History of Psychology vol 2 by El alma pública Biblioteca

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Frontispiece. J ohn L o c k e. \Cof>yright. Reproduced by kind permission of the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U.S.A.)

HISTORY OF

PSYCHOLOGY A SKETCH

AN D AN

I N T E R P R E T A T IO N

JAM ES

MARK

B A LD W IN

P h .D., D.S c ., L L .D . I'Ml MI I.I V P R O F E S S O R IN TO R O N T O , T R IN C E T O X , A N D JO H N S ItO P K lN S U N IV E R S IT IE S

P R O F E S S O R I N T H E N A T IO N A L U N IV E R S IT Y O F M E X IC O

rO R K IG N C O R K H S rO N D E N T O F T H E I N S T I T U T E O F F R A N C E

Vol. II.

|I ssu ed

fo r

From John Locke to the Present Time.

th e

r a t io n a l is t

press

a s s o c ia t io n

, l im it e d ]

L ondon:

W A T T S & C O ., 17, JO H N S O N ’S C O U R T , F L E E T S T R E E T , E.C .

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CONTENTS

OF VOL.

II.

PA R T IV (continued).1 M ODERN P SYC H O LO G Y —I. F IR S T P E R IO D , TO T H E N IN E T E E N T H C E N T U R Y C H A P T E R I. PAGE

I a k i .y

E m p ir ic is m , N a t u r a l i s m , E i g h t e e n t h -c e n t u r y M a t e r ia l is m -

Locke, Hume, Condillac, Llartley, Priestley, Holbach, the French Encyclopaedists. C H A P T E R II. S h iijr c t iv e

C r it ic a l I d e a l i s m ; t h e N e w M y s t i c i s m — F a it h P h il o s o p h y and

Idealism : Berkeley, Kant. Philosophy: Jacob i.

Reaction to the Faith

P A R T V. M O DERN PSY C H O L O G Y —II. SECO ND PERIO D , T H E N IN E T E E N T H C E N T U R Y C H A P T E R III. I’ m-1 im in a r y S u r v e y . P h il o s o p h ic a l P s y c h o l o g y s in c e K ant -

Herman Idealism : Fichte, Schelling, H egel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer. Spiritualism in England. The British Moral Philosophers and Associationists. Shaftesbury, the Mills, Hamilton. Scottish Realism : Reid, Brown, Stew art. French Spiritualism : Laromiguiere, Maine de Biran, JoufFro}'. Eclecticism : Cousin. 1 For the preceding Parts, see the Contents to Yol. I. V

CONTENTS C H A P T E R IV . PA G E

S c ie n t if ic

P s y c h o l o g y in t h e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y and B eyo nd . I. G e n e r a l P o i n t s o f V i e w -

The Positive Method : Rousseau, Comte. physical Parallelism. Herbart, Lotze.

Psycho

C H A P T E R V. S c i e n t i f i c P s y c h o l o g y in t h e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y an d B e y o n d . II. S p e c ia l L in e s o f W o r k -

Physiological and Experimental Psychology. Psycho physics. Mental Chronometry. Genetic P sych ology: Lam arck, Darwin, W allace, Spencer. Animal and Comparative P sych o lo gy: Instinct, Imitation, Play. Accommodation and Learning : R eflex and Causal Theories, Spencer-Bain Theory. Law of Trial and Error. Child Study. C H A P T E R V I. S c ie n t if ic

Psyc h o lo g y and B eyo nd . (c o n c l u d e d ) -

t h e N in e t e e n t h C e n t u r y S p e c ia l L in e s o f W o r k

III. -

104

Social Psychology. Affective Psychology. Innerva tion and K inaesihetic T heories: Bastian. Peripheral Theory o f Emotion and Expression : Jam es. A ffect ive Revival and Affective Logic : Ribot. Animism and Ejective Processes. ^Esthetic Psychology:Lipps. The Attention.

PA R T VI. G E N E T IC IN T E R P R E T A T IO N H IS T O R Y

O F TH E

C H A P T E R V II. T h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f I n d iv i d u a l T h o u g h t

Rise and Development of Dualism in the Individual. The logical Interpretation of Dualism. The new Dualism of Reflection. The Development of imagi native Interpretation.

134

CON TENTS C H A P T E R V III. H i s t o r ic a l R e s u m e . R e s u l t s o f t h e C o m p a r is o n o f I n d iv i d u a l w i t h R a c i a l T h o u g h t

The Primitive Period : Projective (Pre-Socratics). The Dualistic Period : Subjective (Socrates), Ejective (Plato), Objective (Aristotle). Transition to Reflective Interpretation (Patristics, Scholastics, Mystics). Reflective (Modern). Conclusion. In d ex

L is t o f S o u r c e s

L IS T O F IL L U S T R A T I O N S

L ocke

Frontispiece I'A C E

C o n d il l a c

M a in e d e B ir a n

R o u ssea u

H erbart

L o tze

H elm h o ltz S pencer

J am es

F f.c h n e r

116

R ib o t

P art

M O DERN

I V . (continued).

PSYCH O LO G Y.

TO T H E

N IN E T E E N T H C h a p te r

F IR S T

P E R IO D ,

CEN TURY

E arly Empiricism, Naturalism , M aterialism. P sych olo gy as E m pirical Theory of K n o w led g e.— In Jo h n L ockc (16 32 -17 0 4 ) the full empirical point of view revealed itself. Locke limits the problem to the rr r m s of the inner life ; and uses the method of observa tion and induction. He attempts to treat of the actual sources of knowledge by a scientific method, as pro posed by Francis B aco n .1 M oreover, he transferred the problem of the origin of knowledge, of all knowledge, from metaphysics to fa c t; from theories of divine illumination, pre-estab lished harmony, and innate ideas, to hypotheses based on children, animals, and primitive men. Passin g from this examination of actual knowledge, he proceeds to the more critical and epistem ological questions of its validity and applications. Pursuing what he describes as this “ sohrr nio1m<i of investigating the origin and connection of our irlons,” Locke distinguishes between “ sim p le” and “ complex id eas.” Simple ideas, which are those of immediate 1 Locke’s great work is entitled A n Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690).

MODERN P S YC H O L O G Y

perception, are distinguished as coming either through the “ extornnl sen.se and belonging1 to the external world— or through the “ internal sense,” and belonging to the inner world of the mind itself. T h is latter, the sphere of the internal sense, is that of “ thought ” as defined in the system of D escartes; the external corresponds to the system of nature or “ extension.” In this conception of simple, underived, original elements or data of consciousness, the basis is laid for the w ork of qualitative and analytic psychology, one of the problems of which has remained that of determining- these original elements. In this general position, certain other problems were raised. The mind is conceived of as h aving certain “ powers ” native to it. But there is only the one agent or person, who has ideas through the use of all the powers or faculties. These latter are simply its w ays of acting. It m ay be aroused in the w ay of sensation and perception, in the w ay of memory, of im agination, of will, etc. T h is is L o c k e’s refutation of the “ faculty p sy ch o lo g y ” of Scholasticism , after wards continued by W olff. Judged by their internal characters, the simple ideas of the external sense show different m arks. They have “ p rim a ry ” and “ secondary qualities,” both attributed to the external object.1 The prim ary qualities are those which reproduce essentially external conditions— extension, resistance, movement, etc. These are the qualities by reason of which the external object is what it is, as independent of perception. The secondary qualities, on the other hand, are those in which the 1 F o r a note on the history of the distinction, and of the terms primary and secondary qualities, see Klemm, loc. cit., p. 282, who cites Baumke.

E A R L Y E M P IR IC IS M

process of perception itself has a part— such as colour, taste, position. In the prim ary qualities the reality of the “ exten sio n ” of D escartes is vindicated. In the secondary, the variations arise which produce relativity and illusion. Locke does not stop, with Hobbes, at a mechanical view of the play of ideas. He finds a further and higher power of the mind : that of “ reflecting- upon the course of ideas.” Beyond ideation there is reflection. Ideas are the “ objects of the understanding when it th in ks.” Reflection is the source of a new series of ideas— general, abstract, universal— which involve relations between and am ong simpler ideas. Such are the ideas of cause, substance, relation itself. L o c k e ’ s distinc tion between sensation and reflection reminds us of that of Leibnitz between perception and apperception ; and it is likely that the latter is a revision of the former, for Leibnitz kept L o c k e ’s E ssa y constantly in mind. The ideas of reflection are not innate; there are no innate ideas. This Locke argu es with great wealth of inductive p ro o f; but by innate ideas he generally means actual conscious presentations or im ages. He shows that children lack innate ideas in this sense. This Leibnitz w as able to meet by postulating “ uncon scious presentations,” which slumber in obscure form and in the undeveloped psychic modes, but are still essentially innate. The admission by Locke of certain inherent “ p o w e rs ” or functions would seem to leave open the door for the later critical distinction between the a posteriori or experiential content, and the a priori or native form, in the structure of knowledge. The motive of Locke is clear, h o w e v e r: it is the

M ODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y general refutation of rationalism. F o r to all rational ism it is essential that the reason be not dependent upon purely sensational or em pirical data, either in its origin or in its products. L o c k e ’s aim w as to establish empiricism. To Locke, further, reflection w as largely a passive pow er; it w as reflection upon the course or flow of our ideas, not reflection as itself determining this flow or course to be what it is. Reflection is an “ inner sense.” The actual flow of ideas is due to the law s of association, a term first used, though in a special relerence, bv Lockel So while the mind reserved the power of thought or reflection, still all other contents, together with the law s of organisation of these con tents in complex ideas, were due to sensations and their interaction. A s over against rationalism , the program m e of a mental mechanics, a pure “ presentationism ,” was suggested in anticipation; and at the hands of Hume and the Associationists, this program me w as to be speedily realised. L o ck e’s E ssay contains a wealth of sound psycho logical observation. H is analysis of the ideas of reflection, the categories, is the first of its sort : analytic, empirical, psychological. He accepts the certainty of the existence of the mind, immediately given, as D escartes declared. The existence of the external world, on the contrary, w as d erived ; it depended upon the character of “ liv e lin e ss” attaching to certain sensations. The active powers, feeling and will, have scant notice. They have not the importance that cognition has in a polemic against rationalism. Pleasure and pain are simple ideas or sensations. W ill is an origin al movement of the mind, an effort motived by

EARLY

E M P IR IC IS M

“ uneasiness.” Both feeling's and conations, or efforts, like other simple ideas, are involved in the processes of association. Locke focused certain problems by means of experi ment also. His proof of the relativity of temperature is c la s s ic a l: he pointed out that the two hands feel the same water as of different tem peratures when they themselves are. He also demonstrated the limited area or span of consciousness, by showing- the inability of the attention to take in more than a certain number of items or units exposed simultaneously to the eye. L o ck e’s significance for psychology in ^"p\ prim arily in the empiricism of his point of view . This made possible an analytical method, as expounders of Locke generally recognise. But it is not so generally remarked that L o ck e’s research was one of origins also. He aimed to show the nature and validity of ideas as dependent upon their origin and development. This is the point of view, in so far, of modern genetic psychology. The analytical empiricism of Locke w as taken up and carried forw ard by his su ccessors; but the genetic factor remained undeveloped until the theory of evolution came to reveal its true value. Sensationalism and A ssociatiom sm .— D avid Hum e ( 1 7 1 1- 17 7 6 ) , the greatest of the Scottish philosophers, developed L o ck e’s position in the two directions in which empiricism still retained rationalistic features. F irst, the distinction between sensation and reflec tion, sense and reason, w as abolished; even in the functional form of it that L o ck e’s theory of mental “ p o w e rs” had retained. Second, a thorough-going “ nssociationism .” essentially mechanical 111 character,

MODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y

consciousncss. The synthetic activity of the mind was replaced by the association of ideas. Ilum e entirely denied any effective role to mental function or process as such. He distinguished in mental contents two grad es, “ iinpressions ” and “ id eas.” But he distinguished among im pressions, the first data of experience, “ in n er” and “ o u t e r ” impressions. Inner impressions were those of the inner sphere itself, such as pleasures, pains, efforts, etc. ; and outer impressions were those received by the senses and having the imprint of externality. All possible materials of knowledge, of experience throughout, arise in im p ressions; and since the term sensation is commonly used for such first data of knowledge, “ sensationalism ” hecnme_the term applied to the__ resulting theory of knowledge. Rationalism asserts the originality of reason, and explains aw ay or ignores sen satio n ; sensationalism asserts the originality of sensation, and explains aw ay or derives the reason. The term “ id e a ” is confined by Hume to the deriva tives or revived contents of mind in which impressions reappear. They take on various forms of revival and composition. In general, the “ id e a ” of Hume cor responds to the “ complex id e a ” of Locke, and “ im pression” to L o ck e’s “ simple idea.” In the use of the term impression itself, the passivity of the mind, its mere impressiveness, is emphasised. A s a tabula rasa, it receives or suffers impressions. Ideas, the contents of jm ng;naf‘irm, r f r^m im pressions, the contents of sensation, in yividnrga intensity. Accordlng t o Hume the most vivid idea IsfTess~so than the least vivid impression. Thi&-difference is, thereTore7 the disting uishing-one. The course of ideas— their flow, connection, composi-

E A R L Y E M P IR IC IS M

tion— w as ruled by the principle of association. In this, a mental principle w as substituted for the material inertia of the brain, postulated by Hobbes. It also replaced, as we have already seen, the active principle of thought of D escartes. F o r the first time, a psycho logical mode of organisation was suggested to justify a naturalistic view of conscious process. Association came to be recognised hv n p-reat- school of thinkers as the one principle of mental change and lpnvpmpnt. somewhat as attraction w as found to be in the domain " f t he physical. „ Hume recognised three cases of association, general ised in law s : the cases of “ resem blance,” “ contiguity ” in space and time, and “ cause and effect.” A s com pared with A ristotle’s classification, this omits “ con tra st,” and includes the new case of “ cause and effect.” In the tracing out, the detection as it were, of associa tion in the more complex and synthetic products of the mental life— such as the ideas of the self, the external world, etc.— H 1|mp showed his analytical ability and consistency. He w as the first, and remains one of the greatest, of those p s y c h o lo g ic n n a turalists who have consistently applied a positive method. Association seemed to supply the hint to the process of progressive mental accommodation, as natural selection subse quently supplied the hint to that of organic adaptation. It ga ve to naturalism a positive weapon, to mental process a positive law fulness. And !t remains theresort of all those psychologists who find in apper ception, mental causation, subjective synthesis, etc., the resort to new modes of obscurantism , such as the natural selectionist finds in the newer modifications of vitalism . It w as not until the conception of a struc tural psychology, based upon the analogy of the

MODERN P S YC H O L O G Y

mechanical processes of physics, was succeeded by that of a functional and truly genetic psychology, to which mechanism w as not the last word, that association was finally assigned a more modest role. The “ mechanics of id e a s ” of Herbart and the radical “ composition theory ” of mind of Spencer were first to have their development, both based upon the principle of association. Hume worked out, in detail, association theories of the higher ideas or concepts of thought, classed by him under the terms “ relations,” “ m odes,” and “ sub stances.” The “ s e l f ” became a “ bund le” of asso ciated id e a s; in this the “ presentation ” theories were anticipated, which were later on brought into direct opposition to “ a c tiv ity ” theories. The belief in reality, both external and internal, is ascribed to the vividness of certain impressions, whose force is trans ferred to associated ideas or m em ories; these latter are thus distinguished from mere ideas of fancy. Ju d g ments of reality involve a sim ilar reference to impres sions. The grounds of belief in reality are in this w ay carried back to the characters or coefficients of senseimpressions. The persistent character of external reality— looked upon as having continuing existence apart from perception— is due to the im agination, which connects recurrent impressions in an experience equiva lent to that of an identical persistent ob ject.1 The logical relations, so-called, such as that involved in the universal, are also brought under association. The quality white, for exam ple, is not a logical universal, but an “ abstract id ea,” due to the association by resemblance of many white objects. In this procedure, 1 Later thinkers fall back upon much the same psychological facto rs; cf. the writer’s Thought and Things, Chap. X , Vol. I.

E A R L Y E M P IR IC IS M 1111tin

lo re s h a d o w s the d e v e lo p m e n t o f w h a t is k n o w n

,i . " p s y c h o lo g ism ” in lo g ic . In llum c the emphasis continues to rest upon cogni tion, upon ideas, and upon the theory of knowledge. III. interest, like that of Locke, w as in the refutation mI rationalism. Accordingly, we find scant notice of Irilin g and will. Hume developed L o ck e’s position 111.11 pleasure and pain were simple ideas or impressions internal in character— subject to the law s of associa tion I he emotions are impressions aroused by ideas, with which they become straitly associated. Acts of will me similar internal impressions aroused by feclin,; ; they are capable of reproduction as ideas, and m subject to association with other ideas. Mn< h of the reasonableness of H um e’s theory arises, however, from a further almost tacit assum ption, by w lin Ii lie supplemented the principle of association, lb assum es and employs to the utmost the principle ■ il " custom ” or 11 habit.” H abit works wonders in his lulu Is Just tlie wonders that the Lockian “ inner ni l the Cartesian “ reason,” and later on the K an tian "fo rm a l categories,” worked in turn. B y habit, ml llum e, the associated impressions and ideas are I" iiml into aggregates and wholes, to which belief and «i loin attach ; and in which the original details of iiii> lure and com plexity are lost. The complex ideas. line welded and fused by habit, have the unity and i l.mils of the “ clear and d istin ct” ideas of reason il> i iIFied by Descartes and Leibnitz, and conceal their ■il, ill from impressions and presentations. Th in gs i 1 |1. iledlv and invariably associated together become i tii ol one whole over which habit overflows, and to hi< 11 habit giv es the sanction of a universal and necesii i onnection. All necessity attaching to the course Vol.. II. B

MODERN PS YC H O L O G Y

of events, either internal or external, is due to habit. W h at we are in the habit of finding we take to be true and necessary. In this Hume struck upon one of the most fertile ideas of modern psychology and philosophy.1 Its philosophical significance is seen in the development of empirical theories of knowledge and of morals in which the formal element in truth and duty is attri buted to the consciousness of habit. Individual habit passed over into the “ inherited h a b it ” by which Spencer accounted for the a priori “ fo r m s ” of Kant, and into the “ social cu stom ” by which the utilitarian moralists accounted for the imperative of the practical reason. In this w ay, rational form, intuition, the innate idea, are accounted for by individual or racial habit, or by the two combined. Its psychological significance, apart from the theory of knowledge, resides in the suggestion that in habit, considered as a tendency of a functional sort, the inner principle as such is in a sense located; it is to be sought in the active and synthetic side of consciousness. It brings this side of the mental life within the range of observation, and substitutes something actual in con sciousness for the postulates of logical and meta physical theory. The concept of habit has been deve loped enormously in a group of modern theories of 1 Of the historians of psychology, Harms alone, I think, speaks o f this (Harms, toe. cit., pp. 3 1 1 ff.). Dessoir seems completely unaware of this part of Hume’s psychology ; and Klemm makes no note of it that I can find. In fact, however, the “ h ab it” of Hume supplies a most interesting’ transition from the “ inner sense ’’ of Locke to the purely mechanical processes of Condillac. An acute exposition and criticism of Hume's view is to be found in T . H. Green's Introduction to the Philosophy of D avid Hume.

E A R L Y E M P IR IC IS M i In " m o t o r ” or dynamic type, which account for the "lio lc range of the synthetic function— attention, apper• i plion, interest, generalisation, thought, the self— in ii inis of the consciousness of movement and activ ity .1 Ity way of summary we may say that Hume is to In* considered; both by reason of his conception and hitm ise of his method, one of the prophets of modern I'M liology. In conception, he held to a naturalism " lii« h submitted the mind as a whole— the self as well i . its knowledge— to investigation by the same right iu other things in nature. In method, he w as an i' \ pi ■ri men tali st, a positivist, admitting no intrusions I ruin m etaphysics, no dogm atic assumptions. His n nulls were, of course, in a measure personal to him, .hkI .is is the case with those of all pioneers, they have IMin < riticised, developed, in part rejected. But in his Iit i n< iples of association and habit, no less than in his .< ns.itional theory of knowledge, Hume worked out v7«-\vs which have been and still are of enormous Influence. Ih s psychology is one of those system s whose very i .idii alness and freedom from am biguity make them l\pical and influential not only positively, but also as im p els for the practice of riflemen generally. His . 'Inm ess and homely clarity of style— qualities sim ilar _ i" those 77F Locke— gave hi's view s- universal currency^ mil it is to the reaction against Hume that the next I irut departure in rationalism , the Criticism of K ant, u.in directly due.2 1 All llu* writers of the “ m otor” school are not, of course, so 1 1 in their use of the principle. Ribot makes thorough-going.... i'I il ; Fouillee and Miinsterberg employ it more incidentally. I>i llu* present writer's M ental Development in the Child and the r ( ist ed., 1895) it w as given the wide scope indicated in the text. More than once has philosophical rationalism found it con-

M ODERN P S YC H O L O G Y

Condillac, Etienne ( 17 15 -17 8 0 ) .— In Condillac, the sensationalist theory w as transferred to France. In G reat Britain, especially in Scotland, a reaction toward spiritualism showed itself, as a protest against the m aterialistic consequences drawn from the premises of Hume. Condillac pressed the sensationalistic analysis to its conclusion. He dropped Hum e’s principle of habit, and with it all effort to preserve mental synthesis as such. Sensations alone, accompanied bv feelinsr. re produced as ideas, and dominated hv association. account for the entire mental lifc^ All the so-called r‘ rational ” products of the mind are grouping's of sensations, effected by association. Condillac did not concede the legitim acy either of the supposition of an external world apart from sensa tion, or of an inner principle as such. These assum p tions, said he, come from the needs of our practical life. W e act upon a world, or seem to, and it is we who so act, or seem t o ; but there is nothing in knowledge to justify either of these assumptions— either the “ w e ” or the “ w orld.” B y the famous figure of a statue alive, but without experience, Condillac illustrated the development of the entire mental life, through the introduction into the statue merely of ih e senses and the rules o f association. Condillac has the importance that extremes usually have : that of isolating a view, and freeing it of all am biguity. He also suggested the new lines of depar ture to be taken in the movements of phenomenalism and materialism. The first of these appeared when the “ prim ary q u alitie s” of matter— resistance, extension, venient to “ introduce ” itself by a criticism of Hume. See T . H. G reen’s Introduction to the Philosophy of D avid Hume.

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M ODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y etc.— were reduced to complexes of sensations and ideas, as the self had already been reduced by Hume. The conclusion is that the flow of states within consciousness is all that we really have— mere phenomena, ^appearances— and that there is no reality behind them. This sort of analysis w as also made in England by Berkeley, an elder contemporary of Hume, to whom we are to return. Further, impulse, and with it will, is the presence in mind of a dominant idea of advantage or p leasu re; and attention is the presence in mind of an intense sensation or presentation.1 Such phenomenalism, it is clear, reinstated the point of view of the Sophistic dictum, Homo mens uni om nium , but with the reinforcement that came from the inter vening thought of centuries in delining and isolating the subjective point of view . The Sophists were predualistic; the modern phenomenalists, post-dualistic. The Sophists were unable to pass to a clear distinction between mind and body, either by sense or by reason ; ideas alone remained to them. The phenomenalist argues aw ay the distinction by consciously denying both the substances mediated by id e a s ; to them also ideas alone remained. The difference shows itself, moreover, in the greater individualism of modern phenomenalism. The inner life had become that of the private and single self, the area of personal conscious ness. Phenomena, thus restricted to the individual, had the greater relativity and the lesser value. One goes on logically to solipsism. As theory of the mental life, it supplied the psychology of agnosticism . Pure phenomenalism, however, in the form of 1 Both being positions made use of in the modern “ presenta tional” and Herbartian theories.

E A R L Y E M P IR IC IS M

solipsism, is rarely held. The tendency is to use this sort of analysis in the interest of a philosophy which denies one sort of reality, in order to reinforce its asser tion of the other. In Berkeley, it w as mind which profited by the subjective analysis of b o d y; in the m aterialists, to whom we next turn, it is body which is retained at the expense of mind. I'.ighteenth-century M aterialism . —Am ong w riters in England, H artley (17 0 4 -17 5 7 ), a contemporary of llm ne, and Priestley (17 3 3-18 0 4 ) took the step from sensationalism to m aterialism ; in 'F ran c e, it w as taken by Lam ettrie, a contemporary of Condillac. Intelligence. com prising all the faculties of reflection and volition, having been reduced to sensations, and the self to a complex thereof, it was easy to substitute lor the impression in the mind its cause in the brain. I lie brain state, the organic counterpart of the sensa tion, is part of the physical w o rld ; it reflects the physical excitation of the senses. The whole person then, not merely the b ody; the sensation, not merely the exciting cause, is part of the material system of nature. It w as natural, also, in order to give greater positiveness to the law -abiding character of mental phenomena, to ground the association of ideas in the material connections of the brain. Priestley especially developed the idea that the organisation of mental ■■i.iles reflected that of the brain centres. He explicitly 1 night the identity of mind .and hcaim F o r Hartley .1iTTT Priestley, the continuity of mind w as in principle that of brain processes; ideas as states of memory and imagination were due to the reinstatement of brain states according to this law . Thus the last shade of the distinction between sensation and idea disappeared.

MODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y

The further development of materialism is mainly of philosophical interest. It w as carried forward by Diderot, Holbach, and the French Encyclopaedists.1 The aspect of their view that is of psychological significance is the supposed parallelism it suggested between mental and physical states, a suggestion developed into what is now known as “ psycho physical parallelism .” 2 Th is principle does not asso ciate itself necessarily with m aterialism ; Spinoza and Leibnitz had already suggested it in their theories of correlated “ a ttrib u te s” and of “ harm ony.” It allowed also of an interpretation of the mind in terms of the aggregation of psychic atom s— “ least states ” correlated with least physical changes or vibrations— by Diderot, which anticipated a new pan-psychism and a new posi tivism. Spencer, later on, postulated an “ elementary sen sation ” correlated with an “ elementary nervous shock,” in much the same sense.3 M aterialists like Holbach went beyond this, teaching the positive identity of mind and body, and the metaphysical existence of matter and motion. In the neat phrasing of Harm s, “ mechanical physics supplied the m etaphysics of m aterialism ” (loc. c it.y p. 323). 1 Baron von Holbaeh’s Systeme de la Nature (1770) is one of tlie classical statements of Materialism. He postulated qualitatively different atoms, in the sense of chemical elements. 2 See below, Chapter V , of this volume. 3 So comparative psychology may assume in low organisms a “ nervous an alogu e” to elem entary states of pleasure and pain. See the- writer’s M enial Development in the Child and the Race, 1st ed. (1895).

C h a p t e r II.

Subjective and Critical Idealism —Faith Philosophy. W e have seen, on an earlier page, that the philosophical interpretations taking their rise in the dualism of Descartes might be classed, for psychological purposes, .is Dualistic, N aturalistic, Idealistic, and M ystical. W e have traced out the history of the first two of these movements : D escartes to W olff, and Locke to Con dillac, respectively. W e now turn to the idealistic movement, which arose as a protest again st sensation alism. In its early m anifestations it retained the intel lect ualistic character of a philosophy of know ledge; ,md only later did it take on the two contrasted forms <>l Intellectualism and Voluntarism . The development of Intellectualism showed itself in two important figu res: G eorge Berkeley, Bishop of ( loync, and Immanuel K an t, the “ S ag e of K o n ig sb erg .” G eorge B erkeley (16 8 5 -17 5 3 ).— In B erkeley’s psy1 hologv we find the carryin g out of what afterw ards became the Humian analytic method, but with a differ ent philosophical motive from that of the sensational ist ic followers of Hume. The analysis of external icality into sensations did not mean logically a resort lo materialism, although the intervention of the nervous system between the world and the mind suggested that construction. For the term that remains when the analysis is exhaustive is not a material term, nervous or physical, but a mental term, a sensation. 17

M O DERN P S Y C H O L O G Y

Berkeley demonstrated this. He carried the sub jective analysis of the physical thing out to its logical issue. The prim ary qualities— extension, resistance, etc.— were mental states, no less than the secondary qualities. The external world of perception, he de clared, has no separate existence: “ To be is to be perceived,” esse est percipi. This became part o f Ilu m e ’s case. If there be no further factors than those involved in sense perception, then the prim acy of the inner realm, the subjectivity of all experience, is demonstrated. Berkeley thus met the materialists. It was by an analysis of vision that he illustrated this. His Theory of Vision is fam ous. He demon strated that visual space is relative and subjective. He derived the visual localisation of objects from associa tion with sensations of touch. The eye of the child secs the objcct as located by the hand, and afterw ards assign s the visual stimulation to the location thus estab lished through association. V isual space is thus found to be relative, neither wholly innate nor wholly governed by external space relations. Berkeley prepared the distinction of Hume between impression and idea by pointing out a variety of points of difference. Besides differing in intensity and liveli ness, the idea is not dependent in its duration upon an external stim u lu s; and, moreover, it is part of an. associated context or order of contents. These points m ay sufiice to show the thorough empiricism, as well as the accuracy, of B erkeley’s procedure. It w as his philosophy, however, that spoke the last word. The soul, he said, is a simple active being, revealed to us through experience, but not perceived in any concrete experience. It is a concept drawn from.

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the mental life, rather than an idea found in the mental life. Nothing exists except sp irits; the other exist ences, whose essence is to be perceived, are maintained l>v the perception of God, who is the true cause of their appearance to us. W hen perceiving, mind is reason; when acting, it is will. YVe here reach a new spiritualism , m aking use of the subjective analysis that served also the purposes 11I materialism. F o r the one, subjectivism proved the non-existence of a spiritual principle; for the other, that of a material principle. So far as his theistic spiritualism is concerned, Berkeley belongs to the series <>l philosophers already described as rationalists. Lo gic ally he follows M alebranche, com bining occasionalism with Leibnitzian monadism. But this should not lead tis to misunderstand B erk eley’s psychology and theory 11I knowledge. So fa r from deducing his psychology I'mm spiritualism , he explains his psychological results by resorting to spiritualism . That is to say we have lo see in B erk eley’s psychology a legitim ate advance in the direction of H um e’s sensationalistic analysis. C riticism : Im m anuel K an t (17 2 4 -18 0 4 ).— The prinripal problem of K an t is well set forth by the word used by him to indicate his method. He instituted a “ critique ” of the entire outcome of the m ind’s opera tions of knowledge (in the C ritique o f Pure Reason), practice (in the Critique of Practical Reason), and senti ment (in the Critique of /Esthetic Judgm ent) : reinen Vernunft, praktischen Vermin ft, and U rteilskraft. By Ibis criticism be endeavoured to distinguish the uni versal element contributed by the mind to its experi ence, from the particular elements which experience offers to the mind. Startin g from knowledge and

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practice as we find them, he asked : How is experience possible?— what are its factors?— what are the logical conditions on which any experience whatever can arise? H is general result is that there are formal elements in all experience which cannot arise from the combina tion of mental contents, sensations, and ideas, mechanic ally combined by association ; that is, there are elements which are not in themselves experiential or a posteriori. On the contrary, by these forms which are peculiar to thought as such, and a priori, the chaotic m aterials of knowledge are organised and become intelligible, good, and beautiful. All experience, in order to have mean ing, must be ordered in ccrtain categories natural to the mind its e lf; and it is the function of criticism to point out these categories or a priori forms severally and in detail. To these forms he applies the term “ transcendental,” as opposed to the empirical contents, which are “ phenomenal.” He investigates sense-perception in the section on “ transcendental aesthetic,” discovering the forms of space and time, which belong respectively to the “ outer s e n s e ” and the “ inner s e n s e ” ; and thought, in the “ transcendental a n a ly tic ” and “ dialectic,” discovering the categories of logical process (Verstand) and the transcendental “ ideas of the re a so n ” ( Vernunft), God, freedom, and imm ortality. Sim ilarly, he finds in the practical life the a priori form of duty, the categorical im perative; and in the life of sentiment the norms of aesthetic judgment, which are the form s of appreciation or “ ta ste .” All these transcendental elements of knowledge, action, and appreciation are present in experience, organising the manifold of unordered data into a world o f actual phenomenal objects. They do not have any

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further application; since “ reason without sense is empty, as sense without reason is blind.” The sup posed real world, the world an sich, independent of experience, although postulated by the reason, remains ;i “ thought-w orld,” noum enal as opposed to pheno menal, inaccessible, unknown. Thus the ideas of the reason, God, freedom, imm ortality, remain mere postu lates or demands, instruments of organisation, so far as the reason is concerned. The attempt to apply them to a “ noum enal” world leads to insoluble contradictions the “ antinomies of the pure reason.” I his limitation upon the application of the forms of knowledge applies equally to the inner world, to the r||. Know ledge stops with the empirical or pheno m en al s e l f ; it does not reach the noumenal ego. The a priori form s are such only in the structure of know ledge, of which they are the logical conditions; they do not justify the assertion of a substantial self, any more than that of a substantial world. I'he process of “ transcendental apperception” — K a n t’s rendering of the synthetic and reflective func tion, called by Leibnitz “ apperception ” — does not escape 1 lie degradation to phenomenalism, due to its operation upon experiential data. The two sides of experience, the known world and the known self, coalesce in the one organised experience. On the right, but inacces sible, is a postulated real w o rld ; on the left, equally inaccessible, is a postulated real self. K now ledge is powerless to reach either the one or the other. In this conclusion as to the nature and limitations oI knowledge, K an t is both a powerful antagonist and a powerful ally of David Hume. His criticism 1—assum ing its validity— refutes the sensational and associalional theory of knowledge, simply by reverting, when

MODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y

all is said, to the “ inner se n se ” of Locke, a native function. But Kant differs from Locke in denying- that the inner sense, or the outer either, reaches reality as such. The a priori principles of organisation are not causal or ontological grounds of objective construction, but merely its logical conditions. In this he brings logical justification to the agnosticism , present but undeveloped, in the sensationalism of Hume. If K ant had stopped, a s -Hume did, with the theory of cognition, he would have stood before the world, instead of the latter, as the father of modern agnosticism . So far as experience itself is concerned, however, the inner sense, a subjective principle of apperception, is reinstated as over against all mechanical explanations of the composition of experience, both inner and outer alike. Here the two idealists, K ant and Berkeley, a g re e ; logical criticism joins hands with psychological subjectivism . And the development of modern idealism in its various form s, proceeding from this point, is made possible. This is the gain, at any rate, accru ing to psychology from K a n t’s criticism of the pure reason. T o the form of the practical reason, the categorical imperative, K an t attributes a different value. In the practical life, the ideas of the reason find their further justification. In the absolute imperative of duty, the postulates of God, freedom, and im m ortality, are found to be “ constitutive,” not merely “ re g u la tiv e ” ; and a world of values is revealed, absolute in character. In this w ay a sort of moral idealism, a Socratic justifica tion of the true by the good, issues from the Kantian critiqu es; a justification not in a relative, pragm atic, or utilitarian, but in an absolute sense, since the good is the moral ideal, which with Kant, as with Plato, is

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absolute. The soul as a reality is characterised as a Iree and immortal agent. The third of the K antian critiques, the Critique of Judgm ent (meaning- judgm ent of appreciation, aesthetic in character), is less developed than the other two, but in the outcome it adds an important thought. The opposition found to exist between reason and practice does not amount to a theoretical contradiction. Reason is purely logical in its character and phenomenal in its I unction, while practice, although phenomenal in fact, is absolute in its ideal. How, it may be asked, can the universal ideal of conduct be guaranteed any more than I he universal postulate of truth? If the former has application beyond experience, why has not the latter also? In the Critique of Ju dgm en t, K ant finds, or at least intimates, a mode of reconciliation of logic and practice, of theoretical and practical reason, in the domain of feeling. Putting the m atter in our own terms, which develop the idea K an t seems to have had rather obscurely in mind, we may explain as follows. The purely formal postulates of the cheoretical reason represent an ideal of organisation of contents or truths — a logical ideal— which, in view of its purely regulative character, as means and not end, has no right to go beyond phenomena : this in so far justifies the result of the Critique o f P u re R eason. On the other hand, the formal postulate of the practical reason, the cate gorical im perative, represents a teleological ideal, not a logical one : it is an end, not a means. This in so far justifies the outcome of the Critique of Practical Ifeason. But the further question arises, how can the ideal end of the practical reason receive any content whereby it may become after all more than a formal

M ODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y

principle? The answ er is that it can lose its formal character and become the ideal Good only as it is informed by the intelligence. This K an t agrees to. The practical ideal justifies the theoretical, the good supports the tru e; but it is for the sake of and because of the good. The true becomes absolute because an intelligible good requires that it should be so. God, free dom, immortality, postulated by practice, are informed •with m eaning by the intelligence. Is there, it m ay be asked, any more intrinsic bond between the true and the good, between the theoretical and the practical reason, than this? And this is also to ask : Is there any bond between the form al or a priori as such, which the reason legislates, and the concrete facts and motives of life which sensible experience contains? The more intrinsic bond in both these senses is to be found in the domain of feelin g; this is what is intimated by K ant in the Critique o f Ju dgm en t— the judgment of taste or appreciation. In appreciation, felt and judged, the universal loses its purely logical character, as mere rule of organisation, through the reinstatement, in im aginative or “ sem blant” form, of something concrete. The good, likewise, loses its purely teleological character as formal ideal of the will. Both become “ as-if-actual ” in the realisation that the ju dg ment of appreciation discloses, according to its own rule of taste. The ideal of beauty is that of the immediate realisation of values of both so rts; and in the postulate of complete and final aesthetic fulfilment, the opposition between the ideals of intelligence and will, no less than that between particular and universal, is overcom e.1 1 Although to say that this can be rendered in “ judgm ent."

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If K ant had worked this fully out, his kinship wuth Plato would have become more apparent. Plato also sought for the real union of the true and the good in love and contemplation, affective in character. Both were in this sense pancalists.1 In Plato this issues iu Ihe absolute, while in K ant it secures merely the objective thing (not the thing in itself) of our im agin a tive faculty, which is disinterested and common to all individuals. It is worth while to bring out this neglected and in itself undeveloped side of the Kantian philosophy; for it is of high psychological interest. K ant opposed the psychologising tendencies of Locke and Hume, claim ing himself to take up the purely logical point of view of considering experience as a system of organised objective data. He distinguished the problem of the origin of knowledge from that of its validity. This <Iid very well for the pure reaso n ; and the method w as in the main consistently maintained by him. But in the criticism of the norms of the practical reason a departure is noticeable in the direction of a hospitality to other than logical, to moral and psychological, grounds of validity.. In the critique of aesthetic ju d g ment the lapse from grace is complete. The judgment of taste is studied largely as a psychological process; it proceeds according to an a priori rule or norm, but it is not submitted to the rules of the concepts of the understanding. The “ harmony ” of the aesthetic object is due to the harmony or full agreem ent of the faculties. strictly speaking-, is in a w ay to let in the nose of the logical camel again. 1 A term suggested by the present writer, Thought and Things, Vol. I ll, Chap. X V , for the developed view of this type. See the account o f the more explicitly pancalistic views of Schelling, below. VOL

II.

2f>

MODERN P S Y C H O L O G Y

In the result, the gain to psychology— or to “ anthro pology,” as K a n t would put it— is mainly in the treat ment of the non-intellectual functions, will, moral ju dg ment, and aesthetic appreciation. The Critique of Pure Reason, which contains the discussion of knowledge, is so run through with logical classifications and dis tinctions, and so permeated with ex parte argum enta tion, that psychology proper profits little from it. For example, the table of categories of the intelligence, showing symmetrical four-times-three headings, follows from the fourfold distinction of attributes of judgment — quantity, quality, relation, and m odality—of the scholastic lo g ic .1 Sim ilarly, the argum ents cited to prove the a priori character of space are deductive and lacking in experi ential basis. K an t says that space is the native form in which alone the perception of extended objects is possible, because while we can think of space from which all objects have been removed, we cannot think of objects from which space as extension is removed. But why may not empty space be an abstract concept drawn from the property of extension in objects, the extension which, according to D escartes, was— for much the same reason as this of K ant— the very essence of body? D escartes maintained this on the ground that while other properties of external objects were relative, 1 This tendency appears in high light in K an t’s attempt to correlate the three fundamental functions, intellect, feeling, ;;nd will, with the three stages in the process of formal thinking as recognised in logic—concept (term), judgment (proposition), and conclusion. The concept corresponded to intellect, and the con clusion to will (seeing that will is merely formal, having no rational content); and judgment, being the only function left over, must correspond to feeling. It is on such grounds as this that Kant's third Critique is called K ritik der Urteilskra/t. See Bernard's translation of the Critique of Judgment, Introduction (1892).

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the spatial properties were necessary to the conception body as such. K an t’s argum ent would apply equally to colour. W e • an not think of empty space without some colour—■ grey, white, black, or what not. Colour must, then, he an a priori form of the external sense. Kant entrenched the faculty-psychology more firmly by his sharp distinctions of sense, intelligence, and reason. These remind us of the different sculs, or " p a r t s ” of the soul, of Plato. Sense gives order to objects in space and time, intelligence relates them in synthetic categories, and reason imposes the regulative ideals of all knowledge. And yet with all this formal apparatus, K an t also finds functional motives at work. I lc follows Tetens in the distinction of intellect, feeling, and will— the beginning of the modern threefold classi fication of the mental functions. Intellect and will refer to objects, feeling to the se lf.1 lie broadened the definition of apperception to include the synthesis effected a priori in perception; and he used the term "in n er s e n se ” 2 for the functional aspect of conscious ness as a whole. K a n t’s teaching in regard to im agination (Einbildim gskraft), obscure as it is, shows his more direct psychological instinct at work. Im agination, he says, plays a part between perception and thought, throwing I he manifold of sense, by a sort of first synthesis, into "sch em ata ” for the w ork of the intelligence. He takes dI

1 Tetens had distinguished intellect and will, as “ active,” from feeling, as “ passive.” This writer also distinguished sensation mi the Kantian sense (Empftndlichkeit) as referring to an object. Iroin feeling. In the Anthropology. Y e t by the inner sense, Kant also some times means the mere ordering of the phenomena of self-con•a iousness in time (so in the transcendental aesthetic).

MODERN PS Y C H O L O G Y

up, that is, the point made by the m ystics of the R enaissan ce.1 This is, as we have pointed out elsew here,2 sufficiently close to the newer view of the im agination— considered as the function that entertains assumptions and hypo theses, suggests alternatives and proposes suggestions, preliminary to the formation of judgm ents— to justify the adoption of K a n t’ s term “ schema ” (with “ schema tise ” ) for this very vital function of cognition. In the Critique of Ju dgm ent, also, K ant gives the imagination the all-important place in aesthetic production, as Aristotle had done. W ith it all, however, we must say that nothing short of the abandonment of the ultra-logical point of view could have integrated these and other bits of good psychology in the Kantian system. K an t explicitly declared that a positive science of psychology was impossible. He contended that the matter w as not amenable to mathematical treatment, and also that the relative and mobile character of mental states precluded exact observation. W e cannot observe an emotion without altering it. M oreover, the flow of mental process has only one dimension, its order in time. On the whole, we may observe that K a n t’s mind w as so filled with the fact of unity in all the mind’s products, especially in the objects of knowledge, and so convinced of the inadequacy of the mechanical explanations of the associationists, that he detected synthesis ev eryw h ere: synthesis logical and psycho1 See above, Vol. I, Chap. V II. 2 In Thought and Things, Vol. I, Chap. V III, and Vol. II throughout. The w ork o f Meinong, Uber Anvahm en, also emphasises this r6le of imagination, placing it, as Kant dees, between perception and judgment.

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logical, synthesis a priori and a posteriori, the syntheses effected by different faculties often duplicating one another. This gives him his place in history. He offered a new method and made fruitful co-ordinations which were made use of by his successors in a more constructive and synthetic idealism. H is theory of know ledge revives A ristotle’s doctrine of m atter and fo rm ; but he applied it to organised experience instead of to vital organism s. T h is is in itself a suggestive com mentary on the progress of the subjective and logical points of view. The F a ith P h ilo so p h y : Ja c o b i.— The extrem es reached by Spinoza and K ant in rationalistic absolutism and scepticism , respectively, were the signal for a return to feeling. A movement spran g up, sim ilar to the earlier developments in the direction of mysticism after periods of abstract logical thought— the early Greek M ystics, the Neo-Platonists, the German M ystics, those of the Renaissance. K a n t’s destructive criticism of logical dogm atism , L u th er’s return to justification by faith, the prevalence of quietistic and pietistic view s, the reaction of the Rom an Church to authority, in opposition to the Reform ation— all conspired to produce a doctrine of immediate knowledge or intuition in opposition to mediate and discursive reason. This doctrine found its exponent in F . H . Jaco bi (17 4 3 -18 19 ), a late contem porary of K ant. In him it issued in a conscious and critical attempt to justify faith, both as a substitute for rational or conceptual knowledge and as a method of philosophising, in the place of argum entation. As to the first of these, Jacobi declares that there can be no other outcome for rational philosophy than that of Spinoza, which is atheistic; and

M ODERN P S YC H O L O G Y as to the second, that there is no result from the use of argument save materialism. He attempts positively to define and justify faith as an organ of apprehension. It is immediate, not m ediate; an act, not a process. Both sensible fact and supersensible reality are known immediately by faith. Faith may be produced through argum ent, and aroused by im agination; but it is different from both of these : it renders its results by a necessity of feeling. Later on in life Jacob i identified faith with the pure reason ( Vermin ft), interpreting this, however, as feel ing. He used the term intuition (AnscJiauung) for this mode of apprehension through feeling, and so made himself a forerunner of the Scottish 1 and other later philosophers of intuition.2 The faith philosophy, called “ fideism ,” is noteworthy as an effort to ju stify feeling as an organ of immediate know ledge.3 It does not attempt, with the older mysticism, to utilise feeling as exemplified in trance states merely, as the vehicle of aspiration and religious enthusiasm. On the contrary, it sees in faith a normal and universal mental attitude. In this it affords a further step— as the theory of imagination in Aristotle and the Renaissance mystics was one step, and the theory of practical reason in K ant, with which Jacobi 1 The intuitions of the mind are described in J. M cCosh's Realistic Philosophy as “ primitive beliefs.” 2 “ The understanding-," says Jacobi, “ produces notions, of notions, from notions,” in a passage written quite in the spirit of the most modern a-logism. 3 “ There is a light in my heart, but it goes out whenever I attempt to bring it into the understanding. . . . Which of these two is the true lum inary? . . . Can the human spirit grasp the truth unless it possesses these two luminaries united in one light ? ” — Quoted from Jacobi by Schwegler, History of Philosophy in Epitome, Eng. trans. (1886), p. 318.

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himself connects his own view, w as a second— towards a psychological and experiential doctrine of intuition. W e may say that the stream which embodied the affective motive— arising in prim itive psychology and in the Greek and Oriental m ysteries, and entering into philosophy in the divine Love of Plato— divided itself into two currents. One of these kept to the direct methods of absorption, ecstasy, negation of thought in pure feelin g; the other showed a grow in g effort to justify feeling, along with, or in competition with, intellect and will, as an organ of the apprehension of reality. In Jacobi, the latter assum es the form of a reasoned affectivism , and takes its stand, along with intellectualism and voluntarism , as an alternative of reflection. In the new interest in aesthetics and the gro w in g enthusiasm for fine art, born of Romanticism and appearing at its highest in Goethe, Schiller, and L e ss ing, another current of affective psychology 1 w as also gathering force. It w as present in the same generation in the pancalistic suggestions of K a n t’s Critique of Judgm ent, already spoken of, and reappears, as we sh all see, in Schelling and Lotze. 1 See this heading in Chapter V I, below in this volume.

Part

N IN E T E E N T H

CEN TU RY C h a p te r

PSYCH O LO G Y

III.

Prelim inary Survey—Philosophical Psychology since Kant. Prelim inary S u rv e y .— The nineteenth century has been called the “ century of science.” This is pre-eminently true, for the physical sciences proper— physics, chem istry, and astronom y— came into their experimental heritage only in the first half of the ce n tu ry ; and the biological sciences— zoology, botany, and physiology— acquired their independent position on receiving the impulse of the evolution theory in the second half. The motives already pointed out as naturalism and positiv ism came slowly into operation. The form er involved the recognition of natural law in all the phenomena observed, and the latter the adoption of a strictly observational and experimental method. In the bio logical sciences the latter step was impossible as long as the “ special crea tio n ” theory of species w as enter tained, m aking use, as it did, of logical principles of classification, and im plying a philosophy of uncritical vitalism . The same influences held back the science of psychology— in this case strengthened by the tradi tional claim of philosophical speculation to solve the problem of the soul. 32

P R ELIM IN A R Y

SURVEY

The nineteenth century opened at a natural pause in the development of theories about the mind. In the How of the great currents, certain eddies had formed late in the eighteenth century. The dogm atic move ment in Germany had passed over into the critical; and K ant had attempted a new aesthetic reconciliation of the dualisms of “ reason and practice,” and “ inner and outer.” The Kantian psychology or anthropology is essentially a renewed subjectivism — that is, so far as it is critical. Neither scientific naturalism , nor posi tivism in the sense defined above, profited greatly from the w ork of K ant. Indeed, the explicit attempt to refute Hume, in the spirit of the logical critique, throws the w eight of K ant as authority— to go no deeper— on the side of an obscurantist attitude toward facts. H is torically, also, K ant led the w ay to what has been called the “ romantic movement ” from Fichte to Hegel. In F ries and Beneke a reaction sprang up in the direction of the empirical observation of consciousness.1 A gain , in France an impulse was asserting itself aw ay from the materialism of the sensationalists toward the frank and vital naturalism of J . J . Rousseau. R o u s sea u ’s return to the mental life, in all its fulness and immediacy, involved a truer naturalism than the view which ignored the significance of ideas and of the emotional functions in favou r of sense-processes. . In England a science of psychology w as clearly em erging at the opening of the nineteenth century. Locke had broached his subjective naturalism , which the French sensationalists, as we have seen, developed on one side only. Hobbes w as a positivist, in much the same sense for our purposes as Auguste Comte later on. 1 On these two men see the notices given in Dessoir, loc. cit., pp. i So ft'.

N IN E T EE N T H

CENTURY

PSYCHOLOGY

But it w as in David Hume that the two requirements of a true science of psychology were consciously present. Hume treats mind as a part of nature : this is natural ism ; and he also w orks at the problem of discovering the law s of mental change by actual observation : this is positivism. In both he is justified by his resu lts; he is further justified by his extraordinary historical influence. If, then, we are justified in saying that D avid Hume is one parent of the positive science of psychology— in the sense of the word that places this subject in line with the other natural sciences, both as to its material and as to its method— then we have to look for the other parent to France. D ropping the figure, we may say that Rousseau in France started an essential movement in the development of the science, vagu e and difficult of definition as R o u sseau ’s personal influence is. P os sibly, for reasons to be stated later on, this contribution should be called the Rousseau-Com te facto r; as possibly, also, the British contribution should be called the Locke-H um e factor. The influence of the Rousseau-Com te factor, to-day more undeveloped than the other but show ing itself constantly more fertile, may be shown by a further appeal to the analogy with the individual’s grow th in personal self-consciousness. As an intimation of my meaning, I may refer to the Rousseau-Com te m otif as the social or “ collective,” and the Locke-H um e m otif as the personal or “ individual.” T ak in g up the genetic parallel, we may rem ark that the positive method applied by Locke, Hume and the Mills in an individualistic sense, proved itself to be an inadequate instrument for the interpretation of the psychic m aterial; since it not only neglected— and still

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neglects— the social side of life, but by so doing dis torted the normal individual mind. In the development o f the individual the thought of a separate personal “ s e l f ” is a late outcome of reflection. The early stages of dualistic thought are thoroughly social. The mind-body dualism is an abstraction in both its term s; “ mind ” means many minds, and “ b o d y ” many bodies. The m aterial of self is, in its origin, collective, not indi vidual. The immature child thinks of the self as a term in a social situation, as part of a larger whole. If this is true, the science of mind must be one in which the concept of an isolated individual mental life is used as a logical abstraction, as an instrument of method rather than as a truth of analysis and explana tion. Psychology should be a science in which the material is, so to speak, social rather than individual. Th is point has been worked out only in recent litera ture, and still only inadequately; but we may find the source of this type of collectivism in the French thinkers, Rousseau and Comte. Besides these two great movements, credited respect ively to G reat Britain and France, modern naturalistic psychology has felt other important impulses. One of these came about the middle of the century in the rise of the evolution theory, and from the side of biological science; another from German beginnings, and from the side of physical science. I shall speak of these respectively under the headings of Genetic Psychology, its pioneers being Lam arck and D arw in, and Mathe matical and Experim ental Psychology, founded by the G erm ans, H erbart, Fechner and L otze.1 1 An interesting work on the German group is G. S. Hall's .Founders of Modern Psychology, 1912. See also Ribot’s German Psychology of To-Day.

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T h is properly scientific movement, however, did not supersede or discredit— for the philosophers at least— the rational type of interpretation. A new series of speculations, constituting- the romantic movement fol lowing K ant, dominated German thought, and pene trated, in the form of N eo-H egelianism , into England and the United S ta te s.1 W hile the empirical and posi tivist movements of the nineteenth century have hall m arks of Franco-British origin, the new m etaphysics of thought bears the label “ made in G erm an y.” W hile these national distinctions are interesting, they cannot be made the headings of historical treatm en t; for it w as the nineteenth century that saw the true internationalisation of science. W e will, then, revert to the more intrinsic factors, using the national distinc tions only incidentally, in treating of the nineteenth century development (not, however, alw ays under these formal headings, which belong rather to the philo sophical schools as such). I. Philosophical P sychology since K a n t— 1. Post-Kantian Idealism and Voluntarism . 2. Spiritualism , Realism , and Dualism . 3. The New Monism and Agnosticism (touched upon incidentally only). 4. Contemporary Immediatism : /Estheticism and Intuitionism (touched upon incidentally). II. Scientific Psychology in the Nineteenth C entury, com prising— 1 In England it produced an extensive school—Green, Caird, Bosanquet, B ra d le y ; in Am erica its most prominent repre sentatives are W. T. H arris and John Watson.

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1. A s to Method : Positive. a. Descriptive. b. Constructive. c. Genetic. 2. As to Subject-m atter : Naturalistic. a. Physiological and Experim ental Psycho logy. b. Animal and Com parative Psychology. c. Social Psychology. d. Affective, E s th e t ic , and other Contem porary M ovements. I. Philosophical P sychology since K a n t.— The flood of speculation immediately follow ing Kant tended to sub vert the empirical and scientific treatment of the mind. In this movement, however, the concept of the soul, considered as the self or “ e g o ,” underwent certain transform ations. The recognition of reason as the synthetic and absolute principle asserted itself with variations in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The pre-eminence assigned to the practical reason, bv the author of the Critiques, led to the development of voluntarism in Schopenhauer and von Hartm ann. In Schleiermacher and Schelling we see the affective motive stru gglin g to assert itself. W e have space only to single out the essential psychological conception of each of these philosophers, and state it in a few sentences.1 F ich te, J . G. (17 6 2 -18 14 ), asserted the immanent, active, and teleological character of the self. It is immanent in all the empirical processes of the mind. T h is led to a rejection of the faculty conception of the 1 Am ong general works, Hoffding’s History of Philosophy, Vol. II, is a late and able exposition.

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mental powers, a functional conception being enter tained in its stead ; to the rejection of the association of ideas as adequate to explain the organisation of mental contents, an active synthetic process being sub stituted for i t ; and to the introduction of the genetic idea, interpreted in the sense of a teleological move ment. The progress of mind w as considered as the active w orking out of the absolute self-consciousness. But this absolute self-consciousness is not in d ividu al; it is universal, B ew u sstsein iiberhaupt. Its movement includes nature as a whole. Nature is a manifestation of free creative self-consciousness. Im A n fang war die Tat. The personal soul owes its individual char acter to the accidental nature of the relation of mind and body. The history of mental development is that of a series of oppositions between the self and the notself, or “ other,” which the self posits. The other is a limitation set up over against self-expansion and selfrealisation. This opposition shows itself in a series of stages issuing out of the unconscious— sensation, intui tion, im aging, thought, and reason. In the active life there is a similar series of stages, from blind impulse up to free and absolute will. Body is the form which the lim iting “ o th e r” takes on at the stage of senseintuition. The original term, the jons ct origo of all, is action, will. Fichte substitutes “ I act ” for the “ I th in k ” of D escartes and the “ I fe e l” 1 of Hume. In this we discern a psychological doctrine which allows for the results of observation and com prises a genuine genetic movement in the development of con sciousness ; but only, it is true, as the outcome of the rational presuppositions of absolute voluntarism. It has been called a psychology “ from above,” as that 1 Understood as “ I sense,” or “ I have a sensation.”

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of the m aterialists is a psychology “ from below .” Mental processes are not observed, in the first instance, as facts, as scientific d a ta ; but as illustrations and evidences of the movement of a metaphysical principle of reality. A s to its historical antecedents, we find here a renewal of the voluntarism of St. Augustine and Duns Scotus, and the development of the suggestion contained in the Critique of Practical Reason. The same holds of the psychological views of Schel ling and Hegel. They interpreted psychological pro cesses heroically, romantically ; life is an incident in the epic of the Absolute. Sch ellin g, F . W . J . (17 7 5 -18 5 4 ), places greater em phasis on the evolution of nature, which is a sort of prehistoric chapter in the history. Unconscious spirit (Seele) has not yet passed into free and conscious mind (Geist) : it slumbers in nature. The inorganic lias in it the principle of self-consciousness, which goes on to be realised as consciousness in the organic and in man. The series of stages in the development of the mental principle are, with minor variations, those pointed out by Fichte. The outcome of the id eological process of self-con sciousness is, however, for Schelling, not thought or will, but their union in aesthetic construction and con templation. Schelling carries further the hint given by K an t in the U rteilskrajt, and which we have described above, using the term “ pancalism .” Art production to Schelling unites the theoretical motives of science and logic with the practical motives of life and conduct. Artistic creation goes beyond the mere reproductive and schem atising im agination, and produces a work which fulfils at once all the partial ideals of the more special functions of the self. In it the oppositions of

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nature and mind, self and not-self, are overcome. Schelling- gives to this a?sthetic reconciliation an onto logical value, rather in the spirit .of Plato than in that of the experiential objectivity of K a n t.1 In brief, Schelling teaches the radically functional nature of mental process. The inner life is a ceaseless movement of change, becoming (IV erden ). T o this process the movement of the absolute self-consciousness gives teleological character : here is the refutation of all mechanical analogies and explanations. The con summation of the process, for psychology, is the pro duction and appreciation of art. In H egel, G. IV. F . ( 17 7 0 -18 3 1), psychology both gains and loses ground. It loses by the development of absolutism into a theory of an impersonal rational principle. Mind interpreted as thought (G eist) objecti fies itself in the world, and shows itself subjective in the individual mind. Objective mind, subjective mind, and absolute mind are the forms that the one principle takes on in the course of its evolution. F o r the inter pretation of human history and natural history alike, a dialectical process of thought replaces the empirical law s of nature and mind. The saying of Schelling that 1 D essoir (loc. cit., p. 65 f.) gives a full note on this position of Schelling; he s a y s : “ The theoretical and the practical, reason and sense, nature and mind, unconscious and conscious, lose their oppositions in art, which is the highest activity o f the self. Above and beyond theoretical knowledge and practical need is the spiritual enioyment o f beauty, just as beyond both forms of striving, the artistic phantasy proceeds, a heavenly faculty, which has nothing in common with the prosaic ‘ imagination ’ of the old psychology." In the present w riter’s volume, Interest and Art (Vol. I ll of Thought and Things), a detailed research is insti tuted in the psychology of the aesthetic experience, and the results are interpreted in an empirical pancalistic theory (to be developed in Vol. IV) which gives support to these speculative conclusions of Schelling. Cf. also The Psychological Review, M ay 1908.

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tlu* phenomenal event or law of consciousness is “ only the monument and re co rd ” (D cnkm al and Dokum ent) of )lie real, is literally carried out in the theory of I Icgel. Psychology loses by this in the sense that rational oppositions and logical rules are read into all the processes of the mind : the event means thought, whether or not it show s itself to be thought. The lower func tions, even those of sense, are interpreted as embodying potentially, if not in actual form ; implicitly, if not explicitly— the character of logical process. Feelin g to 1Icgel, as to Leibnitz, is a mode of obscure knowledge. I his tendency has been brought out, free from all am biguity, in the w ritings of the Neo-H egelian school in England, led by T . H. Green of O xford, who makes the essence of the real a “ standing in relations ” which are constituted by thought as well as cognised by it. I Ye-logical consciousness is informed with self-con st iousness-. Sensation is immature thought.1 On this view , a genuine evolution, a creative evolu tion, in the historical development of the mind or in tli.it of nature, is impossible. There can be merely a “ becom ing,” which means a becom ing explicit, an m erg c ia already assumed to be present in dunamis. Hut psychology gained through the work of H egel as compared with that of Fichte. The very abstractness .iii*l absoluteness of H e g e l’s principle of thought renders it com paratively innocuous. Like Spinoza’s substance, being incapable of definition, it is susceptible of all pos sible predications. A notion that becomes infinitely thin in intension becomes also infinitely broad in exten 1 The works of Edw ard Caird in philosophy and o f Hobhouse In psychology show this rationalising o f the low er functions of t miNcioiisness. V O L.

II.

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sion. T h is shows itself en germ e in H egel’s psychology as well as in his exposition of history. He w orks out, in the Phenom enology of M ind,1 a genetic psychology in the sense of the schemes of Fichte and S ch ellin g; but it is more free from the intrusion of rationalistic assum p tions. He is able to recognise the results of empirical research— the law s of association, the modes of origin and development of thought, etc.— since the presupposi tions of the entire movement are not m aterial, but formal and teleological.2 Once acknowledge that, w hatever may happen, thought is realising itself by an inner dialectical law of its own nature— and anything may happen ! 3 Hegel himself was more hospitable to scientific and positive psychology than are m any of his followers, who are unable to tolerate the suggestion of an actual empirical derivation of the forms of thought. W ith them, as with Fichte and Schelling, thought has not entered into its full Hegelian heritage of abstractness. N evertheless, H egel held that such a psychology, anthropological and phenomenal, w as in no sense ex planatory.4 The teleological movement of thought, 1 H egel, Die Phenomenologie des Geistes. 2 Schelling, on the contrary, considered the soul as material, no less than formal and final cause (cf. Harms, loc. cit., p. 360) of the entire cosmic process, of which it became the “ microcosmus," a picture of the whole. 3 If in accordance with the famous saying of H egel, Sein gleicht Nichts, “ being equals nothing," then no “ something,” 110 pheno menal fact, can contradict being:. But this is to say that, for scientific and psychological purposes, the pure Hegel equals Hume. This tendency of absolutism to become abstract appears in later forms of voluntarism also (as in Rickert and Munsterberg), in which full dominion over the world of fact is given to science, the philosophical reservation o f an absolute value not interfering with it. 4 Anthropologic was for H egel the science of the mind as inter preting the first level, that o f feeling, which included all that

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through the entire series of modes of mental process, is lot him the only explanation. No third alternative exists between the purely mechanical and the teleologi cal interpretations. The theory of radical evolution, according to which novelties may be produced, new genetic creations, in the course of a purely natural movement of development, w as not then in evidence, lo lle g e l and his followers form al cause— u sing the terms of Aristotle— is necessarily associated with final i m sc. The only explanatory psychology to lle g e l w as lh.it which deals with the third and highest stag e of mental development, the stage of freedom, which is the synthesis of idea and will. In this the absolute prini iple of thought, the immanent cause of the entire movement, achieves its end. In the modern psychology of “ form-cjuality ” and "co m p lex es,” 1 however, and in the recent development n| genetic logic, the problems of the nature and origins o! form are isolated from those of finality. In biology, .11 so, morphology is no longer committed in advance to ,i id eological view of the life-process. So also in the opposition ” made the motive of advance from mode to mode of mental life in the H egelian dialectic, we may teeliug might imply individually and in racial culture (the mind in its relation to body). Pkenomenologie w as the theory of mind m i tin* second stage, that of “ subjective mind,” i.e ., conscious..... . together with its explicit mode self-consciousness, and the Inn iions of intelligence, knowledge, and reason. The third stage, ill ii of freedom, is tlie matter of Psychologic, as is noted further on in tho text. Over against all this, the history o f “ subjective ii i n n I , there is that o f “ objective mind,” active in nature and • mhoilied in social institutions, in morality, in the state, etc. Th i . illy, we come to “ absolute mind,” realising itself in art and irli^ion, and in their synthesis in absolute knowledge. This last !'. t lie domain of the free development of science and philosophy. 1 Developed by the Austrian school of psychologists in recent \ . os. See Hoffer, Psychologie. D 2

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sec a formal rendering of the experiences of em barrass ment, perplexity and urgency of adaptation, made much of in the modern genetic theories. In short, H e ge l’s psychology presents to us a sort of shadowy, abstract and formal simulacrum of the posi tive genetic movement of the mental life. It permits science, but it hardly advances it. The kinship of H e g e l’s genetic view to A ristotle’s is p la in 1 ; but to many minds there is no question that the latte r’ s bio logical interpretation of the relation of matter and form is more fruitful than the purely logical one of Hegel. Throughout this, the heroic period of German specula tion, certain psychological points of view were inci dentally placed in evidence. The genetic conception came to supersede the theory of faculties in both its form s, critical and dogm atic. The conception of the one ultimate and irreducible psychic function replaced the notion of an original “ elem ent” or content. For Fichte, this function w as w ill; for Schelling, synthetic intuition or feelin g; for H egel, thought. Thus the alter natives of later functional theory were all suggested— those of intellectualism, voluntarism and affectivism. The theory of unconscious mind anticipated later view s, both psychological and metaphysical. M oreover, the teleological conception went with the functional, in opposition to the mechanical and struc tural. In this the modern issue between apperceptionism, in its various form s, and prescntationism , also in many form s, was clearly drawn. But these questions were not discussed for themselves. They were resolved incidentally in the development of deductive system s. Schleierm aclier, F . E . D . (176&-X834). Later German 1 Cf. the citation from H egel (Encyclopddie, Par. 378) made by Klemm, loc. cit., p. 70.

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views consisted largely of re-statements of these positions. Schleiermacher drew attention again to the actual con comitance of mind and body, and founded the distinction between receptive and active or “ spontaneous” func tions upon the physiological distinction between excitation and movement. In tracing the two sides of the mental life, knowledge and practice, he distinguished in each the aspect which refers to external objects from that which refers to the s e lf ; and under the latter head ing gave an important place to feeling and sentiment. Sentiment is the sphere in which the powers are no longer held to concrete objects, but establish the ideals of art, morals, and religion. A rt production is a free autotelic development on the side of the spontaneous powers. The analysis of religious emotion into feelings of dependence and feelings of awe or reverence has remained a contribution to the psychology of religion. In A rthur Schopenhauer (17S8--1860) the priority of w ill becomes fixed in a m etaphysical system of voluntar ism. Unconscious will is the active principle of nature. Intelligence enters into consciousness as an accom pani ment of brain organisation. It is only in E . von H a rt mann (1S42-19 0 6), however, that the voluntaristic theory allies itself positively with science, seeking sy s tematic confirmation of the presence of will in nature. 11 is found in the show of instinct and animal impulse throughout the living world. W ith von H artm ann, as with Schopenhauer, the doctrines of will and the uncon scious go hand in hand. Spiritualism in E n g la n d .— W hile in Germany the Kantian criticism dominated thought, being the weapon of the opposition to Hume, in England and France this opposition took on the form of a new spiritualism .

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The “ moral p h ilosoph y” of England, the “ natural realism ” of Scotland, and “ psychological volu ntarism ” of France, all made use of a spiritual concept of the mind. The soul w as a personal principle, not a mere bundle of states. The English moral philosophy took up the problem from the point of view of ethics, attem pting to point out the original springs of action and to define certain native “ in stin cts” and “ propensities.” T h is set a new fashion : it brought into disfavour the treatment of the moral life in a subordinate w ay and as secondary to the intellectual. The questions of the moral end, the moral motive and sanction, moral sym pathy, etc., suggested an investigation of passion and sentiment in all its range. In the w ritin gs of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, C larke, and Adam Smith this investigation w as con ducted with fruitful results for psychology no less than ethics. B y this exam ination of the practical and emo tional life the foundations were laid in psychology for the utilitarian and intuitional ethics. F o r both of these moral systems are empirical and psychological, in con trast with the rational and formal theories which had been developed in Germany. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbu ry ( 16 7 1I 7 I 3), met the adversary by a direct mental analysis. He showed, as again st Hobbes, that sensation was not the only source of know ledge; and as against the disciples of Hobbes, that all action w as not prompted by self-love. On the other hand, the analysis of sympathy and of the altruistic impulses by the utili tarian thinkers (Adam Smith, Bentham) carried on the tradition of self-love descended from Hobbes. In later utilitarianism (Spencer, L. Stephen) the moral impera tive w as grounded in habit and racial custom, by an

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analysis which made a beginning in the direction of social psychology. T he same interest in the practical life led to the dis tinction of the moral from the aesthetic and intellectual sentiments. Home pointed out the contemplative char acter of aesthetic enjoyment, by which it w as contrasted with the active movements of the p assio n s; and Hutche son worked out a theory of the beautiful. The resort to immediate intuition corresponded, in the intellectual life, to the recognition of these original instincts and tendencies in the affective life, practical and sentimental, and became, under the name of “ common sen se,” the catch-word of the Scottish school of spiritualistic dualists. Scottish N atural R ea lism .— The Scottish realists restored, in a sense, the “ faculty conception” in psy chology, by their doctrine of common sense or mental “ in stin ct” ; for the multiplication of the sources of original intuition, prim itive knowledge, direct appre hension, etc., closed the door to more thorough analysis, and left each “ p o w e r” or faculty standing on its own feet. The direct appeal to consciousness, however superficial the scrutiny of consciousness m ight be, came to have the value of finality. Only the most compelling results of preceding an alysis— such as the distinction between the prim ary and secondary qualities of matter— were reckoned with. The Scots gained a certain breadth and liberality of observation from th is; but at the cost of being led to take things for what they seem, and of running the risk of the pitfall of superficiality - the one crime in philosophy ! 1 1 It appears that the theological interest in natural realism and the philosophy o f common sense had much to do with their currency. Dogmatic spiritualism wTas the theory o f the soul

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Thomas R eid ( 17 10 -17 9 6 ), the founder of this school, has the significance of h avin g restored— for a consider able career— a dogm atic dualism. Psychology profited by this in that it aw oke from its dream of extreme sub jectivism . One immediate result was the further ex tension of the theory of association of ideas. In the w orks of Thom as Brown and D ugald Stew art, together with those of Jam es Mill and his son John Stuart Mill, not to go further, the law s of association were extended in detail to feelings and states of activity. It was brought out in the course of refined and fruitful analyses of the “ cognitive p o w e rs ” and “ motive p o w e rs ” — a two-fold classification of functions which restored that of Aristotle. Brown, treating association under the heading of “ su ggestio n,” made common elements of feeling the link between associated ideas. Later Associationism in E n g la n d .— Jam es M ill ( 17 7 3 1836) developed a system atic psychology on the basis of sensation, the single original mental elem ent; and association, the single principle of organisation, of which contiguity w as the fundamental form. In this Jam es Mill supported the sensationalism of Condillac with great breadth and accuracy of observation. S ir W illiam H am ilton (1788 -1856) 1 reduced the laws of association to one, that of “ redintegration ” ; the parts of an original whole tend to be re-integrated again, or restored to their original form , on being taught by Christian theology. This appears especially in the form in which philosophy and psychology were imported from Scotland to Am erica and maintained there up to about 1880. Noah Porter and Jam es McCosh were exponents of official psy chology in the Universities, and both were Reformed clergymen. 1 Hamilton’s erudition w as remarkable. His pages retain a further value by reason of their very full—if not alw ays accurate —historical summaries and citations.

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separately re v iv e d ; each part calls up other parts. This is substantially a repetition of the formula of Christian W olff. Hamilton, also, having- a knowledge of the German idealists, recognised more adequately than others of the Scottish school, to which he belonged, the subjective factors of perception and knowledge. In Jo h n Stuart M ill (18 0 6 -18 73) a new departure appears in British thought, inasmuch as in him the influence of Comte began to show itself. Stuart Mill absorbed the philosophical agnosticism of the Comtean view, and led the British Positivist m ovem ent; but his psychology failed— more than his logic and ethics— to absorb the social or collectivist motive with which the teaching of Comte w as informed. The influence of Stuart M ill upon English thought has been enormous -perhaps second only to that of Hume— but his posi tive theories are in the realms of scientific method and inductive logic, and of the utilitarian eth ics; not in that of psychology proper.1 F rench Spiritualism . —T h e movement in France took on at first a more original form than in England— that of a voluntarism proceeding upon the psychology of the active life. 1 It is a sorry fact for psychology in Britain that both the movements of philosophical thought by which speculative and practical interests have been recently directed—Comteism and Neo-Hegelianism—were foreign importations, which obscured for I In; time the clear British psychological vision and deadened its sound tradition. Only just now, after much travail, has psychology found a place in the universities, and it still lives on the crumbs that fall from the table of logic and metaphysics. It is extra ordinary that the country of Bacon, Locke, and Hume should not have been the first to welcome the experimental treatment of the mind. The empirical tradition in its descriptive form was, how ever, maintained by Bain and Shad worth Hodgson, both referred to again.

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Pierre Larom iguiere, M aine de Biran, and T. S. Jou ffroy analysed volition and found a prim itive “ sense of effort,” much in the sense of that pointed out by Locke. W ith this weapon they combated the sensationalistic analyses of Condillac and Berkeley, and opposed the prevalent agnosticism . Larom iguiere (17 5 6 -18 3 7 ) supplemented the narrower view of sensation by the recognition of feeling, which extended, as he said, to the consciousness of cognitive and volitional processes. He isolated “ feelings of rela tion ” and “ moral feelin g s.” The sense of mental activity resided in the attention, on the intellectual side, as well as in the original effort or impulse, on the volun tary side. It is in the attention that the cognitive processes of comparison and judgment take place. The beginning of the study of the attention by Con dillac and Larom iguiere is noteworthy. The attention is the citadel of spiritual and activity theories of mental process in modern psych ology; and it is astonishing that it remained so long outside the range of interest. Condillac interpreted the attention in terms of the inhibition of other sensations by the high intensity of the one attented to ; an anticipation of the “ intensity ” theory of attention as held to-day. Larom iguicre, on the contrary, asserted the active character of attention, giv in g the cue to later functional and “ motor ” theories. From these beginnings the role of attention has become one of the central problems of modern philosophical and descriptive psychology. Maine de Biran (1776 -18 24 ) followed with a definite psychological voluntarism . He proceeded from the Augustinian postulate volens sum, founding this intui tion upon the opposition felt in experiences of voluntary effort against resistance. He went further than Laro-

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m iguiere in developing- w h a t have been called the “ dynamic categories ” 1— force, cause, substance, etc. — from these original experiences of personal activity. This is, in its results, in sharp contrast with the Humian derivation of these i d e a s ; but it employs the weapons of Hume, since it reposes upon the activities w hich Hume summarised in his theory of habit. If w e say with Hum e that habit is that element by w hich psychic contents are bound together in unity and connection, then w e may g o on to a further analysis of habit on the functional side. T h is is the procedure of certain modern psychologists who agree with Hume that habit results in a solidification of c o n te n ts; by these psycholo gists, habit in turn is analysed into modes of synergy and assimilation in “ motor processes,” to which per haps the attention itself is originally due. In Jouffroy (1796-1842) a further development fol lowed, not so much in the w ay of increased system as in that of increased vitality, through the presence of a certain romanticism and impressionism. Jouffroy might be called the Rousseau of spiritualism, so similar is his call “ back to l i f e ” to that of the g r e a t thinker of Geneva. Both uttered the sentimental equivalent of the logical demand of the formalists, “ back to K a n t . ” And the tw o movements, sentimental and formal, stirred up the positive spirit of science in the person of A u g u ste Comte. T h e same spirit had been stirred up similarly in the person of Francis Bacon. In this interesting departure of French voluntarism, a contribution was made to psychology different from that made by the British moral philosophers, although they have points in common. Both emphasise the 1 C f. O r m o n d , The Foundations of Knowledge , C h a p s . V a n d V I I I , w h o c a r r ie s o u t th e s a m e s o r t o f a n a ly s is w ith g r e a t p o w e r.

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affective and volitional life, both su g g e s t functional con足 siderations over against structural, and each implies in a certain w a y a faculty theory. But the F rench de足 velopment w a s perhaps more profound and lasting in its influence, since it issued in points of view more im足 portant for psychology than those of natural instinct and common sense. T h e most fruitful result, indeed, of the moral-sense m ovement in E ngland w a s the layin g of the psychological foundation of u tilitarianism ; but this w a s a departure from the spiritualistic assumption in the direction of naturalism. In F ra n ce the period closed with an Eclecticism 1 which borrowed directly from the natural realism of Scotland. In France, too, as in England, this was made the ecclesiastical weapon against free thought. 1 I m p o s e d w ith a u t h o r it y u p o n o fficial F r e n c h t h o u g h t b y V i c t o r C o u s in a n d P a u l J a n e t un til th e r e b irth o f s p e c u la tio n in R e n o u v ie r .

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Scientific Psychology in the Nineteenth Century. General Points o f View. I. The Positive Method. — W e have now followed the development of the philosophical view s which arose in opposition to the naturalistic interpretation of the m i n d : the speculative theories of Germany, and the psychological theories of E n g la n d and France. The speculative theories allowed grea te r liberty to science as such, since they g a v e themselves to the interpreta tion of facts in a large r world-view, not to the observ ing or selecting of facts in the pursuit of special inter ests. On the other hand, such special interests— the interests of spiritualism, morals, theology— w ere con trolling in the E nglish and French m ovem en ts; and for that reason their opposition to a th o rough-go ing psychological naturalism w a s sharper and more persistent. Understanding that these special motives w ere in a large sense practical, w e m ay say that in France such practical interests, especially in their vested forms, ecclesiastical and political, suffered a destructive shock in the Revolution. A s a consequence, radically new possibilities of reconstruction w ere opened up in science as in other lines of endeavour. T he victory of psycho logical naturalism w as accordingly more rapid in France than in E ngland or G erm any. T he impulse given to thought in France by the subjectivism and romantic 54

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naturalism of Rousseau w a s lack ing elsewhere. If we lak e the theological interest as typical for our purposes, we are not slow to observe this national difference in high relief. In France, the theological bias and restraint were done a w a y with in scientific circles through the violent reaction from the Rom an Church to freeIb ought; and positive methods of reconstruction were in demand. T h e Church survived as a practical cult— a conventional and aesthetic instrument— not as a theory nor as a restraint upon thought. Positive solutions were sought for everyw here, even substitutes for the deposed theology. W itn e s s C o m t e ’s proposal of the R e lig ion of Humanity. In E ng land , G erm any and Am erica, however, the relative satisfaction of the need of freedom of mind and conscience, achieved in the Reformation, left the citadel of theological interest still standing and still manned by defenders to whom the spiritual attributes of the soul w ere dear. Consequently the spirited and sustained opposition in these countries to naturalistic conceptions which seemed to endanger this view of the soul. T h e biological sciences encountered it in the form of an alliance of theology with vitalism in the interest of te le ology ; and in the opposition made to D arw inism in the interest of the d og m a of “ special creation.” 1 H o w much the more did psychology have to fight its battles for a science of mind considered as a natural thing, found in the body, and subject to psycho-physical laws ! In Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-177 8 ) two motives 1 M r. A . W . B e n n m a k e s th e s u g g e s t i o n th a t it w a s a n a n a lo g o u s in flu e n c e , th e c u r r e n c y o f th e t h e o g o n y o f H e s io d , t h a t p r e v e n te d th e s p r e a d o f th e e v o lu tio n th e o r y a f t e r its e a r ly s t a r t a m o n g th e G r e e k s (History of A n cient Philosophy , p. 38).

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appear which are in a certain opposition to each other. T h e one is that of personal freedom, individualism, the larger naturalism of a full and unrestrained life. This is the dominant note of the “ liberty, equality, fra ternity,” of the French Revolution. It showed itself in the Emile and the Confessions. T h e second motive is a distinctly social and collectivistic one, represented in the Social Contract and the theory of the “ general w ill.” It is the latter of these motives, the social, that remained so long undeveloped. T o b rin g out its import w as, and is, the ta sk of later men. In Aup u stc Comte positivism of method reached its full statement. H e called lus first g r e a t work Cours de Philosophic positive, conceiving philosophy as the systematisation of “ p o s i t i v e ” or experimental science. N othing beyond this, no metaphysics 1 as such, w a s possible. Philosophy being thus limited to the recognition of those sciences in which an experimental method could be employed, psychology considered as an independent science w a s excluded . 2 C om te did not intend, however, to exclude the facts of p s y c h o l o g y ; he only insisted on their b eing referred to a science in which the positive method w a s possible. T h is led.him to objectivism the i n n e r w o rld for s c i e n t i f i c treatment,, and to look upon it as it m ay be observed 1 T h e e p o c h o f p o s itiv e s c ie n c e fo llo w s th a t o f m e ta p h y s ic s , a s th is in turn fo llo w s t h a t o f t h e o l o g y , a c c o r d i n g to C o m t e ’s “ la w o f th e th r e e s t a g e s ” in th e e v o lu tio n o f th o u g h t . M e t a p h y s i c s is a p r e m a tu r e , a n d in it s r e s u lts a b o r tiv e , e ffo r t to in te r p r e t th e w o r ld . In th is, C o m t e g a v e to la t e r P o s it iv is ts a s o r t o f e x c u s e , b u t n o t a r e a so n , fo r t h e s h a llo w v e r b a l a n a t h e m a s d ir e c t e d b y s o m e o f th e m a g a in s t s p e c u la t iv e th o u g h t. S e c th e Biographical History of Philosophy, b y G . H . L e w e s , for a n e x a m p le o f th is a ttitu d e . 2 W e c a n n o t d w e ll u p o n C o m t e 's fa m o u s c la s s ific a tio n o f th e s c ie n c e s . H e . h a d th e a d v a n t a g e o f k n o w i n g B a c o n ’s schem e^ w h ic h h a d b e e n a d o p te d b y th e e d ito r s o f th e En cyclopedia.

Jean J a c q u e s R {.Copyright.

VOL. IT.

o u sseau .

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in its actual operation in the social life. “ Sociology ” — a word due to Com te— w as to comprise all the sciences* of the intercourse and interaction of men, their minds being tne centre ot such interaction. T h u s the mental as such, while not presenting a sphere open to positive treatment, nevertheless offered its data to the sciencc o f sociology. In this program m e of a sociology, we m ay forsee the re-establishment of the collective valu es jeopardised by the individualism of Rousseau. Hum anity w as to be the summary of these values and sociology its theory. An a n alogy of interests su g g es ts itself between this procedure of Comte and the som ew hat similar objective w a y of treating mental facts by ArUtotlp. T h e latter associated the mind not with society, but with the physical organism , in such a w ay that while the sub jective point of view w a s not lost, it w a s still merged theoretically in the objective, in his case, the biological. Mental functions were classed with p h y siological. C om te treats the mind similarly, except that it is the social body, rather than the physical body, in which 1TE- firTcTs'the sufficient objective and positive support for the events of consciousness. In Com te as in Bacon the practical and the metho dological were prom in en t; and he w a s urged on to justify the sort of naturalism in which these two motives issued. This led him to assert the essential fragmentariness and capriciousness of the psychic as s u c h ; 1 while he should have held to a larger natural1 H is in c o n s is te n c y is s e e n in his a p p e a l to K a n t ’s re la tiv is m o f k n o w l e d g e to r e fu te m e ta p h y s ic s , w h ile u s i n g th e o b je c t iv e o r d e r to r e fu te th e s u b je c t iv e p o in t o f v ie w o f C o n d illa c a n d th e sp iritu a lists.

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ism, within the conception of which the external and the psychic m ight develop each its own positive method. O f course, it is no reconciliation of tw o terms to deny one of them ; and such a procedure has not the merit of the aisthetic synthesis which we find in the g rea t monistic systems. Nevertheless, the assertion of the universal range of positive method w as of the first importance. It carried fo rw ard one of the g r e a t motives of the history of science. T h e ga in of the Positivism — now technically so named— of Com te, accrued to science in general, not directly to psychology. T h e spirit of his teaching aw aited its w o r k in g out in a later generation. It w a s to the profit of s o c i o l o g y ; for the negative answer to the question of a positive psychology w ent with the affirmative answer to that of a social science. T he “ positive ” bearing of P ositivism comes out, therefore, in tw o w a y s : first, as announcing a general m e t h o d ; and second, as preparing the w a y for a social science including social p s yc h o lo g y . Com te was original mainly on tlie latter point, since in the former he followed F rancis Bacon, s u g g e s tin g for his own time the method that Bacon had described as that necessary for the “ restoration of science.” II. Psycho-physical Parallelism. — It is evident that no permanent adjustment of interests as between spirit ualism and materialism is possible so lon g as a theory of causal interaction between mind and body prevails. If pure spiritualism is right, a science of uniformities in mental proccss is impossible— as is also a physiology of the brain. The capricious interferences of the soul could not be reduced to law. But on the other hand, if brain states and their law s of organisation are to E 2

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impose their mode of necessity upon the inner life, then psychology may at once close its doors. Mental phenomena would vacate their claim to any characters or procedures worth investigating. YVhy observe them ?— w hy not g o directly to the brain? T h e auto maton theory, of D escartes is extended to the entire human animal. T h e only possible w a y , therefore, to secure a truce, in which psychology m ay retain a strip of neutral territory for its own independent use, is that which adopts, or pretends to adopt, complete agnosticism on the question of the psycho-physical relation. G ivin g up or ignoring altogether the question o f cause as between mind and body, w e may investigate the mental and the physiological each for itself, g r o u n d in g the tw o sciences respectively in the two distinct points of view. Th is is the positive program m e o f which the theory of psvcho-nhvsical parallelism is a part. T h e mental life runs parallel to the cerebral, term for term in a "‘ one to one correspondence,” so to s p e a k ; but inter^. course acrossrthe line is limited to a fraternal hand shake. Th is principle has taken on various forms of state ment. T h e “ double-aspect t h e o r y ” of the English positivists, Clifford, L ew es, H. Spencer, makes the empty reservation that after all the basis o f the paral lelism is a substantial unity of some sort, itself per haps unknowable— a reservation that “ saves the face ” of Positivism by seem ing -to ward off the c harge of materialism. Th is c h a r g e is frankly accepted, on the other hand, by those, such as Maudsley, w ho accept the “ epiphenomenon ” theory of consciousness; to them consciousness is merely a by-product, a sp ark thrown

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<»ll by tlie engine, the b ra in .1 L ate r phases of scientific monism— seen in K . Pearson, Mach, Poincare— reduce ill scicnce to formulas of phenomenal and instrumental value. T h e data of p syc h olog y and ph ysio lo gy alike .ire merged in a larger whole of relative and utilitarian import. W ith the evolution theory, involving a racial descent of mind and body together in the tree of life, the demand has come for the extension of the principle id parallelism to the entire series of animal forms, r.u li type of brain ha vin g just and only the mind that lines with that brain. So evolution becomes psycho physical in its character. D arw in and Romanes pro ceeded upon this assumption, which has since had explicit form ulation.2 In such a parallelism, psychology avails itself of I lie liberty allowed by the old doctrine of “ occasional ism ’’ of Malebranche, and that of the identity of modes of the theory of Spinoza. O ther late philosophical iltempts to interpret the principle are those of Herbart hk I Lotze, the one in the spirit of L eibnitz, the other m I li e interest of a refined spiritualTsm. Herbart, J. F . (1776-18,^1), worked out a doctrine hich, superficially considered, su g g e s ts a new eclecti. ism. But this is only on the su rface; for in the result his psychological v ie w s became of g rea t influence. \dopting an atomistic ooint of view , s i m i l n r to tbr>tllu monad theory of L eibnitz, H erbart postulated what w

' II. M a u d s le y , Physiology and Pathology of M in d ( 1 S 6 7 ) : “ T h e un ity of th e m in d is m e r e ly th e o r g a n i c u n ity o f th e b r a in .” See 111m1 M a u d s le y in M in d , N o . 54, e x a m in e d b y th e p r e s e n t w r it e r in Mi ml. O c t ., 1889. 1 I. th e w r ite r 's Development and Evolution (1902), C h a p . I.

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he called “ reals ” or first elements. T h e soul is a “ real,” whose original active inertia (Selbstcrhaltung) show s itself in presentation. T h e entire phenomenal world is one of presentation (Vorstellen). H a v i n g thus a common character, nature and mind are subject to the same system of law s and principles of organisation. From this l t f o l l o w s that strictly mechanical processes — cause and effect, composition and resolution of forces, etc.— are operative in the play of presentations or ideas ( Vorstcllungcn). W e thus reach a som ewhat surprising- result— surprising- considering the nature of the “ reals” — a “ mechanics of ideas,” developed mathe m atically, which has become the typical ease of pure “ presentationism ” in modern psychology. T h e appar ent inconsequence is due, of course, to H e rb a rt’s h a v in g gone to mechanical science for the method and principle of organisation, while ad vocating the point of view of the psychical in the theory of the matter of the science. It is in its view of the method of mental orga n isa tion, therefore, that the psychology of H erb art has its g r e a t interest. J t is the legitim ate successor of a s sociationism. But it “ go es the assOClatiohl'sTs one be tter.” since it brings into the play of ideas a dynamic and quantitative factor. L ik e associationism, it also bears destructively on all forms of the faculty psycho lo g y ; the one “ mechanics ” replaces the different powers and activities of the mind. M em ory, for ex ample, is only the reappearance of presentations under dvnamic and mechanical conditions. H erb art passed a destructive criticism upon the faculty theory. On this conception, ideas become “ forces ” that push and pull. W h e n forced out of the lime-light of the attention— the focus of grea te st intensity— an idea still

Joh ann F (Copyright.

r ie d r ic h

erbart.

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remains active, exertin g its force and ready to appear when the inhibitions from other ideas are released and a new equilibrium is established. N o experience is ever lost; all presentations are persistent (sclbsterha.ltend) in the unconscious, the dark cavern of the soul. T h e state of mind o f the moment is one of relative equilibrium a m ong these “ idea-forces ; ” 1 it may be, will be, changed by any new experience that modifies the equilibrium. Som e other idea will be reinforced, a new set of tensions and inhibitions set up, and the process will again repeat itself. T h e mental life is thus a constant play of forces in action. The principles operative, according to Herbart, in this play of ideas are those of “ persistence,” or inertia (Selbsterhaltung), “ fu sio n ” ( V erschmelzung), and “ inhibition ” (Hemmung). LTnder the rule of these principles the ideas form systems, which cohere in m asses (Apperceptionsmassen) in the mental life, and assimilate to themselves incoming ideas. T h e higher states are complexes, show in g v a r y in g d egrees of fusion am ong their constituent parts. A new idea, entering into a mass to reinforce it, is said to be “ apperceivcd ” by that mass. B y this mechanical view , Herbart replaces the functional conception of apperception of Leibnitz and K a n t ; it is now not the “ s e l f ” or mental principle that appcrceives a content, but one content that appcrceives another. T h e other g r e a t feature of Herbartianism is its strict “ intcllectualism.” B y presentation or idea ( Vorstellung) Herbart means, as German p sycholog y a lw ays means, a cognitive unit, im age, or i d e a ; something e x p r e s s io n u s e d b y F o tiille e , L a Psychologie des Ideesw r ite r w h o in te r p r e te d th e d y n a m ic s o f i d e a s le s s m e c h a n i c a l l y a n d a ls o le s s in te lle c t u a lis t ic a lly th a n H e r b a r t . 1 The

forces, a

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presented to the mind, h a v in g objective character, not som ething felt or willed. T hese latter aspects of the mental life, covered in Germ an by the term Gemiith, are for H erbart derived, not original : they are functions of the play of presentations and depend upon that. W ill is the consciousness of the dynamic side of the play of ideas— the tension of the idea tow ard clear pre sentation, its reaction a ga in st inhibition. W h e n such a tension exists below the “ th r e s h o ld ” of conscious ness, there is “ im p u ls e ” (Strcbc1^)', when the idea is consciously inhibited, there is “ d esire” (Begehren); when it is released by the idea of the end of satis faction, desire passes into “ v o li t io n ” (Wollen). heeling is the consciousness of the resulting con ditions— o f success, failure, equilibrium, compromise or balance, in this continuous rivalry o f ideas. T he functions of feeling and w ill have no law s of indepen dent movement and orga n isa tion ; they merely reflect the s ta g e of movement, the status quo, of the intel lectual forces at w ork. Here w e spp the extreme i .111(malising of feeling ;nvl'>.m.>tion from which modern p .yehologv is only just now freeing- itself, through the 1n ^;inic and autonomous theories of Tames and Ribot spoken of below. Consciousness becomes a gain, as in British empiri c i s m , the mere theatre or L o k a l of the mechanical play o f presentations. It has a high degree o f clearness in t h e conditions of intensity attach in g to the presenta t i o n mass at the time in the focus of attention; it is relatively obscure at the m argin, where presentations a r e held in c h ec k ; and it has a th r e s h o ld 1— a sort of “ s t o o p ” — below which presentations sink into the un 1 A

c o n c e p t io n

1 ('se arch .

m ade

m o re

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conscious. Consciousness is not fu n c tio n a l; it is not a character of an active self. On the contrary, the self — the empirical self know n in consciousness— is a com plex like other complexes, a mass of contents, a system of presentations, acting; like other systems. Attention to this mass g iv e s it standing in the lime light, like attention to other m a s s e s ; but attention itself is merely evidence of the dynamic activity of the mass attended to. Here w e find H u m e ’s “ bundle of i d e a s ” consciously and deliberately tied up with the mechanical c o r d .1 A m o n g the special theories of H erbart, th a t of the empirical origin of space perception (a case of fusion of spaceless^ data) is im p o r ta n t; it leads on to the ge netic and local-sign theories of.H elm holtz and Lotze. W ith Herbart, a school w a s founded— its members called Herbartians— in whose w ritings the systematic exposition of empirical psychology in general text books b egan to be made. George, W a i t z , Drobisch, V o lk m a n n ,2 and from a modified point o f v ie w Lipps, published important w orks g o i n g system atically over the field of psychology. W i t h them— as with Bain in E n g lish and T ain e in F r e n c h 3— the domain of the descriptive science becomes so broad, and its details so complex, that a brief summary is impossible. W e 1 T h e p r e s e n ta tio n is t v i e w o f t o - d a y — a s s e e n fo r e x a m p le in th e t h e o r y o f th e s e l f o f F . H . B r a d le y — e s s e n t ia lly r e s t a te s H e r b a r t 's v ie w , l e a v i n g o u t, h o w e v e r , th e te r m s o f th e s t r ic tly m e c h a n ic a l c o n c e p tio n . S e e F . H . B r a d le y , Appearance and R eality, 2nd e d . (1897), C h a p s . I X , X . 2 T h e Lehrbuch der Psychologie o f V o lk m a n n v o n V o l k m a r (4th e d ., 18 9 4 -5 ) h a s a n a d d itio n a l e le m e n t o f p e r m a n e n t v a lu e in it s rich lite r a r y c ita tio n s a n d b o o k lists. 3 B o t h a r e a s s o c ia t io n is t s a n d e m p iric is ts . S e e H . T a in e , L ’Intelligence (1870), a n d A . B a in , Senses and Intellect (1855), a n d Em otions and W ill (1859).

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a ccordingly confine ourselves— as in other cases to be mentioned below— to the sum m ary indication of the general characteristics of the school. I l c r b a r t ’s psychology has become influential also in educational theory. A large grou p of writers have followed his leading in applying the theory of apper ception as he conceived it to p e d ag o gy . W ith in the I lerbartian circle a lso— particularly in the w ritings of W a i t z 1 and Steinthal— an early attempt w a s made to isolate the problem of racial p sycholog y ( V o lk e r p sy ch o lo g ie ).

Hermann L o tze f i 8 i f —i 8 S i \ represents the form taken on by modern spiritualism when founded upon induc tive and analytic p s y c h o lo g y .2 l i e discusses the alter native solutions of the g r e a t problems of interpretation raised by scientific k n ow le d g e and method with rem ark able balance, fairness, and judicial a c u m e n : space, time, cause, substance, the self. H is philosophical conclusions are those of a man who has not only con tributed to scientific p sycholog y, but w ho emphasises its role as the fundamental science. His book on Logic is one of the classics of the new “ psvchologistic ” treatment oT thnngh tT L o t z e ’s w o r k on “ medical p s y c h o l o g y ” 3 entitled him to be called one of the founders Of [Jinbiological p sychology. He held to a theory of the relation bc1 Th.

W a itz ,

Anthropologie

der Naturvolker,

v o ls .

(18 7 0 -

18 77). 2 It is th e b e g in n in g - o f th e s e r ie s o f a tt e m p t s to c o n s tr u c t a sp ir itu a lis t m e ta p h y s ic s u p o n e m p ir ic a l p s y c h o l o g y — a s th o s e o f J a m e s W a r d (Naturalism and Agnosticism , 1899) in E n g l a n d , a n d th o s e o f G . T . L a d d (Philosophy of M in d , 1895), a n d A . T . O r m o n d (I nundations of Knowledge, 1900), in th e U n ite d S t a te s . II. L o t z e , D ie medizinische Psychologie, oder die Physiologie der Seele (1852).

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tween mind and body by which, as he th ought, the criticisms b rought aga in st the interaction theory could be met without adopting a strict parallelism. The act of will was causally effective in voluntary m ove ment, as w a s the stimulation of sense upon the mind; but both w ere limited in their effects to the restricted system of psycho-physical changes. In a noteworthy analysis o f cause and effect, includ ing all chan ge in the physical w o r ld ,1 he showed the impossibility of purely mechanical action, that is, action due to impact as such. T h e mere contact of tw o spatially separated bodies cannot result in the transfer of anything from one to the other; and the same is true of the ultimate organisation of the elements or atoms which constitutes physical mass. All physical action requires the assumption of some bond of union or organisation already established. T he only analogy available for the interpretation of physical change is that drawn from the organisation of mental contents, especially in the form it assumes in social relations. L otze thus reaches— or at least s u g g e sts— a new point of v ie w ; that according to which the m onads o f which the world is made up are in their intrinsic nature nsvcho-social. ~ On the basis of this view , to he described as a pan-psychic a to mism, Lotze develops the psychological theories of his important w ork. The Micro c o s m It is evident that he reverses H erb art's e ssential procedure^ I nstead of finding in mechanical law s the ultimate ground o f mental he make$ the mental the g round of the physical. O f his original psychological views, one of the most 1 L o tz e ,

M etaphysik.

Der M ikrokosm us

(18 5 6 -18 6 4 ).

R (Copyright.

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erm ann

Lotze.

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important is the theory of “ local s ig n s. ” Accord in g to this theory visual sp ace, while native to the mind, is provoked by means of qualitatively different “ signs ” or m arks attaching to or stimulated with the retinal elements which are locally distributed. T h e sensa tional equivalent of each such sign— whether considered as som ething intrinsic to vision or as a muscular factor— com es to be referred to its proper optical element. T h e retina, as thus plotted out in its entire area, becomes the organ of discrimination of external spatial position and arrangement. Similarly for tactile space perceived through the skin, where the local signs are circles of radiation. This theory led on to the “ e x T tensity ” theory of Jam es and VVardj according to which the local signs w ere themselves extensive, not merely intensive or qualitative, m arks of visual (or other) sensation. This important idea of signs w as later on e x tended to time-perception, in the theory of “ temporal s i g n s ” ; which were qualitative marks nttm-hing to the passing events in consciousness, whereby they w ere redistributed in tim c-ofder and arranged as before and after. A s in the case of local signs, these qualitative marks were replaced by temporal. Each instant or “ n o w ,” looked upon as a section of conscious content, was considered as having a certain temporal thickness or duration. L o t z e ’s judicious spiritualism sharpened the opposi tion between the mechanical interpretation of conscious ness of H erbart and the functional, which w a s still to have its full development. Presentationism, the purely structural psychology of content, w a s opposed by apperceptionism in the functional form, which rec o g nised a synthetic function or activity of mind.

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Put on the defensive in the m atter of determining the fundamental functions or faculties, L otze accepted the consequences of his view. H erbart and Brentano had argued that if once w e admit different faculties, there is no stopping a n y w h e r e ; every distinguishable mode of mental process may be ascribed to a separate f a c u l t y : colour-perception and piano-playing no less than feeling and will. Lotze did not deny this, but claimed that certain generalisations w ere possible which permitted the valid demarcation of the g r e a t functions recognised in the K antian threefold division. He w a s one of the few Germ ans w ho opposed the current untempered claims made on behalf of “ uncon scious ” presentations, the existence o f which he denied.

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Scientific P sycho lo gy in the Nineteenth Century. II. Special Lines o f Work. Physiological and Experim ental Psycholo g y .— T h e idea that lies at the basis of physiological psyc h o lo g y ,1 properly so called, is that of a regular and uniform connection between the, internal functional con ditions of the b o d y , especially the brain, and states of con sciousness. T h e method consists m ob servin g or m odifying the physiological, with a v ie w to noting, altering, or producing mental conditions— sensational, emotional, active, etc. L o t z e ’s book on Medical Psychology w a s a pioneer w o rk in this direction, as we have already said. T h e method has been productive in researches on sensation, emotion, and m ovem ent; and also notably in the domain of medical diagnosis and surgical treatment. T h e theory of “ localisation of brain functions ” rests upon fa cts observed and experiments made in the pursuit of this method. The development of kn ow le d g e and of medicine in the 1 O n th e s e to p ic s th e r e a d e r m a y c o n s u lt th e w r it e r ’s m o re d e t a ile d b u t u n te c h n ic a l e x p o s it io n s to b e fo u n d in th e w o r k Fragments of Philosophy and Science, C h a p s . V I a n d V I I . T h e la s t e d itio n o f W u n d t ’s Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie, T i t c h e n e r 's Experim ental Psychology, a n d L a d d a n d W o o d w o r t h ’s Outlines of Physiological Psychology (2nd e d . 1 9 1 1 ), a r e to b e r e c o m m e n d e d fo r fu r th e r s t u d y . A n a d m ir a b le e a r ly E n g lis h w o r k , w r itte n fro m th e m e d ic a l p o in t o f v ie w , is W . B . C a r p e n t e r ’s P rin cip les of M ental Physiology (1876).

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domain of “ aphasia,” since the discovery of the speech centre by B r o c a ,1 illustrates its enormous possibilities. In the domain of sensation, the w ork of H e lm h o ltz 2 on vision and hearing w a s epoch-making. It illustrates the extension of the method by means of external stimulation of the senses and experiments upon them, w hereby “ experimental psychology ” cam e in to enlarge the scope of physiolo gical psychology, understood in the narrower sense. Researches in physiological psychology g o back to the Arabian physicians, to Alhacen especially, and its body of results includes observations and discoveries made by many ; but its establishment as a well-defined and well-controlled method of research is one of the notable achievements of the late nineteenth cen tu ry .3 Experimental psychology, as distinguished from physiological, resorts to the external stimulation of the normal senses and to the direct experimental obser vation of the mind, the physiological conditions within the organisation rem aining constant and normal. In psycho-physics, the psycho-physical relation w a s .experim entally investigated! ft~was founHed by G. T . F echner (1S01—1887), \\^io w a s led by his pan-psychic theory o'l the relatio n oF~minrl"?nTTt-hnriy to the ntttrmpt to discover the law of their mutual influence. The outcome of his experiments, in which he utilised results 1 C a lle d B r o c a ’ s c o n v o lu tio n ; it is th e th ird fr o n ta l g y r e o f th e le ft h e m is p h e re . S e e th e a r tic le “ S p e e c h a n d its D e t e c t s ,” in the w r ite r ’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 2 H . H e lm h o ltz , D ie Lehrevon den Tonem pfndungen (1863), a n d Hand buck der physiologischen Optik (1867). ~ 3 F r o m th e m e d ic a l s id e , th e w o r k s o f C h a r lt o n B a s tia n , The B rain as an Organ of M in d (1880), a n d H . M a u d s le y , Physiology a n d Pathology of M in d (1862), h a v e b e e n v e r y in flu e n tial.

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reached by the physiolo gist E. H . W e b e r , w ere stated in a quantitative formula known as “ F ec h n er ’s psycho physical l a w . ” T h e quantity or intensity of sensation varies with the quantity or intensity of the stimulation ; but not in the same direct ratio. An increase in stimulation does not result in a proportionate increase in sensation; but in order that the latter m ay increase irithmetically, the former must increase geom etrically. Put mathematically, this is equivalent to sa y in g that Ilie sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimula tion .1 This bears out the observation of daily life that two candles do not illuminate a p a g e tw ice as much as on e; that tw o violins, pitched in the same key, do not double the sound of one. It is a m atter of ordinary observation that as the intensity of the excitation increases by well-marked variations, very slight ch an ge s are produced in the corresponding sensation. F ec h n er ’s title to recognition as the founder of psycho-physics— as this special line of quantitative research has been designated— rests as much, however, upon his careful w o r k in g out of the “ psycho-physical measurement m ethods.” T h ese methods, which pro vided the code of experimental procedure upon which, with modifications, late'r investigation has proceeded, ;ire expounded in the special w o rk s on psycho-physics. T h e WTeber-Fechner law , although found applicable 1 T h e id e a o f a “ s e n s a t io n a l e q u i v a l e n t " — t h a t th e r e is a d e fin ite e q u iv a le n c e b e t w e e n m e n ta l m a n ife s ta tio n s a n d p h y s ic a l fo r c e s , th e s a m e a s b e t w e e n th e p h y s ic a l fo r c e s t h e m s e l v e s ” — is I.ile d b y B a in , “ C o r r e la t io n o f N e r v o u s a n d M e n t a l F o r c e ," in S t e w a r t ’s Conservation of Erergy. W e b e r h a d a lr e a d y s t a te d th a t in o r d e r to p r o d u c e a n o t ic e a b le in c r e a s e in se n s a tio n , th e stim u la tio n m u s t b e in c r e a s e d b y a c o n s ta n t pro p o rtio n . Fech n er {I Inncnte der PsycJwphysik, i860) c a lle d his d e d u c tio n t h e “ la w o f q u a n t it y o r i n t e n s i t y ” (M assgesetz).

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In a variety of cases, and employed with considerable licence of speculation in others— as in the theory of supply and demand in political econ om y— has not proved of g rea t value. T h e interpretation of the psycho physical formula is uncertain. Op F e c h n e r ’s view , the “ in n e r ” psycho-physical bond— t hn 1 h r l y-»^n in t rinsic brain process and the “ soul ” — was one of direct proportion or cause a nd effec t._ Others think that the facts of psychological relativity and physical inertia account for the apparent discrepancy between the stimulation, considered as cause, and the sensation, considered as effect. It does, however, g o far to confirm the postulates upon which the experimental treatment of the mind p r o c e e d s : it proves that the mind-body connection is constant and uniform. Mental Clironometry. 1— Another relatively distinct line of experimental research is that which inquires into the time taken up by psycho-physical and mental processes. Underlying mental chronometry is the idea that since brain processes and mental processes occur together, and brain processes take time, the time of the central occurrence as a whole m ay be separated off from that of the other parts of a reaction. T he time of the entire reaction from sense to muscle— as when I press a key as soon as I see a light 2— may be divided into three parts : that of the sensory transmission by the optic nerve, that of the central or brain process, and that 1 T h e o ld e r term “ p s y c h o m e t r y ” h a s b e e n a b a n d o n e d ; it is b a d l y a p p lie d in th is c a s e , a n d it h a s a ls o b e e n a p p r o p r ia te d to c e r ta in o c c u lt u se s. 2 An e x p e r im e n t th a t reprod uces th e c o n d itio n s o f an a s t r o n o m e r 's o b s e r v a tio n o f a t r a n s i t ; this c a s e , in d e e d , a c t u a lly p r e s e n te d o n e o f th e e a r l y p r a c tic a l p r o b le m s in r e a c tio n tim e w ork.

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of the motor transmission to the muscles of the hand. Subtracting from the entire time that required for the lirst and third parts— quantities known through the researches of Helmholtz and others, on the velocity of the nervous impulse— or keeping them constant and negligible, the time taken up by the psycho-physical and mental processes may be reached by simple calculation. A vast amount of detailed research has been carried out in refinements on this experiment. “ T im es” have been determined for perception, discrimination, memory, association, etc. Broadly considered, how ever, the results are disappointing. A s is the case with psycho-physics, besides plotting in a cu rve and listing in figures, extendin g to several decimal points, the results already reached by rough daily observation, there has been little gain. An important difference, how ever, has been estab lished between “ s e n s o r y ” and “ m o t o r ” tim es— cases in which the attention is fixed beforehand, respect ively, in the direction of the stimulus or of the muscle used. T h e “ m o t o r ” reaction is quicker. It has also been held that pronounced differences shown by individuals in their mental type, as being visual, auditory, muscular, etc., in their preferred mental imagery, show themselves in differences of reaction tim e.1 C haracteristic variations in reaction-time, occurring in abnormal cases and in nervous diseases, are useful adjuncts to diagnosis. 1 T h is “ t y p e -t h e o r v ” o f d iffe r e n c e s in r e a c tio n tim e is p r e s e n te d miuI d is c u s s e d in th e w r ite r 's Fragments in Philosophy and Science, < h a p s. X V I - X V I I I — a c ita tio n m a d e , h o w e v e r , fo r th e fu r th e r pu rp o se o f a d d i n g th a t th e e n th u s ia s m sh o w n in th e r e s e a r c h e s .1 nd d is c u s s io n s on th is s u b je c t in t h a t v o lu m e d o e s n o t a p p e a r in I I k - presen t te x t. In th is d a m p e n in g - o f a r d o u r th e w r ite r b y no m e a n s s t a n d s a lo n e : cf. J a m e s , P rin cip les of Psychology.

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More important than these special researches in intensity and duration are the results obtained through experiments planned with reference to special problems. Here physiology and psychology g o hand in hand. Ir» the fields of sensation, memory, im aging-, movement, emotion, attention, association, aesthetic judgment, thought, a mass of valuable facts and inferences have been accumulated : the variety and detail can only be understood by a reference to such handbooks as those of Helmholtz and W u n d t already cited, and to the original papers in which the results are reported.1 Genetic P sychology.— W i t h the com ing of the evolu tion theory, especially in the form of the “ natural selection ” hypothesis of D arw in, considerations of origin, development, and grow th came systematically into the natural sciences. P sych o lo gy in time felt the im p u ls e ; and gradually the genetic concept and method became current. T h e progress of D arwinism in the mental and moral scicnces shows itself in certain of the departments of p sycholog y in which specialisation has recently taken place : normal genetic psychology, childpsychology, animal or comparative psychology, racepsychology. Jean Baptiste Lam arck (1774-1829), Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882), and Alfred R ussel W allace.— Both D arw in and W a lla c e , the E nglish co-discoverers of natural selection, the latter still living, were in spirit psychologists, so generously did their instinct for nature in all its aspects extend itself. L am a rck , their French predecessor, had recognised as one of the factors o f 1 R e s u lt s in c e r ta in lin e s o f r e c e n t i n v e s t ig a t io n a r e r e p o r te d a n d d is c u s s e d in E . B . T i t c h e n e r ’s b o o k s , F eeling and Attentiona n d The Experim ental Psychology of the Thought Processes.

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■ ■volution the “ efforts,” psychological in their character, made by animals in accom m odating themselves to their environment. T he effects of these efforts, no less than l he direct effects of the environment itself upon the animal, w ere inherited and accumulated from g e n e ra tion to generation, according to the well-known “ L a m a r c k i a n ” theory. In this L a m a rc k showed that lie breathed the atmosphere of the new voluntarism of ■Maine de Biran and Jouffroy, founded upon the sense of effort. Charles D arw in recognised this principle of Lam arck, .is well as the latter's view of inheritance. B ut D arw in showed the broadest interest in the facts of the mind' itself; 1 and his theories and observations w a rran t our classin g him a m ong the naturalistic psychologists. I he problems that exercised him were originally those of the animal kind— instinct, sexual preference, recognition m arkings, emotional expression, adapta t i o n , etc.— all of which he discussed in the light o f the theory of natural selection. But in his later work, The Descent of Man, he developed the full, bearings of his view s in their application to human faculty. In it all w e must recognise the founding of a new .md tho rou gh-go ing naturalistic psychology. T h e new Hid permanent element wras the suggestion of a genetic m orphology of the human faculties whose w o rk in g out is one of the g r e a t tasks of the future. T h e mind ir .ill its functions is a g r o w th , its natural sta ge s are those o| the animal tree of life, its innate powers and a priori form s are inherited accretions which have been 1 H e o b s e r v e d th e h u m a n b a b y ( “ B i o g r a p h i c a l S k e t c h o f an In fa n t,” in M in d , I I . p p . 285 ft) a n d th e g a r d e n p la n t w ith t h e sa m e in te r e s t.

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selected and accumulated from indeterminate varia tions. T he formal or morphological factor in our equipment, no less than the content or filling given to it by experience, is the outcome of racial adaptation and selection in the physical and social conditions of m a n ’s pre-historical life. In this we see a radical racial empiricism and natural ism, not only in point of view, but in the actual mechanism as disclosed in the principle of natural selection. Darwin not only proposed fo r the race what the associationists had su g gested for the individual, the natural derivation of mental form ; but his proposal took the problem of “ matter and f o r m ” altogether out of the hands of the psychologist who treats of the in dividual, and made it again the genetic and historical problem that it had been to Aristotle and his Greek predecessors. T h e K a n tia n critique of experience asks : “ H o w is the individual endowed to have the experience he h a s ? ” T h e D arw inian genetic naturalist a s k s : “ W h a t are the sta ge s of racial history through which the individual has acquired his endow m ent? ” It was the ring of mechanism and accidentalism in a theory founded upon “ fortuitous variations ” that made D a r w in ’s view s seem ultra-naturalistic in contrast with L a m a r c k ’s. But D arw in held also to the principle of the “ inheritance of acquired c h a r a c t e r s ” of Lam arck, although g iv in g it a subordinate place. Alfred Russel W a lla c e discarded, from the first, the Lam arckian view. In all his subsequent w riting s he has affirmed the sufficiency of natural selection. Like D arw in, he has an open mind for mental facts and sees their bearings on evolution.1 He has made many 1 B o th D a r w in a n d W a l l a c e r e c o g n is e d th e ro le p la y e d b y c o n sc io u s n e s s in anim a) a d a p t a tio n s ; su ch a s th e c u n n in g e m p lo y e d

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observations of psychological value— on imitation, courtship and m ating habits, play, recognition of fellows, etc., a m ong the animals. In one important respect, however, W a lla c e restricts the D arw inian principle outright. He holds that the rational and spiritual faculties of man could not have had a natural origin ; 1 and in his further v ie w he seems to g o over to a form of spiritualism understood in the narrower sense of the reality and separateness of spirits, some times called “ spiritism .” Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).— The ps yc h o lo g ist’s debt to Spencer has been g r u d g in g ly paid.2 T h e reason

in flig h t, th e t a s t e a n d p r e fe r e n c e o f th e fe m a le , th e w a r n in g g i v e n b y c o lo u r s a n d c r ie s , th e e m o tio n s h o w n in d e fe n c e , th e c o n s c io u s ly s o c ia l a n d g r e g a r i o u s a c t io n s ; a s w e ll a s im ita tio n , r iv a lr y , m a te r n a l a n d fa m ily a ffe c tio n , e t c . In c e r ta in d e v e l o p m e n ts o f D a r w in ia n th e o r y , c o n s c io u s n e s s p la y s a n e s s e n tia l p a r t ; n o te th e f a c t s s u p p o r tin g th e th e o r y o f m im ic ry , a s r e p o r te d in th e w r it in g s o f E . B . P o u lto n a n d o th e r s. 1 A lim ita tio n o f th e s a m e so r t w a s s e t upon n a tu r a l s e le c tio n liy th e s ta u n c h D a r w in ia n , H u x le y , w h o h e ld ( H u x le y , Romanes lecture, on Evolution and, E th ics) th a t th e m o ral s e n s e c o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n p r o d u c e d u n d e r c o n d itio n s i n v o lv i n g th e “ s t r u g g le for e x is t e n c e .” A c r itic is m o f th is v ie w is to be fo u n d in th e p r e s e n t w r ite r ’s Darwin and the Hum anities. S e e W a l l a c e ’s Darwinism , lor his s t r ic tly b io lo g ic a l th e o r ie s , a n d th e Studies, Scientific and Six ial, fo r h is m o re g e n e r a l v ie w s . * H . S p e n c e r , P rinciples of Psychology (1855). It is s t r a n g e , b u t it is tru e , t h a t m a n y B r itish w r ite r s find it im p o s s ib le to d o a n y so r t o f ju s t ic e to S p e n c e r . A n d y e t w h e r e is t h e r e th e B ritish w rite r, s a v e D a r w in , w h o s e n a m e a n d t h e o r ie s a r e to b e fo u n d in the w h o le w o r ld ’s lite r a tu re o f a h a lf-d o z e n g r e a t s u b je c t s , sin c e 1S50, a s S p e n c e r ’s a r e ? W e h e a r it s a id t h a t h a lf th e w o r ld n o w a d a y s th in k s in te rm s o f D a r w in is m : b u t it is tru e r to s a y , “ in te rm s o f e v o lu tio n ism ” ; fo r h a lf o f th e h a lf th in k s its e v o lu t io n ism in te rm s, n o t o f D a r w in is m , b u t o f S p e n c e r is m . M o r e o v e r , in lh e L a tin co u n tr ie s a n d in th e U n it e d S t a t e s , it w a s th e le a v e n o f S p e n c e r ’s e v o lu tio n is m t h a t first w o r k e d its w a y th r o u g h th e lum p. W h y n o t, th e n , r e c o g n is e S p e n c e r a s w h a t h e w a s , o n e o f th e g r e a t e s t in te lle c tu a l in flu e n c e s o f m o d e r n tim e s, a g l o r y to B ritish th o u g h t? In p s y c h o lo g y th is is s p e c ia lly w o r th in s is tin g u p on ,

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is, perhaps, this, that w ith an unexampled program m e for the science, and an equally unexampled wealth of plausible and research-exciting hypotheses, in this as in other sciences, Spencer combined a semi-deductive method, a speculative and ultra-logical manner, and a dry unattractive style. Spencer applied consciously and directly the prin ciples of psychological morphology, which w ere also implicit in Darwin. T h e native, a priori, form s of the mind are looked upon as solidified social experience— acquired, stiffened, transmitted by heredity. T o the individual they are n a t i v e ; but by the race they have been acquired. Innate ideas are the petrified deposits of race experience. Here is a reconciliation in prin ciple of the empiricist and the r a tio n a list: the principle is that of racial ex p erie n c e; it is substituted for individual experience. Spencer made L am arck ian inheritance an intrinsic link in the c h a i n ; but that is not necessary. Substitute for it the D arwinian conception of the continued selec tion o f variations— especially as guided in its course by “ c o in c id e n t” 1 individual experience and social custom and habit— and the result remains the same. T o the psychologist, Spencer is an advance upon D a r w in ,2 however, in that he discusses the alternatives s in c e S p e n c e r c a m e ju s t a t a tim e o f su r p r is in g b a r r e n n e s s in th is d e p a r t m e n t in E n g la n d . 1 A te rm d u e to C . L l o y d M o r g a n , o n e o f th e d is c o v e r e r s o f th e s u p p le m e n t to D a r w in is m , k n o w n a s “ o r g a n ic s e le c t i o n ,” in d i c a t e d in th e t e x t b e t w e e n th e d a s h e s : LI. M o r g a n , Habit and Instinct (1896), pp. 322 If. ; s e e a ls o H . F . O s b o r n , Science, O c t . 15 , 1897, a n d th e p r e s e n t w r it e r ’s Development and Evolution, C h a p s . V I I I ff., a n d Darwin and the Hum anities, C h a p . I. 2 I t is a q u e s tio n h o w fa r S p e n c e r w a s in flu e n c e d b y D a r w in . T h e d a t e s o f p u b lic a tio n w o u ld in d ic a te t h a t S p e n c e r ’s th o u g h t w a s , in th e m ain , in d e p e n d e n t o f D a r w in ’s. M o r e o v e r , th e

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ad hoc, and brings out their bearings fully. 1 hr transfer of emphasis to racial experience introduced once for all the social w a y of looking at mental states. N o doubt in this Spencer w a s influenced by C o m te .1 The genetic point of view , thus placed on a racial basis, remained som ew hat formal with S pencer; in this he is in contrast with the extreme concreteness and empiricism of D arw in. In interpreting the actual mental life, Spencer retained the purely structural and associationist point of view. H e extended the struc tural and analytic conceptions— the theory of mental “ e l e m e n t s ” — to a general “ composition theory of m ind ,” replacing C on d illac’s individual human statue by a racial animal colossus, so to speak. Beginning with a primitive sensation or “ fe elin g,” accompanied by an elementary nervous process or “ sh o ck ,” a series of compositions takes place, resulting in more and more compound states. All concrete mental states are com pounds resolvable by analysis. T he first departure from simple feeling is a feeling of the relation of feelin gs; the presentative passes into the representative, the representative into the re-representative, etc. T h u s the process go es on. The additional principle invoked is that of associa tion. Here again Spencer simply transfers the recog nised pattern of individual psychology to the larger ca n va s of race history. Association is the cement of the m i n d ; it binds the elements into wholes, and makes of the compositions permanent complexes and eomth e o r y o f n a tu ra l s e le c tio n , to w h ic h D a r w in 's Origin of Species w a s d e v o t e d , w o u ld h a r d ly h a v e a p p e a le d a t o n c e to o n e im b u e d , a s S p e n c e r w a s , w ith L a m a r c k is m . T h i s is c o n fir m e d , to o , b y S p e n c e r ’s su b s e q u e n t a tt it u d e to w a r d n a tu ra l s e le c tio n . 1 S p e n c e r (Principles of Sociology) a tt e m p t e d to w o r k o u t a s y s te m o f s o c io lo g y in th e s p irit o f C o m t e 's s u g g e s t i o n .

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pounds. In thus rendering the mechanics of ideas in terms of association, Spencer remained true to the British tradition. Spencer differed from the structural psychologist of to-day principally in b eing more th o r o u g h g o i n g : he needed only one primitive element, they require generally tw o or three. W i t h them he, too, used the analysis of chemical and biological synthesis to replace 1lie looser union su g g es ted by the law s of mechanics. Hut in this there is no real gain. In w hat w e may call “ the H 20 theory ” — the chemical a n a logy — there is no recognition of a functional reaction of consciousness or of the self upon the mental content; no real p rog re s sion or gen e sis is reached in the g r o w i n g com plexity of the com pounds produced. T h e mental process, like its mechanical and chemical analogues, m ight as well move b ackw ard s. T h e modern choice of ph rasing— “ so much intellection, so much conation, and so much affection ” — does not help the case. In their criticisms, 1lie functional psychologists have shown the inadequacy of association, w o r k in g on “ elem ents,” to accomplish mental synthesis. It is a poor sort of cement. Even I hose who eulogise it are prone to sm u g g le in, after the exam ple of Hume, some disguised functional principle like ha bit.1 1 In its result, th e c o m p o s itio n th e o r y a n d s tr u c tu r a l v ie w s in g e n e r a l, w h ic h s e e k to d e c o m p o s e m e n ta l s t a t e s in to e l e m e n t s le a d lo a n a n a ly s is b a s e d u p o n th e sim p le r c o n d itio n s fo u n d in o th e r s c ie n c e s . In S p e n c e r , th is p r o c e d u r e w a s a h a b it o f m in d . T h r o u g h h is in flu e n c e , m e c h a n ic a l a n a l o g i e s p la g u e d b io lo g y , an d b io lo g ic a l a n a l o g i e s p la g u e d s o c i o lo g y . It r e s u lts e v e r y w h e re in th e “ illu sio n o f s im p lic it y .” T h e v e r y flo w e r a n d fruit o f s y n t h e s is a r e lo s t in th e c o u n t i n g o f th e disjecta membra o f “ e l e m e n t s .” . . . C e r ta in o f S p e n c e r ’s m o re s p e c ia l th e o r ie s a r e n o tic e d in th e s e c tio n s 011 C o m p a r a t iv e a n d A f f e c t i v e P s y c h o l o g y ju s t b e lo w .

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It should be noted, however, that Spencer, a con fessed Positivist, essentially revised the program m e o f C om te in respect to psychology. T h e independence and scientific integrity of psychology are recognised. The science is freed from the leading-strings of biology on the one hand, and from its service to sociology on the o t h e r ; and stands in its true place between the sciences of life and those of society. T h is step the later history has fully justified ; for psychology has since made more real and noteworthy scientific progress than sociology. Animal and Comparative Psycho lo g y . 1— It w as natural to suppose that under the inspiration of the theory of evolution, various lines of observation would ta k e on new in ter est; that the leading afforded by genuinely orga n isin g genetic principles, like those of L a m a rc k and D arw in, would result in directed scientific effort. T his has been the case in animal psychology. T he study of animals passed first from the “ anecdotal s ta g e ” to that of close observation, that is, from mere story to “ natural hsitory ” ; it then passed from observation to actual experiment. T he literature of the observation of animal habits and characters is rich and varied. The g r e a t natural ists, Buffon, D arw in, W a lla c e , lead off, follow ing the lead of Aristotle. T h e w o rk s of Brehm, Romanes, F abre, H u d so n ,2 are a m o n g the best on the general habits of animals, considered from the psychological 1 In th is a n d th e fo llo w in g ’ s e c tio n s d e a lin g ’ w ith s p e c ia l to p ics , it w ill b e im p o ss ib le to c ite a u th o r itie s in d e ta il ; a p a r t fro m e a r lie r w rite rs, o n ly w o r k s w h ic h g i v e su m m a r ie s w ill b e c it e d , to g u id e th e r e a d e r ’s fu rth er s tu d y . 2 B r eh m , D as Tierlcben ; R o m a n e s , M ental Evolution in A n i mals ; H u d s o n , The Naturalist in L a Plata.

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side; those of Espinas, Groos, Lloyd M o r g a n ,1 on special functions, interpreted by theories of psycho logical and social value. T h e new experimental method, pursued especially in the LTnited States, raises the problems of com parative psychology, understood in the broadest sense. It attempts to apply actual experi mentation to animals, from the lowest to the highest organism s— from the micro-organism to the monkey. Its results are, of course, of enhanced interest when the com parative point of view is extended from the animals to m a n .2 L e a v in g to the text-books the recital of the details of methods and results, w e may point out the progress made tow’ard the solution of certain of the older and more important problems. Instinct.— T h e problem of instinct g a v e to the new genetic theories a bone to exercise their teeth upon. Instinct had been looked upon as conclusive evidence of the “ special creatio n,” each after its own kind, of the different species of anim als ; the instincts are com mon to species, and diverse from one species to another. Further, instinct w as taken to prove “ d e s i g n ” in nature. N ow here else w ere devices to be found so cunning in their construction, and so apt for their 1 E s p in a s , Les Soctttis animates ( 1 8 7 7 ) ; G r o o s , D ie Spiele der T iere (1S96) ; L I. M o r g a n , A n im al Intelligence a n d Habit a d Instinct (1S96). 2 T h e n e e d o f o b je c t iv i t y a n d c o n tr o l h a s le d to th e e m p h a s is o f b e h a v io u r a s s u c h , a n d th e “ s c ie n c e o f a n im a l b e h a v io u r ” t e n d s to r e p la c e “ a n im a l p s y c h o l o g y .” S u c h a s c ie n c e w o u ld b e in p r in c ip le n a tu r a l h is to r y o v e r a g a i n — m a d e e x p e r im e n t a l— m u ch a s A r is t o tle c o n c e iv e d it. I f su ch a m e th o d is to y ie ld p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e su lts, it m u s t b e m a d e a m e a n s, a m e th o d o f s e c u r in g d a t a fo r a tru e c o m p a r a tiv e pS3rc h o lo g y F o r e x a m p le , th e o b je c t o f e x p e r im e n t s on th e c o lo u r v is io n o f a n im a ls is se n s a tio n , n o t b e h a v io u r .

purpose, as those b rought into play by the animal instincts. W i th the rise of the L am arck ian vie w of evolution the first “ n a t u r a l ” and genetic account of instinct came fo r w a r d .1 It w a s held that with the passing down of acquired habits from generation to generation, these became fixed in the nervous s tr u c tu re ; that is, they became instinctive. T h e bird builds its nest as it does because its ancestors learned consciously how to do so in the first instance. T h is function, acquired by experience, has been inherited and improved upon by countless generations, and has thus become native or innate. Finally, it has become a purely nervous function, requiring no antecedent experience on the part of the individual bird. In this w a y all sorts of ancestral experiences were made available to later generations by the simple bridge of heredity, thrown across the chasm between parent and child. Reflex acts, the adaptations due to the “ e ff o r ts ” pointed out by L am a rc k , the actual a ccom modations acquired by the intelligence and preserved by the experience of the forbears— all these are pre served in solid nervous connections, in the organism s of the individuals of the species. In this w^ay, the individuals are endowed w ith instincts. This is the psychological or L am arckian account of instinct, called by Spencer, to whom its fullest state ment is due, the “ lapsed intelligence ” theory. T h e instincts seem so intelligent because they once w e r e intelligen t; they were acquired by the aid of intelli gence. It is only their nervous apparatus that has 1 F o r a b r ie f a c c o u n t o f e a r lie r o b s e r v a tio n s on in s tin c t s e e M ia ll, History of Biology (in th is se rie s ), pp. 69 ff.

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been conserved in the form of in s tin c t; the intelligence, at first required, has lapsed, disappeared. T o this, the strict D arw inian theory, based on natural selection and denying the inheritance of acquired func tions, opposes the theory of accumulated “ va riation s.” It is evident that if L am arck ian inheritance be dis proved, or if it even remain unproved, the lapsed intelligence theory collapses completely. Ap art from all questions of plausibility, this has been the result : recent biologists have almost unanimously discarded the inheritance of acquired actions, or so curtailed its scope that it is highly unsafe to g iv e it any important place. Accord in gly, except for vitalistic theories, such as that recently formulated by B ergson 1— theories supposing in some form an intrinsic internal directive force in the life-process, by which functions are deter mined wholly or largely in independence of the action of the environment— the D arw inian theory is the only resource. Recent advances due to fuller observation and experi ment make an essentially Darwinian vie w less difficult to accept. T h e principle of social heredity or tradition, recently form ulated,2 rests upon observations which show the union of inherited and social activities in many functions formerly considered purely instinctive. By imitative or other processes of learning, the y o u n g of the various kinds acquire what has become a “ social 1 H . B e r g s o n , Evolution crSatrice (1 9 0 7 ) ; B e r g s o n h o ld s t h a t in s tin c t is a so r t o f d ir e c t o r “ s y m p a t h e t ic ” k n o w l e d g e on th e p a ri o f th e a n im a l, b e i n g in c o n t r a s t w ith th e “ l o g i c a l ” fo rm o f k n o w l e d g e s e e n in th e in te llig e n c e . 2 S p o k e n o f a g a i n b e lo w in th e s e c tio n on S o c ia l P s y c h o l o g y ; its r e c o g n itio n in a n im a l a c t i v i t ie s w a s m a d e b y W a l l a c e (Darwin ism), L I. M o r g a n (Habit and Instinct), a n d W e is m a n n (Studies in

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tradition ” in the species, thus supplementing- the rudi ments which are inborn. In many of the cries of animals, their special activities of feeding, play, nest ing, etc., an inherited but incomplete impulse or tendency is perfected and made effective by acquired tradition, which is handed down from generation to generation, not as a physical but as a social heritage. It results from this— and it is confirmed by inde pendent observations— that animal instincts are in many instances not perfect and invariable functions, as the older observers supposed. There are many partial in stincts— functions partially inborn— which ow e their effective exercise to the supplementing and perfecting due to teaching, exercise, and experience. T h e influ ence of the presence of parents, family, and companions on the g r o w i n g y o u n g of animals extends to some of the most vital functions of their life; and few instincts are entirely free from it. These considerations relieve considerably the strain put upon natural selection in the D arwinian theory of instinct; since it is no longer called upon in such instances to account for the perfect, invariable, and precisely adapted instincts described by the older naturalists. Instead, its operation need extend only to that factor or part of the instinct which is actually inherited. Tradition, the social factor, does the r e st.1 A further selectionist theory of instinct is made 1 T h i s is m a d e th e m o re e v id e n t , i f it b e tru e , a s th e t h e o r y o f “ o r g a n ic s e l e c t i o n ” m e n tio n e d a b o v e m a in ta in s, t h a t th e a c c o m m o d a tio n s r e s u lt in g from le a r n in g , e x e r c is e , tra d itio n , e t c . , sc r e e n a n d k e e p a liv e v a r ia tio n s c o in c id e n t in d ir e c tio n w ith th e m s e lv e s . In th is c a s e , th e c o u r s e o f n a tu r a l s e le c tio n w o u ld b e d i r e c t l y in th e lin e s first m a r k e d o u t b y in t e llig e n t , s o c ia l, a n d o t h e r a d a p t a tio n s ; a n d a n y s t a g e o f d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e in n a te fa c t o r w o u ld b e e ffe c tiv e i f s u p p le m e n te d b y a c q u ir e d m o d ific a tio n s, a s th e c ir c u m s ta n c e s o f th e c a s e m ig h t re q u ire .

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possible— though it has not yet to my k now ledg e been su g g e s te d — by the new vie w of the nature and role of variations due to de V r i e s .1 Instead of the minute variations supposed bv D arw in, “ f l u c tu a t i n g ” in every direction, upon which natural selection w as held to act, de V ries discovers in plants occasional m arked v a ria tions or “ m utations,” which breed true, and seem to establish stable departures from type analogous to new varieties. If this should prove to be true in the animal world generally, it would be possible to suppose that instincts, or some of them, arose as mutations or wide variations— adaptive in character, and permanent in inheritance— kept alive by selection. T h e late definitions of instinct hold to its distin gu is h in g character as b ein g an actual performance or act, not a mere innate impulse or disposition.2 Impulses or dispositions m ay be “ instinctive,” in the broad sense of in b o r n ; but an instinct, properly speaking, is an action, partly at least inherited, relatively complex, adaptive in character, and common to the members of a species. Or, defined negatively, it is a function which is not entirely learned from experience, not a simple reflex, not accidental or inadaptive, and not an indi vidual performance. Special F u n c t i o n s : Imitation.— A m o n g the functions closely investigated of late is that of imitation. T h e older and v a g u e view w a s that certain animals, such as the m onkey and the mocking-bird, were given to capricious im ita tio n ; and that the child w a s notoriously imitative. Recent investigations have treated the func1 M . d e V r ie s , D ie Mutationslehre (19 0 1-19 0 3 ). * W . J a m e s u s e s th e te rm in s tin c t, h o w e v e r , s o m e w h a t lo o s e ly fo r a ll in h e r ite d im p u ls e s o r p r o p e n s itie s .

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tion by observation, as it appears in the social life, and by experiment, as it is found in animals and children. In the result, the range of imitative activi ties has been both extended and restricted, as a clearer definition of the function itself has emerged. If imitation be defined from the point of view of the mechanism of the imitative reaction, it ta kes on a very wide range. It may then be considered as a “ circular ” or self-repeating fu n c tio n ; as when the y o u n g child repeats endlessly the “ M a-m a ” sound that he hears himself make. T his conception of imitation has an important place in p atho lo gy under the heading of “ mimetism ” ; it appears in many pathological condi tions, such as “ echolalia,” or mimetism of speech. T h e distinguishing point in this definition is that the stimulation which the act of imitation reproduces need not come from another individual. So far as the act is concerned, the result is the same if the stimulus is due to the action, or arises in the imagination, of the imitator himself. T h is opens the w a y for the inclusion of all sorts of auto-mimetic or self-imitative functions. T h u s the notion of imitation is broadened. It extends to actions in low organism s which are circular or selfrepeating, and also to conscious volitions, in which the imitation is directed toward an end set up in o n e ’s own mind. It thus becomes a unifying genetic principle of importance.1 T he other extreme definition of imitation m akes it essentially social, a “ c o p y i n g ” of one individual by another. In this form, the function is emphasised in theories of social organisation and inter-psychology.2 1 C f. th e w r ite r 's (1895), C h a p . I X ff. 2 A

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But this cannot be called either a psychological or a biological conception; since neither the point of view of consciousness nor that of organic behaviour dis criminates the character of the source whence a stimulation proceeds. It is rather a sociological con ception, and a concession to the popular idea of imitation as an act of personal copying. T h e tw o conceptions m a y, of course, be held to gether, one m a rk in g a special case under the other. It is necessary, however, to indicate clearly the u sa g e one adopts. In experiments on animals the second or sociological conception is usually adopted, such exp eri ments turning upon the behaviour of one animal in the presence of another. M any experiments have been made on animal imitation as thus defined. T h e result has been to establish the fact that imitation varies remarkably w ith the species; also that whether it enters essentially into the a n im al’s learning process— one animal profiting by w ha t he sees or hears another do— varies with the gra d e of the anim al’s intelligence and with the complexity of the act. In many cases it is so obscured by g r e g a r io u s habits and social in stincts that its signs are ve ry am biguous. In the higher forms it is especially m arked in functions peculiar to the species, in which a rudiment of native impulse in the direction of the function in question may well be supposed. An animal imitates another of his own species, where he would not imitate one of a different k in d .1 L ois socialcs (1898), b o th tr a n s la t e d in to E n g lis h , fo r a r e s tr ic te d s o c ia l p s y c h o l o g y . T a r d e u p h o ld s a n e x tr e m e im ita tio n t h e o r y o f s o c ia l o r g a n is a t io n : s e e b e lo w , s e c tio n on S o c ia l P s y c h o l o g y in C h a p te r V I. 1 T h e lite r a tu r e o f im ita tio n g i v e s m a n y d istin c tio n s , s u c h a s “ c o n s c io u s ," “ u n c o n s c io u s ,” “ s u b c o n s c io u s ,” “ p la s t ic ,” “ per-

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A s to its origin, the “ i n s t i n c t ” theory of imitation accounts for it, as the instincts generally are accounted for, Lainarck-wise or D arwin-wise. It is opposed by those, a m ong them B a in ,1 who consider the function acquired. T he social or c o p y in g mode of imitation is considered by W u n d t and others as a case of kiniesthesis— the prompting of a movement by the idea of that movement— since the copy may be looked upon a s an idea which stirs up a kin esth etic equivalent of_tEe. actual mnvrrncntT T h e irmfatlve type of reaction, how ever, psychologically and biologically considered as one that repeats itself through the reproduction of its own stimulation, is rooted more profoundly in organic conditions. It is seen in organic reaction to pleasur able and painful stim u la tion ; the former b eing selfrepeating, and the latter self-suppressing. On this view , as developed in the “ circular reaction ” theory, imitation has arisen from pleasure-pain or hedonic reactions which are fundamental to life. P la y .— Another function, common to animals and man, which has been taken out of the c a teg o ry of mere incidental action and shown to be a function of g r e a t utility, is that of play. Principally through the s i s t e n t ” im ita tio n , e t c . A c u rio u s p h e n o m e n o n is t h a t o f “ d e f e r r e d ” im ta tio n , a n e x a m p le o f w h ic h I m a y n o te h e r e from a b o d y o f u n p u b lish e d o b s e r v a t io n s on W e s t A f r ic a n g r a y p a rro ts. T h e p a r r o t s e e m s to m a k e n o r e s p o n s e w h a t e v e r to a w o rd r e p e a t e d in h is h e a r in g , fo r his le a r n in g , for d a y s o r w e e k s ; w h e n s u d d e n ly he is h e a rd u t t e r in g th e w o rd a lo u d , o r m u m b lin g it o v e r to h im self, w h e n th e r e is no c o p y g i v e n him . T h e stim u lu s r e p e a t e d s o o ften , h a s a so r t o f c u m u la tiv e e ffe c t, a n d a fte r a p e r io d o f in c u b a tio n , so to s p e a k , th e im ita tio n a p p e a r s . T h is m a y w e ll b e c a lle d “ d e fe r r e d im ita tio n ." A p e c u lia r it y o f it is th a t th e fa ir ly s u c c e s s fu l im ita tio n is n o t p r e c e d e d b y g r o s s ly b u n g li n g a tte m p ts , a lt h o u g h th e r e m a y b e a s o r t o f in te r n a l p r a c tic e b e fo r e the a r tic u la te so u n d is m a d e . 1 A l e x a n d e r B a in , Senses and Intellect, 3rd e d ., pp. 4 13 fT.

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important w ork of G r o s s ,1 the topic has become one of interest both to biology and to psychology. Earlier theories regarded play as a sort of luxury of life, a bit of by-play. T h e theory of “ recreation ” g a v e play a certain utility, that of providing recuperation to exhausted faculties during the g a m e ; and the “ surplus en ergy ” theory w orked out by Spencer, which made play a sort of “ e s c a p e ” or vent for stored-up animal energies, also g a v e it a certain value. But no theory till that of Gross assigned to it a really important genetic role in the economy of animal grow th . T h e “ p r a c tic e ” theory of Gross considers play a mode of preliminary exercise of the powers of mind and body, which gives them essential practice under con ditions free from the storm and stress of their serious exercise. T h e kitten teasing the ball of yarn is pre paring itself to be the cat teasing the mouse. The d o g p layin g at fighting and biting is exercising him self to be the victor in encounters in which d ogs really fight and bite. T h is extends th roughout all the playful activities of an animal species; curiously,2 but on this theory reasonably, they show b ung lin g and tentative imitations of the adult habits of the species. W h e n all reserve as to details and minor qualifications are made, this theory seems likely to remain a permanent contribution to the list of real explanations. T h u s considered, play is a function of high utility. It may have— and probably does have, as other writers have shown— other utilities. It is socialising, it is p u rgin g of the energies, it is run through with dramatic G r o s s , D ie Spiele der Tiere (1896), a n d D ie S piele der (1899), b o th tr a n s la te d in to E n g lis h . 2 S o m e tim e s a lu d ic ro u s e x h ib itio n , a s th e h o p p in g - a n d kicking forward o f y o u n g k a n g a r o o s . 1 K.

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and aesthetic meaning. M oreover, it serves the purpose of the exhibition and testing of the pow ers and character of the individual person or self, in a rem ark able w ay. It gives scope to the imagination, allows the free play of fancy. All these psychological utilities g o with the biological, as described in the practice theory, and in no w a y contradict it. T h e theory of play which thus describes its role and utility m akes of it, a lo ng with imitation, a native im pulse. T h e theories of its origin are those of imitation over a g a i n ; and play and imitation are found together. M ost plays are imitative, m any consciously so. The connection would seem to h ave its own utility a l s o ; for if play is to have its role in practising adult activi ties, it must be directed in the line of those activities. T h is could be done only by the production of an instinct to play each function before using it seriously, or by a more general method of b rin ging the im m ature func tions, all alike, under the dominion of the play impulse. T h e latter is n ature’s method, and imitation seems to be the means adopted. By im itating their adults, their own activities are practised by the y o u n g ; and by play ing naturally as their powers develop, they imitate the strenuous life. Gross sums the matter up in these w o r d s : “ Instead of saying, the animals play because they are y ou n g, we must say, the animals have a youth in order that they may p la y .” 1 Play has also become the starting-point for new observations and theories in the psychology of aesthetic appreciation and art production. In play the rudiments 1 It is o n su c h c o r r e la tio n s a s th is, a n d th e tru th s t h e y a r e b a se d upon, th a t a n e w a n d “ n a tu r a l” p e d a g o g y m u st b e b ased . E d u c a tio n a l t h e o r y a n d p r a c tic e a r e a lr e a d y p r o fitin g b y th e r e c e n t a d v a n c e s in g e n e t i c p s y c h o lo g y .

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of self-exhibition, decoration, make-believe or sem blance, and im aginative dramatisation appear, which g r o w up and flower in the aesthetic consciousness. Of this a further word below'.1 Accommodation and L earning .— T he process by which a new act is learned, a new accommodation effected, has been under very diligent investigation. T h e older theories were, here as elsewhere, la c k in g in experimental control; but they hit upon the theoretical alternatives which the newer w o r k is placing in the light. A p art from the purely “ c a u s a l ” theory— according to which the mind simply causes the movement of the bodv as it wishes, without h a vin g to learn how to do so— the “ reflex ” theory seemed the natural r e s o r t : the m ovement is alw ays a rellex, or a compound of reflexes, b roug h t out by the stimulus. Both in its amount and in its direction and character, the m ove ment is the effect of a definite cause. T h is is the Cartesian “ a u t o m a t o n ” theory reinstated in physio logical terms. Opposed to this mechanical view various vitalistic solutions have been proposed. T h e y all assume some thing in the life processes added to the mechanical response to the e n v ir o n m e n t: certain internal processes which initiate, regulate, or, at the very least, complicate and delay, the responses made by the organism to stimulation.2 T h ese three w ords— initiate, regulate, and complicate 1 In th e s e c tio n on “ / E s t h e t i c P s y c h o l o g y , ’’ in C h a p t e r V I . 2 A n e la b o r a t e d e fe n c e o f v it a lis m , b a s e d on g e n e r a l b io lo g ic a l c o n s id e r a tio n s , is to b e fo u n d in H . D r ie s c h , Science and Philosophy of the Organism (19 0 7 -19 0 S ).

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— are used in this order w ith the intent to bring- out the sta ge s of gradual retreat of vitalistic conceptions, in view of the results of experimental research. F ew hold to-day that the will or the soul can initiate a movement of the muscles in an absolute sense. No movement can be made outright, without learning and practice; to be made, it must have been made . 1 A ccord in gly it is held that a directive control over the energies released by the stimulus is exercised by the mind in its psycho-physical fu n ctio n ; volu ntary and even sem i-a u tom a tic2 m ovem ents have a degree of variability and u n c e r t a i n t y 3 that differentiates them, and rem oves them from the category of direct effects of given mechanical causes. N o t stopping to rehearse a gain the controversy on the mind-body relation, w e may state the results of recent w ork. Experim ents on low organism s have done little more than sharpen the issue and g i v e it a new term inology, in spite of the evident extension of the scope of the mechanical point of view and the accumulation of many facts. T h e theory of tropisms 4 reduces the higher responses to complications of simple 1 A c c o r d i n g t o t l i e p rin cip le o f “ k in a e s t h e t ic e q u iv a le n t s ” e s t a b lish e d in b r a in -p h y s io lo g y a n d p a t h o l o g y , no m o v e m e n t ca n be m a d e u n le ss a n d u n til th e r e is in th e m ind a m e m o r y , im a g e , t h o u g h t o r o th e r s y m b o l e q u iv a le n t to th e m o v e m e n t, d u e to e a r lie r e x p e r ie n c e o f m a k i n g it. C f . th e w r ite r ’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, su b v e r b o . T h e term “ k in s e s th e s is ” (“ fe e l i n g o f m o v e m e n t ” ) w a s first u s e d b y C . B a s t ia n , Brain as an Organ of M in d (i88o). 2 A te rm d u e to P r ie s tle y , w h o u s e d it to d e s ig n a t e a c t s a t first v o lu n t a r y w h ic h h a v e b e c o m e h a b itu a l. 3 T h e e a r ly d istin ctio n m a d e b y A v i c e n n a b e t w e e n d e fin ite in v a r ia b le a n d u n c e r ta in v a r ia b le m o v e m e n ts w ill b e r e c a lle d . T h e l a t t e r w 'ere a s c r ib e d to th e r a tio n a l so u l. 4 A te rm s u g g e s t e d b y J. L o e b to in d ic a te a d ir e c t “ t u r n i n g ” r e s p o n s e o f a n o r g a n is m o r c e ll in r e sp o n se to e x te r n a l stim u la tio n .

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ones, mechanical in character. E xcep t for new evidence, it amounts to a re-statement of the reflex theory, and the utility of the new word is not entirely evident.1 T he opposition to this theory, made articulate in the w o r k of Jennings,2 points to the complicated internal processes, chemical and vital, which lie be tween the stimulus and the response, even in the simplest o r g a n ism s ; and holds that this central net w o r k of processes is the seat of the directive and com plicating factor, w hatever it may be. It is also the scat of consciousness, which seems to va r y in degree and positive function with the apparent indeterminism of movement. T h e natural inference is that, w hatever its final m eaning may turn out to be, the presence of consciousness m akes this link in the chain “ psycho ph ysical,” rather than purely “ p h y s i c a l ” ; and this m akes a difference. W h a t difference?— just the differ ence w e see between volu ntary and reflex movements, between m ovements intended and directed as well as caused, and movements merely caused. W h ile , therefore, a remarkable sh o w in g of positive results has been made by experimental research on organism s high and l o w ,3 the outcome for general theory is so far a re-statement of the old theoretical alternatives. W i t h this difference, however : it g r o w s more and more difficult to hold to either alternative, mechanical or vitalistic, as being final. Hence it is 1 C e r t a in a u t h o r s h a v e r e je c te d th e te rm “ tro p ism ” o n a c c o u n t o f v a r ia tio n a n d a m b i g u i t y in its m e a n in g . 2 J e n n in g s , The Behaviour of Lower Organisms (1906). 3 S u m m a r ie s o f r e s e a r c h e s a r e to b e fo u n d in W a s h b u r n ’s The A n im a l M in d , a n d B o h n 's L a Naissance de I'Intelligence. S e e a ls o th e r e v ie w s g iv e n a n n u a lly in th e “ C o m p a r a t iv e P s y c h o l o g y " is s u e o f th e Psychological B ulletin.

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held by the advocates of a radical genetic point of vie w that the solution lies in the recognition of “ genetic m o d e s ” or stages in the process of nature, which arc sui generis, and each of which is a real advance, to be understood only in terms of its own characters or processes, not in terms of a simpler mode or by means of the scientific abstractions made to fit the simpler. The mechanical reading proceeds by the use of physical a n a logie s; the vitalistic, by those drawn from con sciousness and volition. N ature, however, achieves a union of the two which is psycho-physical; and our daily observation teaches us that neither the one an alogy nor the other is adequate to symbolise it. In the investigations, how ever, made on accom modation and learning, in the province of movement, a noteworthy advance has been made. It has been shown that the actual new adjustments which constitute the learning of a movement are, certainly in many cases, subject to the law of “ trial and e r r o r ” or “ selection from over-produced m ovem en ts.” T he animal tries with more or less success— actually less and then more — until he learns. T he history of this principle, now probably safely proved, may be briefly indicated.1 In principle, as its early proposers recognised, it is an application of D a r w i n ’s law of selection. T h e m ove ments of trial or “ try-try a g a i n ,” va ryin g in force and direction, are “ c a s e s ” ; and with the multiplication of cases, the chance of “ happy h i t s ” — a phrase used by Bain in discussing this topic— is increased. So looked upon, the problem w a s ably but somewhat abstractly discussed by Spencer, who postulated diffused dis c h arge s from the nervous centres, g i v i n g an over1 Its a n t e c e d e n t s a r e o v e r lo o k e d , a s is o fte n th e c a s e in th e first flush o f e x p e r im e n ta l s u c c e s s .

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production of “ r a n d o m ” m ovements in g r e a t variety — “ fortuitous,” in the D arw inia n phrasing— of which certain are adaptive. These are subsequently carried out by a w a v e of “ heightened nervous e n e r g y ,” which fixes a path of least resistance in the organism . In order to this, another important factor is necessary, and Spencer recognised i t : a feeling of pleasure is connected with such successful and adaptive m ove ments, which, by association with the pleasure, are repeated and made permanent. Bain b rou g h t to the problem the idea of “ native sp ontaneity,” a primitive tendency to movement with which, on his view , all life is endowed. Movement precedes sensation. It is from this store of original, restless, overflowing activities that adaptive m ove ments are selected. He adopted the idea that pleasure and pain regulated the selection. In his phrase, plea sure “ c li n c h e s ” the adaptive action and by association m akes it permanent through repetition. T h e order of the factors, in the view of Bain, is as follows : “ random movement, pleasure, memory of pleasure with memory of movement, adapted m ovem en t.” 1 Bain recognised 2 that all the essential factors of his theory had been named by S pencer; but B a i n ’s treatment is more concrete and convincing. It is upon this b ackground of theory that the law of “ trial and e r r o r ” em erges from experimental research. 1 Q u o te d from th e w r ite r ’s s u m m in g u p o f a m o re d e ta ile d e x p o s itio n in a n o t h e r p la c e (M ental Development in the C hild and the Race), C h a p . V I I , 3rd e d ., p. 173 , w h e r e it is p o in te d o u t th a t it is th e p le a s u r e t h a t is th e o r ig in a l te rm — if n o t th e first in tim e -— sin c e it is n o t a re p e titio n o f th e m o v e m e n t a s su c h , b u t o f th e p le a s u r e a n d its c o n d itio n s, th a t g i v e s u tility to th e r e a c tio n a n d fu rn ish e s e v id e n c e o f th e a d a p t a tio n . 2 B a in , Em otions and W ill, 3rd e d . (1888), pp. 3 18 f.

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It re-states, so far as the method of perform ing and singling- out the successful movement is concerned, the law of “ functional or excess selection from over produced m ovem ents.” It brings the learning process into line with other cases of the production of appar ently directed results selected from ill-assorted data. “ Trial and e r r o r ” is a phrase used in the mathe matical treatment of chances. Experim ental research, however, has not y et answered the other questions involved : what is it that constitutes the act an adapta tion?— and what clinches or preserves such movements rather than those which are suppressed? T o these questions, the Spencer-Bain theory in some form still supplies the only answer— pleasure and pain. T h e proof of this law through experiment, however, carries the application of D arw inian selection into a new and unexpected field. Its application is possible and has been made to volu ntary no less than to merely responsive m ovem en ts.1 Experim ents have been made upon various aspects of learning, understood in the la r g e r p ed agogical sense. T h e y extend from the conditions of m emorising to those of conscious relating and apperceiving. A much disputed question is as to whether the discipline of one faculty improves others— the old question of “ formal training ” — and more generally as to w hat are the laws ruling the correlation of the faculties.2 Experim ents on children have come to supplement observation, in the pursuit of Child Study, another line 1 “ T h e O r ig in o f V o litio n in C h i ld h o o d ,” Proc. Inter. Cong, of Psychol., L o n d o n , 1902, r e p r o d u c e d in th e a u th o r ’s Fragments in Philosophy and Science, C h a p . V I I I . 2 S e e P . B a r th , D ie Elemente der Erziehungs- w id Unterrichtslehre (1906).

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of genetic w ork. Biographies, diaries, “ question naires,” experimental studies, theoretical interpreta tions, have all taken on a more serious and scientific look since the day of the publication of D a r w i n ’s and P r e y e r ’s careful observation s.1 W h ile not of startling theoretical importance, the results have justified the genetic method and reinforced its d a ta .2 Serious treat ment of certain of the large r questions involved in the psychology and biology of the g r o w i n g individual are to be found in such w o rk s as that of Hall on adolescence.3 1 C h . D a r w in , “ B i o g r a p h i c a l S k e t c h o f a n O .S ., I I , pp . 285 ff. ; W . P r e y e r , D ie S eek des

I n fa n t,” M ir d , (4th e d .,

K in d es

1895). 2 F o r a r e c e n t s e t t i n g t o g e t h e r o f r e su lts s e e C la p a r & d e , La Psychologic de I’enfant et la Pedagogic (1908). 3 G . S . H a ll, Adolescence (1905).

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Scientific Psycholo gy in the Nineteenth Century and Beyond. III. Special Lines o f W ork (concluded). I. Social P sycholog y.— P sycholo g y has reflected the eollectivistic tendency g enerally noticeable in late nine teenth-century tho ught. Th is tendency showed itself in certain well-marked movements. It appeared in evolution theory— as D arw inism worked its w a y be yond the biological sciences as such— in the substitu tion of the grou p for the individual, in cases of selection in which the utility subserved w a s collective. It was seen that social utility may replace indivi dual a d v a n t a g e ; that group competition may succeed to personal r iv a lr y ; that the “ good of the whole ” may be better than the “ good of a ll.” It appeared further in political theory in H e g e l ’s view of the S t a t e ,1 in the stirring of the ferment of R o u sse a u ’s doctrines, and in the beginnings of Socialism .3 In the matter of scientific method, C o m te ’s Positivism w a s its vehicle; and the science of sociology, as projected by Com te, w a s to explain the theory, as well as apply the method, in the domains represented by social science and psychology. In psychology, it became potent in consequence of the c r f fi a s n T of theories based on the concept of an isolated individual. T h e English “ moral philosophy ” had pointed out the pow er of sym pathy and altruism, 1 H e g e l , D ie Philosophic des Rechts (1833). 2 T h e first e d itio n o f V o l. I o f M a r x ’s D as K a p ila l a p p e a r e d in 1867.

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as a ga in st self-love, and the inherent strength of the collective instincts and springs of action. T h e affective motives were shown to run a th w a rt the intellectual, as represented by the law of association of ideas, which had been formulated as a principle w o r k in g within the indi vidual mind. M eanwhile the sociologists were meeting with d ow n right failure and suffering discredit, in their attempts to found a social science upon an un-social psychology. T h e “ s o c i o l o g y ” of the biological analogy, that of the s tr u g g le for existence, that of imitation, opposition, and repetition, that of the com pounding of sensations, desires, and b eliefs,1 that of the association of ideas used to explain the association of human beings — all these more or less futile sociologies put in evidence the need of a psychological theory of the social indi vidual. T h e motives of collectivism clearly expressed in D a r w i n ’s theories of instinct, emotion, and morals were held in check by S p e n c e r ’s ambitious pre-emption of the field of social science with a construction motived by individualism and founded on association. M ore over, the disciples of Com te, in England at least, spent their energies on practical questions and measures and on the n egative criticism of metaphysics. In E n g la n d , too, the hindering influence of the theory of association w as seen at w o r k in the O x fo r d school of anthropologists. In T y lo r 2 and M ax Muller alike, dissimilar as they are, the psychology of primitive man is read in term s of that of the civilised; and this largely by means of the common and universal operation of association. 1 T h e s e a r c h fo r th e “ e l e m e n t a r y s o c ia l f a c t ” h a s b e e n a n a lo g o u s in s o c i o lo g y to t h a t fo r th e o r ig in a l “ e l e m e n t ” in p s y c h o lo g y . 2 E . R. T v lo r , Prim itive Culture ( 1 8 7 1 ) ; M . M u lle r , Science of Religion (1870).

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T he need became apparent for a genetic and social psychology, which would reveal the state of the indi vidual mind in given social conditions; the relation, that is, between individual and collective “ representa tion ,” to extend som ew hat the phraseology of the French writers referred to in the discussion of primitive th o u g h t.1 P u t in Kantian form, the question of social psy chology is this : H o w is a social subject or self possible? Is he a socialised individual self, or is he an individual ised social self? T h e outcome of social psychology until now points plainly to a n egative answer to the first, and a positive answ er to the second, of these questions. It thus reverses the point of v ie w of his torical individualism, and g iv e s collectivism its point d ’appui in the processes of mental development itself. T h e larger results upon which this verdict is based m ay be stated in order; in this w a y the present status and program m e of social psychology will be brought out. (i) T h e matter of “ tr a d itio n ” has been cleared up. It has already been pointed out that a true social heredity is to be recognised a m on g animals, running parallel to physical heredity and supplementing it. In human gro u p s this is enormously developed in w h a t we call “ culture,” a body of beliefs, usages, and sanctions transmitted entirely by social means, and administered to g r o w in g individuals by example, precept, and dis cipline.2 Th is constitutes the social store, the collective 1 C h a p t e r II. o f V o l. I . 2 In c e r ta in e x tr e m e s t a te m e n ts o f th is v ie w , s o c i e t y is m a d e a n o r g a n o f c o n s tr a in t, a s o r t o f n e w L e v ia t h a n , b y w h ic h in d iv id u a lity a s su ch is c r u s h e d ou t. S e e D u r k h e im , Le Suicide, a n d c f. M a u d s le y , Physiology a n d Pathology of M in d .

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wealth of the group, its moral heritage. It consti tutes the milieu, a body of influences which are neces sary to the development of the individual mind. Such functions as lan gu a g e, spoken and written, play and a r t ; such inventions as fire, building, and w ea v in g , are not only conveniences of life; they are necessary means of grow th . W h a t sort of a being would develop w ithout them ? Just the primitive truncated being we actually find in the rudest men, only worse. The a n a logy of the immature child, born physically before its period, is more than a figure. T h e society into which the child is born is, therefore, not to be conceived merely as a loose a g g r e g a te , made up of a number of biological individuals. It is rather a bodv of mental products, an established network of psychical relationships. B y this the new person is moulded and shaped to his maturity. H e enters into this netw ork as a new cell in the social tissu e,1 joining in its movement, revealing its nature, and contributing to its g r o w t h .2 It is literally a tissue, psychological 1 A p h r a se u s e d b y L . S t e p h e n in Science of Ethics. 2 C e r t a i n o f t h e b o o k s in w h ic h th is a n d th e fo llo w in g - p o in ts a r e d is c u s s e d from d iffe re n t p o in ts o f v i e w a re B o s a n q u e t, P h ilo sophical Theory of the State (2n d e d .) ; G . S im m e l, Soziologie (190 8 ); P . B a r th , D ie Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie (1906) ; L a c o m b e , D e VHistoire considdrde conime science (1 8 9 4 ); T a r d e , L a Logique sociale (1893), a n d P. tudes de psychologie sociale (18 9 8 ); R ib o t, L a Logique des Sentiments ; G u y a u , Education et H dredit d a n d Esquisse d ’une Morale. T h e p o in t o f v i e w o f c o lle c t iv e p s y c h o l o g y w a s c a r r ie d in to e t h ic a l d isc u s sio n in E n g la n d b y S . A l e x a n d e r , M oral Order and Progress (1889), a n d L . S te p h e n , The Science of Ethics (1 8 8 2 ); s e e a ls o O r m o n d , The Foundations of Knowledge (1900), a n d D e w e y a n d T u f t s , Ethics (1908). T h e te r m in o lo g y in th is fie ld is n o t w e ll d e v e lo p e d . I fo llo w t h a t e m p lo y e d in m y w o r k Social and Ethical Interpreta tions ( 1 8 9 7 ) ; c e r ta in o f th e t e r m s — s u c h a s “ s o c iu s ,” “ s o c ia l h e r e d it y ,” “ s o c ia l s it u a t io n ,” “ s o c ia l d i a l e c t i c ,” e t c . , h a v e n o w b e e n w id e l y a d o p te d . T h e r e a r e n o g e n e r a l s u m m a r ie s o f

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in character, in the development of which the new individual is differentiated. H e does not enter into it as an in d iv id u a l; on the contrary, he is only an indi vidual when he comes out of it— bv a process of “ b u d d i n g ” or “ cell-division,” to pursue the physio logical analogy. Society is a mass of mental and moral states and values, which perpetuates itself in indivi dual persons. In the personal self, the social is individualised. (2) T he more specific task of social psychology then appears. It is that of tracing out the internal develop ment of the individual mind, its progressive endowment with individuality, under the constant stimulation of its entourage, and with nourishment drawn from it. A constant give-and-take process— a “ social dialectic ” — is found between the individual and his social fellows. B y this process the materials of self-hood are absorbed and assimilated. T h e “ s e l f ” is a gradually form ing nucleus within the mind; a mass of feeling, effort, and know ledge. It g ro w s in feeling by contagion, in k n o w ledge by imitation, in will by opposition and obedience. T h e outline of the individual gradually appears, and at every sta ge it shows the pattern of the social situation in which it becomes constantly a more and more adequate and competent unit. This process the social psychologist has patiently traced o u t; and apart from details, on which opinions differ, it constitutes a positive gain to our knowledge. r e s u l t s ; th e Introduction to Social Psychology b y M e D o u g a ll (190S) c o m e s p e r h a p s n e a r e s t to it, th o u g h it is a ls o a firs t-h a n d s t u d y ot‘ th e p ro b le m s. S e e a ls o E llw o o d , Sociology in its Psychological Aspects (1912). T h e a n n u a l “ S o c ia l P s y c h o l o g y ” is s u e s o f th e Psycholog. B ulletin m a y b e co n s u lte d ; a n d th e s e le c t lists o f title s g i v e n in th e D iet, of Philos, and Psych., sub verbis.

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T h e consciousness of the self, thus developed, carries n ith it that of the “ alter ’’-selves, the other “ socii,” who are also determinations of the same social matter. The bond, therefore, that binds the members of the group together is reflected in the self-consciousness of each member. T h e external social organisation in which each has a certain status is reinstated in the thought of the individual. It becomes for each a psycho logical situation constituted by selves or agents, in which each shares the duties and rights common to the group. Upon the b ackground of commonness of nature and comm unity of interests the specific motives of reflective individuality— self-assertion, rivalry, altruism — are projected; but they are fruits of self-eonsciousness, they are not the m otives that exclusively deter mine its f o r m .1 All through its history, indivi dualism is tempered by the collective conditions of its origin. W h e n the self has become a conscious and active person, w e m a y say that the mental individual as such is born. B u t the individual remains part of the whole out of which he has arisen, a whole that is collective in character and of which he is a specification. Me lives and moves and has his b eing still in a system of collec tive facts and values. He is a “ sociu s,” an element in a social netw ork or situ a tio n ; only by this can his individuality and independence become possible or have any meaning. In this new sense is the Aristotelian dictum confirmed— “ man is a social anim al.” But we m a y express the whole truth more adequately by saying that man is a society individualised; for in the new 1 O f course, the instinctive self-seeking’ and ego istic m otives are present a lo n g with the social from the start.

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individual society comes a lw a y s to a new expression of itse lf.1 (3) Once introduced, the inch develops into the ell. T h e social strain in the normal w orking- of most of the mental functions has been made out. Bio logical intimations of social conditions have been pointed out in bashfulness, organic sym pathy, g r e ga riou s impulses, etc. A p art from the specific means by which the processes of socialising and training g o on— contagion, imitation,2 play, sympathy, obedience, la n gu a g e, moral sense, etc.— the element of “ com munity ” has been found to extend to the operations considered by earlier thinkers the most individualistic. Self-love is never free from a colouring of sym pathy, invention rests upon imitation, rebellion involves the recognition of the rights of others, rivalry is a form of co-operation. T h o u g h t no less than life is shot through with the motive of collectivism. Opinion is formed on social models, social authority precedes logical validity, private jud gm en t is never really private. Even in the processes of deductive reasoning, funda 1 T h ere is room here for a g re a t diversity in philosophical interpretation. T h e Positivist, seein g his collectivism confirmed, rests with satisfaction upon his oars, or seeks to c a rry out a socialistic program m e. T h e Spiritualist finds the social dialectic m erely a draw in g out or education o f the social “ fa c u ltie s” of the soul, born with the body. T h e H egelian finds in it em pirical eviden ce o f the w ider d ialectic o f the absolute S e lf com in g to consciousness in man. T o one w ho holds the radically gen etic point o f view’ it is a process o f new form ation, a form ative process sni generis. T h e self is made out o f social ingredients. W ithout them the inherited mental ch aracters would have no chance to com plete them selves in a person. A s in other cases o f radical gen esis, the outcom e cannot be reduced to its elem ents or explained by th em ; it is a n ew “ g e n etic m o d e ” o f realitv. 2 An e arly anticipation o f the p lace o f imitation in social life is to be found in B ageh ot, Physics and Politics (1872).

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mental social conditions of genesis are never wholly concealed : the “ p ro p o sitio n ” is a social “ p r o p o s a l ” or s u g g e s t i o n ; the conclusion is held to be valid for all persons as well as for all c a s e s ; even the constructive categories of thought are founded on racial expe rience ingrained in individual endowment. There is a synnomic force in all reflective thought, in all science.1 II. Affective Psycho lo g y .— Under this heading we may place for our present purposes the psych olog y of the functions which are included under the “ motive powers ” of the Scottish writers and the Gemiith of the G erm ans : the general phenomena of feeling and will. 1 T his has becom e more and more plain as the “ psycholog is in g ” o f lo g ic has go n e on in a series of w o rks in which thought has been treated not m erely form ally, as o f old, but as an actual in stru m en t: the “ L o g ic s ” of Lotze, S igw a rt, Erdm ann, W undt, B rad ley. In English this m ovem ent has been contributed to by Venn, Em pirical Logic (1889), and Jevons, Principles of Science (1873). S ee also R. Adam son, The Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II (1903). P sych olo gies which show this tendency are those of Jodi, Lehrbuch der Psychologie (1896); Brentano, Psychologie, V ol. I (1874); Jam es, P rinciples of Psychology (1901), and Baldw in, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I (1889) and E xperi mental Logic, V ol. II of Thought and th in g s (1908). T h e theory o f judgm ent has becom e the storm cen tre, since Brentano announced his view that jud gm en t is an origin al function. In the outcom e, the Aristotelian lo g ic has lost much o f its im portance ; it has been driven to interpret the form al elem ents o f thought either, on the one hand, as sym bols of an absolute principle, with H e g e l; or, on the other hand, as sym bols o f mere lo gical and m athe m atical relationship, with the “ sym bolic ” and a lg e b ra ic logicians. Sym bolic lo g ic in the latter sense w as founded by B oole, A n Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854). T h e m ovem ent of “ p sy ch o lo g ism ” has been further accen tu ated since the impulse of the ge n etic point o f view has been added to that o f the psychological, in the later treatises o f the pragm atic school. A note on “ Psychologism us ” is to be found in K lem m , Geschichte der Psychologie, pp. 165 f f ; the reaction again st it in G erm any is led by Husserl, Logische Untcrsuchungen (1901-1902).

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T h e recent advances made in these subjects are im portant, but not surprising-, seeing that in the historical development of theories they have been neglected. K n o w le d g e a n d 'th o u g h t have had a “ tru st.” The Kincesthetic Theory.— F or Locke and the French spiritualists the “ sense of e f f o r t ” was the citadel of the inner life. It w a s connected with mental activity because it seemed to be the channel by which mental initiative expressed itself. T h e ou tgoin g nervous cur rents were its agents in m o v in g the muscles. T h is w as formulated in the “ innervation theory ” of effort. According to a group of writers, of whom W u n d t 1 remained long the protagonist, the seat of physical effort w as the centre of actual discharge of en ergy from the brain, the process being the “ inner v a t i o n ” of this centre; in straining to m ove the arm, and succeeding, we feel the motor or “ efferent ” energy pa ssin g out, proportional in quantity to the effort made. Bastian 2 and James radically disputed this theory. It w as declared that effort w as sensational, due, like other sensations, to “ i n c o m i n g ” or “ a ff e r e n t ” cur rents, to peripheral excitation. Y'arious sensational accompaniments w ere pointed out in the muscles of the throat, scalp, and organs affected, without which the particular effort could not be made. T h e experimental examination of muscular sensation in general came to reinforce this contention. It w as confirmed also by phenomena observed in troubles of speech and w r itin g .3 T h is view , known as the kin1 W . W undt, Grur.dziige der physiologischen Psychologie, ist ed. ; in later editions W undt has grad u ally modified his view , attem p t ing, how ever, to save his “ te rm in o lo g y ” (see 6th ed., 1908-1910). 2 Charlton Bastian, B rain as an Organ of M in d (1880), who su g g este d the term “ kin sesthesis” ; W . Jam es, The Ser.se of Effort ( 1880). 3 S ee E. Strieker, Tiber die Bewegungsvorstellungen (1882), and

B y perm ission.

A 'otman, Boston.

illiam

Ja m e s .

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aesthetic or peripheral theory, in opposition to the innervation or central theory, has gradually come to prevail. Effort is a lw a y s directed in certain channels; and w hat we feel is the incipient stirring up of the sensational processes involved in the muscular action effected by means of these channels. L ate discussion, moreover, shows that the feeling of o u tgo in g energy is not necessary for the grou n d ing of spiritualism. T he consciousness of effort remains the same in any case. T h e “ o u t g o i n g ” or discharge of energy is as much a physical process as the “ incom ing ” ; it amounts to w hat a g r o u p of recent sensation alist writers have called “ centrally initiated sensation ” 1 — the differences characteristic of central states being concealed under the term sensation. T h e kinaesthetic point of view rapidly extended itself. T h a n k s largely to patholo gical cases and to medical research in aphasia, paralysis, hysteria, etc., it cam e to be applied to volu ntary movement as a whole, as has been indicated above. In the theory of m uscular m ove ment, based on kinaesthesis, it is contended that a sign, image, or “ c u e ” immediately or remotely 2 equivalent to sensations of movement must be in the mind before the will to move can take form in concrete effort or issue in movement. T h e effective “ i d e a ” of how the movement “ feels ” must be present to start the energies of actual movement. T his equivalent “ idea ” is a mass of kinaesthetic reverberations due to earlier movements.

Uber die Sprachvorstellungen (1880), and the literature o f the “ internal speech ” and volition, sum m arised in the w riter's M ental Development in the C hild and the Race, Chaps. X I V (espe cially) and X III. 1 S ee Kiilpe, Grundriss der Psychologie (1893). 2 S ee Jam es’ later discussion. Princip les of Psychology ( 1890), chapter on “ W ill.”

SPECIAL LINES OF WORK The applications of the principle w ere not yet finished, however. T w o writers, C. L a n g e 1 and YV. James, applied it about the same time to emotional expression and to emotion itself. The theory of “ emotional e x p r e s s io n ” announced by Darw in in his book on the subject 2 started new interest in the life of feeling. It established an important link in the D arw inian chain binding man to the animals. T o D arw in all emotional expressions— seen at their best in facial expression— w ere either (i) survivals of “ ser viceable associated habits,” (2) movements antithetic to these habits, (3) or movements resulting from “ direct nervous d isc h arge .” O n these three cases his three laws of expression were based. T h a t of “ serviceable associated habits ” w as the revolutionary one. It recog nised, in the g r e a t fixed expressions accom panying emotion, useful defensive and offensive actions, acquired by the animal in crises involvin g high emotion. T he expression of fear, for example, is w hat remains of actions found serviceable by the animals in conditions occasioning fea r; that is, in d anger of some kind. This principle w a s concretely demonstrated by D arw in, and is rarely disputed to-day.3 T h e further application of kinaesthesis consisted in say in g that all consciousness of emotional expression, like that of effort, is 1<ina?sthetic or afferent in its 1 C. L a n g e , t)ber Gemiitsbewegungen (Germ an translation, 1887, from the D an ish); Jam es, M in d , ix, 1884, and Principles of Psychology (1890). Jam es’ later revised form ulation is to be found in the Psychological Review, I, Sept. 1894. 2 Ch. D arw in, The Expression of Emotion in M an and Anim als. O th er w orks on expression are Bell, The Anatomy of Expression ; M an tegazza, Physiognomy and E xp ression ; M osso, Fear. 3 D arw in 's other law s a re in dispute, esp ecially that o f “ antithesis." T h e “ d ir e c t” nervous d isch arges o f a convulsive confused sort, produced in conditions o f stro n g emotion, seem to be gen eral phenom ena of intensity and overflow o f a kind

G u stav (Copyright.

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nervous b a s i s ; and, further, that this consciousness is no more nor less than the emotion itself. In experien cing- an emotion, w e are conscious of the incipient stir ring up ot a mass ot e x p ression. This would mean that instead ot ha vin g an emotion and acquiring its expression by the law of associated habits, one should say that the habits acquired by the animals in defence and offence have left after-effects which are felt as emotion. T h is has been widely admitted for the “ c o a r s e r ” inherited expressions. J a m e s ’ last pronouncement tended to limit it to these. T he_ higher em otions and sentiments, intellectual, aesthetic, e tc., which ha ve less evident expression, are in dispute. 1 It would seem that if the emotion is due to a previously established adaptive and serviceable action, some principle of direct excess-discharge, such as that supposed by D arw in and Bain, would have to be assumed to account for this adaptation; and in that case we may say that this discharge m ay be a factor which in its nervous seat, and possibly also in consciousness, is not ldncesthetic.2 T h e importance of the kinaesthetic principle, however, is undisputed. It results in handing over the entire body of movements, both volu ntary and involuntarv, and much of the life of feeling, to the sensationalist which the principle o f “ d y n a m o -g e n e sis" would lead us to exp ect. So far as this leads to new accom m odations, it recalls the “ exce ss d isch arges ” and “ overproduced m o vem en ts” m ade use of in the Spencer-Bain th eory explained above. 1 A thorough discussion is to be found in Lehmann, D ie Hauptgesetze Aes menschlichen Gefiihlslebens (1892). R ecen t experi mental results 011 feelin g are discussed by T itch en er, Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention (1908). 2 Bastian, an E nglish physician, the first kinassthetic extrem ist, so to speak, does not gen erally receive due credit. He held that the brain-centres usually called “ m o to r" are not d isch arge centres, but cen tres o f “ kinaesthesis.”

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theory. T h e motor consciousness becomes one of sensations of movement and their r einstatem en t; and sensations of movement are merely a special class, or number of classes, like those of sight and h e a r in g .1 T h e theory of mental activity and spiritual reality must find its claim elsewhere than in the superficial sense of activity which accompanies muscular movement. A s further result, the theory that considers emotions as compounded of jDleasures and pains receives its death-blo w; as also does the intellectualist theory, accordin g to which all emotion is due to the play of ideas. L ate r analysis distinguished feeling from sensation. P h ysical pain has been isolated as a sen sa tio n ; mental discomfort remains a feelin g. Bain found feeling to' reside in a certain ruffling or “ e x c i t i n g ” effect upon consciousness. Mere consciousness itself is looked upon by m any as feeling. One “ feels,” as Bradley holds', the operation of each and all the functions alike; feeling is then identified with “ i m m e d ia c y ” to con sciousness, or with mere subjectivity. A broad formnlntion justifies the use of the terms “ a ff e c ti o n ” and “ a ff e c t i v e ” as applying both to con c rete feelings or emotions (called “ objective feelings and to cases in which conditions of consciousness or t h e _self are directly reflected (“ subjective feelintrs ” ^. Between these extremes lie the more v a g u e qualitative sentiments, moods, etc., in which the objective con ditions are less definite.2 1 Experim ental analysis h as show n that the tactile-m uscular grou p o f sensations includes several sense-qualities which pro b ably have distinct nervous elem ents, i. e.t “ pressure ” sensations, “ j o in t ” sensations, “ te m p e ra tu re ” sensations, as w ell as sensa tions o f “ touch ” and “ m uscular con traction .” 2 So far from lending itself to a th eory o f an ultim ate “ ele m e n t” know n as “ affection,” this latter term is justified only

T ir. R ib o t . (Copyright.

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[From Baldw inâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s H istory o f Psychology, W atts & C o., 1913.]

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Affective Revival and Affective L o g i c .— T h e m ove ment a w a y from the intellectualist theory of feeling has assumed the proportions of a th o rou g h g oin g revolt, led by Ribot. Ribot asserted not only that feeling— emotion, sentiment, e t c .— w a s an original state, not dependent on presentation; but also that feeling had its own independent revival (memoire affective), associa tion, and generalisation (logique affective). There is a “ l o g ic ,” a series of im aginative and subsumptive pro cesses, in which feelings— not ideas nor “ ideas of feel i n g ,” but feelings them selves— are the subject-m atter.' T h e bearing of this appears as soon as the. current intellectualist theory of revival is recalled to mind. A c c o rd in g to it only states of knowledge, consisting of im ages, cognitions, relations, etc., can be revived. All memories are c o g n itiv e ; only presentations can be recalled as representations. This means that the memory of a feeling or emotion is never produced directjy, but alw ays by means of the memory of the thing, idea, or bit of k now ledge to which the feeling w as earlier attached. T h e feeling is, therefore, new, and not r e v i v e d ; it attaches to an old c o g n i t i o n ; it is never the reproduction of an old feeling. T h is seems on the surface artificial and unlikely e n o u g h ; but it “ went without s a y i n g ” until Ribot challenged it. Since then a variety of analyses, facts, and a r g u m e n t s 2 have established, in the opinion of by reason o f its extrem e ab stractn ess and gen erality. Indeed, “ affection " has about the sam e relation to con crete “ a ffe c tio n s” that “ feeling;” has to “ feelin gs.” 1 T his m ay well be called the “ autonomous ” th eory o f feeling, in con trast with “ intellectual ” and “ organ ic ” theories. 2 Principally in French : see R ibot, L a Logique des Sevtim ei ts (1904), and Problemes de la Psychologie affective (1909); Paulhan, I.a Fonction de la memoire, etc. (1904); D au riac, E ssai sur I'esprit m usical (1904) ; various authors in the Revue philosophique for recen t years.

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many, the truth of affective r e v i v a l ; and its bearings are begin nin g to be w orked out, with fruitful results, in a wide ran ge of topics 1 T h ose who accept it hold, in principle, (i) that feelings arc directly remembered and a s s o c ia t e d ; (2) that they are subject to a sort of “ generalisation ” in moods or sentim ents; and (3) that in the general form they are available for more or less com plex processes of description, intercourse, ejection, etc., in a w a y that presents analogies with the logic of concepts. Feelin g has its “ l o g ic .” If this logic of fe eling is frwmWl in the active life, as some of its advocates hold, the theory joins hands with the motor and habit theories of generalisation, attention, synthesis, interest, etc., w orked out by the functional p sych olog ists.2 In this wider movement, Ribot w a s also one o f the pioneers.3 Anim ism and E jective P ro c esse s.— T h e g h o s t of a nimism has haunted the psychological house ever since the corner-stone o f the structure w a s laid by the Greeks. B egin n in g with mystic “ p a r ticip a tio n ” and 1 Such a s those o f “ valuation,” “ com m on ” em otion, “ com munity ” in m orals and art, etc. 2 T h e extension o f the idea o f “ affective m em ory,” like that o f the kinaesthetic, seem s to be “ destin ed." It is fit to su rv ive ; 110 doubt in part on accou nt o f the extrem e unfitness o f the intellectual theory, which breaks down in m any fields. M usical phenom ena, and those o f fine art gen erally, furnish rich data, the more because these sentim ents have never had any plausible theoretical treatm ent. T h e present w riter feels free to sa y this because o f his own conversion to the affective theory, occurrin g betw een the publication o f the “ theory o f social m a tte r” based 011 intellectualism (Social and Ethical Interpretations, 4th ed., 1906, C hap . X II), and that o f the “ logic of p ra c tic e ” (Interest and Art, Vol. I ll o f Thought and Things, Chaps. V I and V II), w here the logic of feelin g and interest is a ccep ted and extended. T h e literature, ap art from the French w riters cited, is not exten sive : see U rban, Valuation, Its Nature and Laws (1909), and Psychological Review, V III, N o s. 3 and 4, and the literature o f Valuation (both pro and con). 3 Ribot, L a Psychologic dc I'attention (1895). VOL. II.

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occult “ possession,” as revealed by the anth ropologists and students of human culture, it passed into the “ pan-psychism ” and “ a nthropomorphism ” of early speculation, as narrated by the historians, and became popular in the religious d o g m as of “ tr a n s m ig r a tio n ” and “ demon-worship,” as recorded in many sacred books. The history of psychology down to Descartes shows, as we have seen, a prolonged effort to restrict fhe sphere of the mind-term of what became at last a strict dualism of su b stances.1 A s with the other spontaneous solutions of the riddle of the world, animism recurred in the reflection of later philosophy, in th(TTonfr~otH^i^wed” pfm^p5Tchism and psychic atomism. T h e grou n d in g of such positions, however, had to be more secure than that given to animism in early social tradition and religious faith. T h e result took form both in attempts .to account for the tendency to “ animate ” natu re— to find the motive of animism in general— a nd in attempts to find out how m uch truth it really embodies. Allow to primitive man definite motives for believing in the soul-life, the Beseelung, of nature, how far, it is then asked, is he right in doing so? T h is distinction o f questions is brought out in one of the influential theories of recent times, the theory — of “ introjection " of A v e narius.2 This w r iter finds in a nimism a necessary and universal procedure for the a p prehension of the world, ha vin g its roots in social situations :md e x t e n d in g to animal life. T he dot;- that 1 A historical account and appreciation o f animism is given in W . M cD o u g all’s Body and M in d, a History and a Drjp.nre nf Animi -Hi ( m il] .

2 R ichard A venarius, D er menschlichc Weltbegriff (1891) ; see also his K r itik der reinen Erfahrung (1888-1890).

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sees another clog eyeing’ the same bone with himself acts in a manner to show that he finds in the second clog a sort of mind. In some crude w ay he apprehends the other d o g as havin g the character w e call mental. Me is, then, in so far animistic. T h is appears in the jealousy of animals, sometimes directed even toward inanimate things. T h is is “ introjection.” On this view, the presence of animism in early societies and in the earliest speculation is well-motived and necessary. Its universality as reported by the anthropologists would lead us to expect this. It is further supported by the fact that there is in social and individual thought, alike, a “ p r o je c tiv e ” period in which the first panoram ic apprehension oF things sees them as in movement, as-if-animate, not as dead and still.1 A sort of j nind-mcaning is projected into things. A venarius answ ers the second question also. He finds that although introjection or animism is necessary, in the development of thought, it is none the less mis taken. T h e world is not w hat the animistic interpreta tion takes it to be. It is the business of reflection to correct it, by a re-interpretation of the phenomena on which it is based. In oth er w o r d s, after the develop ment of dualism there comes a lw a y s historically the interpretation of dualism; an interpretation extending to the genetic motives by which the dualism itself w as created. One of these interpretations (not that supported by Avenarius, h o w e v e r 2) looks upon animism as a sta ge 1 T h e term “ p ro je c tiv e ” is freer than “ in tro jectio n ” from positive im plications, and also from the further special bearin gs given to introjection by Avenarius. 2 A ven ariu s’ interpretation is based upon an experien tial criti-

1 2

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in the evolution of thought, not necessarily w rong, certainly not illusional, but relatively cru d e; a first interpretation. T h e vitality of the animistic position is seen in its recent history. It still lives in its m ystic and occult forms as a psychosophy, no less than in philosophical and psychological theories. W e have with us the emotional and mystical spiritists, as well as those who reach the same conclusion by w a y of “ psychic research,” the revelations of “ telepathy,” or other more or less serious methods. A remarkable outbreak of psychosophy or occultism, together with earnest attempts to deal with its problems scientifically, has m arked the history of the last generation .1 A lteration s

o f P erso n ality

and

llie

U n co n scio u s. —

A departure of more evident scientific importance, bearing on the question of the unity of the mental principle, is found in research in the field of double and multiple personality. B egin nin g with the inv estig a tion of hysterical patients whose field of personal con sciousness w as much restricted, through the loss of cism, Etnpiriocriiicism us, o f the whole o f experien ce considered a s a .system ; see the K ritik der reinen Erfahrun'g. T liis l^is h.-nn ~ deveTone d b v Rehm ke. Hofler, a nd other w riters o f the “ immanental ” school, who have em phasised the presen ce ot ••form * 111 m ental operations. T o them “ form-quality " <icstaltsquuiiiiit, , exten ds not m erely to formal- rules'OrTTofins, but exists in actual^ qualities in consciousness ; such a s the identical form o f the sam e/ m elody when rendered in different k e y s (J. R ehm ke, Lehrbuch derj allgemeinen Psychologie, 2nd ed ., 1905; H. Hofler, Psychologie J

i897)-

1 A s to the results, opinions differ from the n eg ative o f most of the professional psychologists to the more favourable verdict of those w ho think, that the sep arate existen ce o f the soul and its im m ortality have been scientifically dem onstrated. S ee Proceed ings of the Society /or Psychical Research (1S82 ff.) ; also H yslop, Problems of Psychical Research (1909).

SPECIAL LINES OF WORK sensibility in localised areas of touch, vision, e t c .,1 it extended to the observation of trance conditions, in which alternating- or simultaneous personalities appeared in the same living body. A m o n g the most remarkable cases are those reported by Flournoy and P rin ce.2 It has been shown that portions of the nervous system m ay function in relative isolation and detachment, the disturbance sho w in g itself in the presence of partial mental a g g r e g a t e s which tend, in J am e s’ phrase, to “ ta k e on personal fo rm .” Interpretations of these parts vary from the purely physiological to the psycho logical and spiritistic. T h e advocates of pan-psychism explain it by the hypothesis of elementary psychic or “ s o u l ” properties, supposed to attach to each living cell or unit of the body. Materialists find in it evidence of a real disintegration or decomposition of mind, the normal unit personality g i v i n g evidence merely of the larger unity of organisation of the brain.3 A radically functional view of mind sees in these phenomena merely the consequence of psycho-physical parallelism. If, it may be asked, binocular v.ision can be so deranged that the tw o eyes see “ double,” w h y may not the same be true of any more or less distinct portions of the nervous sy ste m ? — assum ing, that is, that each preserves its own functional integrity. A secondary result appears in the new light these facts throw upon the question of the unconscious. In the cases cited, evidently, the sensations, memories, 1 Binet and F ere, A nimal M agnetism (1886); Binet, Alterations de la personality (1892), in English tran slatio n ; Janet, L ’Autornatisme psychologique (1889). In these investigations, hypnotism proved to be a valu able instrument. 2 Flournoy, From India to the Planet M ars (3rd ed , 1910); M. Prince, The L)issociatiou.cf a Personality (1905). 3 See H. M audsley, B o d y and M in d (2nd ed., 1873).

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e t c ., which are outside the “ p r i m a r y ” or normal con sciousness are not really unconscious; they are present in a subsidiary or “ s e c o n d a r y ” consciousness, so far as they remain mental a t all. Ejection and Sem blance.— A new form taken on by the animistic concept has appeared in modern dis cussion of religion, in the theory of the “ eject.” T he English positivist, C lifford ,1 defined God as the form in which the human mind “ e j e c t s ” its own being or self out into the world. T h e human self, at each sta g e of culture, is idealised and set up as a personal object of worship. God becomes, in the phrase of Romanes, the “ world-eject ” ; like the world-soul of the ancients, it is a projection on a larger c an vas of the im ag e of the human soul.2 God is made in the im age of man rather than man in the im age of God. T h e hypothesis of ejection has worked forward to su g g e s t exact empirical research, as well as b ackw ard to confirm the studies of the anthropologists. Jn two recent departures we see its rein statem en t: one in the statem ent of the process of individual g r o w th in selfconsciousness (already adverted to, and to be discussed more fully in the chapter on “ In terpretatio n ” 3) ; the other, in the discovery of the facts of aesthetic “ sem blance ” or “ em p athy.” 4 1 W . K. Clifford, Seeing and T hin kin g (1879). 2 A modern statem ent o f the world-soul th eory is to be found in F ech n er’s Nana (1849); see also his Zend-Avesta (2nd ed., 1900-1902). 3 C hapter V II, below. 4 A term su gg ested by T itch en er and W ard as rendering for the G erm an Einfuhluvg. “ /Esthetic sem blance " is the equivalent of “ em pathy-" I' is lo be hoped the confusions m ay be avoided' in E nglish that have m ade the G erm an term alm ost useless. It has becom e equivalent to “ anim ism ." E m pathy is no doubt tht best term for the strictly aesthetic movement, some other and m ore gen eral word such a s “ sem b la n ce” b ein g used for the entire gro u p of analogous im agin ative processes.

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In spite of passing anticipations,1 the credit b elon gs to Th. Jip p s of havin g investigated the facts and fo r mulated the rules of the sort of semblant or im ag in a tive reading of the self into aesthetic objects which he calls Einfiihlung .2 In his important w ork, /.E sthetics, the principle is made one of universal explanation.3 It appears to explain the fact that in aesthetic appreciation the spectator has a certain sym pathy or “ fellow-feeling ” (Mitchell) for the object, apprehending it as-if it could itself leeLj. that is, as if it were animate. In this broad tendency, we see the kinship oi the movement with those of animism and ejection, and this suffices to giv e to it its iirst classification. Hut we find that the treatment of the aesthetic object as if it could feel, or as if it were a self or subject of feeling, involves the sort of mental movement that all as-if or “ s e m b l a n t” functions in v o lve : a sense of “ m ake-believe,” “ self-illusion ” (Gross, bewusste Selbsttuuschung), willing deception (Paulhan, m en son ge), Scliein. W e speak otL~~fbe “ illusions ” of the theatre, the “ m a k e -b e lie v e ” of play, the artificial conventions and “ h y p o c r is ie s ” of social life; all thesejcontain alike an element of “ a s - i f ” or pretence, which w e all a gree to and allow to pass. Th is results in a second and narrower classification of the aesthetic phenomenon : it 1 N o tably that o f Lotze in Uber den Begrifj der Schonheit (1845). S ee also his Microcosmus (1856). 2 T h . Lipps, Raumaesthetik (1893-1897); Aesthetische E in fiih lung (1900); Aesthetik (1903-1906). 3 S ee also K . G ross, D er asthetische Genuss (1902). In E nglish the literature is not exten sive : see M itchell, Structure and Growth of the M in d ; W . M. U rban, Valuation, its Nature and Laws (1902); Baldw in, Interest and A rt (1911). F o r a full exposition o f G erm an discussions see V. B asch, Revue Philosophique, Vol. X X X V II, Nos. I and II, and for th orou gh goin g criticism , Ch. Lalo, Les Sentiments esth&tiques. Cf. also Paulhan, Les Mensonges de I'art (1906).

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is a case of semblancc. T h e aesthetic object simulates the r e a l ; it does not assert reality. It depicts; it dogs n o t n nr r . - i f p.

But we have not y et com e to the differentia of E infiihlung or empathy. T h e aesthetic object is not only (x) a semblant object which (2) falls in the class of beings that feel; it is further (3) endowed with the human life and with the ve ry feeling of the spectator himself. It is a process o f ejection, of the semblant re-reading, o f the personal s e l f ; it is an auto-projection of the self into the w ork of art or the beautiful thing-. A p art from other possible criteria or essential m arks of aesthetic experience— such as idealisation— this, it is claimed, is one criterion and essential mark. * T h is discovery, apart from the unchastened use made ? > r TE irT~ccr-tain of the more speculative German trea tises,1 is recognised by many as a notable advance. It seems To include and to unify many of the partial insights of earlier writers on aesthetics. It is vigorously opposed, especially by the “ intellectualist ” 2 and “ tech nical ” theorists, who find aesthetic value respectively in a rational idea and in the technical sufficiency of the w ork of art. It constitutes, however, a notable advance in the understanding of the aesthetic sentiment as such. The Attention.— As remarked above, the problem of attention w a s neglected until modern times. It w as taken up by Condillac and the French spiritualists, 1 T h e p a ssage from the strict aesthetic mode o f ejection to the broader m eanin gs o f sem blance and animism has brought con fusion into the discussion and opened the door to hostile criticism . Instead of the em pirical m eaning o f the sense o f self, o f w h atever grad e, a m etaphysical principle, “ the S elf,” is invoked to explain the facts. - F or a presentation o f the intellectualist theory, see B. Bosanquet. History of /Esthetics (1892), a w o rk written from a very ex parte point o f view.

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notably Larom iguiere, w ho found in it evidence of pure mental activity. Fries distinguished “ in v o l u n t a r y ” from “ v o l u n t a r y ” attention.1 Its g r o w i n g importance in recent psychological theory is the result of several som ewhat distinct causes. In the first place, the discovery of hypnotism and its investigation brought the attention into critical notice. The tw o schools of P aris and N an cy, differing widely in theory, still agreed on the technique of hypnotism, as requiring the induction of a fixed or static state of attention, directed upon a single idea (monoideisme). It w a s through this state that the sleep in which the “ s u g g e s tio n ,” essential to the N a n c y view , w a s found to ta k e place, and also the states of relative trance, considered characteristic of it by the Paris authorities, were alike induced.2 T h is has remained perhaps the greatest gain from researches on h y p n o tism ; for light was thrown upon the function and the effects of atten tion. In pathology, it has resulted in the resort to mental sym pto ms and diagnosis, as supplementary to physical, and to theories based upon a variety of dis turbances of the attention, found in mental disorders.11 A g ain , investigations in both experimental and animal psychology have shown the attention to be of capital importance. States of distraction, preoccupa tion, over-concentration, etc., are m atters of high importance in the control necessary to experimentation 1 T h e form er belonging’ to the “ low er o r d e r ” o f processes, memory, habit, and association with im agin g. 2 T h e Paris school is represented by the authorities o f the Salpetridre hospital, led by C h arcot ; the N a n cy school, by Li^geois and Bernheim . 3 S ee esp ecially the w ork, Les Ndvroses, etc. (1898), o f P. Janet, who su g g e ste d the term “ psychasthenia ” as bein g more appro priate in m any cases than “ neurasthenia.''

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upon the mind ; and the psychology of these different conditions is slill to be w orked out. In connection with reaction time, differences have been made out due to sorts or types of attention. In experiments on animals, the pre-requisite to any sound results— in investigation on learning, imitation, etc.— is that the attention be effectively attracted and normally e n g a g e d .1 Th e s e special indications converge upon the atten tion; and with them g o indications given by the general psychology of effort and volition. T h e result is a body of theories about attention and some experiments upon it. T h e theories are in general those which typical vie w s of the mental life would respectively welcome. T h e “ intensity,” “ inhibition,” and “ m o t o r ” or “ d y n a m i c ” theories are the presentday alternatives. In the intensity theory one recognises the Herbartian and Humian notion that high intensity or vividness in a presentation is what is meant by attention; there is no function as such, called “ the attention,” which may be on occasion focused upon the presentation. This is, in short, a “ c o n t e n t ” theory, either sensational or presentational. In its sensational form it w as stated by Condillac. T h e “ m o t o r ” theories are at the other extreme. They recognise a functional concentration or fixation of the mind upon the presentation, either drawn by the content or selective of it. F o r this theory it is “ the attention,” the “ a c t iv i t y ” of the spiritualist psychology identified with a mass of active or motor processes. 1 T h e ever-present difficulty is to secure experim ental conditions so natural that the animal is not distracted, confused, or made afraid. T h is is esp ecially difficult when the natural g reg a rio u s habits are interrupted under conditions of isolation.

SPECIAL LINES OF WORK In the development of the mental life, the motor pro cesses act as the adaptive and fixing a g e n t ; the atten tion is an organ of intellectual, as the muscles are of organic, accommodation. T h e actual motor elements involved have been variously described.1 T h e “ in h ib ition ” theory is, in a sense, a negative rendering of the intensity point of view. A ccord in g to it, there is nothing intrinsic about a given presentation that it should be attended to ; it is attended to, when it is, because of the inhibition or restraint of other contents, by reason of which these cease to be rivals to the former. T h e rival presentations fall aw ay , or are held back, and the one left free stands in relative isolation, and so secures the vividness which we call attention.® Contemporary Views of the M ind.*— T h e present 1 See Ribot, Psychologie de Vattention. In the w riter's schem e, for exam ple, M ental Development in the C hild and the Race (1886), the attention to a thing or idea m ay be analysed into elem ents, as shown in the follow in g form ula, A lt = A + a + a. A stands for the gro ss m uscular and organic tensions o f “ g e ttin g rea d y," n ecessary to an y a ct of attention ; a for the more special pro cesses o f concentration to a class of things, a s o f the e y e muscles in vision ; and a for the most special p rocesses o f seizin g upon and reco gn isin g the single th in g or presentation. E v e ry a ct of attention has “ g e n e r a l” elem ents, “ c la s s " elem ents, and “ individual ” elem ents, all of them motor in character. 2 T w o recen t sum m arising books a re by E. B. T itchener, The Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention (190S), and W . B. Pillsbury, Attention (1908). Both these authors do scant justice to the “ m o to r” th eory. 3 T h ere are other special departures which m ight be noted before closin g our brief exposition. M ost important w ork has been done in m ental pathology. T h e investigation o f individual heredity and c h a ra cte r w as given a fruitful impulse by the w orks of F. G alton (Natural Inheritance, and Enquiries into Human Faculty), to w hose initiation a lso— reinforced by the statistical m ethods used by K . Pearson on investigations on “ bionom ics” — it is due that the undertaking called “ e u g e n ic s " starts out with promise for p ractical p sych o logy and morals.

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day secs the refined and reflective re-statement of older theories, but has its own preferences as well. The pendulum swung- widely to the left in the late nineteenth century, when the “ n e w ” nerve physiology and path o lo g y substituted the brain for the mind, and the advocates of the experimental met hod talked of a “ new psychology without a sou l.” T h e middle point of the return sw in g w a s touched in the theory of psycho-physical parallelism and in the scientific a g n o s ticism which professed a neutral attitude in respect to the nature of mental reality. This had the merit, at least, of silencing much of the philistinism of the “ n e w ” departures just referred to. In the present decade the pendulum is m ov in g to the right, toward a re-statement of the spiritual theory. It appears in the return to consciousness, considered as the first datum of k n o w le d g e— as in the movements of “ neo-criticism,” “ imm anentism ,” “ radical empiri cism .” 1 T h e mind is said to be just w hat it seems to be, just what it shows itself doing and experiencing. T h e substance view of the soul is replaced by an “ a c t u a l i ty ” 2 view of the mind. Mind is w ha t we actually find it to be; just as body is what the physicists find the properties of matter actually are. P sych o lo gy is as capable of dealing with mental c han ges and laws as physics is with physical. T h is is supported also by thinkers whose interests are 1 A phrase given curren cy by W . Jam es. T h e point o f view w as exp licitly taken up by S hadw orth H odgson (Philosophy of Reflection, 1878, and M etaphysic of Experience, 1898), in a sus tained and original analysis o f exp erien ce. A s in Hume, the dualism o f inner and external w orlds is derived by this w riter within llie sphere of experien ce itself. W ith Bain and Jam es, H odgson (who died in 1912) ta k es his place as one o f the forem ost modern represen tatives of empiricism . 2 S ee Paulsen, Einleitung in d it Philosophic (1892).

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moral. It permits the reassertion of the point of view of Lotze, according- to which the mind has its own synthetic function, different from that of the brain, and possibly under some conditions— realised, it may be, in another life— independent of it. T h is also appears in various forms of “ intuitionism ” and “ im m ediatism .” O f the former, the m ovement in F ra n ce is especially noteworthy, where the revolt a ga in st the logical pretensions of the formal idealists is based upon a negative critique of conceptual k n o w ledge. T h e resort is to immediate intuition, and to direct experience of life and the w o r ld .1 T he immediatism w hich results from a critique of logical thought takes on various forms. Both feeling and will are resorted to, to make good the defects of knowledge. There is a new affeetivism and a new voluntarism. T h e former takes shape in constructive aesthetic theory— a renewal of the pancalistic s u g g e s tions of Plato and K a n t — and in thinly disguised m ysti cism. Voluntarism appears in form s va r yin g from pragm atic relativism and psychological theories of value — considered as being more fundamental than truth— to the return to absolute will. Just now we have the day of feeling, passion, striving, as before the year nineteen hundred w e had the day of reason, logic, conceptual knowledge. 1 S ee B ergson , Les D onnies immediatcs de la conscience (1890), and I'Evolution crdatrice ( 1907).

Part

G E N E T IC

VI.

IN T E R P R E T A T IO N H ISTO R Y C

hapter

THE

V II.

The Development o f Individual Thought. Ix the Introduction it was stated tliat in our exposi tion we would note the bearing of the analogy between philosophical and individual interpretations of the men tal principle : between the r a c e ’s and the individual’s progressive understanding of the self. In various places, accordingly, we have pointed out in passing the application of this thought, and our main division of the history into epochs has illustrated it. T h e epochs designated prelogical (primitive), spontaneous (Greek), and reflective (modern), belong to the history of thought and to the history of the person alike. T h e interest attaching to the facts will be enhanced if we state the principle a little more succinctly, espe cially in vie w of deciding w ha t it does not imply. This we will first attem pt; and then g iv e a brief sketch of the actual course of the individual’s normal develop ment, in which the main s ta g e s will be thrown into relief. T h e points of correspondence between the two movements will then become plainer. The parallelism or concurrence in question is this : the course of human interpretation presents a series of progressive stages which bear analogy, both in

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character and in order of appearance, to the stages of the individual’s progressive understanding of the self. The reason for considering this parallelism as more than an a n alogy has been intimated a b o v e .1 There is an important sense in which the two series appear to be not really two, but only one. T h e racial prog re s sion is due to a series of assimilations, on the part of society, of the thought's or interpretations of indi viduals. Social thought is a re-reading of individual thought. On the other hand, the results reached by individuals are re-interpretations of socially current material. Individual invention and originality a lw a y s proceed by a re-reading of earlier know ledge, belief, or practice. S o far as the mere facts go , therefore, we sec some reason for sa y in g that the tw o series can not be radically different or dissimilar. H o w could society, represented by the series of racial thinkers, reach results which were not also normally achieved in typical individual points of v ie w ? On the other hand, the individual’s capricious im aginings, his atypical and purely personal fancies, would not “ set ” in the social mould or appear in the historical movement. This is clearly the case with the topic of our inquiry, the self, w hatever may be said of the less fundamental and merely factual beliefs and opinions. T h e view entertained by the mind is an interpretation of one of the tw o parts of the g rea t w orld-cleavage into self and th in g s; and the movements of the individual’s thought, like those of the r a c e ’s thought, represent a very grad u al g r o w th in the course o f the entire experience of life. T h e self is a c h i e v e d ; it must be constantly tested and found to hold g o o d ; it is the permanent ' Introduction in Vol. I.

GENETIC INTERPRETATION centre of values, both individual and social. Its development, therefore, in the one case as in the other, can g o forw ard only by a scries of adaptations reached through stru gg le and a ch ie v em e n t; it is the outcome of a continuous tr a v a il.1 I. T he ltisc and Developm ent of Dualism in the Individual. W e will now inquire into the series of interpretations of the self and the world reached in normal individual development. Psycho lo gists find that the child very early comes to recognise in himself a centre of the events ta k in g place about him. T h a t is to say, he is the centre of his own apprehension and experience. But his early self is his whole person, not his mind simply. The physical person is the seat of the s e l f ; but it differs, he soon learns, from the things which arc not persons. 1 T his leaves untouched, o f course, the question o f the nature o f the d evelop in g principle ; to ta k e that up would be only to add our own interpretation to the rest. W e are dea lin g here sim ply with history. It m ay be well also to point out certain other questions which remain over ; to indicate certain things which the principle here announced does not imply, (i) W e are not dea lin g with the history o f culture as such, the social attainm ent o f an epoch or people ; but with the theory o f the mind or soul which w e find exp ressed in the w ritings o f its representative thinkers. (2) It is, therefore, most frequently the advan ced thought, not the a v e ra g e social belief that we have to consider. (3) W e do not raise the questionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; touched upon 011 anoth er p a g e â&#x20AC;&#x201D; as to the possible achievem ents of individuals, at this epoch or that, had th ey been born in some other environm ent or epoch : the question o f a real p rogress in human endowm ent. On the other hand, the tw o valid applications o f the a n a lo g y in question are these : (a) that which rests upon so cial historical p ro gress rather than a d va n ce in individual en d ow m en t; and (b) that which finds in the recorded or reported outcom e of pro gressive human thought abou t the self an advan ce parallel with that found by psych o logists in the developm ent o f individual thought.

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W h a t it is that m akes this difference— the something that is present in the body to m ake it a person— he is to learn only very slo w ly .1 It is his gra d u al discovery and interpretation of the m eanin g of this difference that motives his g r o w th in knowledge. If w e d esig nate any sort of distinction between these tw o factors of personality, between mind and body, that is, as dual ism, w e m ay say that at first experience is probably without dualism. In more technical terms, it is “ a-dualistic.” B ut the dualism of mind and body tak es its rise and passes through certain well-marked sta g e s o f de velopment, the details of w hich we cannot here relate.2 T h e principal movements, however, arc as follow s— (1) T he Projective S ta g e : the interpretation of all nature as crudely animate, w ithout distinction o f livin g and dead, mental and physical. A s g i v i n g a first advance tow ard a sense of the m eaning of the self, it is called “ projective.” Alth o u gh a-dualistic, still its striking feature, movement, a gen cy, mysterious force, is on the side of what afterw ard s comes to characterise mind as the self. This character is simply projected forward, a lo ng with the other m arks of n atu re; it is not in any sense reserved for the self. It is also, so far as human— that is as representing human values and beliefs— a collective or common mode o f appre hension. T h e child accepts the traditional and conven tional estimates, methods and sanctions. H e cannot 1 F o r the theory o f the social origin o f self-consciousness see 1he w riter’s Social and Ethical Interpretations (4th ed.). C f. also R o y ce , Studies in Good and E v il; Ormond, T he Foundations of Know ledge; M ezes, Ethics, Descriptive and Exp la natory; M cD o u g all, Introduction to Social Psychology. 2 On the progressive developm ent o f the dualism o f mind and body, see the w riter's Thought and Things, Vol. I, “ Functional L o g ic .” VOL.

II.

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be independent or logical, not being y et a complete individual. Me is developing in the social matrix. T h e la rge r interest, representing the essential moulding of his personality by society, is all-absorbing to his curiosity and all-imperative for his practice. It is his nature, not his will, that leads him to follow the social trend. (2) The F irst Differentiation: the apprehension of persons as different from things, without, however, the apprehension or interpretation of the m arks of sub jectivity. T here is merely the discovery of an actual but indefinite differen ce; the marks that indicate an inner centre of experience are not separately cognised. T h e character of this difference appears as the positive m arks of the contrasted term s develop (as g iv en just below). (3) The Rise of S u b je c tiv ity : the experiences of the inner life itself, its pains, pleasures, efforts, ctc., are apprehended as b elon ging peculiarly to the self, which is for this reason “ sub jective.” E very person becomes in this sense a subjective centre of personal experience, h a vin g emotions and desires which are peculiarly his own. T h e merely projective m arks of personality are taken over from others by imitative absorption and found to be marks of the private self. By his a w a r e ness of this he becomes conscious of the individual mental life as a circumscribed area. T h is is the period of the rise of the subjective. A t this stage, the dualism ta kes on more definite form, since the objects of the world are those th ings which do not have the subjective character. T he objective exists over aga in st the subjective, the outer over a ga in st the inner, dead things over a gainst con scious persons.

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T h e young- child’s interest does not pass easily over to external objects as such ; he treats them as instru ments of action, means to ends, tools for the ca r ry in g out of personal purposes. H is concern attaches in preference to persons, w hose acts and attitudes con stitute, with his own, the continued and highly inter esting panoram a of life. T h e interest so aroused and developed continues to be, as at first, a collective one, a social on e; since his distinction of persons from things does not yet am ount to the radical separation of persons as individuals from one another. “ M an is the measure of all t h i n g s ” ; but the m eaning of “ m a n ” is that connoted by the collective “ w e . ” T his is the “ subjective-objective ” stage. (4) Ejection. This last-named s ta g e of dualism— the “ subjective-objective ” stage-— is confirmed and hardened by the process known as “ ejection .” By this is meant the tendency to understand other persons, and personality in general, in terms of o n e ’s own experience; to ta k e the outline sketch giv en in o n e ’s own subjective life as lit to be placed upon the similar life of others. “ T h ey fee l,” sa y s one, “ act, and desire, as I do or as I should in their places. I understand them because they are selves as I a m ; my g r o w i n g experience enables me to interpret their conduct con stantly more accurately. In short, in the words of the social psychologist, I ‘ eject ’ m yself into the other person; and that which is thus common to us both and to all individuals is the social self, the socius, of the group. It connotes a self of personal values, sanc tions, and duties, in w hich all individuals by their very nature participate.” It is for this reason that the interests and values of the early life continue to be so distinctly collective and k

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social, even after the objective world as such is fairly apprehended. Only gra d ually are the motives of indi vidualism released. E ven the know ledge o f things, resting upon sense perception, and confirmed on occa sion by individual observation, is socially tested and supplemented; it is a body of “ collective representa tion ,” as the French sociologists phrase it. Besides w hat it merely is for recognition, an object means w hat it is for use as a social utensil or instrument; just as to us adults, while a lamp-post on the corner is a post, it means withal a system of g o o d or bad city illumination : it is both a thin g and a civic symbol. I11 all this, there is the further connotation which is due to the survival of earlier collective interests. A child accepts the say-so o f parent or teacher, and docs not rcllect or judge independently. In matters at all removed from im m e diate apprehension, the social standard and tradition are final and obligatory upon his know ledge and con duct. And even in cases of direct sensation, the social interest so floods over and obscures his perception that an a-logical and mystical m eaning may be imparted to the simplest and most commonplace th ings and events. A similar state of mind is often present in adults, as in the Christian com m unicant’s attitude to w ards the H o st or its elements. W h a t Christian, even the sternest Protestant, sees in the Eucharist merely a morsel of bread? Alth o u gh bread, it is also the B od y of Christ. W h ile , therefore, the individual at this s ta g e of his g r o w th does understand persons as b eing subjective, it is a social and practical subjectivity that he reaches, not one in which the single personal self and its inter ests are fully isolated. T h e character, ends, and objects of tho u ght and life arc collective. E v ery th in g is

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socially prescribed and socially judged. T h e family, the school, the social set, embody the socius which is the subjective principle, over a gainst objective and inanimate things. (5) The Growth of Objectivism. A similar harden ing of the objective term of the dualism g o e s on, but much more slowly. T h e child only gra d u ally comes to interest himself in th ings for themselves and in k n o w ledge for itself, apart from the personal concerns to which they are instrumental. l i e has to be ta u g h t to observe things and describe them accurately, to report exactly w h a t he sees and hears. H is definitions are couched in terms of interest and practical use : a stone is “ w h a t you throw at b ird s,” ice is “ that which cools the w a t e r .” It requires an enormous mental readjust ment to effect the transition of interest to the objective pole of the w orld-d ua lism ; and this even when all the ped agogical agencies of example, precept, and instruc tion are exerted to aid in the achievement of it. Never, in fact, do any of us completely emancipate ourselves from the subjective preference which is so largely of social origin. T here remain a lw a y s many of B a c o n ’s “ idols of the d e n ” : im ages of social origin and interest which w e worship at the expense of the colourless forms of objective and neutral truth. B u t the process of logical emancipation does g o on. T h e factors o f external reality, which w e find to be foreign to u s ; the actual data of sensation, which restrict our a ct iv itie s ; the requirements of accuracy in m e m o r y ; the need of common results a m on g ourselves in the details of k now ledg e— all these things lead to the establishment of a body o f facts and truths by which the movements of personal interest and prefer ence are controlled. T h e b o y ’s know ledge of the topo

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g r a p h y of the neighbourhood becomes accurate, just as does the s a v a g e ’s k now ledg e of the regions of the forest in which he lives. T r u th comes to dominate and guide his activities in the direct affairs of life; although preferential interest m ay continue to lead in the further interpretation, and result in the contortion of truth as soon as these direct affairs are lost sight of. T he child know s that “ Dolly ” is not alive, and treats her on occasion as a mere inanimate thin g; “ D o l l y ” is then the objective doll. Hut “ D o l l y ” is also the dear child, the preferred playmate, the injured loved one. The larger personal and sentimental interest en gulfs the mere objective t h i n g ; and the world of persons, sub jective and preferential, asserts its superiority with overw helm ing force. T h e tw o “ D ollies,” born of the tw o rival interests, objective and subjective, live to gether without discord in the one porcelain im age. So to the adult the mere thing, which is real enough, dis appears in the holy object, the familiar fa ct in the m ystic presence it signifies. In the “ le g a l- te n d e r ” note, the mere printed paper m erges in the social instrument of exchange and profit. T h is doubleness of meaning, attaching to things generally, remains in the mind of most men in civilised society. Rut the progress o f thought in the individual is, nevertheless, not arrested at this point. Individuals may, and many do, learn to reflect upon life and mind, and to attempt to construct science, even though most men remain ignorant o f such problems. T h e p a ssa ge into w hat w e m ay call a reflective or logical dualism shows certain further m otives at work. (6) Immature Dualism. A continued em barrassment arises in the presence and role of the body, the physical part of the self. It is at once a mere thing and also

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the intimate seat of the subjective life. T h e two interpretations to which inanimate thing’s are open, on occasion resting side by side without g r e a t inconveni ence, now com e into flagrant opposition. M y frie n d ’s body, and even my d o g ’s, can never be to me a mere thing, although it is an external physical object. I alw ays have to treat it as a living or personal body, a centre of feeling and action. So with m y own body. It is, of course, a th in g ; but for me it is not only the instrument, it is the very residence of my self. One w a y of escaping from this dilemma is seen in a g r o w in g emphasis of the subjective. T h e agen t asserts himself to the extent o f seek in g to dominate the physical and control the things of sense and fact by force of personal preference and will, or by ign o r ing the physical a lto ge th er.1 S o a pronounced indi vidualism is born. T h e g r o w i n g child manifests a series of resisting, a g g re s siv e , and “ c o n t r a r y ” atti tudes; he rebels a ga in st authority and refuses to recognise facts. W e say he is w ilfu l— which is true ! In this tendency, the individual subject and its interests tend to free themselves from the social matrix. T h e sturdy self-assertive person appears, ready to dis regard for the time the mere things which he uses as instruments of his efforts and purposes. And he finds in other persons centres of pow er and individuality like himself. A fruitful opposition of wills arises. Another direction of g r o w th appears in a lapse from the binding conditions of the dualism itself, when resort is had to a tem porising personal a ttitu d e : a 1 T h e psychosophic counterpart o f this is seen in the quasi religious view s which recogn ise certain a sp ects o f the physical while ign orin g others because they a re disag reea b le or painful or “ e v il.”

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sort of hedonism, opportunism, and scepticism. This appears more simply in the individual than these descriptive terms, drawn from the sphere of reflective thinking, would indicate. It is a state o f surrender, impotence, laisser faire. “ W h a t ’s the u s e ? ” “ I d o n ’t c a r e ,” “ N o g o o d ,” arc its expressions.1 It leads, how ever, to the step taken in advance when both terms of the opposition are giv en due force and a further development of the dualism itself becomes necessary. (7) Psycho-physical Dualism. Such a development could have only one issue. T h e hardening of the mind and body terms— each assim ilating to itself a wide range of experiences— leads to the separation of the twro types of existence into two disparate controlfa ctors or substances. T h e spiritualism of early religious instruction and of conventional social belief is the refuge of the individual’s thought. H e believes that he has a “ soul,” a spiritual substratum, which is nevertheless placed in a body which is in nature and in fa ct separate from it. T h e body has a different substratum. T h u s a spiritual world and a physical world arise over a ga in st each other. T heir actual meeting-place is in the personal body. H ere the psycho-physical bond is established by which the soul can act through and upon the body for the realisation o f the ends of minds. T h e particular form of this view depends, of course, upon the social e n v ir o n m e n t: upon the influences b rou ght to bear upon the individual. But in essence it is a lw ays the same. It is a “ su b sta n tiv e” dualism, 1 It is characteristic also o f the lapse from reflection after failure and discomfiture, or when the vigou r o f thought is succeeded by w earin ess. In old a g e vigorou s sceptics often return to faith, and irreligious rationalists resum e their pious practices.

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a dualism of substances, of spirit and matter, irrespec tive o f any further definition of either. B efore this the problem w a s that o f separating- mind and body in view of their com m on characters. T h is problem is now treated as a n s w e r e d : they are tw o disparate and separate substances. T h e problem then bccomes the reflective one, how this can b e ? H o w are the two substances related to each other? H o w can mind and body interact, one with the other? From the point of vie w of theory, w e call it the psycho-physical problem. T h is is the question— not urgently asked or asked at all perhaps by the individual— whose solution ta kes form in reflective and logical alternatives. Society to-day, and the ordinary mature individuals in it, are and generally remain w h a t w e have called substantive dualists. It is the task of logical thought to g o further in the w a y which carries human interpretation on to its more refined issue. T h e individual has now passed from the childhood p e r io d ; from the prelogical and spontaneous sta ge s of self-consciousness into the fully logical. II. The L ogical Interpretation of D ualism : the N ew Dualism o f Reflection. T h e movement by w hich the logical or reflective faculty com es into operation in the individual mind is on the whole fairly plain. It involves simply the recognition by the individual that all the objects of k now ledg e— percepts, im ages, notions, ideals — all are, w h a tev er else may be said, in his own m ind; all are ideas, w hatever they may prove to be besides. T heir relative value is that w hich he, the subject, is justified, for one reason or another, in a tta ch in g to them. H e thus reflects upon his -ideas, upon any or

GENETIC INTERPRETATION all of them, and judges w hat they respectively arc and mean, beyond being mere ideas. D ream s, for ex ample, are judged to have no further v a lu e ; im ages are treated with discrimination, some b eing acccptcd as true memories, convertible into facts, others dis counted as mere fancies; conccpts arc jud ged true or false, ideals worthy or unworthy. T here is now, in short, a critical attitude, a further belief or disbelief in the availability of mental states, as representing and m ediating something beyond themselves. In this distinction between the subject and the whole of experience considered as objective to it, w e have the further statement of dualism in the form known as “ reflection.” It is called reflective as distinguished from prelogical and spontaneous. It involves a certain reserve of the self over a ga in st the entire body of contents in the mind. In this sense it affords a new dualism : the self is distinguished from the entire body of its ideas or th o u gh ts ; upon these it passes judgment. T h e y are its objects, its ideas, its expericntes, no matter what differences of value m ay be assigned to them as the result o f reflection. T h e dream, the fancy, the memory, the hypothesis— all come forw ard as objects of thought for the inspection and judgm ent of the self which is the subject. T h e dualism of reflection is a subject object dualism. W i t h this the various modes of logical process proper, argum entation and reasoning in its various forms, come into p l a y ; and the mind is launched upon its career of more or less independent thinking, specula tive construction, and scientific discovery. From now on, all sorts of theories of the mind, of the world, and of Clod are possible.

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III. The Developm ent o f Imaginative Interpreta tion . 1 It is of the greatest interest to note that the g r o w in g mind does not rest content with the dualisms that its social and practical life constantly produce. On the contrary, even the form of dualism produced by reflection itself demands revision. A lon g with the early strenuous endeavour to cope with serious situa tions, we find the child in d u lgin g his imagination in various w a ys to rearrange and re-interpret the more superficial reports of fact. F irst of all, the play functions present to him the world of th ings and persons in a sort of make-believe or semblance, producing an “ a s - i f ” world, in which there is a rem arkable room for preference and read justment. H e delights also in im aginative and mythical stories and legends, in fairy tales and wonderlore, finding in all this a more immediately satisfying world than that to which the rude law s of nature and life introduce him. T h is tendency g r o w s stronger with the gr o w in g years. W e find it constantly ta k in g broader form and e v o k in g w ider in ter est; until the entire content of life is shot through with a re-reading of things in the light of ideals, schematic and assu m p tive in character, erected by the imagination, and servin g as standards of w h a t m ight be or of what ou g ht to be. Both persons and things take on the m eaning which m akes them part of a further world 1 M einong, Uber A nwahmen (1902), pointed out exp licitly the rtMe o f im agin ative “ assum p tion ” (A vn ahm e) and its place as lyin g betw een perception and judgm en t. T h e doctrine of the “ sch em a,” in K a n t’s Critique of Pure Reason, is an earlier insight into the role o f the sem blant im agination, ju stify in g the use of the K antian term s “ schem a ” and “ schem atism " in the discussion o f this function (cf. the w riter's Thought and Things, Vol. I, Chap. V III, and Vol. II, C hap. IV), as w e have a lread y rem arked above.

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in which the terms o f dualism are reconciled and ils conflicts abolished. In the personal realm, the ideal of duty a r i s e s ; in the external world, the ideals of order and truth. All this is semblant in the sense that, while not realised in fact, yet it has the semblance of reality. It is “ a s - i f ” r e a l: a sort of prophecy of reconciliation and unity. S o far as such an ideal unity is assumed or postulated in the personal and social life, it combines the subjective and ejective in the postulate of God, taken to be a real personality, absolute in character. T h e child takes this over from his elders as a final solution of the dualism of thin gs; “ God made both persons and th in g s,” he is ta u gh t to say. In this a more or less reasoned mysticism of a religious character— involving emotional elements of dependence, awe, and love— identifies the individual’s interest with the corresponding racial motives of religion. T h es e ideals become thus embodied in assumptions' or postulates of various a b s o lu t e s : absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty. On the objective side, it is in the aesthetic consciousness, in the appre hension and appreciation of beauty, that this movement toward ideal unity and value seems to reach its cul mination. In the thing of beauty the individual finds both his personal demands and the requirements ol truth realised for the time and in a semblant way. D u r in g his full enjoyment of the w ork of art, he finds the subject-self merged with the objective th in g ; and it is w ith a distinct sense of loss and of lessened apprehension of the inner m eaning of things that he sees the old dualism of self and object, desire and fact, re-establish themselves when he returns to prosaic life again. H e says to him self: “ Oh, that things were

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a lw ays beautiful, that satisfactions need not clash with facts, that ideals were universally realised, as the thing of beauty shows me they may b e ! ” And when he rcachcs a state of rcllcction he may well a sk : “ M a y not the icsthetic point of view be, after all, the profoundest? M a y not the real come by an experience of unity and ideality— a real which the dualisms of life and logic only serve to mutilate or distort? M a y not a return to the immediacy o f ajsthctie contemplation he the true course for our rcllcction as it is the resort of the spontaneous mental life, when harassed by the perplexities of partial mediation in this direction and in that? ” Be this as it m ay, the facts arc plain. T h e im ag in a tion insists upon setting up its semblant interpretations of things : its postulate, its ideals, its absolutes, its God. It supplements, s ta g e by stage, the results of one-sided kn ow le d g e and the incomplete ends of w i l l ; it abolishes, at least in the imagination, the finality of any sort of dualism, indicating constantly the wider view and holding out the large r hope. . It appears, then, in the light of this brief account, that the course of normal individual development shows marked uniformity in tw o w a ys. First, the exigencies of life require and produce adaptations which result in dualism between selves and things, between mind and body, betw een subject and object. T h is dualism goes through a series of transformations which, while refin ing, nevertheless harden and intensify it, up to the rise of the logical and rcilective period. It then takes on the most refined and varied forms in the crucible of reflection. But with this goes, pari passu, the development of the im aginative function, which shows at each period

GENETIC INTERPRETATION a return to a sort of semblant or ideal unity. At each sta g e the finality of the dualism of the period is denied; and an immediate intuition of things, as ideally complete and whole, is revealed, extending to the entire mental life. T his reaches its fullest form in Ihe aesthetic consciousness, which succeeds to the earlier, more mystic modes of intuition, and clarifies 1licit results. A thing of beauty, whether in nature or in art, is for the time apprehended as being both ideal as a thing and ideal for the self. It is as if the Creator, in s a y in g of the world “ It is very g o o d ,” had meant “ It is completely reasonable and wholly satisfying, because, as em bodying my very Self, it is entirely beautiful.” In the individual, in sum, the development of the theoretical reason or intelligence culminates in laws «>1 T ru th for him absolute, that of practical reason or will in norms of absolute Goodness, and that of the <•1110 tional life, with which the imagination is charged, in rules of absolute Beauty.

hapter

VIII.

Historical Resume. Results o f the Comparison o f Individual and Racial Thought. It remains only to throw into relief the progressive line of historical thought about the mind— its contour, so to speak— sh o w in g the peaks and valleys, from ancient to modern times. T h is will allow us to utilise the parallelism between the racial interpretation of the self and the individual development of thought, and see how far it holds good. I. The prehistorical and primitive period represents the true infancy of the mind. Its tw o g r e a t features— its m ystical or prelogical character and its collective or social character-— are equally evident in the child before the rise of conscious individuality and the pow er of logical thought. If the child could express his thought, we should have the same difficulty in describing and a nalysing it that the anthropologist has with the thought of primitive peoples. It is in both cases an infantile reproduction of tradition, a m ystic participation illu minated by im aginative and romantic elements, and charged with the most po ign an t emotional possibilities. The child, like the s a v a g e in the prelogical period, is a microcosm, reflecting the la r g e r macrocosm of social values, beliefs, rites, and sanctions, and participating in the mysteries of religious belief. F o r the race, it is the period of psychosophic repre sentation ; of the morally epic and m y s t i c a l ; of m agic and fearful religion. F o r the child, it is the period of

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heroes, wonders, quaint im aginative constructions and logical impossibilities. In v ie w of the distinction that comes later on to dominate thought and m ake it dualistic, this period is to be described as p r o j e c t i v e : w ith the rest of nature, the mental is projected before the g a ze in a sort of panorama. T h e prime distinction is not that between spirit and matter, mind and b o d y ; but that between the seen and the unseen, the evident and the hidden, the clear and the mystic. Behind the curtain of nature which is projected before the eyes there is a seething body of agencies w o r k in g for go od and ill. F o r p sy chology, the period is a-dualistic both to the child whose self is the animated body, and to the s a v a g e whose entire world is a mass of animated things. T h e transition from this period to that of spontaneous thought takes place through the use of the imagination. Anthropologists tell us that the “ myth ” represents the primitive m a n ’s attempt to bring some sort of logical or dram atic coherence into his knowledge. T h e y also find a genuine attempt on the part of the s a v a g e to justify and explain his m ost obscure and illogical tra ditions.1 T h ere is a g r a d u a l rationalising of social institutions, of gam es, fetes, religious and tribal rites, etc., w ith the beginning of speculative th ought, anti with the development of political freedom .2 T h e child similarly passes out of his b ond age to common values and social conventions by the assertion of his indi viduality and the pow er of personal judgm ent, and by the use and abuse of his im agination .3 1 So B oas, The M in d of Prim itive M an. 2 A . W . Benn, History of A n cien t Philosophy, Chap. I, notes the influence o f the early G re e k s’ sense o f justice upon their philosophy. 3 T h is is to say that in the individual and the race alike (ho

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JS3

II. T h e second g rea t racial period is that of spon taneous thought. It appears in the Greek thinkers before Socrates. N o better characterisation of its g r o w i n g logical character can be given than that con veyed by the statement that it shows the rise and early development of dualism. Dualism in this sense m eans a departure from the Hat, curtain-like vision of the projective period in the direction of the apprehension of a cleft in nature between the dead and the living, between agencies and effects. It brings forw ard the agen cies which were behind the curtain, and defines them as in some sense minds. A first sketch is made of the distinction between those th ings that h ave a self and those that have not. W i t h the earliest thinkers, the Ionians, this appears in attem pts to refine a w a y the cruder features of the elements which are taken to represent life and the soul. Air, w a rm air, heat, fire, arc more subtle and thin than the other elements of nature. A n a x a g o r a s w en t so far as to call this refined stuff “ rea son .” P y t h a g o r a s took the next important step by subordin ating the mere matter of nature to its essential prin ciple of form and order, identify ing the latter with reason or the soul. T h is, however, remained merely a distinction within the one “ n ature,” not a difference between the two sorts of nature. In the “ c le a r i n g - u p ” w o r k of the Prc-socratic schools, the seed of “ s u b j e c ti v i s m ” w as sowed. But assum ptive or sch em atisin g im agination lies betw een perception and judgm en t. B y its assum ptions and sem blant constructions, the im agination form ulates the solutions and anticip ates the confirm ations o f ju d gm en t and thought. T h e im agination is the experimental faculty am on g the mental pow ers. VOL. II.

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it w a s a scattered and unintentional sow ing. It w as a reaction from attempts to launch the speculative boat, a return upon the beach, upon the thinking- mind itself. T h e Sophists made ready for Socrates by clearing a w a y the w reckage. T h e y b rought out the real mean ing o f the say in g “ the senses d eceive,” a sayin g common to Elcatics and A tom ists alike in their attempts to account for the movement and plurality in nature. If the senses deceive, w h a t we have left is merely the sen ses; not the objects of experience, but only experi ence. So the mind begins to be looked upon as some thing a little more certain than the external w o r l d ; and a line of cle av ag e appears between mental nature and physical nature. III. In Socrates the mental took on a more sub jective character. T h is has been sufficiently remarked upon already. It has just the same capital significance in racial thought that the da w n in g of the sense of sub jective personality has in that of the individual. Besides its positive character as a human attainment, it is the basis of the later and fuller achievements of thought. From the subjective soil g r o w the fairest blossoms of the mind. In S o c ra te s’ thought the tw o m arks of early indi vidual self-consciousness a p p e ar; it is practical and it is so c ia l.1 F o r Socrates, the subjective sphere in which truth defines itself is not individual but human, not private but s o c i a l ; and its end and criterion are not theoretical but practical, not logical but moral. In the tw o g r e a t Socratics, Plato and Aristotle, the m otives necessary— as shown in individual life— to the development of full self-consciousness, plainly appear. T h e y have been designated in our account as “ objec1 See the p reced in g Chapter.

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l i v e ,” “ ejee liv e,” and im aginative or “ sem blant.” Each of these had its explicit development. Plato stands for the union of truth and goodness in the supreme idea of God. P l a t o ’s “ ideas ” g i v e ejective rendering to the concepts of Socrates, which are thus taken out of the realm of the subjective and given m etaphysical value. Moreover, the supreme idea is g o in g 011 to be personal; it is God. T h e self becomes the “ world e jec t,” the absolute reason. But God is also the suvim um bonuni, the supreme go od , the ideal of the practical life. T h u s the moral demand of Socrates is also fulfilled. Further, the emotional and im aginative c ra vin gs for completeness, unity and beauty, satisfied hitherto in the psychosophy of the time— the O rphic and Pythagorean mysteries, the popular legend of transm igration, e t c .— and in the development of line art and its folkequivalent, the dram atic myth, becomes an intrinsic th ough inarticulate factor in speculative thought. The reconciliation of truth and go od ness, the theoretical and the practical, in G od, is reached by the exercise of the faculty of emotional intuition or love. In the ideals of feeling, the fully real, at once true and good, is seized by an act of m ystic and aesthetic contempla tion. B v divine love, the human self overcomes all its dualism s of partial apprehension, in a contemplative oneness with God. . T h e self-consciousness of the individual is advancccr also by the movement throug h which the objective is defined. T h e objective is that which is in a sense left o v er ; it is the impersonal world of things, physical nature. T h is appears as a sort of rebound from the m ovement of subjectivity. In the historical prog re s sion Aristotle stands out as the “ objeetivist,” following L 2

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upon the “ su bjectivist,” Socrates, and the “ ejective idealist,” Plato. In Aristotle, however, objectivism is only w hat it could he at such a time. It w a s not the objectivism of modern physical science nor that of a positivist philo sophy ; much less could it be merely that of the Greek Atomists, which w a s unaware of the subjective point o f view. It w as rather an objectivism that carried the mental life over to the objective, restoring the mind to nature. Mind to Aristotle w a s the form of organised m atter; it w a s not a self-sufficient sub stance, of independent definition. Matter, also, w as not a substance, set up in opposition to mind and free from the form of mind. A ristotle’s theory w a s a re instatement of the hylozoism and animism of the Ionic thinkers, enriched by the gain of a partial dualistic insight and by the conccption of “ n ature.” It w a s the objectifying of mind, however, that made A r isto tle’s contribution to psychology important; it enabled him to employ upon mental, a lo n g with physical facts, a sound observational method. IV . In the Post-Aristotelian schools, the em barrass ments due to dualism b egan to assert themselves, as they do in individual thought. T h e “ relativity of k n o w l e d g e ” w a s extended from the senses to the reason. T h e development of individualism tended to impair political and social solidarity in practice, as it destroyed universality in thought. I he dictum, “ Jlomo mensurci omnium, ” of P ro ta g o r a s took on riper form in the personal resignation of the Stoics and the reasoned individual moderation of the Epicureans. T he downhill tendencies of d eca yin g speculation took effect in the ethical decadence of the C yrenaics and Sceptics. Like the individual, however, the racial self does not

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rest, torn by its em barrassments. T h e individual resorts to the emotional, m ystical, and idealising im a g in a tio n ; he forgets hard facts and stern duties alike in the semblant illusions of play, the fictitious situations of the fairy-tale and drama, and the synthetic representations of art. In the period of which we speak, the beginning of the Christian era, all these had lon g been familiar. In the speculative realm, Plotinus g a v e place to the imagination and renewed the “ c o n te m p la tio n ” by which Aristotle had inter preted the “ love ” of P la to ; but with a fuller sense of its practical, if “ oth er-w orldly,” value—-due to the alertness of the new theological interest. T h e sharp weapons of Christian d o g m a w ere tempered by the softer alloy of Alexandrian theosophy. Plotinus, how ever, w as the first to turn explicitly to mystic thought in and for i t s e lf ; for in Plato it had been an emo tional motive, and in Aristotle it was the copestone placed upon a theoretical structure. In Aristotle the m ystic interest completed the sy ste m ; in Plotinus it produced it. W i t h the Church Fathers, the power of religious authority and the forms of psychosophic faith came to impart new confidence to tho ught and new vig o u r to life. T h e dualism of spirit and flesh justified itself in terms of the philosophical distinctions of “ subjective and o b j e c t i v e ” and “ form and m a t t e r ” of the late G reek period. T h e result, both in the Patristic and in the Scholastic writings, w a s a sharpening of the opposi tion between mind and body in the interest of Christian apologetics. T h a t this outcome w a s welcomed as a means to religious faith, not as an end to theoretical interest, is seen n egatively in the nature of the topics of discussion, and positively in the mysticism of the

I 5S

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Christian crccds. In the voluntarism of St. Augustin e and the new Aristotelianism of St. T h om a s, however, w e sec the motives o f later reflective thought str u g g lin g to release themselves. A s in the individual, the s tr u g g le into personal inde pendence and individualism is urged 011 la r g e ly by practical motives, so it w a s in the racial movement also. T h e motives o f religious faith controlled the definition of d o g m a ; and d o g m a in turn produced apologetic theories o f personality— divine, human, demonic, and angelic. It w a s from the side of practical considerations, including those o f national scope, that the pressure came bv which the cle av ag e between mind and body, considered as tw o distinct substances, w a s finally produced.1 V. T h e cle av ag e came with Descartes, as we have seen. Descartes opens the period which is called reflective in the sense that the dualistic results o f earlier thinking now become data for a further interpretation and for direct criticism. It w a s no lon ger mind and body as distinct terms that w ere to be interpreted; these had become presuppositions of reflection itself : but it w a s the dualistic relation as such, together with the assignm ent of am bigu ou s data of experience to one c atego ry or the other. It w a s no doubt because of a w a itin g for “ the full ness of ti m e ” that D escartes appeared only so long after St. Augustine. In the latter the definition of the func tion of reflection; the separation of mind from body and its definition (in terms of w i l l) ; the use of a method 1 “ T h e com plete sev eran ce o f spirit and nature . . . began with the d e ca y of G recian life, in the a g e im m ediately subsequent to A lexan der the G reat.” — S cliw e g le r, H ist, of P h ilos, in Epitome, p. 184.

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of observation suited to the mental m a te r ia l; all these essentials o f scientific psyc h o lo g y w ere actually present. B ut the theoretical interest had to w ait a fa vourable turn in the tide of practical and human concerns. It w as held for generations in b on d a ge to the theological, a w aitin g the dawn of the Renaissance. T h e case is the sam e w ith the i n d iv id u a l1 when he passes into the period of reflective thought. All ideas alike, as w e ha ve seen, fall inside the sphere of reflec tion or judgm ent. T h e tw o control-categories of mind and body are present as presuppositions, nets spread out for the reception of facts. E ach idea g o e s in one class or the other; it is the ta sk of reflection to ju d ge which. It is clear, then, that in Cartesianism , and in the developments known as “ occasionalism ” and “ preestablished harmony ” that followed shortly after, racial reflection did w h a t the logical individual also d o e s : it used dualism as point of departure or presupposition for the assimilation and reduction of the detailed events of experience. T h is may be called the logical crisis in both series, the individual and the racial alike. It leads to a further reflective dualism, that between the self as thinking and 1 O ne m ight insist upon the a n a lo g y here, rem arkin g upon the apparent difficulty the race and the individual alike encounter in p assing from a mature dualism to a reflection w h ich interprets exp erien ce in term s of this dualism or b y means o f a criticism of it. T h e individual rarely becom es a p h ilosop her; and the race had to w ait for the rare philosopher w ho w as to be its mouth piece. Further, O cciden tal civilisation alone has produced the lo gical type of thought that em bodies itself in speculative system and positive science. W e m ay w ell im agine the w orld entire, still liv in g in the practical and m vstical types o f culture, as represented b y the E g yp tia n and Indian civilisations. T h e G reek and the w estern European developm ents seem to be the tw o historical cases in which the ra ce has achieved an advan ced lo gica l m ode o f Reflection, so far a s historical records show.

GENETIC

I N T E R PR El ' AT I ON

ju d gin g- principle, and nil the objects of thought, the ideas, whether these represent mind or body. The “ s u b jec t-self” is set over against the “ object-self,” which is a content or idea in the same sense that pre sentations of body are. In the history o f reflection, this presupposition of subjectivity is the explicit charac teristic of idealistic thought. T h e distinctive problems of epistemolo gy now appear. Besides the problem of k now ledge, there is the problem of know ledge-ofk n o w le d g e ; the subject not only knows objects, but it know s itself as object a m o n g others. T h is doubling upon itself is characteristic both of the reflective tho ught of the individual and that of the race. Its problems have been stated and their principal solutions w orked out in modern philosophy since Descartes. It is of g rea t significance that this point w a s reached through the urgency of emotional or affective m otives no less than of those of thin kin g; in Boehme no less than in Descartes. T h e distinction of subject and object came, in the one case, out of the em barrass ment o f tho ught; in the other, out of the aspirations of faith. T h in k in g havin g appeared, it is evident that reflection may take on protean forms. Modern p sych olog y reflects the alternatives which philosophy has w orked out in its varied systems, so fa r as these concern the mind. L o o k in g upon the m ovem ent of tho ught as it appears in perspective, we see the early alternatives reproduced each for itself, with critical and historical justification, in the modern period. It is in respect to variety and refinement of enterprise, to richness of data and power of criticism, to sobriety of method or its opposite — deliberate speculative licence— that the a n a lo gy with the individual now holds good. Positivism , rational

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ism, and immediatism— science, philosophy, and faith broadly understood— are the modern alternatives. As in modern culture, so also in individual thought, the choice a m on g them is largely a matter of tem peram ent.1 In conclusion we may say, in view of the confirma tion that our study has given of the parallelism between individual and racial th o u gh t of the Self, that in the history of psychology w e discern the g r e a t profile which the race has drawn on the p a g es of time. On closer inspection it appears to be made up of a g r e a t number of smaller profiles, placed on end, com in g down the line. Each of these in turn, more distinct in detail and fuller in outline than the last, contributes som ething to the la rge r picture which is the portrait the race has made, and is m akin g, of the human Self.

1 S ee above, C h a p ter V II o f Vol. I, ad fin.

TIIF. KN D

IN D E X

VOL.

T h e figures printed in h ea vy typ e indicate the most im portant citations.)

A b s o l u t e , of Schelling and lle g e l, 39,45

Accom m odation, 97 If. A ction, to F ich te, 38; toSchleierm acher,

A c tiv e powers, to H erbart, 65 A c tiv ity , m ental, to Larom iguiere, 50 Adamson, R ., i n E s th e t ic ,o f Kant, 20; of Schelling, 3q f. /Esthetics, K a n t 011, 23 f . ; psychology of, 126 f. Affection (and affective), 118 f . ; a revival, 120; logic, 120 A ffectivism , (see M ysticism ); 31 Alexander, S., 107 A lhacen, 74 A lter, the, 109 A lterations of personality, 124 A naxagoras, 153 Anim al psychology, 88 If. Anim isfn, 121 If. A nthropologists, English, 10s A nthropology, K a n t’s, 27; H egel’s, 42 A ntinom ies, K a n t’ s, 21 Antithesis, D an vin on, 115 A phasia, 74 Apperception(ism ), 7; transcendental in K ant, 2 1 ; 27; to Iierb art, 64 ; 70 A priori, the, to K a n t, 20; to Darw in, 79; to Spencer, 82 A ristotle, 7, 30, 48, 58, 86, 156 A rt, to Schelling, 39 Association(ism ), H um e’s, 5 ff.; b y resemblance, 7 ; b y con tigu ity, 7; b y cause and effect, 7 ; b y contrast, 7; to Th. Brown, 48; in England, 48 if. ; to Spencer, 84 Assum ption, 149 f. Attention, to Larom iguiere, 50; modern theories, 128 if. A utom atism , 59 f., 97 A venarius, K ., 122 Avicenna, 98 Bacon, F ., 1, 49, 52, 56, 59 B agehot, n o Bain, A ., 66 f., 75, 93 f., 100 f., 11 7 Baldw in, i n , 127 B arth , 1*., 102, 107 Basch, 127 B astian, Ch., 74, 98, 112, 11 7 ,1 3 2 B aum ke, 2 B ehaviour, anim al, 87 B ell, S ir Charles, 116

B encke, 33 B enu, A . VV., 5 5 ,15 2 B cntham , 46 Bergson, II., on instinct, 89, 133 B erkeley, B .shop, 1.5, 17 If., 22, 50 B ernard, 26 B ernheim , 129 B in et, A ., 125 B iran , Maine de, 50 f . ; p ortrait, 5 1 ; 79 B oas, F ., 152 Bohn, 99 Boole, i n B osanquet, B ., 36, 107, 128 B rad ley, F. II., 36, 66, i n B rehm , 86 B rentano, 7r, i n B roca’s convolution, 74 Brow n, T h ., 48 B uffon, 86 Caird, E d ., 36 C arpenter, W . B ., 72 C ategories, K a n t’s, 26; dynam ic, of B iran, 52 Cause, to Schelling and H egel, 42; in L otze, 68 Charcot, 129 C hild -p sych ology, 102 f. C hronom etry, m ental, 76 Church Fathers, 157 C ircular reaction, 92 Claparede, 103 Classification, of functions, K a n t’ s, 27 ; o f sciences b y Com te, 56 C lifford, W . K ., 60, 126 Cognitive and m otive powers, 48 Coincident variations, 82 C ollectivism o f Rousseau, 56 C om m unity, n o C om p arative p sych ology, 86 ff. Com position theory of Spencer, 84 C om te, 33 f., 40, 52, 58 f., 84, 86, 104, 105 Concurrence of racial and in divid ual thought, 134 f. Condillac, 1 0 , 12 f f .; portrait, 12 ; 48, 50, 59, 84, 128 Consciousness, to H erbart, 65 f . ; role of, 80 Cousin, V ., 53 Criticism , 19 ff. D arw in, Ch., 35, 6 r, 78 f., 82, 84, 86, 100, 115

164

INDEX

Darwinism , (see D arw in, and natural selection); in instinct, 8 1; 89, 9<j f.,

i°5, 115

Datiriac, 120 Deferred im itation, 94 Descartes, 3, 4 ,9 , 26, 59, 158 Dessoir, 10, 40 D e Vries, 91 D ew ey, J., 107 D ialectic, of K a n t, 20; social, 108 D iderot, 16 D iffused discharge o f Spencer, 100 f. D ouble-aspect theory, 60 Driesch, H ., 97 D robisch, 66 Dualism , 136 If.; psycho-physical, 144 f . ; o f reflection, 145; of subject and o b ject, 160 D uns Scotus, 38 D urkheim , 106 E cholalia, 92 Eclecticism , French, 53 E tfort, to French voluntarists, 50; to Lam arck, 88, 112 F.inftihlung, (see Sem blance); 127 E jection, 121, 126 f., 139 f. E lem ents of mind, 84 f. E llw ood, 108 E m otion, to Hume, 9, 114 ; expression of, 115 f . ; kinaesthetie theory of, 116 f. E m p ath y, 126 Em piricism (sec H um e); radical, 132; L o cke’s, 1 if. Encyclopaedists, 16 English m oral philosophy, 46 If. Epiphenom cnon theory, 60 E rdm ann, 111 Espinas, 87 F.sse esl p cn ip i of Berkeley, 18 E volution, 61, 78 . E xcess discharge, 100 Experim ental psychology, 7 j ft. Expression, em otional, 115 f. E xte n sity, 70 E xtern al sense, to Locke, 2 Eabre, 86 F acu lties (see F unctions and p o w ers); L o tze on, 71 Faith philosophy, 29 f. Fechner, G. P ., 35, 74 tf., 126 Feeling, to H egel, 4 1 ; to H erbart, 65; to Spencer, 84 ; theories Of, 118 Fer6, 125 F ichte, 33, 37 f. Fideism . See Faith philosophy. Flournoy, T h ., 125 F orm -q uality, 43 Fouillfee, i r , 64 Freedom , to K an t, 2 1; to H egel, 43 French spiritualism . 49 if. Fries, 33 Fusion, to H erbart, 64 G allon, F., 131

G cm iith, 65 Generalisation affective, 121 G enetic modes, 100 G en etic p sych ology o f H egel, 41. 78 ft. G eorge, 66 God, to K an t, 2 1 ; as eject, 126 Goethe, 31 Green, T . H ., 12, 36, 41 Groos, K ., 87, 95 L, 127 G uyau, 107 H abit, to Hume, 9 ,5 2 ,6 8 ; Darwin on, 115 H all, G. S., 35, 103 H am ilton, S ir VV., 48 f. H arm s, 10, 16 H arris, VV. T ., 36 H artley, 15 f. H artm ann, li. von, 37, 45 f. H earing, H elm holtz on, 74 Ilegel, 33, 37, 30, 40 If., 104, I I I H elm holtz, II., 66; p ortrait, 7 3 ; 78 H erbart, 8, 12, 35, 61 If.; portrait, 64 ; 70 f. Hesiod, theogony of, 55 Hobbes, 3, 33, 46 1 lobhouse, 4 1 Hodgson, S., 133 Hoffding, 37 I lofler, A ., 4 3, 124 Holbach, Baron von, 16 Home, on aesthetics, 47 Hudson, 86 Hume, 1)., 4, 5 ff., 12, 17, 21, 25, 33 f., 42. 4<>. ■ »<>. 52 Husserl, m H utcheson, 47 H uxley, 81 H ypnotism , 129 I I yslop, 124 Idealism , 16 If. Ideas, (see A ssociation); Locke on, I f . ; of reflection, 3 ; innate, 3 ; to Hume, 6 ; to Berkeley, 18 ; of reason, 21 Im agination, in K a n t, 27; as in terp reta tion, 147; (see Sem blance). Im itation, 91 f f .; deferred, 94 Im m ediatism , 133 Im m ortality, to K a n t, 21 Im perative, categorical, 22 Impressions, to Hume, 6 Individualism of Rousseau, 56 Inheritance, Lam arckian, 79 f., 82, 88 Inhibition, to H erbart, 64 ; as attention, 130 f. Innate ideas, 3, 82 Innervation, 112 Instinct, 88 ff. Intcllectiialism , 17 ff. Intensity, law of, 75 f . ; as attention, 130 Interaction, to Lotze, 68 • Internal sense, to Locke, 2 Interpretation, genetic, 134 ff. lutrojection, 121 1 Intuition to Jacobi, 30; in English,

moralists, 47; to Scots, 48; the new view, 133 Jacobi, 29 f. Jam es, W ., 66, 70, h i f . ; p ortrait, 113 f . ; 125, 132 Jan et, P aul, 53 Jan et, Pierre, 129 Jennings, H. S., 98 Jodi, K , 111 jo u ffro y , 52 f., 79 Judgm ent, K a n t’s critique of, 23, 30 K a n t, 9 f., 17, 19 ff., 29, 33, 58, (>4, 133, M7 Kinassthesis, 94 f . ; equivalents, 98 ; 112 f., 114 f. K leinm , O., 2, 44, h i K filpe, O ., 114 Lacom be, 107 Ladd, G . T ., 67, 72 L a lo , C h., 127 Lam arck, 35, 78 f. Lam arckism (see L a m a rck ); inheritance, ^9 f.t 8 2; instinct, 88 Lam ettrie, 15 Lange, C ., 115 Lapsed intelligence, 88 1-aromiguidrc, P., 50 . 129 Law o f Com te, 5<> Learning process, 97 ff. Lehmann, A ., 11 7 Leibnitz, 3, 9, 16, 19, 21, 41, 61, 64 Lessir.g, 31 Lewes, 56, 60 Liegeois, 129 Lipps, T h ., 66, 127 Localisation of brain functions, 72 L ocal signs, 66; to L o tze, 70 Locke, J., 1 ff., 5 ,9 ,1 0 ,2 2 ,2 5 , 33 f., 49 f112 Loeb, J ., 98 Logic, A ristotelian, i n ; sym bolic, 1 1 1 ; affective, i2 o f . L o tze, H ., 31, 35, 66, 67 ff., 72, 11 1,

127. 133

McCosh, J., 30, 48 MeDougall, \V., 108, 122, 137 Mach, 61 Malcbranche, 19, 61 M antcgazza, 115 M arx, K ., 104 M aterialism, 15 if. M audsley, H ., 60 f., 74, 106, 125 M echanics, of Ideas, 8; H erb a it’s, 62 f. Meinong, 28, 147 Memory, affective, 120 f. M etaphysics, Com te 011, 56 Method, positive, 54 f . ; psychop hysical,

Mezes, S ., 137 Miall, 88 Mill, J. and J . S., 24, 48; Jam es, 48; J. S tu art, 49 f. M imetism , 92 Mind, reduced to b rain ,15; in H egel, 40 f.

M itchell, 127 Monad ism , of H erbart, 61 Moral philosophy, E nglish, 45 If. Morgan, C . L I., 82, 87, 89 M otor processes, 52 ; reaction, 77 M ovem ent, theories of, 97 if. MCiller, M., 105 Miinsterberg, n , 42 M ysticism , 30 f. M yth, 152 N a tu ra l Realism , 48 f. N atural Selection (see D a rw in ); 78 N aturalism , H um e’s, 7 f. Neo-H egelianism , 36, 41, 49 Noum enon, to K an t, 21 O bjectivism , 141 f. O rganic selection, 82, 90 Origin of knowledge, to Locke, 5 Orm ond, A . T ., 52, 67, 137 O sborn, II. 1\ , 82 Pain (see Pleasure and P a in ); 118 Pancalism o f K a n t, 25; of Schelling, 39 fParallellism , psycho-physical, 16, 59 ff. Paulhan, 120, 127 Paulsen, 132 Pearson, K ., 61, 131 Pedagogy, H erbart’ s, 67 Personality, alterations of, 124 Phenomenalism (see Sen sation alism ); to Condillac, 14 Phenom enology of Hegel, a Physiological psychology, 72 3. P illsbury, W. li., 131 P lato, 22, 25, 133, 156 Plav, 94 ff. Pleasure and Pain, to Locke, 4 ; analogue of, 16 ; reactions of, 94, 101 Poincare, H ., 61 Porter, Noah, 48 Positivism , (see C om te); E nglish, 49, 104 ; French, 56 f. Poulton, K. B .. 81 ‘ P ractice ” theory of p lay, 95 Presentation, in H erbart, 62 Preyer, W ., 103 Priestley, 15 f. P rim ary qualities, to Locke, 2; to Condillac, 12 Prince, M., 125 Projective stage, 137 f. Psychologism , 9, i n Psychology, to K a n t, 28; in nineteenth century, 32 ff.; individual and collec tive, 34 f . ; p ositive, 34; philosophical and scientific, 36; in nineteenth cen tury, 55 f f . ; physiological, 72 ff.; e x perim ental ; 74 f f .; genetic, 78 f f .; anim al and com parative, 86 ff. Psych ology of child, 103 f . ; social,

104 ff.

Psychophysical parallellisiii, 16 ; 591!.; law of Fechner, 75 ; dualism , 144 Psychophysics, 74 f.

166

INDEX

F ythagoras, 153, 156 R acial experience, 82, 88, 111 Reaction-tim e, 76 £. R ea lity, belief in, to H um e, 8 “ R ea ls” of H erbart, 62 Reason, pure and practical of K a n t, 19 f f .; to Jacobij 30 R edintegration, 48 R eflection, ideas of, in Locke, 3 ; dualism of, 145 f. Reid, T li., 48 R ehm ke, J., 124 R epresentation, collective, 140 R ev iv al, (see M em ory); affective, 120 R ib ot, ix , 36, 66; portrait, 11 9 ; 120 f.,

»3i

R ickert, 42 Rom anes, G. J., 61, 86, 126 Rousseau, 33 f., 52, 55 f . ; p ortrait, 58; 104 R oyce, J., 137 St. A ugustine, 38, 50, 158 Schelling, 31, 37, 39 ff. Schem a, K a n t's, 28, 147 Schiller, 31 Schleiennacher, 37, 44 Schopenhauer, A ., 37, 45 Schwegler, 30, 158 Scottish psychology, 48 f. Secondary qualities, of Locke, 2 Selection. See N atural and O rganic Selection Self, H um e’s, 8; K a n t’s, 2 1 ; as subject and object, 160 Self-consciousness, to F ichte, 38; to H erbart, 66; origin of, 108 f. Self-im itation, 92 Sem blance, (sec S em blan t); 126 f.,

147

Sem blant im agination, in R a n t, 24 Sensation, tactile, 118 Sensational sin, llutne’s, 5 If.; C on dil lac’s, 12 If. Sense, to Locke, 2 S ensory reaction, 77 S entim ent in Lnglish m oral p h ilo sophers, 46 Shaftesbury, lia rl of, 46 1. Shock, nervous, 84 S igw art, 111 Sim m el, 107 Sim plicity, illusion of, 85 Sm ith, Adam , 46 Social psychology, 101 tf. S ociology, Com te’s, 58, 105 Socius, 108 Socrates, 154 Sophists, 12, 154 Soul, to Berkeley, 18; to H erbart, 61 Sources, L st of, 163 f. Space, visual and tactual, to B erkeley, 18 ; to K a n t, 2 6; to H erbart, 66; to L o tze, 70

Spencer, H., 10, 60, 81 f . ; portrait, 83; 88, 95, 100 f. Spinoza, 16, 29, 41, 6r Spiritism of W allace, 81 Spiritualism (jsts), B erkeley’ s, 19, In U ngland, 4 ; French, 49 f . ; o f Joullroy, 52; of Lotze, 70; French, 112 S pontaneity, of B ain , 101 Steinthal, 67 Stephen, L ., 107 S tew art, D ., 48 S trieker, 112 Subject and object, dualism of, 1(0 S u b jectivity, rise of, 138 f. Suggestion, 129 Synornic m eaning, 111 Synthesis, 7 Taine, 11., 66 Tarde, G ., 92 f., 107 Teleology, in H egel, 42 Tem perature, Locke’ s experim ent, 5 Tem poral signs, 70 Tetens, 27 Theory of Knowledge, o f Locke, 1 ff. Thought, developm ent of, 134 II. Threshold of consciousness, 65 Tim e-perception, Sec Tem poral Signs Titcliener, li. B ., 78, 126, 131 Tradition, anim al, 90, 106 Transcendental, aesthetic, to K an t, 20; dialectic, 20 Transit observation, 76 T rial and Frror, 98 f. Tropism , 08 T u fts, J . II., 107 T y lo r, E . B ., 105 T yp e of reaction, 77 Unconscious, the, to Schellm g, 39; to Schopenhauer 45; to von H artm ann, 45; to Lotze, 7 1 ; m odem theory, 124 Urban, W. M., 121 U tilitarianism (see M ill); 46 f. ; French, 49, 53 Variation, Darwinian, 79 f . ; coincident, 82 Venn, J ., 111 Vision, B erkeley’s theory of, 18 ; H elm holtz cn, 74 V italism , 97 f. Volkinann v. Volkm ar, 66 Voluntarism of Fichte, 38, 133 YVaitz, 66 f. W allace, A. R., 78 f., S i, 86, 89 W ard, J ., 67, 70, 126 W ashburn, 99 W atson, J., 36 W eber, law of, 75 f. W eism ann, 89 W ill, (see Voluntarism ); to Condillac, 1 2 ;

to Lotze, 68

W olff, C., 2, 49 W oodworth, 72 W u n dt, W ., 72, 78, 92, i n , 112

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