Reframing the Frames of Human Suffering

ELEANOR HOLTZAPPLE

In her book Regarding the Pain of Others, political philosopher Susan Sontag highlights the problems that arise from the modern ways in which society conceptualizes human suffering. This framing that we assign to the suffering of others has made people desensitized to it. Sontag asserts that this indifference is especially prevalent in war photography, because of the way it utilizes framing techniques to circulate images of suffering. She provides solutions to reframe suffering through the attachment of narratives to war imagery. In Frames of War: When Life is Grievable, political theorist Judith Butler shares Sontag’s concern about the rise of desensitization by calling for the redescribing of the social norms which provide the foundation for these frames that condition how we view suffering. Butler claims that these norms create a hierarchy of grievability, where some lives have a quality allowing them to be mourned in occurrences of suffering, while others lack this quality of grievability. Ultimately, this hierarchy gives the power to decide the value of others’ lives. Butler claims desensitization occurs because we are incapable of recognizing - or understanding the existence of - the personhood and precarity of those lives which are framed as encompassing low grievability. A precarable life is one that is recognized as being vulnerable to suffering, and only grievable lives - ones that society truly cares about and recognizes as a human life - have this quality of precariousness. Without recognizing the grievability of the lives of others, our society will not have the motivation needed to properly alleviate human suffering on a state or global scale.

This paper investigates the similarity between Sontag’s and Butler’s claims, both of which assert that we labor under frames of unrecognizability. The frames create indifference towards human suffering and stifle attempts to try to alleviate this suffering. By examining the commonality of Sontag and Butler, this paper argues we can only reframe suffering through the

attachment and circulation of narratives alongside the frames. In this way, we can increase awareness of suffering while mitigating desensitization to it.

Sontag’s main assertion claims that if we are able to reframe the way we view human suffering, we may be able to motivate others to help those suffering. This creates a more generous world view, where we rely on others for aid in times of need, especially in occurrences of large-scale human rights violations. Sontag argues that the most common framing technique where desensitization occurs is mass media, especially in photography. Photography, Sontag claims, is a powerful form of media due to its ability to be understood by a wide audience (Sontag, 2004: 18). While there is sufficient access to imagery of human suffering, it is so widely circulated, and without context, that it lacks the desired effect of motivating people to try and alleviate the suffering pictured. Although social norms do teach spectators to react with shock and horror to war photography, they are sentimentally detached from the events of the photo. The viewers have become desensitized to suffering due to the sheer volume of its portrayal in mass media, causing a trend of ‘mounting levels of acceptable violence and sadism in mass culture’ (Sontag, 2004: 79). The framing of this genre of violence as acceptable causes a lack of motivation, on the part of bystanders, to intervene in conflicts which cause suffering. Instead of being a mode of engaging others to help, ‘photographs shrivel sympathy’ (Sontag, 2004: 82). War photography has been framed, Butler would argue, so there is a lack of recognition of the precarity and personhood of the lives in the photos (Butler, 2009: 29). Sontag asserts that a solution to this desensitization is to attach a narrative to the photo, to ensure the viewer is informed of the context in which the photograph was taken and the reasons for the suffering shown (Sontag, 2004: 96). Only then will the viewer be motivated sufficiently to intervene and alleviate the suffering.

Butler’s main goal is to raise awareness for human suffering, or what she refers to as recognition. With this increased recognizability, she hopes there will be an amplification in our motivation to help those suffering. She argues the current lack of motivation is because of the high level of unrecognizability towards the precarity of life. In other words, many don’t recognize the shared

vulnerability and finitude of life ‘that singularizes our relation to death and to life’ (Butler, 2009: 14). Butler claims that if we were able to use ‘norms of recognition… based on an apprehension of precariousness’ when framing lives, we would then recognize the personhood of others and increase our level of respect for life in general (Butler, 2009: 13). However, modern society has established frames of unrecognizability where, through underpinned social norms ‘that the body is exposed to socially and politically,’ certain lives have been given more or less value depending on how they are framed (Butler, 2009: 3). Due to these framing techniques, caused by socialization, Butler argues that we establish a hierarchy of grievability, where it is easy to be indifferent to the suffering of those we deem to have lives lacking grievability. As such, our capacity to recognize these lives and their personhood is diminished, because we are disinterested and unmotivated to prevent suffering.

Examples of these types of ‘lives that are not quite lives’ (Butler, 2009: 31), are those commonly viewed as half-living or different from the social norm, such as those with mental handicap. Many mentally disabled people are treated poorly, but because this is a norm in many places, people are indifferent to such suffering. In this way, the mentally disabled population is framed as being accustomed to living ‘lower-value’ lives, causing lack of recognition of their precarity and personhood. Like Sontag, Butler believes, in order to remove these frames of unrecognizability, we need to attach a narrative to frames. These narratives show the plight of the unrecognized and the appeal to the emotions of others. With an emotional connection, one is able to mourn and grieve for the lives of those experiencing suffering. This recognition of their grievability causes current frames of suffering to break as people begin to question them and the social conditions that allow them to exist. Butler claims ‘when those frames that govern the relative and differential recognizability of lives come apart’ (Butler, 2009: 12), following the redescribing of both social norms and framing techniques, we increase our recognition of the lives of the suffering. Only then, with this recognition, are we motivated to provide aid to alleviate suffering.

Butler’s insistence on increasing recognition for human lives, especially of those who are often sidelined in society, emphasizes Sontag’s claim

concerning the importance of removing indifference towards suffering. To Butler, this increased recognition of personhood is essential to fulfill what she deems our moral obligation to help those suffering, which can only be done by recognizing Sontag’s arguments about the dangers of framing techniques. It is these framing techniques which often cause the wider world to ignore human suffering by giving the frames the power to ‘decide which lives will be recognizable as lives and which will not’ (Butler, 2009: 12). Instead of maintaining these frames, we must break or reframe them, allowing us to act upon our obligation to help others (Butler, 2009: 14). That is why finding solutions to reframe suffering to remove societal indifference is important. Sontag claims the attachment of narratives is a potential solution to indifference (Sontag, 2004: 96), a claim echoed by Butler. Additionally, Butler provides two other solutions: increasing critique of state violence and decreasing social stratification between the ‘ungrievable’ and ‘grievable’ (Butler, 2009: 32). The former solution resonates with Sontag’s argument of appealing to ‘intellectual’ communities to critique framing techniques, instead of allowing us to become ‘consumers of violence as a spectacle’ (Sontag, 2004: 86). The latter solution is also expanded upon by Sontag, where she describes the danger of identifying lives as either suffering or of having ‘the dubious privilege of being spectators [to suffering]’ (Sontag, 2004: 82). This mentality, pitting the suffering against the spectators, plays a large part in maintaining high levels of desensitization to the suffering of those deemed ‘ungrievable.’ In this way, Sontag shares Butler’s ideas of ways to increase the effectiveness of narratives as a solution to the desensitization caused by frames. Only through the effective implementation of narratives can we increase recognition and open the way for the creation of the necessary motivation to provide aid to those suffering.

Butler’s arguments surrounding unrecognizability towards suffering highlight Sontag’s claims of the danger frames pose in allowing for desensitization of those deemed to lack the quality of grievability. Additionally, Butler and Sontag propose similar solutions to removing this societal hierarchy of grievability through the attachment of narratives. With these narratives, Butler’s goal of redefining social conditions surrounding the framing of lives can be actualized, by allowing us to recognize others’

personhood and precarity. Only then will others feel sentimentally motivated enough to try to alleviate global suffering. While Sontag and Butler do not provide any specific examples of this having yet occurred, they hold hope that we can reframe grievability and our societal view on suffering, allowing us to fulfill our moral obligation to provide assistance to those suffering and preserve human rights as a whole.

WORKS CITED

Butler, Judith, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable. New York, London, Verso, 2009.

Sontag, Susan, Regarding the Pain of Others. Penguin, 2004.