History of Psychology Vol 1 by El alma pública Biblioteca

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H A N D B O O K O F P S Y C H O L O G Y : Vol. I. S en ses and I n tellect . Second Edition, 1891. New York. Holt & Co. ; London, Macmillan. H A N D B O O K O F P S Y C H O L O G Y : Vol. II. F eelin g and W il l . 1892. Same publishers. E L E M E N T S O F P S Y C H O L O G Y . 1S93. Same pub足 lishers. Second Edition, tenth thousand. M ENTAL DEVELO PM ENT IN T H E C H IL D AN D T H E R A C E. New York and London, Macmillan. 1S95. Third Edition, seventh printing, 1907. German and French Translations. D E V E L O P M E N T A N D E V O L U T IO N . Same pub足 lishers, 1902. S O C IA L A N D E T H I C A L I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S IN M E N T A L D EV EL O P M E N T . Same publishers. Fourth Edition, 1907. In French, German, Spanish, etc. Awarded Gold Medal Royal Acad, of Denmark. D IC T IO N A R Y O F P H IL O S O P H Y A N D P S Y C H O 足 LO GY. 3 Vols. in 4 Parts. Edited (with an international corps of contributors) by J. M a r k B a l d w i n , 1901-5. New York and London, Macmillan. S T O R Y O F T H E M IN D . London, Ilodder & Stoughton ; New York, Appletons. For popular reading. In several languages. F R A G M E N T S IN P H IL O S O P H Y A N D S C I E N C E C o llected E ssa ys . London, Nimmo ; New York, Scrib足 ners, 1902. T H O U G H T A N D T H I N G S ; O R , G E N E T I C L O G IC . Vol. I. F unctional L ogic , or G e n et ic T h eo ry ok K nowledge . 1906. London, George Allen & Co. ; New York, Macmillan. In French, German, and Spanish. Vol. II. E x p er im e n t a l L ogic , or G e n et ic T heory ok T hought . 1908. Vol. III. I n t e r e st and A rt . 19 11. T H E I N D IV ID U A L A N D S O C I E T Y . Boston, Badger; London, Rebsam, 1910. French trans. D A R W IN A N D T H E H U M A N I T I E S . Baltimore, Review Pub. Co., 1909; London, George Allen & Co., Ltd., 1910. French trans.

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[Frontispiece.

{.Copyright. Reproduced by kind permission of the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U.S.A.)

HISTORY OF

PSYCHOLOGY A S K E T C H AN D AN IN T E R P R E T A T IO N

J A M E S M A R K B A L D W IN P h .D ., D .S c., L L .D . F O R M E R L Y P R O FESSO R IN T O R O N T O , P R IN C E T O N , A N D JO H N S H O PK IN S U N IV E R S IT IE S ; P R O FE S S O R IN T H E N A T IO N A L U N IV E R S IT Y O F M E X IC O F O R E IG N C O R R E S P O N D E N T O F T H E I N S T IT U T E O F F R A N C E

Vol. I.

From th e E a rlie st Tim es to John Locke.

[ I S S U E D FO R T H E R A T IO N A L IS T rP .E S S A S SO C IA T IO N , L I M I T E D -]

L ondon :

W A T T S & CO., 17, JO H N S O N ’S C O U R T , F L E E T S T R E E T , E.C.

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CONTENTS

O F V O L . I. PAGE -

T a b le L ist

C o nten ts

I l lu str a t io n s

P r efa c e

vii ix xi

T art I. P R E L IM IN A R Y

M ATTERS

C H A P T E R I. I n tr o d u c t io n : R a cial

and

I n d ivid u al T hought

C H A P T E R II. P rim itive T h o u g h t.

P sych o so p h y

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â&#x2013;

II.

E A R LY U N SCIEN TIFIC INTERPRETATIONS OF MIND C H A P T E R III. Tim O r ig in and D ev elo pm en t o f D ualism . G r e e k S p ec u latio n , F ir s t P e rio d : P r o jec tiv ism The Pre-Socratic Schools.

C H A P T E R IV. G r e e k S peculatio n , S econd P e r i o d : S u bject iv ism Socrates, Plato, and the Minor Socratic Schools, vii

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CONTENTS

C H A P T E R V. PAG E

G r e e k S p e c u l a t i o n , T h i r d P e r io d : O b j e c t i v i s m

Aristotle, Post-Aristotelian Schools, Stoics, Epicur足 eans. The G reek M ystics : Neo-Platonism ; Philo; Plotinus. P art I I I .

TH E

R IP E N IN G

D U A L IS M

C H A P T E R VI. T he

P a t r is t ic s , S c h o l a s t ic s , a n d A r a b ia n s . a n t i - L o g i c a l R e a c t io n : M y s t i c i s m -

T he -

Christian and Patristic P sychology: Church Fathers, St. Augustine. The Scholastics : John of Salisbury, Thom as Aquinas, Albertus, Duns Scotus. Arabian Physiological Psychology : Avicenna, Alhacen, Averroes. The M ystic Reaction. The German Mystics : Eckhart, Tauler. P a rt IV .

M O DERN

P S Y C H O L O G Y - I. F I R S T

TO T H E

N IN E T E E N T H

P E R IO D ,

CENTURY

C H A P T E R V II. T h e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f D u a lis m

The Modern Schools. The N ew Departures : The empirical Method, F . Bacon. The Renewal of M ysticism : the Italians, Jacob Boehme. The indi足 vidual Analogy. C H A P T E R V III. P h il o s o p h ic a l P s y c h o l o g y : D u a l is m , D o g m a t is m , E m p i r i c i s m . .

R a t io n a l is m , . .

j 0s

Dualism : Descartes. Occasionalism : Malebranche. Parallelism : Spinoza. Pre-established H arm ony: Leibnitz. Dogmatism : Wolff'. Beginnings of N a足 turalism and Early Em piricism : Gassendi, Hobbes. Index

L IS T O F IL L U S T R A T IO N S

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E Z E Q U IE L A. CH AV EZ PROFESSOR, D E P U T Y , OF

F O R M E R L Y U N D E R -S E C R E T A R Y

TURT.IC IN S T R U C T IO N M E X IC O ;

PRO FO UN D A

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PREFACE proposal to prepare the History of Psychology for I his series appealed to me for other than the usual reasons. In the first place, singular as it may seem, there is no history of psychology of any kind in book form in the English language.1 Some years ago, I projected as Editor a series of historical works to be written by various authorities on central psychological lopics, the whole to constitute a “ Library of Historical Psychology.” These works, some twelve in number, are in course of preparation, and certain of them are soon to appear; but up to now no one of them has seen the light. The present little work of course in no way duplicates any of these. In French, too, there is no independent history. The <icrman works, of which there are several,2 had become somewhat old when last year two short histories appeared, written by Prof. Dessoir and Dr. Klemm. I refer to these again just below. Another reason of a personal character for my enter ing this field is worth mentioning, since it explains the scope and method of the present sketch. I had already prepared much of the same material for a The

1 Since this w as written the History of Psychology, Ancient mid Patristic, by G. E. Brett (1912), has appeared ; and Prof. Dessoir’s Abriss, mentioned below, has been translated into Knglish. 2 The titles are given in the list of “ So u rces” at the end of Vol. II.

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PREFACE

course of sixteen lectures, given in my capacity of Special Professor in the School of Higher Studies of the National University of Mexico (April to June, 1912). These lectures have been entirely made over, in being thrown into book form ; but the original purpose appears both in the plan and in the essential idea ruling the historical interpretation itself. 1 lie point of view adopted—that of a parallelism between racial reflection and individual thought, which leads to an account of the history of psychology considered as the rise and interpretation of the mind-term 1 in the dualism of mind and body— this point of view I have been interested in carrying out. The merely narrative sort of historywriting— useful as its results are— makes no appeal to many, among whom I count myself. In a subject like psychology it is peculiarly futile, since the views and theories of men cannot be ascertained and reported as earthquakes and battles can. They are themselves matter of interpretation.2 Had it not been, therefore, for the larger interest in the principle of interpretation, I should not have cared to undertake the task. The 1 It leads to the consideration of physical science as the development of the theory of the matter-term of the same dualism, a correlation merely hinted at in certain places in passing'. 2 The place of Socrates and Socratic views, to note a case in point, is a matter of wide divergence of opinion, although we have two able and almost contemporary expounders. From the important place assigned to the “ subjectivism ” o f Socrates in the present volume, opinions vary to the extrem e of the omission of Socrates altogether, as by Dessoir. It would seem, however, that any plausible hypothesis as to the course of reflection would restore “ Socratism ,” if not Socrates, to an important place. One may cite the well-known saying as to the authorship o f the Ilia d : “ If it was not written by Homer, then it must have been written by another man of the same name.” W e m ay recognise the Socratic contribution to thought, leaving aside the question of mere fact as to whether it is essentially due to Socrates himself or to “ another of the same name.”

PREFACE

xiii

point of view itself is explained in the Introduction; and the results of its application are gathered up in the last chapter. It should he added, however, that the use of this principle of interpretation has in no way influenced the statement of historical fact or tlie exposition of theories. I hope the opinion of competent critics will confirm this assertion. The book is to be looked upon as a sketch; no more than this. Two possible ways of treating the subject are well illustrated by the recent handbooks of Dessoir and Klemm, the former entitled Abriss citier Geschichte ilcr Psychologic and the latter Geschichte dcr Psycho logic. Each lias certain defects of its plan. Dessoir ex pounds the theories in their historical setting and with reference to their philosophical significance. The result, while on the whole of the highest competence, must per force leave so much unreported or merely hinted at that the reader gets little idea of the richness of the sources. Moreover, from limitations of space, the author can give but a slight and impressionistic-seeming account of nineteenth-century scientific psychology, and that on national lines. Klemm, on the other hand, adopts the topical method, and gives us important notes on the development of views on this or that special subject. Hut anything like completeness in such a task is quite impossible in one small volume. As remarked above, the series projected to serve this purpose in English will have ten or twelve large volumes. Klemm’s method results also in the omission of many topics, in this case naturally those in which the German psychologists have not had the leading p a rt; as, for example, the subjects pertaining to the genetic method, its problems and results. Incidentally, it may be remarked that in these

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and the oilier German works the contributions made to the science by Germans have not been given too little importance—a remark not intended in a disparaging sense. It follows that a rule of interpretation, such as that adopted here, to guide the selection and govern the estimation of particular facts and theories, is a real desideratum in a short sketch like this. I find, in the result, that the entire psychological development down to the nineteenth-century scientific movement is illumin ated by it and given a larger interest. This is true, I take it, because the hypothesis adopted accepts as sub ject of the history just the problem about which all the minor topics arrange themselves : that of the theory of the soul or self. Omissions in particular fields, and even mistakes 1 in the report of particular results or theories, should not impair the essential truth of the account as a whole. I have found the work of Harms, Philosophic in Hirer Geschichte, I. Psychologic, very suggestive because of the author’s constant recognition of the problem of dualism. As I have already intimated, the principal embar rassment arises from the variety of problems and wealth of results of nineteenth-century psychology. The earlier works have generally brought the account down only to Kant or Herbart. If one includes the more recent work, the treatment must be selective. This I have frankly recognised; and in the chapters devoted to nineteenth-century psychology I have reported simply what are, in my opinion, the most significant features 1 M istakes which could hardly be entirely avoided. N o writer— least of all the present author—could pretend to be equally con versant with the literature of all the periods, ancient, mediaeval, and modern. He should expect to see some of his authorities challenged, and should welcome expert correction.

of the entire modern movement. The selection has been made, however, with a view to illustrating further the interpretation which looks upon psychology as a body of knowledge and theory about the mental principle or self.1 By preserving this conception one is able to pass in review nearly all of the relatively distinct new depar tures— social, genetic, experimental, affective, aesthetic and by a partial statement of results illustrate at least their problems and methods. J. M. B. Janu ary, r<p/j. 1 A radical definition of psychology, for its own purposes, as (he “ science of selves,” has been advocated by Prof. W. M. C a lk in s; see her historical work, The Persistent Problems o f rhilosophy (1907).

P art

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I. M ATTERS

CHAPTER I.

Introduction: Racial and Individual Thought. I n writing a historical sketch, the writer’s first duty is to make clear what he is writing about. And while a definition of psychology, in its relations to other sciences and to philosophy, would be open to debate, still the general field that it includes is plain. Like all science, psychology is knowledge; and like science again, it is knowledge of a definite thing, the mind. How mind in turn is to be defined is not here and now our task, but rather to trace the ways in which it has been defined. A history of psychology is nothing more nor less than a history of the different ways in u hich men have looked upon the mind. W e are going to trace the ways in which man has historically thought about or attempted to understand the soul, mind, or spiritual principle. It is only to put this a little differently, to say that the subject matter of psychology, when it is histori cally traced, is the way or ways in which men have thought about the “ s e lf” ; for the self is always what mind more or less clearly means. As we shall see, this meaning is crude enough when it starts out, the ■elf that the mind means. In the early periods, it is VO L. i .

P R E L I M I N A R Y M ATTERS

simply the significance attaching to things as not being dead or inanimate. Deadness or lack of anima tion was overlooked in primitive tim es; all things were found to have a mysterious sort of agency similar to that of personal agents and actors. All beings fell in one c la ss; everything was looked upon vaguely as having an anima or indwelling soul. But when differ ences began to be discerned, and things were classified by their properties and behaviour, then the momentous and compelling distinction came between objects that were really selves or conscious beings, and those that were merely dead or inanimate things. Once come, this distinction made psychology as such possible. The development of the meaning attaching to the personal self, the conscious being, is the subject matter of the history of psychology. The problem of psy chology is the interpretation of minds or selves, and all of its subordinate problems are those pertaining to the several parts of this great whole meaning, the se lf; so the history deals with the course of develop ment of this interpretation. W e may say in brief, therefore, that the science of psychology reflects the ways in which the human mind has been able at various epochs to apprehend or inter pret itse lf; and that the history of psychology is the history of the modes in which these attempts at inter pretation have taken form. It is the history of the more or less systematic forms of reflection upon selfconsciousness. I say reflection upon self-consciousness, because it will not do to say self-consciousness simply, without further explanation. All adult human beings are con scious of self in some sort, and so were primitive men— endowed with the ability to judge objects to be different

R A C IA L AND IN D IV ID U A L T H O U G H T

11mn rind remote from themselves. But such conscious ness, or self-consciousness, is not itself sufficient; it niiiHt pass into reflection. Not only to be conscious of • II, but to have some sense, impression, or idea of v\ hiit the self is, is necessary to give the “ interpreta tion” which is available for history. This means that I lie self must take in or apprehend that it is thinking nl itself in a certain way. Let us illustrate. Suppose we say, as we must, that the early Greek philosophers, Thales and the others, did not have a irimed or clear view about the self; that is, that their psychology was crude and undeveloped. This means l hut if one of them had been called upon to explain what he understood the self to be, he would have given w hat we would now call a vague and insufficient reply. I le would have pointed to some fluid and subtle physical iif.ent, saying that the self or mind was like that. He would not have distinguished between mind and matter. IhM he would still have been personally self-conscious, lie would have distinguished between himself and tilings, and between himself and other selves. His limitation would have been that he could not mean by the self what later thinkers could mean; he could not interpret it as they did. When he talked about self, describing the fact of his own self-consciousness, it would have been in terms showing that his thought on the subject was crude and lacking in essential distinctions. It will be of interest to define our topic in this w ay; 11H when we consider that it is the human self that e<ieh of the great thinkers sought to understand and Interpret to his fellows, we see that their attempts, t.iUen in their succession, will show the progressive development of what we may call racial or social self13 2

PR ELIM IN A RY MATTERS

consciousness. They will show, each in turn, the type of thought about the self which is fixed in a society or race as its understanding of its own nature and facul ties. A distinction must be made, indeed, when we interpret human institutions, between those customs, rights, etc., which are spontaneous, due to gregarious ness, natural imitation, tradition, etc., and those which are due to deliberate co-operation, thought, interpreta tion of nature and man. These latter reflect directly the way individual men are at the time thinking about and interpreting the self, one another, nature, God. The history of religion, for example, is a history, just as that of psychology is, of the ways in which men have interpreted self-conscious beings—in this case super human spirits : God, or the gods—and religious institu tions vary with these interpretations. The deity can not be thought of as more refined or more moral than the interpretation of the self at the time will allow. If the self consists of “ thin vapour,” then God as a self must be thin vapour also. The social interpreta tion shown in institutions follows upon that of the indi vidual thinker; it cannot anticipate the latter nor can it surpass it. Our history, then, becomes valuable as showing the stages in the evolution of racial self-consciousness. All along we find that social life— religion, politics, art — reflects the stages reached in the development of the knowledge of s e lf; it shows the social uses made of this knowledge. An analogy is current between racial evolution and individual development; we hear of the “ childhood ” of the race, and of its growth from childhood to mature manhood. We now see that there is more in this than mere analogy or a popular figure of speech.

R A C IA L AND IN D IV ID U A L T H O U G H T

When men are thinking- of themselves simply or " i hildishly,” and are building- upon such thoughts in.I iI lit ions of like simple and childish character, then Ihere is a real childhood of the race. And when, with the development of finer thoughts and interpretations • •I personality, institutions and racial things in general i; row more complex and refined, then we may say, in more than a figure, that the race is growing up into maturity. It suggests itself, indeed, that in social • volution we may see a re-statement of the great stages ol individual development; that individual thought may .how stages which recapitulate those of racial evolu tion a parallel similar to the “ recapitulation” recog nised by biologists in the evolution of organisms. The individual’s development in consciousness of self re capitulates, we should then say, the evolution of selfronscious reflection in the human race. Such a problem becomes complicated when we deal, r. we do in the history of psychology, with the develop ment of reflective self-consciousness; for we are not wilting a history of human institutions, but of a human m ience and its effect on institutions. To get any .idvantage from such a principle, we should have to discover that the racial stages in the interpretation of I In self, culminating in the scientific and philosophical Interpretation, have been unrolled “ concurrently,” or m I lie same serial order, with the stages of development ol individual self-consciousness. Put in this way, the problem becomes for our pur p o se s the following : Do the racial ways of thinking of the self, seen in the theory or science of the mind Known as psychology, show results of a progressive ' luiracter which are in nature similar to those reached I*y individual thought?— and this despite the fact that

PR ELIM IN A R Y MATTERS

these racial thoughts occur in the minds of single men, who are themselves full-grown and reflective? That is, to put the question concretely, why do we find Thales, himself adult and reflective in thinking about the self, to represent so simple and crude a stage of racial interpretation?— and what is the rule of progress in succeeding epochs, whereby later representative thinkers achieve higher and more refined results? Is it the same rule of progress as that shown by the individual’s growth from crude to mature selfconsciousness ? In answer to this, we may say that the facts, on the side of the individual, upon which the parallelism is based, are clear. W e find the facts of the development of the individual’s consciousness of self sufficiently well known. The child, as recent genetic psychology has shown, is entirely dependent upon society for the materials of his thought of self; his thought is de pendent upon the thoughts already current in his social circle. He absorbs what society already thinks; and his originalities, in the way of further refinement, are slight. He imitates social “ copy,” and absorbs social tradition. The character he has in being a self, at whatever stage of development, and the character he gives to the self, in his thought about it, are different things. Just as, in the case of Thales, we say that the philosopher had a mind full-grown for reflection, but was still dependent upon society and its institutions for the material of his thought; so also the maturing child’s thought of self, at each stage, is what he gets from his social environment, and makes use of to the extent of his ability. The philosopher and the child each uses the social sources of knowledge to the best of his ability. But however great his ability neither

R A C IA L AND I N D IV ID U A L T H O U G H T

Iher one nor the other can create something out of nothing. The reason of the close concurrence between the individual’s progress and that of the race appears, therefore, when we remember the dependence of each upon the other. The individual can think in this way or that only provided the race in the midst of which hr lives already thinks, or thinks “ toward,” the same result; and the racial thinking in this way or that is only what it is because earlier individuals have thought in this way or that. So we should expect no great departure on one side or the other from lines of thinking which are common to the two. The individual equips himself socially before he thinks independently; and society thinks progressively only as individuals are its mouthpiece. To whatever extent this idea may be finally justified, it is an extremely attractive one. Here are two great movements, one that of the individual growing con stantly more competent to understand himself and to t ommunicate what he understands; and here is society, made up of a series of generations of individuals, doing precisely the same thing and doing it upon precisely the same mass of materials. It is on the surface likely that the series of critical periods in both, marked by new modes of accommodation and due to new crises of a natural, moral, and political sort, would show a general serial correspondence. To the writer it has been surprising to see how closely the gropings of the thinkers who represent the i ncial undertaking, the philosophers, are explained for I lie historian by comparison with the gropings of the individual’s struggle to achieve a full reflective selfronsciousness. The crises are the same, the problems

P R E L I M I N A R Y M A TTERS

and embarrassments the same, the solutions the same. In a later chapter,1 the matter is carried further. Our present purpose is simply to justify the use we make of the analogy in various places as we proceed. Further details of the concurrence itself will appear in the light of the sketch of the individual’s progress given in the later connection. Adopting a preliminary division of the entire history, in accordance with this guiding principle, we find the great epochs in the history of thought about the mind to be as follows— 1. The Period of Pre-historical and Pre-logical Inter pretation, occurring in primitive peoples, mystical and emotional in its character. It is the period of “ psychosophy,” 2 preceding psychology. It corresponds to the early a-dualistic and practical period of the child’s apprehension of the self. 2. The Ancient or Unscientific Period, covering the development of Greek thought, which we may call the “ Greek Period.” It corresponds to the unreflective stage of the child’s thought of self, the period of the origin of dualism. It is unreflective in the sense that in this period the view of the self is not exact or critical, not the subject of distinct definition, but remains in cidental to the larger view of the world or nature taken as a whole. It has three sub-periods : the “ pro jective ” or Pre-socratic, the “ subjective ” or Socratic, and the “ objective” or Aristotelian. In Plato, the motives of “ ejection” and aesthetic reconciliation are present, mediating the transition from Socrates to Aristotle. 1 Chapter V III of Vol. II. 2 A term used by Dessoir, Geschichte der Psychologie (19 11 ; Eng. trans., 1912).

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3. The “ Mediaeval ” or “ Substantive ” Period, so named from the fact that in it the great distinction arose between mind and body as different and distinct substances. It culminated in the explicit dualism of Descartes. It corresponds to the stretch of develop ment of the individual which culminates in a similar dualism. Historically, this allowed of the separation <>f the problems of mind from those of body, and justified the rise of Psychology, the science of mind, in distinction from Physics. 4. The Modern Period, or the epoch of reflective and scientific interpretation. It corresponds to the develop ment of the individual’s reflection in which the self is both objective matter and subjective principle. The subject and object selves are distinguished. Mind and body become presuppositions of reflection : spheres of reference for all sorts of experience. Psychology as a science develops its peculiar body of knowledge and its exact methods of investigation. These great divisions will constitute the Parts of our I tidy, the last period being subdivided into two. The further justification of this division and its corroboration, as being a fair way of utilising the concurrence of racial and individual thought, will appear as we proceed.1 It results from this general plan that we are not to ■.italogue or even to report single theories or discoveries simply as historical facts. It is rather the conception entertained of the mental life as a whole— its principle, and its relation to the body, to the world, and to God that we are to trace out. This gives us a single problem and a central one; the various solutions being 1 For the detailed filling out o f this scheme the T ab les of c ontents (Vols. I, II) m ay be consulted.

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presented in their actual genetic and historical order. Of course, the great discoveries of this thinker or that should be mentioned; but in each case they are kept subsidiary to the theory of the mental principle itself. That is, we are concerned with the science itself, its subject matter and method, not primarily with the detailed results of observation.

C hapter

II.

Primitive Thought: Psychosophy. T iie history of a science may be conceived in a broader or a narrower sense, according- as we place greater or less emphasis on the word “ science.” If we mean science in the strictest sense, the science which is developed through exact observation and experiment, often called “ p ositive” science, the history is in all cases very brief and very definite. But if we include (lie more or less scientific and pre-s(^ientific conceptions and interpretations of the subject under consideration, which have been entertained and taught, history becomes at once more extended and more vague. Astronomy was preceded by astrology, geology by cosmogony, chemistry by alchemy, medicine by magic, theology by theosophy; and in each case, the rise of positive science has meant the transition from vague mystical and metaphysical interpretations of the things observed to the sober and disinterested endeavour to discover facts and formulate law s.1 Psychology more than any other science has had its pseudo-scientific no less than its scientific period. The occultisms, spiritisms, mysticisms, psychic magics, pseudo-religious “ is m s ” of all times, ancient and modern, and of all races, oriental and occidental, have 1 The exact requirements o f the positive science o f psychology ni o stated later on ; see Chap. IV o f Vol. II.

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claimed the right to call themselves psychological. Each makes pretence to a certain way of thinking of or interpreting the mind, soul, spirit— whatever the spiritual principle is called. Each shows us how a period—a succession of men—has understood and endeavoured to explain its own mental being and activity. “ This is the sort of thing we souls are,” say equally the sorcerers, the ghost-seers, the religious prophets, and the speculative thinkers. “ W e are animated bodies,” “ we are warm air,” “ we are astral presences,” “ we are indivisible atoms,” “ we are ghosts in migration,” “ we are the seeds of things,” “ we are fallen gods,” “ we are pure spirit ” — all these and many more are types of psychosophic opinion which have at one time or another gained currency and played their part in practical and social life. They are only by indulgence entitled to be called science. Modern psychology, the science proper of psychology, gives us, it is true, only another interpretation. But it is based upon sounder data, acquired by safer methods, and confirmed by broader induction and experimenta tion. Still, taken as a whole it sums up what we think, and think we have a right to think, about the soul or self. The knowledge of science takes the place of the guessing, conjecture, superstition, speculation of the pre-scientific view s; but still, like them it is an interpretation of mind; a statement of what, do the best it can, the human mind understands itself to be. This consideration justifies us in taking the broader view of the history of psychology. The narrower scientific interpretation of mind plays an important theoretical role; but it is doubtful whether it is to-day as influential practically as the mystical unscientific

PSYCHOSOPHY

views which arose earlier and dominated human thought for long a g e s.1 The philosophical historian seeks to discover the rule of progress in the historical movement as a whole; to sec why certain views arose before others and after still others—the entire series exhibiting the growth of man’s knowledge and opinion about his own nature. If we call each view entertained at any time an “ inter pretation ” of the mind, our question then is this : Has there been any continuous evolution of interpretation? - is there a primitive type, followed by a more rational and refined type, this in turn perhaps succeeded by the scientific type?— are there genetic steps or stages aris ing in a continuous historical order, in the development of the human understanding of the human mind? The historian is here confronted by a problem which lias exercised both psychologists and students of social evolution. On the philosophical side, one thinks at once of the famous “ law of the three s ta g e s ” of Auguste Comte, according to which human thought, racially considered, passes in order through three stages, called by him the “ theological,” the “ meta physical,” and the “ scientific.” Apart from the details, it is conceded by later writers that Comte’s conception was a remarkable first attempt to treat the historical progress of human thought as proceeding according to law : a law by which the interpretation of the world unfolds genetically. He actually pointed out the three supposed stages of this progress.2 Such attempts as 1 It is curious that while scientific knowledge has effectively overcome mystic and occult view s in other provinces, in this field I he latter have not surrendered, but have maintained themselves without great change. " See the recent excellent treatment of the question by lluffding in L a PensSe humaine, pp. 109 ff., who applies to the stages the terms “ Animism,” “ Platonism,” and “ Positivism.” .

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that of Comte rest upon the characteristics of the various epochs of thought as actually shown in history. A more speculative endeavour to interpret genetically the entire historical movement of human thought is seen in H egel’s philosophy of history.1 It is evident, however, that such an attempt, if it is to be comprehensive, should not confine itself to those more systematic and explicit views of the world and the soul to which one may give the names science, meta physics, and theology. All these considered as such show the results of reflection, or of thought thrown into more or less articulate form. As we shall see below, in its beginnings among the Ionians, philosophy was already somewhat reflective and aimed at being logical. Early religious mysteries and rites tended to take on a measure of rational formulation in dogmas. Accord ingly, it is necessary to take the question farther b ack; to inquire into the types of belief which lie in the darker periods, before the rise of those logical formulas in which spontaneous belief seeks to justify itself. The characteristics of primitive and pre-historic knowledge and culture— considered as showing crude first inter pretations of nature and man— should be investigated. They are genetically preliminary to the logical and reflective types of thought. In this task the work of the anthropologists is directly available. They have attained a constantly clearer understanding of the modes and results of early racial thought— the thought of primitive man. Later on we are to take account more fully of the results. Here we may note especially the distinction emphasised in the recent work of Levy-Bruhl,2 who, following the 1 H egel, D ie Philosophie dev Geschichte (trans. in the “ Bohn Library ” ). 2 L. L e v y - B r u h l , Les Fonctions mentales dans les Societes injerieures (1910).

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leading of recent genetic psychology, separates primi tive thought, as being “ pre-logical,” from the “ logical ” thought of civilised man. The primitive precedes the rcllcctive; the pre-logical, the logical. If we admit that (here is a stage of interpretation so primitive that it may be called pre-logical, then this period is to be recognised as coming before any sort of intentional speculation. The results of this procedure are in striking agree ment with those of the later researches in genetic psychology. W ork in mental development has shown the great stages through which the normal individual mind passes in growing up to maturity. The safest and most striking distinction is that between the prelogical period, in which the individual remains logically undeveloped, and the logical, in which the reflective powers are fully matured. The characteristics of the pre-logical are made out with sufficient clearness to .erve at least the negative purpose of indicating what I lie individual at this epoch cannot do.1 These indications confirm the idea already suggested of a general analogy, if not an exact parallel, between I lie two sorts of development, the individual and the racial. The individual mind goes through a continuous growth from infancy to maturity, certain stages of which are so marked as to be well designated by certain terms. Racial thought has also gone through a con tinuous evolution, the stages of which present striking analogies to those of the individual development. In reaching actual results, the British school of anthropologists was first in the field.2 The outstandI See the detailed treatment of the writer’s Thought and Things, Vol. I (1906), where this use of the term “ prelogical " w as sug gested, and the Preface to Vol. I l l (19 11) of the same wrork. II See E. B. T ylor, Prim itive Culture (18 7 1); J . G. Frazer, The 1 ■■'/den Bough, 2nd edition (1900).

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ing principle of explanation of this school is that of “ animism,” the primitive man’s reading of soul into nature. All nature to the savage is living, resourceful, dynamic, semi-personal; and as such it is capable of good or ill to man. The recognition of the facts of animism, however, lost much of its value as the wellfounded discovery it was, through the inability of these writers to conceive of the “ so u l” save in one way— after analogy with the civilised man. The “ ejected” souls, the souls with which primitive man animates nature, could not be of different grades or modes— souls in which this or that faculty might be undeveloped, this or that interest predominant—because the ejecting agent himself, the savage, was looked upon as having always one and the same sort of mind. The genetic idea of a real evolution of mind, and of its products in social life, as seen in racial history, even when formally accepted, could not be fruitfully applied in the absence of a functional and dynamic conception of mental operations.1 In Germany, the beginning of a racial or folkpsychology was early made by Waitz and Steinthal.2 A series of later publications of lesser importance are summarised in the treatise on folk-psychology by W undt.3 In this work the rich resources of modern research in ethnology and psychology are made use of for the interpretation of primitive thought and institutions. 1 See the criticisms o f the British school, somewhat overdrawn, by M. Levy-Bruhl, in the work just referred to. 1 Th. Waitz, Die Anlhropologie der Naturvolker (1870-1877) ; H. Steinthal, Mythus und Religion (1870). 3 W. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie (1900-1909). This w ork is less effective because o f the w riter’s tendency to abstract classifica tion and schematism. See also the author’s condensation of the w ork in one volume, Elemente der Volkerpsychologie (1912).

PSYCHOSOPHY

ll is in France, however, that a school of thoroughly genetic sociology and ethnology has been founded. Starting out from Positivist premises, the French writers have considered primitive culture from a purely , objective and collective point of view. An early work l>\ Kspinas on primitive invention1 (technology) traced I he origin and development of practical discovery and invention, emphasising the social and religious motives in I he practical life of early societies. This direction has been pursued by the later French investigators, who have formulated the principle of “ collective repre sentation,” “ representation collective.” According to IIns principle, primitive life is dominated by a body of 1 iscntially collective thought, usage, and authority, which replaces the individual types of thought and .issociation reached by the analysis of the British m liool." The result is a view which, while too “ positivist,” in 1 he narrow sense of Comtean, to be called psycho lo g ic a l, nevertheless reacts upon the theory of savage mind and thought, and meets half-way the results of ’Hocial psychology. The mass of “ collective repre.entation,” another name for “ tradition” broadlv understood, replaces and prevents individual thought, ii> such a degree that a real distinction has to be made between primitive and civilised mental processes. i\ age thought is “ pre-logical,” over against civilised thought, which is “ logical.” Pre-logical primitive thought is “ mystical,” emotional, practical, dominated li\ the interests of social community and utility; while logical thought is formal, theoretical, and objective, 1 A. Kspinas, Les Origines de la Technologie (1897), a w ork not utlii'iently appreciated in English-speaking- countries. I heir results have appeared in the annual A n n ie Sociologique, uni in the w orks of the editor, E . Durkheim, and his associates. V O L . I.

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ruled by the laws of contradiction, consistency, and proof. This outcome is further sharpened by the formulation of the “ law of participation,” announced by L6vyBruhl as the most general principle of organisation to be found in primitive thought. According to this law, all objects and persons “ participate ” in the mystic meaning authorised by the collective representation or group-tradition, such as that of the totem-animal of the tribe. In virtue of this common participation, objects and persons lose what we should call, in our logical modes of thinking, their singular identity, their local and temporal position, their self-hood, etc. They interpenetrate one another. All logical and objective distinctions as such go by the board; the savage thinks in terms of the larger unity of the mystic meaning and presence. Animism is a phase of this participation of personalities inter se. Not only does primitive man not think logically, we are told; he cannot. He is pre-logical in his indi vidual capacity no less than by virtue of the compulsion of the social milieu. He cannot “ perceive ” through the senses merely, nor judge identities by logical rules; the faculty of cognition as such is rudimentary: at the best it is held under by the collectivistic interests embodied in him as well as operative upon him. It is held, by critics of the school, that this view overlooks important distinctions, one in particular. The fact that tradition hinders the individual savage from thinking logically by no means proves that he cannot think logically. The whole question of the relation of social meaning or tradition to individual endowment comes up. The results, socially considered, might be just what they are if human endowment, con-

•■idercd for itself, had not changed at all since pre historic times. It is the social factor, the tradition, I hat has slowly changed, constantly allowing the logical Iacuity, which is always present in man, to develop more fully and express itself more adequately.1 Apart from the question as to what a given mind might or might not do in other and different social conditions, the essential point made by the collectivist •< hool still holds good; the point that, as a fact, the thought of primitive man is collective, mystical, and Iire-logical. The very emphasis on the social which is made in the definition of thought as collective takes the problem out of the domain of speculation as to the « stent of early human endowment, and places it in that ol social fact.2 I lie question of the relation of individual endowment to racial attainment gets, however, a new form of tatemcnt from the results of recent studies in social psychology.3 For it is evident that if we take a tadically collectivistic point of view, we cannot adopt Ilie distinction with which the biologist serves himself lie Iween the factors of individuality represented by “ endowment” and “ environment,” the latter under wood in terms of the physical environment. The 1 t his point is well put by F. Boas in The M in d of P rim itive M an

( i«>1 1 ), who adds the consideration also, that in respect to many ol our civilised interests we are still about as pre-logical and mystic in our modes of thought as the most primitive savage. ' A claim pressed to the point of reducing all the “ norm ative” lii (lie level of “ descriptive” sciences ; as is the substitution o f a irncc des mceurs for morale, the derivation of logical categories from rules o f social usage, etc. . . . It may be added that all • volutionists agree that the mental w as at some time pre-logical in its c a p a c ity ; it remains so in the animals. W hether then the logical arose in pre-human or only in pre-historic times, is a • i oiidarv matter. 1 See the resume given in Chapter V I of Vol. II under the In tiling of “ Social Psychology.”

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biologist finds the processes contributing to endowment to end at birth, that is, when the child is physically separated from its mother; and the psychologist gener ally calls this the beginning of independent mental life also. But if there be factors of mental life which appear only in social conditions, as social psychologists assert, and if these conditions become effective, as they do, only after physical birth, then the mental endowment of individuality must be said to complete itself only much later. Even for biologists, physical birth is an unsatis factory place at which to locate the beginning of “ nurture,” as distinguished from “ n ature” ; for pre natal life is in many respects subject to influences from the external as well as from the uterine environment. A purely physiological criterion in biology would have its counterpart in a purely psychical one in psychology; and this would place the mental birth, the beginning of the mental individual, defined as the social unit, at the epoch at which the individual achieves consciousness of his individuality, that is, at the rise of self-consciousness. Putting the matter more generally, we may say that if the independent physical life is properly said to begin at physical birth, because then the formative influences necessary to physical independence cease to operate, we should say that independent psychic life begins only when there is a similar release of the mind from essentially formative social influences. Only then does the person take on his full mental character, becoming a fellow among fellows, as the body does when it becomes physically independent.1 The person begins to know himself to be a self among selves. 1 There seems to be in the growth of social independence no crisis similar-to that of birth in the physical life. At birth part of

PSYCHOSOPHY

Whatever the exact force of this point may be, in i field in which the distinction between endowment and icrjuired modification is vague at the best, we may still iv that the birth of the body is no point at which to locate the birth of the fully endowed mind. The mind develops in society after birth, as the body does in the mother before birth. Many of its essential organs, indeed we may say most of them— sensation being the principal exception— are absent at physical birth. They are not merely undeveloped, but as psychic organs they are absent. This truth, I suggest, tends to justify the position of the French writers referred to above. It shows the impossibility of determining individual mental endow m ent apart from social conditions. The task is as futile i\ that of determining physical endowment apart from pre-natal conditions would be. On the contrary, we are led to the view that a collective form of mental life pre■cdes the individual form. How the individual can think is best seen in how he actually does think in the .in ial conditions in which he finds himself. I he presumption, then, is in favour of a theory of ladical collectivism for the period of racial culture ■in responding to the pre-logical period in the individual. I his is established, indeed, by the facts collected by iccent observers of primitive societies. It gives raison I'rlrc to all those forms of illogical and irrational p .ychosophy by which the science of psychology was preceded, and which will always remain a thorn in its ide. Socially established superstitions, occult rites, iln

entire environment— the physiological part—is radically otY, while the physical part proper remains. The nearest tiling to this, on the mental side, would seem to be the achieve ment of the consciousness of self, as described by the students of iHin I psychology (see Chapter V II of Vol. II, below). Iiu U c ii

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mystic appearances, religious wonders, animistic and spiritistic realities, systems of “ new thought” and “ Christian science ” — these do not make appeal to logic or recognise the demand for objective proof. They rest in collective representation; or they are sanctioned by tradition; or they represent types of affective value; or they make appeal to emotional and gregarious habits of mind. In short, they represent and find their refuge in practical interests in behalf of which they continue to scout the claims of the theoretical.1 1 The limits of space forbid any adequate consideration of the particular forms of psychosophic interpretation. Certain of them are noted below in passing—the Orphic m ysteries, the belief in transmigration, the recognition of demons, etc. The subject must remain in our treatment merely preliminary to the main topic.

P art

EARLY

II.

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h apter

III.

The Origin and Development of Dualism—First Period of Greek Speculation, before Socrates. I' ro jectivism .— I t is commonly recognised that the lust recorded attempts to explain the world are those nl I he Greek schools before Socrates.1 There were In-fore this, of course, the mystic and spiritistic points nl view of the religious cults and mysteries whose characteristics have been mentioned in the preceding i hapter. Such views were, however, bound up with a i.ocial tradition and sanction of extraordinary force; llicy did not allow— much less did they stimulate— any • o it of independent speculation on the part of indi viduals. The rise of speculation represented, accord ingly, an enormous transition in culture, and an unheard-of dislocation of interest. Its roots are to be lound, no doubt, in political and geographical condi tions. In certain cases, geographical conditions favoured freedom of commerce and the rise of industrial indi vidualism; and in some cases, political conditions l.ivoured the rivalry and competition of social and 1 Aristotle’s account of these early thinkers, in his De Anim a, Itook I, constitutes the first history of psychology and philosophy.

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religious institutions. These, together with the embar rassment that such conditions produce for the individual, worked for results of liberty and freedom in which the motives of reflective thought found a certain scope. That this did not extend far, even in Greece, is seen in the conditions of persecution under which Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Socrates pursued their careers at Athens. But both politically and socially there was in certain of the Greek colonies a state of things which, in contrast with earlier mystical collectivism, could be called one of relative rationalism. There arose a degree of speculative liberty, and with it came the urgency of new problems for thought. Its factors became more and more explicit, as we are to see, and culminated in the “ relativism ” of the Sophists and the New Academy. The thinkers of this early period are generally classi fied in groups as “ Ionians ” and “ Eleatics ” (so named from their geographical origin in Ionia and Elea), “ Pythagoreans,” “ Atomists,” and “ Sophists.” Later historians, however, have properly insisted upon a classification which will reflect something- more important than location of birth or membership in a group. W e should aim at presenting a more essential connection than that of mere locality between this thinker and that, and a more essential bond than that of mere succession between this period and that. In our view the development of the theory of the soul or self furnishes the proper clue; and in this the analogy with the development of the individual’s apprehension of the self has direct application. From this point of view, the period may be described as that of the first appearance and early development

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<•1 “ dualism.” It opened, indeed, with a sort of specula tion which was, properly speaking, a-dualistic. The world is to the race, as it is also to the individual in 1 he earliest stages of his development, a sort of panoi.mia of given and unexplained changes. It is simply ‘ projected ” before the eyes, given to the senses. Its explaining principles, matter, mind, God, are not in .my way isolated or differentiated from one another. Itill it is just its principal character that it does not 1 • main meaningless and blank; it passes from this projective ” and a-dualistic stage into one of crude but positive dualism. In tracing this out, we reach the 1 <m 1 significance of the movement for psychology. Construed in accordance with this genetic principle, \\c find the following stages in the development of PreSocratic thought— 1. The “ Hylozoism ” of the Ionic thinkers. II. The “ D ualism ” of the so-called “ Early Dualists.” I I I . The “ Corpuscular T h eo ry ” of the Atomists. IV. The “ F o rm a l” Theories of Pythagoras and his School. V. The Theory of the “ One ” of the Eleatics. VI. The “ R ela tiv ity ” of The Sophists, and the transition to the “ Subjectivism ” of Socrates.1 1 Although this method, considered as a mode o f treating the . nl ire historical movement, is new, the interpretation of the period 1 . one of developing dualism is not new. It will be found in the ' 1>1 lv of Harms, D ie Philosophie in ihrev Geschichte, 1. Psychologie, iH/H (see especially p. 1x2, and in detail, pp. 118 ff.). In the hmv iii Geschichte der Psychologie of O. Klemm, 19 11, the antithesis between earlier dualistic and later monistic views is made the tunacteristic of the “ m etaphysical” psychology o f the period (/.'< , <it., pp. 12 ff.). Accordingly, it will be plain that the exposition ol the movement as one of grow ing dualism is not due to our '•penal rule of interpretation, although it is clearly in accord with it.

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I. Ionian Hylozoism. 1— The Ionian philosophers sought for some single principle by which to explain the world. By Tliales and Anaximenes (in the sixth century B .C .) , Diogenes of Apollonia (who wrote about 424 B . C . ) , and Heracleitas (about 500 B . C . ) , “ water,” “ air,” and “ fire” were in turn taken as the principles of explanation. To Diogenes the soul was warm air; to Heracleitus it was fire. Through the breath, it partakes of the eternal living fire, which is the basis of all things. Heracleitus is called the “ flux.” philoso pher, from his insistence on change and transformation, taking place, as he said, through the identity of being, considered as fire, through all its opposites. In common they recognised movement, change, and development, and sought to account for it by some primal principle. This led to the theory of “ hylozo ism ,” according to which all the world of reality is endowed with life, and the living or self-moving thing is the seat of the soul. Accordingly, we find, on the side of their theories with which we have to do, a common emphasis laid upon life. Life is the basis of all movement, change, evolution. Living beings have souls, and all things have life. The mental or conscious principle is not separated from matter*: matter or hyle (vA.?/) is always life or zoon ((wor); hence the term “ hylozoism.” 1 It should be distinctly understood that in treating’ of this and o f all the other “ is m s ” of our account, it is not the history of philosophy but that of psychology, with which we are concerned. It is only the psychological bearings of a theory that we are to bring out. For the G reek philosophy as such, authoritative his tories should be consulted such as Zeller, History of Greek P h ilo sophy, and Gomperz, The Greek Thinkers (both in English transla tion). See also the little book of A. W. Benn, H istory of Ancient Philosophy (1912), in this series. Mr. Benn’s larger work is The Greek Philosophers (1882).

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This view represents a first step toward an inter pretation which makes some note of the group of changes and processes by which living and conscious beings are characterised. It is, therefore, properly described by the term hylozoism. On the other hand, ■<> far as distinctions of living from not-living, and mind from life, are concerned, the result is quite negalive. It is consequently possible to say that it represents the “ projective ” stage in the development of dualism ; 1 it is not subjective, nor is it objective. Life is a sort nl first thing, a crude general term within which more positive meanings arc later on to be differentiated. It r. I he first step toward a more individual and reflective point of view— similar to that taken by the child— lead ing away from the social or collective zoomorphism of racial interpretation. But it retains the essentially /oomorphic content, for which hylozoism is only another nnme. II. The Early Dualists.— Within the same school, a j;ioup of men went further and worked out a series of \ icvvs to which the term dualism has been very properly applied by the historians of the period. The great names to be mentioned are those of Anaximander (1 ir. 566 B .C .) , Empcdocles (455 B .C .) , and Anaxagoras (500-428 B .C .) . Each of these thinkers pointed out • outlasted or opposing principles in the world. Anaxi mander postulated the “ unlimited” or “ infinite” ( ttnupov) as a positive something over against the limited elements of things. To Empedocles “ love and linte ” were the principles of opposition— an anthropo morphic rendering of attraction and repulsion. Finally, to

1 I f. Chapter V II of Vol. II on the “ projective” stage in the In d ivid u al.

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Anaxagoras gave the name spirit ( vovs) to the vital or formative principle, contrasting it with matter. Not only in these general principles of opposition, which in a sense did what the one principle of life had been called on to do, do these thinkers differ from the hylozoists; but also in their views as to the concrete matter of the world. They recognise in nature certain qualitatively different elements whose composition, under the action of general principles, produces things. The qualitative elements for Anaximander are the “ w arm ” and the “ cold,” the “ d r y ” and the “ wet.” Empedocles postulated four different elem ents: fire, water, air, and earth. But fire and air are the warm and the cold over again, and water and earth are the wet and the dry. These elements are undecomposable although composite. They also fill sp ace; there is no such thing as the “ empty.” Anaxagoras also explains all the phenomena of nature in terms of the union and separation of qualitative elements. Man according to Anaximander was evolved from aquatic animals. The philosophy of these thinkers, thus briefly described, leads to a new stage of the dualism which the science of psychology presupposes; and this in two ways. In the first place, the postulation of natural qualita.tive elements serves to solidify the external or objective pole of the growing distinction between the soul and the outer world. It is a step toward naturalism— toward a causal explanation of change in nature. It is a clarification of the mystic and vitalistic explana tions of the hylozoists, tending to express itself in dualism. In the second place, this reacts to produce a similar clarification or definition on the side of the self, the

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subjective term or pole. If the more objective is in a measure divorced from the less objective, the external from the internal, this will result in a further state ment on both sides. Accordingly, we find not only the recognition of the elements as external and distinct from one another, but with this that of the general principle of movement or change by which the combina tion and dissolution of the elements is accomplished. And it is here— in Empedocles, and more explicitly in Anaxagoras— that the further phase of dualism asserts itself. This principle is “ spirit,” reason, i/oi)s. The origin of this opposition and its further develop ment are of great interest from the point of view of the analogy between the racial and individual processes. I lie child is led by the stress of life, by the need of adaptation, to the recognition of a certain stability, lawfulness, and uniformity in the external world. I his uniformity conditions and controls his thought and action. And it is by this movement toward the definition of the objective that the contrasting phase of experience, the inner quasi-subjective phase, is clarified in turn. The moving principle behind the regularity ,md uniformity of things, the raison d'etre of ordered <hange, is something that is to shape itself as the self or soul. This we see reproduced here in the development of lellection. It is the further working out of a motive present in the mystic interpretation of primitive peoples. Animism and mystic participation are read ings, by a sort of social projection,, of a crude soullifc into the changes of nature. Here we see its 1 ounterpart in early reflection. The world of things is exhausted in the combination and dissolution of dem ents; how is this combination and dissolution to

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IN T E R P R E T A T IO N S

be accounted for? By the second and less definite principle which the dawning world-dualism implies— the soul. It has been very commonly said that in this dualism, which gives explicit recognition to the principle of “ spirit ” or yovs, over against matter or v\r/, Anaxa goras anticipated a full dualism, even that of Descartes. This is, however, a grave mistake. The facts, no less than the interpretation they should bear, dispute this. W e cannot here anticipate more than the general sig nificance of the Cartesian dualism ; but that will suffice. Descartes reached the thought of the actual separate ness of two substances, mind and body, having dis parate characters, thought and extension, and incapable of direct interaction between themselves. The contrast to this afforded by the theory of Anaxagoras is in structive. Instead of two substances, having specific characters, this thinker makes mind the basal principle of order and unity in the material no less than in the spiritual world— a conception developed by the Pytha goreans. Instead of separation and non-interaction, he postulates immanence and union. The problem for Anaxagoras is, what is the one principle of all nature? That of Cartesianism is, how can the appearance of interaction between mind and body, in particular cases, be accounted for, despite their absolute separation? The philosophy of the Greeks worked out the separation of mind and body; that of modern times seeks to bring them together again .1 More positively stated, the dualism reached by ' 1 The same difference exists between the substantive form of dualism of later Christian theology and that of the mystic spiritualism of Alexandria. Modern theology is em barrassed by the contradiction involved in the resurrection of the body ; but the Apostle Paul could say without feeling the contradiction, “ it will rise a spiritual body."

ii \>/yright.

yth a g o ras.

Reproduced by kind permission of the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U .S.A .) ___________

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Empedocles and Anaxagoras may be described as an important step toward subjectivism. It did not, how ever, reach the full subjective point of view, seeing that the positive determination reached was on the side of the objective, the external in nature; where the elements were qualitatively determined and the underlying prin ciple was that of space.1 The inner or mental principle remained largely negative : a sort of speculative resort, or at best a refinement on matter. The subjective as a conscious life was not yet defined. This appears in the fact that the two great problems which exercised the Greek mind subsequently to this were not strictly those of dualism. We find the problem of “ the one and the many ” growing con stantly more exacting and imperative. It was solved by the theories of the Atomists and Pythagoreans. The other problem— connected with the former—was that of the unreliability of the senses worked out in turn by the Eleatics and Sophists. The special doctrines of this group of thinkers were varied and interesting; we have space only to mention certain of them. The evolution of the world, including man, is described as a single and continuous process. It is due, accord ing to Empedocles, to the action of love and hate. Man is the latest and highest product of this develop ment; his immediate cause, according to Anaximander, is the action of the sun upon the earth working through lower forms of life, from the fishes upward. Accord ing to Empedocles, the plants are still earlier forms of life, produced by the action of love which overcomes the disorganising forces of hate.2 1 Like the “ thought" of Parmenides, the “ nous” of A n ax a goras was made one with empty space. 2 The organs were separately formed and were brought to-

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Empedocles also held to a theory of “ transmigra tion ” of souls. A series of bodily forms is imposed upon the soul by the action of hate. It is the function of love to free the soul from its bondage to this wandering life, and restore it to its divine place. Perception to Empedocles was due to the action upon the senses of emanations from things. He attri buted perception to plants. Truth was secured through sense-perception in accordance with the principle that “ like acts only upon like.” W e can know things because we, like things, are composed of material elements organised by love and hate. In Anaxagoras, the principle of spirit, or voOs, already spoken of, takes the place of the love and hate of Empedocles. As opposed to the elements of things (called by Aristotle “ seeds,” b/xoio^tpr}) which are material, the soul is simple, identical, unmixed. It brings movement, order, and form into the mixed materials. It is, moreover, the principle of reason, from which the ends found in nature proceed, acting in opposition to accident and blind necessity. It is also active, not merely intelligent; it is the moving, working principle, seen not in the living person only but in all nature. In Anaxagoras, too, the concept of evolution becomes more clear, as a process of real advance, of historical creation, rather than one of mere distribution and redistribution of elements.1 gether in many combinations by the action of love ; from which those best adapted survived. Thus he hit upon the idea of natural selection. 1 A n axagoras is criticised, however, by Socrates (in Plato’s report in the Phaedo, 96 ff.) for omitting finality, i .e ., the end which is the “ good,” from his account. It is true that the souldoctrine of A naxagoras lapses into physics, instead of leading on to ethics. V O L . I.

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The single soul is the form taken by spirit in a given body of material elements. The plants have “ dark” or immature reason, endowed with sensation, desire, etc. Truth is reached by reason working upon opposition and distinction; it is not attainable by the senses alone. Summing up the position of dualism among these thinkers, we may quote Mr. A. \V. Benn: “ Anaxi mander could regard the heavenly bodies as blessed Gods, Xenophanes could ascribe omnipotence and omni science to the material world. Empedocles could repre sent love and strife as elementary bodies” —all this in explaining how “ pure reason could have been identi fied with pure space ” by Parminides and Anaxagoras (A. W . Benn, Ancient Philos., p. 33). III. The Greek Atomists and the Corpuscular Theory. In Leucippus (cir. 480 B .C .) and Democritus (460361 B .C .) , the leading Atomists, the definition of the objective pole of the mind-matter dualism was carried forward. It reached such a positive statement in the direction of naturalism and mechanism that the theory, especially as presented by Democritus, is usually called “ materialism.” It advanced the concept of the soul, however, only negatively; and for this reason its psychological interest is sm all.1 To these thinkers, the elements of the world were atoms or corpuscles, varying in figure and size, but without differences of quality. These atoms have, for Democritus, a necessary downward movement: thcv fall in empty space (Leucippus), faster or slower accord ing to their size, the larger being heavier. By these atoms, thus set in movement, nuclei of matter are —

1 The

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formed, aggregates assembled, and the world of things produced.1 Bodies are aggregates of corpuscles. The soul is such an aggregate. It is composed of round, smooth, warm, fire-like atoms. The physical body is also an aggregate of atoms warmed into life by the soul, which departs at death leaving the body inanimate. Perception takes place by means of little images (ei8w\<i) which pass to the soul through the sensesBut perception is imperfect and often deceptive. The qualitative aspects of the world are due to illusion of the senses, since only quantitative differences exist. Impulse and will, the active life, reveal the reverse process— the pouring-out of the images taken-in bv perception. The air is peopled by demons, as the popular theo sophy declared, agreed Dem ocritus; they are human shaped images, capable of speaking, and having knowledge of human affairs. As intimated above, these thinkers represent a depar ture of importance in a certain direction. They freed speculation about the external world from the intrusion of occult and vitalistic elements. They banished the moving principles— love, hate, reason— of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, substituting a falling movement, which is, of course, so far as falling is concerned, a movement without a cause. But for such a movement there must be a void, an empty space. This thought is a notable achievement in physical science; but it denies the existence, and obscures the properties, of qualitative phenomena and with them those of the 1 This is the usual account. According- to Benn {Hist, of Ancient Philosophy, p. 133 f.) it w as only in the later atomism of Epicurus that “ weight ” and a “ downward ” direction of motion w ere attributed to the atoms ; Democritus' atoms flew at random. D 2

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soul. It may be called an advance for psychology, therefore, only in the negative sense that it makes it easier for subsequent thought to characterise subjective phenomena as such, in so much as the external and mechanical is more sharply defined. W e cannot, properly speaking, call their view materialism. F or this would be to suppose an opposi tion between their view and some sort of conscious spiritualism : to presuppose, that is, the dualism be tween mind and matter. On the contrary, the sup position that the soul is made up of smooth round atoms is only another of the attempts to account for it as part of the world, composed of the same stuff as the world in general. In this, it is in agreement with preceding theories, which had also failed to isolate the mental or conscious as such. The conception of N ature (<£iW ) is advanced in the direction of an objective and mechanical world-order. The antithesis between nature and man, as it took form in the Sophists, is thus prepared for. IV . Pythagoras (after 600 B .C .) and the Pythago reans .— A s multiplicity and disorder were emphasised by the Atom ists, so in the Pythagorean school we find em phasis placed on the notions of unity and order. The atoms of Democritus are, as we saw , left without any ordering, arranging, or developing principle; they fall, and that is all. In Pythagoras, there is a return to the Ionic thought of a principle— love, hate, spirit, etc.— that stands for unity and order, behind or within the multiplicity of nature; this thought w as given a very remarkable illustration in the Pythagorean theory. F o r Pythagoras, nature obeys and reflects the law s of “ num ber.” E very phase of phenomenal change may

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be supposed to follow a numerical order. A s we should say to-day, every thing allows of “ numerical expres sion ” — a mathematical conception of the world. The world becomes an ordered cosm os; its unity is seen in its numerical relations. Plurality is disorder; a rebel lion against the order and unity of a numerical system. The essence of things consists in the numbers which express them ; the numbers, therefore, are themselves essences. The Pythagoreans did not find this incon sistent with the recognition with the “ early dualists” o f opposites or antitheses in nature of which they made a list— one and many, rest and motion, etc. The soul is the numerical harmony of the body, as the world-soul from which it arises is the harmony of the cosmos. U niversal life is governed by number in four s ta g e s : (i) it is latent in seeds; (2) it appears in plan ts; (3) it becomes the “ sensitive ” soul in animals {located in the h eart); and (4) the rational soul in man (located in the head). The soul has three parts : reason (^peVt?), intelligence ^0119), and desire (Ovfju'x;). The first of these, the reason, is peculiar to m an; animals have the other two. This is an early attem pt at classifyin g mental powers •or faculties; but it goes no further than this. W ith the point of view of order and harmony we find united a development of the Orphic 1 doctrine of transm igration of souls. Souls go from one body to another, being in this sense separate existences. Demons are disembodied spirits. There is an apparent contradiction between this doctrine and the view' that the soul is the numerical harmony of a particular body. It is probable that in 1 T h e name o f O rpheus, the le g en d a ry founder o f a m ystical se c t, becam e attach ed to this type o f w orld-theorv.

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the Pythagorean circle— a secret religious organ isa tion— the theory of transm igration w as the accepted view , answ ering to ethical and practical demands and m aintaining the Orphic tradition. The need of carryin g out further the conception of order and harmony in a comprehensive philosophy, and of ridding it of contradictions, appeared later in the theory of “ ideas ” of Plato, for which the foundation is here in a sense laid. The development of a formal and unifying principle— that of number— su ggests the corresponding role of thought or the “ idea ” ; but it is only by vagu e hints that this is intimated. In the general tendency, however, aw ay from the purely objective and pluralistic view of things to one in which the apprehension of unity and order is made prominent, and which is in some w ay connected with the soul, an advance toward subjectivism is to be recogniscd. V. The Eleatics . — In the philosophers of E lea— X enophanes 1 (cir. 540 B . C . ) , Parmenides (cir . 490 B . C . ) , Z e n o 2 and Melissus of Sam os (both cir. 450 B . C . ) — a further movement of thought shows itself. In them, two antitheses were clearly presented which had been fore shadowed in earlier speculation: that of “ the one and the m an y,” and that of “ being and becom ing.” These, together with the Aristotelian problem of “ matter and fo rm ,” remained the critical questions of Greek interest. So far as the problem of psychology is concerned, the definition of the mental principle, both of these antitheses have significance. Claim ing that the abso lute principle of things is one and not many, the 1 X eno ph an es w a s the first G re ek philosopher to write in verse. 2 K now n a s “ Z en o the E le a tic ," in distinction from the more fam ous “ Zeno the S to ic ."

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Eleatics explain the multiplicity of things as “ appear ance ” only, due to the deception of the senses. To Xenophanes, earth is the one original element. It is of infinite extension : and it is at the same time God, all-wise and all-powerful. As this principle w as held to be one of fixed being, not one of change and be com ing, such an interpretation of sense perception was reinforced. F o r Parm enides the “ o n e ” — to M elissus, infinite— was finite but eternal and at re st; it w as pure space, which, like the “ earth ” of Xenophanes, was also reason and God. The Eleatics developed both these positions. The world-principle is on e; not many, as the Atom ists taught. It is also fixed, perfect, chan geless; not in development, as the Ionics believed. The two other schools were alike led astray by the appearance of things— an appearance due to illusion of the senses. In this the force of the Eleatic philosophy for psychology shows itself. It brings to the fore the problem of perception and makes an explicit criticism of knowledge necessary for further theory. W ithout such a criticism the three alternatives of thought— Ionic, Atomistic, and Eleatic— might be reiterated again and again without end. But the problem of perception or knowledge is one of the inner or subjective life ; and in brin gin g it for w ard the Elcatic philosophers took a step toward the definition of the subjective point of view as such, represented later on by Socrates. Parmenides, although identifying soul and body in the “ one,” still attributed to the “ o n e ” something like consciousness. Their theory w as also in line with the doctrine of unity and order of P yth agoras, which also denied abso lute multiplicity. But it sought this unity in the abso

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lute ground of things or in God, as the Ionics had done before them ; not, as P yth agoras had done, in a pro perty of the world itself. The potential dualism of spirit and matter disappears in the theory of Xenophanes and Parm enides as to the nature of God. God is both a sphere, supporting the world of m aterial things, and also a sp irit: the “ per f e c t ” in extension and in thought, the “ All in O n e ” (ev k o l 7 r u v ) . In this speculative “ identity philosophy,” we are reminded of the pantheism of Spinoza, which followed upon the dualism of D escartes, much as the pantheism of the Eleatics follows upon the sim ilar but less well-defined dualism of the Pythagoreans. They both show the resort of the im agination to a single monistic principle. The world of change and becom ing is appearance, illusion, S ch ein ; this Zeno demonstrates by showing the absurdities contained in the conception of motion. H is fam ous proof that Achilles could not overtake the tortoise— because whatever the fraction of the distance traversed by Achilles, the tortoise would also have gone forw ard a distance in the same time— remains a classical piece of logic. Specifically the world, and with it man, is a m ixture of “ light and d a rk n e s s ” : a position which shows how undeveloped the dualism of mind and matter still rem ains. Both together are the outcome of the one fundamental refined physical principle. “ Ligh t and dark ” w as about the only antithesis of a general sort in nature that had not already been invoked ! A sharp distinction w as made, however, between reason and sense. A s perception is illusory, change and becom ing are not real but only apparen t; but as reason is the organ of truth, unity and being are abso

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lutely disclosed by it. The reason grasps the being of things and establishes, for Parmenides, the identity of thought and its object, that of reason and extension. V I. The Sophists. — In the group of men called Sophists, or “ wise m en,” 1 the decay of speculation fol lowed from its own general tendencies. The Sophistic period is one of denial and lack of confidence. This showed itself in a temper of mind to which certain of the implications of earlier thought were congenial. F irst, the doctrine that the senses deceive, stated by the Atom ists and E leatics in a form that made all perception a m irage and motion impossible, w as carried out by the Sophists in the theory called in later specu lation that of the “ relativity of sense qualities.” All external reality or truth is relative to the observer, who apprehends the world through the medium of the s e n s e s ; there is no reliable general knowledge of nature secured by perception. Ju stice and morals cannot be founded on a supposed objective order of nature. But this is not all. W h y, ask the Sophists, is reason any better? W h at right have the E leatics to say that the absolute can be reached by reason? This, too, is v a in ; there is no w ay to reach any independent truth, either sensible or ra tio n al; all rests upon the experience and nature of man. Hence the positive position to which these negations brought certain of the Sophists— the only resort is that which appears to the man, his fleeting and circum scribed experience. Homo mensura omnium: “ man is the measure of all th in gs.” Th is is the motto of P ro 1 T h e y w ere a class o f travellin g teach ers who took m oney paym ent. T h e y prepared w e a lth y y ou n g men for careers re q uirin g skill in disputation and rhetoric.

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tagoras (4 8 0 -4 11 B . C . ) , and G orgias (427 B . C . ) , 1 the latter the dialectician who argued that there is nothing, and, besides, we could not know it if there were, and we could not communicate it if we knew it. The Sophistic period is one of clearing up or stock taking. It represents the bankruptcy of the old w ays of thinking. The mind finds itself em barrassed by the futilities of partial and unsuccessful system s. Its meaning for psychology, however, is not at all nega tiv e ; it is very positive. The retreat of thought into the man him self, into his circumscribed consciousness, into the empirical life, is in itself a new point of view , and the beginning of a new method. Give up, say the Sophists, the mere “ say s o ” of dogm atic assertion, the mere preference for this system or that, and be content with what you find within you. T o be sure, the Sophists did not themselves apply such a method or develop the new point of view. They were in a true sense sceptics; the satirists of the old, not the prophets of the new. But nevertheless they indicated the platform — cleared of its broken furniture — from which the prophets of the subjective were to speak, Socrates first of all. The Sophistic stand is, for the development of racial interpretation, what the dawn of the subjective era is for that of the thinking individual. The mind is, in a sense, thrown back upon itself through the ineffective ness of its first efforts to understand things. It finds in itself a mass of material of first-hand immediate quality, a mass of affective and active data : feelings, efforts, the contents of the practical life. All this 1 T h eir contem poraries, H ippias and Prodicu s, held a more c o n se rva tiv e position a s to the value o f objective kno w led ge.

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remains a direct possession, after the objective illusions and appearances of sense and reason are discounted. The “ subjective ” becomes a sphere of reference, a resort having its own characters, sanctions, and modes of b ein g; it is a term that stands in opposition to the other term, the external and foreign, of whatever sort. The dualism of “ subjective and objective ” is preparing itself. In our opinion, this is the significance of the Sophistic reaction : it came up to the verge of the subjective. It shows its value fully in the Socratic schools, sub sequent to Socrates, in which various tendencies of thought were held together by this one common intui tion of the subjective. W e are to see its positive characters in our exposition of the view s of Socrates himself. It is the mother-thought of all the idealism s, empirical no less than rational, of the history of philosophy.1 The Sophistic situation reminds us forcibly of the condition of embarrassment in which the gro w in g in dividual finds himself, as he confronts the puzzle of 1 Certain recent w riters 011 the history o f p syc h o lo g y h ave seem ed singularly blind to this or neglectful o f it, although it has been g iven full recognition b y various historians o f philosophy. F o r exam ple, Klemm {Geschichte der Psychologie) is led by his plan o f treatin g only o f positive theories, to overlook the Sop h ists— no doubt because they represented no positive “ ism ,” but m erely a point o f view . Sim ilarly, D esso ir (Abriss einer Geschichte der Psychologie) passes from the so-called Seelevbiologie, o f the e a rly G re ek schools, direct to Plato, om itting S o c ra te s a s well a s the Sop h ists altogether, to the extrem e d isa d van ta g e o f his treatm ent o f Plato, Aristotle, and the Sto ics. T h is is incom prehensible, even from the simple point o f v ie w o f the history o f ideas. H arm s is much nearer the truth (Geschichte der Psychologie), although still too n egative. T h e a n a lo g y with the p ro g re ss o f individual thought reinforces the traditional interpretation, w hich finds in S o c ra te s the transition— b y w a y o f the Sophistic reaction — to subjectivism and practical idealism : to all that bod y o f doctrine w hich the subjective point o f vie w underlies.

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his own body. On the one hand, the “ s e l f ” is the body, its principle of organisation and manner of exist ence are prim arily those of external things. But, on the other hand, the personal “ s e l f ” has the characters of an inner world— the practical, active, characters by which it dominates the body and w orks effects through it. Like that of the Sophists, the thought of the in dividual at the corresponding stage of reflection, shows the germ s at once of practical idealism and of theoret ical positivism . The division into parties shows the two m otives actually present in the school, the extrem e “ h u m an ist” and the more “ naturalistic.” It is clear that the significance of the entire preSocratic movement resides in this : it furnished, un consciously or spontaneously, the dualistic basis upon which the alternatives of later reflection were founded. The “ p ro je c tiv e ” is passing into the “ su b je ctiv e” point of view . The distinction between subjectivism and objectivism , idealism and naturalism , could receive its first and world-famed presentation in Plato and Aristotle, when once Socrates had shown the meaning of the subjective.

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Greek Speculation, Second P e rio d : Subjectivism.

Socrates, Plato, and the Minor Socratic Schools . — The significance of “ su b jectivism ” in racial and indi vidual thought alike is this : it isolates the contents of the mind itself from their external references and dis closes the possible interpretations that may be placed upon them. To say that the senses deceive, is to say that the interpretation put upon sensation is incorrect or false. T o say that knowledge is relative, is to say that our percepts, im ages, etc., are capable on occasion of varying interpretations. T o say that reason is in effective, is to say that the beliefs, presuppositions, and processes which are its tools are insufficient. All these misinterpretations turn upon the fact that con sciousness possesses data which are taken to be subjective. T o take the subjective point of view is simply to recognise this in some m easure; to acknowledge that we must deal first of all with what is in the mind, with percepts, im ages, hypotheses, etc., “ made u p ” in con sciousness; in short, with “ id eas.” It recognises that ideas intervene in some sense between the perceiver and the thing perceived ; that ideas are the mediating or instrumental term in knowledge. I. Socrates (469-399 B . C . ) . — The Sophists denied in effect the possibility of passing beyond ideas. To them the interpretations made by the preceding philosophers 46

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were all alike false; all that w as left for knowledge was the body of ideas itself. Man, the possessor of ideas, w as “ the measure of all th in gs.” Now in the teaching of Socrates, we find a new sort of interpretation of ideas suggested. Recognising the subjective point of view of the Sophists, Socrates built positively upon it in two different directions, which we may call without violence the “ social direction ” and the “ ethical direction.” F irst, Socrates opposed the Sophists’ individualistic w ay of em ploying subjectivism . He attempted, by his celebrated questioning method (as seen in P lato’s dialogue, Protagoras), to bring them to admit a general form of knowledge, a commonly received definition of a thing, which w as more reliable and true than mere individual opinion (86£a). The criterion of truth thus comes to be found in collective or common acceptance; truth and knowledge are social. It is man in the sense of “ hum anity,” not man the individual, in which the true subjective point of view resides. In this position, the foundation was laid for the theory of general and universal know ledge,1 which w as to be developed by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Socrates said, as Plato reports, that the only thing he knew— being in this w iser than other men, as the Oracle had declared— was that he knew nothing. T h is is, however, to know something of the m eaning, limitations, and value of knowledge itself. Second, Socrates connected truth with virtue, know ledge with duty. He said that virtue depended upon knowledge in the sense that with adequate knowledge, 1 T h is interpretation o f S o c ra te s follows that o f Zeller, The Philosophy of the Greeks. C f. also Boutroux, “ S o c ra te s ” in His torical Studies in Philosophy, E n g . trans. (19 12).

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or insight into the results of action— called by him “ wisdom ” (o-opitt)— one would never do w rong. This m akes action, conduct, depend upon ideas, ju st as truth does; and carries the subjective point of view into the domain of practice. A fter this, mere external authority, social constraint, religious sanction, cannot replace the inner light of knowledge. If all w e have is a body of ideas, still this very point of view has resu lts; for it is then our ideas that stand for things, and it is our ideas that guide our actions. T w o processes of mediation play through ideas : ideas are the m eans of attaining both sorts of ends, ends of truth and ends of virtu e.1 In Socrates, the em phasis falls upon the latter sort of mediation, the practical. He establishes the eternal right of virtu e; and m akes ideas, in the form s of knowledge and truth, means to the ends of practical life.2 In this departure, the dualism whose history we are tracing, in the history of theories of the self, takes on a new and valuable phase. It becomes the dualism between the “ subjective ” and the “ external ” ; between the mind, as a subjective principle and the seat of ideas, and the world of things and of practical interest and valu es.3 In Socrates, this dualism appears in the 1 In the a u th o r s w o rk , Thought cindThings, or Genetic Logic, V o l. I l l , “ Interest and A r t ,” it is show n that individual thought and actio n a lw a y s proceed b y this twofold pro cess o f m ediation. C f. also below , C h ap . V I I , ad fin. 2 T h is point is m ade the cap ital one b y H arm s, loc. cit., who expounds S o c r a te s' p syc h o lo g y under the h e ad in g “ E th ic a l D eterm inism .” ;! It has not yet becom e a dualism betw een “ subject and object " a s such, in w hich both term s a re set up consciously in exp erience itself, or within the self. T h is is ach ieved only later on, when thought becom es reflective. But it afford s the foundation for it, b y su pp lyin g once for all the refutation o f pure externalism either a s m aterialism o f nature or a s legalism o f morals. V O L . I.

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immature form that it takes on at first also in the individual : it recognises the fallibility of individual perception and personal opinion, and seeks a method of converting the individual’s ideas into socially con firmed and general knowledge. It thus saves itself from the pitfalls of sophistic relativity. And again it asserts the correspondence and interdependence of knowledge and virtue, with the result of securing the stability of practical interests and values. Th e child likewise learns to judge for himself, but according to an enlightened social conscience, which comes to replace the ipse dixit of an external authority. The external term is not a purely objective and neutral system of controlling conditions over again st the individual; on the contrary, it is the embodiment of practical values 1 over again st the social body which is bent on pursuing these values as ends. T h is is the meaningO of the external also to the child,' before his prying curiosity develops into consistent reflection. The world is something to conquer and enjoy, and something to conform to, rather than som ething to understand; and the “ self ” is a body of collec tive social interests, rather than a personal being of mere desire, individual personal caprice, and private opinion. The result is that, in the school of Socrates, Physics, or the science of objective nature (<£ra-i? of the pre-Socratics), gives place to L o g ic and Ethics, pursued by the dialectical method. The gain com ing from the human point of view is far from being lo s t : it is now made positive and lasting. 1 S o crate s exp licitly add ed to the intelligent m o vin g principle o f A n a x a g o ra s, the id ea o f “ final c a u s e ” : the intelligence w o rk s for the good. S e e Fouillee, La Philosophic de Socrate, V o l. L P- 2 .V

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It is thus that the fam ous motto of the Socratic school, “ know th y s e lf” (yvwtfi aeavrov) is to be under stood. It is an exhortation to exam ine man— the social, active, virtuous man— and understand his place in the network of external things and social interests. B y such knowledge is virtue a d van ced ; for virtue is taught and learned with the teaching and learning of truth. Freedom is found in intelligent action. The principal am biguity that remains— one that re appears in the system of P lato— attaches to the relation of truth to practice, w hat is known as the “ Socratic p arad o x.” Socrates, as we have seen, made the “ g o o d ” the absolute end, and knowledge the means to it. But the relation thus barely stated may be understood quite differently. It m ay be taken to mean that virtue is contingent upon know ledge; that the truth of ideas must be established before virtue can be reached or the good conceived.1 Such a turn would give suprem acy to the reason, and lead on to system atic intellectualism in the theory of m orals.2 The empirical question involved— that of the relation between cog1 It is the virtue (evirpd^'ia) that is founded on kn o w led ge or wisdom that is “ te ach a b le,” not the virtue (evruxia), w h ich rests on m ere opinion. 2 O f course, S o c ra te s could not foresee the use later speculation w a s to m ake o f his intuitions. A nd it is worth sa y in g , though it is not new , that the “ S o c r a t e s ” o f P la to ’s Dialogues (the Menon esp ecially) is, in this m atter a s in others, a Platonic So crates. H o w e v e r w ell intended by the author, w e must suppose S o c r a te s ' opinions to h ave been developed som ew h at in the direction ot P la to ’ s. On the m atter before us, the follow ing is the decision o f Fouilli^e : “ S o c ra te s w a s not exclu sively m oralist, a s the read ing o f Xenophon would lead us to believe, nor a s much o f a m eta physician a s Plato represents him. H is proper point o f vie w is that o f the unity o f ethics and m etap h ysics in the notion, at once practical and speculative, of final cause ” (Fouillee, loc. cit.. Vol. I, p. 34). In his opinion also S o c ra te s is an ethical determ inist, assu m in g that he d iscard ed free-w ill (a question, h o w ever, w hich he did not discuss). E 2

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nition and will— is one of modern psychology. Its answ er in later thought will concern us further on. Although put to death for “ im piety,” Socratcs held to the existence of a supreme God. H is belief in the spirits of the earlier theogonies is attested by his claim that he himself w as guided by the prohibitions and restraint of a “ demon ” which, however, never guided him positively. II. Plato .— In the philosophy of Plato (427-347 B .C .) , the factors of earlier thought have explicit development. W e will indicate only those aspects which bear upon the problem of psychology. P la to ’s thought centres in the celebrated “ theory of id ea s.” Its m eaning in brief is that ideas or concepts are not merely subjective states of mind, but absolute realities existing in themselves. E very actual thing in nature has its absolute prototype or model in “ id ea.” W h at degree of reality things have comes only from the presence of this prototype, of which the thing is a mere “ shadow .” The ideas constitute a hierarchy or ascending series, the supreme idea being God or the Good. The idea of the Good must be the highest idea, and it must be divine. In this theory there is a further advance in the direction of the Socratic teaching. The starting-point is the idea, but it is now not only not an individual state, but also not merely a subjective th ing; its mean ing is what is important, its existence as reality per se. This is the beginning of a typical form of rationalism, one that considers the m ediating term, the idea, not as the instrument of knowledge, but as itself revealing the real. A further thing— a second real something— reached through the idea, is given up : such apparent

S t . A u g u st in e .

Reproduced by kind permission of the Open Court Publishing Co. Chicago, U .S .A .)

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realities are mere shadow s, reflections, pseudo-ideas. In the intuition of the idea, the absolute itself is directly apprehended. B y this step, the dualism of the earlier philosophy is carried forward and enriched. The “ s p ir it ” of A n axag o ras and the form al “ number” of P yth ago ras are given the quality of the idea. The absolute is enriched bv the gain accruing from the Socratic sub jectivism ; it becomes a rational principle. Further more, its highest embodiment in the idea of God makes it, in the final interpretation, something spiritual. A gain the ethical significance of the Socratic point of view is not lost in the rationalism of Plato. T o Socrates, all things exist for the sake of the G o o d ; ideas are means of attaining virtue; all cause in nature is final cause, a process working to a desirable end. Plato is true to his m aster here; and in his doctrine of ideas he justifies the thought by a metaphysics. Instead of being a mere belief, a pious hope, the absolute Good is really present in the supreme idea. The rational principle culminates in God, the supreme reason, and the ethical principle in the Good,, the supreme end. These two are o n e: the idea of the Good is God. The process of mediation involved in the Socratic method— the mediation of ends or “ goods ” by con cepts— is therefore not superseded in the Platonic pro cess of mediation of realities by ideas. Both are recognised in their culmination, in the final synthesis of God and the Good. In this the motives of individual thought are again exhibited in their integrity. The individual finds that truth is reached through ideas, and also that ideas lead to satisfactions; both processes o f mediation hold good. He docs not find it necessary

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to deny one of them in m aking use of the other. It is only when his further reflection leads him to inquire into it, that he finds that he him self, follow ing social leading, has already united the two results in a further synthesis and embodiment in personal form . Father, priest, God, each may become in turn the being in whom knowledge and goodness are alike and together realised. The hero is at once the wise man and the good m a n ; God is the great ITero, the eternal Good. W e are all naturally to this degree Platonic in our definition of God. In this result, too, the “ e je c tiv e ” process in the grow th of reflection, individual and racial alike, reaches its full statement. The rational-ethical postulate of God, in Plato, follows upon the animistic and anthro pomorphic postulates of early religious m ysticism . It secures deliberately, in term s of reflection, what the earlier movements secured spontaneously, in terms of ejection : the presence of personality in the divine nature. Psychologically, this is of great interest, because it show s us the gradual freeing of the hidden motives of dualistic thought. Both the processes of mediation, each w orking through ideas, set the inner life over again st the o u te r; the world of reason, order, and the good, over against that of appearance, plurality, dis order, and imperfection. So far we have dwelt upon P la to ’s theory as it affects the first of the opposed term s of the du alism ; we will now look at his treatment o f the second. In the human person, according to Plato, reason or the idea is involved in matter, or the body, through the presence of the soul. The soul as common prin ciple partakes of the nature of both. It has an im

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mortal or rational part, coming- from God; and also a mortal part (i-m O v /irjT L K o v ), the scat of appetite and sensation, belonging to the body. Lying between these and m aking their interaction possible, there is a third part (6vfj.6s), by means of which reason conquers desire. Plants have the lowest p a r t; animals the two lower, but not reason, which is exclusively human. In man, the head, breast, and abdomen are the respective seats of the three. The rational soul pre-existed and also survives the body. It is immortal, gradually freeing itself from its non-rational parts through transmigration into new lives separated from one another by periods— each of a thousand years— of the penalties of p u rg a to ry .1 N ature shows an upward progress, whose end is repre sented by man (but not by woman !), since in man the rationality is achieved in which the absolute good is freed from the corruptions of matter. M atter (vXrj) is not a positive substantial principle, but one of lim ita tion and confinement. It is the “ m atrix,” the “ n u rse,” the “ m other,” of the generation of reason. The world as a whole is a living being (£wov) of whose life living organism s partake. The world-soul takes form in individual souls. In all this, we see the return to a m ystic or psychosophic point of view. The objective loses its exact content, reverting from the naturalism of Democritus back to the hylozoism of the Ionics. The service of Plato, accordingly, in the doctrine of ideas, consists in h aving developed the subjectivism of Socrates and in havin g rationalised the spiritualism of A n a x a g o ra s; not certainly in having clarified the concept of nature or in h aving hastened the advent 1 F o r the w orst offenders, bein g everlasting, it is no lo n ger “ p u rg a to ry ,” but “ hell.”

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of scientific method. Psychology, understood in the empirical sense, remains a part of “ ph ysics,” which treats of the shadow-world. In discussing the reason, Plato held that the know ledge awakened in the mind— all learning and research — comes by a “ rem iniscence” (avd/ivr]<Ti<i1) from some earlier existence. He form ulated the two law s of association, known as “ resemblance ” and “ contiguity,” to explain the play of ideas. Fin ally, we should rem ark that two great directions are represented in P la to ’s view s. In the first place, he started out from S o cra tes’ instrumental theory of k n o w led ge; concepts are the instruments and means of attaining practical and m oral ends. But in m aking ideas themselves realities, P lato goes over to a more rationalistic point of view . Instrum entalism passes into absolutism . The point of unity of the two is, as we have already noted, the identification of the highest idea or God with the absolute Good. The question arises, then, by what mental process— whether idea, feeling, intuition— this identification is effected. W e here reach the apex of this extraordinary struc ture of thought. W hile in his later life (in the Timceus), Plato em phasised rationalism by m aking existence the outcome of ideas of identity and difference— the soul h aving existence in this sense— still his characteristic view is more m ystical. Plato the poet, the artist, w as as profound in sensibility as Plato the philosopher w as in thought. The divine reason in man, he says, responds to the divine good in G o d ; by love and contemplation the soul realises the union of wisdom and goodness in God, and attains its own proper immor1 T h is doctrine is found in P la to 's exposition o f S o c r a te s ’ view s in the Metton.

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tality. P lato ’ s doctrine of divine love (tpw?), exercised by immediate contemplation of God, is a recognition of the synthesis of knowledge and value, of thought and practice, in a higher immediacy which is contemplative and aesthetic— “ pancalistic ” — in ch aracter.1 It makes the aesthetic the fundamental reconciling categ o ry. T h is is the first appearance in the history ■of philosophy of another movement which clearly appears at the same relative place in normal individual reflection. The individual presses the two modes of mediation, cognitive and active, each to its lim it; and at the limit, each of them by an outgo of the imagina tion postulates its own ideal. Then, overcoming this final opposition, the two ideals become fused together in the one immediate and ineffable object of contemplation. The aesthetic mode of apprehension is thus called into p la y ; it reaches the reconciliation of the terms of the dualism of thought and actio n ; its object is one of beauty, one to love and adore.2 It w as this form of Platonism , not the developed rationalism of Aristotle, that first gained currency, through the N eo-Platonists of Alexandria, and held its own for more than two centuries. The child’s preparation for the enjoyment of beauty undoubtedly involves the play-functions, as current 1 S e e below, C hap. II o f Vol. II, on K a n t's Pancalism. Plato, h o w e ve r, proscribed most form s o f a rt from his ideal Republic, holding that the}’ had too “ so fte n in g ” an effect in education. 2 An analo go us interpreta ion o f Plato is presented, with p sych o lo g ical insight and g re a t learning, in Prof. J. A . Stew art’s book, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. H e uses, a s I do here, the terms “ instrum ental” and “ aesthetic " for the two Platonic points of vie w . Fo r the a n a lo g y with the individual's process, one m ay note the suggestion m ade in the author’s article, “ Sketch of the H istory o f P s y c h o lo g y ,” Psychological Review, M a y 1905 (deve loped in U niversity lectures). S ee also W . D. Furry, The .Esthetic Experience (1908.)

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aesthetic theory admits. B y these functions mental m aterial becomes detached and disposable for “ semblant ” and im aginative uses. Som ething analogous is seen in the course of Greek reflection in the sophistic “ play ” of ideas. In the Minor Socratic Schools} the “ M e g a ric s ” (Euclid of M egara), the “ C y re n a ic s” (Aristippus), and the “ C y n ic s ” (Antisthenes, Diogenes), the Socratic leading w as dominant, with little further result for psychology. The beginning of “ hedonism ” appears in Aristippus, who, on this point, prepared the w ay for the Epicureans. He taught that pleasure w as positive, not the mere rem oval of p ain ; also that pleasure, defined in sensuous terms, constituted the good and afforded the criterion of truth. V irtue w as prudential in character. In the Cynics, we have sim ilar suggestions of the philosophical positions reached later on by the S to ics; nature and fate w ere the great realities, to which man w as to subject himself with simplicity and without pretence.

C h a p t e r V.

The Third Period o f G reek Speculation— O bjectivism .

Aristotle and the Rise of Objectivism .— It would seem that Aristotle (384-322 B . C . ) , 1 without doubt the greatest scientific man, if not also the greatest speculative genius, that ever lived, arose to restore the empirical tradi tion to philosophy after the plunge into absolutism. The time was ripe for the foundation of empirical psychology, and follow ing his scientific instinct, he founded it. But the time w as not ripe for its entire philosophical justification, and he did not ju stify it. He had the right to found formal logic, and he took advantage of the right. H is achievements in natural science, politics, aesthetics, and ethics are also those of a man of the highest constructive genius. T hese rem arks follow from the one statement that A ristotle developed both the empiricism of method of Socrates and the rationalistic logic that Plato inherited in the Ionic and Pythagorean tradition. Confining ourselves to the psychological bearings of his view s, we will look at his doctrine from both sides, takin g the m etaphysical first. A ristotle distinguished four sorts of “ cau se,” as w orking together in th in g s: “ efficient,” “ form al,” “ fin al,” and “ m a te ria l” cause. Of these, three fell together on the side of form (eiSos), manifested in reason, soul, and God. The fourth, the material cause, 1 C alled the S ta g irite from his birthplace, S ta g e ira , a G reek co lon y in T h ra ce . 60

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is matter (v\yj). This is A risto tle’s interpretation of dualism. Aristotle declares that final cause w as the relatively new conception which had been clearly distin guished before him only by A n axagoras. B u t m atter is not an independent principle : it exists only in connection with form and design. It is a limitation, a relative negation. The only independent absolute principle is God, who is, as in the Platonic teaching, both Reason and the Good. W ith such a m etaphysics, there is no positive justifi cation of science, psychological or other. Objective nature is teleological, an incorporation of reason, which gives it its form , movement, and final outcome. L ife is a sem i-rational teleological principle, w orking to an end— a vitalistic conception. All form in nature is the product of a form ative reason. N atural phenomena are not purely qu antitative; form al distinctions are qualitative. The objective world is thus given its right to b e ; but it is a world in which reason is immanent. There are two great modes of reason, considered as cause, in the world : a cause is either a potency (Svva/xis), or an act, called “ entelechy ” (eVrtA.c^cia) or actuality (ivepyeia). Reason or form, when not actual, slumbers as a poten tiality in nature. Pure reason or God is pure a ctu a lity ; m atter is pure potentiality. A s such God m erely exists in eternal self-contemplation, apart from the world. The heavenly bodies are made of ether (not m atter like that of the four elements) and have s p irits ; they are moved by love, directed toward God. In this we have a concrete rendering of the ideas and divine love of Plato. On this conception, “ ph ysics,” which deals with phenomenal appearances, including psychology, is con

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trasted with the theory of causes, “ first th in gs,” or “ m etaphysics.” 1 This philosophical conception so dominates A ristotle’s mind that he practically abandons, in theory, the sub jective point of view. In his view of the soul, he goes over to a biological conception, which is, however, not that of evolution. N atu ral species, like the types of Plato, are im m utable.2 The soul is the “ first entelechy ” or form al cause of the b o d y ; in essence it is akin to ether. It embodies also the efficient and final causal principles. M an, in the masculine gender, alone realises the end of nature. Psychology, thus fused with biology, extends to plants and animals and so becomes a com parative science. The plants have nutritive and reproductive s o u ls; they propagate their form. Anim als have, besides, the sentient and m oving soul, which is endowed with impulse, feeling, and the faculty of im agin g. In man, finally, the think ing or rational soul is present. This is implanted in the person before birth from w ithout; and at death it goes back to its source, the divine reason, where it continues in eternal but impersonal form. It is two fold in its nature in man, partaking both of divine reason and of the sensitive s o u l; it is both active and passive (votSs 7t o i ? / t i k o s and I'oDs In the theory of the relation of these souls to one another, Aristotle advances to a genetic and strictly modern point of view. They are not separate “ p a rts,” having different local seats in the body, as 1 T h e subjects that followed “ a fte r physics ” (ra /*era ra (pvaiKa) in the collection o f A risto tle ’s w ritin g s made by Andronicus. 2 A nim al form s sh o w a grad atio n up to m an, but they do not represen t an actu al evolution, a s the Ionic philosophers had d eclared , but incom plete or abortive efforts o f nature, w hich aim s at producing man in whom the active reason a p p ears.

OBJECTIVISM Plato taught, but functions of the one developing prin ciple. The higher is developed from and includes the lower. . In all this, it is evident that while the objective point of view is maintained, still the doctrine is not the result of a searching of con sciousn ess; nor does it employ a strictly empirical method. It does not isolate the sphere of mind as one of conscious fact, distinct from that of the physical. The results are on the same level for mind, life, and physics in the narrow er sen se; they are deduced from the immanental conception of nature as a whole. So far A ristotle the m etaphysician. But A ristotle the scientific observer is still to be heard from. It is clear that psychological facts may be observed, just as other facts m ay be, even in the absence of any clear distinction as to the presence or absence of consciousness. Aristotle set him self to in vestigate the functions of the soul, looking upon it as the biological principle of form in nature.1 In this sense, as using an objective method of observation, and as m aking important and lasting discoveries, he is properly to be described as the pioneer p sych ologist.2 W e may now enumerate the most celebrated psycho logical doctrines of Aristotle, those in which his permanent influence has shown itself. He divided the mental functions or faculties into two 1 In this he an ticipated the m odern, m ore explicit attem pt to o bjectivise the mental sphere w hile retaining- the essen tially sub je c tiv e c h a ra cte r o f its content. It ap p ea rs later on in C o m te’s attem pt to do ju stice to p sych o lo g ical facts in connection with so cial, and in recen t definitions o f anim al p sych o lo g y a s the “ scie n ce o f anim al b eh avio u r,” both m atters touched upon later on. 2 A risto tle 's p sych o lo g ical treatises a re De Anitna (irepl ipuxvs} and Parva Naturatia. A recent w o rk g iv in g a translation into En glish , with full Introduction and B iblio graph y, is by Prof. W . A . H am m ond, it is entitled Aristotle’s Psychology (1902).

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classes, the “ cognitive p o w e rs ” (those of knowledge and reason), and the orectic or “ motive p o w e rs ” (those of feeling, desire and action). T h is division survived until the threefold K an tian classification of intellect, feeling, and will came in .1 A ristotle’s theory of knowledge extended from senseperception at the bottom of the scale to the active reason at the top. There are three s t a g e s : senseperception (aiaOr/ais), im agination (<fravTacriu.), and thought (vol's). He accounted for perception by supposing har mony or correspondence between the sense-function and the stim ulating external conditions— as, for exam ple, between vision and the illuminated object— the harmony consisting in the form common to the two, and its favourable condition being a mean between extrem es of stimulation. The general function of sensation is to take the form of the object, without the matter, over into the mind. He distinguished five senses, correlating them with the physical elements. Colours were compounds of black and white, the original qualities of light. Sim ilarly, all tastes were combinations of sweet and bitter. F o r the co-ordination of the various sensations and their formation into true perceptions, A ristotle sup posed a “ common sen se,” located in the heart. It is also by the common sense that im ages arise and become 1 In his general psych o -p h ysical conception, A ristotle is startlin gly modern, sa ve , o f course, in the actu al results reach ed. 1 le g iv e s detailed and co nclusive reasons for lo catin g the soul not in the head but in the heart, which, a s he d isco vered , w a s the centre o f the va scu lar system ; for co n sid erin g heat the material substratum o f life and mind ; for re g a rd in g the veno-arterial system (with the blood) a s the channel o f com m unication o f sense and motion. But for our kn o w led ge o f nerve and brain, w e should consider his a rgu m en t a model o f inductive reasonin g, as indeed it w a s taken to be for generations.

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memories, dream s, and fancies. These im ages in their revival follow three law s of associatio n : “ con tigu ity,” “ resem blance,” and “ con trast.” It is in the common sense, moreover, that the judgm ent of things as true or false takes place, and the common “ sensible qualities ” - -motion, number, shape, size— are attributed to things. The common sense g iv es unity to consciousness itself. Only man has active recollection and constructive im agination (as employed in art). The im agin g func tion is necessary to thought as sensation is to imagination. B y the productive im agination the necessary schemata are supplied to the reason. In the creative or higher reason, A ristotle finds a principle which brings rational certitude into the em pirical matter of the common sense. A s adding an element of absolute form, it is “ a c tiv e ” ; as having commerce with empirical data it is “ p a ssiv e .” The interpretation, however, of the active as contrasted with the passive reason, is in dispute.1 In the investigation of thought proper, the entire body of formal or “ Aristotelian ” logic w as worked out. The theory of syllogistic inference sprang full-formed from the brain of Aristotle. He even su ggested, in his treatment of the “ practical syllogism ,” that the law s of conduct m ight be thrown into sim ilar form .2 In his theory of the “ categ o ries,” of which he finds ten, A ristotle enumerates the different modes of pre dication possible about the same thing or subject. 1 S e e H am m ond’s accou nt o f the different vie w s {Aristotle's N o doubt the best co m m en tary is that a Horded by the theoretical developm ents which followed upon Xristotle’s incom plete statem ents. 2 lith. N ic.} 114 7 b , 18. T h e “ N ich o m ach ean e t h ic s " is thought id be a treatise on m orals ad d ressed by A ristotle to N ich o m ach u s, his son.

I ’sychology,-Introduction).

VOL. I.

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Sim ilar fruitfulness attached to the investigation of the motive powers. All perceptions, said Aristotle, are accompanied by pleasure and pain, which also charac terise emotion, and issue in impulse and desire. Pleasure and pain are, in general, sign s, respectively, of advanced and hindered life. Emotion is a mixture of pleasure and pain, either actual or suggested by per cepts and ideas. On the basis of emotional differences, A ristotle founded differences of temperament. These rem arkable positions remained the exclusive doctrines in the domain of feeling until modern tim es; and they are integral elements in the scientific conceptions of to-day. A s to the active and voluntary life, the sam e rare genius displays itself. Im pulse and appetite are stimu lated by pleasure and p a in ; emotion prompts to action. But along with this impulsive spontaneous action, there is deliberate will, which arises in desire. D esire is awakened by ideas or knowledge. There is a hierarchy of active motives and ends, as of intellectual s ta te s ; stag es of desire, will, and rational choice depend respectively upon perceptions, empirical knowledge, and rational insight. T h is introduces a certain rationalism into the theory of the practical reason, and reminds us of S o crates’ theory of the relation of conduct to know ledge. The rational will is f r e e ; but the principle of will in general extends into all organic nature, in the form of impulse or potentiality. It is somewhat anal ogous to the “ conatus ” of Spinoza and the “ blind will to live ” of Schopenhauer. In morals, the doctrine of the “ m ean ” — virtue being the mean or moderate exercise of a power, tending to self-realisation— had its influence on the Stoics and Epicureans.

OBJECTIVISM

These principles of P sychology and L o g ic were carried by Aristotle into the domains of “ E th ic s,” “ P o litics,” “ E s t h e t ic s ,” and “ R h eto ric” with a suc cess that has made him one of the greatest authorities in all these subjects for all time. In his discussion of art, developed in the Poetics, he holds that the artistic im agination is im itative (yxt/x^crt?), producing a purified or idealised picture of the real. A rt is alw ays con cerned with appearances (<f>ai'T<lo-naT<i), which are sem blant of the real. The dram a serves to afford an outlet for the emotions of pity and fear— a function by which the soul is purged and ennobled. In accord ance with this view , the universe is a w ork of art, a whole in which an ideal is presented in sensible form. It is present eternally to the contemplation of God, to whom it responds with love through the spirit which is in it. In this we see the tendencies which were referred to in the case of Plato as being “ pancalistic,” losing something of their mysticism and taking on more articulate form. Sum m ing up, we m ay say of Aristotle that his philosophical theory did not advance or clarify the dualism of mind and b o dy; but that this dualism was re-cast by him in the distinction of “ m atter and form .” This obscured the subjective point of view . It placed em phasis upon the objective to such an extent that mental phenomena, considered as vital form , became matter for objective observation along with physical phenomena. In this w ay, psychology w as treated as a branch of natural history or “ physics ” ; and as such it took an enormous stride forward. Incidentally, also, the doctrine of the soul as form led Aristotle to com bat theories of a spiritistic and “ psychosophic ” character, such as metempsychosis and F 2

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pre-natal reminiscence. T h is w as an important gain to the naturalistic point of view. But A risto tle’s vitalism prevented its issuing in a complete scientific naturalism .1 But, as we are to see, of the two sides of A ristotle’s doctrine the formal, embodied in the new logic, w as to gain the ascendency. W ith this weapon the Patristics, Scholastics, C asuists, L o g icists, and deductive reasoners of every sort hit about them with deadly effect, having their w ay for centuries, while natural science slumbered under the pall of the Middle A ges. II. The Post-Aristotelian Schools : 2 The Epicureans. — Epicurus (342-270 B .C .) reproduced tendencies cur rent before Aristotle, but united them in a more con sistent philosophy. The atomism of D em ocritus, says Epicurus, gives the proper account of the s o u l; its faculties are built up upon sensation, its desire is for pleasure, and it dies with the death of the body. F o r psychology, the life of sensation and that of activity 1 T h is has remained a hindrance in (lie developm ent o f the su bject-m atter o f positive science. In the gro w th o f the modern scien ces, p sych o lo g y h as been about the last to attain the full naturalistic point o f view . T h e ph ysical scien ces ach ieved it earliest, that is, the scien ces o f the purely objective and external. But they w ere long em barrassed by the intrusion o f an ill-defined a n d m ystical postulate o f soul or mind or reason, m ade the e x plaining principle even in the domain proper to science. It w a s to be exp e cte d that physical, like m ental science, would be able to define its su bject-m atter c le a rly only after the substantive dis tinction betw een mind and m atter w a s achieved and the latter w a s defined in term s o f extension. O nly later still— and not com p letely y e t— have the biological scien ces freed them selves from this sort o f intrusion ; seen in anim ism , vitalism , and teleo lo gy in its various form s. A s to p sych o lo g y, the distinction between naturalism o f content and m ethod, and spiritualism o f principle finds difficulty in m aintaining itself to-day. 3 A n able account o f the period is to be found in C aird , The Development of Theology in the Greek Philosophers, II, Le ct. X V .

OBJECTIVISM

in the pursuit of pleasure, sum up the teachings of the school. Sensation is produced by im ages passing from the object through the air and strikin g upon the sense organ. A doctrine of freedom, in the sense of caprice, is based upon the postulate of accidental deviations in the course of the falling atoms. T h is is the first appearance of articulate sensationalism in psychology, and as in its later appearances, in the French Encyclo paedists, for exam ple, it is associated with a m aterial istic metaphysics. It unites the subjective relativity of the Sophists with the physical ontology of the A to m ists.1 The Stoics .— Under this heading (derived from the word otou, a porch) a g re a t variety of tendencies is gathered together and a group of thinkers included. Zeno “ the S to ic ” (336-264 B . C . ) is the founder and the most representative Greek of the group, which includes Greek and Rom an literary men, as well as professed philosophers. Chrysippus (cir. 280-207 B . C . ) w as the logician. Seneca, Epictetus, and the Em peror M arcus Aurelius were prominent Rom an Stoics. The Stoic movement w as a return to sober and prac tical understanding, after the vogue of high theories of the reason. Know ledge in the interest of practical l i f e ; prudence guided by inform ation; freedom as ex pression of personality in a world ruled by law and subject to fa t e ; social obligation and calm enjoyment over again st capricious individual pleasure : such were the Stoic counsels of moderation, justified here and there by personal and eclectic philosophical considera tions.2 Conscientiousness toward man and resignation 1 T h e g re a t poem, De Natura Rerum, o f the R om an poet L u c re tius, presents in not too faithful form the philosophy o f Epicurus. 2 C f. C aird , loc. cit., L e c t. X V I I , for an account o f the gen eral so cial be a rin g s o f the S to ic m ovem ent.

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toward fate are its watchw ords. In the Rom an group they were embodied in lofty m axim s of friendship, duty, and hum anity.1 Little that is psychologically noteworthy— as distinct from the practically moral— appears in it; and what does appear is suggested rather than explicitly stated. Zeno contended, again st both Plato and Aristotle, that the soul w as one, a unit function in whose activity all the parts and powers of sense and reason were included. The conception of common sense, considered a s a centre of organisation and unity, w as expanded into a doctrine of “ consciousness,” which w as of the nature of knowledge— literally a “ knowing together.” L'eeling and will were aspects of knowledge, while error and misfortune were due to its abuse or misdirec tion. Sensation is accepted or agreed to by the understanding. The soul w as corporeal, fire-like, and ethereal, as w as also the world-soul or God. The world developed by law s, showing “ n ecessity ” (<ivay/c7/), the Epicurean “ ch an ce” (Tv\rj) being excluded; it embodied reason (Aoyos)2 and showed divine Providence or design. There w as a cycle of creative period s; and the soul had only the duration of one of them. On the whole, the Stoics vindicated the Socratic practical wisdom in real life : a tempered and humane enjoyment and a just resignation. Their dualism was that which appears between the values of experience and life on the one hand, and a colourless but neces 1 U ndoubtedly the loftiest and purest o f m oral codes based on hum anity ; it yields only to the Christian ethics o f love, e x pounded so soon after in the “ Serm on on the M ount.” 2 T h e term “ l o g o s ” w a s used before this b y A n a x a g o ra s in connection with the principle o f reason. It passed through S to icism and Alexandrianism into Christian theology.

O B JE C T IV IS M

sary world-order on the other. They undoubtedly g a v e a more positive and lastin g m eaning to the subjective life, the inner seat of affective and active processes, sharing this with the Epicureans. And in the doctrine of the unity of common sense or know ledge, they transferred speculative interest to the self as the bearer of consciousness and the centre of values. This w as the transition of view-point required to give to psychology its restricted sphere and to ju stify its place as a science of inner or conscious phenomena, after the undue objectivation of the mental by Aristotle. W ith the clarification of the inner sphere thus brought about, the an alogy with the “ subjective ” stag e in the individual’s self-apprehension goes forw ard. R acial reflection, like that of the individual— when once the thought of self as the centre of conscious processes is achieved— never again loses this vantage-ground. Consciousness, the background of the Sophists’ scepticism , the theatre of S o cra tes’ dialectic, the object of A ristotle’s research, and the postulate of occultism and theological m ysticism , is on the point of becoming the presupposition of speculative thought. It had to w ait, however, to come actually and fully into its own, fo r the emancipation of reflection, after the period of the domination of the Church. I I I. The Greek Mystics, Neo-Platonism .— The elements of m ystic contemplation found in Plato became explicit in the Greek M ystics. The influence of Oriental thought, notably Jew ish , united with this in a revolt again st the exclusive pretensions of the reason as organ of apprehension of the world and God. F o r this the new intuition of the conscious person, the embodiment

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of the soul, thrown into relief by the Stoics, and soon to be explicitly demonstrated in an anti-m aterialistic sense by Plotinus, supplied the needed vehicle. It w as furthered by the sceptical criticism of the members of the N ew Academy (e.g. Carneades, cir. 2 13 B .C .) , who developed the theory of relativity of A ristippus and the S op h ists.1 The world issues from God by a series of emanations or outpourings; by these he is manifested, without loss or impoverishment to himself. In concentric circles, the Divine becomes dilute, its perfections are impaired in the world-soul and in angels, demons, and men. This is the “ fall,” the descent of man. The ascent is through love and ecstasy, by which the soul rises through a series of embodiments, gain s the stars, and finally reaches again its divine source. In Philo of Alexandria , called Philo Judaeus or “ the Je w ” (cir. 30 b .c .-a .d . 40), the explicit union of Jew ish theology with Platonic idealism is effected. In the series of personal beings interposed by Philo between God and man is the “ W ord of God ” ; a doctrine in which the “ Logos ” of the Stoics becomes the “ W ord ” or “ first begotten S o n ” of the Gospel of St. John. Philo makes the conception of personality fundam ental, and depicts the world as the imperfect form in which the perfect reveals itself. In these vital points, he leads the Alexandrian movement. In the Neo-Platonist group proper, or “ A lexan drian s,” Plotinus ( a . d . 205—270) is the. commanding figu re.2 In his doctrines, the motives of speculation are clearer, 1 T o these more intrinsic factors should be added the recrudes cen ce o f p sych osop h y and superstition favoured by the disturbed political and social conditions after the M acedonian invasion. 2 A ssig n e d to the school o f A lexandria, though born in E g y p t out o f that city, and teaching, after about A.D. 245, in R om e.

D uns S c o tu s.

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Reproduced by kind permission of the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U.S.A.)

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since they are more essentially Greek. The emanation theory becomes a philosophy of creation which, as Harm s points out, leaves aside the principles of causa tion and linality, both essential in the rational thought of the time. The world-movement is depicted as one simply of occurrence, happening, the embodiment of a rational principle. God reveals himself in successive pulsations, proceeding from his inner nature; instead of in a hierarchy of ideas, originating in thought. There is a hierarchy of quasi-personal existences, appre hended by the soul as in nature one with itself. The different “ s o u ls ” of Plato and “ mental p o w e rs ” of A ristotle indicate stag es of degradation of the divine person, down to the animal and reproductive soul, and finally to matter itself. Plotinus argued directly for the spirituality of the soul. H is two main positions were, first, that the animate organism could not arise out of the inanimate particles by com bination; and second, that continued personal identity is proved by memory. The latter position probably suggested the doctrine of “ memoria ” of St. Augustine, mentioned below. T o Plotinus, God is a mind, without body or self, in which all ideas arise. He is the first stage in the manifestation of pure identity, or being, or the O ne,1 conceived very much in the sense of the substance of Spinoza. After Mind comes the world-soul, which is in turn present in all individual souls. These last ure conscious and personal. The individual arises, by a series of intuitions of the successive stages or embodi 1 A c c o rd in g to B outroux {Historical Studies in Philosophy, E n g . tra n s., p. 157). Plotinus him self connected his transcendent One with the A bsolute o f A risto tle, which existed apart, in pure sellcontem plation.

O BJECTIVISM

ments, to a state of union with the impersonal and absolute One. This is a state of ecstatic love and contemplation. The movement is m ystic in two senses, both of which are important for the history of the development of dualism. In the first place, G o d ,1 and with him all concrete reality, is in essence a personal presence, not a rational idea. The movements in the real are likew ise inherent and immanent, simply presented as given fa c ts ; observed, not accounted for on logical grounds. T he dualism, therefore, of objective things and personal soul (whether rational, sensitive, spiritual, or whatever it be) is abolished. Its terms are recon ciled through the intuition of unity in their divine source. A gain , the same appears in the method of apprehen sion of God or the real. It is by an act of contempla tion or direct intuition that the human soul vindicates its oneness with the divine. The will goes out in ecstasy, the heart in lo ve; the will subsides in self repression, the heart in a trance-like calm. The divine presence, not revealed to thought or attained by effort, is taken up in feeling, by a movement of personal absorption. H ere we see the legitim ate development of Platonic “ lo ve,” freed from its rational presup positions. The “ ejective ” process, the reading of God and the world in term s of personality, reaches here its culmina tion. It is the form of pan-psychism which succeeds to the heritage of Ionic hylozoism and the Platonic “ id ea.” W ith this the motives of reconciliation of dualism appear in personal intuition, contemplation, emotional and aesthetic realisation. In the earlier 1 O r, with Plotinus, the next lo w er bein g, the “ w orld-soul.”

EA R LY U N SC IEN TIFIC INTERPRETATIONS

doctrines, the true and the good were reached indirectly, mediated by ideas : here they are apprehended imme diately and directly in an act of communion with G o d .1 1 T h e Indian system s, w hich w e have no sp ace to describe, pre sent a n alo gies with N eo-Platonism . T h e y g iv e an exhibition of thought w hich is in principle intuitive rath er than reflective, con tem plative rather than logical. W e can easily see, on com paring O riental with O ccidental civilisations, w hich o f the tw o types of thought has proved fruitful for science, including psych ology. F o r a com prehensive exposition o f O riental svstem s, see J. E . C arpen ter, article “ O riental Philosophy and R e lig io n ," in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology o f the present writer. H arm s (loc. cit., pp. 19 3 f.) m akes an interesting com parison of O riental and G reek dualism s with that o f D e scartes.

P art

TH E

III.

R IP E N IN G

V I.

h apter

D U A L IS M

The Patristics, Scholastics, and A r a b ia n s; the Mystical Reaction.

I. Christian and Patristic Psychology . 1— The motive of dualism, fundam entally present in experience, was not permanently overcome by the mysticism of Alexandria. The voice of reason, no less than the demands of conduct, insisted upon the distinction between the self and the world. The achievement of the consciousness of personality only served to reinstate this distinction in more mature form. This appeared in the spiritual and logical dualisms that dominated Patristic and Scholastic thought, and culminated in the doctrine of “ substances ” of D escartes. The point of view represented by the Founder of Christianity w as ethical rather than psychological. It placed in a new light, however, certain essential truths of the subjective life. The “ Serm on on the M ount,” the most sublime of moral discourses, places personal responsibility in motive, intention, rather than in obedi ence to authority or in explicit a ctio n ; and so bases morals upon the innermost springs of conduct. It is a sharp rebuke to externalism and legalism . 1 S e e the w ell-docum ented article on Patristic Philosophy by E . T . Shanahan in the w riter’ s Diet, of Philosophy and Psychology

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N ew doctrines of justice and love are also ta u g h t: the justice of the “ golden rule,” and the love that turns the other cheek. The personal virtues of humility, charity, resignation, of the Stoic M oralists receive a new interpretation in the principle “ out of the heart are the issues of life .” In this practical subjectivism , Je su s may rightly be looked upon as a new and more enlightened Socrates. The general theory of personality also had its ad vancem ent. The doctrine of the Fatherhood of God ga ve new force to that of the brotherhood of man. This figure of speech w as employed by Je su s himself — the figure by which a most intimate social bond w as symbolized between men and between man and God. A personal individualism , tempered and sustained by universal moral justice and love—as in the answ er to the question, “ who is my neighbour,” in the Parable — is the Christian substitute both for the naive col lectivism of early G reek thought and for the more conscious solidarity of Rom an nationalism and civic pride. The spiritualism of the Church Fath ers w as a view of the soul worked out in the interest of Christian eschatology. Developed into a m essage of salvation, the theory of C hristianity involved statements as to the nature, origin, and destiny of the individual soul. It w as to the single soul, also, in the person of the indi vidual convert, that the m essage of the gospel made its appeal. The F ath ers held in common to the view that the soul was “ sp irit,” personal in its conscious nature, and im m ortal; that it w as created by God, who was also a person; that demons and angels existed ; and that the Saviour w as a mediating person, partaking of both divine and human characters, by whom the hum.iib

T H E M YSTICA L REACTION

soul w as restored or “ sav ed .” The differences am ong them began in the discussion of further philosophical questions, by which they endeavoured to rationalise this body of doctrines in a system of apologetics. Under these limitations, of course, psychology and philosophy could not be motived by strict observation or by free speculation. Thought w as conducted from a platform of divine revelation and dogm a. In all gro w in g religious tradition, the assum ptions underlying belief consist in a body of revealed or decreed tru th s; and further thought is confined to the exposition and defence of these truths in a system of apologetic inter pretations. This aspect of the Patristic thought does not directly concern u s ; its psychology is soon summed up. The controversy between “ crealionism ” and “ traducianism ” concerned the origin of the individual soul. Creationism w as the view that the soul w as created by a divine act at the moment of conception. A ccord ing to traducianism , the soul w as passed from parent to child, in a new individual form , all souls having been potentially created in the first man. The concept of personality had acute discussion, carried to the extrem es of refinement by the Scholastics. The relation between divine and human personality w as taken u p ; especially the relation between the two aspects in the personality of Jesu s and am ong the three persons in the Trinity. These subjects, although stand in g m ysteries, were nevertheless topics for theological definition. The purely logical and ex parte character of the results points the w ay to the form alism of H igh Scholasticism . In Saint Augustine (354-430), however, the greatest of the F ath ers, we find a mind formed in the mould

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of Aristotle. St. A ugustine gathered into one the scattered results of what w as best in G reek psycho logical thought. He held that the soul w as to be approached and known directly through consciousness; that it w as immaterial in character and im m o rtal; that inner observation w as possible and necessary. Result ing from such observation, he found that the mental life w as one of continual movement in the one spiritual principle, and showed itself in three fundamental func tions : intellect (intcllectus), will (voluntas), and “ selfconscious memory ” (perhaps the best rendering of memoria , 1 as St. A ugustine used the term). The funda mental m oving principle of the entire mental life is will. The other functions m anifest will. This develops the Socratic tradition in the direction of the emphasis on conduct or activity, over against the rationalism of Plato. But in St. Augustine the em phasis on will is accompanied by a corresponding recognition of fe e lin g ; a position in which the religious interests and intuitions were no doubt involved,2 but which w as none the less new and fruitful. H is a rgu ment for freedom of the will, within the broad concept of determinism, is classical. The soul has also the power of knowing itself; the faculties turn in upon them selves; we rcflect upon our own states of mind. T h is w as to St. Augustine the key to divine know ledge; for in reflecting upon ourselves we discover the characters of the spiritual principle and of God. T h is is the end of all knowledge. In such teaching St. Augustine shows himself to be 1 In “ m em oria ” St. A u gu stine found the consciousness o f sell a s identical (with Plotinus), a s persisting (not self-forgetting hence memoria), and a s eternal. In m em ory, the distinction ol past, present, and future are annulled in an intuition o f eternity. 2 A s m ediated through the A lexan drian tradition.

F r a n c is B a c o n . (â&#x20AC;˘Copyright.

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V O L . 1.

TH E RIPENING OF DUALISM

after Aristotle the second great pioneer in the history of psychology. B y him, the sphere of fact which psychology is to m ake its own is clearly marked out : the sphere of conscious events, apprehended by intro spection. He also develops further the dualism of mind and body, by defining mind in terms of will and activity, terms which find their meaning only within the con scious life itself. It w as no doubt only his theological interest that kept St. Augustine from taking the radically dualistic' step taken later on by D escartes, who denied all inter action of mind and body inter se in view of their disparity as substances. The resurrection doctrine and the theory which attributed to demons and angels the power of acting on the physical world may have con tributed to keep St. Augustine from raising the psycho physical question of interaction, and from answ ering it in the Cartesian manner. It appears to be clear, how ever, after all reservations have been made in the case of St. Augustine, that the absolute substantive separa tion of mind and body is not reachcd in the Patristic w ritings, but rather a logical separation in the interest of the distinction between “ s p ir it” and “ flesh,” be tween the “ kingdom of h e a v e n ” and that of sin or “ fleshly lu st.” Tertullian, another leading psychologist of the Latin Church, no less than St. Paul, argues for the resurrection of the body as part of the entire per sonality that is redeem ed.1 The risen Saviou r preserves the same recognisable body, in the New Testam ent nar rative. To certain of the Fathers (Tertullian among them) the soul is a sort of fine air-like stuff, diffused throughout the entire body— one of the many absorp1 “ I f the d ead rise not . . . then jo u r faith is vain ; ye are still in you r sin s."— i C o r. x v . 1 6 - 1 7 .

T H E M Y STIC A L REACTION tions from Greek thought of view s which proved to be available in the service of Christian do gm atics.1 Further, according to St. Augustine, by the know ledge of self scepticism regardin g the external world is re fu ted ; for the self distinguishes itself from its objects. W h atever deception or illusion there m ay be in sense-perception, it arises in the judgm ent or inter pretation of sensation; it is not in the sensation itself. The belief that som ething real is external is proved by the facts. In this a further most im portant phase of dualism discloses it s e lf : that between the subject and the object of thought. In establishing this dualism, reflection passes into the clearly logical period ; that is, it becomes conscious of itself as an activity of ju dgm ent; it inter prets its own contents. The full results of this step appear, as those of the “ substantive ” distinction just mentioned also appear, only in D escartes. But it is safe to say that D escartes occupies the conspicuous place he does, in both of these respects, in part cer tainly, because of his historical position as follow ing after the great Patristic w riter, St. A ugustine. In considering Aristotle, we saw that psychology w as pursued by him in the spirit of natural history, but without entire theoretical justification; to him mind and body were still united in the one f W or “ nature.” St. Augustine took the further step that justified 1 H arm s, loc. cit., p. 208, pro bably g o e s a little too fa r in in tim ating that nothing in St. A u gu stin e ’s recognition o f the fa c ts o f consciousness is in contradiction with such a vie w o f the soul. F o r S t. A u gu stin e not only a rg u e s a g a in st the co rp o reality o f the soul, but finds its essen ce in the will, much a s D e sc a rte s found it in “ th o u gh t.” In N em esiu s, B ishop o f E m e sa (about 430, riept 'bvatctis’Avdpiiirov ; Latin , De Natura Hominis ), w e find a sharp dualism insisted upon, in opposition to the “ entelech y ” theory o f A ristotle. G 2

T H E R IPENING OF DUALISM

psychology as a science— having its own body of data, the data of consciousness, and its own method of pro cedure, introspection— by m aking the soul a principle different from m atter, and known only in conscious personalities. The truth hinted at in the famous injunc tion, “ know th yself,” of Socrates, passed into the equally fam ous response of D escartes, “ I think, there fore I a m ” ; and com ing between them, the mediating doctrine of St. A ugustine might well have been framed in Cartesian fashion from the words, “ volens, sum.’' T o sum up, we m ay safely say of St. Augustine the following three th in g s : (i) he justified empirical psychology by separating off and defining the inner world of mind as distinct from physical n a tu re; (2) he developed the dualism of mind and body up to the point at which their actual separation as different sub stances could be made by D esca rte s; and (3) he estab lished the function of reflection, by which the self distinguishes itself as subject from the objects of its thought, thus carryin g dualism on to a new stage of development. II. The Scholastics .— The writers who are grouped under this title were also men enlisted in the service of the Church. The Church w as the guardian of learn ing during the long period from a . d . 400 to 1400. The religious orders in P aris and O xford, led by dominant spirits, became cam ps of doctrine devoted here and there to the defence of this or that philosophical tradi tion in theology. O f the great Scholastics, Albertus M agnus and Thom as Aquinas were Dominicans, Duns Scotus a F ran ciscan .1 1 Full treatm ent o f this period is to be found in the H istories o f Philosophy. E sp e c ia lly authoritative are the detailed a rticles by Sie b e ck in Archiv jiir Geschichte der Philosophic, B d. I —III, and Bd. X .

THE MYSTICAL REACTION

T h e A risto telian and P la to n ic d irection s of th ou gh t are p lain ly d istin gu ish a b le, to g e th e r w ith t h e ‘ m ystic influence of the A le x a n d ria n s. P lato n ism ap p e ars e arly in the m ovem ent in m odes of id ealism w hich place em p h asis on reason , the v a lid ity o f g e n e ra l k n o w le d ge , and the m ore m ystic fo rm s of intuition fath ered by P lotin u s. A risto telian ism , on the other hand, gain ed com plete ascend ency in the la te r w rite rs, both in the sh ap e o f a lo g ica l fo rm a lism , and in em p h asis upon the v a lid ity of p artic u la r k n o w le d ge , the subordination o f the id ea o r form to m atter. It w a s p rob ab ly only the re a lly v ita l p sy c h o lo g y of S t. A u g u stin e , w ith its e m p h asis on w ill and the concrete life, th a t sa ved the C h u rch for lo n g p erio d s fro m the sterile lo g ic and d eg en erate, or a t le a st ca su istic a l, p ractice th at finally cam e to m ark its in tellectu al and m oral life. T h e influence of S t. A u g u stin e show ed itse lf in Jo h n and R ic h a rd of S t. V ic to r in the tw elfth cen tu ry. T h e A b b o ts of S t. V ic to r m ade ou t three aven u es o f k n o w le d g e — called by them “ e y e s o f the s o u l ” : sen se, reason , and in telligen ce. B u t these w ere s ta g e s in the p ro g re ss o f the m ystic app reh en sion o r contem plation of G o d , and the recovery o f the soul from sin. T h e problem o f evil in the w o rld , d iscu ssed by S t. A u g u stin e , w a s centred in th at of the fa ll o f m an and the consequent re a lity o f hum an sin. E r r o r is the re su lt o f blindness due to s i n ; sin is not, a s S o c ra te s had su pp osed , due to erro r. In all this m y stic turn of vie w , fe e lin g held the prom inent place. T h e p sy c h o lo g y o f S t. A u g u stin e a lso served to g iv e a n a lo g ie s by w h ich lo g ic a l “ realism ” could be defended : the doctrine th at ge n u s and species have real ex iste n ce in natu re. T h e three fac u ltie s w ere p resent in the one soul, w hich w a s their g e n u s ; so a lso in the T rin ity , the three p erso n s, each real, existed in

THE RIPENING OF DUALISM

the equal reality o f the p erso n ality of G od. On the oth er hand, “ n o m in alism ,” 1 the doctrine th at the g e n e ra l, the g e n u s, w a s only a m ental rep resen tatio n , h a v in g m erely nom inal existen ce th ro u gh the nam e attach ed to it, found re a lity only in the p articu la r o b jects of extern al perception. T h e ideal form or type o f P la to w a s replaced b y the sin g u la r form of the object in w h ich , on the A risto telian view , it w a s em bodied. T h is prolonged co n tro ve rsy had app lication , a p a rt from fo rm al lo g ic , to th eolo gical problem s m ain ly, such as those o f the T rin ity , the hum an race in g e n e ra l as in volved in the fa ll and redem ption, the n atu re o f a n g e ls , etc. T h is m ore p sych o lo gical period of S ch o lasticism g a v e birth , h ow ever, to Jo h n of Salisbury (cir. J1 5 0 ) , a m an w h o m ay p roperly be described as one o f the foreru n n ers o f m odern gen etic p sy c h o lo g y . T h is th in k er w o rked out a th eory of the continuous developm ent o f k n ow le d g e, p oin tin g out the tran sitio n s of fun ction a s they a c tu a lly take place from sense-perception to reason. F ir s t ap p ears sen sation , and in it the germ of ju d g m en t; then im a g in g , w ith a fu rth er developm ent of ju d g m e n t in the direction o f the va lu atio n of ex p e ri ence, from w hich a rise p leasu re and p ain, the b asis o f d esire. O ut of im a gin a tio n sp rin g s ratio n al kn ow led g e, and throu gh it com es w isdom , the contem plation o f God. T h is rem arkab le an ticipation of the g en etic point of v ie w , g iv in g a s it did specific content to the theories o f m ental a c tiv ity , m ovem ent, and w ill o f S t. A u gu stin e 1 B etw een R oscellinus and A nselm , nominalist and realist re sp e ctiv e ly, the co n tro ve rsy w a s joined. T h e middle or “ con ceptualist ” vie w holds that g e n e ra l concepts contain k now led ge o f ge n e ra l realities.

THE MYSTICAL REACTION

§7

and the M o n k s of S t. V ic to r, rem ained quite fru itless. It w a s sw am p ed by the flood of H ig h S ch o lastic su btle ties th at the sw e llin g cu rren t of v e rb a l lo g ic bore w ith it. A lb ertu s M a g n u s, T h o m a s A q u in a s, and D u n s S co tu s are the com m an d in g figu res o f “ H igh S c h o la stic ism .” W ith Albertus ( 1 1 9 3 —1280 ) w e find the c lea r enunciation of the d octrine of “ creatio n out of n o th in g ” w hich bro ke once fo r all w ith th eories of em an ation and of the etern al existen ce of m atter. M a tter w a s the product o f a d ivine “ f i a t ” — w h eth er intellectual o r vo lition al, opinions differed. T h e hum an soul w a s included in the act of creatio n , but it w a s m ade in the lik en ess o f God. T h a t is, it w a s ration al and p ersonal. Thom as Aquinas ( 1 2 2 7 - 12 7 4 ) , the A n g e lic D o cto r of m odern R o m a n th e o lo g y , developed an acu te and m od ern-sound ing th eory of the m utual relation of reason and w ill. E a c h is dependent upon the other : k n o w led ge is in strum en tal to a c tio n ; and action con trib u tes to k n ow led ge. T h o m a s a lso confirm ed the A risto telian distinction betw een a c tiv e and p a ssiv e reaso n , a s w ell a s the doctrine o f m atter and form . T h e ra tio n al soul is a princip le w hich h as its form entirely w ithin it s e l f ; it is not, lik e the sen sitiv e and an im al sou ls, su b ject to stim ulation from the e x te rn a l w orld to w hich it reacts. In th is th eory, the d octrine of m atter and form is re vived and extend ed . T h e ration al soul, lik e G od and the a n g e ls, is pu re f o r m ; and a s such it is im m ortal. T h e low er soul is a sort of form w hich inheres in m atter and con stitu tes the principle of v ita l o rg a n is a tion. T h e active reason or pu re fo rm , h o w ever, e x ists only a lo n g w ith the p a ssiv e reaso n , and is a lw a y s p er sonal. W ith in the function o f k n ow led ge, the role o f activ e reason is to reach g e n e ra l or a b stra c t concepts, the lo g ica l species or kin d s w hich underlie sen se-p ercep ts

THE RIPENING OF DUALISM

and im a g e s. S en sa tio n itself is not due to the tra n sfe r o f m aterial im a g e s or efflu via, but is in prin ciple a m ental or spiritu al im pression. T h e significance o f T h om ism fo r u s w ould seem to reside in the truce it declared in the riv a lry betw een the b io logical and th eo lo gical conceptions of the soul. T h e soul is ra tio n a l; but its life ta k e s on a p ersonal form , w hich includes the b io log ical asp ect o f in d ivid ual足 ity. P re s e rv in g the p sy ch o lo gica l point o f vie w of S t. A u g u stin e re g a rd in g p erso n ality, S t. T h o m a s en d eav足 oured to avoid a sh arp dualism of p erson and m atter by a return to the m atter-fo rm theory. L ik e oth er com 足 p rom ises of the so rt, it h as not had the influence, outside o f Church circles, th at the g e n iu s of its au th o r d eserved . C ath o lic w rite rs, h ow ever, ju stly cite it, and also the m an y isolated poin ts in w hich St. T h o m a s anticipated the resu lts o f m odern th o ugh t. T h om ism a lso had the m erit o f so fa r ju s tify in g a n atu ralism in scientific point of view , and so o f e n c o u ra g in g a to leran t attitu de to w ard m odern science. In T h om ism , h o w ever, w e see the lo g ic a lly op p osin g concepts of b io lo g ical form and ratio n al sp irit held to geth er by the recogn ition of the unity o f p ersonal experien ce as b e in g su b jective. T h is is the g a in to th o u gh t that S t. T h o m a s received from S t. A u gu stin e and confirm ed by his ow n auth ority. D uns Scotus (D u n s, the Scot) (cir. 12 6 5 - 13 0 8 ) , a F ra n c isc a n , re a sse rted v ig o ro u sly the su b jective point o f v ie w and in sisted upon the p rim acy o f the w ill. C reation is an act of divine w i l l ; and the w orld is con stan tly renew ed by the con tin u in g w ill of God. F u rth e r, the in d ivid u al w ill is back of k n o w led ge, even k n ow led ge o f self. T h e end o f existen ce is the G ood, which is reached b y w ill; intelligence is in stru m en tal,

THE M YSTICA L REACTION

the se rv a n t of actio n . Sin is a p erversion of w ill, c a u s ing- intellectual b lin d n e ss, and sin is p ossible becau se the w ill is free. A “ su ggestio n ” o r “ first th o u gh t ” enters con scio u s n ess, servin g a s stim u lu s to the w ill; the w ill responds to it, em bracing o r re je c tin g i t ; it th us becom es a “ second th o u gh t.” I t is this second th o u gh t, the object o f w ill, to which the a g e n t ’ s freedom and respo n sibility attach . Good and e vil do not b elon g to th in gs in th em selves, but to th e use m ade of them in the vo lu n tary “ second thought ” o f the agen t. D u n s Scotus, fo llo w in g the le ad in g of S t. A u g u stin e , distinguish ed the e m o tio n s or “ p assio n s ” a s a fu n d a m ental class of m e n ta l phenom ena. B e fo re him the S ch o lastic leaders h a d looked upon fe e lin g a s a m odifi catio n o f im pulse a n d d esire, fo llo w in g the A ristotelian d ivision . A n in terestin g v a r ia tio n upon the d iscussion of realism and n o m in alism , a lre ad y spoken of, aro se re g a rd in g the re la tio n o f the facu lties to the “ inner sen se ” or c o n scio u sn ess a s a w hole. A risto tle had asse rted the oneness o f m ental function in the com m on sen se, the Platonic “ p a r t s ” o r d ivisio n s of the soul b e in g m erely p o w e rs or a c tiv itie s of the one conscious principle. This b e c a m e one of the b u rn in g qu estion s o f late S ch o lasticism . W illia m of O ccam m aintained th at all the “ r e p r e s e n ta t io n s ” — sen se-p ercep tions, m em ories, concepts, e tc .— w ere m erely m ental sig n s o r sym b ols of v a ry in g - o rd ers, a ris in g at different sta g e s of m ental fu n ctio n ; 1 they w e re not p ictu res of different realities perceived b y fu n d am en tally different facu lties or p ow ers. 1 S e e the exposition

Philosophic, Bd. X .

o f S ie b e c k ,

Arcliiv jiir Geschichte der

THE RIPENING OF DUALISM

T h is raised in turn the m ore subtle q uestion a s to the so rts of re a lity arising- resp ectively in percipi and in re, in the m ental sym b ol and in the e x te rn a l w orld. A risto tle had held th at the ob jects of sen sation and th o u gh t w ere really, th at is fo rm a lly , p resen t in the sen sation and th ou gh t. T o P la to , the id ea w a s itself the true existen ce o r re a lity in sc. T h o m a s A qu in as developed a view a c co rd in g to w h ich existen ce w a s “ in te n tio n a l” in th o u g h t; and A nselm o f C an terb u ry based his fam ou s a rg u m e n t fo r the existen ce o f God on the proposition th at the idea of a p erfect b e in g m ust im ply his e x is te n c e ; fo r oth erw ise, la c k in g existen ce, the perfection p resu p po sed in the idea w ould be im paired. S u m m in g up the ch aracters of S ch o lasticism , w e m ay s a y : (i) th at the p h ilosop h ical and p sy ch o lo g ica l tre a t m ent of the problem s of m ind yielded to a lo g ica l and th eo lo gical tre a tm e n t; (2) th at the p oints of view developed in these d iscu ssio n s— those of realism and nom inalism , o f trad u cian ism and creatio n ism , o f d eter m inism and a ccid en ta lism ,1 o f em anation and creation, o f seco n d ary sp iritu a l e x isten ces, such a s sp irits and dem ons— all proceeded upon the p resu p po sition o f the auth o rity o f the S c r ip tu r e s ; (3) th at, so fa r a s p ro g re ss w a s m ade in p sy c h o lo g y , it w a s m ade b y b rin g in g to ex p lic it recognition the d ata of e arlie r th o u gh t which lent th em selves to such p re su p p o sitio n s; n am ely, the natu re of th o u gh t and w ill and their relation to each other, the e sse n tia lly em p irical unity o f con scio u sn ess, the theory of conscious p e rso n a lity ; (4) th at the dualism o f m ind and body received a tem p o rary and d ogm atic interpretation in the doctrine of creatio n , m atter b ein g 1 R e n e w e d later 011 a s betw een “ C alvinism ” and “ Arm inianism .”

THE M YSTICAL REACTION

“ m ade of nothing-, ” w h ile soul aro se from the “ breath o f G od ” and took form in h is im age. III. Arabian P hysiolo gical P sy c h o lo g y . — C ontem po ra n e o u sly w ith the e a rlie r S ch o lasticism , a m ovem ent o f in terest developed am o n g the A ra b ia n s w h o re ceived , esp ecially in S y ria , the tradition o f W e ste rn le a rn in g . Avicenna (Ibn S in a), the p h ysician o f Isp ah a n (died 10 3 7 ), w a s the first to in v e stig a te the a ctu al relation o f m ind and body, esp e cia lly a s show n by m ovem ent. H e d istin gu ish ed the m ovem ents of the body which w e re v a ria b le and uncertain a s b e in g cau sed b y the ratio n al soul, w hich th us show ed itse lf to be a force fo re ig n in principle to the body. H e enum erated five inner sen ses, located in the brain, in correlatio n w ith the five ou ter o r p h y sica l s e n s e s : they w ere “ com m on se n se ,” “ im agin atio n ” (located in the fro n ta l regio n of the brain), “ sen se ju d g m e n t,” “ m e m o r y ” (in the pos terio r region ), and “ f a n c y ” (in the m iddle region)— the la st h a v in g the va lu e o f w a rn in g in the presence of g o o d and ill. S en se k n o w le d g e issu e s in m o vem en t; and m ovem ent in turn con tribu tes to ration al k n ow le d g e, w hich is o f the absolute. T h e ration al soul, b ein g a sim ple su b stan ce, is out of sp ace and tim e and independent of the body. G o od n ess and truth a re reached b y the denial and subjection o f the body, b y ab straction o f the self from sen sible exp erien ce, in ord er th at illum ination m ay com e into the soul. H ere a strain o f orien tal m ysticism sh o w s itself. A lhacen w a s the au th o r of a re m ark a b le book on “ O p tic s,” w ritten quite in the sp irit of the latest tre a tise s on the p h y sio lo g y and p sy c h o lo g y o f vision.

THE RIPENING OF DUALISM

H e treats of v isu a l sen sation proper, colour, visu al space perception, the perception of depth, the depend ence of size upon the visu a l a n g le , the assim ilatio n of m em ory im a g e s to v isu a l percep ts (finding here the b a sis of resem blance, conception, and thought), the tim e required fo r the p ro p a g a tio n of the im pulse from the eye to the b rain , indirect visio n , eye-m ovem ents, e tc.— problem s w hich stand forem ost in the contents of ou r m ost m odern trea tises. H e an ticipated the H elm holtz theory of “ u nconsciou s ju d g m e n ts ” in visu al space-perception. H e a lso in v estig a te d v a rio u s p rob lem s of tim e, as w ell a s o f space, a s revealed b y visu al phenom ena, and from such q u estion s w en t on to con sid er the problem s of apperception and illu sio n .1 A lh a c e n ’s ' influence ap p e ars sp o ra d ica lly in later th in kers. H e w a s cited by the m ore em p irical S ch o las tics, such a s R o g e r B aco n . In A verroes (died 119 8 ) , finally, the p sych o-ph ysical relation w a s interpreted in a m ate ria listic sen se. B ut, on the other hand, a g e n e ra l and im perso n al existen ce w a s attrib uted to the ration al principle, to which the ind ivid ual soul m igh t attain by a b stra c t th o u gh t. T h is com bination of p an th eistic im personal reaso n , with n atu ralism or m aterialism in the dom ain o f em pirical k n ow led ge, also a n ticip a tes a m ode of v e ry recent speculation. T h e ad van ce, p sy c h o lo g ic a lly sp e a k in g , m ade by the A ra b ia n p sych o lo g ists is in the direction of a statem ent o f the p sych o-ph ysical problem as one d em an d in g actual research . T h e dependence of the mind upon the body, to geth er w ith the la w s of correlation o f the tw o c la sse s 1 A lh a c e n ’s w ork w a s translated from the A ra b ic in 1269. A concise list o f the main topics treated b y A lh ace n is to be found in K lem m , loc. cit., pp. 3 2 7 ff.

THE M YSTICAL REACTION

o f phenom ena, is the m ain problem of m odern p h y sio lo g ic a l p syc h o lo g y . B e sid e s this new conception of m ethod, they reached — A lh acen e sp ecially— valu ab le p o sitive results. IV . The M ystical R eaction . — T h e reaction a g a in st the lo g ic a l refinem ents o f the S ch o lastic s— w hich often d eg en erated into b arren v e rb a l distin ction s— showed itse lf stro n g ly in the v a rio u s g ro u p s o f M ystical w rite rs and in the rise o f em p irical science. T h e la tte r w ill be spoken of a g a in below . M eister E ck h a rd (cir. 12 6 0 - 13 2 7 ) , the m ystic, a n sw ered the q uestion o f the p rim acy of principle as betw een in telligen ce and w ill, by in clu d in g them both in a sta te of fee lin g — the G erm an Gem iith. B y the app reh ension of G od in an e csta sy of fe e lin g , k n ow led ge and a sp iratio n a re fu sed and com pleted. T h is rein stated , in v ie w of the a lte rn a tive s o f the tim e, the im m ed iaten ess reached in th eir day by the N eo -P lato n is t s ; and it represented abou t the sam e m otives of reconciliation. It w a s m ade lo g ic a lly less difficult by the T h o m ist re v iv a l of the d octrine o f m atter and form , w hich reduced the opposition betw een m ind and body, and b y the A u g u stin ia n em p h asis on w ill. E c k h a rd w a s a disciple of T h o m a s, and a fello w D om inican. T h e unity of the co n sciou s fu n ctions in feelin g he called the “ s p a r k l^ o f divine lig h t w hich d irected m an to G o d ; in it the d u alism s and op p osition s o f hum an facu lty w ere su b m erged and overcom e. T h e nam e o f Jo h n Taider (cir. 1 2 9 0 - 1 3 6 1 ) is a s so ciated w ith that o f E c k h a rd . H e a lso sh ared the doc trine of feelin g or Gem iith. B oth a lik e d re w inspiration from their g r e a t p red ecesso r in m ystic appreh en sion , P lotin us.

THE RIPENING OF DUALISM L ik e the N eo -P la to n ic m ovem ent, this tu rn to m ysticism show ed the dem and of the mind fo r an escap e from the p artial m ediation s o f re ality effected by though t and actio n , to geth er w ith the sa tisfactio n o f this dem and in a m ode of h igh er unity achieved when the whole p erso n a lity pours itself out in feelin g.

P art

M O DERN

IV .

PSYCH O LO G Y. T O 18 00 C h ap ter

F IR S T

P E R IO D ,

V II.

The In te rp re ta tio n o f Dualism . I. The M odern Sch ools .— W ith the developm ent of the dualism betw een mind and b o d y up to the s ta g e it reached in R en e D e sc a rte s (of w hom we a re now to sp eak), the period p rop erly to be called “ m odern ” com m ences. T h e m ean in g is not one, h ow ever, m erely o f m odernness in tim e ; but o f m odernn ess, first of all, in the essen tial state of the problem s of philosophy and p syc h o lo g y. U p to the p resen t, w e h ave traced the p ro g re ss o f the interpretation o f the w orld and the self a s it w o rk ed out the distinction betw een mind and m atter. T h e term s of th at d istinction b e in g now understood, a s d istin g u ish in g tw o su b stan ces sh arp ly c o n trasted and a ctu a lly sep a ra te d from each other, speculation ta k e s the form of the interpretation of this dualism itself. If w e look upon the e arlie r thought a s b ein g a spontaneou s or direct con sideration of natu re and m an, w e m ay look upon the la tte r as b e in g a reflec tion upon the resu lt o f this fo rm er th in k in g. Th e d ualism itself becom es a so rt of p resu p position o r d a tu m ;, its term s condition the fu rth er problem . H o w can m ind and m atter both e x ist and g iv e the ap p earan ce 95

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY o f in te ra c tio n ?— w hich of the tw o is the prius of the o th er? T h ese q uestion s, a s now form u lated , sh o w later th o u gh t to be an interpretation of dualism , as the e arlie r w a s an interpretation of the w orld in terms of dualism . W h ile the ancient and m ediaeval philosophies developed a p ro g re ssiv e distinction and finally a divorce betw een body and m ind, the m odern resu lts in a serie s of attem p ts to accom m odate them to each other again in a single co sm ic household. H o w can the world con tain tw o such d isp a rate p rin cip les, and how a re w e to conceive of th eir final ad ju stm en t to each other in the nature of re a lity ? P sy c h o lo g y reflected, fo r a lo n g tim e, the altern atives w o rked out by the e arlie r philosoph ical schools. So much so th at the th eory of the m ind rem ained an app en d age or c o ro lla ry to philosophical doctrine. The a ltern atives w ere p lain ly enough m ark ed , and term s h ave grow n up to ch aracterise them. One m a y accep t the dualism and d evise a theory of m utual ad justm ent o f the tw o su b stan ces to each oth er." T h is w a s the c o u r s e pursued b y D e sc a rte s, M aleD ranche, and bp inoza, a n a g a v e rise to a series o l~ doctrines^ w hich w e kn ow as “ d u a lis tic .” “ re a listic.” * a n d “ a b so lu tistic .” 1 B u t interpretation m ay ta k e a d ifferent tu rn ; mind m ay be m ade the p rio r term , the b a sa l e x p la in in g term , m atter b ein g reduced to m ind, o r its substant i;i 1 ch arac ter exp lain ed a w a y . T h is w a s the m ethod of tw o g re a t schools of “ id e a lists , ” one p a rty , the Intellectu alists, finding the u n iversal so lven t in the in telligence, or reason : so Leib n itz, W o lff, K a n t, B erk e ley , H etrel1 In an interesting p a ssa g e , H arm s (loc. cit., p. 243) m akes Ilnv e ry valid point that it w a s only the rad ical dualism o f D escartes that m ade possible the theories o f “ o ccasio n alism ,” “ h arm on y,” etc., o f his su ccessors.

TH E INTERPRETATION OF DUALISM

T h ey produced the p sy c h o lo g y found in the “ d o g m a tic ,” “ c r it ic a l,” and “ s u b je c tiv e ” sy ste m s of philosoph y. T h e other p a rty of the id e a lists, the V o lu n ta rists, so u g h t the fun d am en tal p rin cip le in w ill • F irh U y S ch ellin g , S ch o p en h au er, and m an y others. T h e se tw o schools re-introduce the m otives of G re e k “ su b jectivism ” and P la to n ism , on the one hand, and of the vo lu n tarism o f S t. A u g u stin e on the other. B u t in lik e m anner the second term o f the dualism , m atte r o r bo dy, w a s g iv e n p rio rity eq u ally by oth ers, the independence of m ind b ein g denied. S o aro se reflective “ n atu ralism ” and “ m ate ria lism ” : Flobbes, H a rtle y , C o n d illac. D id ero t. In this the m otives of G re e k “ o b jectiv ism , A risto telian ism , and A tom ism reap p ear. F in a lly , as in the spo n tan eou s d evelopm ent o f G reek th o u g h t, all of these— su b je ctivism , ob jectivism , d u alism — m ay be com bined in a th eory of h igh er intuition, ot tfte fusion or sy n th e sis o f contem plation!-' T h is em bodies the K m ystic ” m otives o f fe e lin g and faith , o r m ak e s the sp ecu lativ e claim o f u n itin g the divided and p artia l m otives o f the oth er th eories in a h ig h e r in tu itio n ; so the M y stic s, the F a ith P h ilo so p h ers, the In tu itio n ists. and the aesthetic Im m ed iatistfy In the first period o f m odern th o u gh t, th erefo re, w e m ay reco g n ise the p sy ch o lo g ica l tendencies g o in g w ith th ese p h ilosop h ical a lte rn a tive s.

(M odern P sy ch o lo gy )— I. P h ilo so ph ical P sy c h o lo g y . A . D u a listic and R e a listic . „ „ . ... f In tellectu alistic.

13. Rationalistic » tt 1 \ Voluntaristic.

C . N a tu ra listic and M a te ria listic . D . M ystic and A ffe ctivistic. vo l

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T h is m ore philosop h ical treatm ent did not deny to p sych o lo gy its scientific place and m ethod, so fa r as these had been determ ined. A s w e are to see, the ob jectivism and n atu ralism w o rked out by A risto tle, St. A u gu stin e , and the A ra b ia n p h y sio lo g ists rem ained the fru itfu l in stru m en ts of scientific d isco ve ry . And in the th eoretical developm ent of n atu ralism in the other sciences— p h y sic a l, v ita l, so cia l— p sy ch o lo g y w as to sh are. A n e x p licit natu ralism of su bject-m atter w a s to a rise, supplem ented by an e q u a lly ex p lic it positivism of m ethod. T h is w a s the line of p ro g re ss in all the scien ces alik e. I f w e d escribe the new and m ore scientific p sy ch o lo g y as em p irical and p ositive, w e m ay treat o f the m ain g ro u p s o f th in k ers under the h ead in g s of th eo ry, m ethod, and m atter. A s to th eo ry, the step in ad van ce con sisted in a transition from a d eductive or lo g ica l interpretation of m ind, which im paired the pu rity of em p irical o b se rv a tion, to a full and unrestricted em piricism . F . B aeo rj. R ou sseau , C o m te, and J . S . M ill a re am o n g the im p ortan t figures in the h isto ry of the developm ent of the th eory. In the application of such a th eory, v a ria tio n s are a g a in possible, e x te n d in g from m ere description and classification to gen u in ely an alytic, co n stru ctive, and e x p erim ental procedure. D e scrip tiv e p sy c h o lo g y a s such had its ap o stles in L o c k e , Ilu m e, T a in e. Ja m e s M ill, B a in , H o d g s o n ; con stru ctive p sy ch o lo g y in H erb art, S pen cer, Lotze, W illiam Ja m e s . Such p sy ch o lo g y is often called “ s tru c tu ra l,” from the natu re of its resu lts. U nd er the h ea d in g of m ethod, the ch an g e in point o f view bro u gh t abou t by the theory o f evolution is to be considered. T h e ge n e tic m ethod h as w o rked its w a y into all the sciences o f life and mind. H ere

THE INTERPRETATION OF DUALISM

D a rw in , W a lla ce , B en ek e, R o m an es, R ib o t are nam es to be cited. U nder certain of its a sp e cts, a s contrasted w ith a n a ly tic or stru c tu ra l science, th is is called “ functional ” p sych o lo g y . T h e developm ent o f recen t p sy c h o lo g y h as resulted, finally, in the g ro w th of certain su b -d ivisio n s, each h a v in g its ow n su b ject-m atter, and each ad op tin g the m ost a va ila b le m ethod. S o “ p h y s io lo g ic a l,” “ s o c ia l,” “ c o m p a ra tiv e ,” “ e x p e r im e n ta l” and oth er “ p sych o lo g ie s ” h ave arisen . E a c h h as to-day its a p o stle s and its g ro u p of en th u siastic w o rk e rs. T h e h ead in g s of ou r treatm en t of the second period in m odern p sy c h o lo g y , th erefo re, w ill be as fo llow s in the tab le, which fo rm s the second p art of a la rg e r one, the first p art h a v in g been g iven ju st above.

(M odern P sych ology )— II . E m p irical and P o sitiv e P sy c h o lo g y . , . rpi f E m p irical. A . A s to 1heorv > n . .

I P o s itive .

( D escrip tiv e. B. A s to M ethod - C o n stru ctive (stru ctu ral). '.G en etic (functional). C . A s to S u b ject- (P h y s io lo g ic a l S o c ia l, E x m atter I P e n m e n t a l , C o m p a ra tive, m a Cr 1 etc. 11. The N e w D epa rtures: The Em pirical M ethod. — T h e com in g of a new m ethod 1 had its early prophets 1 A p a rt from m ethod— w hich w a s the main thing’ for scien ce— certain events and influences m ade the period truly rem arkable. T h e d isco very o f A m erica , the revival o f letters in Italy, the G erm an Reform ation, all illustrated the new spirit o f vig o u r and enterprise. T h e m ystical thought o f Bruno and C am p an ella faced fo rw ard tow ard the universal doubt o f D e sc a rte s, rather than b a ck w a rd tow ard the universal auth ority o f the C hurch. H 2

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even am o n g the sc h o la stic s; a s in R o g e r B aco n (died 1294 ) and W illiam of O ccam (died 134 9 ), w ho w ith D u n s S co tu s and Joh n o f S a lisb u ry in v estig a te d k n o w le d g e em pirically. On the side o f p h y sica l science, the C opernican theory, th rou gh the w o rk o f the a stro n o m ers K e p le r and G alileo, becam e re vo lu tio n a ry and farreach in g fo r science in g e n eral. In K e p le r, the theory o f p h ysical action took on a m ore m ech anical and qu an titativ e ch arac te r. M a n y a n a lo g ies d raw n from the old an im istic conception o f n atu re w ere banished. M ove m ents o f attraction and repulsion w e re accounted fo r on m echanical p rin cip le s.1 N e w to n ’ s dem onstration o f u n iversal grav ita tio n w a s alone needed to vin d icate the conception o f natural la w ; and m ech anical a n a lo g ies b e g a n to creep into p sy ch o lo g y in the form of a ttra c tion, repulsion, and in terferen ce— fu ll m ech an ical in ter p la y . in f q c f — nninnty T h e nam es of V iv e s and F r a n c is B aco n are of esp ecial note in the R e n a issa n c e period. Ludovicu s Vives (14 9 2 —154 0) proclaim ed the inde pendence o f m ental phenom ena, con sid ered a s the m atter o f p sych o lo gy, and p rotested a g a in s t the m eta p h ysical point of view , w ith its em p ty d iscu ssio n s of the essence of the sou l. l i e w a s a lso an e arly in v es tig a to r of the la w s o f asso ciatio n o f id eas. Francis Bacon /L o rd V e ru la m . 1^ 6 1-16 2 6 ^ is u sually called the fath er of em p irical scien tific m ethod. H is w o rk consisted in an attem p t a t re sto rin g kn ow led ge to the path of fact and to the service o f u tility .2 H e 1 K e p le r m ade interesdne ^ o n t r ib u j j o n s t o the physiological p syc h o lo g y ot v ision, establish ing the colour c h a n g e s of after im a g e s and the tact o f the form ation o f the visual im age on the retina. 2 S e e R . A d am son's citation o f p a ss a g e s sh o w in g B a co n ’s insistence on the utilitarian or pragm atic function and value o f

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led a re vo lt a g a in s t form alism o f v ie w and prejudice o f tem per. H e pointed ou t the v a rio u s hind rances (id ola *) under w hich the p u rsu it o f truth is prone to labour. H e attem pted to c la s s ify the sc ie n c e s.2 to lim it and define p hilosophy, and to fo rm u late a sound e xp erim en tal m ethod w h ereb y the sum of k n ow led ge m igh t be au gm en ted. T h is p ro g ra m m e w a s o f service, o f c o u rse, to all the scien ces a lik e, m ental a s w ell as p h ysical. It proved m ost difficult o f re a lisa tio n , h ow e v e r, in p sych o lo g y and the m oral sciences.

T he R en ew a l o f M ysticism .— A fte r an in terval of tw o and a h a lf cen tu ries, the tradition o f m ystic illum ination renew ed itself in Ita ly and G erm an y. A gro u p of m ystic th in kers in w hom the rom anticism of the R e n a issa n c e sh ow s itse lf is com posed o f P a ra c e lsu s ( 1 4 9 3 - 1 5 4 1 ) , T e le siu s ( 15 0 8 - 15 8 8 ) , ^ a m o a n e lla ( 15 6 8 16 39 ), Q iordano B ru n o ( 15 4 8 -16 0 0 ) and oth ers, prin cip ally It a lia n s .3 T h e se m en sh ow a b re a k in g up of c la ss ic a l theories into disjecta m em bra , and (as seen in T e le siu s p articu larly) the bizarre rearra n g em en t of the fra g m e n ts, m ingled w ith detached o rig in a l apercus. A v a lu a b le d ep artu re w a s m ade, h ow ever, in the view o f the im agin atio n w hich ru n s th rou gh th eir w ritin g s. T h e im agin atio n (im aginatio) is looked upon a s, in va rio u s w a y s , m ed ia tin g betw een sen sation and re a s o n ; k n o w le d g e, in the a rticle “ B a c o n ,’’ Encyclopedia Britannica, 10th edition. T h e object o f kn o w le d g e to B a co n is the control o f nature by man (impenum hominis )7 ' 1 Novum Organum, P a rt I, E n g lish edition, with N o te s and Introduction b y F o w le r (2nd ed., 1889). - B a co n 's classification is based upon the an alysts o f the faculties o f kn o w le d g e into m em ory, im agination, and reason, which underlie respectively history, poetry, and philosophy with science. 3 A sym path etic recen t w ork is b y R . Steiner, The Mystics of the Renaissance, E n g . trans. (19 12).

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it com pletes the detached d ata of sen se, building- them up into id eas, and o ffers p relim in ary schem ata or ideal con stru ction s to the reason . T h is is an anticipation— and on the w hole a c lea rer statem en t— o f K a n t’s view o f the “ sch e m atisin g im a g in a tio n ” ; it a lso su ggests the v e ry m odern d octrine o f the a ssu m p tiv e and e x p e ri m ental function o f the im agin ation , w ith the application o f th at view in the a n a ly sis of the “ se m b la n t” p roducts o f p la y and art. It is in te re stin g th at this should h ave been hit upon by w rite rs of a m ystic c a st of th ou gh t. It constitutes an im portant step in the developm ent o f m ysticism out o f the statu s of em otion and sentim ent into th at of a ration al con stru ctive th eory. I f the im agination accom plish es in its norm al w o rk in g the results fo rm erly attrib uted to em otional intuition and ecstasy, then this type of apprehension m ay be put dow n a s one of the recogn ised fu n ctio n s of cogn ition . T h is means th at the p sych o lo gy o f the im agin ation ta k e s its place am ong the la rg e r p rob lem s o f the theory o f know ledge. In Jacob Boehm c (15 7 5 -1.6 2 4 ), the full dualism of the p re -C a rtesian era is as u rg en t fo r expression a s in_ D e s c a r te s ; and the an tith esis betw een the, tw o is v e ry in terestin g. T h e one, the A cad em ic philosopher and acute m ath em atician , arg u e d from the standpoint of u n iversal doubt and m ade the. te.wr.stT o n l y THn necess a ry , assu m p tio n s. T h e other, a plain w orkm an, se e in g by intuition and sp e a k in g bv “ revelatio n ,” m ade know n the m y stprif^ nf faith— Tloehme" re v e rse s the m ethod of th at other g r e a t m ystic, P lotin u s, w ho proceeded to transcend all dualism in the ab stractio n of the im perso n al and a b so lute O ne. B oeh m e finds that only by dualising itself in su bject and ob ject could the divine principle becom e

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self-co n scio u s sp irit and be apprehended a s such. O pp ositio n , lim itation , and reconciliation are n ecessary fo r the m an ifestation of the attrib u tes ot‘ reaso n , w ill, and love. God is self-g en e ra ted , th rou gh opposition a ris in g in his ow n n atu re. K n o w le d g e and self-co n scio u sn ess are p ossible on ly th rou gh opp osition and d u a lity .1 In re g a rd to both th ese relatio n s— B o e h m e ’s re la tions to D e sca rte s and P lotin u s (and sim ila rly to S p in oza)— the fo llo w in g p a s s a g e m ay be quoted from S c h w e g le r 2 : “ C o m p ared w ith D e sca rte s, B oehm e h as a t le ast m ore profoun dly apprehended the conception o f self-co n sciou sn ess and the relation o f the finite to G o d. B u t his h isto rical position in oth er resp ects is f a r too iso lated and e xcep tio n al, and h is m ode of statem en t fa r too im pu re, to w a rran t us in in co rp o rat in g him an yw h ere in a series of sy ste m s developed con tin uo usly and in a g e n e tic con n ection .” W e m ust ta k e excep tio n , h ow ever, to the la st statem en t m ade in this c ita tio n ; fo r th ough iso la ted in fa c t, still Boehm e w a s not isolated a s to the “ ge n e tic connection ” of th o u gh t understood in a sen se la rg e r than th at defined b y the term “ s y s te m s .” T h e c lear lig h t o f the dualism o f su b ject and ob ject, kindled by m editation on C h ristia n truth, illu m in ates his p a g e th rou gh the lens o f m ystic in tu itio n ; ju st as the sam e lig h t, kindled b y p hilosophical reflection, fa lls upon the p ag e of D e sc a rte s th rough the len ses of reason and d o u b t.3 1 S e e the elaborate study, “ B o e h m e ," in B o u tro u x’ Historical Studies in Philosophy, E n g . trans. (19 12 ). - S c h w e g le r, History o f Philosophy in Epitome, E n g . trans. (1886), p. 99. 3 In the Christian m ystics, the direct result o f the profound realisation o f sin and redem ption, a s set forth in the Christian th e o lo g y, is a sharpened distinction between the divine Person

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In the dialectical p rocess of the self-g en e ra tio n of God, a p rocess o f p ro g re ss iv e op p osition s and recon cilia tion s, Boehm e supplied the m ain m otive to the suit sequent lo g ica l idealism of G erm an p h ilo so p h y .1

The In dividual A n alo g y .— T h e cou rse of spontaneous philosoph ical reflection h a s been seen to p resen t strik in g an a lo g ies w ith th at of the individual. W e h ave seen th a t they both proceed upon the sam e lines up to the fu ll dualism of m ind and body w hich p recedes the function o f reflection upon th at d ualism itself. W e a re n ow in the p resence of the tra n sitio n in racial th o u gh t from the spontaneou s to the reflective type ; and w e cannot b etter understand its fa c to rs than by m a k in g b rief com parison a g a in w ith the sim ilar tra n si tion in the in d ivid ual, re fe rrin g to the ch ap ter on this su b ject (C h apter V I I , V o l. II) fo r fu rth er details. T h e individual becom es lo g ica l or reflective when lie becom es a w a re th at the m aterial of his experience in not a t once and im m ed iately a va ila b le in the form in w hich he ta k es it to be real— a s, bo d y, soul, truth, e tc.— but that he h as to w o rk by m eans of his con sciou sn ess, by the in stru m en tality o f his m em ories, id e a s, and concepts. H e ju d g e s o f his experience, c ritic ise s his im a g e s, selects from ap p e aran ce s, rejects p h an tasm s and illu sio n s; in sh ort, he interprets the d a ta presented in his con scio u sn ess, and thus e sta b lish es resu lts th at he finds fit to be tru sted and act<*«l upon. T h is is reflection. T h e en tire b ody of life ’s and the human self. Self-debasem ent, laceration o f spirit, adorti tion and praise, tak e the place o f the personal absorption anil union with G od o f G re e k m ysticism . 1 On this accou n t he w a s called — a s w e are told b y the aroll “ dialectician ’’ o f the entire m ovem ent, H e g e l— the “ Philosopltus T e u to n icu s."

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« ven ts, all the h ap p en in gs o f e v e ry k i* id , are set up in the m in d ; the o b je ctiv e fa c ts a r e , as w e sa y , " m ediated ” by id eas. T h e su b jective point of vie w a sse rts it s e lf; and it is on ly b y ta k in g * account o f it 11 lid w o rk in g th rou gh it th at m ind and body are con tinued and interpreted. I his in terpretatio n is in a ll c a se s c o n d itio n e d by the dualism a lre ad y establish ed by s p o n ta n e o u s experien ce. I lie in d iv id u a l’s id eas com e to him b e a ir in g the m ark s <n co-efficients of th eir o rigin in the r e a l m s of m atter mid mind re sp ectively. H is fu rth e r t a s lc is confined to .illu m in g, d en yin g, c ritic isin g these t w o fo rm s of < sisten ce— so fa r a s the con ten ts in m ind are not a lto g e th er fu g itiv e and m ean in gless. I11 d oin g th is, fu rth e r, he finds tw o a v a i la b le m eth o d s; 1 here are tw o so rts o f m ediation e ffe c t e d b y ideas. M r.is se rv e a s in stru m en ts to secu re \y o lu n tary ends (Ilie though t o f a d a n g e r, fo r e x am p le , l e a d s to sa fe ty hi (ligh t); this is the m ediation o f the g o o d or o f valu e. Itut ideas se rv e a lso to m ediate fa c ts o r * the true (my it If a of a lo cality enables m e to g o to th a t lo ca lity or to m ake true in feren ces re g a rd in g it). I n th ese w a y s , I Ilf idea m ed iates both the a ctu a lly g o o d , w hich is an < ml for the self, and the a c tu a lly t r u e , w hich is a system o f th in gs a p a rt from the s e l f T h e term s 1ncdiated, th erefo re, a re the se lf and t h e n o t - s e lf: the th inking self and the ob ject of t h o u g h t . T h is is the dualism establish ed by reflection. It r e s u l t s from the interpretation of exp erien ce, fou n d to be su b jective, hi term s of the dualism of m ind and b o c ly . F u rth e r, the in d ivid u al h as an oth er c o u r s e open to Inin by the use of his im a g in a tio n ; by th iis he id ealises • \perience in the m an n er d escribed m ort3 fu lly b e lo w .1 1 C h ap te r V I I I , V o l II.

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H e in d u lges in h yp o th eses, p ostu lates id eals of valu e and truth, erects ab solu tes of b eau ty, p erso n a lity , etc., and by these ex p la in s, in som e fu rth er term of unity, the dual actu alities of th ou gh t and th in gs. H e then le a v e s the realm of the a ctu a l, and becom es in som e sen se an “ id e a list,” p o ssib ly a “ m y stic .” It is clear, then, th at to the in d ivid ual, if he is of the so rt to think upon the problem s of life and m ind, certain a lte rn a tive s are open. (i) H e m ay rem ain sim ply a dualist, the self and the w o rld b e in g equ ally real and u ltim a te; or (2) he m ay accept a s va lid the referen ce of id eas to th in g s, the m ediation o f fa c ts and tr u th s ; and build up a scientific vie w o f the w o rld that is n a tu ra listic and m ate ria listic. T h e oth er so rt of m ed iation , th at of the g o o d or the self, is n eglected o r denied. O r a g a in , (3) he m ay accep t the m ediation o f the g o o d , e sta b lish in g the re a lity of the se lf, but find ing that it in turn su bord in ates o r ab olish es the o th er term , the w o rld of th in gs. A g a in , (4) he m ay not sto p w ith such a resu lt of actu ality o r fa c t o f cither s o r t ; but g o on to reach an im a g in a tiv e id eal, eith er in term s of in telligen ce, g iv in g finality to id eas as such, o r of w ill, g iv in g finality to ends as such. H e then becom es either an in tellectu alist or a v o lu n ta rist. O r yet a g a in , (5) he m ay m ak e app eal to som e m ore in clusive m ode of re a lity , not exh au sted by these tw o so rts, but including and recon cilin g them : the ideal G ood , the B e a u tifu l, G od a s absolu te principle. It w ill h ave becom e clear to the read er th at these a lte rn a tive s re-state the m ain directions o f m odern philo sophy ; and that under one or other o f its h ead in gs each of the g r e a t c u rren ts of th ough t m ay be set dow n. W e now see that these are lik ew ise the a lte rn a tive s open to ind ivid ual reflection. I f one a sk o n e ’s c a su a l ac

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q u ain tan ces fo r their v ie w s of the natu re o f the w o rld , one w ill find among- them som e com m on-sense d u a lists, som e scientific p o sitiv ists and m ate ria lists, som e id eal ists eith er in tellectu alistic or v o lu n ta ristic, and som e m ystics, fu ll of id eals o f faith and b eau ty, but unlike all the re st unable to tell ju st w h y. E a c h is a p otential m em ber of an honourable h isto rical s c h o o l; each is, in fact, a sp iritu a l broth er o f som e one of the com pan y of p rop h ets— D em o critu s, P la to , A risto tle, St. A u gu stin e, P lo tin u s— by w hom the g r e a t a lte rn a tive s o f m odern speculation w ere first th o u gh t out in sim pler form .

hapter

V III.

Ph ilo so ph ical P sy c h o lo g y — Dualism , R ation alism , Dogm atism . I. D escartes (15 9 6 - 16 5 0 .) — It h as a lre a d y been inti m ated th at R en e D e sc a rte s stan d s at the p ortal of I he tem ple of m odern philosop h y and p sy ch o lo g y . It is not by reason of absolu te o rig in a lity of v ie w th at he hulds this p osition , but b y reason of the e x p licit statem en t he g a v e to v ie w s, and the new syn th esis he g a v e to th o u g h ts, which had been stated b efo re him only p a rtia lly and in re la tiv e detachm ent. T h e essen tial a d va n c es which D e sc a rte s rep resen ts— a p a rt from I he question o f m ethod— are tw o , both o f w h ich w e huve had reason to re fer to a lre ad y . In the first place, P c s c a r t e ^ ctnnrlg fn r tlif> m n d cyp licit and u ncom p rom isin g du alism betw een m ind ;md m atter. H is position is not only cle a rly stated , but defended in detail. H e d istin gu ish es m ind and body as tw o su b stan ces sep a ra te and incom patible. T h e y have d ifferen t p rop erties, each its own specific ch aracters or m ark s. T h e essence of b ody, he s a y s, is “ extension ” ; a nd the essen ce of m ind, is “ th o u gh t .” T h e se tw o su b stan ces are known in different w a y s ; they form the su b ject-m atter oi d ilterent scientific in t e r e s t s ; they .ire in vestig a te d by d ifferen t m ethods. T h e m ethod of I he p h ysic a l sciences is m ath em atics. H ere D e sca rte s, ns the philosopher, opened up a new v ista to m odern 108

R f. n ÂŁ D (Cfl/yrig/tt.

esca rtes.

Reproduced by kind permission of the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U.S.A.)

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th o u g h t.1 Th e method of p sy ch o lo g y , the sciem r nl mind, on the con tra ry , is in tro sp ectio n , inner o h sem i* tion of th e e v e n ts o f co n scio u sn ess. It is in this l.r l point th at w e com e upon a second position by whit li D e sca rte s g a v e a la rg e m easure of ju stification In m odern p sych o lo gy. T h is second position is sum m ed up in the fam ous C a rtesian m otto, “ I th in k, th erefore J a m .” In till* sentence, the criterion of m ind, as D e sc a rte s conccivcil it, w hich w a s a lso its specific ch aracter, w a s given form al statem en t. Mincl differs from body by its m n ^ scio u sness of its ow n th in k in g p ro c e s s; and in 1 his finds the im m ediate evidence of its e xistence as ii p eculiar mode of re a lity . T h e form al m ode of stale m ent should not ob scu re the essential im port. Jl In not an argu m en t, p rop erly sp e a k in g , for the thinl.i i h im se lf; it is such only to the ou tsider. T o consciou*. ness, to the th in ker h im self th at is, it m eans, “ I mu here th in k in g ,” “ I catch m yself h a v in g th o u g h ts," cogitans, sum. T o the ou tside o b serv er it m eans lluii by its th in kin g the m ind k n ow s itself to be different from m atter, w hich is exten d ed , and to be a sort nl ex iste n ce or reality sui gen eris . 2 T h e significance of both these elem ents of C arttsu m ism a p p e ars from the p reced in g h isto ry. T h e y w en both eq u ally inevitable and both at the tim e equally m ature. T h e final cu lm in atio n of the m ind-bodv <ln.il ism w a s prophesied in the first su g g e stio n of the din tinction m ade by E m p edo cles and A n a x a g o r a s , and 1 D e scartes founded the branch o f m athem atics known ii>< A n a ly tic G eom etry. 2 It is by a resort to “ universal d o u b t” that D e scartes eslnt* lishes th is; the only thing to which effective doubt cannot ntlm It is self-consciousness, since to doubt this is to question the vri v pro cess o f thought in w h ich doubting itself consists. Tim " I am ” is n e ce ssary for the “ I doubt.”

DUALISM, RATIONALISM, DOGMATISM

d eveloped th rou gh all the v icissitu d e s of G re e k and M ediaeval philosoph y. S o plain is this th at we h ave been ju stified in d escrib in g the, p ro g re ss of philosophy so fa r a s the ge n e tic h isto ry of d u alism . M o reo ver, it is m atched , in its m ain s ta g e s , by the sim ilar h isto ry o f the indiv id u a l’ s thought.- T h e individual g r o w s to know the “ self ” as a principle d ifferent from body. In both a lik e, the issu e in a h a rd -an d -fast su b stan tive dualism seem s in evitab le : there is an extended body, e x is tin g o v e r a g a in s t a con scio u s sp irit or m ind. T h e d o g m atic sp iritu alism of the C hurch fath ers receives now the auth o risation of sp ecu lative th o u g h ts T h e point of n ovelty in the C a rtesian statem en t con sists in th is, th at the du alism becom es an o n to logical _ori£^ it does not rem ain m erely lo g ic a l, re lig io u s, p ractical, but becom es m eta p h y sica l— a form u la of reality , the presupposition o f futu re s r i f nr^ — aadphilosophy. S o definite is this that the interest a fte r D e sca rte s con sisted no lo n g er in "poin tin g to evidence' of the d isp a rate natu re o f mind and body, but~of hndm g a m ethod of a cco u n tin g for th eir seem in g relation and interaction! T h e dom inant problem of the th in kers "Tm mediately fo llo w in g , u e s c a r t e s w a s the p sy c h o ^ ph y sical one : how could the tw o h eterogen eou s su b sta n ce s, m ind and body, sustain any relation at all to

each oth er? T h e second position, em bodied in the s a y in g , cogito, R is in g in the relative isolation o f the su b je ctive point of view by the S o p h ists and S o c ra te s, the cu rren t o f su b jec tivism gath e re d force in P lato n ism , M y sticism , and S to icism , and finally becam e fu lly a w a re of itself in St. A u g u stin e , w h o m igh t h ave said in form , a s w e have before rem arked , “ I w ill, th erefo re I a m ; volens su m .”

ergo sum , is also the issu e of a lo n g tra v a il.

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T h is cu rren t had to rid itself of the jetsam of A ristotcli anism w hich obscured the su bjective in the v ita l, mill o f the flotsam of both P lato n ism and Sen sation alism , w h ich equally, th ou gh in different sen ses, deprived il o f its true m eanin g. B u t the inner point o f view con sta n tly ga in e d in clea rn ess, and finally defined itself in e ssen tial term s : the point of view of con scio usn ess an e ssen tial m ark of m ind and startin g -p o in t o r prcsii|i position of reflection. T h e problem of self-ro n scin ir. n ess a s such a r is e s .1 T h e se are the issu es of C artesian ism . T h e substnm < m ind differs ge n e ric a lly from the su bstan ce b o d y ; ami the specific proof of this d ifference is seen in the oppn**l tion betw een the e xtended th in g a nd the thinking sell. A nd the th in kin g m ind k n ow s itself and sets itself o vt i a g a in s t all the ob jects o f its th ough t. O f D e s c a r te s ’ m ore d etailed and special th eories, tlutl o f “ an im al a u to m a tis m ” is the m ost sign ifican t, lit rejected a lto geth er the conception of an anim al 01 v e g e ta b le soul d ifferent from the ra tio n a l; and hr hi th at the organ ism w a s go ve rn e d by the sam e physical and m ath em atical la w s a s other bodies in natu re. 'I hw u n reaso n in g an im als are “ a u to m a ta .” liv in g m a c h iiu i, M an alone has the p ow er of d irectin g his m ovem ents, F o r the “ i m a g e ” th eory o f sense perception, I ><•» c a rte s substituted a m ath em atical conception fiiulinu the sen sc-stim ulus in “ v ib r a t o r y ” ra y s or undulal i<>u . (ligh t, a ir, etc.), ex p re ssed in m ath em atical form ulas, T h e se produce effects in the o rg a n ism w hich are in im sen se “ like ” the ob ject perceived. 1 “ In the intellectual life o f G re e c e . . . the com plete h<jv*h a n ce o f spirit and nature had not yet arrived : the subject limt not y et reflected upon itself. . . . T h e turning- a f self-coust-imm ness upon itself, which w a s the standpoint ot the post-AristofnT.m sp ecu latio n s,~ forms in D e scartes the startintr-nninl nC :i ph ilo so p hy."— Schw eg-ler, tlist. of Philos . in Epit., pp. 184 iNy

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In his d octrine o f em otion, D c sc a rtc s conics to the v e rg e o f a p sych o -p h ysical th eory, in spite of the diffi c u lty of c o n ceivin g an y interaction b etw een the tw o d isp ara te su b stan ces. H e held that the h eart, actuated by h eat, due to it s ow n p ro ce sse s of com bustion, pro^ duces “ an im al s p i r it s ” or Huids (spintus am m ales ). ~ T h e se c irc ulate th rough the hnrly nnd nffrrf- the s e a t o l the sou T fth e pineal glan d in the b ra in ). T h is resu lts in sen sa tio n s, percep tio n s, and em o tion s. T h e en tire fiTfTof perception and feeling- has this p h y sic a l b a s is M em ory is clue to the second o r su bseq u en t p a s s a g e o f the an im al sp irits re v iv in g the sp o res or residua of their e a rlie r action. T h in k in g has its clear and evid en t p rincip les, innate id eas— exten sio n , num ber, d u ration , e xisten ce, e tc .— g iv e n to the soul much a s the im m ediate k n o w led ge o f the se lf is g iv e n to it. T h e se a re in co n tra st w ith the o b scu re and confused p erceptions of sen se. In this theory~ tHe problem s oT Hie c rite ria of im m ediate c erta in ty — “ c learn ess and d istin c tn e ss,” a cco rd in g to D e sc a rte s— and of the e x iste n ce o f “ inn ate ideas ” w ere b ro u g h t into philosop h y, to be bones o f conten tion, the la tte r problem e sp e cia lly , to th in kers from L o c k e to K a n t. U n d er the term “ th o u g h t,” D e sca rte s included all the op eration s o f m ind. H e d istin gu ish ed , h o w ever, betw een “ p assio n s ” and “ a c tio n s.” 1 p assive and active op eratio n s o f m ind . H e called them “ perceptions ” and “ v o l o n t i s T h e in telligen ce, no less than the fe e lin g s, considered a s cau sed by the action of o b jects, com e under the h ead in g o f “ p a s s io n s .” T h e idea of G od m ust be true, since no object sa v e God could ca u se an idea of the infinite and p erfect. 1 D e sca rte s, v o l

. r.

Les Passions de I’dme. 1

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F u rth e r, God is the g u a ra n te e of the va lid ity of the c lear and distinct id eas g e n e ra lly , since w e cann ot supp ose he w ould deceive us. T h u s the certa in ty of the ob jcct of k n o w le d g e rests upon the certa in ty of the existen ce of G od. In all the d etails, w e find the tendency to c la rify the conception of soul, b y re stric tin g its presence to those p u rer and m ore intellectu al p rocesses in w hich depend ence upon p h ysical sta tes is not in evidence. T h is resu lts in the p a s s in g o v er of the low er fun ctio n s— sen sation , fe e lin g , m ovem ent— to the sp a tia l and p h ysical. T h u s the d ualism is sharpened betw een the one substance w hich th in k s, and the other w hich is extend ed . II. Occasionalism and P re-established H arm on y .— T h e im m ediate resu lt of the dualism o f D e sc a rte s w a s to g iv e furth er em p h asis to the e m b a rra ssin g p sych o p h ysica l relation. S o u rg en t did the q uestion of mind and body becom e th at its a n sw er w a s the burden of all the subsequent th o u gh t o f the school. In O ccasio n alism , the n e x t step w a s tak en . G eu lincx and M alebran ch e d istin gu ish ed betw een a “ ca u se ” and an “ o c c a sio n .” A c au se is a real source of action, pro d u cin g an effect w hich w ithout it w ould not have been produced. A n occasio n , on the c o n tra ry , is m erely the m ore or less accid en tal circu m stan ce under w hich the true cau se a c ts, or by which it is interfered w ith o r prevented from a c tin g . F o r exam p le, the p ulling o f the tr ig g e r of a g u n is the occasion of the expu lsion o f the b a ll; the c a u se is the explosion o f the pow der. A p p ly in g this distin ction, the “ o ccasio n alists ” said th at the mind acted a s occasion of the m ovem ents of the body, not as their true cau se. B e in g d isp arate in

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c h aracter, w ill and body could not act c a i^ ally npnn_ each oth er. B u t the w ill could serve a s occasio n for f h ^ t r u e cau se, the action o f G od. Both sen sation , which seem s to be cau sed by the ex te rn a l o b ject, and m ovem ent, w hich seem s to be cau sed by the m ind, are in re a lity cau sed by God. T h is occasio n al relation o f m ind to body served the hum an p u rpo se of vo lition , but a t the sam e tim e did not im p air the divine tru th fu ln ess a s em bodied in the tw o c lea r and distinct id eas. T h is v ie w is represen ted to -d ay, in k in d , in the theories w h ich hold th at w hile the m ind cann ot alter the e n e rg y of the brain in q u an tity, it can d irect the d isc h a rg e o f this energ-y in one n ervo u s cou rse rath er than another. T h e sup erficiality o f such a conception prevented its b ein g m ore than a step p in g-sto n e to the rad ical doctrine of “ p re-establish ed h n rm on y.” O ne m ay a v a il on eself d irectly of D e s c a r te s ’ s u g g e stio n a s to the o rig in a l effective a ct o f G o d, rath er than distribute the divine influence th ro u gh a series o f sp ecial acts. It is p art of the o rig in a l act o f c au satio n , one m ay s a y , th at all possible c a se s o f app aren t interaction of m atter and mind h ave been provided for. W h e n ev er such a case ap p e ars, p re se n tin g concom itant ch an g es in both mind and b o dy, it is due to a “ h arm o n y ” a rra n g e d fo r, p re a rra n g e d , “ p re -e sta b lish ed ,” in the creatio n of each. E a c h ch an g es b ecau se it is so m ade, not becau se the other c h a n g e s. E a ch w ould ch an g e if, la c k in g such com plete h arm ony, the oth er did not. It is in e x o ra b ly a rra n g e d th at m y arm should m ove w h en ever m y w ill e x e rc ise s itself, and seem s to m ove it, ju st a s it is inevitable th at tw o clock s, each re g u lated by the divine harm ony of the sph eres, should strik e a t the sam e 1 2

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instan t, and seem to influence each oth er to do T h e tw o series of eve n ts, m ental and p h ysical, lin n fore, a re quite independent of each other. T h e re is no interaction w h a te v e r. T h e conditions under whit It L eibn itz developed this vie w fu rth er are noticed m i an oth er p a g e below . T h e se doctrines, it is c lear, did not affect psych ology m uch beyond fix in g the C a rtesian p oints of v i e w , A utom atism is extend ed in theory to the hum an oignn ism . T h e body m oves independently o f mind by it d ivine decree, w h ich a c ts on occasion o f a volition «n w hich estab lish es once fo r a ll its h arm o n y with vttli tion. In either c a se , there is the exp licit assum ption of the act of G o d — a m etap h ysical principle, a (Jt'in ex machina, s e rv in g as first cau se and prim e movei til mind and body alik e. T h is leads to a new dogmnli».iu o f m ethod and a new absolu tism of resu lt in the sc hoi tin o f W o lff and S p in oza, w hich obscured the Carteslnii lig h t of im m ediate self-co n sciou sn ess. T h e gu ll \v»t*« th us w idened betw een the ra tio n alist schools ol I In C ontinent and the em p irical school in E n g la n d . In M alebranche (16 3 8 —1 7 1 5 ) , h o w ever, we find iln> developm ent of the doctrine of o ccasio n al c a u sc s into 11 g e n e ra l id ealistic th eory o f k n ow led ge. T h e soul, Mmt he, cannot kn ow th in gs th em selves : th in gs are only I In occasion of the rise o f ideas in the m ind. T h e I nit cau se of all ideas is G od, in w h ose presence and at 1 mu the w orld is perceived . E ve n the ideas of the perlw I and infinite cannot be innate to the sou l, for it is U n l i t and im perfect. T h e se id e a s— that o f G od himi»ell a rc divin ely aro u sed in the m ind on the occasion nf the contem plation of the w orld w ith atten tion. I It tut the s a y in g of M alebran ch e, “ W e see all tiling* lit

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G o d .” A c tio n s, m oreo ver, acts o f w ill, a re volition s ul ( lo c i, since ou r d esire is on ly th eir occasio n al, not their o r i g i n a l , cau se. T h e a c tiv e life, like the in tel le ctu a l, is lived in Ciod. In t lx i s w e find a return to the P la to n ic “ id e a ,” w ith 1 rom m i n g l i n g of N eo -P la to n ic m ysticism . In so fa r il a b a n d o n s the point o f v ie w of em p irical con scio u s p r o c e s s , and p rep ares the w a y fo r the th eory o f the id e n tity o f m ind and body in the absolu te, as announced by S p in o z a . Y e t in one im po rtan t point M alebran ch e w as a d u a list, not an ab solu te id e a lis t : he held th at llie k n o w le d g e o f the soul th ro u gh self-co n sciou sn ess w as m o r e superficial than th at of the body. W e h ave 1 p r o fo u n d k n o w led ge, in his v ie w , of sp ace and its p r o p e r t ie s — the essence o f m a tte r; but w e k n ow only p a r t ic u l a r sta te s o f m ind, not g e n e ra l and u n iversal truth s. G o d, th erefo re, is ra th e r a p ostu late of lo g ic a l and t h e o lo g ic a l va lu e , not a principle c a p a b le o f u n i f y in g the term s of the m ind-body dualism . M a le b r a n c h e show ed h im self, indeed, to be a firsti.ile p s y c h o lo g ic a l o b server. H e in v estig a te d vision with n o t a b le r e s u lts ; w o rk in g ou t a vib ratio n th eory of c o l o u r d ifferences, a th eory o f accom m odation , an .ic c o u n t of v isu a l d epth-perception . H e w a s led a lso into tH e in v estig a tio n o f sen se-illu sion b y the objection raised t o his o ccasio n alist v ie w , to the effect th at God often d e c e iv e d us in these c a se s. S p in o z a .— In B aru ch de S p in o za ( 1 6 3 2 - 7 7 ) , one of the h e r o i c figu res of p h ilosop h y, the .d u alistic th eory r e c e iv e d its final philosop h ical statem en t— final, th at is , in th e sen se th at to g o beyond the S p in o zistic Icn m u la tio n is to m erge the tw o te rm s in an identity '.(> u n i f y in g th at th eir d ifferences d isap p ear a lto g e th e r .' S p in o z a em ployed a ded u ctive and m ath em atical

i IS

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m ethod. H is g r e a t w o rk , E th ica , 1 co n sists o f a scrim of propositions and d em o n stration s, w ith c o ro lla t i* •> d raw n out in the m an ner of geo m etry. In h is opinion n eu trality and o b je c tiv ity , no less than m athem atii ,d v a lid ity , w ere thus g iv en to the conclusions reached. A d m ittin g the truth of the distinction betw een m iml and m atter, and th at o f the im possibility of any inLlu action betw een them , there is, said S p in o za, one ollu i truth equ ally ind isp utab le : the ch an g es, relatio n s, altll even ts ta k in g p lace in them occur in strict correlation “ the ord er a n d connection of ideas is the sam e as 11n ord er and connection o f th in gs ” — ordo et comic \i i> idearum idem est ordo et connexio. H o w is tlii-i possible— a ssu m in g the tru th of the dualism ah ead \ a g re e d to ? It is possible, said S p in oza, in fo rm a l agreem ent w ith M alebran ch e and G eu lin cx, only b ecau se of tin presence of the a c tiv ity of G od in both. B u t how is iTiTi presence to be co n ce ive d ? H ere the th o u gh t o f Spino/.i ta k e s form in a system o f absolu te fo rm al identity. ' G od" is the only, the one, su b sta n c e ; but bein g in finite, God m ust have an infinity o f attrib u tes. N othing conceivable can be denied of him . O f th is infinity nl a ttrib u te s, w e are able to kn ow only tw o : th ou gh t ami exten sion , mind and m a tte r; but the infinity-less-lw u attrib u tes m ust h ave equ al reality. M ind and b o d y, th erefo re, are equ ally independent of each other and o f all the other attrib u te s, but they a re a lso cquttlls dependent upon the one infinite su bstan ce, God. W h a te v e r tak es place in one of the attrib u tes. ..n a th o u gh t in the a ttrib u te m ind, or a m ovem ent in iln 1

Ethica online geometrico demonstrata. T ra n s, and in t i t»«Imi Spinoza, his Lije and Philosophy, jiuI • <I

(ion by S ir I-'. Pollock, 1899

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attrib u te body, m ust h ave a c o rre sp on din g plnce in _each of the oth er attrib u tes, sin ce it is a m odification of the one su b stan ce, C o d . T h e m ode of th o u gh t— “ m ode” is S p in o z a ’s term for an y specific d eterm in a tion w ithin an attrib u te— m ust h ave a corresp on din g sp a tia l m ode ; and each m ode o f m ovem ent, a corre-^ s ponding th o u gh t m ode. T h u s the correlatio n is e sta b lished. E v e r y event in th o u gh t or exten sion is also an event in exten sion or th o u gh t. W h a t, then, is this one su b sta n c e ? O nly the s um of its attrib u tes : m ore w e cannot sny_ It can n ot be defined by the p redicates o f th o u g h t; for “ all definition is n e g a tio n .” 1 T o affirm one p red icate is to deny its op p osite, and n o th in g can be denied of the infinite su b stan ce. T o m ake it m ind, w ould be to deny its a ttri bute m a tte r; and so on fo r all the unknow n attrib u tes. T h is is the e x p licit d eclaration of S pin oza, w h ose system is re fra cto ry to a n y in terpretation in a su b je ctive or id ealistic s e n se .2 T h e fo rm a l lo g ic a l requ irem ent o f identity has its proof in the a ctu al existen ce of the correlated m odes in the attrib u tes o f th o u gh t and exten sion . T h e em p h asis is th row n b a c k upon the attrib u te s, upon the re a listic and d u a listic h ap p en in gs o f the life o f th o u gh t in the w orld of extension . E v e n w ill and intelligence do not e x ist in G od : they are m odes m erely in the finite attrib u te, m ind. S p in o z a ’s fligh t o f sp ecu lation ju stifies the e x is tin g ord er, and m ak es it possible 1 Determinatio est negatio, Ep ist. 50. 2 T h is is in opposition to som e com m entators, a s Pollock, w ho find a tendency in the attribute thou gh t to “ sw allo w up all the other attrib u tes,” based upon S p in o za’s Definition 4 o f A ttribute ( “ that which intellect p erceives co n cern in g su b sta n ce,” cf. also Epistle 27). A refutation o f this view with citation o f texts is to be found in the w riter’s paper, “ T h e Idealism o f Sp in o za ,” Fragments in Philosophy and Science, C h ap . II.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY to p ursue the sciences, p h y sio lo g y and p sych o lo gy, w ith ou t em b arrassm en t from the problem of inter actio n . It is a m etap h ysical anticipation o f the fornix o f truce establish ed in the developm ent o f science the th eory of “ p a ra lle lism , ” the “ doub le-asp ect th e o ry ," e tc .— w hich banish the problem of cau se as between m ental and p h ysical phenom ena, and confine attention to the fa c ts in the tw o d om ains re sp ectively. W h ile, th erefo re, Spin oza could not join the P o s itiv is t cam p he w a s one of the a rch -m etap h ysician s in the eye ol C om te— still, w e m ay s a y th at in h is doctrine <»l id en tity the absolu te becom es so tenuous, ch aracterless, and h arm less that science m ay entirely ig n ore it. I lie natura naturans sh o w s itse lf only in the natura mi/iirata, a s Spin oza p uts it— absolu te natu re ap p e ars only in phenom enal natu re. Sp in o za w a s also a p sy ch o lo g ist. H e d istin gu ish ed, in the traditional w a y , the s ta g e s of in tellectu al appre hen sion— im agin ation , in tellect, intuition. H e found it difficult to c a rry out a th eory o f g e n e ra l kn ow led ge and a b stra c t intuition, in the face of his doctrine nl con co m itan t m odes of m ind and b o d y ; since the p h ysica l m ode m ust corresp on d to the ob ject o f thought and a lso to the m odification o f the self. B u t thin difficulty loses som e of its force when w e realise thuI the p h ysio lo g ical event a cco m p an yin g a g e n e ra l idea 01 the g e n e ra l se lf need not itself be “ g e n e r a l ” ; it need on ly be specific. O ne brain m odification m ay c o n e spond both to the th in ker and to the o b ject of liin th o u gh t. T h e active life w a s to S p in oza the d evelopm ent of .1 fund am ental “ w ill to liv e ,” a tendency (conatm) to w ard self-co n servatio n . Im m o rtality w a s upheld by a cu riou s argu m en t ad hoc, in effect this : the personal

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soul is not the h igh e st or tru e soul b y w h ich thou gh t is m an ifested . T h e re is a h ig h e r and pu rer m ode than th is, and w ith it there is asso cia te d an oth er mode of b ody. A t death this la tter, the tru er body, acco m p an ies the im m ortal soul in acco rd an ce w ith the principle of the concom itance of the m odes. Leibnitz (16 ^ .6 -17 16 ^ .— A s m ath em atician and philosop h er, L eibn itz is classed am o n g the g re a te st g e n iu se s, by reason o f the com preh en siven ess of his p ow ers. H e has been called the A risto tle of m odern tim es. H is v ie w s are fun d am en tally m etap h ysical, since he sta rts out from the conception of su bstan ce. B u t in con scio u sn ess he finds the c h arac ter o f su b stan ce. M ind is the e x p la in in g principle of all re a lity . L eib n itz is a t once a m onist and a p lu r a lis t : a m onist so fa r as q u alita tive d istinctions o f su b stan ce are c o n c e rn e d ; he accepted on ly one su b stan ce, the soul : a p lu ra list so fa r a s independent ccn tres of existen ce or re ality are con cerned ; th ere are m an y independent sou ls, irreducible “ m o n a d s.” It is am o n g these independent m onads or so u l-a to m s,1 each con scious, th at the p re-establish ed h arm o n y of the w o rld sh o w s itself. T h e body is an a g g r e g a t e of m onads, in essence sou ls. T h e re is no m atter a s such : only the sp iritu al m onad s e x is{. T h e se a g g r e g a t e s ra n g e from tfieT in o rg an ic, th rou gh p lan ts and an im als, up to m an. In the a g g r e g a t e s h igh er than the in o rg a n ic th ere is a cen tral m onad or soul, w hich in ap p earan ce ru les the r e s t ; but the la w o f the relation is th at o f p re-establish ed h arm ony. T h e m onad or sp iritu al atom is self-a c tiv e , never p assiv e . Its essence, a s show n in co n scio u sn ess, is 1 Leibnitz w o rk ed out a system atic theory o f the m onads ca llin g it “ m o n ad o logy.” .

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a ctiv ity o f “ p re se n tatio n ,” ta k in g form in w ill and th o ugh t. T h is one a c tiv ity o r m ental e n erg y sh ow s itself continuously in all the developm ent of the m ind7 b egin n in g with the “ d a r k ” or un conscious p resen tations p resen t even in the in o rg an ic w orld , and ending^ with the ' ‘ c l e a r ” a n a ly tic th o u gh t o f hum an reason.^ I n its nature this a c tiv ity is both d istin g u ish in g and rela tin g . T h e elem en ts u ncon sciou sly p resen t in the “ d a rk ” p resen tatio n s ot the low er ord ers of monads", are b ro u gh t out in the relatio n al form of th o u gh t ip the~higher. A nd in the developm ent of the ind ivid ual m ind, p ro g re ss co n sists in this ad vance from uncon scio us co m p le x ity to con scio u s relatio n . I n it all, the s pecific c h a ra c te r o f co n scio u sn ess, an d th at of a ll reality , is “ unity in v a rie ty ” — v a rie ty of elem ents in the unity o f the one con scio u s activity . T h e h ig h e st s ta g e in v o lve s not only c lea r relatio n s of elem en ts, b u t” a ls o con scio u sn ess of s e lf a s the a c tive un ity, i o this Leib n itz g a v e the nam e of “ ap p e rcep tio n ,” in co n trast to the m ere “ perception ” o f the lo w er s ta g e s . T h e entire p ro g re ssio n from lo w er an d o b scu re to h igh er and clear k n o w led ge is n ative to the s o u l; jj: all b e lo n g s to its o rig in a l p ow er of p resen tatio n . .X p the statem en t of the sen sa tio n alists to the effect that there is n o th in g in reason th at w a s not a lre ad y presen t in sen se, Leib n itz rep lies, “ excep t reason it s e lf,” nisi

ipse intellectus. T h e syn th etic c h a ra c te r o f L e ib n itz ’s v ie w s, thus briefly described , becom es at once app aren t. H e held to a m onism of su b stan ce, thus m ak in g the h arm o n v o f w o rld -a ctivitie s possible : each o f the m onads “ p re sen ts ” or reflects all the o th e r s ; it is a m irro r of the w orld , a “ m icro co sm .” B u t he establish ed a plu ralism of in d ivid u alities, differen ces am o n g the p artic u la r

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c en trcs of reality , a s it had n ever been done before. T h e c h arac ter of the soul as a u n itary e n erg y or a c tiv ity is not lost eith er in its q u alita tive sam eness w ith oth er sou ls, or in the d ifferentiation ol pre^HTTTT" tions w ith in Its ow n th o u gh t! T h e fru itfu l but mueti o v erw o rk e d principle o f m odern sp ecu lative idealism , “ id en tity in d iffe re n ce,” had here its earlie st and peih aps its soundest expo sitio n . In this connection, tin* principle o f “ sam en ess of ind iscern ibles ” w a s fo rm u lated and applied : the prop osition th a t w ith out real d ifferences, only a b stra c t id entity of appreh en sion is possible. F o r perception in d istin gu ish ab le th in gs art* id e n tica l.1 In the theory of the one a c tiv ity or e n e rg y , spiritunl in ch aracter, p an-psych ism is r e v iv e d : bu t in a form th a t em p h asises in d ivid u ality. A “ s o c ia l ” c h a ra c te r. so to d escribe it, is introduced into the stru ctu re of tin* w o rld . T h e difficulty, indeed, w ith L e ib n itz ’s pluralism w ould seem to lie on the side of its insufficient unity. T h e m onads lack essen tial and im m anent bonds of union. T h e ir system s o f p resentations m erely duplicate one another. A nd the doctrine of G od, the suprem e m onad and ca u se of the unity of the w o rld , rem ains ob scu re. Leibnitz fu rth er in co rp orates in h is system the g e n e tic and v ita listic poin ts of view o f A ristotle, in terp retin g life, h o w e ve r, in term s o f m indr ra tlin than the reverse. In this con n ection, h is theory o l uncon scious p resen tatio n s, toetites ■berccbtions. w h irls h a ve the pow er of d evelo p in g into conscious c o g n itio n s, is based upon sou n d ob servatio n ! C ertain o f h is s p i t u I 1 T h e correlated principle o f “ difference o f discern iM e s " I n eq ually true : one thing b ecom es tw o or m any when difference* o f a p p earan ce prevent its* identification (see the w rite r's Thotirhl and Things , V o l. II, C h ap . X I V , § 8).

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a rg u m e n ts, h ow ever, d raw n from the com position of co lo u rs, sleep, and the sum m ation of infinitesim allv sm all stim u lation s, a re of v e ry unequal v a lu e. T h ey are a ll used, in v a ry in g fo rm s, and v a rio u sly criticised in la te r literatu re of the “ u n co n sciou s.” It w a s in L eib n itz, ^ s H arm s re m a rk s, that the series of e x p la n a tions of the c lea r b y the ob scu re, the p o sitive bv the n e g a tiv e , the conscious py tnc uncon sciou s b e g a n 7 It re a d ie d its culm ination in Sch o pen h au er and H a r t m ann, and rem ains the resort of m any p seu d o-exp lan ations— from crim e to g e n iu s ; from art and invention to h y s te r ia ; from se x u a l m an ifestatio n s to re lig io n — in the p sy c h o lo g y of to -d ay. B y m a k in g con scio u sn ess u n con scious, w h en ever oth er e x p lan atio n s fa il, of co u rse one e n larg e s o n e ’s resou rces. F in a lly , it is to be noted th at the form g iv e n by Leib n itz to the p ostu late o f self-co n scio u sn ess— m ak in g it active in its v e ry n atu re— a s se rts a p o sitive sp iritu a l ism as o v e r a g a in s t the p a ssiv ism found in the em p irical p sy c h o lo g y of the B ritish sc h o o l.1 T h e m ind is not a tabula rasa, a blan k tab let, re ceivin g im pressio n s from ou tsid e it s e lf; it is, on the c o n tra ry , the fons et origo o f all action. T h e w ill is the principle b y w hich the flow o f p resen tatio n s in co n scio u sn ess ta k e s its d eter m ined c o u r s e ; it is the d yn am ic aspect o f m ind. In sh ort, w e find in L e ib n itz ’s p sy c h o lo g y a syn th esis o f elem en ts d raw n from A risto tle, the S to ic s, and S t. A u g u s t in e ; the w hole re c a st in the form m ade possible b v the d evelopm ent o f the d u alistic m o tive s in and a fte r D e sca rte s. It h as le ft an indelible m ark upon New Essays on the Human Under (Nouveaux essais sur I’entendement humain) has referen ce to that o f L o c k e 's Essay concerning Human Under standing. 1 T h e title o f Leibn itz’s

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m odern thought. In vie w o f its m etap h ysical point of d ep artu re, and its e x p la n a tio n o f the w orld in term s o f m ind, w e m ay con sider it a s the cu lm ination of the ration alism of D e sca rte s and Spin oza. W ith reference to la te r developm ents, w e m ay note th at it la c k s the ra d ica l distinction betw een intellect and w ill which m arked and differentiated the system s of subsequent id ealistic thought. D ogm atism .— Christian Wol f f (died 17 5 4 ) defined th e doctrines of L eib n itz, each fo r itself, in such a w ay th at they lost their relation to the system a s a whole. T h e y becam e a series o f d o g m a tic statem en ts. H is m ethod, m oreover, w a s u ltra -lo gica l, p roceed in g by •definition and distinction. T h e “ m o n a d ” becam e the “ a t o m ” a g a in . T h e p ow er o f “ p re se n ta tio n ” w as restricted to the m ental or con sciou s atom s. Pree sta b lish ed h arm ony took the form of an ord er e sta b lished once fo r all by the act of G od. T h e re w a s no p ossible d irect interaction betw een mind and m atter. T h e a c tiv ity o f the soul, described as in itself one, ta k e s on, a cco rd in g to W o lff, different directions, a p p e a rin g in different “ fa c u ltie s,” of w hich the vis repraesentativa , or “ lo g ic a l fa c u lt y ,” is fundam ental. T h e a ctiv e facu lty or w ill is due to the sam e fu n d a m ental m ovem ent. T h e fa c u lty of im agin atio n , belongin g to k n o w led ge in g e n e ra l, produces rep resen tatio ns c onnected b y the la w of asso ciatio n in the form <>1 statem en t th at a p artia l reproduction re v iv e s the whole o f w h ici r it w a s fo rm e rly a p a r t .1 W o lff d istin gu ish es m em ory, poetic fan c y , etc. facu ltie s a rra n g e d in ord er a nd treated w ith much p sy c h o lo g ic a l in sigh t. T h e em otions are m ixtu res of 1 T h is anticipates the S ir W illiam Hamilton.

“ L a w o f R edintegration ” form ulated l>y

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p leasu re and pain, w hich reflect resp ectively the re la tive c learn ess or ob scu rity w ith which unity in va riety a p p e ars in the m ental life. A lth o u gh d o g m a tic and u n o rig in a l in his philosoph y, W o lff undoubtedly aided the p ro g re ss of p s y c h o lo g y ; p rin cip ally, h o w e ve r, b y sh arp e n in g its problem s. T h e s u g g e s tion of “ facu lties ” soon cry sta llise d in the e x tra v a g a n t “ fac u lty p sy c h o lo g y ” w hich cu t the mind up into w a te r-tig h t com partm en ts, each d oin g its p ecu liar w o rk in independence o f the o th e r s.1 T h e d istinction m ade b y W o lff betw een a “ ration al ” o r p h ilosop h ical, and an “ e m p ir ic a l” or o b se rv atio n a l, p sych o lo g y w a s in line w ith a la te r d ivision of problem s and in te re sts ; but his bo o k s on these tw o so rts of p sych o lo g y 2 illu stra te the d ifficulty o f c a rry in g out the d istinction from his point of view . T o him “ ratio n al p sy c h o lo g y ” w a s a d eductive m etap h ysical d iscipline, o v er a g a in s t the in d u ctive and em pirical science. T h e form er should rath er h ave been called the “ p sy c h o lo g y o f ra tio n a lism .” H is d istinction be tw een the tw o is not th at w h ich m odern p sy ch o lo g y re co g n ises in d iffe re n tiatin g betw een the ob servatio n al problem w ith w hich science b e g in s, on the one hand, and the e x p la n a to ry problem , on the other hand, with w hich she concludes. T h is la tter d istin ction w a s d ev elo p in g in a sounder w a y in the w o rk o f the B ritish E m p iric ists. T h e m ovem ent traced in this ch ap ter— from D e s c a rte s to W o lff— sh o w s the d evelopm ent o f one of the g r e a t m o tives of re fle c tio n : th at which e x h ib its, in 1 A n historical review o f the doctrine o f “ faculties ” is g iven by Klem m , loc. cit., pp. 4 4 -7 0 ; and in D essoir, loc. cit., is to be found a section on the “ G erm an F a c u lt y P s y c h o lo g y fo llo w in g W o lff." - Empirische Psychologie and Rationelle Psychologie.

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philosoph ical and reasoned form , a ratio n al solution of the problem presented by the sh arp C a rte sia n dualism of m ind and body. In the different th eories, h a vin g this m otive in com m on, the a ltern atives re-occur which cam e fo rw a rd , in le ss rcflective form , in G re e k and M ediaeval th ough t. In succession w e see b are and b arren dualism in D e sc a rte s, “ creatio n ism ” in M ale branch e, “ absolu te id e a lis m ” and “ id e n tity ” in S p in oza, psych ic “ a to m is m ” and “ p a n -p s y c h is m ” in Leibnitz. T h e y all em ploy the p ostu late o f ration al c erta in ty a s a tta ch in g to kn ow led ge, and follow a d eductive m ethod. T h e y all id en tify the ration al principle with God. I t w ill be profitable, befo re g o in g furth er, to m ak e these p oints a little clearer. T h e dualism o f D e sca rte s w a s m ore “ bare and b arren ” than th at reached at an y tim e by the G re e k s, b ecau se it w a s m ore con sciou s and uncom prom isin g. T h e la st am big u ity o f m atter, as w ell a s the la st em b a rrassm en t of m ind, w a s re m o v e d ; t he d ivorce nf in terests w as com plete. T h e exten t o f the d a m a ge suffered by p sych o lo g y is seen in the autom aton theory b y w h ich all p ossible v ita l connections betw een soul and body w ere denied. T h e th eory of n atu ralism w a s e x tended, it is true, but en tirely in the sen se of e n la rg in g the sphere of the p h ysical. T h e p sych ical, beyond b ein g defined as “ th o u g h t,” w a s placed m ore than ever beyond the reach o f p o sitive m ethod. T h e solution offered by a n y sort of creatio n ism , a s in the C h urch F a th e rs and M aleb ran ch e, only m ade the issu e m ore obscure by se ttin g a term to in v estigatio n . T o s a y “ the w orld is m ade o f n o th in g ” sim ply m eans th at G od is its cau se in e ve ry sen se, m aterial and fo rm a l alik e. T h e tendency then becom es— a s it show ed itself in the G re e k s— to m ake of “ n o th in g ” a

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sort of negative “ s o m e th in g ” upon w hich God co u lcl act and out of which the w orld could take form . T h e “ n o n -b e in g ” of the G re e k s becam e a n e g a tiv e s o m e thing a g a in st which the p o sitive divine im pulse a s s e r t e d itself. T h is w as developed in the p o st-K a n tia n id e a l ism on lines laid down by Bohm e. T h e new departures found in Spin oza and L e ib n it z show an interesting co n trast. T h e one “ cu ts u n d e r ’ ’ the dualism of thought and exten sion , le a v in g its s u p e r ficies intact, just as w e put a c e lla r under a h ou se ! God is the unifying principle, the fou nd ation-ston e o n which both pillars of this stru ctu re o f re ality rest. O u r sep aration of the p arts, the a ttrib u tes, ob scu res ou r vision of the whole, the su bstance. T h ere is bu t o n e substance. T o Leibnitz this d ivision o f reality into tw o s u b stan ces is equally s u p e rfic ia l; but his w a y of s u rm o u n t in g it is the very opposite to that of S p in oza. H e reaches one substance, but m ak es it p lu ralistic, a tom istic, in its properties. In stead o f an infinite a tt r ib u te weTTTnd an infinitely sm all soul-m onad. And by c u tt in g up the substance thought into an infinite num ber of b it s , the substan ce extension is m ade to d isapp ear. F o r psychology the m ain th in g w a s the c o n tin u e d im portance attached to in tellect, re a s o n ; this p art o f C artesian ism w as not o u tg ro w n . R easo n w a s t h e th ing to account for and reason w a s the in stru m e n t by which to account fo r it.

Em piricism .—A nother g r e a t current of th o u gh t w a s g a th e rin g force across the C h a n n e l; m o vin g in m direction opposed to “ R a tio n a lis m ,” and kn ow n a s “ E m p iric ism .” In G assen d i and H obbes the em pirical tendencies o i V O L . i.

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the P re -C a rte sia n s, V iv e s and R o g e r B aco n , focused th em selves. A s in D e sca rte s a series of ration alist it theories took their rise, so in G assen d i and H obbes w ho directly opposed D e sca rte s p ersonally— the n atu ral istic and m aterialistic series b egan. T h e dualisticid calistic philosophy w a s opposed b y the m onistirsen sation alistic. Gassendi (15 9 2 —16 55) developed the atom ism of E p icu ru s, but adm itted the p ossib ility of a so rt of soul-m olecule in the p rim itive m atter. l ie a lso m ade reason the function of a sp ecial im m aterial soul created, a s the atom s w ere, by God. It w a s by Ilo b b es (1^ 8 8 -16 7 0 ) th at the tw o fu n d a m ental p osition s of C a rtesian ism w ere a lik e assailed : the substance v ie w of mind and the ratio n al theory <>l the o rigin of kn ow led ge. M ind, said H obbes, is a function of body, and reason is a product o f sensation. T h e w orld is m ade up of m atter in m otion undei m athem atical la w s ; and con scio usn ess is one of thr asp ects or ch a ra c te rs of the liv in g o rga n ism . Thenis, then, no sep a ra te su b stan tive soul or sp irit a s the d u a lists declare. F u rth e r, sen sation is the one consciou s event, and upon it know led ge is loundetl. Sen sation is based upoi 1 p h y sio lo g ic a l p rocesses, stirred up bv extern al stinni ration. H o b b e s d escribes these o rg a n ic p ro c e sse s. •W aking the h eart the centre. B y the com pounding of sen sation s— the p rocess so g r e a tly developed by la te r sen satio n alists and asso ciation ists— all the m odes of intelligence are produced. W ith sensation g o e s an o rig in a l form o f impulseidentified with the p reserv atio n o f life— and also feel in g s of p leasure and pain. T h e se , like the sen sation s, a re com pounded under the la w s of asso ciation . Th< w hole results in a conception th orough ly n atu ralistic

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and m echanical in sp irit, hut its c a rry in g - out is inadequate and sketch y. It served as p rog ram m e, h ow ever, fo r the la te r m ore deailcd a tta c k s upon ration alism , which carried the w a rfa re into the special fields o f innate ideas and the th eory o f k n ow led ge. T h e ve rv e of Ilo b b e s ’ philosoph y w a s directed to w ard p olitical th e o ry ; and in this he establish ed the bond betw een sen sation alism and political in d ivid ualism , which rem ained vita l and p ersisten t d u rin g the d evelop ment o f eigh teenth -century B ritish th o u g h t.1

1 T h is sh ow ed itself in the union p o lity ” in the ch airs o f instruction in G reen a t O xford, and H . Sidg-vvick quarter o f the nineteenth century, the them selves closely united.

o f philosophy and “ civil the universities. In T . II. at C am b rid g e , in the last tw o interests still showed

IN D E X

(The figures printed in heavy type ii

A b s o l u t e , of Plotinus and A r is t o t le ,

Achilles, argument, 4 1 Adamson, R ., 100 /Esthetic contemplation, in Plato, 57; Aristotle's, 67 Al bert us M agnus, 84, 87 Alexandrian philosophy, 30 Alhacen, 9 1 Analogy between race and indi vidual, Introduction, 7 1, 104 f. Anaxagoras, 23, 28 IT., 4 1, 50 Anaximander, 27 f., 36 Anaximenes, 26 f. Animism, 16 Anselm, argument, 90 Antisthenes, 59 Apperception, to Leibnitz, 123 Aquinas, Thom as, 84, 87 If. Arabian Psychologists, 91 ff. Aristippus, 59 Aristotle, Frontispiece, 33, 60 ff. ; on matter and form, 6 1, 67 ; dual ism ol, 6 1 ; on the soul, 6 2 ; on physics, 62 ; on cognitive powers, 64 f .; on categories, 65 ; 011 virtue, 6 6 ; on motive powers, 6 6 ; on aesthetics, 67 Arminianism, 90 Art. See /Esthetics and Pancnlism. Association of ideas, Aristotle on, 6 5 ; in W olff, 126 ; in Hobbes, 130 Atomism. See Atomists Atomists, 24 f., 26 f f , Greek, 34 f f ; Gassendi, 130 Attribute, of Spinoza, 118 f. Automatism, in Descartes, 1 1 2 Averroes, 91 f. Avicenna, 91 Bacon, F ., portrait, 8 1 ; 98, 100 Bacon, Roger, 92, 100, 129 Bain, A ., 98 Beneke, 99 Benn, A. W ., 26, 33, 35 Berkeley, 96 Boas, F ., 19 Boehme, Jacob, 102 f., 129 Boutroux, !£., 48, 74, 103

VO L. I e the most important citations.)

Bruno, Giordano, 99, 1 0 1 Caird, E . , 68 f. Calvinism, 90 Cam panella, 99, iox Carneades, 72 Carpenter, J. E . , 76 Cartesianism, 30 Cause, four sorts, of Aristotle, 60 f. Chance, Stoic, 70 Christian Ethics, 78 f. Classification of Sciences, Bacon’s, 1 0 1 ; of functions, 101 Clearness and Distinctness of Descartes, 1 1 3 Cogito ergo sum, of Descartes, 1 10 Collective representation, 176 Common sense in Aristotle, 64 f. ; to the Stoics, 70 Comte, 9 8 ; law of three stages,

Conatus, o f Spinoza, 120 Concurrence of Interpretations, 5 ff. Condillac, 97 Consciousness, to the Eleatics, 40 ; to the Stoics, 70 Contemplation, in Plato, 57 Corpuscular theory, 25, 34 ff. Creationism, 7 9 ; o f Albertus, 87; to Duns Scotus, 88, i2 S f. Cvrenaics, 59 Cynics, 59 Darwin, C h ., 99 Dc anima, of Aristotle, 23 Democritus, 33 f. Demons, 35 Descartes, 4 1, 82, 84, 95, 99, 102 f., 108 ff. ; portrait, 109 ; motto of, n o ; automatism in, 1 1 2 ; superception, 1 1 2 ; 128 Dessoir, preface, 8, 44, 12 7 Determinism, ethical, of Socrates, 49 f f Diderot, 97 Difference of Discernibles, 124 Diogenes of Apollonia, 26 f. Diogenes the Cynic, 59 Dogmatism, 126 f. Doubt, of Descartes, n o

134

INDEX

Dualism, origin and development of, 23 ff. ; Aristotleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, 6 1 ; to St. Augustine, 8 3; interpretation, 78 ff., 95 ff. ; of Descartes, 108 f ., 128 Dualists, early, 27 ff. Dunamis, in Aristotle, 61 Duns Scotus, portrait, 73 ; 84,88 f., 100 Durkheim, E ., 17 Kckhart, Meister, 83 Ecstasy, o f Neo-Platonism, 72 Ejective process, 55 Eleatics, 23 f., 39 ff. Elements, chief, 28 f. Emanation, of Neo-Platonists, 72 ; of Plotinus, 74 Emotion (see Feelings); in Descartes,

IX3

Empedocles, 27 f., 36 Em pirical or Positive Psychology, 99 ff. Endowment, mental, 19 ff. Entelechy in Aristotle, 61 Epictetus, 69 Epicurus and Epicureans, 68 ff., 130 Espinas, A ., 17 Ethics (see Virtue and G oo d); Stoic, 7 0 ; Christian, 70, 7 8 f. Euclid of M egara, 59 Evolution, to the Ionics, 26, 62 ; in Aristotle, 62 Extension, of Descartes, 108 Faculty (see Functions and P ow ers); to Wolff, 126 Fatherhood o f God, 78 Feelings (see Powers, Faculties and Functions); St. Augustine on, 80 ; to Descartes, 1 1 3 Fichte, 97 Final Cause, to Socrates, 50 Folk-psychology. 16 Form and matter in Aristotle, 61, 67 ; in St. Thom as, 87 Fouill^e, A ., 50 f. Fowler, T . , 10 1 Frazer, J . G ., 15 Freedom of will, to Duns Scotus, 89 Functions, Mental Powers ; to St. Augustine, 80 ; to St. Victor, 85 ; to John of Salisbury, 86 ; ClassifiÂ cation of, Bruno's, 10 1; to Spinoza, 120 Furry, W . D., 58

Galileo, 100 Gassendi, 130 Gemiith, 93 Genetic point of view, in Aristotle, 62 f. ; in John o f Salisbury, 8 6; Psychology, 98 Geulincx, 1 18 God, to Plato, 52 f. ; to Aristotle, 61 ; to Plotinus, 74 ; Fatherhood of, 7 8 ; to Boehme, 1 0 3 ; to Malebranche, 1 1 6 ; to Spinoza, 1 18 ; to Leibnitz, 124 Golden Rule, 78 Gomperz, 26 Good, the, to Plato, 53 Gorgias, 43 Greek Period, 8 ; of speculation, ist period, 23 ff. ; Psychology, 24 ff. ; M ystics, 72 f. Green, T. H ., 13 1 Hammond, 65 Harms, Preface, 49, 74, 76, 83, 125 Hartley, 97 Hartmann, E . von, 12 5 H ate, and Love, of Empedocles, 32 f. Hegel, 14, 96, 104 Helmholtz. H ., 92 Herbart, 98 Hobbes, 97, 129 f. Hodgson, S ., 98 Iloffding, 13 Homo mensura omnium, o f the Sophists, 42 Hippias, 43 Hume, 98 Hylozoism, Ionian, 25, 26 ff. Ideas, Plato's theory of, 52 ff. Identity, philosophy o f Spinoza, 118 ff. Imagination, Aristotelian, 6 5 ; in John of Salisbury, 8 6 ; to Italian M ystics, 1 0 1 f. Indian systems, 76 Individual and Racial Thought, 1 ff. Intellectualism, 96 f. Interpretation, Prehistoric, 8 ; prelogical, 8 ; unscientific, 23 ff. ; of dualism, 95 ff. Ionians, 24 f . ; hylozoism of, 25 Jam es, W ., 98 Jesus, 77 f. John o f Salisbury, 86 f., 100 Judgm ent (see Powers, Functions, Scholastics); to John of Salisbury, 86

INDEX K ant, 58, 96, 102 K epler, 100 Klem m , O., Preface, 44, 92, 127 Knowledge (see Perception) ; A ri stotle's theory, 64 Lange, 34 Leibnitz, 96, 121 ff.; portrait, 1 2 2 ; 128 f. Leucippus, 33 f. Ldvy-Bruhl, 14, 16 , 18 Localization, cerebral, by Avicenna,

Locke, 98 Logical, and pre-logical thought, 14 f. Logos, 70 Lotze, H ., 98 Love, and hate, of Empedocles, 34 Love, divine, o f Plato, 57 ; ol NeoPlatonism, 7 2 ; o f Plotinus, 75 Lucretius, 69 M alebranche, 96, 116 f., n 8 , 128 M arcus Aurelius, 69 Materialism o f Epicurus, 69 ; of Hobbes, 130 M atter 3 0 ; to Plato, 56 M atter and Form , in Aristotle, 6 1, 67 ; in St. Thom as, 87 Mechanics, of Ideas, 100 Mediaeval period, 9 Mediation, processes of, 49 Megarics, 59 Memory (see Powers, Faculties, and Functions) ; to St. Augustine, 80 ; to Plato, 57 M etaphysics, Aristotle’s, 62 Method, scientific, of Bacon, 100 f. Mill, J . , 98 M ill, J. S., 98 Modern period, 9 Monadolugy of Leibnitz, 1 2 1 Motive Powers, Aristotle 011, 66 Multiplicity, to die Eleatics, 40 Mysticism, Greek 71 ff. ; in I lniinus 75 f .; German, 93 ; Italian, 102 If.; Christian, 10 N ature, concept of, 36 Nemesius, 83 Neo-Platonism, 7 1 ff. Nee-Platonists, 58 New Academ y, 72 Newton, 100 Nominalism, 86, 88 Nous (I’oOi), of Anaxagoras, 23 ff. Number, Pythagorean, 36 f.

'35

Objectivism, 60 ff Occasionalism, 114 f f Optics, of Alhacen, 9 1 f. ; K epler, 10 0 ; Malebranche, 1 1 7 Orpheus, 38 Orphic mysteries, 22, 38 Pancalism, in Plato, 5 7 ; in Ari stotle, 67 Paracelsus, 10 1 Paradox, Socratic, 5 1 Parmenides, 32 ; 39 f. Participation, law of, 18 Passion, of Descartes, 1 1 3 Patristics, 77 ff Paul, the Apostle, 30 Perception, to Empedocles, 33 ; to Democritus, 35 ; to the Eleatics, 40 ; to Descartes, 1 1 2 ; to Leibnitz, 123 Periods of interpretation, 8 ff. 1Vrson, con scious, of Neo- Platon ism, 7 1 f. ; o f Philo, 72 ; to St. Thomas, 88

Philo (Judfeus), o f Alexandria, 72 Physiological Psychology, Arabian, 91 ff. Plato, on Socrates, 5 1, 52 ff. ; por trait, 47 ; on the Good, 53 ; on the Soul, 55 f. ; 011 reminiscence, 5 7 ; love, 57 ; contemplation in,

Plotinus, 72 ff., 102 f. Poilock, F . , 118 f. Post-Aristotelian Schools, 68 f f Powers of Mind (see Faculties and Functions); Aristotle on, 64 ; St. Augustine on, 80 Pre-established harmony, 1 1 4 f f Prehistoric interpretation, 8 Primitive thought, x i ff. Prodicus, 43 Projective period, 23 ff., 45 Protagoras, 23, 42 Psychology (see Interpretation) ; as Physics, 57 ; piiy.siological, Ara bian, 9 1 ff. ; modern, 95 f f ; philo sophical, 97 f.. 108 ff. ; empirical and positive, 99 f. ; rational and empirical, 12 7 Psycho-physics, of the Arabians, 92 ; Aristotle’s, 64 Psychosophy, n ff. Pythagoras (ami Pythagoreans), 24, portrait, 3 1 ; 26 f f

INDEX

136

Racial and Individual thought, i ff. Realism (logical), 86, 88 Reality, in Plato's “ ideas,” 5 2 f. Reason, to Aristotle, 62 f. Reflective period, 9 Relativity, to ihe Sophists, 42 ; to Carneades, 72 Reminiscence, of Plato, 57 Ribot, 99 Romanes, 99 Rousseau. 98 Saint Augustine, portrait, 53 ; 79 f f .

Steiner, R ., 10 1 Steinthal, 16 Stewart, J . A ., 58 Stoics, 69 ff ; ethics of, 7 0 ; on the soul, 7 0 ; on Chance, 70 Subject, and object, in Boehme, 102 Subjectivism, o f Socrates, 23 ; be ginning in Empedocles, 3 2 ; the Sophists, 42 f f , 46 ff. Substance, o f Descartes, 109 f . ; of Spinoza, 1 18 Substantive period, 9 hi Suggestion, in Duns Scotus, 88 St. John, Logos doctrine, 72 Taine, 98 St. Paul, 82 Tauler, John, 93 St. Victor, John and Richard of. Telesius, tor Tertullian, 82 85 Sameness of Indiscernibles (L eib Thales, 26 f. Thought, Racial and Individual, 1 nitz). 124 Sehelling, 97 ff. ; primitive 1 1 ff. ; pre-logical Schematism, K ant's, 102 and logical, 14 f. ; to Descartes, Scholastics, 84 ff. 108 ; to Aristotle 65 : see Lo gic Traducianism, 79 Schopenhauer, 97, 125 Schwegler, 103, 1 1 2 Transmigration o f souls, 33, 3 8 ; Science and vitalism, 68 n. to Plato, 56 Self-consciousness, to St. Augustine, Truth, to the Sophists, 4 3 ; to Socrates, 48 ; to Empedocles, 33 80 T ylor, E . 13., 15 Seneca, 69 Sensation, Aristotle on, 6 4 ' E p i Unconscious judgm ents, o f Alha curus on, 6 9 ; John of Salisbury cen, 92 ; in Leibnitz, 123 on, 86 Unscientific Period, 8 ; interpreta Sensationalism in Epicurus, 69 tions, 23 ff. Sermon on the Mount, 70, 77 Verulam, Lord, see Bacon, F. Shanahan, E . T ,, 77 Virtue, to Socrates, 48 Sidgwick, II., 1 3 1 Vision, see Optics Siebeck, 84. 89 Vitalism, see Hylozoism, in Aristotle, Socrates, preface, 23, 33 ; portrait, 61, 68 ; of St. Thom as, 88 Vives, Ludovicus, ICO, 129 37; 47 ff. ; paradox of, 5 1 ; motto | \'ole.ns sum, o f St. Augustine, 1 1 1 of, 84 | Voluntarism, 97 Socratic Schools, 44, 59 Sophists, 23 f., 36 [ Waitz, 16 Soul, Plato on, 55 f. ; Aristotle on, W allace, A. R ., 99 6 2 ; Stoics on, 7 0 ; Plotinus on, W ill (see Reason, Faculties and Functions); to St. Augustine, 80; 7 4 ; Christian doctrine of, 78 f. ; to Duns Scotus, 88 to St. Thom as, 87 William of Occam, 89, 100 Space perception, Alhacen on, 92 Spencer. H ., 98 W olff, 96, 116 . 125 f. W ord, see Logos Spinoza, 4 1, 96, 103, 1 16 , 117 f f , 128 t. World-soul, of Plotinus, 75 Spirit (see Soul) ; to A naxagoras, Wundt, W ., 16 2 9 ff. ; to Plotinus, 74 ; to the Xenophanes, 39 ff. Fathers, 78 Zeller, E . , 48 Spiritualism of the Fathers, 78 f. Zeno, the Eleatic, 39 f. Stagirite, see Aristotle. Zeno, the Stoic, 69 f. watts

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