practical and realistic budget. Q4: (EM) Sudan achieved the Decision Point back in June 2021. Can you please elaborate on how the country is planning to proceed through to the Completion Point amidst the present political challenges facing the country? It was very unfortunate that we had to face such a situation only after few months from making the breakthrough with Sudan’s reaching the Decision Point. In spite of the fact that the IFIs paused their engagement with Sudan since October 2021, the Government upheld its commitments towards the Extended Credit facilities (ECF) Program; the fulfillment of which will take the Country to the Completion Point. Not only that, but we moved faster than expected by the full removal of subsidies on wheat and substantially on those of electricity. We are trying our best to keep monetization to the required limits but I am afraid, with shortages in revenue generation, we might not be able to hold for long unless we get extensive budget support from somewhere and eventually have regional and international finance resumed. The current situation calls for a new perspective on how partners work together. With the current level of complexities facing our nation, we expect our partners in general to engage in a discussion to formulate an innovative framework that will enable us to move forward towards Completion Point. As mentioned before, we have achieved great strides in the areas needed to qualify us for the “Decision” point and we are 20 | Elaborate | October 2022

My role, as Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, is to lead the restructuring of the economy and encourage ending the state monopoly on certain production and service areas to give the private sector more leeway

fully committed to stay the course. We have fully adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan 2021 - 2023 and will continue to commit in working in alignment with its directives throughout the political turbulences we currently operate within. Q5: Are there any specific initiatives that the government has put in place to reboot the economy post-COVID-19? In general, after the pandemic, the government has very difficult balance of choices to make in its fiscal and monetary policies. Governments across the world find themselves prioritising between preservation of existing economic operation and creating new ones. We need to design our interventions wisely and intelligently in Sudan to recover from the pandemic’s effect without forgetting the major task in hand of supporting the nation’s overall economic recovery.

I would love to think of our Government as one that has a global orientation, and when you combine this with our philosophy working on a more decentralized archetype structure, it means we have to work on developing policies that create incentives for the private sector which we will bank on to support the Government’s effort in finding effective solutions to support recovery. Our policies and programmes will target our strategic industries that we believe are aligned to the national agenda and those in which we possess a competitive advantage, so we will be channeling spending to the agriculture and mine sectors where we believe returns will outpace expenditure and pose no dangers of depreciation of the national currency. When it comes to the health sector in specific, It is important to learn from previous experience when it comes to international financial support. As despite

receiving considerable funding (around USD47m) which was requested by the UN from donors to apply specific COVID-related measures, successful implementation faced many challenges that resulted in a relatively poor impact. The Ministry needs to ensure that it allocates funds to improve our weak and fragmented health system, build better infrastructure of health facilities (hospitals, isolation centres, and ICU units, and provide essential supplies and equipment as well as invest in the human capital of our health industry Q6: How do you expect Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and exports to develop in 2023? In 2021 we enacted two key laws, namely: the Investment Law as well as the Public Private Partnership law. We are very optimistic that these laws will provide the much needed encouragement to investors and help in establishing better trust levels between key stakeholders. We are expecting substantial FDI, in the form of BOOT or PPP, aiming at development projects of ports, railways, airports, and electricity generation in addition to oil production.

We are also hoping to reinvigorate the Sudan Food Security Initiative that was first adopted by the Arab League Summit in Riyadh in 2013 and approved by the General Secretariat of the Arab League back in July 2022 and which will run through 2023 and beyond. This is supposed to be funded by Arab countries and their private sectors in the range of $10 billion USD. Sudan must present itself as an attractive and secure destination for investors’ funds that are fearful of the threats in the Western markets. It is a bit sad that the entire African continent, at the moment, attracts less than nine percent of FDI. We need to work in a collaborative way with all concerned parties within Sudan to continue reducing the challenges facing foreign investment from both policy and service perspectives. Q7: How do you foresee the relations with foreign investors to develop throughout the coming years and are there any specific investment areas where you will be focusing on? Sudan’s strategic location represents an entrance to Africa from the east and

the fact that it is neighbored by a number of land-locked countries to which Sudan represents their only sea outlet; this besides the rich resources the country possesses makes us an attractive destination for investors. We are fully aware, though, that there are areas for improvement such as service infrastructure, political stability and economic policies. My role, as Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, is to lead the restructuring of the economy and encourage ending the state monopoly on certain production and service areas to give the private sector more leeway. We also work closely with the Ministry of Investment, which is responsible for the area of investment by its mandate, to create a conducive environment for foreign investors and their business. Investment opportunities in Sudan are huge and rates of return on capital invested are unmatchable. What appears as obstacles to investment, such as the absence of infrastructure , can be easily turned into very lucrative investment opportunities themselves. Agriculture, mining, and oil production are front runners for investment in addition to infrastructure. Q8: (EM) What is the Ministry’s vision for growing the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME’s) in Sudan? Sudan economy is suffering from an unprecedented rate of unemployment among youth of both sexes. Some put unemployment rate above 40%. One very important way of creating jobs and increasing production is putting more resources into Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). We are collaborating with some regional and international organisations to finance and provide technical packages to small farmers. The Microfinance Unit in the Central Bank is actively engaging SME’s to provide finance for the winter season farming which begins this November. We highly count on SMEs to bring about considerable growth in our economy as it is one of the most important industrial sectors capable of meeting the challenges of poverty reduction in Sudan. Generally, the SME’s sector accounts for a significant percentage of our GDP. It is also the largest source of employment, providing a October 2022 | Elaborate | 21

INTERVIEW / DR. GEBREIL IBRAHIM livelihood for almost three-quarters of the working population, especially women. The sector is the backbone of almost every healthy economy; this is true not only for Sudan but across the entire African continent. Q9: How is the International Community, and in specific the World Bank, supporting Sudan in its recovery efforts? The World Bank Group has been a close partner of Sudan, working alongside other development partners to support us. After clearing arrears with the major multilaterals and reaching the Decision Point in the HIPC initiative in June 2021, Sudan was promised with huge and ambitious funding in the form of grants from the World Bank Group through its International Development Association. Unfortunately, the Oct 25, 2021 political developments brought that into a pause. Despite Sudan being under OP7.30 since October 2021, the World Bank has, thankfully, responded very positively to the urgent social matters and coined an intelligent partnership with the World Food Programme to deliver a cash-based support programme. This gives us hope that there are alternative and innovative approaches that can be adopted to implement development projects. We do hope that in 2023, we get international funding resumed including 700 million the USA Congress appropriated for Sudan with positive political developments, Sudan can make use of the ECF financing from the IMF as well as its recently allocated SDRs. We consider the World Bank as one of our strategic partners and take confidence from its President, David Malpass statement: “We hope that peace and the integrity of the transition process will be restored, so that Sudan can restart its path of economic development and can take its rightful place in the international financial community.” Q10: Where would you like to see Sudan in the next 5 to 10 years? Sudan with its huge potential represented in its strategic geographic location; arable land; livestock, mining and petroleum resources, can have a miraculous 22 | Elaborate | October 2022

development in all sectors within a decade if the right visionary leadership emerges. We do understand that all IFIs use country strategy documents, as these are fundamental to establishing an IFI’s lending priorities for a particular country. For these documents to be effective, it should be based on the country’s own vision for its long-term development even when written by the IFI as the document lays out the IFI’s support program for that particular country. We have our minds set on developing a comprehensive 10 year-national development plan that can be shared

with all development partners so that they can better understand our vision for the future of our nation as well as the priority areas. For the coming future, I believe Sudan require more on the field of comprehensive technical support. Having a National Development Plan in place will avoid the classical “Dialogue of the Deaf” situation that is frequently encountered in communication between our government and the various external partners The country can be put in a speedy growth track in directing foreign and domestic investment towards agriculture and mining in addition to infrastructure.

ME 1. CUT ON THE DOTTED LINE 2. ROTATE 180 DEGREES

ABOUT •

Dr. Ibrahim was born on 10th of May 1955 in Al-Tina, North Darfur, in what was then the Anglo-Egyptian colony of Sudan. He studied his Undergraduate degree at the University of Khartoum, before leaving Sudan at the age of 24 years old.

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Ibrahim was offered a scholarship in Japan, where he spent 7 years, completing his Masters and Doctorate in economics, and becoming a fluent Japanese speaker. He later returned to Sudan, before leaving again for Chad in 2000 due to his opposition to the government. A year later, in 2001, he moved to the UAE where he worked in the Cargo forwarding business.

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Dr. Ibrahim served as the Economic Advisor for JEM and later as its Secretary of Foreign Affairs before being elected as the Movement’s Chairperson in 2012. He was also one of JEM’s key negotiators since 2005.

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During the 1990’s Dr. Ibrahim taught as a university professor at Imam University in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

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He was appointed as Minister of Finance and Economic Planning back in February 2021.

IF YOU WANT A GREAT COUNTRY, WORK ON IT TOGETHER

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SUDAN RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK

SUDAN NATIONAL RESILIENCE AND RECOVERY FRAMEWORK

Disaster events result in consequences that affect individuals, communities, regions, and nations depending on the scale and seriousness of the event. The most vulnerable are those that suffer the most as they lack the resources to rebound following an event.

his document provides the general guiding principles and concepts of recovery management, which will be applied to Sudan disaster caused by the flooding event of September 2020. It sets out the prioritization for action and the arrangements for implementation. Recovery is described by the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) as: ‘The coordinated efforts and processes to affect the immediate, medium- and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a disaster’. Recovery is a developmental and a remedial process encompassing the following activities: • Minimising the escalation of the consequences of the disaster; • Regeneration of the social, emotional, economic, and physical wellbeing of individuals & communities; • Instilling resilience to meet the social, economic, natural, and built environments future needs; • Reducing future exposure to hazards and their associated risks. The leadership of the country is keen to instil the concept of resilience into the fabric of the Sudanese society.

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For so many years the country has suffered from ineffective approaches to disaster recovery and this resulted in even more suffering struggle for the vulnerable members of the society. The proposed recovery approach will aim to reduce the level of vulnerability; and hence improve the ability of the various society components to deal with future disasters. As part of the undertaking of the Rapid Post Disaster Needs And Recovery Assessment, commissioned and led by the Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS), following Sudan’s worst flooding in decades, a resilience and recovery strategy has been prepared, which will work to meet the needs of the people and support the vision and work towards the fulfilment of the Sudan Transition Government Programme. The strategy recognizes the broader challenges facing the country as it grapples with a complex political transition, treats with measures to achieve macroeconomic stability, addresses the health crisis due to the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic while all at the same time increasing population displacement.

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SUDAN RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK

followed by Employments, Livelihoods and Social Protection (24%), Energy (8%) and Water, Sanitation & Water Resource Management (5%)

The strategy therefore will seek to adopt an integrated approach – or whole of government approach – to recovery and resilience building. The country experienced extraordinary rainfall in the summer of 2020 which caused deaths, displacement, and massive destructions to key infrastructure and livelihoods across seventeen of the eighteen states of the country, with Blue Nile, Khartoum, North Darfur, Sennar, and West Darfur states amongst the hardest hit. The result was unprecedented floods affecting the entire length of the country. The worst effects of the floods were experienced by those already vulnerable populations such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and women headed households and their children. One third of cultivated land and about 3 million people from agricultural households were directly affected. According to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) the rains/floods have affected thousands of people in many states in the country. The impact of the floods was felt in many sectors of the economy and in villages and cities across Sudan. Many cultural sites of great significance, not only to the Sudanese community but to the world archaeological community, have been

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Cultural sites that have been damaged are earmarked to be restored, repaired, or retrofitted as needed impacted by the disastrous floods. This due to the fact that ancient Sudanese civilizations were mostly near the Nile. Additionally, many people lost their living heritage as a result of the floods that have taken their homes, forcing them to live in shelters. The total estimated damage across all sectors amounted to SDG 183.77 billion or USD 3.34 billion. The indicative160 cost of recovery will be SDG 379.87 billion or USD 6.91 billion, to be disbursed over a five year period (see Table 19 1). As summarized in Figure 19 1, the housing sector accounts for over half (57%) of the total estimated recovery costs,

VISION The vision of “Building a democratic, development-based State for everyone, where citizens will all enjoy peace, freedom, justice and welfare,” is the driving force of the Recovery Strategy. (General Framework for the Programme of the Transitional Government) Guiding principles The following are the five guiding principles discussed and agreed with the leadership of the Higher Committee for Flood Mitigation which will guide Sudan’s recovery efforts. Each principle is meant to describe an action that realises a certain outcome: 1. Restore Livelihood to preserve lives. 2. Improve Resilience to minimise risks. 3. Involve Community to ensure sustainability. 4. Align with Governance to maximise coordination; and 5. Leverage on Humanitarian Effort to avoid redundancy. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY Disaster events result in consequences that affect individuals, households, communities, regions, and nations depending on the scale, intensity, and type of the event. The general principles and concepts of recovery management should be applied to all scales of disaster. The recovery strategy adopts a holistic – all of government approach – which highlights the importance of coordination across sectors/policy domains as well as between the different levels of government. Such an approach to recovery measures ensures that measures not only meet the needs required for mitigation against future flooding, but where possible addresses the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and supports the governance needs of the TGoS. In that regard the Strategy seeks to support the most relevant priorities for recovery

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SUDAN RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK

as set out in the General Framework for the Programme of the Transitional Government: • Addressing the economic crisis and establishing the bases of sustainable development. • Promoting public and private freedoms and safeguarding human rights. • Ensuring the promotion of the rights of women in all areas and their equitable representation in the structures of governance. • Supporting social welfare and development and preserving the environment. • Enhancing the role of youth of both sexes and expanding their opportunities in all areas. It will be the guiding principles, however, that provide the implementation strategy for the recovery processes. Figure 19 2 illustrates how the principles should guide the recovery efforts in the short, medium, and long term. Recovery measures are presented according to the sectors which have been assessed, the cross-cutting issues and the human impact of the event. It is evident that the event has had a very high impact on the people, particularly the already poor and the internally displaced. The human impact analysis undertaken suggests that there will be need to provide support for personal debt relief, for seeds and agricultural inputs, veterinary and livestock support, animal feed due to damaged pastures and lack of income to purchase feed, the replacement of lost poultry, goats and donkeys used for draught, and vaccines to prevent spread of animal diseases. For households; construction of latrines has been identified as a priority. The following measures for resilience building and recovery identified in the report are highlighted to meet the recovery needs of the people: • Livelihood Restoration - the restoration of livelihoods disrupted,

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B A L A N C E D E L E G A N C E

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will be undertaken through the establishment of cash for work programmes: to meet the needs of the agricultural sector and to support farmers; works on rebuilding and retrofitting irrigation projects; and skills training to support house building and resettlement with new methodologies to withstand future flooding. Cash grants to supplement income loss due to destruction of produce ready for harvest and as support to SMEs involved in the agro-processing area. As part of the restoration of livelihoods the distribution of seeds and seedlings and food aid will be undertaken where necessary. Resilience Improvement – will be most evident in the physical infrastructure sectors that requires reconstruction or repair. Based on the building back better principle, infrastructure teams will repair, reconstruct, relocate and retrofit infrastructure to withstand future floods. Rehabilitating the transportation network of roads and bridges. With regard to housing, the aim is to repair, reconstruct, and where necessary relocate damaged and destroyed housing and provide

training in improved techniques for families involved in home construction. In addition, zoning and avoiding urban development in hazard-prone areas will be undertaken. In the energy sector the team will seek to reconstruct, repair and rehabilitate damaged facilities; provide renewable energy systems to provide power to communities that are cut off; establish standard operation procedures (SOPs) for emergency preparedness and disaster response; develop and implement improved safety standards and building codes; carry out longterm development planning for power generation, transmission, distribution, improvement program, increase power supply coverage, and explore alternate sources of energy; strengthening the uses of solar energy. With regard to educational facilities the teams intend to explore modelling through the use of local materials in different regions, taking into account the educational standards and the particular culture and customs, such as those of nomadic peoples. Where it is deemed that schools require relocation the appropriate risk and vulnerability

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SUDAN RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK

•

surveys will be undertaken. Cultural sites that have been damaged are earmarked to be restored, repaired, or retrofitted as needed. The damaged sporting facilities are to be to be reconstructed and repaired with consideration of lessons learnt and ensuring future flooding risks are addressed during restoration work. Community Involvement - The recovery strategy seeks to enhance communities’ involvement in terms of improving risk awareness and strengthening disaster preparedness at the community/local level. For that, the Transitional Government of Sudan will invest in building capacities of community members, organizations, and local governments to better understand and respond to future emergencies. Introduce on-line services (e-governance) thus reducing face to face and paper-based services and increase efficiency in the delivery of government services to the people and strengthen online capabilities and facilities for teachers and children. Develop School Flood Preparedness Plans and create School Disaster Risk Management Committees; incorporate Disaster Risk Reduction principles and approaches into schools’ curricula; Strengthen psychological health programmes with focus on DRR (through psychosocial support and school counselling) for both students and teachers; provide training in primary health for students and children in view of the recent floods and COVID-19. Water Education courses for youth of both sexes is proposed to increase youth resilience in managing water disasters such as floods and droughts. In the area of culture there is a recommendation to mobilize communities in the management and protection of key cultural sites and develop and strengthen communitybased tourism. Governance Alignment – Efforts will be undertaken to ensure accountability and transparency by

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•

strengthening inter-governmental alignment through the establishment and activation of systems to control State revenue and expenditure, by means of using networks and modern technologies. Humanitarian leverage – Through the strengthening of partnerships with the development community the Transitional Government of Sudan will seek to deliver the programme for resilience and recovery. With the support of the humanitarian actors and the development partners the Transitional Government of Sudan can jointly leverage resources for the recovery efforts. The Transitional Government of Sudan will guarantee that the necessary action are taken to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the population are met while human rights are safeguarded, by adopting and encouraging oversight and supporting bodies, mechanisms and societies for human rights issues, adopting and enforcing international human rights conventions, starting with the International Bill of Human Rights, particularly the rights of women and children; and promoting and ensuring religious freedoms in a way that preserves the peoples’ absolute right to practice their religious rituals. It is expected that measures will be carried out on a phased basis using the short, medium- and long-term timeframe as detailed in the sector reports. Action will be based on the Common Values and Principles of the TGoS. Among those that are immediately applicable to the recovery strategy are the following: “Celebrating diversity and plurality; respecting and promoting human dignity and

rights; Inclusive participation and joint social responsibility; Justice and equality; Financial and administrative transparency and accountability; Promoting peace and tolerance; Upholding the national interest; and encouraging Innovation and creativity”. In the General Framework for the Transitional Government Programme, the TGoS states that “The institutions of both the State and society shall work in full harmony and effective partnership with the regional and international community to meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people in attaining the bases for realizing the desired common vision, the programmes and plans of the transitional period.” It is within this spirit that the Recovery strategy is presented with the details provided in the sector reports. Institutional Arrangements for Recovery With Sudan’s Disaster & Emergency Risk Management Authority, a permanent strategic federal body was established to coordinate national, regional, and international efforts in the field of disaster risk management. Beyond leading implementation of the overall recoverystrategy, the establishment of this authority will support the current

efforts to manage disasters and emergencies, and will benefit from the experiences of humanitarian aid and emergency committees to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of torrents and floods. This body will work to institutionalize the efforts made in the context of dealing with the recent flood disaster, which witnessed a measure of success in activating the mechanisms of damage assessment, estimating losses, defining needs and formulating recovery plans through the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) project that was implemented with the participation of 15 Ministries and over 13 international organizations coordinated by the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) operating under the Higher Committee for Floods Mitigation. The Disaster & Emergency Risk Management Authority is a federal body with branches in the 18 States, supervised by a coordinating Supreme Council headed by the Prime Minister, assisted by the Minister of Social Development acting as the Council’s Rapporteur. The executive arm of the Council is conducted by a General Secretary with the rank of a State Minister and who is appointed by the Prime Minister. The Authority consists of a number of strategic units concerned with managing disaster related information and making strategic and emergency decisions,

The institutions of both the State and society shall work in full harmony and effective partnership with the regional and international community to meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people in attaining the bases for realizing the desired common vision, the programmes and plans of the transitional period while supporting and following up on the implementation mechanisms in coordination with the relevant authorities The Authority also works to support the efforts of the emergency committees that are established according to need in the event of disasters, to carry out specific tasks.

The duties of the Authority are as follows: • Developing policies, strategies and programs related to disaster and emergency risk reduction; • Managing the Disaster Management Information Centre and coordinating research and studies while keeping an inventory of damages and emergency needs; • Establishing guidelines and frameworks for early warning mechanism, as well as disaster precautions in coordination with the relevant government agencies; • Coordination between national, regional, and international bodies concerned with disaster risk reduction; • Activating partnerships and supporting the implementation of regional and international agreements to achieve the effectiveness of preparedness, response, and disaster recovery efforts; • Supporting mobilization efforts, media and communication between the relevant authorities and affected parties and communities; • Drafting regular professional reports on disasters forecasts, damages, needs and interventions; • Support efforts and mechanisms for The Strategic Inventory mechanism and all related logistical needs.

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INVESTMENT

SUDAN:

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INVESTMENT ACT OF 2021 BY A MGA D N A GY, MA H MOUD BA S S IOU N Y, N A D IA A BDA LLA H, YA S S I R A LI

he Republic of Sudan is moving forward to attract the attention of national and foreign investors. On December 14 2020, Sudan was officially removed from the US’s ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ list. This was further followed by an announcement from the President of France, Emanuel Macron, of the cancellation of $5 billion from Sudan’s debt on May 17 2021. In light of the improvement of the Sudanese national economy, Sudan has published several new legislations to set out a more flexible and effective legal framework. This includes, among others, the new Investment Encouragement Act, 2021 issued on April 11 2021 (the New Investment Act) cancelling the previous Investment Act, 2013 (the Old Investment Act), the Public Private Partnership Act, 2021, and the new Banking Act, 2021. The New Investment Act introduces new provisions, establishes additional investment authorities, and adopts advanced concepts as explained below. The New Investment Act maintains the following types of projects, which were regulated under the Old Investment Act, while providing further clarification in relation to the definition of each of them: 34 | Elaborate | October 2022

October 2022 | Elaborate | 35

INVESTMENT • •

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State project: any investment project established in Sudan in accordance with the requirements set forth by the newly established Investment and Private Sector Development Authority (Authority) in which the conditions of the national project do not apply; Investment project: any economic activity licensed by virtue of the New Investment Act; National project: any cross-border investment project between different Sudanese states which is based on the investment, exploitation of the natural resources, or underground national resources, or participated in by the state, which affects the domestic communities, or controls strategic products and services of the state including, foreign investment; and Strategic project: a project established by virtue of an agreement with the government of Sudan.

developing entrepreneurship, creativity, as well as emerging, small, and medium companies, in addition to protecting the environment and public health, and encouraging scientific research and using modern technology in different production sectors. NEW INVESTMENT AUTHORITIES The Authority The New Investment Act establishes the Authority for Investment, Development of Private Sector and Units subject to the Supervision thereof (the Authority) which enjoys most of the competences previously vested in the High Authority established under the Old Investment Act. The Authority shall be constituted by virtue of a Prime Minister decree and headed by the Minster of Investment, and shall supervise the following units: • The investment encouragement and progressing investor services unit; • The public and private sectors partnership unit: • The market and free zones unit: and • The leading small and medium companies (Article 6). The Authority is the supreme authority in charge of investments-related matters. Its powers, which are listed under the New Investment Act, include, without limitation: • Approving the general policies, strategies, plans, and programs required to achieve investment

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purposes and following up on the execution thereof; Revising laws related to investment; and Cooperating with the investmentrelated authorities (Article 7).

The Operation Rooms The New Investment Act provides that the Minister of Investment shall establish: • The ‘Investment Lands Operation Room’ for the purposes of cooperating with the relevant Sudanese state to determine the lands designated for investment; and • The ‘State Investments Operation Room’ to cooperate between the Ministry of Investment and foreign cooperation (Ministry of Investment) and the Sudanese states to achieve the purpose of national investment (Articles 13 and 14). The Insurance Guarantee Company The New Investment Act provides for the incorporation of a company to guarantee insurance of national and foreign investment (the Insurance Guarantee Company) in accordance with the Companies Act of 2015. The purpose of the Insurance Guarantee Company shall include insurance against: • The risk of currency conversion; • The risk of confiscation and nationalisation: • The risk of war, social dispute, and civil rebellion;

The risk of terminating a contract in violation of the law; and Non-commercial risks pursuant to the relevant international conventions (Article 27.1).

The insurance of a project may be undertaken by the investor in consideration for annual installments fixed under the company’s articles of association. The Ministry of Investment may participate in the insurance through installments fixed pursuant to its discretionary power, such participation is made by the means of a set-off through deduction from the obligations of the project toward the state of Sudan (Article 27). The Insurance Guarantee Company has the right to proceed with reinsurance activities with international Arabic institutions, in which Sudan is a party (Article 27.3). INVESTMENT INCENTIVES & SOCIAL LIABILITY Investment incentives and privileges All investments in Sudan enjoy fair and equitable treatment. Investment projects that ascertain economic interests benefit, among others, from the following privileges. Privileges Foreign investors are offered residence in Sudan for the duration of the project. Further, no fees shall apply on projects except by virtue of an approval of the Ministry of Investment. Accordingly, the Ministry of Investment shall fix the fees thus promoting competition between investments in Sudan. Customs and taxes exemptions The New Investment Act provides for an exemption from the following customs duties: (i) the fee applicable to the capital required for the setup and preparations of a project; and (ii) on specific transportation as determined by the regulations. Furthermore, an investment project is exempt from business profit tax for a period not exceeding five years from the commercial production date in accordance with the regulations. It is expected that the exemption period will be fixed on a case-by-case basis within the limit of

five years from the commercial production date. The investment project is also exempt from value added tax (VAT) in accordance with the list approved by the Ministry of Investment. Allocating the land The Investment Lands Operation Room shall prepare the project land in cooperation with the Sudanese states, and fix the general and specific requirements of each project with regard to allocating the project land. The duration of contracts over investment lands is three years subject to renewal with the license as determined by the regulations. Preferential incentives The Authority may grant additional privileges for projects in accordance with the regulations. Such privileges are subject to the fulfillment of the determined timeline for project execution. Social liability The New Investment Act innovates the concept of social liability. An investor may allocate a percentage of the annual dividends of a project to participate in

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Protection of the environment; Healthcare, social, cultural, or any other development services • Training and scientific research; and • Any other field as agreed with the competent authorities. The Minister of Investment may, in cooperation with the relevant ministries, issue a list of the best projects which undertake social development activities. LICENSING REGIME Granting the license The New Investment Act allows any person to undertake an investment project upon obtaining the required licenses. In the case of national projects, negotiations shall be held with the relevant state. The license duration is three years subject to renewal following the fulfillment of the required information in accordance with the regulations relating to the New Investment Act, noting that such regulations have not yet been issued. Failure to execute the investment project within the duration of the license would result in cancellation of the license (Article 23).

The New Investment Act aims to prepare the investment environment to attract investments in line with the targets and priorities of Sudan, as well as increasing the economic growth rate, creating job opportunities, and exploiting natural and human resources social development, which amounts will be deducted from the investor’s tax base. The type and scale of social liability is determined upon the issuance of the license (Article 28). Given the voluntary language of the New Investment Act regarding the allocation of a percentage of the annual dividends to participate in the social liability, it is presumed that the determination of the social liability type and scale under the license will occur following the approval of the investor to participate thereto. The New Investment Act lists the domains in which an investor may participate including:

Investment-related ministries and regions (the competent bodies) have the right to issue a preliminary approval in respect of the establishment of a project on the basis of a technical, economic, and social feasibility study, as well as following up on the execution of the project and reporting periodically to the to the Ministry of Investment (Article 10). The single-window system The single-window system, which was created by the old Investment Act, in order to facilitate the services delivery, was maintained under the New Investment Act. The single-window system covers all October 2022 | Elaborate | 37

INVESTMENT 34.2 of the New Investment Act (e.g. the Investment Disputes Settlements Raised Between the Arab States Convention of 1974); and the principle for the establishment of competent courts by the head of the judiciary, and competent public prosecutions by the public prosecutor for the violations in relation to investments, as already provided under the Old Investment Act (Article 33 and 34). Sudanese states, in addition to including coordinators from the competent ministries and governmental units related to investment (the investment coordinators) (Article 9). The investment coordinators shall have the same powers of the entities they represent, and shall be competent to undertake a technical review of the licenses requests (Article 11.3). INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS General limitations The investor may not, except upon the approval of the Minister of Investment, undertake any of the following (Article 24): • To amend the project size, the purpose for which the license was granted, or changing the site of the project specified in the license as approved by the competent bodies; • To use or sell the equipment, machinery, material, or transportation means which enjoyed privileges for any a purpose other than that specified in the license; • To create a pledge over the project, equipment, machinery, or transportation means in order to acquire financing for the project; • To dissolve the partnership or transfer the ownership of the company; • To dispose of the land granted for the investment project whether by sale or pledge except after it is fully invested in accordance with the regulations. It is expected that the regulations to determine the criteria of ‘full invested’ project will be confirmed, as it is not specified under the New Investment Act (e.g. full construction of the project is completed, or the elapse of the license duration etc.); and • To divide an investment project by any means.

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Limitations on foreign investments The New Investment Act provides that the Authority shall, on the basis of the recommendation of the Minister of Investment, issue a list including certain sectors and economic activities which are not subject to foreign investment. Given the novelty of the New Investment Act, such a list has not yet been issued. It is worth noting that the New Investment Act refers to the unissued regulations with regard to fixing minimum capital requirements for foreign investors (Article 22.1). The Authority is competent to issue regulations required to enforce the provisions of the New Investment Act, which regulations have not yet been issued (Article 39.1). Prior to obtaining the license, a foreign investor must pay an amount not less than $250,000 or its equivalent of the foreign currencies admissible by the Central Bank of Sudan as evidence of commitment in accordance with the regulations. It is expected that the regulations will specify the relevant authority to which the investor is entitled to pay such amount, given that it is not determined under the New Investment Act. Such an amount will be used to finance the relevant project after obtaining the license (Article 22.2). DISPUTE RESOLUTION Dispute resolution mechanism The New Investment Act maintains: • The dispute resolution mechanism provided under the Old Investment Act, whereby any dispute in relation to an investment shall be settled by the competent court unless the • parties agree to arbitration or conciliation, to the extent the dispute does not fall under the umbrella of the conventions stated under Article

The New Investment Act creates a plaint mechanism which was not tackled under the Old Investment Act. A ‘plaint committee’ shall be established by the Authority to examine the complaints regarding the decisions issued by virtue of the New Investment Act. The plaint committee shall issue its decision in relation to the complaint within a period not exceeding three weeks from the date of receiving the complaint (Article 38). Violations and penalties The Minister of Investment has the right to impose the following penalties (to be registered under the ‘investment register’ of the investment project) in case of violation of the provisions of Article 23 or 24 of the New Investment Act in relation to granting licenses and the general limitations on investment elaborated above (Article 37): • Serving written notice requesting the cure of the violation within the period specified in the notice; • Total or partial deprivation of the privileges and exemptions granted to the violator in accordance with the regulations; • Suspension of works until the violation is cured; • Cancellation of the license in case of violation of the provisions of the New Investment Act, the regulations issued pursuant thereto, or the licensing conditions; and the • Cancellation of the license in case of suspension of the activities or business performance of the investment project for a period exceeding one year without notifying the Authority, or delay for a period exceeding one year from the date of the operation under the timeline submitted by the investor when requesting the license without an acceptable excuse.

WORK | PLAY | EAT

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SECTOR FOCUS

SUDAN’S GRAIN DIVIDE A Revolution of Bread and Sorghum BY: EDWARD THOMAS, MAGDI EL-GIZOULI

n December 2018, a financial crisis brought people out on to the streets of Sudan’s cities in and around the northern Nile valley—the cultural heartland of the state. One symptom of the crisis was the government’s decision to remove a long-standing subsidy on wheat, which had caused the price of bread—a favoured food of urban Sudanese—to suddenly and significantly increase. The protests soon shifted from a focus on the ill-performing economy into a more general howl of rage at President Omar al-Bashir’s three decades in power. Several months later, in April 2019, they played an important role in bringing Bashir’s thirty-year rule to an abrupt end. Important as they were, the 2018/19 protests were one dramatic act in the much longer and deeper tragedy of Sudan’s modern political economy. It was urban bread-eaters, both the better-o and poorer beneficiaries of National Congress Party (NCP) rule, who took to the streets. Their grievances were also shared by the wider urbanbased elite, but were distant and distinct from those of the rural peripheries, who mostly eat sorghum, and had arguably suffered and resisted the Bashir regime for much longer. THE TASTE OF SUDAN’S RURALURBAN DIVIDE Most people in Sudan live of sorghum. In 2018/19—considered a bumper harvest year—Sudanese farmers produced about 7 million tonnes of it. It is Sudan’s biggest crop, well-adapted to cope with the heat and unpredictable aridity of the country’s vast rain-fed savannahs, and most of its diverse ecological zones. 2018/19 was a bumper year for wheat too, with almost 600,000 tonnes produced. The wheat harvest is smaller because it only grows on Sudan’s narrow strips of irrigated land, and only in northern areas, where the weather cools down in the winter (December and January). But although Sudan grows more sorghum than wheat, the country’s cities mostly eat wheat bread. Despite the good wheat harvest in 2019, domestic production only provided about a quarter

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SECTOR FOCUS

of the consumption needs of Sudan’s cities. The rest was imported. In 2017, wheat made up 9.9 percent of Sudan’s imports by dollar value. When Sudan can’t finance its imports, it has bread crises and bread uprisings, which start in the wheaten cities. In 1985 wheat made up a tenth of imports, and a different financial/ bread crisis toppled a different ruler in a different Khartoum intifada. Wheat has been a subsidised commodity in Sudan since 1969 (sorghum, in contrast, is taxed). The subsidy was introduced by the government as a way to manage hunger and discontent among the soldiers, civil servants and traders of Khartoum, which was then a relatively small city. However, because it is subsidised, wheat imposes other big costs on Sudan’s economy. By the 1980s, one fifth of Sudan’s population had moved to the cities (today about one third live in cities, and one sixth lives in Greater Khartoum). The 1980s financial crises and 1985 intifada helped Sudan’s rulers understand better the secret to maintaining their grip on power—they could withstand enormous famines in the countryside as long as they managed urban food security. The famines of the 1980s were enormous. The global financial crises of 44 | Elaborate | October 2022

the 1980s led to a debt crisis across Africa and a couple of decades of total austerity and economic contraction. In Sudan, the costs of the crisis were passed to peripheral areas like Darfur or present-day South Sudan (then Southern Sudan). Over the next few decades, social services collapsed, food deficits deepened, wars spread, and more and more people were pushed towards towns. In Sudan, when people are pushed towards towns, they are pushed towards wheat. In 2015, USAID’s Famine Early Warning Network (FEWSNET) found evidence that up to 90 percent of newly displaced people shift from sorghum and millet to wheat bread within a few years of displacement. Evidence for this was found in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, where displaced people were seen to be trading humanitarian rations of sorghum for commercial bread. Bread is fast food for people working outside the home and a time-saver for the kitchen workforce. Also, for many people, the pale and flavourless wheat rolls of the commercial bakeries taste more sophisticated, more aspirational than darker, sourer sorghum pancakes and porridges.

BREAD IN THE POST-OIL ECONOMY The story of bread in Sudan illustrates the mixture of aspiration and coercion that the previous regime foisted on the country for thirty long years. The cost of the wheat subsidy increased as moreand-more people moved to the cities. Well-connected commercial interests clustered around the subsidy, which operates in several ways. First, the central bank gives private wheat exporters access to foreign currency at a preferential exchange rate, which in 2017 was about a third of the parallel (or black-) market rate.1 Second, the government purchases privately procured and milled grain and sells it at discounted prices. Finally, the wheat magnates pay over the odds for their wheat: between 2010 and 2014, importers paid between USD 372 and 445 per tonne, while the cost of all US grades of wheat stayed below USD 300.2. A recent report from FEWSNET delicately explained that the wheat market has ‘the potential to be heavily impacted by other opaque and unpredictable policies and expenditure patterns. This was another way of saying that two wheat companies were run by two of the biggest commercial families in Sudan and the third was run by an entrepreneur reportedly linked to the government’s security and intelligence service. At the start of 2018, the government began cutting wheat subsidies. This was part of its response to the long financial crisis which began after the 2011 secession of South Sudan ended the country’s oil boom and led to a long-term shortage of hard currency. The government tried various schemes to make up for lost oil revenues. It leased millions of hectares of agricultural land and Nile water access to Gulf investors, including a patch of land the size of Bahrain to Bahrain. It turned thousands, perhaps millions, of farmers into artisanal miners who rushed to the gold-rich regions in the country’s dusty, violent peripheries. The central bank tried to monopolize the gold sector and outbid all other

buyers, using another manipulation of the exchange rate. The bank paid for gold in Sudanese pounds, at a price reflecting parallel (or black-) market foreign currency rates. Deeply indebted since the 1980s, the bank could not borrow foreign exchange from international markets to pay for gold, so it printed money, sending inflation upwards. It sold the gold on international markets, and then sold the foreign currency it earned back to importers at the official exchange rate, far lower than the rate used when purchasing gold. In 2017, the IMF estimated that this loss-making strategy for controlling the gold supply cost the government 1.8 percent of gross domestic product and the central bank decided to reduce its share of the gold market.5 But Sudan still ran short of foreign exchange. When the US lifted some of its economic sanctions in 2017, demand for imports and foreign currency rose, pushing up inflation and forcing the government to print more Sudanese pounds. The IMF encouraged the government to open up the economy, including an attempt to accede to the World Trade Organization. However, Osama Daoud, Sudan’s biggest wheat supplier and one of its richest men, told the Financial Times a few weeks before the December 2018 protests began that this made things worse. As part of WTO accession, the government lowered tariffs, making imports cheaper before it could increase its exports. The trade deficit exacerbated the currency crunch and a domestic cash shortage. The central bank was forced to set withdrawal limits on foreign currency and even on Sudanese pounds: businesses could not pay for wages or inputs, eventually consumers could not even get hold of enough money for a weekly shop. The government became desperate and signed away USD 100 million of oil rights and 3,000 square miles of agricultural land to Turkey. It even flirted with the idea that Russia could build a naval base in Port Sudan. AUSTERITY AND REFORM In addition to its (mostly ineffective) attempts to generate foreign currency, the government adopted deep austerity

measures. The IMF had long encouraged it to cut subsidies on fuel and wheat, and the government began to reduce its fuel subsidies soon after South Sudan’s secession. In early 2018 it cut the wheat subsidy. It also trialed even bigger price increases in the cities of the northern Nile valley, where it mistakenly believed it enjoyed more popular loyalty. However, it was these places that were the first to take to the streets in December 2018. Fuel subsidies can be criticized in this era of climate change, and bread subsidies can be criticised for favouring wheaten cities over sorghum villages and nomad camps. But these are not the main reasons why the IMF has run a campaign against subsidies for energy and food across the Middle East and Africa. Its objection to subsidies

Sudan has moved away from the sour, partly fermented sorghum porridges, the sorghum beers and paper-thin sorghum at breads of the countryside. Cities need fast food. When the summer sit-ins disrupted bread supplies in the capital, some of the city’s cosmopolitans bemoaned the fact that they had to eat sorghum porridge during Ramadan. The bumper sorghum harvest in 2018/19 meant that in Darfur, agrarian families were eating better than the year previous. But a WFP survey of 13 mostly agrarian states found that about one third were food insecure and that hunger was worsening, even in Sudan’s breadbasket, Gedaref. In West Darfur and West Kordofan, more than half of households were food insecure. The survey found that

In Sudan, when people are pushed towards towns, they are pushed towards wheat. In 2015, USAID’s Famine Early Warning Network (FEWSNET) found evidence that up to 90 percent of newly displaced people shift from sorghum and millet to wheat bread within a few years of displacement is that they are regressive— that they benefit the rich more than the poor. An IMF report on Sudan’s economy in 2017 provided some evidence for the regressive character of energy subsidies, but no evidence of the regressive character of food subsidies. (In a 2014 report, the World Bank was more respectful about the lack of evidence, recognizing that universal food subsidies can stabilize food prices and act as social safety nets for poor people.) THE SORGHUM ECONOMY IN CRISIS Sudan’s wheaten bread crisis explains a lot about the way that money, migration and urban politics work in Sudan. But Sudan’s sorghum crisis is deeper. Sorghum is the food of Sudan’s antiquity: archaeologists trace the boundary between ancient Sahelian porridge and pot cultures and Near Eastern bread and oven cultures in Nubia, just south of the Egyptian border. But today, urban

women are hardest hit. Women are very involved in agricultural production in Darfur, but the nature of that production has changed, to their disadvantage. Fifty years ago, production was oriented towards household consumption, but now it is oriented towards market sale. When food gets turned into money, women food producers typically have less control over it. Women still play a big role in production, but much less of a role in marketing, and so they do not have the same level of control over the fruits of their labour. Households headed by women had particularly low purchasing power and were more likely to be hungry. The worst were people engaging in non-agricultural wage labour or charcoal collection, two desperation strategies. This sorghum system of peripheral exploitation pre-dated the Islamist government. And the victims of the sorghum system did not play a significant part in the 2018-2019 bread October 2022 | Elaborate | 45

SECTOR FOCUS

protests. For decades, their protests have turned into peripheral insurgencies, which have been thwarted by government counterinsurgency (usually involving locally recruited mercenary forces). These insurgencies were not able to challenge the economic changes, which the Bashir government made in the peripheries. The main economic achievement of Bashir’s government was to supercharge the system of peripheral exploitation, using militias to clear populations away from oil fields and gold fields, and then setting up opaque currency mechanisms that allowed private elements within the state to siphon o profits. At the same time, Bashir cut back hard on education and health, pouring the state’s money into the security services. He used racism, religious prejudice and tribalism to divide the periphery. His oil booms and gold rushes created great wealth, and he spent that wealth on managing the system. His mix of an authoritarian version of Islam and the market shaped Sudan’s most durable postindependence government and offered a template for authoritarian market management which may outlast him. CAN A WHEAT-EATING COALITION TRANSFORM SUDAN? Formed in August 2019, Sudan’s transitional government is a coalition of Bashir’s former powerbase, the security forces, and his former political opponents, drawn from the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), which emerged out of the protest movement in 2019. The security forces have half the seats in the Sovereignty Council (the 46 | Elaborate | October 2022

collective head of state), and control two security ministries—the rest of the cabinet is nominated by the FFC. The Central Bank, which sets the different foreign exchange rates, still falls under the Sovereign Council, who may well include beneficiaries of those exchange rates. The government is warily backed by the young revolutionaries on the urban street and is bidding for support from the commanders of the peripheral insurgencies. The FFC needs to work with its coalition partners in the security forces. But, somewhat incompatibly, it also needs to come up with an agenda to end Sudan’s wars and its hunger crisis, and the extractive, economic system which underpins them (and nances its coalition partners). In the 2020 budget, wheat subsidies were maintained alongside big increases in health and education spending and a new universal basic income covering 60 to 80 percent of the population. Despite some improvement, Sudan’s health and education spending rates are rising from a very low base. The 2020 budget proposals were to be financed, in part, by removing fuel subsidies, which took up a more significant proportion of the budget.12 But at the last minute, the FFC demanded that the government maintain all subsidies until an economic conference scheduled for March 2020. The FFC is a movement largely led by established politicians who are nonetheless answerable to the street, and it might find it difficult to renege on the bread slogans for which dozens of brave youngsters gave their lives. Both the government and the FFC

agree that the wheat subsidy should be maintained. The government’s commitment to both food accessibility and social spending may offer a way forward for a deeply fragmented country organized around the spatial injustices of its agricultural and extractive economy. The principle of universality— that all people in Sudan should enjoy food, health care, education and income support—which the new government is promoting by investing in healthcare, education or basic income across the country, helps foster the belief that a life lived in Darfur is worth the same as one lived in Khartoum. But it is not possible for the government to spend its way out of its inherited crises, which are reproduced on a daily basis by Sudan’s systems of wealth generation. Sudan’s wealth is produced in a way that serves the interests of a relatively small group of politically well-connected people, extracting economic benefits from the country’s vast spatial inequalities. Replacing peripheral exploitation with peripheral investment in less grueling, less violent production systems needs a radical reconsideration of the whole economy. Without a radical reconsideration of Sudan’s economic direction, the new government will need to woo its donors the military corporations, the Gulf palaces, the international financial institutions—and allow their priorities to dislodge those of the revolutionaries. Donor priorities are likely to be reducing inflation, stabilising the balance of payments, maintaining profit rates in the periphery, and maintaining urban stability. The government is likely to continue the commercialisation of the peripheries through, for example, cash transfers, even though several decades of commercialization does not appear to have improved productivity or reduced poverty. If they do not rework Sudan’s bread and sorghum systems, the government may end up maintaining the market authoritarianism, which the previous regime had almost perfected. This briefing was originally published in XCEPT Website https://xcept-research.org/publication/ sudans-grain-divide-a-revolution-of-breadand-sorghum/

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October 2022 | Elaborate | 47 @bdrairlines

STRAIGHT VOICE The World Press Photo of the Year Mohamed Youssef chanting revolutionary poetry following the ousting of former president Omar al-Bashir in 2019 PHOTOGRAPHER YASUYOSHI CHIBA AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 48 | Elaborate | October 2022

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EDUCATION

SUDAN’S EDUCATION DILEMMA BETWEEN COSTLY EXCELLENCE AND AFFORDABLE AVERAGENESS BY SARAH BAKRI, M.A. IN INTERNATIONAL AND MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT AHFAD UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN - SUDAN 50 | Elaborate | October 2022

ducation is the most important investment in our lives for it determines the future of our children and our nations. It is the potential cure for every disease. It changes how we behave as citizens and how we feel as human beings about ourselves and others. There’s no problem that cannot be resolved in the short or the long term by investing in education. Education saves lives and gives us the means for a better, brighter present and future. Education in Sudan is a tricky subject that cannot be covered in just one article for its challenges are numerous

and diverse. It is quite difficult to gather information as there are little or no published reports or evaluations that are accessible to the public. So, one has to make his own analysis based on personal or professional experience or research, and discussion with educators and educated people who are non-educators and the public to reflect different perspectives about their experience with schools in Sudan. Schooling in Sudan is quite challenging. There are many public schools that offer free tuition. So tuition is free, but books and supplies are not. Also, students are required to pay “compulsory donations” to the school at the time of enrolment and again during the academic year, whenever the school is in need of resources such as extra desks or maintenance fees. Public schools are suffering from scarcity in resources as they sometimes lack essential material or don’t have safe and equipped classrooms or books, let alone computers or teaching aids. The environment is challenging and takes a great deal of willpower or drive to stay enrolled in the system and continue learning. Some youth-driven initiatives have emerged from this need, such as a group of architects and interior designers who gather funds and voluntarily partner with schools to do maintenance work and decorate the schools. Other initiatives

gather, books to be shared and reused to make them available for learning. It is challenging for both, the students and the teachers. So frustration is the general trend. There are exceptions for every rule, but the environment is not advantageous in many public schools. There are many stories about the general attitude of the frustrated teachers who ignore their classes and do their personal affairs outside the school campus instead of completing their lesson plans. Alternatively, they can attend lessons with a bad temper and let it out on the students. Corporal punishment is still regularly used in public schools although it is officially prohibited by the ministry of education. Before we blame the school we ought to realize that the choices the schools have are either to keep their unqualified teachers or leave the students with no teachers at all. The decision is not easy, especially when there’s no better alternative. The common family with average or low income tries to get through these years the best way they can, giving in to the fact that this is just how things are. Of course the schools vary and some are better than others, especially model schools for those who score the highest marks in their assessments. These get greater attention and better selected teachers. Private education is in a better position in terms of providing better facilities and teacher selection. But teachers are still October 2022 | Elaborate | 51

EDUCATION

scarce. Most of the teachers in private schools are neither graduates from the faculty of education, nor holders of any teaching qualifications. English language proficiency, attitude, academic background, sometimes experience and their ability to learn and teach from the principal’s perspective are the evaluation and hiring criteria. Private schools have more facilities ranging from spacious house structures that were adapted to accommodate classes and gardens, to real school structures that have courts, gardens, libraries and all the required school facilities. Private schools, like most entities in Sudan, have to create the caliber they need. So they might be in a better position in terms of providing educational services but they come with their new cultural problems also- A new culture where we start seeing students and their parents putting teachers in a position of doubt and blame by undisciplined students who feel superior just because their parents pay tuition fees to the school. This leads us to 52 | Elaborate | October 2022

In a place where teachers are not valued by the society or by the job market, only those who had no chances in other fields (such as medicine or engineering) will join the faculty of education more challenges of trust environments, so now a days, having cameras in schools to protect both, the students and the teachers has is almost common practice. Employers are now looking for the discipline which they say has deteriorated significantly. They rely on their training programs to qualify their staff for the job. Doing one’s best is considered naïve and discipline is called “being foreign.” Many have given up and those who talk about the brighter future, highlight the positive potentials and the possible solutions are looked at like the aliens who will soon learn about the planet earth and join the reality of the passive majority. Reality is, the culture is strongly driving

our decisions. In a place where teachers are not valued by the society or by the job market, only those who had no chances in other fields (such as medicine or engineering) will join the faculty of education. Reality suggests that we need to have real and realistic measures for teachers, and find a way to create, train and support those teachers, who are struggling to nurture fine citizens to the Sudan. We must raise our standards and accept no less than we deserve. We have to be more concerned. You, me, educators, policy makers, the community and everyone who can assist in any area whether they can fund or start a school, contribute their knowledge to improve curricula and educational system.

HALL OF FAME

KAMALA IBRAHIM ISHAQ n this issue, in theme with our focus on Fine Arts in Sudan, we commend the pioneering artist Kamala Ibrahim Ishaq – born 1939 in Omdurman – is one of the first women to graduate from the College of Fine Arts at the Khartoum Technical Institute (KTI). Having completed her undergraduate studies in Sudan in 1963, Ishaq moved to the United Kingdom where she attended the Royal College of Art in London for postgraduate studies (1964-1966). After receiving her postgraduate degree in which she studied painting, illustration and lithography, Ishaq returned to Khartoum and worked at KTI in the College of Fine and Applied Art as a lecturer and then as the head of the painting department. Ishaq is currently one of the most prominent figures in Sudan’s art scene. As a modernist painter she defied the traditional approach to art and artistic knowledge by proposing anti-academic models of production. In the 1970s, to outline their artistic vision, Ishaq in collaboration with four other artists and critics established and co-signed the text Al-Bayan Al-Kristali –the Crystalist manifesto – in Arabic. The goal of the Crystalist Manifesto was to create a new language that does not abide with the constraints of expression; it sought to break every boundary achieving transparency exemplified by the crystal. Influenced by the work of the English painter and writer William Blake, Ishaq has been inspired and consequently uses her art to explore and reproduce interpretations of the spiritual dimension of zār – exorcisms, rites and spiritual practices performed by women in central. These influences are apparent in 54 | Elaborate | October 2022

Ishaq’s work and are depicted through the distorted faces and figures that she paints. Moreover, what particularly identifies Ishaq’s work is her preferred use of monochromatic and subdued color palettes, which combined with her illustration of zār, creates images that are deeply eerie, and powerfully expressive. Ishag’s work is inspired by the flora in her Khartoum home garden, mythology, the stories of spirits told by her mother and grandmothers, and the field research she carried out with spiritualist women convening healing Zar ceremonies, a traditional practice in North Africa and the surrounding region. From her time spent in London, Ishag has also drawn on William Blake’s visionary subjects and Francis Bacon’s distorted figures which she connected to the reflections of human faces and figures she saw

during the 1960s in the curved windows of Underground trains. Drawing on a diverse range of contexts, Ishag’s work embraces different landscapes, histories and subjects to contemplate themes of spirituality, kinship and human relationships with the natural world. Ishag’s work was part of the touring exhibition Breaking the Veils: Women Artists from the Islamic World, sponsored by the Royal Society of Fine Arts, Jordan (2002) and has also been exhibited at Galérie de l’Institut francais de Khartoum (2015); Shibrain Art Centre, Khartoum (2014); Sharjah Art Museum, UAE (1995); Whitechapel Gallery, London (1995); National Museum of Women in Art, Washington, DC (1994) and Camden Art Centre, London (1970), among others. Ishag currently lives and works in the Burri neighbourhood of Khartoum. October 2022 | Elaborate | 55

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FEATURE ended up in the least seaworthy and most dangerous boats. Thousands perished – we will never know the number. They were well-aware of the risk. But this was seen as temporary and short-term compared with the longterm and continuous risk of staying in Sudan. The family member of one migrant, whom we interviewed in Darfur in 2017, explained: “They choose to migrate because staying in Darfur means a slow death. Because of this, quick death is better than a slow one”.

WHY SO MANY SUDANESE ARE PREPARED TO RISK THEIR LIVES TO REACH THE UK WRITTEN BY: MARGIE BUCHANAN-SMITH, SUSANNE JASPARS

he tragic death of Abdulfatah Hamdallah – the young Sudanese man whose body was washed up on the beach in northern France last week after attempting to reach the UK in an inflatable dinghy– has alerted the world to a much larger crisis, which has been unfolding for over six years. That crisis involves the lives of tens of thousands of Sudanese, mostly young men, fleeing their own country to seek protection in another; protection to which they have a right under the 1951 International Refugee Convention, to which all European countries, including the UK, are signatories. We documented this forced migration of young Sudanese fleeing Sudan for Europe in a 2018 study. We focused particularly on the plight of the Darfuris: who was leaving Sudan and why; what were their experiences after leaving their 58 | Elaborate | October 2022

own country; and what happened to them when they reached Europe. The study findings, published by ODI and SOAS, provide sober reading. They reveal a fundamental failure to protect Darfuris, not only within Sudan – which is the reason so many young people leave – but even when they reach Europe, a continent that aspires to abide by international conventions and human rights. WHY MAKE THE DANGEROUS JOURNEY TO EUROPE? Abdulfatah is reported to have left Sudan in 2014. This was when the number of Sudanese arriving in Europe, having crossed the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy, was beginning to peak. The reasons they would be prepared to take such a risk lie in the long-running conflict and violence in Sudan. This affects

Darfur in particular but also other parts of Sudan such as neighbouring Kordofan, Abdulfatah’s home, and Blue Nile state. Our study provided substantial evidence that young men from these regions of Sudan were subject to persistent and systemic persecution, including attack, arrest and surveillance. Particularly so if they were from ethnic groups associated with the opposition and with the rebellion against former President Bashir. Many Darfuris who left Sudan for Europe had spent much of their lives in camps; some had experienced multiple displacements within Sudan. They also faced discrimination in the workplace. Effectively living in a police state, the depths of despair experienced by many young Sudanese was striking. With few other options available to them to reach safety – for example, migration to South Sudan and Egypt had become increasingly difficult due to conflict and

political instability – many, like Abdulfatah, fled to Libya. Libya has long been a destination for Sudanese migrant labourers. But in 2014, instead of a thriving labour market they found a country embroiled in its own civil war in which they became pawns. The Sudanese are some of the poorest of the African migrants in Libya. They were therefore especially vulnerable to being kidnapped, held for ransom and sold into slavery or bonded labour. If they managed to escape, or earned their freedom, they were desperate to leave Libya. Many were forced to attempt the perilous journey across the Mediterranean to Europe. Again, as some of the poorest of the African migrants, the Sudanese

WHY IS THE UK THEIR DESTINATION? For those who reached European shores their suffering continued. Many want to reach the UK because of Sudan’s historical colonial ties with the UK, because of the English language – for many this is the only European language they speak – and because of the presence of family and friends in the UK. In the words of one Sudanese refugee we interviewed for the study: “I knew the UK was the former occupier of Sudan, that it was democratically governed, and that it respects human rights”. But the only way they can claim asylum in the UK is if they actually reach British soil. Therein lies the ‘Catch-22’. There are no safe and legal means whereby they can enter the UK. So they have to risk life and limb, literally, to claim asylum. When we interviewed Darfuris in the UK in 2017 we heard horrific stories of how, in an effort to claim asylum in the UK, they had travelled under buses, in the backs of lorries. Now, like Abdulfatah, they are prepared to attempt the Channel crossing in flimsy unseaworthy rubber boats. WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE UNABLE TO MAKE IT TO THE UK? The near impossibility of reaching the UK means that tens of thousands of Sudanese are living in limbo, in countries like France and Belgium, without protection or welfare and in conditions that Europe should be ashamed of. Some apply for asylum in Italy, France and Belgium. In Belgium, however, first

asylum decisions were stalled after the Sudan revolution and second with Covid-19: applying for asylum has now become much more difficult. Some Sudanese are forced to live under the radar because they fear the consequences of the Dublin III Regulations which mean they have to return to the European country they first entered to apply for asylum, but they want to reach other European countries where they have stronger connections, especially the UK. As a result, many are living rough, in Europe’s parks and forests, undocumented and without legal status. And their conditions have worsened because of the Covid-19 pandemic. WHAT DOES THE SUDANESE REVOLUTION MEAN FOR REFUGEES? Just over a year ago Sudan experienced a remarkable revolution which finally overthrew President Bashir and captured the world with its images of young people defying the security forces. However, a secure and safe future for young Sudanese is still far from assured. After 30 years of Bashir rule the country is currently navigating a highly unstable transitional phase and a severe economic crisis. Violence has recently flared up in parts of the country, including Darfur. The deep state security apparatus of the former regime has yet to be disentangled. A secure and safe future for young Sudanese is still far from assured. THE UK GOVERNMENT’S DUTY TO PROTECT The UK government must recognise its full duty to protect those fleeing persecution; as long it fails to provide safe and legal channels for migrants to reach the UK, for their asylum claims to be lodged and assessed, smuggling networks will proliferate. For those, like Abdulfatah, who cannot afford to pay the smugglers, they will continue to risk their lives in desperate attempts to reach the European country with which they have the greatest connection, and where they expect their human rights will be respected.

This article was originally published in ODI website https://odi.org/en/insights/why-so-many-sudanese-are-prepared-to-risk-their-lives-to-reach-the-uk/ October 2022 | Elaborate | 59

CITIES

SUAKIN - THE PLACE OF

s a place, Suakin has a special position in Sudanese culture, because of the memory of the beauty of the lost buildings and because it is identified with where Islam entered Sudan. Suakin has been described by the Sudanese as ‘the place of all our beginnings’. Suakin was formerly Sudan’s chief port, before the construction of Port Sudan. In addition to trade, the town provided the gateway between Islamic culture and Eastern Africa as the major pilgrimage route between Africa and Mecca. During Suakin’s period of prosperous trade, most of its famous 15-20th century coral block buildings were constructed. These buildings are one of the best and now last remaining examples of the Red Sea architectural style. 60 | Elaborate | October 2022

A Historic Port For 3000 years, the port on the island of Suakin was strategically crucial to powerful empires. Located on the Red Sea in Northern Sudan, the former port of Suakin is now a crumbled relic of the wealth that passed through its coral walls from around the world. During the 19th century, Suakin evolved for the last time, becoming a hub for the slave trade from Eastern Africa. As the slave trade diminished, the port became increasingly unnecessary. By the 1920s, Suakin was falling into complete disrepair. Shallow waters and rough coral

had pushed most trade North to Port Sudan and the coral buildings that were once the crown jewel of the port were not maintained and disintegrating. Suakin Islands and the Historic Town Suakin’s natural lagoon harbour is backed by the Red Sea Hills. The historic town consists of an island joined to the mainland by a causeway, and a mainland area

ALL OUR BEGINNINGS

known as the Geyf. The island where you see the ruins was the main town and has been continuously inhabited for at least 500 years. The island town grew like most old towns, with irregular narrow streets and blocks of houses of different shapes and sizes. The adjacent historic mainland town, known as the Geyf and connected to the island by a causeway, was occupied mostly by Hadendowa tribe inhabitants, containing houses, zawias and mosques,

a number of public buildings, the SuakinBerber Railway installations, shops, shanties and drinking houses. The Geyf was encircled by fortifications, while the area surrounding this was scattered with outer defences and a number of shrines and tombs. Suakin’s Decline and Documentation Suakin was abandoned for Port Sudan in the early 1900s. The historic town is now mostly uninhabited, much of it in ruins without the constant maintenance

required. However, Suakin remains shrouded in legend and myth and contains one of Sudan’s most eventful and significant histories. Furthermore, trade and prosperity has returned to the area, following the opening of Suakin’s new port in 1991 and subsequent growth of a surrounding new town, in addition to the continuing passenger ferry route from Suakin to Jeddah. Despite Suakin’s regrowth, much of the historic town remained in ruins and has now almost disappeared. However, Suakin’s importance and the need for this to be saved for future generations has been well recognised. This has resulted in extensive research and documentation of the site for many years, including great efforts of the Suakin Project established by Sudan’s National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums in 2000. October 2022 | Elaborate | 61

FOREIGN AFFAIRS some other social issues also there is a linguistic overlap between the two nations. The great impact of the Turkish engagement in Sudan is also more noticeable in agriculture, crafts, industrial professions, health and medical services also in transportation sector. The sisterly countries also have huge natural resources and human resources that would help in strengthening the state building as a regional economic and political power. Sudan and Turkiye share the same importance particularly in their region in terms of geopolitical and strategical position though. Also both countries play a huge role in their regional surroundings; leads to sustain peace and stability despite the internal challenges both countries face. Beside that; it’s important to shed a light on the international dimension for Sudan and Turkiye and their positive engagement in the Middle East and Africa through the related international organizations and forums also their tight work to serve the Palestinian issue.

THE SUDANESE TURKISH RELATIONSHIP INTRODUCTION Sudan and Turkiye have a strong and deep ties goes back to the history in the year 1555 AD when the eastern part of Sudan was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, whom they established what is known as the Eyala of Al-Habash which included eastern Sudan and part of the current state of 62 | Elaborate | October 2022

Eritrea, and the capital of that governorate was the city of Suakin. But in 1821 that ruling expanded to other parts of Sudan until it demolished by Mahdiyya revolution in 1885 AD. The diplomatic representation between Sudan and Turkiye started right after the independence of Sudan in 1957 when

Turkiye opened its embassy in Khartoum, and Sudan established its first resident diplomatic mission in Ankara in 1981and the same year witnessed the first visit of a Sudanese president to Turkiye. There are common cultural factors which linked the two countries and it appears clearly in food culture and

THE COURSE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS The subsequent period at the end of the last century witnessed some stagnation in the relations of the two countries, due to many variables including the internal, regional and global factors. However, these relations soon developed and flourished at a steady pace at the beginning of this century. This development coincided with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the formation of the National Unity Government in 2006. The relationship path between the two countries had its first big step forward after the Turkish Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkiye in 2002, also the following period witnessed great progress in political and economic relations especially the two countries have shared the same views regarding many regional and international critical issues. In 2017 the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Sudan and that visit considered as the second huge step because it was resulted in signing of number of bilateral political, economic, trade and agricultural agreements between the two countries. Turkiye considers Sudan as a gate to Africa and due to this perspective;

Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... Pull quote text will go here... both countries are very keen to build a constructive relationship serve the interests of the two brotherly peoples. And in light of that; Sudan and Turkiye as members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have a strong cooperation through the joint mechanisms likewise the other international and regional organization of which both sides are members. After the political change in Sudan in 2019, Turkiye expressed its support for the choices and wishes of the Sudanese people which was greatly appreciated by Sudan government and people. Thus, the year 2021 witnessed two high level official visits. The first one was the visit of H.E General Mohammed Hamdan Daglo vice president of the Sovereignty Council in Sudan; in May2021, and the second

one was the visit of the president of the Sovereignty Council in Sudan H.E Lt-Gen Abdelfattah AL Burhan in August 2021. Those visit had a positive impact in terms of the political side and also in renewing the commitment to fulfil the previous agreements and understandings. In addition to these important visits, there is also an exchange of visits between high-ranking officials from both sides covering various fields of common interest such as higher education, mining, agriculture, military and security aspects. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL TIES What further enhances these excellent relations between the two countries; is people to people interaction. There are more than seven thousand Sudanese citizens in Turkiye, nearly half of them are students studying in Turkish universities and institutes in various scientific fields. Also hundreds of Turkish citizens live in Sudan, whether they are students or investors or workers in both Sudanese and Turkish companies whom they have big added value in strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries. In addition to this, there are also many marriages on both sides, which consolidate the bonds of the social communication. Both countries also exchange scientific scholarships in different fields especially in post graduate studies and more than 200 Sudanese students study in Turkiye which represent one of the positive aspects of

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the signed agreements between Sudan and Turkiye in the field of higher education, and likewise; there are a lot of Turkish students study in numerous of Sudanese universities. Health sector also plays great role in enhancing the bilateral relations; thanks to the health protocol signed between the two countries, through which a number of Sudanese get opportunities for free treatment in Turkiye and also doctors from both sides benefit from mutual training opportunities. In the other hand, Turkiye established Neyala hospital in west Darfur and Kalakla hospital in Khartoum as part of the constructive cooperation between the two countries, and by this development projects which have been constructed by Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA) the relationships have taken on a new positive dimension. The tourism field also occupies a good status in the bilateral relations of the two countries, and the projects that have implemented by TICA in rehabilitation of Sultan Ali Dinar Palace in Alfashir in North Darfur state beside the rehabilitation of Suakin Island in eastern Sudan, emphasizes the importance of this field in the course of bilateral relations especially as it helps in strengthening the economy of Sudan. In trade sector; there are a lot of companies from both sides working in Sudan and Turkiye in terms of increasing the rate of trade exchange between the two countries. Those companies work in several sectors especially in crops exporting and other food products, also clothing, and different industrial production inputs to both countries. THE JOINT MECHANISMS There are many joint mechanisms between Sudan and Turkiye contributed to strengthen the relationship between the two countries, such as the Supreme Council for Strategic Cooperation chaired by the presidents of the two countries, the Strategic Planning Council chaired by the foreign ministers also the Joint Ministerial Committee, which is the oldest of these mechanisms, as it was established in 1998, and convenes under the chairmanship of the Ministers of Agriculture in the two 64 | Elaborate | October 2022

countries, upgraded to be chaired by the Vice president from the Turkish side and the Prime Minister from the Sudanese side. Also the Political Consultation Committee, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the two countries, which was established in 2011 under the chairmanship of the two undersecretaries of the two foreign ministries. There are also many joint committees between the ministries of the two countries The two countries also exchange mutual support in various international and regional forums regarding the candidature for high positions in international organizations and others, in addition to coordinating positions on many issues in which they share similar views through these mechanisms. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE It’s very important to bear in mind the big potentials of the bilateral relations between the two countries in many sectors such as agriculture, trade and military side. Those important fields will be the core of the strong relations because both countries have the required experience and qualification to succeed. The factors necessary to build strong and strategic relationships now and in the future; with mutual benefits are available to both parties and must be optimally exploited with the presence of a strong political will. Sudan in particular has a very fertile lands and human capacity to invest on; along with the good Turkish experience in this field. Thus, both countries have to focus in this matter in addition to harnessing all available resources to bridge the food gap internally and regionally; which can occur as a result of political and climatic fluctuations which are taking place in the world today. The bilateral agreement in agricultural cooperation as a good example would play a huge role to make this vision a reality. The mutual trade still below the expectations and the level of ambition for the people of the two countries as the level of trade exchange has reached 500 million US dollar, although Sudan and Turkiye are bound by a trade agreement should be activated and also there must be room for more positive involvement for the private

sector along with the public sector as well for more intensive works and investments. Both countries have many goods and products can be exchanged and thus trade flourishes between the two sides. The third important field is mining, oil and renewable energy projects. Both sides have small projects in these sectors should be developed by providing great opportunities for the private sector of the two countries and removing all procedural and field obstacles in order to develop cooperation in this important sector. With the security and military challenges that the world is witnessing today in light of the growing internal, regional and international conflicts, the desire to strengthen relations between the two countries in this important aspect emerges. The leadership of the two countries is aware of this matter, and the cooperation is moving forward between the two countries in order to ensure security and stability at the internal and regional levels. Also to strengthen relations, it is necessary to continue joint work in the relevant fields, in addition to sustain the constructive cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In conclusion, the Sudanese-Turkish relations, despite the political fluctuations and complexities, are still moving forward and require more common understanding of some internal issues and the political dilemmas of both countries especially those that Sudan has been experiencing since 2019 in light of the political instability in the country which imposes a reality that is sometimes difficult to deal with, and in light of this, the Turkish leadership must take these matters into consideration and provide extra support to Sudan during this tremendous and complicated circumstances.

Nubian Meroe Pyramids in Sudan (2500 - 1500 BCE)

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OPINION Turkey wishes to deepen and broaden the two countries’ bilateral relations. Moreover, Turkey’s President Erdoğan talked over the phone with Burhan many times to discuss potential cooperation, and successive visits followed.

SUDAN AND TURKEY HEAD TOWARDS STRATEGIC COOPERATION? The deepening of bilateral ties will provide many strategic benefits to both Turkey and Sudan. Right now, Turkey is standing by the Sudanese transition government. BY: MEHMET RAKIPOĞLU

he year 2021 is seeing regional repositioning of power, competition, and strategic alignment. A series of normalization moves have taken place between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Turkey and the UAE, and Turkey and Sudan, which would have been impossible a few months back. Since 2011, whoever is in the White House has been focusing more on U.S. primacy than the concerns of Washington’s traditional allies. This U.S. policy has directly affected the Middle East and Africa. Sudan, which has been affected by these transformations since 2019, is not an exception. Even though Sudan suffers from economic challenges, primary among which is inflation, the administration in Khartoum is decisive in diversifying foreign policy alternatives and intensifying cooperation with regional actors. In 68 | Elaborate | October 2022

this manner, the chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council Abdel Fattah alBurhan visited Turkey on August 12-13 to expand the cooperation between the two countries. Official Sudanese statements show that Khartoum is eager to cooperate with Ankara. It is the first-ever visit of Sudan to Turkey at the head of the state level since the country witnessed popular protests against the ousted president Omar al-Bashir in 2019. GRADUAL COHERENCE Turkey-Sudan relations had reached advanced stages during the term of ousted president Omar al-Bashir. However, after the dismissal of al-Bashir, there was a decline in this relationship, especially politically. What is more, Ankara-Khartoum relations were adversely affected by developments in Sudan. As for regional issues, the two countries

had adopted opposite approaches. For example, whereas Turkey supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, mercenaries from Sudan fought for Khalifa Haftar. Later, a gradual coherence was observed between the two parties. Turkish President Erdoğan paid three visits to Sudan in 2006 and 2017. Whether during his prime ministership or presidency, Sudan remained in Erdoğan’s geopolitical vision of Africa. During these visits, the bilateral relations were strengthened by the signing of several agreements. In 2020, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the vice president of Sudan’s Transition Council, visited Turkey. In April 2021, Vice President of Turkey Fuat Oktay visited Niger where he met with Dagalo. The photos of the meeting indicate that the Oktay-Dagalo meeting took place in a very warm atmosphere. In his statement, Vice President Oktay reiterated that

POSSIBLE COOPERATION AREAS During the latest visit of Sudanese officials to Turkey, six memoranda of understanding and agreements from energy to media were signed. As a result, we can expect intense bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the near future. During my field research in Khartoum from March to June of this year, I encountered many Sudanese who are closely following Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. Turkey has embraced almost every African country even though there is a strong anti-Turkey propaganda in the Middle East. Turkey’s Africa policy is shaped by an approach that aims to develop mutual benefits. Instead of exploitation, Turkey has rented a large agricultural land in Sudan for 49 years. The Sudanese are very eager to see Turkey’s investment in their country. Many Africans believe that Erdoğan is the architect of democratization in some African countries. In an op-ed, Justice Minister of Somalia Abdulkadir Mohammad Nur stated that Turkey is the hope for African countries to stabilize their democratic political structures. Turkish aid organizations like TIKA and Kızılay have extended their helping hand to the people of Sudan especially during natural calamities. Turkish aid organizations like TIKA and Kızılay have extended their helping hand to the people of Sudan especially during natural calamities. Turkey provides medical supplies to support Sudan’s fight against COVID-19. East of Khartoum, Kızılay has renovated a medical center where children with Down syndrome are educated while TIKA has been involved in constructing Nyala Hospital since 2014. Turkey has been also providing around 700 scholarships to Sudanese students since 1992 under the umbrella of the Türkiye Scholarship Program. These indicators are representative of Turkey’s sizable financial assistance to the people of Sudan. Moreover, there is a bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Sudan. According to Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkey’s exports to Sudan increased by 22.25% in 2020 compared to 2019, and Sudan became the sixth largest export partner in Africa worth

over $300 million. The Sudanese minister of energy and oil announced that they have agreed with Turkey to increase electricity production by 67% by using Turkish floating ships. Revealing the will of both sides to boost trade, the two countries promised to increase their bilateral trade volume to $2 billion. STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS The deepening of bilateral ties will provide several strategic benefits to both Turkey and Sudan. Right now, Turkey has been standing by the Sudanese transition government. Turkey refrains from addressing sensitive topics with Sudan like the overthrowing of Omar al-Bashir by non-democratic means. This policy paves the way for Sudan to reach out and reapproach Turkey. The recent visit by al-Burhan, the highest-ranking Sudanese official, to Turkey where he met with President Erdoğan shows that the Sudanese transitional government, which distanced itself from Turkey for a long time after the coup, has realized that it must diversify its foreign policy. The visit of Sudanese officials to Turkey is linked to the recent Ethiopian official visit to Turkey. There is strategic strangulation in the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan triangle. Serhat Orakçı, an analyst of African politics, told Politics Today that there are three reasons for the increasing tensions between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other hand. These are border disputes, the unsettled issue of water resources, and Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis. None of the efforts by international or regional organizations to reconcile the parties of the conflicts and resolve these issues could lead towards a lasting peace and settlement. Therefore, each party is trying to maximize its material and diplomatic cooperation with relevant regional actors. With this view, Sudan views having good relations with Turkey as part of reinforcing its strategic capabilities. It is well known that during Omar al-Bashir’s rule, Turkey-Sudan relations were strong. With the new government in Khartoum, though, bilateral relations suffered a setback. Now, it appears that Sudan is more interested in cooperation with Turkey. The latest visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey is an important indicator of this interest. It is most likely the heavy diplomatic efforts made by Ethiopia to

approach Turkey might be behind Sudan’s increasing interest in Ankara. SUDAN NEEDS TURKEY’S SUPPORT The recent months have shown that Ethiopia, which is under pressure from the West, is eager to upgrade its bilateral relations with Turkey from an ordinary level to a strategic one. By deepening its ties with Turkey in terms of military cooperation, Ethiopia wants to strengthen its military power. Sudan hasn’t remained silent either. This atmosphere has forced Sudan to move closer towards Turkey. When we compare Sudan’s will to reach out to Turkey, it is Sudan that is more interested in increasing its bilateral cooperation. Sudan could also ask Ankara to play a mediator role in the deadlock between conflicting parties. The political trajectory of Sudan shows that it wants to escape from the hold of the UAE. The UAE has been trying to build a new regional order in which there is no room for any democratic transition unless the political elite in the region obeys Abu Dhabi. Therefore, by upgrading its relations with Turkey, Sudan wants to balance its relationship with the UAE and Egypt without abandoning them. This policy could be described as a hedging game: Sudan is hedging itself against the UAE and Egypt by getting closer to Turkey. Therefore, Sudan wants to become more independent and exit its isolation by approaching Turkey. The recent visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey can be seen as a clear message from policymakers in Khartoum indicating Sudan’s will to maneuver its foreign policy. This Article was originally published in POLITICS TODAY https://politicstoday.org/sudan-and-turkeycooperation/

Mehmet Rakipoğlu Mehmet Rakipoglu completed his BA in International Relations at Sakarya University. He worked as a teaching assistant at Sakarya University Center for Middle Eastern Studies from 2015-2017. Rakipoglu is currently a PhD candidate at the same Center. His research areas include foreign policy in the Gulf, Turkey’s policies towards the Gulf region, and political Islam.

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ENTITY STORY

THE MICROFINANCE UNIT AT THE CENTRAL BANK OF SUDAN

ACTIVELY CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

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ENTITY STORY n July 2006, the Central Bank of Sudan initiated the preparation of a vision for the development and development of the microfinance sector in Sudan. In March 2007, the Central Bank of Sudan established a specialized unit for microfinance as a supervisory and supervisory body that aims to: • Encouraging and stimulating microfinance as a tool for providing financial services to the poor and vulnerable groups, alleviating poverty and promoting and developing economic development. • Providing microfinance through banks and non-bank financial institutions to facilitate the flow of financing to the targeted segments of the governmental and non-governmental sector resources. • Institutional development for banks and microfinance institutions through training and qualification programs and capacity building • Introducing Takaful microinsurance and non-traditional guarantees as insurance for owners of micro-enterprises. The stages of development of the microfinance sector through the unit began with the structural and functional construction and the formulation of its role by issuing publications and regulations regulating the work of banks in microfinance, as well as framing their regulatory, supervisory and developmental role for the microfinance sector in the country, as well as training its employees and arranging field visits to global experiences based on the best international foundations and practices in Microfinance. These initial steps were necessary at this stage, as this unique experience was based on a new and comprehensive vision that had never been seen before.

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The unit’s main tasks consist of: • Setting policies, regulations, laws and legislation, preparing reports and reviews, and monitoring implementation and performance. • Stimulating the development work of the microfinance sector in cooperation with major stakeholders, including donors • Contribute to economic and social development and choose appropriate legal formulae for microfinance. • Analysis and classification of finance provided to microfinance institutions for the purpose of evaluation and reintroducing new products that meet the needs of the sector. MFU Vision To make the unit a pioneer in joint and participatory work as well as effective networking to build a Microfinanceoriented culture aiming to promote the Microfinance activities in order to

‫ﻣــﻊ ﺗﻄﺒﻴــﻖ ﺑــﺪر ﻟﻠﻄﻴــﺮان‬ Saif Al-deen Hassan Ahmad Microfinance Unit Director

ensure the sustainability of the effective goals of Microfinance as a mechanism to reduce poverty in Sudan.

‫رﺣﻠﺘــﻚ ﻓــﻲ ﻳﺪك‬

MFU Mission Facilitating the sustainable accessibility of the economically active poor “under-served in rural, urban and semi-urban areas” to financial services by expanding and developing the Microfinance sector. MFU Goals • To carry a regulatory and supervisory role that works on passing laws and policies that encourages the development of Microfinance in Sudan. • Designing and executing programs to build the institutional and technical structure and provide technical assistance and support to the Sudanese Microfinance institutions. • Promoting the Microfinance industry through offering incentives and participating in media and networking activities and coordinating with governmental agencies, and public organizations. • Designing and introducing applicable models for marketing and developing the Microfinance industry on the National level.

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INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

DEVELOPMENT IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL WBG President David Malpass September 30, 2021

hank you, Prime Minister Hamdok for the warm introduction and hospitality. Ladies and gentlemen, it’s a great pleasure for me to be speaking today from Africa, particularly in these challenging times for the continent and the world. It’s even more special to be here in Sudan’s Friendship Hall at this historic time. Over the past few years, you have made a tremendous effort to put people on a forward path, amid very adverse conditions. Two years ago, Sudan’s transitional government inherited a deeply damaged economy and society that had suffered decades of conflict and isolation. Even as the people resolved to break with the past, Sudan faced extraordinary headwinds: from the COVID-19 pandemic, a locust plague, unprecedented floods, and an inflow of refugees escaping conflict from across the border. Yet the country pressed forward with bold reforms, re-engaging with the international community, clearing World Bank arrears with the help of a U.S. bridge loan, and in June reaching the decision point for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC – initiative. I welcome Sudan’s progress in macroeconomic stabilization, including arrears clearance, unification of its exchange rate, slowing inflation, fewer shortages, and removal of fuel subsidies. While there is much work ahead, 74 | Elaborate | October 2022

I commend the Sudanese authorities, civil and military, for their efforts and achievements in working together toward a country that is unified, tolerant, and can deliver a better future for all of its citizens. It’s critical to avoid political slippages because there is no development without peace and stability. I would also like to acknowledge the remarkable resilience of the Sudanese people – your drive to build a better Sudan despite the challenges is truly inspiring. I. An unprecedented crisis These are extraordinarily difficult times for Sudan, Africa, and billions of people around the world. Reversals in development threaten people’s lives, jobs, livelihoods, and sustenance. In many places around the world, poverty is rising, living standards and literacy rates are falling, and past gains on gender equality, nutrition, and health are sliding backwards. For some countries, the debt burden was unsustainable before the crisis and is getting worse. Rather than gaining ground, the poor are being left behind in a global tragedy of inequality. This drastic narrowing of economic and social progress is creating a time of upheaval in economics, politics, and geopolitical relationships. While some advanced economies are providing trillions of dollars in spending programs and central bank asset purchases, low-income countries are facing high inflation, too few

jobs, a shortage of vaccines and food, and the high cost of adapting to climate challenges that they did not create. In this troubling time of upheaval, the challenge for people – and for the development community – is to shorten the crisis, resume development, and lay a strong foundation for a future that is more prosperous and better prepared for disasters like COVID-19. To combat the reversals in development, we will need strong new approaches suited for these very challenging times. We need to focus our efforts more, set clear priorities by measuring what works and what doesn’t, and rapidly scale up successes. II. Turning around the reversal in development The COVID-19 crisis has resulted in increased poverty rates again after decades of steady decline. It has pushed nearly 100 million people into extreme poverty, with several hundred million more becoming poor – many of them in middle-income countries. Human capital accumulation stalled, with most schools closing for months, even years; and some have still not reopened. The crisis also imposed a heavy toll on firms and governments. Business closures skyrocketed, and many firms that remained active are now overindebted or in arrears. Governments have run large fiscal deficits, often pushing public debt

to dangerously high levels that require especially careful investment decisions by both the public and private sectors. And yet, the crisis has also brought unprecedented transformation. We see a surge in the number of newly established firms. Venture capital has exploded, and innovative outfits are proliferating. We see that sectors such as information technology, logistics, and finance, all with heavy digital components, are surging in both advanced economies and developing countries. This digital revolution not only means faster growth in the IT-based sectors: it offers the chance to transform other sectors such as education, health, and even agriculture. Along the way, it will reduce the control of the vested interests that thwart competition – the COVID-19 crisis may have jump-started the creative destruction that is the engine of economic growth. III. Fostering change while remaining focused on poverty reduction The Spanish Flu of 1918-20 brought havoc and death comparable to the COVID-19 crisis. Yet, it was not followed by a lost decade, but rather by the Roaring Twenties. That was a time of extremely rapid economic growth – but also a time when social inequality widened, and dangerous financial vulnerabilities built up, culminating in the prolonged Great Depression. The question for the international community is: what should we do to boost growth that is inclusive, broad-based, and sustainable, and avoid a lost decade for development? It might be tempting to say: let’s stay the course and redouble our precrisis approach. Given the challenges of demographics, climate, disease, and debt, this clearly won’t be enough. And on the positive side, given advances in technology, communications, innovation, and cooperation, it doesn’t have to be enough – we aren’t limited to pre-crisis approaches. We can – and must – aspire to do more in two ways: First, we need a stronger focus on the key priorities, with clarity on how we approach and measure them. For example, one global priority is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which

As you walk your journey toward peace, prosperity and national unity, the World Bank Group, along with the rest of international community, are walking alongside you requires prioritizing the major emitters and measuring the reductions in a clear and transparent manner. And second, we need much bigger scale to achieve impact. We need education, nutrition and vaccination programs that reach hundreds of millions of children. We need digital cash transfer programs that can provide necessary resources to billions of people in the next crisis. In response to climate change, we need thousands of large publicprivate projects that combine the world’s resources – from governments, MDBs, foundations, private investors, and the buyers of carbon credits – in order to reduce carbon emissions and increase electricity access. And we need thousands more projects that help people adapt to climate change in ways that will save lives. The World Bank Group remains committed to alleviating poverty and boosting shared prosperity in our client countries – from people in the poorest countries to those in middle-income countries who are being left behind. This involves creating chances for everyone to benefit from the digital revolution

and requires empowering women and protecting girls to offset deeply rooted sources of disadvantage. Major policy reforms may be difficult, with economies barely emerging from the crisis and many citizens completely left out of the recovery. To resume progress on development, a high immediate priority is to secure access to vaccines and accelerate their deployment. In addition, there are four key focus areas where determined action should make a difference. First, achieving economic stability. Many developing countries have made extraordinary efforts to support their people and keep economic activity going during the pandemic. Many have gone beyond what they could afford, especially as debt in developing economies was at record highs when the pandemic hit. As of mid-2021, over half of IDA countries – the world’ poorest countries – are in external debt distress or at high risk of it. This situation could worsen if commodity prices are volatile, interest rates increase, or investors lose confidence in emerging markets. When the debt service suspension initiative – or DSSI – expires at the end of this year, low-income countries that resume debt service payments will see their fiscal space shrink, limiting their ability to purchase vaccines and finance other priority expenditures. It’s time to pursue a gradual and people-oriented fiscal consolidation, and restructure unsustainable debt. Enhanced and accelerated implementation of the Common Framework will be critical on this front. We need global cooperation, including private sector participation, to provide debt relief to the world’s poorest countries and fund growth-enhancing investments. In Sudan, for example, global cooperation that included the U.S., France and the UK helped the country clear its arrears with the World Bank, IMF and other IFIs, making possible more than $50 billion in debt relief in what will be the largest HIPC initiative ever. It’s critical that countries eliminate wasteful public expenditures, make service delivery more efficient, and reallocate public resources to their most productive uses. This is also a time for proactive October 2022 | Elaborate | 75

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS debt management to reprofile payments while international interest rates remain low. There need to be concrete steps to improve the transparency of debt contracts, increase accountability, and ensure decisions draw on comprehensive information. Lower-income countries need to prioritize concessional financing and avoid the high interest rate financing that has become increasingly problematic. Focusing this agenda for each country and measuring the progress will be critical. The potential is clear throughout the developing world, including Africa. In Sudan, for instance, eight out of 10 citizens own mobile phones—and a similar proportion has a national ID. The digital revolution can also transform the public sector. For example, it allows a radical rethink of safety nets systems. Across the world we are seeing programs move from in-kind and cash delivery to digital delivery, direct to people’s bank accounts or visible on their phones. Similarly, in both the formal and informal sectors, new payment systems enable daily purchases through phones, using QR codes and other technologies. Kenya and many other African countries have extensive experience on this. In many middle-income countries, shifting to e-government can facilitate access to public services for households and firms. E-procurement can reduce opportunities for corruption, while enhancing the government’s transparency and efficiency. Third, making development greener and sustainable. The international community is strongly committed to slowing the increase in atmospheric carbon and to reducing climate impacts on the most vulnerable. A key step is to stop the creation of new coal-fired plants, decommission existing ones, and substitute for them with cleaner sources of electricity. We should support countries in a “just” transition, which includes taking care of the workers affected. The transition is increasingly feasible as technological innovations bring down the cost of clean energy. Recognizing the massive expense of this undertaking, efforts need to focus on the most impactful transitions. This is also the time to reinvigorate often-stalled power sector reforms. Energy 76 | Elaborate | October 2022

subsidies are expensive and distortive, while removing them needs to be done in ways that solve underlying inefficiencies and increase access. Aiming for clean, affordable energy requires competition in electricity generation and distribution, as well as a truly independent regulator. Sudan’s commitment to electricity sector reform is important in this respect. In the climate change efforts, both mitigation and adaptation, and the development effort more broadly, we need to prioritize and focus efforts for the largest impact per dollar spent and look for solutions that are rapidly scalable. And fourth, investing in people. The crisis shows that strong, effective health systems need to be at the forefront of preparing countries for future shocks. COVID-19 vaccine access and deployment are acute priorities now, while other vaccinations are also critical to keep other deadly illnesses in check. Strengthening education and health systems takes more than just providing budgetary resources in an efficient and prioritized way. For example, aligning incentives for teachers and health care providers – public or private – with the needs of the people they serve is important. And finding scalable solutions to enhance health care and improve the quality of education, including through dis For example, it is at the family and community level that we build the acceptance for women to work outside the home, for all children to be educated, and for the contributions of girls to be recognized. Indeed, educating girls involves more than providing them with skills. It means fostering self-sufficiency and encouraging their aspirations. This is in everyone’s interest. Closing gender gaps offers massive economic returns for developing countries, including the most fragile and conflict-affected. IV. The contribution of the World Bank Group None of this will be easy, but the World Bank Group is uniquely endowed and positioned to support countries with the four priorities I have outlined – through finance and know-how for governments, while mobilizing the private sector. We have unmatched experience working with countries, using technical experts across

all the key sectors. Most of our staff comes from developing countries, often bringing experience from innovations in development that they helped carry out in their home countries and regions. Looking ahead, much more needs to be done to secure a sustained recovery and a better development path for all. The need for COVID-19 vaccines remains massive, and we have financing readily available to keep supporting countries. Low- and middle-income countries face many concurrent challenges. Some are dealing with fragility, as we see in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. And all need to deliver services effectively, finance resilient infrastructure, embrace digital opportunities, and respond to climate change. With the replenishment of IDA later this year, African heads of state have called for donors to be ambitious in supporting IDA’s critical mission for the poorest countries. IBRD, IFC, and MIGA will also continue to find ways to increase financing and mobilize more resources, including from the private sector. This unprecedented crisis has set in motion a time of upheaval. The many choices in coming years will determine whether developing countries suffer a lost decade or can usher in rapid growth and economic transformation. I have outlined huge endeavors: bringing economic stability and growth, leveraging the digital revolution, taking strong climate change action, and investing in people. To succeed requires the active participation of the public and private sectors across countries, civil societies and foundations, indeed the whole international community working together. These efforts require leaders to be ambitious for the prosperity of people. And they require focus and scale throughout our development work. As I talk to people here in Sudan and see the faces of young people in this hall, I feel optimistic that we will help countries avoid a lost decade. As you walk your journey toward peace, prosperity and national unity, the World Bank Group, along with the rest of international community, are walking alongside you. By working together, we will build a better development path. The history of Sudan is yours to chart. Thank you.

FAQ What is the status of the World Bank Group’s engagement in Sudan? The World Bank Group paused disbursements in all of its operations in Sudan on October 25, 2021 and stopped processing any new operations as it closely monitors and assesses the situation. The World Bank has recently provided $100 million for the Emergency Safety Nets Project. Does this mean it is now doing business as usual in Sudan? The pause of disbursements by the World Bank in all of its operations to the Government of Sudan remains in effect, under the World Bank’s operational policy on Dealings with De Facto Governments in Sudan. The emergency funding is being provided on an exceptional basis, in response to the urgent needs of Sudanese households and communities facing a tremendous food insecurity crisis. Financing does not go to the government, as disbursements remain on pause. The Emergency Safety Nets Project will serve as a platform for providing cash and food support to the most vulnerable population in Sudan through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP). How is the Emergency Safety Nets Project funded and implemented? The project is made possible through the generous support of donors (the European Union, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Italy,

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE RECENTLY APPROVED EMERGENCY SAFETY NETS PROJECT IN SUDAN Finland, Spain, Ireland, and the State and Peacebuilding Fund) to the Sudan Transition and Recovery Support Trust Fund (STARS). The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is the direct recipient of the grant and the implementing agency of the Sudan Emergency Safety Net Project. What is the difference between the Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Project (SESNP) and the Sudan Family Support Program (SFSP)? The World Bank paused all its operations in Sudan in October 2021, including the implementation of the Sudan Family Support Program (SFSP). The SFSP, commonly known as ‘Thamarat’, aimed to strengthen social protection and increase the spending power of families affected by economic reforms and other shortterm shocks during the time of economic transition. SFSP was led and implemented by the Sudanese government. At the time of the pause, SFSP had enrolled 9.3 million individuals in the program, of which 4.7 million received payments in less than six months from the start of the program. The Sudan Emergency Safety Net Project (SESNP) is a new project, which aims to respond to the deep food insecurity in Sudan caused by a poor harvest and rising international food prices. It will provide cash transfers and food support directly to the most vulnerable households (approximately two million vulnerable people) in 11 of the most food

insecure states based on a vulnerability assessment carried out by WFP. World Food Programme is the direct recipient of the SESNP funding and the implementing agency. Are the beneficiaries of the Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Project (SESNP) the same as those of the Sudan Family Support Program (SFSP)? While the SFSP aimed to target 80% of the population nationwide, the Emergency Safety Net project aims to target two million of the most food insecure people in the 11 most food insecure states. How will beneficiaries be selected? The project will use geographic and community targeting methods. Geographically, project target areas will be selected based on the level of extreme poverty, while beneficiaries will be selected using Community Based Targeting to identify the most food insecure households in the most affected localities and states. The community will vet the list of selected beneficiary households to confirm they are the most food insecure households in the area before they are enrolled in the program. Priority will be given to women, children, elders, and those with disabilities. In addition, the third-party monitoring agent that the World Bank will hire will ensure the selected beneficiaries are the most food insecure in the area. Originally published in World Bank Website https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ sudan/brief/

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ECONOMY

WHEN THE FINANCING STOPS: THE WORLD BANK, CHAD, AND SHADES OF ENGAGEMENT Lessons from evaluation point to the merits of continuing analytical work even when direct financial support is prohibited BY: JEFF CHELSKY & SENGPHET LATTANAVONG & MEES VAN DER WERF

fter a long period of political stability, Chad saw a surprising reversal in 2021, forcing a reassessment of how the World Bank works with Chad. World Bank Operational Policy (OP) 7.30 on Dealing with De Facto Governments is triggered when a “de facto government” comes into power by means outside of a country’s constitution, such as a coup d’état, revolution, suspension of the constitution, or when no government is in place. When OP 7.30 is triggered, the World Bank suspends disbursements on projects under implementation. This lasts until the World Bank determines that a proper legal framework is in place and that all parties have carried out their obligations as agreed with the Bank. LESSONS FROM THE WORLD BANK’S ENGAGEMENT IN CHAD IEG recently evaluated World Bank Group engagement in Chad between 2010 and 2020. Over that period, the Bank Group thrice suspended disbursements and new lending to the country. The first suspension occurred in January 2006 when disagreements arose over the use of oil revenues as agreed under the 80 | Elaborate | October 2022

World Bank-support Chad-Cameroon pipeline project (approved in June 2000). The suspension was prolonged by rebel attacks on the capital in 2008, resulting in the temporary closure of the Bank office. In January 2009, the office in N’Djamena reopened, and lending resumed following repayment of the balance on the pipeline project and associated credits of US$66 million to the World Bank in 2008. In May 2010, new lending resumed following an Interim Strategy Note (ISN) covering the 2010-2012 period. IEG’s Country Program Evaluation found that the renewed lending in 2010 and the success of initial operations in Chad were hampered by the absence of strategic and high-quality analytics to inform the design of projects, target capacity development efforts, and identify the most critical needs and preconditions for development impact (including adjusting to the evolving political landscape ). Indeed, the World Bank’s interim strategy itself was largely informed by analytics produced by development partners, mainly the African Development Bank and European Union. This was necessary given the lack of continuity and

institutional memory at the World Bank as many staff moved on to other assignments when operations were suspended. While analytical and technical work picked up when lending resumed, this delay meant that findings and recommendations were not available during the critical stage of figuring out how best to reengage with Chad. Had a more strategic approach been taken to analytical and diagnostic work, which could have continued despite the suspension of disbursements and new lending, the Bank could have had a better prioritized road map when relations normalized. While the Bank’s use of analytical work from development partners to inform the interim strategy showed commendable collaboration, it was not a full substitute for Bank-led work in areas for which the Bank had a comparative advantage. The Bank slowly ramped up analytical work in the second half of the evaluation period. When timely analytical work was available, it informed priority setting, policy dialogue, and the design of more successful interventions. This was especially true for the World Bank’s social protection portfolio approved in 2016.

At the same time, when it comes to analytical work, more is not always better. In a situation of limited resources, as was the case for Chad, what is needed is a strategic approach to analytical work with coordination around the setting of priorities to align them with the absorptive capacity of the country authorities and to ensure adequate quality control. SHADES OF WORLD BANK ENGAGEMENT When a country is under OP 7.30, the World Bank will generally not approve new operations. However, exceptions can be made as the Bank carefully weighs a range of considerations. For example, while Sudan is currently under OP 7.30 following the military coup in October 2021, the Bank has responded to the urgent needs of the population by working through “third parties” to deliver much-needed support without being seen to legitimize the current de facto government. The suspension of disbursements under OP 7.30 can last from several months as in Chad (April 2021 to July 2021) to years as in Madagascar (2009 – 2014). In recent years, OP 7.30 has been triggered for countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Niger, Mali, Madagascar, Myanmar, GuineaBissau, Sudan, Yemen, and most recently, Burkina Faso. Similarly, long pauses in Bank engagement occur when countries are in arrears on repayments to the Bank, as was the case for Somalia and Sudan and remains the case for Zimbabwe. Exiting from OP 7.30 status is often referred to as “re-engagement” in World Bank parlance, but this is a misnomer. It is rare for the Bank to entirely disengage from countries under OP 7.30 or even those in arrears. Analytical and diagnostic work usually continues and can play a critical role in identifying priorities and bottlenecks in the reform process when relations are normalized. While OP 7.30 or arrears do restrict the resources that the World Bank can mobilize in support of longer-term development and reform, external sources of funds such as trust funds can provide important flexibility for the Bank to remain “engaged.”

Countries under the World Bank’s OP 7:30 in the past decade:

Note: Red diamond represents countries in arrears.

While Sudan is currently under OP 7.30 following the military coup in October 2021, the Bank has responded to the urgent needs of the population by working through “third parties” to deliver muchneeded support without being seen to legitimize the current de facto government The resumption of lending often comes with first-mover status, as was the case in Niger and Madagascar, where exiting from OP 7.30 status convinced other development partners to reengage shortly thereafter. Similarly, in the CAR, the resumption of World Bank lending helped restore government credibility and mobilize other resources for the beleaguered country. IEG’s recent evaluation of World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict showed that World Bank emergency operations in the CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Yemen were often highly effective at maintaining critical service delivery, although the necessary haste in which they were prepared, often without the benefit of solid analyses, did increase risks of unintended consequences (e.g.,

exacerbating conflict drivers). In contrast, in Madagascar, the coup which triggered OP 7.30 led the World Bank to ramp up its analytical work and better understand the causes of political instability. This helped inform strategic and operational considerations ahead of eventual normalization of relations and resumption of direct financing. These cases reflect something that was a key finding of the Chad Country Program Evaluation: the quality and focus of analytical work produced before financing is resumed, makes World Bank support for countries emerging from a status where financing is not possible, more effective. And with the timing of that resumption by its very nature uncertain, investing in ongoing monitoring and well-targeted diagnostics has a potentially high return. October 2022 | Elaborate | 81

HISTORY

In July 1958 the World Bank made a loan equivalent to $39 million to the Republic of the Sudan for the development of transportation. It is financing the imported equipment and materials needed to increase capacity and improve the operating efficiency of the railways and of river transport services on the Nile; to build two new railway extensions into productive zones in the South and West; and to increase berthing capacity at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, the country’s chief outlet to world markets.

Remarks at Airport Upon Arrival in Sudan WBG President Robert McNamara November 10, 1972 This is my first visit to the Sudan and I am delighted to be here. As the largest country in Africa, your country merits special attention from those concerned with economic development. The World Bank Group has had a continuing association with the Sudan since 1958. During these years the Bank Group has provided the Sudan about $167 million of financial help with development projects in agriculture, transport, power and education. Considering the size and needs of the country, mu re remains to be done if the benefits of development are to reach greater numbers of the people. We in the World Bank hope that, in addition to important investments in transport and power, we can assist the country’s efforts to carry out an increasing number of projects designed to benefit more people more directly: projects such as expanding irrigation, providing farmers with credit and storage facilities, improving livestock, and shaping education more to the needs

Remarks at Airport Upon Arrival in Sudan WBG President Robert McNamara November 10, 1972 As I leave the Sudan I want first of all to thank H. E. the President and his Ministers for the time they have given to explaining to me the needs and aspirations of the Sudan, the problems you face, and the means you are seeking to overcome them. Though the problems and opportunities are yours, and though most of the effort to solve them must be yours, I have said that the Bank stands ready to give all the help it can. Nearly five years ago I promised we would double our lending to the world at large, but would triple it to Africa. We 82 | Elaborate | October 2022

Loading cotton seed from a barge onto a vessel at the Port Sudan. March 1962

of the country. In this context, one major development scheme which is being considered by the Government of Sudan and the Bank Group is the Rahad irrigation project. In considering the efforts that need to be made for the future, we are particularly interested in the pessibi1ities of economic development in Southern Sudan. Our recently approved highway project has already provided for the improvement and maintenance of roads there, as well as

in other parts of the country. But I am looking forward to visiting the southern region to learn more about its problems and its potential. I realize that the process of development is neither easy nor quick, but I am confident that your Government and people will strive hard to make good use of the nation’s tremendous potential for economic development. The Bank Group stands ready to assist you in this task.

have fulfilled those promises. Now we are planning to further expand our lending to the poorest countries of which the Sudan is one. I have been interested to notice in my short time here that in your national development you are placing the highest priority on expansion of agriculture, transport and education. These are your government’s decisions, with which we in the World Bank agree, and we are planning to concentrate our assistance in those sectors. No part of our visit made a greater impression on me and on all my colleagues than our trip to the Southern Region, where we saw something of the efforts being made to reunite the North and the South and to resettle the returning refugees. What gave me the greatest hope both

in Juba and in Khartoum was the deep and sincere spirit of reconciliation, the determination to bind up the wounds of this nation, and to try to build together a better life for all the people of the Sudan. In that endeavor the World Bank stands as your friend and partner. This visit has strengthened my belief that you can succeed and our determination that the Bank shall be of all possible assistance. October 2022 | Elaborate | 83

HISTORY

1959 Representatives for Sudan, Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., USA.

1981 Mr. Yousri Mohamed Gabr, Alternate Governor for Sudan, Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., USA.

1978 Mr. Nasr-Eldin Mustafa, Governor for Sudan, Development Committee, Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., USA

1969 Mr. Ismail El Misbah Mekki, Governor for Sudan seated far left at the table. While Mr. E.I.W. Mtei, Governor for Tanzania can be seen seated in the forefront, right.

1971 Representatives for Sudan and the United States, Delegations, Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., USA.

1962 Governors for Sudan, Somalia and Sweden.

1968 Mr. Hussain El Shareef Yousif El Hindi, Governor for Sudan, Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., USA

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1975 Mr. William D. Clark, Vice-President of External Relations, left and Mr. Ismail El Misbah Mekki, Executive Director, Governor for Sudan, right.

1960 Representatives for Spain and Sudan, Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., USA.

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World Bank lending in the Sudan has been concentrated on two vital sectors of development. The first is irrigation from the Blue Nile, which enables large areas of semi-desert land to be made richly productive. The Bank has made two loans totaling $35 million to assist this sector. The most important crop from the irrigated areas is long-staple cotton, which is sold all over the world and provides the Sudan with most of its foreign exchange income. The second sector is transportation. The millions of bales of cotton and bags of cotton seed must travel about 600 miles by rail across the desert to Port Sudan on their way to overseas markets, and a Bank loan of $39 million has helped to expand and modernize railroad and port facilities. To open up new areas for cultivation and speed up the movement of crops, two new rail extensions, to the west and south, are being built with the help of the Bank loan. Here, one of the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who go to the large irrigated areas south of Khartoum for the annual cotton crop. October 2022 | Elaborate | 87

WORK | PLAY | EAT

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OBITUARY

THE DEPARTURE OF THE

SUDANESE SONG GENIUS

... ‫وقبـّال ما الصور تنشال‬ ‫علي خيوط االمل والفـال‬ ‫وصٌبح الناس يجيك مرسال‬

.... ‫يشيلك شوق وسط عينين‬ l Kabli was born in the city of Port Sudan in 1932. During childhood, he developed an interest in the Arabic language, especially the old Arabic poems, and learned to play music on a penny whistle. At the age of sixteen, he moved to Khartoum to attend the Khartoum Commercial Secondary School, where he studied Sudanese folk music and Arabic poetry. His musical interest evolved to the oud (lute) and shetern (small drum), which he learned by himself. Al Kabli’s songs contain a diversity of topics and scenes including love, passion, revolution, nationalism and Sudanese folklore. Some of his songs make use of old Arabic poems. Others are in Sudanese Arabic dialect that require

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deep knowledge of the language and customs. Some of his famous songs include “Ya Bint Ashreen” (Oh that girl in her twenties), “Husenek Fah Masher” (My Love Is More Than The Sweet Perfume...), “Sukker Sukker” (Sugar, Sugar), “Asia wa Africa” (Asia and Africa), “Noama”, “Cleopatra”, “Limaza” (Why?), and “Merowi” (the ancient city Meroë in Sudan). Al Kabli was also active in peace and reconciliation efforts in Darfur and South Sudan and, through his music and his social influence, stressed the rich ethnic diversity in the country. In 2005, he joined other well-known artists and musicians and travelled to South Darfur during the “16 Days of Activism for Violence Against Women”, where he performed in camps for the internally displaced and in the Nyala stadium. In his later life, his music

and poetry dealt with women’s equality and women’s health, and he was an honorary Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations Population Fund. Al Kabli died on the 2nd of December 2021, in the United States, where he had lived with his family in the years before his death • Awarded an honorary doctorate in literature from Nyala University, Nyala, Sudan • He was presented with the Gold Award by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika • Awarded the UNFPA Goodwill Ambassador for Obstetric Fistula in Sudan for his advocacy for women’s health, gender equality and human rights. • Awarded his second honorary doctorate in music and arts from Sudan University.

‫يوديك مقرن النيلين‬ ‫يخضـّر فيك عقيد ياسمين‬ ... ‫وتقوم شتلة محنـّة مثال‬