EURODIALOGUE, Vol. 5. CYPRUS ISSUE: SLIDING ON A KNIFE-EDGE by Eleni Theocharous

L E D RA

COLLEGE N I C O S I A

EURODIALOGUE Autumn 2016 Volume 5

CYPRUS ISSUE: SLIDING ON A KNIFE-EDGE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies Edited by: Panayiotis IFESTOS and Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES A Publication of VUZF UNIVERSITY / LEDRA COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF M.A. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GLOBAL ECONOMY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS and ERPIC

in co-operation with Dr. Eleni THEOCHAROUS MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

This Publication deals with geopolitical, geo-strategic, economic, legal and security issues of the Cyprus problem. The authors express their scientific views in the context of a fruitful and constructive dialogue with regard to the forthcoming solution.

EDITORS: Panayiotis IFESTOS

Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies in University of Piraeus Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES Doctor of International Relations and European Studies Head of the Department of M.A. in International Relations, Global Economy and Strategic Analysis, Ledra College - Vuzf University

EDITORIAL SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD Members of the Board Panayiotis IFESTOS Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies in University of Piraeus Savvas KATSIKIDES Professor of Social and Political Sciences/University of Cyprus Dr Gagik HARUTYUNYAN Executive Director of Noravank Foundation Christodoulos PELAGHIAS Doctor in Law Chairman of European Rim Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC) Vahagn R. AGLYAN Ph.D., Noravank Foundation, Advisor, Deputy Director, Center for Political Studies

SUPPORTING EDITORIAL TEAM Mary PANOUSSI DES in Translation-Conference Interpretation, Université de Mons-Hainaut (UMH) Executive Masters in Public Relations, Marketing and Advertising, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) PhD Candidate in Environmental Communications, Frei Universität Berlin Thalia LIVADIOTOU MA in Public Sector, Panteion University, MBA general, Leicester University Melissa MAVRI Phd Candidate and Researcher in International Politics Charis KYRIAKOU BSc Business Management-University of East-Anglia MSc Advanced Business Management-University of East-Anglia Lecturer of Digital Marketing TARAMA DESIGNS - Nicosia Marios CHARALAMBOUS Cover Design, Layout Design and Type Setting

ISSN 1986-4698 4

Dr Eleni Theocharous Dr Yiannos Charalambides

Legal responsibility:

Dr Yiannos Charalambides

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be copied, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or means, without the prior expressed permission in writing of the publisher of the journal. PUBLICATION ADDRESS: LEDRA College Department of M.A. in International Relations, Global Economy and Strategic Analysis, 13 Langada str., 2023 Strovolos, Nicosia, Cyprus VUZF University Gousla Str. 1, Sofia 1618, Bulgaria EUROPEAN RIM POLICY AND INVESTMENT COUNCIL (ERPIC) PO Box 40758 6307, Larnaca Cyprus Eurodialogue is a periodic journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the address below: Dr Eleni Theocharous, MEP ASP 08E246 – European Parliament 60 rue Wiertz, 1047 Brussels, Belgium The journal can be acquired by contacting the editors. The full responsibility regarding the content of the articles belongs exclusively to the authors. This Journal has no commercial purpose and it is distributed for free.

CONTENTS FOREWORD ..........................................................................................................................................

POLITICAL INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................

PART I

REGIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM .......................................................................................... 11 TURKEY AT THE CROSSROADS OF A NEW GEOPOLITICAL MAP .................................................. 12 Eleni THEOCHAROUS CYPRUS’ REUNIFICATION ......................................................................................................................... 19 Revecca Pedi and Ilias KOUSKOUVELIS CYPRUS AS A FEDERAL STATE: THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ................................................ 35 Ioannis VIOLARIS

PART II ............................................................................................................................................................ 45 LEGAL ASPECTS AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS ............................................ 46 AS A CORNERSTONE OF RULE OF LAW AND REGIONAL STABILITY Panayiotis IFESTOS THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 AND ITS RELEVANCE ........................................ 59 TO THE CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

PART III ......................................................................................................................................................... 85 SECURITY ISSUES THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM FROM TURKEY ................................................. 86 AS A SECURITY ISSUE Andreas PENTARAS REUNITED CYPRUS AS AN ACTIVE SECURITY PARTNER ............................................................... 95 IN THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES Goffrey Van ORDEN THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS ............................................. 99 ΑFTER THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM Andreas LOIZOU

PART IIII ...................................................................................................................................................... 109 REVISIONIST POLICY AND ENERGY GAMES DOES THE CYPRUS EEZ FOLLOW THE MODEL OF THE AEGEAN SEA?........................................ 110 Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES A GEOPOLITICAL COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN ........................................................................ 131 THE CASE STUDY OF KIRKUK AND THE CYPRUS POLITICO – ECONOMIC PROSPECTS Pavlos VOSKOU

FOREWORD Dear reader, The Cyprus issue is running the last stage of a negotiating procedure, which aims in the finding of a comprehensive solution. This journal deals with various aspects of the outstanding Cyprus problem. The articles of this work focus on legal, economic, military, geopolitical and geostrategic topics. It is an intensive effort through which the authors attempt to examine and analyze the Cyprus conflict and thereby to find out whether the solution, which is under configuration, could be a viable one. In this regards, the Cyprus issue is not only seen through the lens of its bi-communal dimension but also in the context of its international aspects. Cyprus is an indispensable actor of the regional geopolitical games due to its sensitive and important geostrategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and its very close position to the turbulent arena of the Middle East. The discovery of gas resources within the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone renders the island to be much more attractive to all and particularly to its enemies, the regional and global powers. Whether this reality will be in favor of the finding of a comprehensive and viable solution, it is a matter that time will show. Besides, the viability of the solution depends on the Turkish political attitude. In this regard, relevant questions are raised: Does the solution, which is under way, falls into the Turkish revisionist policy or not? Is the solution in line with the democratic and EU values and principles or not? Will the new political system, resulting from the negotiations, exist and function under a status of security? Do all these issues constitute factors which are essential for the viability of the solution? Time is running out and the Cyprus problem is on the knife edge. This collective work aspires to shed light on invisible aspects and angles of the Cyprus issue and thus to contribute to a constructive and democratic dialogue, which is, in fact, the quintessence of democracy.

POLITICAL INTRODUCTION The document presented below has been prepared by the lawyer, Mr. Polyvios G. Polyviou*, and sent to the negotiating team of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Nicos Anastadiades. Polyvios G. Polyviou is one of the president’s special advisors on the Cyprus issue. He has vast experience in the negotiations as he was part of the efforts under president Makarios for the solution of the Cyprus problem prior to the invasion of the Turkish troops on July 20, 1974. In this document, Mr. Polyviou raised his concerns regarding the content of the solution and thus triggering a discussion about the functionality and the viability of the “new state of affairs”. This email was published in the local press of Cyprus on September 6, 2016.

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Mr Polyvios G. Polyviou attended the University of Oxford 1968-1972, obtaining the degrees of B.A. (Hons) in Jurisprudence and B.C.L. He obtained a Double First at Oxford, the only one in his year, and was also awarded the Martin Wronker prize in Law for the best performance of the year at the University of Oxford. He was then called to the Bar, being awarded the MacKaskie scholarship, and was then the Procter Fellow at the School of Politics of the University of Princeton. He was then a Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, and Lecturer in Law in the University of Oxford between 1973 - 1980.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

PART I REGIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

TURKEY AT THE CROSSROADS OF A NEW GEOPOLITICAL MAP The consequences of an unsuccessful coup d’état and the solution to the Cyprus issue Eleni THEOCHAROUS*1 Introduction The coup attempt in Turkey constitutes an important turning point in the history of the country and has a serious impact on the entire region. On one hand, it was a move that failed and ridiculously collapsed but, on the other, it gave huge power to Erdogan and armed him with audacity to proceed to a harsh operation of dissident suppression, sending some thousands of military personnel, public servants, judges, academics and reporters to jail and firing

thousands of others. However, the Turkish society, despite its important

dissimilarities, rallied around the government, thus rendering Erdogan much more powerful, than he was before the coup; this is the reason why the neo-sultan considers this event as “God’s gift”. This is so, because he has been granted the opportunity to realise his vision, his expansive conquests for post-Kemalist Turkey. Turkey is the most important country in the unstable Middle East area, with a dominant position, due to its size, population, geography, military and economic power and historical ambitions. The Middle East is already the most explosive region of the planet and cosmogenic changes occur in it. The rise of Erdogan and the AKP party to power, the AKP being the Turkish version of the Muslim Brotherhood, which conducts itself in parallel with the Salafi Jihadism, converted instability into a constant conflict. For years, Erdogan’s Turkey trained and funded terrorists, by sending them to the Middle East. Erdogan, who “replaced” the harsh rhetoric of Erbakan, with the policy of mild, modern Islam and received the blessings of the United States, in order to constitute a secular model state for all the regimes of the Middle East, woefully refuted all those naïve enough who believed in him. Turkey appeared to be the forerunner and the supporter of the Arab Spring. At the same time, Turkey was the main *

Chair of the “SOLIDARITY” Party in Cyprus Member of the European Parliament

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

instigator and funder of ISIS. However, Turkey’s stance related to the Middle East crisis, but also to its aspirations, its aggressiveness and its machinations against Metropolitan Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, was and still remains firmly aggressive and the same would have happened with a success of the coup. In other words, Erdogan and the Generals “ikisi de bir” (the two behave as one). Plans never change, no matter who governs in Turkey. The deep state always controls them. It is only the administrator of the deep state who gets replaced. The plan of re-occupation of Cyprus that has been prepared since 1956 by Nihat Erim, is in full progress. This is by far the most significant element and not the coup and the repressive measures imposed by Erdogan or the sudden concern of the Europeans for the human rights and the Kurdish MPs led to prison. The paranoid dedication of Erdogan to a post-Kemalist hegemony begins to materialize with the deconstruction of Ataturk, the challenging of the Treaty of Lausanne and the direct aspirations against Cyprus and Greece. Davutoglu’s theoretical approaches begin to take shape. However, it is obvious that the governments of both Greece and Cyprus do not understand this reality. Instead of recognising their own responsibilities in the overall effort of rescuing Hellenism, instead of drawing up a strategy of opposition to the Turkish projects, they are happy that “democracy” prevailed in the Republic of Turkey.

Major Cause and Turkish Army One of the major causes of the coup was the worsening of the American-Turkish relations, which have been undergoing a major crisis for the past two years, due to the U.S Alliance with the Kurds of Syria, against the Islamic state. The Turks know that this will lead to the establishment of a second Turkish state in Northern Syria, paving the way for the liberation of the whole Kurdistan. In light of all these eventualities, Erdogan, after trying, anxiously and repeatedly, to convince Washington to change its policy, turned to Israel and Russia. As already mentioned, in the region of the near and Middle East and Western Asia but also in the Eastern Mediterranean and in North Africa, the situation is extremely unstable, due to the Syrian crisis, the actions of the Islamic State and to other extremist Islamic organizations. It is also very fluid, because of the constant insurrections of the Kurds, of the Palestinian issue and because of the discovery of large hydrocarbon deposits in the Levantine sea. Turkey invaded Syria to Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Security, New Geopolitical Environment and EU Energy Supply

create a so-called zone of security; however, in reality, this was to control the Kurds who seek, with the solution of the Syrian problem, or even before that, to unify the three cantons that they possess, in Efrîn, in Kobanê and in Jazira, according status to “the state of Rojava”, with the prospect of having direct access to the Mediterranean sea. The identity of the leader of the coup has not been confirmed yet. Some however, consider the self-exiled in Pennsylvania Fethullah Gülen to be the mastermind of the whole stratagem, whereas others believe that the coup was orchestrated by Erdogan, as a means to further consolidate himself within the country. It was clearly an operetta-coup, which proved however that the entirely amateur move of the insurrectionists leads to the following conclusions: 1.

The Turkish army is not immune and is not as organised as some would like to believe.

It has lost the consistency it used to have in the past and most of its important adherents, primarily Kemalists, with it. Today key positions are held by Erdogan supporters, Gullen supporters and Alevites.

Turkey has been found in a position of turmoil and rearrangements but is also under the eye of the democratic powers of Europe. A recently circulated document of the European Commission speaks about a proposal for the interruption of the accession talks. The army, being an extremely powerful weapon of Turkey, is now converted into a factor of instability. The question of the reinstatement of death penalty remains open, a fact that rouses protestations by the Europeans and the Americans. The Secretary of State John Kerry, declared that if Turkey reinstates the death penalty, then it will have to face even its expulsion from NATO. The Council of Europe has already bluntly raised the issue of the immediate expulsion of Turkey, in the event of a reinstatement of the death penalty. The tense atmosphere prevailing in Ankara is expected to influence its relationships with NATO, since the military base at Incirlik has been closed, whereas the authoritarian and psychologically unstable actions of Erdogan are infuriating Europe.

Geopolitical Environment After the coup of the 15th of July, Erdogan turned himself towards Moscow and this was welcomed with satisfaction by the latter, due to its big interests in Turkey. After the meeting of Putin with Erdogan on the 9th of August 2016, the 14

ELENI THEOCHAROUS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

relations of the two countries have been revived, as the tourist and commercial activities towards Turkey have restarted and two major projects have been unfrozen: The Nuclear Programme of Akkuyu and the Turkish Stream. We understand the magnitude of these projects by the fact that the installation of a single reactor in the nuclear power station costs $22 billion USD. These geopolitical changes influence dramatically Cyprus and Greece, at a critical period in time when serious efforts are under way to resolve the Cyprus Problem. In this case, if we get led to an international summit, no one will consider putting pressure on Turkey for any kind of compromise, but instead on the weak and vandalised Greek-Cypriot side. The Turkish strategic goals in Cyprus, in the Aegean, in Thrace, in Syria, in Iraq, in the Caucasus and in the Middle-East are as already mentioned, inextricably connected with the deep-state politics and do not change. They always stay at the forefront in a bold and insolent way, accompanied by implementation claims. The deep state in the hands of Erdogan, and in the name of security, supresses democracy and the human rights and implements brutal dictatorship. Whereas beforehand the guardian of the state was the army, now it is the police of the absolute monarch Erdogan that controls the whole system. Such a situation does not provide Turkey with political stability. In order to divert the attention of the public opinion from his oppressing and illiberal politics, Erdogan resets the Turkish irredentism in the Aegean Sea and in Thrace, as a part of his revisionist policy. He publishes maps of the “Big Turkey” which include half of Armenia, half of Syria, North Iraq, the Aegean Sea, Chalkidiki, Thessaloniki, Bulgaria and Cyprus. He threatens with the annexation of the occupied territories of Cyprus, he provokes Greece, he invokes issues of Muslim minorities in Rhodes and Kos, he demands a referendum for the independence of Thrace and last but not least, he tries to control the Aegean with his naval and air forces. On top of it, he attempts to destabilise Greece and Cyprus by constantly channelling refugees and illegal immigrants from Syria, while the penetration of Turkish companies, either directly or undercover, within the Greek and the Cypriot economy does not constitute an encouraging factor. At the same time, a profound linguistic genocide is about to take place, at the expense of the Cypriot Hellenism.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Security, New Geopolitical Environment and EU Energy Supply

Easy Target Cyprus is the first and the easiest target. Turkey’s direct pursuit is the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, as this was determined by Turkey and Britain in 1956 and as it has been etched on the ground in 1974 with the military invasion. It goes without saying that the political and numerical equality will of course be a fact, as well as the complete control of the federal government and the imposition of sovereignty by the 18% over the 82% of the population. The political equality, that unfortunately has been accepted by the Greek side, was converted into a numerical one, in the case that the analogy in governance would be 2:1 as well. Due to the rapprochement of the relations of Ankara and Moscow, the United States softened their stance against Turkey and together with Russia allowed Turkey to invade Syria, but did not allow any participation in the combat operations for the re-occupation of Mosul from ISIS. The political pendulum strategy succeeds once more. Erdogan acts according to his interests, once towards Moscow and once towards Washington. As for the EU, which does not possess any military force, it remains lost in its own problems. At the strategic level, NATO takes over, as happened in the Aegean with the refugee crisis, and the European Union deepens its relations with this Organization.

Gas Reserves and Political Games Turkey, while coveting the natural gas of Levantine through the Turkish-Jewish company Zorlu, seeks normalization of its relations with Israel to direct the pipeline from Leviathan towards the Turkish coast. It is a fact that diplomatic steps have been taken for the normalization of relations, however Israel refuses to strategically hook itself to Turkey, with a natural gas conduit, thus giving Turkey the opportunity to materialise its projects by converting itself into an energy umbilical cord for the European Union and into a competitive regional power. A power that will not hesitate to use the Muslims at the expense of Israel. It is exactly for this reason, as Tel-Aviv reads between the lines of the Turkish policy that one of its conditions is for Turkey to bridle the Islamic organisations over which it exercises influence and which are directed against Israel. On the other hand, Cyprus and Greece are the only outlets of Israel into Europe and a geopolitical breathing space, due to lack of strategic depth. The problem is that both Cyprus and Greece are unable to proceed to a strategic alliance with Israel based on common energy interests, but also on the prevention of threats.

ELENI THEOCHAROUS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

This weakness allows Turkey to consider the delimitation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the area of Kastelorizo as a casus belli and requests the modification of the EEZ of Cyprus and Egypt, so that the Cypriot and the Greek EEZ not to be adjacent ones. Turkey has already submitted coordinates to the United Nations. With these coordinates, Turkey disputes the Cypriot continental shelf as well as the Cypriot EEZ and requests their review either before or after the solution of the Cyprus problem. Additionally, Ankara tries to impose the construction of a pipeline from the Cypriot energy fields towards Turkey. In this way, Cyprus will be fully controlled through the water pipe already constructed and through the electricity power station in its plans. To this, the natural gas will be of an added value for Turkey as, due to its prevailing power, the project will be placed under the control of Ankara. If the issues of the continental shelf and EEZ are left to be faced after the solution of the Cyprus problem, we will have a regime alike to that of the Aegean; or we will probably retreat under the weight of the Turkish threats which, as it has been publicly and repeatedly stressed since 2011 by Erdogan, they impose a lawful conversion, of the sea area from Marmarida to Alexandretta into a Turkish lake, with the control of the hydrocarbons of Cyprus and Greece. Such an achievement will be feasible with the solution promoted today in Cyprus by Turkey. Cyprus and Greece do not have a deterrent strategy. Because the question is not only what Turkey does, but what those who are under the Turkish threat do as well. The undergoing negotiations of the Cyprus Problem “turkify” even more the northern part of Cyprus and, under the structures of the federation and the privileges given to the Turkish-Cypriots and the settlers, Ankara will govern Cyprus and will cause serious problems to the European Union. The equal numeric representation and the labyrinthine state system of the four parliaments and three governments will not cause only dysfunctional issues but also economic and social problems. Democracy will be abolished, since from all the Greek-Cypriots who will wish to return to the north, under Turkish-Cypriot administration, only 20% will have voting rights in local elections, while they will not have a voting right at all in the national elections. On one hand, Turkey, through its exclusive right to conclude commercial treaties, will incorporate the north economically and otherwise and with its power it will control the institutions through the Turkish element. On the other hand, Turkey will put ahead the threat of dismantlement, if its policies are not accepted, in order to control totally the federal state system, and by consequence through this the EU.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Security, New Geopolitical Environment and EU Energy Supply

The Fate of Hellenism The solution to the pending deal will be the beginning of new geopolitical changes based on the Turkish revisionist policy. The policy of consoling is not perceived as a sign of good will by Turkey but as one of weakness. Remember how Turkey behaved towards the agreements for the protection of Hellenism in Imbros, Tenedos, the Karpas Peninsula and the Third Vienna Agreement. Not only did Turkey disrespect them but even led Hellenism to extinction. This is the fate awaiting the Hellenism of the free areas as well. It is only a matter of time. Unless there is a policy change from Athens and Nicosia.

ELENI THEOCHAROUS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

CYPRUS’ REUNIFICATION: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy. Revecca PEDI* and Ilias KOUSKOUVELIS**

1. Introduction For Cyprus to find itself through a critical juncture in its history has become destiny. Being a small state with an enviable position in a turbulent area, Cyprus has been vulnerable to every change in the international system.1 The road to freedom has been rocky and, even after the island acquired its independence, the challenges to the Republic’s sovereignty, democracy, prosperity, and international legitimacy have been enormous2. Cyprus matured through a process of trial and error, which means that during the almost six last decades Cypriot political elites have scored important successes, but they have equally made grave mistakes.3 All of them have had an impact upon the so-called “Cyprus question”.4 Since the 1960 Constitution’s political arrangements proved themselves over-optimistic and dysfunctional, especially after the Turkish invasion and occupation, the need for a solution to the “Cyprus question” has cast its shadow on the Republic’s international agenda and political discourse. For more than forty years the focus of the Republic of Cyprus is on its effort to reverse the consequences of the illegal invasion and occupation.

Revecca Pedi, Phd, is a Teaching Fellow at the Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece.

** Ιlias Kouskouvelis, Phd, is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. 1 2

C. Pagedas, ‘Introduction’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 25.1 (2014), pp. 1-5. P. Ifaistos, ‘The postwar international system: fixed and variable criteria of the Cyprus problem before and after 1974 and the causes of a national strategy deficit.’. In The Cyprus and the International System, 1945-1974: Seeking position in the world, P.. Papapolyviou et al., (Eds.), (Athens: 2013), pp. 423-439, (in Greek). V. Coufoudakis, ‘The Republic of Cyprus at Fifty: Challenges and Prospects’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 22.2 (2011), pp.20-30; E. Hatzivassiliou, ‘The Red Line: Pressure and Persuasion in Greek Diplomatic Strategies on Cyprus, 1945 to 2004’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 20.1 (2009), pp. 52-68; I. Kouskouvelis, “Smart” Leadership in a Small State: The Case of Cyprus. In The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, Tziampiris A. & Litsas, S. (Eds.), (Abingdon, 2015), pp. 93-117. V. Coufoudakis and M. Miltiadou, The Cyprus Question: A brief Introduction, (Nicosia, 2011). Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/Embassies/Embassy_Warsaw.nsf/All/ C87529455B0F3E07C1257AE70043B0E1/$file/The%20Cyprus%20Question,%20A%20Brief%20 Introduction%20(2011).pdf. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

Today, the pressure for a solution is mounting, both by domestic players, and also by international actors, such as the EU, the UN, and others who, for their own reasons, want the two sides to reach an agreement. It is argued that there is an irresistible momentum towards reunification in the next few months and that this is the last chance for a peaceful solution.5 In contrast with these voices we suggest that the Republic of Cyprus is in danger of finding itself entrapped in an unwanted solution or abandoned to Turkish aggressiveness and a de facto solution. Therefore, Cyprus for the sake of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should avoid the momentum trap. Nevertheless, the Republic of Cyprus has to develop a long term strategy, keep the “Cyprus question” open, and build its own momentum, in order to secure a fair and viable settlement which will reverse the implications of the illegal invasion and occupation. Accepting a solution at any cost, simply for the solution’s sake, would be disastrous both for the Republic’s future and for the stability in the area. To support our argument we first assess the parameters of the current momentum for solution. Then we draw on the literature focusing on small states in international relations and, in this context, we present a series of factors that can have an impact upon Cyprus’ position in the negotiations in the next few months. Therefore, in the remaining of this paper we first look at the growing international interest for a settlement. Then, we develop our approach to Cyprus as a “small state” in the international system and we look at the specific factors that could help the Republic of Cyprus to improve its position. We suggest that circumstances in the international system, the Republic’s reputation, its lessons from the past, and international partnerships in the area and beyond, can help it to follow a “small but smart” state strategy and achieve its aim at a later stage.

J. Gorvett, ‘Cyprus in the Middle’, Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2016, Available at: https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-01-12/cyprus-middle. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016; J. Gorvett, ‘One Cyprus’, Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2016. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus. Last accesed: 9 November, 2016; S. Stefanini, ‘Moment of truth for Cyprus reunification talks’, Politico, 27 October 2016. Available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/moment-of-truth-for-cyprus-reunification-talks-nicos-anastasiades-mustafa-akinci/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016; The Economist, ‘The chances of a Cyprus settlement look better than ever’, The Economist, 2 November, 2016, Available at : http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21709503-turkeys-mercurial-president-nothing-ever-certain-chances-cyprus-settlement. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

2. A Momentum towards Reunification, or just a Way to Keep Turkey Calm? The current negotiations over the “Cyprus question” have attracted considerable attention by almost any major player in the international system.6 The UN sponsors the talks and its officers, at every level, appear determined for a final agreement to be negotiated this time, before the end of term of the current Secretary General, who wishes to achieve a notable success. The EU is also highly interested in a settlement between the two sides, as the recent visit of the EU’s High Representative and Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini signals. Although EU leaders have constantly condemned Turkey’s provocative statements and actions, and asked it to respect human rights and international law, a solution to the “Cyprus question” would give them a free hand to start negotiations over Turkey’s membership and also send a positive message to the world. After all, a settlement to the “Cyprus question” is long sought and awaited among the EU circles, at least rhetorically. In addition, the US have put their weight behind the momentum for a solution, as current Administration’s term is also ending, and Russia has shown its interest through the visit of its own Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, few days after US secretary Kerry’s visit. Furthermore, European powers and China are supporting the momentum for a deal for their own, mostly economic, reasons. For all their differences the various players, agree that a deal would be a “game changer”, in a region which “needs hope and trust in diplomacy and in political solutions as no other region in the world needs” and “not only for all Cypriots, not only the island, also for the European Union, but also for the entire South East Mediterranean and for the entire Middle East”, as Mogherini put it.7 Although the importance of a ‘happy end’ to the negotiations is incontestable, the blind haste with which international actors are ready to embrace any solution needs to be further explored. There is no doubt that a fair settlement of the “Cyprus question”, which means a settlement in accordance with international law, namely one that reverses the consequences of the illegal invasion and occupation, will be beneficial for both Cyprus and the region. Nonetheless, it is clear that we are very far from such an agreement. The most complex issues 6 7

J. Gorvett, 27 October, 2016, ibid. EEAS, ‘Remarks by the High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini at the joint press conference with Ioannis Kassoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus’ 28, October, 2016. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/13522/remarks-by-the-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-ioannis-kassoulides-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-cyprus_fr. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

regarding property, territory, political arrangements, the role of Turkey, and the Turkish occupation army remain unresolved, whereas even now Turkey’s plans and actions on the island violate international law and tighten Ankara’s control over the northern part.8 So, which kind of agreement could be reached by the end of the year and why, after so many decades of inaction and indifference towards gross violations of human rights and breaches of international law, there is now such impatience? There are three pressing issues in the area for which a deal in Cyprus is considered to be a positive development. First, it is the turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean.9 It is argued that a settlement of the “Cyprus question” would send a positive message to other states and people in the region in regard to the value of diplomacy and the peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims.10 Moreover, it is contended that a unified Cyprus could play a greater role in the region and contribute to stability in the Mediterranean, especially within the EU policies context. Yet, none of these arguments is new. The Eastern Mediterranean has always been a source of turmoil and a unified Cyprus has always been perceived as a potentially important player in the area.11 Even before Cyprus’ accession into the EU, there were voices suggesting that the reunification of Cyprus is necessary for the cooperation among the democratic states in the region to be strengthened.12 Besides, the problems in the area are so serious and complex that Cyprus has not the weight to influence them and even if it could, the reunification process would absorb much of the Republic’s resources and render it necessarily inward looking for some time. Thus, under this perspective, the linkage between conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean and the settlement of “Cyprus question” is a weak one. It serves only international actors like the EU and the UN at a rhetoric level. Nonetheless, Cyprus, since its independence and even more after its accession into the EU, has played a non negligible role in the region, and it can continue to 8

I. Kouskouvelis and K. Chainoglou, ‘The water pipeline in occupied Cyprus and violations of international law.’ Working Paper 1/2016, Institute of International, Defence and European Analyses, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia. (in Greek). Available at: http://idea.uom.gr/ο-αγωγός-μεταφοράς-ύδατος-στα-κατεχόμ/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016; J. Gorvett, 27 October, 2016, ibid. 9 A. Tziampiris & S. Litsas, (Eds.),The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, (Abingdon, 2015) 10 Stylianides, quoted in Stefanini, 27 October, 2016, ibid. 11 S. Calleya, ‘The South.’ in The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, Mouritzen, H. Wivel, A. (Eds.) (London:2005), pp. 109-127. 12 E. Inbar, and S. Sandler. ‘The importance of Cyprus.’ Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2001), pp. 51-58.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

do so, as a democratic, prosperous, and respectful to international law state and an EU’s member.13 However, the connection between the exploitation of newly discovered natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the need for a solution constitutes a stronger case. This is because it is related to a third issue, which is the erratic and aggressive Turkish foreign policy.14 It is expected that new drillings, that are expected in the beginning of next year, will provoke reactions from Turkey, which given its President’s recent record are totally unpredictable. Therefore, international actors that are interested in the gas resources are willing to appease Turkey and potentially support any agreement which would satisfy the Turkish demands. Turkey has become a big headache for the West.15 Yet, the West’s reaction is nervous, if not bipolar. It seems that everyone worries about developments in Turkey, but everyone wishes to keep Turkey calm and satisfied. Since the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member, it has been believed that Greek Cypriots hold the key to Turkey’s accession into the EU. As always, interests have dominated over values. Without hiding his disappointment for the rejection of the Annan Plan, Lord Hannay suggested that “it is Turkey’s accession to the EU which at the end makes a settlement of the Cyprus problem necessary and inevitable”.16 Now, the distance between Turkey and the EU is constantly widening; the former appears indifferent for its future in the EU and day by day marches closer to authoritarianism,17 and even Turkish Cypriots are worried by Turkey’s plans in the area.18 It is therefore Turkey’s aggressiveness that should be taken seriously into consideration. A hasty and dysfunctional solution may open the Pandora’s 13

14 15

16 17

M. Bishku, ‘The Middle Eastern Relations of Cyprus and Malta: From Independence to Nonalignment to the European Union.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 26. 2 (2015), pp. 42-62; A. Mavroyiannis. ‘The Geopolitical Role of Cyprus in the Wider Context of the European Union.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 25.1 (2014), pp. 54-64. I. Kouskouvelis, ‘The Problem with Turkey’s” Zero Problems”.’ Middle East Quarterly (2013), pp. 47-56. K. Kirişci, ‘Turkey: Getting worse before it gets better’, Brookings, 1 November, 2016. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/11/01/turkey-getting-worsebefore-it-gets-better/?utm_campaign=test-emails&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=37064872. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016. D. Hannay, ‘Cyprus: Lessons from the debacle of 2004 and the way ahead.’ The Round Table 95.383 (2006), p. 99 M. Rubin, ‘Textbook totalitarianism in Turkey’, AEIDEAS, 4 November 2016. Available at: https://www.aei.org/publication/textbook-totalitarianism-in-turkey/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016. S. Levent, ‘Who will guarantee us (Cypriots) against our guarantor (Turkey)?’, Mignatiou.com, 29 October, 2016. Available at: http://mignatiou.com/2016/10/who-will-guarantee-us-cypriots-against-our-guarantor-turkey/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

Box in the area, and send wrong messages to the world, especially to those having revisionist plans in Europe and elsewhere. A settlement can be beneficial; an unfair settlement will be disastrous. Therefore, a momentum for any solution other than the reverse of the consequences of the illegal invasion and occupation is not a momentum for peace and stability in the region. Moreover, it is argued that this is the “last” chance for a peaceful settlement. Although, such a position implies an acceptance of a de facto solution and therefore it constitutes a provocative and totally incompatible with the normative structure of the current international system position, it has gained popularity.19 However, it is not anything new and it can be summarized as follows: “Greek Cypriots are possibly destined to end up with a de facto, and, perhaps, one day, with a de jure Turkish (not Turkish Cypriot) north. The Turkish Cypriots have long since lost control over their own fate and depend on Turkish willingness to give up its loot from 1974. Their future is that of a disappearing community, unless the Cyprus problem is solved”.20 Thus, overemphasizing the “momentum” and the “last” chance could lead to two dangerous consequences, either the conclusion of a hasty agreement which will finally be for one more time rejected by the people of the one or the other side, or a non-agreement, and a de facto solution of the “Cyprus question”. In this context, Cyprus is in danger of abandonment or entrapment in an unwanted situation, and that is why it should avoid the momentum trap, employ a long term strategy aiming at keeping the “Cyprus question” open, and create its own momentum for a fair and viable solution.

3. Cyprus in the negotiations: a “small but smart” state strategy Cyprus has been a sui generis case of a state and its foreign policy can be characterized as mostly existential.21 The peculiar circumstances of its independence and the illegal invasion and occupation that followed made for Cyprus to have an effective foreign policy next to the impossible.22 However, Cyprus, for all its mistakes - which can be partly justified by its past experiences - has acquired a growing autonomy.23 19 20 21

The Economist, 2 November, 2016, ibid. H. Faustmann, ‘Can the Cyprus Problem be Solved?.’ The Cyprus Review, 25.2 (2013), p. 125. C. Melakopides, ‘Cyprus, Small-Powerhood and the EU’s Principles and Values’ in Steinmetz R. and Wivel A. Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (2010), pp. 161-179. 22 I. Kouskouvelis, ‘Small States Strategy in the International System: the Case of Cyprus,’ in P.. Papapolyviou et al., (Eds.) The Cyprus and the International System, 1945-1974: Seeking position in the world, (Athens: 2013), pp 395-416. (in Greek) 23 J. Ker-Lindsay, ‘Shifting Alignments: the External Orientation of Cyprus since Independence.’ The Cyprus Review, 22.2 (2010), pp. 67-74.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Under the current circumstances the Republic of Cyprus finds itself between a rock and a hard place. The international pressure that has been built around the momentum for a solution from the one side, and the Turkish aggressiveness from the other, compels Cyprus to make very careful steps. Either with an agreement, or with a non-agreement in the current negotiations, Cyprus can get into a serious predicament, and find itself for one more time in its history under the threat of the Turkish aggressiveness. Therefore, Cyprus needs an effective strategy. We argue that Cyprus should exploit its smallness and follow again a “small but smart” state strategy, namely a strategy which can help Cyprus to increase its influence.24 Smallness should not be mistaken for impotence.25 Several small states have managed to achieve their goals in negotiations against more powerful players.26 Yet, success does not come automatically with smallness; “small but smart” states have to follow specific steps.27 In the case of Cyprus, we suggest that by exploiting circumstances in the international system, employing appropriate argumentation, managing its reputation, being reflective on its own lessons from the past, and harnessing its newly founded partnerships and its EU membership, it can avoid both the Scylla and the Charybdis, and build its own momentum for a settlement capable of guaranteeing stability and peace on and around the island. Although small states feel the consequences of anarchy more heavily than the Great Powers do,28 the international system provides them not only with constraints, but also with opportunities.29 Cyprus has not always read the international system successfully.30 As it has already been mentioned, currently the turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean, the potential of gas resources and cooperation in the region, and also the competition between different powers have attracted much interest in a deal and created the circumstances for the so called “momentum”. Yet, the Republic of Cyprus cannot accept just a solution. 24 25 26 27

28 29 30

I. Kouskouvelis, 2015, ibid. C. Browning, ‘Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19. 4 (2006), pp. 669-684. G. Baldacchino, ‘Thucydides or Kissinger? A critical review of smaller state diplomacy.’ in The Diplomacies of Small States, (Cooper, A. and Shaw, T. (Eds.), London, 2009), pp. 21-40. C. H. Grøn and Wivel A., ‘Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State policy to Smart State strategy.’ Journal of European Integration 33. 5 (2011), pp. 523-539.; D. Panke, ‘Dwarfs in International Negotiations: How Small States Make their Voices Heard.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25.3 (2012), pp. 313-328. R. Jervis. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.’ World politics 30.02 (1978), pp.167-214. M. Maass, ‘Small states: Survival and Proliferation.’ International Politics, 51.6 (2014), pp. 709728. I. Kouskouvelis, 2013, ibid.; I. Kouskouvelis, 2015, ibid.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

There is an opportunity that Cyprus should not waste, namely the Great Powers competition in Eastern Europe. If the West is ready to accept any solution other than the one reversing the consequences of the illegal invasion and occupation, then it will give a carte blanche to Vladimir Putin and any other leader with revisionist ambitions. The EU in its recently drafted Global Strategy states that “[W]e will not recognise Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine”.31 Will the EU accept any settlement that would legitimize the illegal invasion and occupation - as the Annan Plan did32 -, and destabilize Cyprus, one of its smallest member-states? Therefore, a fair solution is not only an issue of justice, but also, and most importantly, an issue of order in the international system. The Republic of Cyprus should warn the West of the implications of a hasty solution. Of course, Cypriots should not wait to be saved by others like the Melians did, because they will follow their fate. “Small but smart” states are successful because they recognize that the international system is anarchical, competitive and therefore a self-help system. Nonetheless, they are aware that despite their smallness they can pursue their interests. Cyprus has to be proactive. In a “small but smart” strategy reputation counts.33 Small states make use of their smallness and appear as unthreatening and flexible, whereas a reputation for determination and high levels of success at the domestic level matter too. The Turkish side, as well as several opinion makers, policy makers,34 and scholars, have portrayed the Greek side as rigid. Yet, the Greek Cypriots yearn for the reunification of their island. To this aim, they have made many concessions, without the expected reciprocity.35 What is more, Greek Cypriots have more to lose than the Turkish Cypriots, a part of whom supports the reunification in order to escape from Turkey’s control.36 Cyprus has to prove that it is a constructive partner and that it works according to international law and in the benefit of everyone at the table. By rejecting the Annan Plan Greek 31

32 33

34 35 36

European External Action Service, European Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action, A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, (Brussels, 2016) Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016. C. Palley, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-general’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004 (Oxford, 2005) R. Pedi, Theory of international relations: small states in the international system. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia. (Thessaloniki, 2016). I.e., D. Hannay, ibid. V. Coufoudakis, ibid. S. Levent, ibid.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Cypriots secured the viability of the Republic, protected their political and economic achievements, but they also safeguarded the peace and stability on the island and in the region. That said, in this phase of the negotiations the rejection of the Annan Plan can be useful, as it proves the determination of the Greek Cypriots to strike a fair and functional agreement. It constitutes a valuable red line. However, the current President, Anastasiades, was a supporter of the Annan Plan, and this means that his work is more difficult, as his red line appears to be different from that of his co-citizens. Moreover, the Republic of Cyprus has an impressive record of recent achievements that have rendered it a respectable small state. First, despite pessimism37 and due to their sacrifices and a consensus at a political level, Cypriots managed to make reforms, overpass the economic crisis and successfully conclude the European Stability Mechanism financial assistance programme. Furthermore, in spite of doubts regarding Cyprus’ ability to cope with the administrative requirements of its EU membership,38 the Republic has managed to be an active member-state in issues that are of its interest and, what is more, to hold an EU Presidency that delivered real achievements.39 Last but not least, Cyprus makes every effort to create value in the region; as a small state, Cyprus alone cannot have an impact upon the region. Yet, it can, in partnership with others. Cyprus in cooperation with other states in the region, namely Israel, Egypt and Greece, and through their growing cooperation in many different sectors, they try to bring about peaceful change and increase opportunities for prosperity and growth in the Eastern Mediterranean.40 Such cooperation can be a ‘game changer’ in the area. However, it is not only the reputation of a small state that matters, but also the reputation of its more powerful opponent.41 Cyprus should spare no effort to express its concern over the authoritarian turn of Turkey, the massive violations of human rights, and Erdogan’s provocative actions and statements. In 2003, Con37 38 39 40 41

M. Clarke, ‘Cyprus: The Mouse That May Yet Roar.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 25.1 (2014), pp. 95-104. N. Nugent. ‘Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of its Smallness, both as an Applicant and a Member.’ Journal of European Integration 28.1 (2006), pp. 51-71. G. Christou. ‘The Cyprus presidency of the EU:‘Real achievements’ in a ‘filoxenos topos’.’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51.1 (2013), pp. 80-88. A. Tziampiris. The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation (Cham, 2015). E. Bjøl , ‘The Power of the Weak’, Cooperation and Conflict, 3 (1968), pp. 157–168.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

gressman Payne wrote: “Turkey seems always poised to seize every opportunity to cash in on emerging crises and to bully its neighbors”.42 Thirteen years later nothing has changed. The “policy of zero problems with the neighbors” was just an effort to cover Turkey’s neo-ottoman plans, as Kouskouvelis, had quite early pointed out.43 With regard to Cyprus, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Davutoglu himself has noted that: “It is not possible for a country that neglects Cyprus to have a decisive say in the global and regional politics … Even if there was not one Muslim Turk there, Turkey had to maintain a Cyprus issue. No country can stay indifferent toward such an island, located in the heart of its very own vital space … Turkey needs to see the strategic advantage which it obtained … in the 1970s, not as the component of a Cyprus defense policy, directed toward maintaining the status quo, but as one of the diplomatic main supports of an aggressive maritime strategy”.44 Therefore, Cyprus, on the one side, is a peaceful, democratic, prosperous small state which, in partnership with other actors, makes every effort to bring about stability and peaceful change in the area, and, on the other, Turkey “threatens a modern republic that has neither the capacity nor the inclination to threaten anyone”.45 Furthermore, Cyprus should reflect on the lessons of its own past. According to Reiter (1994), small states make their choices based on their past experiences; success is followed by continuity, while failure provokes innovation. The Republic of Cyprus knows well what the consequences of an unfair settlement will be. If political arrangements are again dysfunctional, any solution will be unviable and will put in danger Cyprus’ hard-won achievements. Cypriot politicians should also recognize that unity pays back46 and should try to form a common position. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the 76% of the Greek Cypriots shows that their society is united in their demand for a fair, functional, and viable solution. Politicians have to follow. The history of negotiations reveals that red lines and a clear position help.47 In this moment, Cyprus is blackmailed with the “last” chance argument and the 42 43 44 45 46 47

D. Payne, ‘Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: Bargaining with Law Breakers.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 14.1 (2003), p.25. I. Kouskouvelis, ‘The Problem with Turkey’s” Zero Problems”.’ Middle East Quarterly (2013), pp. 47-56. Quoted in I. Kouskouvelis, 2013, ibid., p. 48. D. Payne, ibid., p. 26. I. Kouskouvelis, 2015, ibid. E. Hatzivasssiliou, ibid.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

danger of losing its potential to exploit its gas resources. However, this is not the first time that pressure is put on Cyprus to give into an unfair compromise. Turkey and other actors tried to connect its EU membership with the settlement of the Cyprus question, however unsuccessfully.48 In this context, Payne49 argued that Turkey tried to stop the unstoppable and the same is true for the current situation. As Kouskouvelis noted, in international relations and especially in the negotiations on the “Cyprus question”, there are not historical, unique or last chances.50 In its effort Cyprus should equally draw on legal, technical and moral argumentation, targeting both the leaders and the international public opinion. Cyprus has underused its legal advantages;51 it has not clarified the consequences of a dysfunctional settlement and it has not stressed to a satisfactory degree, the moral perspective of the Cyprus question. The republic of Cyprus has failed to create a powerful narrative and achieve international recognition of the “Cyprus question” and of the Republic’s rights. At the same time, Turkey has continuously violated any UNSC resolution calling for a withdrawal of its army from the island.52 Yet, it asks from Greek Cypriots to make more concessions, and although it is a force of occupation, it presents the Turkish Cypriots as victims.53 Cyprus has to use an effective political communication strategy and make use of traditional and new media in order to project its positions. Last but not least, Cyprus needs active supporters. Lesser powers in the area, which also are threatened by Turkey, big powers, such as France, Italy and the US with which Cyprus shares a common interest in its gas resources exploitation,54 Turkish Cypriots, who want to escape from Turkey’s control,55 and the EU, may come as effective partners. As for the EU, the question whether the EU will work as a shelter for Cyprus remains crucial. According to Bailes, Thay48 49 50

51 52

53 54 55

C. Melakopides, ibid. D. Payne, ibid. I. Kouskouvelis, ‘Annan Plan: neither historical, nor unique, nor a last chance’, Phileleftheros, April, 2004. Available at: http://www.kouskouvelis.gr/site/arthra-gnomis/kouskouvelis-exoteriki-politiki/item/118-σχέδιο-ανάν-ούτε-ιστορική-ούτε-μοναδική-ούτε-τελευταία. Last Accessed: 9 November, 2016. Coufoudakis, ibid. S. Zunes, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolutions Currently Being Violated by Countries Other than Iraq’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 1 October, 2002. Available at: http://fpif.org/united_nations_security_council_resolutions_currently_being_violated_by_countries_other_than_ iraq/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016. Coufoudakis, Ibid. A. Mavroyiannis, ibid; J. Sitilides, ‘The Modern Geopolitics of the Cyprus Question’, Mediterranean Quarterly, (2014), 25.1, pp.77-94. S. Levent, ibid.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

er and Thorhallsson,56 small states join alliances and international or regional organizations for economic, political, security and societal reasons; in this sense the alliance or the international/regional organization becomes a shelter for the small state which can benefit disproportionately, although usually at a cost in its autonomy. Indeed, Cyprus has been keen to become an EU member state mostly for security and societal reasons.57 EU membership has enhanced its position vis-a-vis Turkey and has also increased its status, whereas provided to its citizens a much wanted identity. The EU’s reaction to the outcomes of the current negotiations, as well as to Turkish provocative behaviour can be critical. Cyprus has to lobby hard for its positions within the EU and remind to its partners firstly, that in a case of a settlement it should be unacceptable for Turkey to have any kind of influence or presence to an EU member state; secondly, that, in a case of a non-agreement, Turkish aggressiveness and a de facto solution will become EU issues, and Cyprus can not be left alone; and, thirdly, it should stress to other small states in the Central and Eastern Europe the meaning of a small state to be threatened by a more powerful neighbour. Equally, Cyprus should underline that its location and stability are important to the transatlantic partnership, as well as its cooperation with other powers in the region, and that it is Turkey blocking its participation to the Partnership for Peace programme.

4. Conclusion In conclusion, although a solution to the “Cyprus question” is desirable and potentially a positive development for the region, a hasty solution can be disastrous. Therefore, overemphasizing the fact that there is a “momentum” for a solution and that this is the “last” chance for a peaceful settlement can have negative consequences for the whole of Cypriots. The Republic of Cyprus needs to avoid the “momentum for a solution” and “last chance for a solution” traps. It has to keep the “Cyprus question” open, until it creates its own momentum for a fair and viable settlement. We argued that employing a long term “small but smart” state strategy, one that gives emphasis on opportunities in the international system, reputation, effective argumentation and partnerships, can help the Republic of Cyprus to enhance its international and bargaining position. 56

A. Bailes, B. Thayer, and B. Thorhallsson. ‘Alliance theory and alliance ‘Shelter’: the complexities of small state alliance behaviour.’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1.1 (2016), pp. 9-26. 57 Nuggent, ibid.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

References •

Bailes, A. B. Thayer, and B. Thorhallsson. ‘Alliance theory and alliance ‘Shelter’: the complexities of small state alliance behaviour.’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1.1 (2016), pp. 9-26

•

Baldacchino, G. ‘Thucydides or Kissinger? A critical review of smaller state diplomacy.’ in Cooper, A. and Shaw, T. (Eds.) The Diplomacies of Small States, (London, 2009) pp. 21-40

•

Bishku, M. ‘The Middle Eastern Relations of Cyprus and Malta: From Independence to Nonalignment to the European Union.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 26. 2 (2015), pp. 42-62

•

Bjøl, E. ‘The Power of the Weak’, Cooperation and Conflict, 3 (1968), pp. 157– 168

•

Browning, C. ‘Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19. 4 (2006), pp. 669-684

•

Calleya, S. ‘The South.’ in Mouritzen, H. Wivel, A. (Eds.) The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, (London: 2005), pp. 109-127

•

Christou, G. ‘The Cyprus presidency of the EU:‘Real achievements’ in a ‘filoxenos topos’.’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51.1 (2013), pp. 80-88

•

Clarke, M. ‘Cyprus: The Mouse That May Yet Roar.’ Mediterranean Quarterly, 25.1 (2014) pp. 95-104.

•

Coufoudakis V. and M. Miltiadou, The Cyprus Question: A brief Introduction, (Nicosia, 2011). Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/Embassies/Embassy_ Warsaw.nsf/All/C87529455B0F3E07C1257AE70043B0E1/$file/The%20 Cyprus%20Question,%20A%20Brief%20Introduction%20(2011).pdf. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

•

Coufoudakis, V. ‘The Republic of Cyprus at Fifty: Challenges and Prospects’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 22.2 (2011), pp.20-30

•

EEAS, ‘Remarks by the High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini at the joint press conference with Ioannis Kassoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus’ 28, October, 2016. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/13522/remarks-by-the-high-representativevicepresident-federica-mogherini-at-the-joint-press-conference-with-ioanniskassoulides-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-cyprus_fr. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

•

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

•

Faustmann, H. ‘Can the Cyprus Problem be Solved?.’ The Cyprus Review, 25.2 (2013), pp. 117-125.

•

Gorvett, J. ‘Cyprus in the Middle’, Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2016, Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-01-12/cyprus-middle. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016;

•

Gorvett, J. ‘One Cyprus’, Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2016. Available at https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus. Last accesed: 9 November, 2016;

•

Grøn C. H. and A. Wivel, ‘Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State policy to Smart State strategy.’ Journal of European Integration 33. 5 (2011), pp. 523-539

•

D. Panke, ‘Dwarfs in International Negotiations: How Small States Make their Voices Heard.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25.3 (2012), pp. 313328

•

Hannay, D. ‘Cyprus: Lessons from the debacle of 2004 and the way ahead.’ The Round Table 95.383 (2006), pp. 95-100

•

Hatzivassiliou, E. ‘The Red Line: Pressure and Persuasion in Greek Diplomatic Strategies on Cyprus, 1945 to 2004’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 20.1 (2009), pp. 52-68;

•

Ifaistos, P. ‘The postwar international system: fixed and variable criteria of the Cyprus problem before and after 1974 and the causes of a national strategy deficit.’, in P.. Papapolyviou et al., (Eds.) The Cyprus and the International System, 1945-1974: Seeking position in the world, (Athens: 2013) (in Greek) pp. 423-439

•

Inbar, E. and S. Sandler. ‘The importance of Cyprus.’ Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2001), pp. 51-58

•

Jervis, R.. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.’ World politics 30.02 (1978) pp.167-214.

•

Ker-Lindsay, J. ‘Shifting Alignments: the External Orientation of Cyprus since Independence.’ The Cyprus Review 22.2 (2010), pp. 67-74.

•

Kirişci, K. ‘Turkey: Getting worse before it gets better’, Brookings, 1 November, 2016. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2016/11/01/turkey-getting-worse-before-it-gets-better/?utm_ campaign=test-emails&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_ content=37064872. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

•

Kouskouvelis, I. “’Smart’ Leadership in a Small State: The Case of Cyprus”. In Tziampiris A. & Litsas, S. (Eds.). The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, (Abingdon, 2015), pp. 93-117.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

•

Kouskouvelis, I. ‘Small States Strategy in the International System: the Case of Cyprus,’ in P.. Papapolyviou et al., (Eds.) The Cyprus and the International System, 1945-1974: Seeking position in the world, (Athens: 2013) (in Greek), pp 395-416

•

Kouskouvelis, I. “The Problem with Turkey’s ‘Zero Problems’”. Middle East Quarterly (2013), pp. 47-56

•

Kouskouvelis, I. and K. Chainoglou, ‘The water pipeline in occupied Cyprus and violations of international law.’ Working Paper 1/2016, Institute of International, Defence and European Analyses, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia. (in Greek). Available at: http://idea.uom.gr/οαγωγός-μεταφοράς-ύδατος-στα-κατεχόμ/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016

•

Kouskouvelis,I., The ‘Annan Plan: neither historical, nor unique, nor a last chance’, Phileleftheros, April, 2004. Available at: http://www.kouskouvelis.gr/ site/arthra-gnomis/kouskouvelis-exoteriki-politiki/item/118-σχέδιο-ανάν-ούτειστορική-ούτε-μοναδική-ούτε-τελευταία. Last Accessed: 9 November, 2016.

•

Levent, S. ‘Who will guarantee us (Cypriots) against our guarantor (Turkey)?’, Mignatiou.com, 29 October, 2016. Available at: http://mignatiou.com/2016/10/ who-will-guarantee-us-cypriots-against-our-guarantor-turkey/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016

•

Maass, M. ‘Small states: Survival and Proliferation.’ International Politics, 51.6, (2014), pp. 709-728

•

Mavroyiannis, A. ‘The Geopolitical Role of Cyprus in the Wider Context of the European Union.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 25.1 (2014), pp. 54-64

•

Melakopides, C. ‘Cyprus, Small-Powerhood and the EU’s Principles and Values’ in Steinmetz R. and Wivel A. Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (2010), pp. 161-179

•

Nugent, N. ‘Cyprus and the European Union: The Significance of its Smallness, both as an Applicant and a Member.’ Journal of European Integration 28.1 (2006), pp. 51-71

•

Pagedas, C. ‘Introduction’, Mediterranean Quarterly 25.1 (2014), pp. 1-5.

•

Palley, C. An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-general’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004 (Oxford, 2005)

•

Payne, D. ‘Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: Bargaining with Law Breakers.’ Mediterranean Quarterly 14.1 (2003), pp.25-31

•

Pedi, R. Theory of international relations: small states in the international system. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia. (Thessaloniki, 2016)

•

Rubin, M. ‘Textbook totalitarianism in Turkey’, AEIDEAS, 4 November 2016. Available at: https://www.aei.org/publication/textbook-totalitarianism-inturkey/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus’ reunification: From the “momentum” trap to a “small but smart” state strategy

•

Sitilides, J. ‘The Modern Geopolitics of the Cyprus Question’. Mediterranean Quarterly, (2014) 25.1, pp.77-94

•

Stefanini, S. ‘Moment of truth for Cyprus reunification talks’, Politico, 27 October 2016. Available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/moment-of-truth-forcyprus-reunification-talks-nicos-anastasiades-mustafa-akinci/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016

•

The Economist, ‘The chances of a Cyprus settlement look better than ever’, 2 November, 2016, Available at : http://www.economist.com/news/ europe/21709503-turkeys-mercurial-president-nothing-ever-certain-chancescyprus-settlement. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016

•

Tziampiris A. & S. Litsas, (Eds.),The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, (Abingdon, 2015)

•

Tziampiris, A. The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation (Cham, 2015)

•

Zunes, S. ‘United Nations Security Council Resolutions Currently Being Violated by Countries Other than Iraq’ Foreign Policy in Focus, 1 October, 2002. Available at: http://fpif.org/united_nations_security_council_resolutions_ currently_being_violated_by_countries_other_than_iraq/. Last accessed: 9 November, 2016.

REVECCA PEDI and ILIAS KOUSKOUVELIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

CYPRUS AS A FEDERAL STATE: THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS Ioannis VIOLARIS*

Introduction Since the election in 2013 of H.E. Mr Nicos Anastasiades as President of the Republic of Cyprus a renewed effort of intercommunal talks has been initiated aiming in bridging the differences that exist, mainly since 1963, between the two main communities of the island, that is the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Arriving at an acceptable solution presupposes the agreement on an array of issues, such as those on Governance, Territorial arrangements, Guarantees et al. In this paper, we attempt to address the economic implications and dimensions of a solution.

Basic assumption This study is based solely on economic theories and approaches as the solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’ has not yet been concluded therefore nobody, not even the parties taking part in the intercommunal talks, can at this stage know which the final solution and final arrangements will be. And of course, the political, social, as well as economic implications, cannot be safely deduced. Yet, it is probably certain that the solution will be the establishment of a federal bicommunal, bizonal state.

Definition of a federation – variations of it A federation (also known as a federal state) is a political entity characterized by a union of partially self-governing states or regions under a central (federal) government. In a federation, the self-governing status of the component states, as well as the division of power between them and the central government, are typically constitutionally entrenched and may not be altered by a unilateral decision of either party, the states or the federal political body. Alternatively, federation is a form of government in which sovereign power is formally divided between *

Dr Ioannis Violaris is the Academic Director of the City Unity College, Nicosia and a Visiting Associate Professor of Economics and Management at the European University, the University of Nicosia, the Ledra College and the Alexander College.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus as a federal state: The economic implications

a central authority and a number of constituent regions so that each region retains some degree of control over its internal affairs.1 The governmental or constitutional structure found in a federation is known as federalism. It can be considered the opposite of another system, the unitary state. Germany, with 16 Bundesländer, is an example of a federation, whereas neighboring Austria and its Bundesländer was a unitary state with administrative divisions that became federated, and neighboring France, by contrast, has always been unitary.2 Federations are often multiethnic and cover a large area of territory (such as Russia, the United States, India, or Brazil), but neither is necessarily the case. The initial agreements create a stability that encourages other common interests, reduces differences between the disparate territories, and gives them all even more common ground. At some time, that is recognized and a movement is organized to merge more closely. At other times, especially when common cultural factors are at play such as ethnicity and language, some of the steps in this pattern are expedited and compressed.

The case of Cyprus – the status quo In the case of Cyprus, it is well known that the main two communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot ones, are those most involved in the discussions and they are the ones that will enjoy (or suffer) from the economic developments that will follow any solution (or lack of it). They are also the ones that will co-jointly form the new Cyprus federal state. The status quo, as it has been created following the Turkish invasion (or ‘interference for restoring the constitutional order’, as the Turkish side prefers to call it) is that since July 1974 more than 30% of the land, and all the resources related to it, are under the control of the Turkish side and the owners of that land and resources have no access to it. This in itself has caused immense problems both on a microeconomic as well as macroeconomic level.3

1 2 3

Oxford English Dictionary Leonardy, U. (1992). “Federation and Länder in German foreign relations: Power-sharing in treaty-making and European affairs”. German Politics. 1 (3): 119–135. Violaris, I. (2008), Economics, a bilingual approach, Epiphaniou Publishers

Ioannis VIOLARIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Micro- and macro - effects On a microeconomic level, more than 200,000 people were violently displaced from their homes and work places and as a result they had to start all over again in building their lives. On a macroeconomic level the country has been deprived of vital resources and lost the advantage economies of scale offer.

Solution scenaria In order to address the possible implications of a solution we need to assume a scenario of a solution. Although not much is disclosed, from the discussions taking place between the two communities, it seems that the most expected final solution will be that of a loose federation. This implies that the resources found in the northern part of the island will be under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriots’ federal state and will mostly be used for that communities’ interests and vice versa for the ones in the south. The economic implications will very much depend on how the resources will be used and how the proceeds from such use will be allocated to the people of the island. Given that Cyprus is a tiny island4 (9,251 km²) it is obvious that any separation in the use of resources will be catastrophic for the development of the country. Therefore, let us assume that the final solution will provide interstate cooperation both in the development of the resources as well as in the allocation of tax receipts and government spending.

Some key expected benefits In that case as from ‘day 1’ after the solution is ratified it will provide new opportunities for both communities and if we further assume that truly trustworthy cooperation between the two federal component states will be established the benefits to both communities can be positive. Foreign investors, who so far have been reluctant to invest will be encouraged to do so. For example, the return to the Greek Cypriots of the now non-accessible part of the Famagusta town will offer opportunities for re-building it which in itself is a major project. 4

http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#asia UN

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus as a federal state: The economic implications

Mr. Anastasiades told a joint meeting of the Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus Chambers of Commerce in July, 2016, “There is the potential that the all-island G.D.P. could double in 20 years’ time.” It is obvious, just on the basis of the above statement, that the possibilities that will follow a solution are indeed immense. Additionally and proportionately positive effects to the growth of the G.D.P. and the economy in general will accrue from the development of other, now occupied areas, such as Morphou, which is, besides Famagusta, one other of the occupied areas expected to be returned to its owners. The above prospects are to be counted in the positive developments. Moreover, besides the growth of the G.D.P. employment opportunities will be created both in the re-building processes as well as in new projects that will develop. The most positive, nevertheless, benefit will be the attraction of foreign investors who are expected to see the ‘new’ Cyprus as a ‘new’ opportunity for investments, not only in Cyprus but in the broader region as well.5

Some key negative implications Yet, several negative implications are to be expected and have to be addressed. It is known that Cyprus is a major net importer of goods and services. It is also known that many well-known brands, such as soft drinks, food staff, clothes etc. are imported in both sides from different firms. A practical problem that will have to be faced is when two firms are currently the ‘official representatives and distributors’ in their respective areas. It might be the case that the suppliers will decide to retain two representatives, one in the north and one in the south, yet, and given that free movement of goods and persons will be possible, it will be necessary for the two to cooperate in agreeing on the prices and terms of trade as otherwise one of them will prevail. Additionally, it is well known that most of the goods consumed in the northern part of Cyprus are imported from Turkey and that the Turkish importers enjoy better prices and terms of business from their suppliers since they deal in much larger volumes than the importers in the southern part of Cyprus. Therefore, this is an issue that has to be addressed as there exists the threat for the Greek Cypriot 5

Slaughter and May (2012). “Legal regimes governing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in host countries”.

Ioannis VIOLARIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

importers to have to face an uneven competition and be unable to survive. Especially this will have even more implications and complications if the new State will be a confederation, even a ‘covered’ one. A confederation, in modern political terms, is usually limited to a permanent union of sovereign states for common action in relation to other states.[4] The closest entity in the world to a confederation at this time is the European Union. While the word “confederation” was officially used when the present Canadian federal system was established in 1867, the term refers only to the process and not the resulting state since Canadian provinces are not sovereign and do not claim to be. In the case of Switzerland, while the country is still officially called the Swiss Confederation (Confoederatio Helvetica, Confédération suisse) this is also now a misnomer since the Swiss cantons lost their sovereign status in 1848.6 In this case, matters, such as the above, will be even more difficult to address. Prof Theophanous, of the University of Nicosia, has recently published his book The political economy of a Cyprus settlement. He examines four scenaria: that of a ‘bicommunal, bizonal federation’; that of ‘the continuation of the status quo’; the ‘solution of two separate countries’; and that of a ‘federation with weak bizonal state’. He arrives at the conclusion that the implications of a solution will very much depend on which of these solutions is finally agreed. He agrees with our above views that if Cypriots are brought together then the socioeconomic benefits will be the best possible. One has to additionally consider that a ‘bicommunal, bizonal federation’ will not assist in building a ‘common interest’ vision, which will be necessary for reuniting the island’s resources and achieving economies of scale, so much need in such a small country like Cyprus. Economies of scale are the cost advantages that enterprises obtain due to size, output, or scale of operation, with cost per unit of output generally decreasing with increasing scale as fixed costs are spread out over more units of output. Often operational efficiency is also greater with increasing scale, leading to lower variable cost as well. Economies of scale apply to a variety of organizational and business situations and at various levels, such as a business or manufacturing unit, plant or an entire enterprise. For example, a large manufacturing facility would be expected to have a lower cost per unit of output than a smaller facility, all other factors being equal, while a company with many facilities should have a cost advantage over a competitor with fewer. 6

CH: Confoederatio Helvetica - Switzerland - Information. Swissworld.org.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus as a federal state: The economic implications

Some economies of scale, such as capital cost of manufacturing facilities and friction loss of transportation and industrial equipment, have a physical or engineering basis. The economic concept dates back to Adam Smith and the idea of obtaining larger production returns through the use of division of labor.7 Diseconomies of scale are the opposite and since 1974 Cyprus, both in the north as well in the south, businesses have been suffering from such diseconomies that acted as a barrier to further growth and perhaps are partly responsible for the catastrophic effects the recent, 2007/08 financial crisis had on Cyprus.8

The E.U. diastases of a solution in Cyprus Cyprus as a member of the E.U. (and the Eurozone) is strategically located to enjoy major economic advantages if it can fully exploit its location, the good relations it enjoys with the Middle East and with Russia. Cyprus can, moreover, be an island of peace and prosperity for all its citizens if the Cypriots can grasp the opportunity to find a mutually beneficial solution to the political problem which has plagued the island since its independence. Cyprus should be seen as the motherland of all its citizens. This profound statement is not dissimilar to how the E.U. was established. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up after World War II. France and Germany’s shared interest in the ECSC was also a peace initiative which led to the creation of the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the E.U. Can anyone dispute that the period since the last Great War on the European continent has been one of peace? A lasting and peaceful solution in Cyprus will definitely benefit the E.U. as well. It will be also possibly an opportunity for Turkey to finally achieve its entrance to the E.U. It will additionally foster the European integration that has been recently negatively affected following the decision of the British people to exit the Union.9

7 8

O’Sullivan, Arthur; Sheffrin, Steven M. (2003). Economics: Principles in Action. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. p. 157. ISBN 0-13-063085-3. Eigner, Peter; Umlauft, Thomas S. (2015-07-01). “The Great Depression(s) of 1929-1933 and 2007-2009? Parallels, Differences and Policy Lessons”. MTA-ELTE Crisis History Working Paper No. 2: Hungarian Academy of Science. Mortimore, Roger. “Polling history: 40 years of British views on ‘in or out’ of Europe”. The Conversation.

Ioannis VIOLARIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

The financing of the solution One major issue that has to be addressed is how people whose properties are not be returned are to be compensated, as well as how the re-building of towns such as Famagusta and Morphou, as well as perhaps other areas, are going to be financed. Neither the Government of Cyprus nor the Turkish- Cypriot ‘state’ have or are expected to have the funds to cover this cost. Vice-president of the European Parliament Ramon Luis Valcarcel on Wednesday 26.6.2016 asked the European Commission to share its estimates on the cost of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem and any practical changes that could be made in the European Union’s strategy towards the return of occupied properties, in order to make it more effective and of real help for the Cypriots. The cost of a solution to the Cyprus problem remains one of the big unknowns, as a study by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank seems to stumble on the Turkish Cypriot side’s refusal to allow inspection of the financial state of banks in the north. And of course it is well known that especially after a solution is arrived at those banks will have to be controlled by the European Central Bank, as the case is with all banks operating within the Eurozone.10 If they are not then financial chaos will be created and it will be impossible to efficiently apply a monetary policy.11 Complicating matters further, disagreements remain on the negotiating table between the two Cypriot leaders with regard to the real value of properties to be returned, exchanged, or compensated for, following a solution. The Greek Cypriot side argues that current market values should be used, while the Turkish Cypriot side claims the 1974 values are the appropriate measure. “Since the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders started meeting under the framework provided by the United Nations, progress towards achieving a comprehensive solution for the Cyprus problem has been made,” Valcarcel noted. “Both leaders now seem to be optimistic, hoping even to reach an agreement in the upcoming months. However, in order for the solution they are seeking to achieve to be feasible, practical matters such as the financial dimension of the situation that would emerge from a new settlement should be addressed widely.”

Bertaut, Carol C. (2002). “The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem” (PDF). New England Economic Review (2nd quarter): 25–28. 11 “B.M. Friedman, “Monetary Policy,” Abstract.”. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. 2001. pp. 9976–9984.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Cyprus as a federal state: The economic implications

In his written question to the Commission, entitled ‘State of play in negotiations to resolve the Cyprus problem and the envisaged financial framework’, Valcarcel said “it would not just be the whole of the island’s population that would benefit from a satisfactory solution to the Cyprus problem, but “the European Union as a whole”, as it would feel the benefit that would derive from greater territorial security and better relations with Turkey. “The financial dimension’s main pillars [in a solution] include costs relating to property that would have to be returned, as well as the costs of running the institutions of a federal state,” he said. “In view of this, can the Commission supply data on said costs, so that steady progress can be made in the negotiations?” Likewise, he asked, and in order that it may act faster, does the Commission plan any changes to the EU’s strategy on the return of occupied dwellings, given that, as President Jean-Claude Juncker has already indicated this is “one of the keys to the settlement’s success”? As the inter-communal talks resumed and progressed, following a joint statement in February 2014, the Commission assumed a special role, closely following the negotiation process and discreetly providing technical and political support. However, in light of poor progress made thus far on the issue of properties, Valcarcel’s question could bring to light the Commission’s intentions with regard to helping tackle the crucial issue through more decisive action. “If we want the Cyprus talks to succeed – and in the European Union we all do – practical matters such as the financial framework within which a new settlement could develop should start to be addressed widely,” Valcarcel said. “This is the reason why I have asked the European Commission to supply data on the costs. My aim is that steady progress can be made in the negotiations.” Valcarcel’s interest in the Cyprus problem, dating back several years, was exemplified in several contacts with Cypriot leaders from his former posts as President of the EU’s Committee of the Regions. Such crucial concerns have to be addressed BEFORE any solution is brought forward at a referendum. The people’s decision on the outcome of the referendum will, inter alia, depend on whether a satisfactory compensation formula is secured.

Ioannis VIOLARIS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

One possibility is to create a ‘solution fund’ to be funded by all U.N. countries according to their financial capability. A fund similar to the ‘Marshall plan’12 Another possibility is to partially finance the solution costs out of the proceeds to be accrued from the extraction of hydrocarbons from Cyprus’ south sea reserves.

Governance costs One additional issue is how the multiplicity of three public sectors (central and two at community level) as well as the parliaments, at both sides and at a federal level, will be able to cover their costs. Already and following strict fiscal measures imposed to the Government of Cyprus by the Troika (European Commission, IMF and European Central bank representatives) through the Economic adjustment program13 it has been extremely difficult to overcome the difficulties caused by the 2007/08 crisis and still recent (October 2016) data published by the Statistical Department one out of three Cypriots is deprived of basic goods and services. (these are set as: rent, housing loan payments, public utilities’ payments, heating expenses and a meal every two days). Therefore any additional burdens that will be caused through a solution will worsen these statistics and the standard of living.

Concluding remarks Forty two years of alienation form ones property is a very long time. The division of any country is a traumatic event that involves both social as well as economic impacts. A solution is longed for by all rational people having a sentimental link to Cyprus. One, nevertheless, has to consider, besides a politically, legally and socially acceptable solution, a solution that will be economically not only viable but economically able to heal the wounds the 2007/08 crisis has caused and ensure a steady growth based on an economic system that will be based on sustainable industries and institutions that will not allow corruption ill profit making. It is expected, therefore, that these issues will also be discussed and addressed to in the context of the solution to be agreed, as no solution will be viable if the peoples’ lives are not improved. 12

Mills, Nicolaus (2008). Winning the Peace: the Marshall Plan and America’s Coming of Age as a Superpower. Wiley. p. 13 James Wilson (25 June 2012). “Cyprus requests eurozone bailout”. Financial Times.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

PART II LEGAL ASPECTS AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AS A CORNERSTONE OF RULE OF LAW AND REGIONAL STABILITY Panayiotis IFESTOS* Introduction Principles and prerequisites definition for a viable state The following analysis shall touch upon certain central issues related to approaches for a peaceful resolution of a conflict originating in the post-colonial practices of divide and rule. What is a viable solution? Ηow rule of law could prevail in Cyprus? What means democracy in re-united Republic of Cyprus? What arrangements could prevent regional instability? It should be made clear at the outset that the analysis which follows is descriptive and not prescriptive. That is, it refers to factors which manifestly interstate experience is telling as regards the causes of conflict and instability. Certainly, by defining principles which experience tell us are conducive to viable interstate and intrastate stability we have no illusions that in contemporary international relations power, national interests and most importantly hegemonic antagonism are by and large defining the outcome. Nonetheless, defining these principles is also important to the extend it creates a framework for more rational negotiations and for “solutions” that are conducive to stability. In the same context, it is crucial to underline that the Cyprus Republic is a full member of the European Union whose normative structures as it happens to all other members are incorporated in the internal legal system1. *

Professor of International Relations-Strategic Studies, Faculty of International and European Studies, University of Piraeus

At this point it is worth commenting the decisions of the Security Council of the UN in 1974, 1983 and subsequently the confirming decisions calling, at the same time –and given that the Cyprus government was sitting on the negotiating table instead of claiming as a precondition for these negotiations the implementation in accordance to the principles of international order– all parties to negotiate for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. We consider the following as crucial aspects of a rational approach for a viable solution of the Cyprus question:

The SC in 1974 when we had the Coup d’ Etat and the Turkish invasion, and in 1983 when we had an illegal proclamation of independence in the occupied areas, decided –an indeed rare event, given the stalemates in the SC since 1945 owing the disagreements of the permanent members– in favor of re-establishing international order, that is, calling everyone to respect of the integrity and sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic.

In each subsequent decision calling for the continuation of negotiations we had references

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

In this regard, I need not repeat here the comprehensive report written by an international panel in 2005. Its title is: “A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law of the international expert panel for a European Solution of the Cyprus Problem”2. This report offers a full account of international and European rule of law and, indeed, an “arsenal” of objective arguments if international agreements and international conventions. The point or reference of this report is the “Anan plan” which was proposed in 2004 and was rejected in a referendum. A prerequisite for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Cyprus necessitates on the one hand the application of the fundamental principles of International and European rule of law without exemptions and on the other hand the establishment –for the first time in the history of modern Cyprus– of all principles relating to internal and external sovereignty. In fact, elementary knowledge of purely objective factors regarding the Cyprus conflict after 1960 is telling: At the outset it became evident that the colonial constitution which provided veto and firebreaks on national / racial basis couldn’t as regards the state of affair during the previous phase of negotiations. So the Greek side gradually yielded politically to non-functional terms by accepting to negotiate on the basis of bizonality, bicommunallity and most importantly of “political equality” (on a racial/national divisive basis!). Standard negotiating practices make it imperative that those political postures would had been withdrew given the other side’s consistent intransigent postures and its interpretation of these terms in ways that create an indeed dysfunctional monstrous state which exists nowhere else and never existed. c.

Those supporting that there is a “negotiating acquis” of “equality” on racial/national basis in ways that clearly violate the principle of democracy are crossly mistaken. As it was correctly explained by the GS of the UN –para. 11 report of 3.4.1992 (S/23780), confirmed in SC resolutions beginning with 774 - 1992, 26.8.1992– it is not an arithmetic equality of the 82% to the 18% (which is an aberration improper for democratic states). What was said in the past is that a) Changes of the constitution shall be agreed by both communities. b) That both communities should have an adequate participation in all Federal structures. c) Provision of safeguards that no decision could be taken at the Federal level which turn against the two communities. d) Identical functions and jurisdictions.

Last but not least, may I add that if anything else is meant it should be abandoned even if the Security Council “decides” otherwise. The sole role of the SC is international order. “Peace and Security” stipulated in Charter 7, moreover, does not concern the Cyprus Republic which was twice the victim of illegal external aggression (by the dictators of Athens and then by Turkey when it invaded). According to the Charter of the UN article 2 the SC has no right to define the internal regimes of its member-states. In addition, it is also against the Charter of the UN if anyone imposes on an independent state member of the UN arrangements which are not viable, are undemocratic and are leading to instability and conflict. When it was published it was published in many periodicals, newspapers and in the internet. See for example (in four languages) «A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law» By the International Expert Panel convened by the Committee for a European Solution in Cyprus. [ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ: «Πλαίσιο αρχών για μια δίκαιη και βιώσιμη λύση του Κυπριακού με γνώμονα το διεθνές και Ευρωπαϊκό δίκαιο»] http://wp.me/p3OlPy-1lW. See also in http://www.ifestosedu.gr/32RuleofLaw.htm (it includes articles which highlight many aspects of the main report).

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Democratic Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as a cornerstone of rule of law and regional stability

function. To put it otherwise, there is no viable outcome of the Cyprus conflict if the divisive arrangements of the Zurich Agreement are not abolished and if the so called guarantees as well foreign troops stationed on the island are not withdrawn. Again, if we stick to international principles by and large acceptable by all states which are members of the UN, the UN charter stipulates that internal and external sovereignty, independence, equality among states and non-intervention are fundamental factors and criteria of the international regime established in 1945. Also, the same applies for the states involved which are members of the conventions for human rights whose clauses are incorporated in their internal normative structures and which provide a legally binding framework. To sum up at this point, a prerequisite for a viable solution which provides a viable state which is conducive to regional stability, is the respect of fundamental principles such as the prohibition of aggression, the non-recognition of its consequences, the respect of human rights and of international and European rule of law.

Democratic orientation and normative structures: Towards a socio-political morality State normative structures democratically oriented, is certainly the single most important factor for a viable state whose political rights apply to all citizens irrespective national origin. The democratic orientation in viable civilized states is defined in their fundamental chapter, that is, their constitutions. Irrespective anyone’s doctrinal views, by democratic orientation here we refer to the classical perception of the term democracy: The governing authorities are the assignees where by the assignor are the citizens. The citizens of a democratic polity, moreover, have equal political rights which apply to all of them irrespective racial or national origin. In fact in the context of a state’s democratic structures so oriented, sky is the limit for political, cultural, religious decentralization and for checks and balances which secure full application of the socio-politically defined political rights. Moreover, given that politics classically conceived refer to an ever going «contest» during which endlessly define and redefine political morality that underpins the distributive justice system and the corresponding compatible –to this

PANAYIOTIS IFESTOS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

system– normative structures, any prefixed legal system –especially if the state is so divided on national / radial basis– the state enterprise is programmatically condemned to failure resulting to conflict. As the aforementioned Report of the international panel put it, “both the present state of affairs in Cyprus and the terms of the Annan Plan [proposed in 2004] are inconsistent with [these] fundamental principles”. As already mentioned, a central issue concerns the fact that the accession of the Cyprus Republic into the EU makes it imperative to incorporate in any solution all the principles and all the criteria on the basis of which the European Community was established. As already underlined, by joining the EU, Cyprus incorporated the “acquis communautaire” which by itself provides a democratic state governed by the rule of law principles3. The decision on the basis of which the full accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU was achieved, was, precisely, based on a deliberate purposeful approach in the search for a viable state whose orientations and functions are safeguarded by incorporating the aforementioned fundamental principles in the negotiating process and by providing a normative framework which apply to all Cypriot citizens without discrimination4.

Conflict-resolution and Security issues Let’s be more specific: Conflict-resolution is not an altruistic approach. It could prove productive only if it serves the lawful and legitimate interests of all actors involved. That is, primarily the interests of the Cypriots themselves (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the other communities), of Greece’s (as Greek Cypriot security would be compromised if a conflict between Greece and Turkey erupts) and Turkey’s (the security of the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara’s often declared fear for a possible strategic encirclement by Greece if union takes place). Security is in fact a core concept of conflict-resolution. Against all trivial approaches to conflict-resolution we could cite the core arguments of Hans Morgenthau 3 4

See in footnote below concerning CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Article 12: non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. See “The Cyprus problem and the Greco-Turkish conflict: Causes of war and the European option” in Irini Chila (ed.), La Grece dans le sud-est europeen: enjeux regionaux et perspectives (Herodotos, Paris, 2004). Also, see (in Greek) “In memoriam Γιάννου Κρανιδιώτη Ειρηνική επίλυση των ελληνοτουρκικών διαφορών και ο Γιάννος Κρανιδιώτης στο Στ. Περράκης (Επιμ.), In Memoriam Γιάννου Κρανιδιώτη (Εκδ. Σιδέρη, Αθήνα 2010) also appended in http://www.ifestosedu.gr/42memoriamkranidioti.htm. See also articles regarding the follow up of the aforementioned expert panel for the Cyprus and the international and European rule of law in http://www.ifestosedu.gr/84ConventionforCyprus.htm.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Democratic Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as a cornerstone of rule of law and regional stability

as regards diplomacy: «… 1. Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit. This is the first of the rules that diplomacy can reflect at the risk of war. … 2. The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest and must be supported with adequate power. 3. Diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations. Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear”. 4. Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them (Five additional prerequisites of compromise) 1). Give up shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage. 2) Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing face and from which you cannot advance without grave risks. 3) Never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you. 4) The armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master. …”5. Precisely, respecting the lawful and legitimate national concerns of all countries involved is a core concept for conflict-resolution. Defining “lawful-legitimate”, however, is not a matter of subjective judgement but a matter of attachment to the principles of international governance which is compatible with international law and to the Charter of the United Nations. No aggression and respect of international order, as we know, are high principles of the contemporary system. In this productive sense, the primary concern is the interests of Cypriots themselves: a.

Greece’s and Turkey’s lawful and legitimate national concerns and the purpose of peace and stability in Cyprus are fully served if they both disengage completely from Cyprus6.

b. The interest of the people of Cyprus are served if all armies, the military bases and all external neo-colonial tutelage are swept away. c.

The interests of the people of Cyprus are served in a lasting way if European rule of law –as the Treaty of Accession provides– applies on the whole island.

Furthermore, as it is correctly and pointedly noted in the aforementioned report, “a principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law”: “International law, as well as EU law, is founded upon the recognition of independent and sovereign states. Consequential 5 6

Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations, The struggle for power and peace, revised by K. Thompson and D. Clinton (McGraw Hill 2005), citations from pages 559-566 By adopting this argument, one should not sightsee that the Greek side in 1959 compromised on an important domain, that is, self-determination on the basis of the de-colonization principle “one man one vote”.

PANAYIOTIS IFESTOS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

principles include the obligations of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and respect for the territorial integrity of all states. In addition, the right of self-determination provides that while people within a state have the right to participate in the governance of that state, the free choice of the people of a state, conforming to fundamental international and European values must be respected on the international level” (points 10 and 17) “Democracy refers to the establishment and continued existence of a genuinely representative government responsive to the people. It requires that the basic rules establishing and organizing the state and its relationship with society be accepted by the citizens. It further requires full respect of the will of the people as expressed by the voters and/or their legitimate representatives. Democracy is founded on majority rule, in full recognition and application of individual, minority and group rights, as appropriate. The principle of democracy is an increasingly important part of international law, and at the very heart of European law. Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe refers to pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law as principles of the Council system”. (Point 15) “the rights enshrined in the European Convention constitute fundamental principles of the European Union, which itself is based upon the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law. The European legal order, therefore, both through the European Convention of Human Rights and the acquis communautaire, provides the most stringent and efficient system of protection of human and minority rights worldwide. Moreover, both Cyprus and Turkey are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 1 of which lays down the right of self-determination, and to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” (point 15). (Emphasis added). Ipso facto and rightly so, these points answer adequately and satisfactorily the claims for the so called “equality clause”. Equality in a federation could not possibly mean “a right for veto” in line with racists and national criteria. Paralyzing the state along these lines is self-defeating and self-destructing. Furthermore, it contradicts all conceivable ideas regarding the State as a normative structure appropriate for a collective way life. One should not confuse safeguard clauses or the need for check and balances with the right of some groups to paralyze the functioning of the political institutions. A principle purpose of the Accession of Cyprus in the EU where rule of law prevails was, precisely, the creation of opportunities for additional safeguards, in both legal and political terms. Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Democratic Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as a cornerstone of rule of law and regional stability

A state is not a trap or a prison. Designing a normative structure which safeguards equality of the citizens and its constituent groups should not therefore be conceptualized as two states trapped in a single and non-independent “federal state” whose institutions could not possibly function. This is self-defeating, dead ended and a prescription of conflict and bloodshed. As noted above, in a democratically oriented polity sky is the limit of increasing the role of the citizens and at the same time safeguarding the political rights for everyone. There is no limit for arrangements which provide adequate decentralization and self-governance in a multitude of issues and levels as long as it does not lead decision-making into a stalemate, an impasse and a conflict7. It is not the purpose of this paper to describe and elaborate methods and approaches pertinent for Cyprus. Certainly, however, in the context of governance involving decentralization and self-governance compatible to International and European rule of Law, there are innumerable thoughts as regards approaches which provide procedures, co-decisions among the various levels irrespective nationality and methods of qualified majorities, simple majorities and checks and balances that implicate all the citizens and groups of the Cyprus Republic irrespective of national origin8. 7

This was precisely the divide and rule heritage of the colonial era along the lines of which the former colonial power designed a state structure doomed to conflict, interference and intervention. No surprise that the separatist logic of the colonial era combined with foreign interference led to conflict and bloodshed few years after the Republic of Cyprus was created. The historical evidence proving this strategy of foreign powers is abundant and Cypriots should close their ears to innumerable propagandistic accounts dressed in academic veils. See analysis and substantiated facts in the Appendix of “The Convention way and EU membership; UN implications”, http://www.ifestosedu.gr/84ConventionforCyprus.htm#_ftn34. An additional prerequisite to conflict-resolution in Cyprus it is, precisely, to understand the real causes of war and the real sources of mistakes. Foreign powers wishing to perpetuate rights and methods of intervention that serve unlawful strategic footholds, are the only beneficiaries of wrong, distorted and ideologically driven and thus perverse historical accounts that overlook the real causes of war. For example, such macabre hegemonic purposes are served when supposedly academic accounts of the conflict in Cyprus attribute to the peace loving historic communities of Cyprus nationalist-chauvinist intentions. Those are, argue some unhistorical essays, the causes of war. No surprise these essays often end up supporting foreign intervention and eventually abolition of democracy, human rights, popular sovereignty and external-sovereignty. The Treaty of the EU is a source of inspiration of such approaches providing for cooperation which do not lead to a stalemate along national or racist lines. See CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. For example, Article 12: non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, which stipulates that: “Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”. Further on, article 251 defines methods of decision making which could serve as an inspiration for approaches compatible to the principle of rule of law, which exclude impasse and which provide innumerable checks

PANAYIOTIS IFESTOS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Let’s however not go further but just stress the fact that self-autonomy and self-governance in the context of any federal structure could not possibly mean splitting the people or worse, inserting divisive logics which could cause conflict and bloodshed. This was the intention of the colonial power when they imposed the unworkable constitution of 1959. Let’s not repeat the same mistake by accepting, this time voluntary, a dynastic and divisive institutional structure. Nowadays the Cypriots dispose a state, the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the EU where rule of law prevails. Let’s not abandon it but just reform it in order to make compatible to the concerns of the composing communities. Before proceeding, let’s make it abundantly clear that invoking International and European Rule of Law and other principles or approaches to conflict-resolution has nothing to do with legalistic ideas which overlook the dynamic political character of international relations or the causes of war that cause conflicts in inter-state or intra-state relations9.

Conflict-resolution through accession into the EU The principles to which we appeal here are legally binding clauses for all states involved in the Cyprus conflict10 and the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus should claim that they should apply in full. In fact application of the principles of International and European Rule of Law are as an appropriate approach to conflict resolution, as already mentioned, were the core idea of “conflict-resolution through accession into the EU”. Cypriots, irrespective nationality or culture, properly understanding their common interests, by accepting to apply these principles shall immediately and effectively terminate the main cause of war in Cyprus, that is, external interferences and external interventions. and balances and safeguards against abuse and arbitrary decisions. Even in the EU which hitherto consists of sovereign states, splitting along national or racist criteria is rejected. To put it otherwise, at the federal level, dividing the people of the Cyprus Republic is a self-defeating approach to governance contrary to the acquis of the European Union of which Cyprus is full member. 9 This is the political rational, precisely, of the supporters of the “accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU as a conflict-resolution approach”, when they advocated, at the same time, a credible deterrence strategy against revisionist acts, threats and claims. For an essay (in Greek) explaining this strategy see “Ελληνική Εθνική Στρατηγική, έννοια, σκοποί προϋποθέσεις επιτυχούς εκπλήρωσης: η περίπτωση της ευρωπαϊκής προοπτικής της Κύπρου” in Χρ. Αλεξάνδρου, Θ. Μαλκίδης (επιμ.), Προσκλήσεις Ασφάλειας για την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο (Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, Αθήνα 2008) σελ. 113-137 also published in http://www.ifestosedu.gr/63GreekStrategy.htm. 10 See point 10 of the “Report: A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law”, cited above.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Democratic Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as a cornerstone of rule of law and regional stability

The Cypriots have vested interests in claiming to apply International and European Rule of Law, an approach that by and large offers the framework of binding rules which could establish internal-external sovereignty, democracy, popular sovereignty and thus real independence. By so doing, if they succeed, they have a chance to take their fortune in their hands and the fact that the Republic of Cyprus is a full member of the EU, precisely, secures the legal and political and legal framework to fulfil all these purposes (by all means in terms of political civilization noble purposes). Reversing this argument, we could also point out that if a non viable Cyprus state is agreed it could undermine the functioning of the EU and establish a precedent which runs against of all principles and ideas on the basis of which the European Union was constructed. Understanding the nature of the dangers lying ahead, it is important to make a flashback on lost opportunities as regards conflict-resolution in Cyprus. Above, I just referred to the “European option as a conflict-resolution” approach. It is time to understand the causes, in fact, the causes of war which had a negative impact in 2001-2004. The Republic of Cyprus concluded the accession negotiations and the application of international and European law would had been the axis for conflict resolution. Foreign interferences had the following results: a.

It would had transformed the UN into a depended variable of hegemonic interests which contradict International Law by producing proposals incompatible to Rule of Law and the Chapter of the UN (ironically so, submitted in the name of the GS of the UN).

b. It would had created a negative momentum which if the Anan plan would have been accepted it would had nullified the aquis of EU membership prior to full entry on May 1st 2004 (and thus nullify all prospects for a viable conflict-resolution). c.

It would had created a divisive logic along the logic of the illegal fait accompli of 1974 instead of a logic of unity in accordance to European rule of law.

The opportunities for conflict-resolution created in 2001-2004 when the Republic of Cyprus effectively entered the EU were annihilated owing, once more, to foreign interference, alas, often academically veiled. If we do not reach the correct conclusions out of this unfortunate experience, whatever chances we have for a peaceful conflict-resolution in Cyprus, shall vanish. 54

PANAYIOTIS IFESTOS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

The correct conclusion is that the spirit and letter of the Anan plan should completely eclipse from the peace process at all levels and instances. Despite the fact that some politicians and some intellectuals who are deeply implicated in supporting the illiberal Anan plan continue to pay lip service for this abortive divisive approach, the logic that incarnated in the plan which was basically drafted by the British diplomat Lord Hanay11, is not appropriate for the ongoing attempts to resolve the Cyprus question12.

The rejected 2004 Anan plan: A war machine of modern times At this point, it is probably worth underlining further some points which highlight the fact that the abortive Anan plan rejected by the Cypriots in 2004 in a referendum, incorporated all causes of war of modern times: a.

Strategic planning intended to establish full control of an independent state, its people and its resources making it thus a depended variable to great powers’ and regional powers’ antagonisms and conflicts.

b. It suggested unscrupulous proposals to abolish democracy, human rights, the acquis communautaire, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the High Principles of International Law. c.

It was attempted to impose the fait accompli of illegal use of force imposed on a sovereign state (one should also not sightsee war crimes committed in 1974).

Lord Hanay was the key actor in drafting, promoting and attempting to impose the illiberal Anan plan which aimed at terminating the internal and external sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, perpetuating the colonial military installations of Great Britain in Cyprus and imposing a tutelage of foreign powers by perpetuating the so called guarantees and by abolishing democracy and popular sovereignty. One could read Lord Hannay’s book, the first ever he wrote by him after the Anan plan was rejected by the Cypriots. More and more books come up floodlighting this dark phase of Cypriot history. For an academic work proper see An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretar-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004. By Claire Palley. Oxford, UK and Portland Oregon, USA. Hart Publishing, 2005. 12 In academic life, avowal and acknowledging errors is an honourable stand and a precondition of scientific progress, not a humiliation. The process which produced the Anan plan and the events that preceded its rejection provide the basis for self-criticism of the community of scholars in Europe. A precondition of doing this, however, is our attachment to standard academic ethics. Alas, such virtues are more and more scarce in academic circles, whilst illegitimate mobilization to corrupting ideological and political purposes are more and more frequent. It is not without reason that a scholar deeply committed to the highest academic standards and intellectual values, Hedley Bull, noted: «The search for conclusions that can be presented as “solutions” or “practical advise” is a corrupting element in the contemporary study of world politics. Such conclusions are advanced less because there is any solid basis for them than because there is a demand for them which it is profitable to satisfy. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A study of order in world politics (Macmillan Press Ltd, London 1995), p. 308. Our purpose here, precisely, is not to search for practical solutions for the way of life of the Cypriots but to establish a process leading to self-determination of the citizens of Cyprus in accordance to International and European Rule of Law.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Democratic Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as a cornerstone of rule of law and regional stability

d. It is a clear case of coercive diplomacy against a small and weak state to which the United Nations became an accomplice. e.

We had the sad phenomenon many members of the Academic community becoming some sort of instrumental soft power propagandists in the service of abusive and unlawful purposes so well exposed in the report sided above (“A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law” of the international expert panel for a European Solution of the Cyprus Problem”).

In retrospect, and in order not to repeat the same mistakes, one should always have in mind that the Anan plan served two distinctive strategic purposes: a.

The perpetuation of Great Britain’s military bases and the acquisition of neo-colonial control over the island’s sea and air resources13 and

b. Τhe often proclaimed of nationalist-chauvinists posture of officials in Ankara that Cyprus is a vital strategic space for Turkey (even if a single Turkish Cypriot was not living there!). We could by arguing that any presumption that the causes of war in Cyprus have the roots in the nationalist-chauvinist feelings of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is either based on grossly mistaken a-historic assumptions or is intentionally propagating erroneous perceptions in order to serve unlawful political expediencies (see below and appendix). As regards the specific case of Cyprus, it is unworthy not to see straight on the main cause of war which was British divide and rule, Turkey’s interference, and Greece’s coup d’ etat in 1974 by the junta stirred, as we all know today, by the United States. The culmination is that the coup d’ etat was followed by the Turkish invasion, that is, a double violation of Rule of Law that lasted more than four decades. Secondly, the Cyprus Republic is not a future candidate for tutelage, trusteeship or guardianship in the context of the so called guarantees. These are colonial relics that should be rejected by all Cypriots irrespective nationality. They contradict, moreover, Rule of Law in a full member of the EU, a fact that establishes a worrying precedent.

This is well understood if ones scrutinizes the Anan plan, especially as regards the proposed – in the plan–new status of the military bases and the so called “guarantee” clauses

PANAYIOTIS IFESTOS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Conclusion As an academic I would have said exactly the same arguments with regard to all other societies, including Turkey. In fact I tell this daily to my students. All Cypriots should therefore reject forcefully and angrily, any insolence or pretention that stability in a sovereign state depends upon destructing the ontologically founded societal distinctiveness and historic anthropological structures. There is no conflict-resolution if, inter alia, the approaches followed destruct national feelings, turn the face away from national symbols, abandon national identity, sightsee religious beliefs, give up one’s language and spoil one’s cultural heritage. All Cypriots have a strong interest to keep at bay external interventions and external interferences attempting to attack their culture and anthropological structures. There is abundant historical evidence that the two communities lived in peace, basically until the late 1950s and early 1960s when divide and rule and foreign interference intensified14 [22]. The key term for a viable solution the conference should focus on, therefore, is the re-unification of the Republic of Cyprus and its people. To the extend the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the European Union, the form and the content of a just, viable and lasting solution is one way. Designing a Constitutional Conference should take this crucial fact fully into account: Only application of International and European Rule of Law shall re-establish Cypriot internal and external sovereignty and safeguard against future foreign interventions or interferences. As already noted, there is no limit for domestic arrangements which safeguard both democracy and the legitimate interests of all the citizens respecting at the same time their historic and cultural identities. 14

It is not the place to elaborate this crucial issue. Suffice to point here that the struggle for independence was not turned against Turkish Cypriots, despite the fact that British colonialists in the context of their divide and rule policy mislead young Turkish Cypriots conscripted in the special police forces as torturers of the suspected Freedom Fighters. Inter-communal conflict begun when Ankara ordered the “burning of Nicosia” and when, as it was revealed recently, imported illegally over 10000 weapons between 1960 and 1964. During this period, regrettably so, some hundreds of Cypriot citizens were killed in battles, blood feud for revenge and murders by their own people for personal or political reasons. It is an “academic crime” and mere miserable propaganda to equalize these tragic events with the colonialist crimes and the crimes caused by strife generated by foreign intervention. More importantly, historic reality as regards these tragic events is intersubjective knowledge for most Cypriots. Honest non Cypriot academics referring to them should do that with caution and care for historical truth. First and foremost, they should guard against non credible secondary sources – which regrettably so distort historical truth in order to serve propaganda of those intervening in Cyprus. For further analysis see the Appendix in “The Convention way and EU membership; UN implications”, http:// www.ifestosedu.gr/84ConventionforCyprus.htm#_ftn34 already cited above.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Democratic Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as a cornerstone of rule of law and regional stability

Like all peoples on earth, Cypriots as well, are not political masochists, that is, they are not willing and they are not able to construct the Political on a monstrous institutional setting in a way that all decisions shall depend upon unanimity along internal vertical national/racial lines. If Cypriots do not understand this relentless truth they should the soonest possible talk for permanent divorce. Such a course, however, does not guarantee peace and it would be utterly unfortunate to follow such a course. There is still time to reunite Cyprus. Our support for the entry into the EU purported, precisely, to provide another, maybe the last, chance. This chance has a name: Full and immediate application of International and European Rule of Law, something we should claim without delay.

Bibliography •

Bull Hedley, The Anarchical Society. A study of order in world politics (Macmillan Press Ltd, London 1995), p. 308.

•

Ifestos Panayiotis, “The Cyprus problem and the Greco-Turkish conflict: Causes of war and the European option” in Irini Chila (ed.), La Grece dans le sud-est europeen: enjeux regionaux et perspectives (Herodotos, Paris, 2004).

•

Ifestos Panayiotis (in Greek) explaining this strategy see “Ελληνική Εθνική Στρατηγική, έννοια, σκοποί προϋποθέσεις επιτυχούς εκπλήρωσης: η περίπτωση της ευρωπαϊκής προοπτικής της Κύπρου” in Χρ. Αλεξάνδρου, Θ. Μαλκίδης (επιμ.), Προσκλήσεις Ασφάλειας για την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο (Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, Αθήνα 2008), the same also published in http://www.ifestosedu. gr/63Gre ekStrategy.htm.

•

Ifestos Panayiotis. (in Greek) “In memoriam Γιάννου Κρανιδιώτη Ειρηνική επίλυση των ελληνοτουρκικών διαφορών και ο Γιάννος Κρανιδιώτης στο Στ. Περράκης (Επιμ.), In Memoriam Γιάννου Κρανιδιώτη (Εκδ. Σιδέρη, Αθήνα 2010). Also appended in http://www.ifestosedu.gr/42mem oriamkranidioti.htm.

•

Morgenthau Hans, Politics among nations, The struggle for power and peace, revised by K. Thompson and D. Clinton (McGraw Hill 2005)

•

Palley Claire, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretar-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004 (Oxford, UK and Portland Oregon, USA. Hart Publishing, 2005).

•

Report, by the International Expert Panel convened by the Committee for a European Solution in Cyprus. [ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ: «Πλαίσιο αρχών για μια δίκαιη και βιώσιμη λύση του Κυπριακού με γνώμονα το διεθνές και Ευρωπαϊκό δίκαιο»] http://wp.me/p3OlPy-1lW. Also in http://www.ifestosedu. gr/32Rul eofLaw.htm.

PANAYIOTIS IFESTOS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

THE FOURTH GENEVΑ CONVENTION OF 1949 AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES*1 In Politics, Aristotle issued a timeless warning: ‘Man, when perfected, is the best of animals but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all.’ (Source: The Politics of Aristotle as translated by B. Jowett (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885), page 5.) Since antiquity, Aristotle’s point has been illustrated on countless occasions, none more brutally than during the Second World War from 1939 to 1945. Under the iron leadership of Adolf Hitler, the armed forces of Germany marched into, invaded, occupied, purportedly partitioned or purportedly annexed a multitude of territories. In the German-occupied parts of Poland, the Soviet Union and elsewhere, Germany also engaged in crude acts of demographic engineering forming part of a broader programme of ‘Germanisation’. It was against this background of cold-bloodedness that the Holocaust and other horrors unfolded. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, some of the gruesome details were laid bare before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and in its judgment handed down on 30 September and 1 October 1946. All these years later, that judgment remains of central importance, not least to anybody seeking to gain a better understanding of the point which Aristotle was making in Politics. To quote one particularly pertinent passage of the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which relates to the demographic engineering procured in the German-occupied parts of Poland and the Soviet Union, the Germans inflicted ‘mass murders and cruelties’ as ‘part of a plan to get rid of whole native populations by expulsion and annihilation, in order that their territory could be used for colonization by Germans. …’. (Source: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Volume I: Official Documents (International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947), page 237.) *

Assistant Professor of Law at the Cyprus Campus of the University of Lancashire and the Co-ordinator of its programme dedicated to the Rule of Law and the Lessons of History

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 In view of the injustice which was meted out to so many states and to so many people during the Second World War – and during the preceding First World War – the victorious Allies of 1945 oversaw a dynamic legal backlash during the mid-to-late 1940s. In addition to the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter in 1945, which gave rise to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the backlash resulted in the adoption of other landmark legal instruments. These included the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the Genocide Convention of 1948, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. It is no accident that the Preamble of the United Nations Charter of 1945 includes noble commitments ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’, ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights’ and ‘to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained …’. The reader will note how the United Nations Charter connects law with justice and with the humanity inherent in fundamental human rights. It was in this broader historical context that on 12 August 1949 four Conventions were adopted in Geneva, the home city of the International Committee of the Red Cross. As pointed out in 1957 by Viscount Kilmuir – the then Bristish Lord Chancellor and Head of the Judiciary, who was also a former prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal – the four Geneva Conventions were designed to be ‘a comprehensive and up-to-date code of rules for the protection’ of ‘four classes’ of ‘victims of war’ or armed conflict. Thus, the first Geneva Convention of 1949 is dedicated to ‘the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’, the second to ‘Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea’, the third to ‘the Treatment of Prisoners of War’ and the fourth to ‘the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’. All in all, to quote Viscount Kilmuir once again, the four Geneva Conventions embody many ‘rules of conduct’ which are ‘in accordance with the highest demands of humanity.’ (Source: Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 25 June 1957, Column 349.)

Partly as a means of prohibiting inhumane demographic engineering of the type graphically described by the Nuremberg Tribunal in its judgment handed down in 1946, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 contains two specific prohibitions. 60

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

The first prohibition is in Article 49(1): ‘Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. …’. Notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49(2) authorises an Occupying Power to ‘undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.’ However, Article 49(2) is subject to a number of strict conditions. These include the following: ‘Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.’ The second prohibition in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is in Article 49(6): ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.’ The above two prohibitions form part of a broader effort in the Fourth Geneva Convention to minimize the adverse effect of any war or armed conflict upon ‘protected persons’. In this regard, mention must be made of Article 4; this defines ‘protected persons’ as being ‘those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. …’. It follows that ‘protected persons’ may include unarmed civilians who are the citizens of a sovereign state which is the subject of an invasion by another sovereign state. Let us now take a closer look at Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and its prohibition against ‘Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations … regardless of their motive.’ To this end, reference may be made to a judgment handed down on 24 March 2016 by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) in the historic case involving the prosecution of Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader during the erstwhile conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. In its judgment (which is now the subject of an appeal), the ICTY found that Mr Karadzic ‘bears individual criminal responsibility’ for inter alia ‘deportation, a crime against humanity (Count 7)’ and for ‘inhumane acts (forcible transfer), a crime against humanity (Count 8)’. These findings were reached in the light of inter alia Article 2 of the Statute for the ICTY which, with reference to the four

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

Geneva Conventions of 1949, incorporates a prohibition against ‘unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian’. Article 5 of the Statute for the ICTY also incorporates a prohibition against ‘inhumane acts’ which are ‘directed against any civilian population’. In its judgment in the case of Karadzic, not only did the ICTY underline that a crime against humanity is committed whenever a deportation or an inhumane act such as a forcible transfer is committed contrary to international humanitarian law. In addition, the ICTY cited judgments in earlier cases in order to reiterate the following established principles which help to determine whether an unlawful deportation or forcible transfer has arisen, as a matter of fact, during a conflict: ‘Deportation [‘across a de jure border’] and forcible transfer [‘within national boundaries’] are defined as: (i) the forced displacement of one or more persons by expulsion or other forms of coercion, (ii) from an area in which they are lawfully present, (iii) without grounds permitted under international law. …’. As regards the intent necessary for the crime of deportation or forcible transfer to be committed, the ICTY noted the following in its judgment in the case of Karadzic: ‘Deportation and forcible transfer do not require intent that the victims be displaced permanently, only that they be intentionally displaced.’ (Source: Judgment of the ICTY in Prosecutor v Radovan Karadzic, 24 March 2016, paragraphs 488-493 and 3524. The judgment has been published by the ICTY at www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/ en/160324_judgement.pdf last accessed on 2 January 2017.)

The relevance of Article 49 (1) to the Turkish invasion launched on 20 July 1974 and the subsequent occupation By 1974, the State Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 included the Republic of Cyprus and all three of its guarantor powers under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, i.e. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, on the basis that an armed conflict began upon the launch of the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus on 20 July 1974 – if not upon the unlawful coup instigated in Nicosia on 15 July 1974 by Greece which was governed at the time by a military junta – all parties to the conflict were under a legal duty to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Indeed, Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention imposes a strict duty ‘to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.’

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

To limit its length, the analysis which follows in this article concerns itself with one specific question. On or after 20 July 1974, were any forcible transfers procured within the frontiers of the Republic of Cyprus, contrary to Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949? Bearing in mind the clarification provided by the ICTY, it would appear that, on or after 20 July 1974, forcible transfers – and, thus, crimes – might have arisen in the Republic of Cyprus in at least two circumstances: firstly, whenever any invading armed forces unlawfully frog-marched civilians away from their homes at the barrel of a gun; and, secondly, whenever any civilians fled from their homes in fear amid a climate of coercion caused, for instance, by the approach of invading armed forces. Credible evidence exists to support the proposition that forcible transfers were indeed procured on or after 20 July 1974. A prime example, among several which could be adduced, is a declassified telegram sent on 5 August 1974 by the then British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Stephen Olver, to the British Foreign Office in London. To quote High Commissioner Olver: ‘A transfer of the Greek Cypriot population out of the Kyrenia area is going on steadily. This is undoubtedly considered Turkish policy and people are being told that they will never come back. This is tragic, and we must obviously do what we can to contest these forced evictions.’ (Source: FCO 9/1920, National Archives of the UK. The author thanks Ms Fanoulla Argyrou for helping him to trace this document during his latest visit to the National Archives.) The above evidence suggests that in the aftermath of the first phase of the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus, many civilians were arbitrarily uprooted from their homes and driven away from their neighborhoods because of their ethnicity or religion or both. More specifically, bearing in mind the principles reiterated by the ICTY in the case of Karadzic, such civilians appear to have been the victims of ‘(i) … forced displacement … [by means of] expulsion or other forms of coercion, (ii) from an area in which they are lawfully present, (iii) without grounds permitted under international law. …’. No less importantly, such civilians also appear to have been the victims of military action with the ostensible aim of intentionally displacing them from ‘an area’. This injustice was – and remains – an affront to the dignity of these victims of criminal misconduct. They became victims for one immediate reason. International humanitarian law, as laid down in Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, was not adhered to when it mattered most i.e. when Article 49(1) was Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

most relevant and, accordingly, when it should have been obeyed. In consequence, the people of the Kyrenia area mentioned by High Commissioner Olver – in common with so many other citizens of the Republic of Cyprus from both of its constitutionally sanctioned communities – were unjustly denied the protection to which they were entitled under the law. In addition, they suffered a cruel fate which was not unlike the cruel fate of the people who were unjustly uprooted from their homes by invading German forces in Poland, the Soviet Union and other parts of Europe during the Second World War. On 13 August 1974, Turkey rejected the allegation that any people had been ‘driven out of their homes’ in the areas occupied by Turkey on or after 20 July 1974. In its view, as expressed by the foreign minister of Turkey at the time, such persons had not been forcibly transferred or deported from the Turkish-occupied area. Instead, they had ‘emigrated’. This Turkish denialism is to be found in the declassified British ‘Record’ of a ‘meeting’ held in, of all places, Geneva, at 6.40pm on 13 August 1974, i.e. on the very eve of the second phase of the Turkish invasion. The ‘meeting’ was attended by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, his Greek and Turkish counterparts, Messrs Mavros and Gunes, Mr Glafcos Clerides (representing the Greek Community of the Republic of Cyprus) and Mr Rauf Denktash (representing the Turkish Community). To quote from the salient passage of the British ‘Record’ of the ‘meeting’: ‘Mr Clerides interposed that thousands of Greek Cypriots had been driven out of the areas occupied by Turkish armed forces. Women and children had been sent over to the Greek side [sic.], separated from their husbands who were still detained by the Turks. He [i.e. Mr Clerides] sympathized with Mr Gunes’ concern about [the] evacuation of Turkish Cypriot villages by the National Guard [of the Republic of Cyprus]; he hoped that Mr Gunes would show similar sympathy for the 28,000 Greek Cypriots expelled from the occupied area, and requested that those who were still detained should be released. ‘Mr Gunes [the foreign minister of Turkey] said that these people had not been driven out of their homes’; they had ‘emigrated’. …’. [The expression ‘emigrated’ appears in the original text.] (Source: Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Historians of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office) (eds.), British Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume V: The Southern Flank in Crisis 1973-1976 (Routledge on behalf of The Stationery Office, Abingdon, 2014), Document 76, pages 224 to 242.)

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

During the early hours of 14 August 1974, a few minutes after the above exchange of views, the ‘meeting’ in Geneva came to an abrupt end and the second phase of the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus began.

‘ … too close to Hitler …’ As the second phase of the Turkish invasion unfolded from 14 until 16 August 1974, tens of thousands of other people involuntarily vacated their homes – primarily because they were directed to do so by invading Turkish forces or because they fled in fear before the arrival of these forces at their doorsteps. By the time of the cease-fire announced on 16 August 1974, Turkey had managed to occupy and, to a considerable though not complete extent, ‘ethnically cleanse’ approximately 37 per cent of the territory and 57 per cent of the coastline of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus, ‘about 180,000 Greek Cypriots’ – that is to say ‘a third’ of the total population of the Republic of Cyprus – ‘were displaced’ ‘while the Turkish Cypriots were compelled to move to the occupied part of the island in compliance with Turkey’s policy of ethnic segregation.’ (Source: ‘Brief Introduction to the Cyprus Question’ published by the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus at www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_beijing.nsf/DMLcyquest_en/ DMLcyquest_en?Opendocument last accessed on 2 January 2017.)

The above broadly tallies with what may be found in other sources. An example is the ‘Factual Background’ in judgment of the English Court of Appeal handed down in 1998. In the carefully chosen words of Lord Justice Mummery (with whom Lord Justice Potter and Lord Justice Nourse agreed): ‘In the summer of 1974 Turkey invaded the island. By 16 August 1974 it had occupied a large area in the north amounting to just over one third of the whole island (the occupied area). Many members of the Greek Cypriot community in the occupied area fled, in fear of armed force, from their homes and businesses to other parts of the island.’ [Source: Polly Peck International Plc v Marangos Hotel Company Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 789.]

As occurred when Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in March 1939 in breach of the Munich Agreement of September 1938 (to which the United Kingdom was a party), the executive branch of government in the United Kingdom did not cover itself in any glory when, in 1974, Turkey occupied substantial parts of the Republic of Cyprus in breach of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (to which the

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

United Kingdom was a party). After all, as occurred in March 1938, the United Kingdom responded to the start of both phases of the Turkish invasion by failing to take any meaningful military action to prevent an aggressor from achieving its military objectives. This despite Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 under which ‘Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom … recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus …’. In the light of the above, was the United Kingdom in any way responsible for any violations of Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention or for Turkey de facto reaping the ill-gotten rewards of any such violations? In addition, was the United Kingdom in any way responsible for lending a veneer of international legitimacy to one of the core objectives of the Turkish invasion, namely the formation of a segregated post-settlement ‘federal’ Cyprus built on the demographic realities generated by de facto demographic engineering? The reader may draw his or her own conclusions, particularly after perusing the extract below from a declassified British ‘Record’ of an extraordinary telephone conversation conducted at 1.45pm on 14 August 1974 by the then British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan MP, and the then American Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger. The telephone conversation was conducted as the second phase of the Turkish invasion was in full swing and as atrocities, forcible transfers and other crimes were apparently being committed in flagrant breach of international law. To quote from the British ‘Record’ of the conversation: ‘Foreign Secretary [Callaghan]: Henry, if I can put the position in a nutshell, I think it comes to this: that the Turks have got a good case. In my view this can now only be resolved by the creation of a zone. A zone in which they will have autonomy within a federal republic. This could be got by negotiation but in the temper of today, no one can begin to get anything like this. And so you have a military solution for the time being, in which they will police their own boundary. You’ll have a great exchange of population with the Greeks moving out and we’ll then just let diplomacy take over when we see the opportunity once more, to see if we can get a peaceful solution in the island. Now as regards Greece and Turkey, it is Greece who will need massaging because the Turks are too jingoistic, indeed too close to Hitler for my liking. All right? ‘Dr Kissinger: I completely agree with you, Jim. And the tragedy is that it could have worked out that way through diplomacy …

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

‘Foreign Secretary [Callaghan]: I believe you. Well, goodbye old man and all the best to you with your pre-occupations. …’. (Source: PREM 16/20, National Archives of the UK. The author of this article traced the original of this document after spotting a reference to it in William Mallinson, Britain in Cyprus (I.B. Tauris, London, 2011), pages 67-70. The author hereby records his gratitude to Dr Mallinson.)

To repeat, even though Foreign Secretary Callaghan had disclosed that, in his view, ‘the Turks’ were ‘too close to Hitler’ for his ‘liking’, Mr Callaghan and the government in which he served did not take any military action to honour the solemn British guarantee embodied in Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 i.e. to ‘guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus’. In the view of this author, not only was the British failure to honour this guarantee unethical and arguably unlawful. It was ungallant and, indeed, un-British. More to the point, this failure formed part of the backdrop to what appear to have been the commission of grave violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention and other instruments of international law. On and after 20 July 1974, did Turkey pursue a ‘determined policy of exterminating and deracinating’, as alleged by the Republic of Cyprus on 6 December 1974? After the cease-fire proclaimed on 16 August 1974, Ambassador Zenon Rossides, the Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations from 1960 until 1979, submitted letter after letter to the United Nations in which he described the alleged crimes and other indignities inflicted upon the Republic of Cyprus and its citizens. A prime example is a lengthy letter, dated 6 December 1974. Therein, Ambassador Rossides incorporated many allegations into a single document which expressly invoked the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as part of an effort to demonstrate that Turkey had pursued a ‘determined policy of exterminating and deracinating’. To quote some salient extracts from the said letter of Ambassador Rossides: ‘ … The invaders are not content with occupation and control; they are actively and systematically engaged in a determined policy of exterminating and deracinating from their ancestral homes the Greek Cypriot people, namely 80 per cent of the indigenous population of the area, and usurping their lands, their properties, the produce of their labours and literally all their belongings with the sinister and wholly obvious aim of changing the demographic character of the island. … ‘In the execution of this plan, the invader has committed a whole series of international crimes, namely:

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

Cold-blooded killings through mass executions and individual murders of hundreds of innocent civilians – men, women and children – in undefended towns and villages …

Mass forcible transfer and deportation to Turkey of citizens of the Republic from the occupied area in violation of international law, and more specifically of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which both Turkey and Cyprus are parties. …

Expulsion and uprooting by the use of armed force of hundreds of thousands of civilians from their homes and properties in violation of international law, the [Fourth] Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights of 1950. …’.

To his letter of 6 December 1974, Ambassador Rossides provided an Annex embodying a catalogue of alleged ‘atrocities, mass executions and murders in cold blood, rapes and other indignities’. (Source: United Nations Security Council Document S/11569, United Nations Archive.)

More than forty years later, does the Republic of Cyprus still stand by the allegations set out in the letter of Ambassador Rossides, dated 6 December 1974? Perhaps the President of the Republic can clarify. In the meantime, it would be remiss of the author not to observe that in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion, other allegations were submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Turkey and by the leadership of the Turkish Community in the Republic of Cyprus. These allegations, no less than those submitted by the Republic of Cyprus, should have been the subject of proper investigations in the interests of international humanitarian law, criminal justice and the truth. In this context, it should never be forgotten that, since the outbreak of inter-communal upheaval in 1963, the victims of criminal misconduct in the Republic of Cyprus have included many members of the Turkish Community, as well as many members of the Greek Community. Justice is supposed to be blind. Consequently, all victims of injustice, irrespective of ethnicity or religion, are entitled to justice and this article has been composed in that spirit. Back in 1974 and in subsequent years, official allegations of conflict-related criminal misconduct in the Republic of Cyprus tended to be filed with the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Kurt Waldheim. Notwithstanding the

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

efforts of the United Nations peacekeeping and police forces in the Republic of Cyprus – and no criticism is directed at those forces in this article – these allegations seemed to cut little ice with Dr Waldheim. To put it mildly, Dr Waldheim did not respond as robustly to these allegations as he might have done. Nor, it seems, did he call for let alone oversee the formation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal of the type established, for example, in Nuremberg in relation to Germany in 1945 or in The Hague in relation to the Former Yugoslavia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. In this context, it may be noted that Resolution 827 called for ‘the establishment as an ad hoc measure … of an international tribunal’ relating to the Former Yugoslavia and for ‘the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law’. Resolution 827 assessed that such steps ‘would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace’. The fact remains that Dr Waldheim did not oversee – and, it seems, did not call for – the adoption of any similar Resolution in the context of the Republic of Cyprus. Why? Part of the answer may lie in the background of Dr Waldheim. As is now known, Dr Waldheim wormed his way to the top of the United Nations after misleading the world as to his wartime whereabouts and activities. In fact, Dr Waldheim was a former Austrian intelligence officer who had served in Hitler’s Wehrmacht at a time when German armed forces were committing grave crimes in German-occupied Greece, Yugoslavia and other parts of Europe where he was deployed. Indeed, in ‘the considered opinion’ of the Office of Special Investigations of the US Department of Justice, in a declassified report completed in 1987 – the year in which Dr Waldheim was put on a ‘watch-list’ of persons prohibited from entering the United States – Lieutenant Kurt Waldheim had inter alia ‘… “assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of … persons because of race, religion, national origin or personal opinion.” …’. (Source: In The Matter of Kurt Waldheim, Office of Special Investigations, Criminal Division, US Department of Justice, 9 April 1987, at page 3.)

In the light of the above, it is arguable, to say the least, that when Dr Waldheim received allegations of criminal misconduct in the Republic of Cyprus in the months and years after the launch of the Turkish invasion on 20 July 1974, he was in the professionally embarrassing position of receiving allegations which were not unlike the acts of criminal misconduct perpetrated by the German armed

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

forces in which he had served during the Second World War. For this and other reasons, Dr Waldheim appeared to have a conflict of interests.

Mr Rauf Denktash’s call for the ‘removal’ of people to the Turkish-occupied area Since 1964, as explained in further detail below, Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Community had sought to transform of the Republic of Cyprus into a ‘federation’ based on two separate ‘communities’ and two segregated ‘zones’. Partly as a result of the strategy agreed over the telephone by Messrs Callaghan and Kissinger on 14 August 1974, as described above, and partly as a result of the diplomacy of Dr Waldheim, the wheels of post-invasion international diplomacy began to turn in a direction which was favourable to this Turkish strategy. In consequence, law and justice effectively became subordinate to diplomacy, politics and the search for a negotiated ‘settlement’. It was against this post-invasion diplomatic background that the leadership of the Turkish Community encouraged if not coerced many members of the Turkish Community to vacate their homes or places of refuge south of the cease-fire line and to make their way to the Turkish-occupied area north of that line. To illustrate this point, one may refer to a letter dated 2 September 1974 and signed by Rauf Denktash on the letter-headed paper of the Vice-President’s Office of the Republic of Cyprus. Therein, Mr Denktash alleged that ‘hideous crimes’ had been ‘committed by Greek and Greek Cypriot gunmen against unarmed Turkish civilians of all ages’. Mr Denktash made these allegations, in part, as a prelude to calling, in effect, for the ‘removal’ of members of the Turkish Community from south of the cease-fire line to ‘the Turkish region’ as Mr Denktash described the Turkish-occupied area north of the cease-fire line. To quote the salient passage of the letter of Mr Denktash: ‘I appeal to you [i.e. the Secretary-General of the United Nations] for immediate instructions to be given to UNFICYP patrols to visit all Turkish villages in Greek areas and to let us have news about the Turkish inhabitants living there as a matter of routine pending their removal to the Turkish region [sic.]. These people live in daily-terror of their lives and news of the discovery of such mass murders only increases their agony. …’. (Source: Expanded Number S-0903-0006-03-00001, Container 0903-0006: Peacekeeping – Cyprus 1971-1981, United Nations Archive. This file has been published by the UN Archives at https:// search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/c/8/3/c83a6786b8bf9374d9df34c8a360 9fb9bb38e9f12e05003fba20f71850127a25/S-0903-0006-03-00001.pdf last accessed on 2 January 2017.)

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Over subsequent months, the ostensible ‘removal’ of people from south to north – and vice versa – ensured that a near complete de facto segregation of citizens accompanied the de facto ‘bi-zonal’ partition of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Further evidence to this effect may be found in a declassified United Nations telegram dated 26 April 1976. It was co-written in capital letters by Mr Peres de Cuellar, the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus (and a future Secretary-General of the United Nations), together with Brigadier-General Clayton E. Beattie, the officer serving at the time as Commander of the Canadian contingent in UNFICYP: 1.

FLOW OF GKCYPS [i.e. members of the Greek Community of the Republic of Cyprus] TO SOUTH CONTINUES UNABATED AS NOTED IN DAILY SITREPS.

TURN OF BELLAPAIS, LAST GKCYP VILLAGE OF CONSEQUENCE IN KYRENIA AREA, APPEARS TO HAVE COME. SINCE 20 APRIL [1976] FIFTY-SEVEN HAVE MOVED SOUTH, INCLUDING ELEVEN ON 26 APRIL [1976], LEAVING 334.

ACCORDING TO GKCYP MUKHTAR AND TKCYP POLICE ELEMENT IN KYRENIA, AND CONFIRMED BY DIPLOMATIC SOURCES, BELLAPAIS IS TO BE EMPTIED WITHIN ONE MONTH WITH REMAINING 20 GKCYPS IN MYRTOU. THESE EVACUATIONS WOULD VIRTUALLY END GKCYP PRESENCE IN KYRENIA REGION.’

(Source: Series 0898, Box 6, File 5, Acc. DAG 1/5.3.2.0., United Nations Archives. This file has been published by the UN Archives at https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/unitednations-archives/e/e/1/ee1e60840f57159c6f90def08238c6ea3ef1ef4f4cefcca96a0821d0b90b526a /S-0898-0006-05-00001.pdf last accessed on 2 January 2017.)

In due course, as predicted in the above telegram, Bellapais was ‘emptied’. Indeed, as The Economist noted on 4 September 1976 with reference to the celebrated book by Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons, the departure of the last Greek inhabitants from Bellapais had converted the village into ‘a bitter lemon squeezed dry’. In common with the ethnic cleansing of Kyrenia District and other parts of the Republic of Cyprus, the cruel fate of Bellapais encapsulates what can go wrong when the rule of law is poisoned by a lethal cocktail of illegality, impropriety, inhumanity and injustice. The upshot is a stain on the conscience of humanity. To make matters altogether worse – and as already hinted at above – the apparent

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

prevalence of forcible transfers in the aftermath of 20 July 1974 was compounded by what seems to have been a failure to launch effective investigations under domestic or international criminal law into all of the grave allegations made in that aftermath. That said, on a number of occasions, United Nations military or police personnel did launch their own investigations, but these efforts were often frustrated by the restrictions placed in their path. To illustrate this point, it suffices to quote from a passage of a report dated 5 June 1976 and completed by Dr Kurt Waldheim, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations: ‘UNCIVPOL [i.e. the United Nations Civilian Police] has continued to receive complaints that Greek Cypriots in the north are being subjected to pressure to move to the south and that their property is subject to confiscation. The Greek Cypriots complain that they are coerced into signing applications to leave the region with warnings that those who do not do so will be moved anyway, but without their personal possessions. Because of the existing restrictions, UNCIVPOL has been able to do little to investigate such complaints. The Turkish Cypriot side maintains that all Greek Cypriots moving to the south do so of their own free will without any pressure and that complaints are often made both to discredit the Turkish Cypriot side and to secure displaced person benefits in the south. The agreed procedure for screening applications for transfers (S/12031, para. 5) does not appear to function effectively. UNFICYP has no possibility of verifying whether people wish to leave.’ (Source: United Nations Security Council Document S/12093 of 5 June 1976, paragraph 27.)

At this point, mention must be made of Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: ‘The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2. ‘In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations. ‘In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. …’. In other words, notwithstanding the cease-fire proclaimed on 16 August 1974, Article 49 and other relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention continued to be applicable in the Turkish-occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus. Indeed, on the basis that the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 72

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

(purportedly established in 1983) is a subordinate administration of Turkey, the Occupying Power, Article 49 and the other provisions specified in Article will continue to be applicable in the Turkish-occupied area for so long as that area remains occupied by Turkey.

The relevance of Article 49 (6) to the Turkish invasion launched on 20 July 1974 and the subsequent occupation All of which brings us to the second prohibition embedded in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. To recap, this is the unqualified prohibition found in Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides as follows: ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.’ As pointed out by the International Court of Justice in an Advisory Opinion handed down in 2004: ‘That provision prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory.’ (Source: Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004, at page 51.)

It hardly needs stating that Turkey stands accused of pursuing a sustained post-1974 policy of colonizing the Turkish-occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus, contrary to Article 49(6). (See, for instance, Illegal Demographic Changes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 2006) published online at www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa15_en/mfa15_ en?OpenDocument&print last accessed on 31 December 2016.)

Interestingly enough, there is contemporaneous documentary evidence to support the proposition that Turkey began violating Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 within days of the cease-fire proclaimed on 16 August 1974. This evidence is to be found a declassified US State Department record of a meeting held in Washington DC on 27 August 1974. Therein, Sir John Killick, the then Deputy Under-Secretary in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is recorded as disclosing the following: ‘There are a number of difficult points such as the movement of Greeks from Turkish zones and the settlement of certain Turkish mainlanders in former Greek zones.’ (Source: Laurie Van Hook (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXX Greece Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976 (US State Department, Washington DC, 2007), Document 146 at pages 470 to 481.)

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

‘The Turkish and Greek regions of Cyprus shall be homogeneous …’ Against an undignified background characterised by what appear to have been wholesale violations of Article 49(1) and Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Community responded to the Turkish invasion by calling for the legalisation of the de facto demographic realities generated by the two phases of the Turkish invasion. On the one hand, Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Community reiterated their long-standing post-1964 call for the Republic of Cyprus to be transformed into ‘a Federation composed of two Federated States’. (See, for example, ‘the Proposals made by the Turkish Cypriot Members of the Expert Committee set up by the first Vienna Conference on 28 April 1975’ at Annex B on page 6 of UN Security Council Document S/12093 of 5 June 1976.)

On the other hand, Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Community effectively called for what may be described as legalised apartheid, legalised segregation and legalised discrimination. This call formed part of a broader Turkish diplomatic attempt to secure the legalisation of the illegal consequences of what appear to have been multiple violations of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and other provisions and principles of international law. After all, the stated objectives of this Turkish policy were to ensure inter alia (i) that members of the Turkish Community (and, it would seem, colonists from Turkey) would legally inhabit one ‘homogenous’ geographical ‘zone’ in the north of a post-settlement Cyprus and (ii) that the members of the Greek Community would inhabit a separate ‘homogeneous’ geographical ‘zone’ in the south. Evidence to support the above propositions may be found in various sources. A prime example is a letter dated 25 May 1976 and submitted to the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General by Umit, S. Onan, an official representative of the Turkish Community. The letter envisaged that in the event of any settlement: ‘(a) The Turkish and Greek regions of Cyprus shall be homogeneous both demographically and geographically. (b) In view of past experiences, the boundary line of the Turkish region shall be of such nature as to enable the two communities to coexist peacefully side by side and to meet the security requirements of the Turkish community. …’.

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

(Source: ‘Letter dated 25 May 1976 from the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community [Umit S. Onan] addressed to the Special Representative of the [United Nations] Secretary-General’, paragraph 6. See Annex F of the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 391 (1976), UN Security Council Document S/12093 of 5 June 1976.)

It is somewhat ironic, yet in keeping with the broader picture of injustice painted in this article, that the above words were composed in a letter dated 25 May 1976, that is to say less than three months before 18 July 1976 on which latter date the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid Convention of 1973 (‘the Crime of Apartheid Convention of 1973’) came into force. All of which begs at least two questions. Firstly, why, in contrast to 109 other states, have Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus never become State Parties to the Crime of Apartheid Convention of 1973? (Source: Official website of the United Nations Treaty Collection at: https://treaties.un.org/ PAGES/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-7&chapter=4&clang=_en (last accessed on 2 January 2017.)

Secondly, why did Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Community pursue a strategy which appears to have been contrary to the spirit and the letter of Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Crime of Apartheid Convention of 1973? In relation to the second question posed above, what is not in any reasonable doubt is that the consequences of the Turkish invasion were consistent with the segregationist tenets of pre-invasion Turkish strategy.

Pre-1974 Turkish strategy: the key to understanding the nature and effect of the Turkish invasion of 1974 To understand properly the segregationist tenets of pre-invasion Turkish strategy, it is necessary to go back to 1956 and to Turkey’s embrace of partition on the back of a British initiative at a time when Cyprus was still a British Crown Colony. (For details, see inter alia Klearchos A. Kyriakides, ‘The Lennox-Boyd statement of 19 December 1956 and the origins of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation in Cyprus’, Agora Dialogue, 27 December 2016 available at: http://agora-dialogue.com/2016/12/27/the-lennox-boydstatement-of-19-december-1956-and-the-origins-of-the-proposed-bi-communal-bi-zonal-federationin-cyprus/ last accessed on 2 January 2017.)

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

The crux of post-1956 Turkish strategy was neatly summarised on 26 June 1958 by Harold Macmillan MP, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. This evidence enables one to understand the roots of a Turkish strategy which appears to have been adjusted in 1964 and implemented by means of forcible transfers on and after 20 July 1974. To quote Prime Minister Macmillan: ‘The Turks — I am putting their view — regard Cyprus as an extension of the Anatolian Plain, a kind of offshore island with vital significance for their defense and their security. They say — this has been their argument up to now — that the Turkish-Cypriot community must not be ruled by a Greek-Cypriot community and they have advocated the physical separation of the two communities by means of a territorial partition.’ (Source: Statement of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan MP, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 26 June 1958, Columns 724-725.)

By 1964, in the aftermath of the constitutional crisis of 1963 and the seismic inter-communal upheaval which followed, Turkish strategy was modified in favour of a segregationist form of ‘federation’, as distinct from a pure ‘territorial partition’. More specifically, this Turkish strategy called for the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus into a ‘federal’ republic consisting of two separate ‘communities’ and two segregated ‘zones’ pursuant to a ‘compulsory exchange of population’ under which one ‘zone’, in the north, would be populated by Turks while the other ‘zone’, in the south, would be populated by Greeks. Post-1964 Turkish strategy was graphically identified and described in the Report, dated 26 March 1965, by Dr Galo Plaza, the then UN Mediator on Cyprus. To quote some salient passages from the Report. ‘… In short, they [i.e. the leadership of the Turkish community of the Republic of Cyprus] wished [the Turkish community] to be physically separated from the Greek community. … Their proposal envisaged a compulsory exchange of population in order to bring about a state of affairs in which each community would occupy a separate part of the island. The dividing line was in fact suggested: to run from the village of Yalia on the north-western coast through the towns of Nicosia in the centre, and Famagusta in the east. The zone lying north of this line was claimed by the Turkish-Cypriot community; it is said to have an area of about 1,084 square miles or 38 per cent of the total area of the Republic. An exchange of about 10,000 Greek families for about the same number of Turkish families was contemplated. … [sic: this was evidently a very conservative estimate.]

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

‘The Government of Turkey, for its part, indicated that it considered a solution to the Cyprus problem to lie along the lines of a federal State … The proposal of the Turkish Government for the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government remains essentially the same as the plan previously submitted by itself and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership …’. (Source: United Nations Security Council Document S/6253, paragraphs 72, 73, 78 & 109.)

In the light of the above, it would appear as if the two phases of the Turkish invasion of 1974 were carried out broadly in line with post-1956 Turkish strategy, as identified by Mr Macmillan, and specifically in line with post-1964 Turkish strategy, as identified by Dr Plaza.

The United Nations Security Council and its policy of appeasement In view of the above, what was the response of the United Nations Security Council to the injustice meted out in 1974? Put another way, what did the Security Council do to fulfil the requirement embedded in Article 24(2) of the United Nations Charter i.e. that ‘in discharging’ its ‘duties’ to maintain international peace and security the Security Council ‘shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations? To all intents and purposes, the United Nations chose to adhere to the policy of appeasement formulated over the telephone by Messrs Callaghan and Kissinger on 14 August 1974. In the short term, this resulted in the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Kurt Waldheim, helping to arrange for President Makarios of the Republic of Cyprus to embrace a set of ‘guidelines’ dated 12 February 1977. The first of these ‘guidelines’ affirmed that President Makarios and the ‘leader’ of the Turkish Community, Mr Rauf Denktash, were ‘seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic …’. In other words, Dr Waldheim helped to steer President Makarios into accepting a central tenet of post-1964 Turkish strategy: the idea that the Republic of Cyprus should become a ‘Federal Republic’. In the long term, this policy of appeasement led the United Nations Security Council to endorse the core ‘bi-zonal’ as well as ‘bi-communal’ and ‘federal’ objectives of Turkish strategy. This policy came to be crystallised on least two key

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

occasions. The first was via the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 649 of 1990 under which the UN Security Council expressly endorsed the proposed formation of a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’. The second was via the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 750 of 1992 under which the Security Council endorsed the segregationist definition accorded to ‘bi-zonality’ by the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali: ‘… each federated state [of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation] would be administered by one community which would be guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of land ownership in its area’. By adopting Resolutions 649 and 750, the United Nations Security Council appeared to endorse the creation of a perverse ‘bi-communal’ and ‘bi-zonal’ post-settlement ‘federal’ Cyprus subject to legalized segregation, supremacism, discrimination and the restrictions on freedom inherent in any ‘zone’. By going down this path, the Security Council effectively turned a blind eye to what appear to have been flagrant violations of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and other provisions and principles of international law. Today, in consequence of the above, the Republic of Cyprus finds itself subject to a secretive and otherwise opaque ‘leader-led process’, as the UN describes what is, in effect, a process of surrender in line with the post-1964 demands of Turkey and with the post-1974 de facto demographic realities procured by the use of brute force and coercion. Thus, the undignified if unspoken aims of this ‘leader-led process’ include the purported normalization of a de facto partition, the acceptance of de facto demographic engineering, the legalization of other illegalities, the cementing of segregation, the promotion of supremacism and, in sum, the institutionalization of injustice. By bowing to the segregationist pro-‘federation’ demands of Turkey and by thereby appeasing an aggressor, the United Nations Security Council has in effect, undermined the credibility as well as the integrity of the post-1945 European legal order in what is today the south-east flank of the Council of Europe and the European Union. After all, if legalized segregation, supremacism, discrimination, ethno-religious ‘communities’ and ethno-religious ‘zones’ are, in principle, authorized by the United Nations Security Council in one Member State of the Council of Europe and the European Union, this must surely mean that, one day, they may be authorized in other parts of Europe as well. Put simply, the Security Council appears to have acted in a way which is difficult

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

if not impossible to reconcile with the principles and purposes of the United Nations as laid down by its very own Charter dating back to the dark days of 1945.

Questions On 4 February 2016, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, reminded the world that the post-2011 conflict in Syria had generated the world’s ‘biggest humanitarian crisis since 1945’. (Source: BBC News Online, 4 February 2016.) With this in mind, one is obliged to ask a pertinent question.

If those responsible for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had been brought before an ad hoc international criminal tribunal established in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of 1974, could this development have served as a deterrent which might have prevented the appalling crimes inflicted since 2011 on the citizens in Syria? The question gains added resonance if one considers that Syria is a sovereign state situated next door to the Republic of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. If the answer to this question must remain a matter for conjecture, three things are not in any real doubt. Firstly, a ‘Conference on Cyprus’ is due to begin in Geneva on 12 January 2017. The participants will include ‘the two sides’ (a euphemism to describe the ‘leader’ of the Greek Community and the ‘leader’ of the Turkish Community of the Republic of Cyprus) plus the ‘three guarantor powers’ of the Republic of Cyprus (i.e. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The stated aim of the forthcoming ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva is to address ‘the international dimension of the Cyprus problem, Security and Guarantees.’ (Source: Statement by the Deputy Government Spokesman of the Republic of Cyprus, 10 December 2016.) Secondly, as a result of the above, the Republic of Cyprus may be on the verge of a ‘settlement’ designed to transform this de facto partitioned sovereign state into a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ i.e. in line with the post-1964 demands of Turkey, as serviced by the United Kingdom and the United States and as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. Thirdly, but perhaps most importantly of all, the rule of law is at stake in Geneva. Quite apart from the security of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union of which it forms part, what is specifically at stake in Geneva is the credibility and the integrity of the European legal order and the fundamental values of lib-

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

eral democracy. By the same token, what is specifically at stake in Geneva is the credibility as well as the integrity of the post-1945 international legal order and the principles of humanity, fairness and justice upon which that order rests. In the light of the above, this article concludes with a non-exhaustive list of questions. In the interests of the rule of law and justice, as well as peace, security and transparency, the President of the Republic of Cyprus (in his constitutional capacity as President) plus the various parties to the forthcoming ‘Conference in Geneva’ and the Secretary-General of the United Nations are hereby invited to publish written replies to these questions before the ‘Conference’ begins. 1.

Does each party to the forthcoming ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva agree with the principle which lies at the core of the rule of law i.e. that no persons and no states are above the law? If so, will the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva take a firm stand against what appears to have been the commission of multiple violations of international law, including violations of Article 49(1) and Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, since Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus on 20 July 1974?

Since 20 July 1974, has the Republic of Cyprus – or any other party to the armed conflict triggered on that date – invoked Article 149 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to ‘request’ the institution of ‘an enquiry … concerning any alleged violation of the Convention …’? If not, why not? If so, what was the outcome of any such ‘request’?

Since 20 July 1974, have any criminal proceedings been brought in the criminal courts of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey or the United Kingdom against any individuals for allegedly infringing any domestic laws – such as the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 in England and the Geneva Conventions Ratification Law of 1966 in the Republic of Cyprus – which, in line with Articles 146 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, incorporate the prohibition against deportations, transfers and other grave crimes specified in the Fourth Geneva Convention? If not, why not? If so, what was the outcome of such proceedings?

Since 20 July 1974, how many citizens of Turkey have purportedly been granted (i) ‘citizenship’ or (ii) a permanent ‘right of residence’ in the Turkish-occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus by the de facto authorities in that area? More broadly, why does Turkey appear to have been granted impunity in spite of ostensibly violating Article 49(6), as well as Article 49(1), of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949?

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Since 20 July 1974, has Turkey, in its capacity as the Occupying Power in the Turkish-occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, complied with the duty imposed by Article 65 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 under which ‘The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. …’. If so, how? If not, why not?

On the basis that it is never too late for criminal justice to be served, do the various parties to the forthcoming ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva agree with the proposition that no settlement can be ‘just’ if criminal justice is not served by means of a new independent international criminal tribunal for Cyprus formed along the lines of the tribunals established since 1993 by the United Nations Security Council in relation to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda?

Under any settlement, will Turkey or any other party be compelled to provide any reparations and other appropriate remedies for any violations of the Geneva Conventions and for any other violations of international law? If not, why not?

How can any settlement guarantee peace, security or justice if Turkey continues to refrain from making any Declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in The Hague so that Turkey recognizes as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?

Why has Turkey hitherto failed to become a State Party to numerous legal instruments of substantial importance to peace, security or justice including (i) the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (ii) the Crime of Apartheid Convention 1973, (iii) the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982, (iv) the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court 1998, (v) Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (regarding the principle of equality) 2000, (vi) the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance of 2006, (vii) the Cluster Munitions Convention of 2008 and (viii) the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013? Under any settlement, will Turkey be compelled to become a State Party these and to other significant legal instruments?

10. Why have the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and the United Kingdom, as well as Turkey, failed to join 109 other states and thereby become State Parties to the Crime of Apartheid Convention 1973? Under any settlement, will each be compelled to become a State Party? Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its relevance to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’

11. Why does the definition of ‘bi-zonality’ endorsed in 1992 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 750 – i.e. ‘… each federated state [of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation] would be administered by one community which would be guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of land ownership in its area’ – appear to envisage the legalization of violations of Article 49(1) and Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention? 12. How, if at all, can the definition of ‘bi-zonality’ quoted above be reconciled with (i) the principle of freedom inherent in liberal democracy (ii) the free market (iii) the founding values, treaties and other legal instruments of the European Union (iv) the founding values and legal instruments of the Council of Europe including the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 and Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (regarding the principle of equality) 2000 (v) the prohibition against racial segregation in inter alia the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965 and (vi) the prohibition against apartheid in the Crime of Apartheid Convention of 1973 and the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court of 1998? As each of the above questions has been raised in the interests of the rule of law, it is worth drawing attention to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. This was a document published in 2004. Therein, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, ventured the following views on the significance, meaning and implications of the rule of law. These views are as pertinent today as they were back in 2004. ‘The rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the [United Nations] Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’ (Source: Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (United Nations Security Council, New York, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616), paragraph 5 on page 3.)

Klearchos A. KYRIAKIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

In the light of the above, various supplementary questions inevitably arise. Above all, will the rule of law prevail in the Republic of Cyprus? Or will the rule of law give way to the crude idea that ‘might is right’? Will criminal justice will be served, in part, as a means of creating a deterrent to help to prevent in the future any repetition of the crimes committed in the Republic of Cyprus in 1974 and in other years? Or will criminal justice continue to be denied so that a culture of impunity continues to thrive?

Closing thoughts The citizens and lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union of which it forms part deserve to receive answers to the various questions posed above. Looking ahead, one lives in hope that the future of the Republic of Cyprus will be built in a transparent manner on the humane bedrock formed by the rule of law, the principles of liberal democracy and the Aristotelian idea that ‘the administration of justice’ is the key to ‘order’. Time will tell whether these hopes will ever be fulfilled. In the meantime, one is left to mull over another wise warning given by Aristotle in Politics: ‘The weaker are always anxious for equality and justice. The strong pay no heed to either.’ This article was originally published by Agora Dialogue at agora-dialogue.com on 2 January 2017.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

PART III SECURITY ISSUES

The Management of the Cyprus Problem from Turkey as a Security Issue

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM FROM TURKEY AS A SECURITY ISSUE Andreas PENTARAS*1

Introduction The Cyprus problem constitutes the latest manifestation of the Eastern Question, an issue which emerged out from the territorial claims of the subjugated to the Ottoman Empire, since the dawn of the 18th century, in parallel with the interests of the great powers in the broader region of the Empire. The particular feature of the Cyprus problem guarantees the fact that although the Ottomans voluntarily bequeathed Cyprus to the British in 1878, they resurfaced at this point as a New Turkey in the conquering of the island during the 1950’s, following the apparent departure of the British due to the National Liberation Struggles of the Greeks of Cyprus against Great Britain. However, why does Turkey work so strategically and perseveres the targeting of the regaining of Cyprus for the last half and more century? The entire management of the Cyprus problem from Turkey proves, as we shall see in the analysis that follows that the main target of Turkey is the consolidation of its security, of course security; as Turkey itself defines it.

The Strategic Context Cyprus is situated at the South-Eastern edge of the Mediterranean and the distance from Turkey is 40 nautical miles and from Greece 600. The population of the island in the 1950’s was 80% Greek, 18% Turkish and 2% different others. If we assume that in Cyprus there were no inhabitants, Cyprus would have no value in the service of Turkey’s interests. This is so because at a strategic level, the maritime distance which separates Cyprus from the South shores of Turkey is not considered a hindrance, it is considered a continuation of the continental mainland, because on the one hand the modern weapons systems can from the beach of Turkey intercept any target in Cyprus and much further than this starting point and on the other hand, in a few minutes the transfer of troops from Turkey to Cyprus with helicopters and aircraft (paratroopers) can occur. In reality, the reassurance of strategic interests of Turkey and its security from threats originating from the direction of the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean, can be *

General (rt)

ANDREAS PENTARAS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

accomplished from the nautical and airport bases of the South and South-Eastern Turkey. From this perspective, Cyprus as a terrestrial area, does not offer any strategic advantage to Turkey. That which makes Turkey claim Cyprus with so much vigor, is the existence of the state entity in Cyprus. This is so, either under the form of an independent state, or either as a section of another state (meaning Greece). This is so for two reasons. The first is the ‘security dilemma’, which post-war Turkey is plagued by, who constantly lives under the fear of partition of the multiethnic state which was shaped with the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey determined as its vital area South and South-East Turkey in which it situated most of its strategic assets (nautical and airport bases, dams, industries, energy hubs (Ceyhan) and in the future a nuclear power station (Akkuyu). The reason is because this area offers security from air attacks coming from mainland Greece, due to a weakness of the Greek air forces to operate at such a large distance. This area however, does not offer security from airstrikes deriving from Cyprus, which is a limited distance from Turkey as reiterated above. As a consequence, one of Turkey’s targets, is to never allow Cyprus to become a part of Greece and through any solution of the Cyprus problem, Turkey to have a say in security issues of Cyprus, so that the state of Cyprus never acquire naval and air forces The second reason has to do, with the sovereign rights that international law offers to the coastal and island states within their own Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), as well as with the rights of the responsibility of control in the Flight Information Region (FIR). As it is known, according to international law, islands which have viable life contain Exclusive Economic Zones. Cyprus, due to its geographic position, possesses a huge Exclusive Economic Zone, whose distance is approximately tenfold as that of the continental expansion of the island and boarders with the Exclusive Economic Zone of Greece, limiting thus the EEZ of Turkey at the narrow confines of Kilikia. In the case where Cyprus met the objectives of its liberation struggle 55-59 and was unified with Greece, the Greek EEZ would begin from the North Aegean and would end up at the boarders of Syria, of Lebanon, of Israel, of Egypt and so on, isolating Turkey from the Aegean as well as the Mediterranean, thus essentially situating it as a continental state. The same would occur in the case where Cyprus would become a truly independent state without rights from Turkey upon the island. Something similar with the EEZ occurs with the FIR of Cyprus, the distance of which coincides with that of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the FIR space, Cyprus exercises control of Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Management of the Cyprus Problem from Turkey as a Security Issue

airborne movement and on the other hand, it has the responsibility of its security, limiting also the equivalent responsibilities of Turkey at the narrow straits of Kilikia. These are according to my opinion, the two basic reasons that are related with the security of Turkey with the wider sense of the term, for which Turkey since the 1950’s has been struggling for the reclaiming of Cyprus, as the events that followed which will briefly be mentioned below, anyway indicate.

Period 1955-1963 As it known, in the year 1879, Turkey bequeathed Cyprus to England in return for a rental fee, after three centuries of occupation. In 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey lost every right over Cyprus and in 1925, Cyprus was proclaimed officially a colony of Great Britain. Up until 1950, Turkey did not display any interest for Cyprus, because it considered that the British occupation of the island, guaranteed Turkey from threats stemming from the direction of the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean. Turkey begun to be interested in Cyprus at the beginning of the 1950’s, when the Greeks of Cyprus in cooperation with Greece, raised the Cyprus problem in conjunction with the plea to self-determination-unification with Greece, following the realization that the British, despite their periodical promises, were not willing to bequeath the right of self-determination to the Cypriot people. The interest of Turkey for Cyprus was not different from the security issues which Turkey itself believed would occur in the event of the British withdrawal and if Cyprus would fall under the sphere of influence of Greece, with the given majority of the Greek citizens of the island. Let it be noted that on the 1st of April 1955 in Cyprus, begun the armed liberation struggle with the purpose of the unification of Cyprus with Greece. This opinion meant that the Cyprus problem is a security issue for Turkey, which was destined to be constituted the dominant policy of all the governments of Turkey until today. Officially, for the first time was set forth, from the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Zorlou at the London Conference in August of 1955, which among others stated the following: “Turkey in the case of war can ensure its supply only from the harbors of South and South-Eastern part of the country, since the harbors of West Turkey are controlled from the Greek islands. 88

ANDREAS PENTARAS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

If Cyprus is occupied by a hostile country, Turkey must commit suicide.” Based on this strategy, meaning the aversion of threats originating from the direction of the South-Eastern Mediterranean and in order for an action plan for Turkey to be established, the then government of Antan Menteres summoned the constitutionalist, professor and Member of Parliament of the Republican’s People Party Nixat Erim and was appointed the undergoing of a study and the elaboration of a management plan for the Cyprus problem. In the proposals which Nixat Erim submitted in 1956, after he suggested the initiation of a plan which foresaw a singular partition, among others he stressed the following: “At the part of Cyprus which will be controlled by the Greeks, Turkey will have the first say in security issues, whereas for the part which will be controlled by Turkey, Greece will not have a say at all. This is so, because Greece has a distance of 600 miles from Cyprus, whereas Turkey only has 40”. With this wording, Nixat Erim confirmed that which Fatin Zourlou proclaimed at the London conference. That Turkey was not willing to accept a solution to the Cyprus problem, which in its view endangered its security. In other words, it would never allow the installation of aeronautical bases or other military installations which on the one hand could cut off the naval and airborne communications from and to the harbors and airports of South Turkey and on the other hand to destroy the strategic chapters which were evident at the South and South-Eastern Turkey. Much later, in the 1990’s, the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ahmed Davoutoglou, wrote in his book, ‘Strategic Depth’… “Even if in Cyprus no Turkish person resided, Turkey should have up-kept the Cyprus problem.” In 1959, after the four year liberation struggle of the Greeks in Cyprus against the British, the London-Zurich Agreements were signed with which Cyprus gained a truncated independence. In reality, it was about a bi-communal state, in which the Turkish minority of 18% was converted into a community with immense rights (veto, separate municipalities, separate majorities etc.), all which constituted the state as dysfunctional. Most importantly however, was the fact that through the security system of Cyprus which was foreseen in the aforementioned deals, Turkey ensured long-term at least, that Cyprus would not be included under the influence of Greece and secondly, Turkey would have a say in the security matters of Cyprus, therefore it would not threaten its own security, as proclaimed by Zorlou and Erim. Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Management of the Cyprus Problem from Turkey as a Security Issue

The security plan of the Republic of Cyprus as foreseen in the London-Zurich agreements is included in three different texts analyzed below. The first text, is the Treaty of Guarantee, according to which, Greece, Turkey and Britain, guarantee the independence, the territorial integrity and the security of the Republic of Cyprus, the aspects of partition and the unification of Cyprus with another country are forbidden and the most important, the guarantor powers gain the right of intervention in Cyprus, either together or individually in the case that they observe that the status quo is upset, i.e. the state of affairs created with the London-Zurich Agreements. This is something that Turkey projected as an excuse for the invasion and occupation of 37% of the territory of Cyprus in 1974. The second text was the Treaty of Alliance, according to which Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey agreed to defend in unison the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus against any threat. In the context of this agreement there would be placed in Cyprus tripartite headquarters (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey), while Greece and Turkey would up-keep on the island military units (ELDYK and TOURDYK), of the force of 950 and 650 men correspondingly. A political committee comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and allied states was ordained as the supreme political organ which had the responsibility for functioning the tripartite headquarters and the management of the deal. The third text was the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus in which the composition of the Cyprus armed forces is overseen by 2000 men; 60% Greek-Cypriots and 40% Turkish-Cypriots. The Council of ministers was destined as the organ which would manage the defense and security issues. Particular knowledge was not needed for someone to realize the complexity and therefore the non-functionality of the above mentioned security system, through which Turkey undermined the sovereignty of the new state, both through the internal proceedings of the Treaty of Guarantee and through the Treaty of Alliance. As previously analyzed, Turkey with the London-Zurich Agreements, succeeded to a large degree the consolidation of its security, since with the above provisions of the Agreement and especially through the security system mentioned for the

ANDREAS PENTARAS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Republic of Cyprus that was established, Cyprus could never be used as a military operations base, neither from itself, nor from Greece. Despite all this, Turkey did not consider as final the Zurich-London Agreements because it believed that long-term, due to the big majority of Greeks and the fact that the Turkish-Cypriots were dispersed across the entire island, there was the risk of amalgamation and ultimately the domination of the Greek-Cypriots, with unforeseen consequences for itself. Let it be noted here, that in 1960, a big number of Turkish-Cypriots, especially those that lived in mixed villages, did not even speak the Turkish language. Therefore, immediately after the signing of the London-Zurich Agreements and before their implementation, Turkey begun the preparations for the second stage of the completion of the Nixat Erim plan, with the armament of the Turkish-Cypriots and the creation of episodes, in order to prove that the cohabitation of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots was impossible and therefore to gain the geographic partition of the two communities. Therefore in December of 1963, after one superficial episode, armed Turkish-Cypriots of the Terrorist Organization TMT, released attacks against the legal forces of the state across the entire Cyprus. In Parallel with a command of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, all the Turkish-Cypriots departed from the public service, the army and the police. With the pretext that the Turkish population of mixed or exclusively Turkish villages did not feel safe, begun to concentrate on the Turkish streets of the cities, the suburbs, where they formed the so-called Turkish-Cypriot self - administered areas outside the control of the legitimate state

Period 1964-1974 In August 1964, the Republic of Cyprus tried to wipe out the Turkish self-administered area of Mansoura in the North-Western part of Cyprus, which had access to the sea and offered the potential of illegal transportation of weapons and soldiers from Turkey to Cyprus. Turkey responded with air strikes and with threats of landing to Cyprus. In November of 1967, the Republic of Cyprus tried also to wipe out the Turkish self-administered area of Kofinou-St. Theodoros, inside which armed Turkish-Cypriots blocked the movement of Greek-Cypriots in the

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Management of the Cyprus Problem from Turkey as a Security Issue

main driving lanes of Nicosia-Larnaca and Nicosia-Limassol. The self-administered area was wiped out, but the reaction of Turkey was immediate. Turkish military aircraft flew over the capital and in other cities, while Turkey, with the threat of the use of violence (landing) blackmailed the newly prevalent military regime in Greece at a strategic defeat of Hellenism. It forced it to withdraw the Greek division which since 1964 was situated in Cyprus, creating therefore the pre-conditions for the next stage that did not take long to arrive. In July of 1974, the military regime of Greece averted the coup of the Archbishop Makarios government, using the National Guard of Cyprus that was comprised of Greek officers, in order as it believed, to realize in a coup manner the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Turkey that was preparing a while for the military intervention in Cyprus, relying on the Treaty of Guarantee (as itself interpreted it) fulfilled on the 20th of July 1974, an invasion in Cyprus and occupied 37% of its territory, in which it keeps till today with an army corps of 40000 men. In parallel, with the command of Turkey, the Turkish that lived in free Cyprus, projecting the feeling of insecurity that they supposedly felt, moved to the occupied section, creating therefore conditions of geographic partitioning of the two communities and the conditions of the formation of a separate state. In 1983 was declared the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, which has since operated as a “state” which however is not recognized from any other country except Turkey. With the invasion in Cyprus, the proclamation of the pseudo state and the presence of 40,000 troops, Turkey believed that it finalized its goals that it set on Cyprus regarding its security, but also the consolidation of its illegal “sovereign rights” in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is also the reason that Turkey, through the consecutive leadership of the Turkish/Cypriot community, it eliminated every effort of the international community and the UN for the solution of the Cyprus problem, considering that the Cyprus problem was solved finally in 1974.

Period 1975-2004 But this strategy of Turkey was converted through the 1990’s, when Cyprus and Greece decided on the establishment of the joint defense doctrine of Cyprus-Greece

ANDREAS PENTARAS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

and the reinforcement of the defense of Cyprus in the greatest possible degree. In the context of this strategy, Cyprus was equipped with super modern and sophisticated weapon systems and means (antiaircraft and antiballistic rocket systems, combat tanks and armored combat vehicles, modern combat artillery, antitank rockets, missile systems against naval targets, combat helicopters, etc.), while it constructed the naval and airbase, which hosted naval and aircraft units from Greece, within the frame of common joint exercises of Cyprus-Greece. This fact upset Turkey which saw its own strategy regarding its security crumbling, since Greece could via the air and naval base in Cyprus, on the one hand prevent sea and airborne communications to and from South-Eastern Turkey and on the other hand, to insult with its air force Turkish strategic assets in the same area. In light of this new state of affairs, Turkey revisits the strategy of the non-resolution of the Cyprus problem and advocates for the solution of the bizonal, bicommunal federation, with terms of course which would ensure its strategic interests, regarding its security and the consolidation of its “sovereign rights” in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regarding the first one, meaning its security it is insistent on the disarmament of the Cypriot state (de-militarization), in the upkeep of the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance in parallel with the presence of Turkish troops on the island, whereas regarding the second one, meaning the “sovereign rights” in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is insistent upon a system of decision-making of the federal state where no decision will be taken without the consent of the Turkish/Cypriots. With this method and with the check that the leadership of the Turkish/Cypriots will exercise, Turkey will not allow the decision making, which will forbid or hinder the exercise of these “rights”. This is what Turkey did with the proposed solution to the Cyprus problem by the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan in 2004, which the Turkish/Cypriot community voted with a majority vote. In this plan which the Greek/Cypriot community rejected with a majority vote, maintained the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and kept on the island Turkish troops. In parallel through a complicated decision making system of the central state, Turkey intervened and would influence through the Turkish/Cypriot leadership these decisions.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Management of the Cyprus Problem from Turkey as a Security Issue

Period 2004 until Today In the period after 2004, the efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem were continued under the auspices of the United Nations in the context of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Today, the talks continue, without yet discussing the issues of security, including and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance and the withdrawal of the Turkish troops. Via information that has seen the light of publicity; the Greek/Cypriot side does not accept the existence of guarantor powers, nor the residing of the Turkish troops on the soil of Cyprus. For the security of Cyprus, the Greek/Cypriot side suggests the formation of a mixed professional force, comprised of Greek/Cypriots and Turkish/Cypriots in a proportion that will be agreed and for which it can fulfill the following missions. To protect Cyprus from the asymmetrical threats, to protect the Flight Information Region (FIR) and the sovereign rights of the Exclusive Economic Zone, to fulfill search and rescue missions and to participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. Turkey on the other hand, keeps its cards closed, regarding security issues. It is apparent however, according to all mentioned in this article, that Turkey, dealing with the Cyprus problem for half and a more century as a security issue of Turkey itself, it will be difficult if not impossible to reduce the rights which were granted to her by the London-Zurich Agreements. In this case, of course there will not be a solution to the Cyprus problem, with this meaning both our side and the Turkish/Cypriot community side, but for Turkey as well, which anticipates in becoming a member of the EU but also the energy center of the region.

ANDREAS PENTARAS

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

REUNITED CYPRUS

AS AN ACTIVE SECURITY PARTNER IN THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES Geoffrey Van ORDEN*

Introduction Cyprus has a key geo-strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, at the crossroads of three continents, in a region afflicted by instability and chronic violence. It sits only 100 kms West of Syria, 200 kms from Israel and 70 kms from Turkey. Egypt is just 380 kms away. Successive imperial powers have ruled the island – most recently Britain, but previously the Ottomans. In spite of the division of the island in 1974, it has been a haven of relative tranquillity. But its division has itself been a factor impeding economic and political progress in the region, creating the possibility of further crisis, and complicating the role that Cyprus could play in terms of regional security. There is now optimism that reconciliation and reunification of the island could take place.

NATO and Cyprus In terms of the security dynamic, one interesting outcome of a settlement could be Cypriot partnership, even membership, of the NATO alliance. Its three security guarantors – Britain, Greece and Turkey - are all NATO members. Turkey’s refusal to recognise the government of the Republic, given that government’s previous embargo on progress in meeting Turkish Cypriot concerns, has been an obstacle to direct Cypriot involvement in NATO operations. One of the abiding criticisms of the EU’s defence policy is that it brings no additional military assets and merely duplicates the structures and capabilities of NATO. This is underlined by the fact that 22 of the EU’s 28 member states are also full NATO members and five of the remaining six are involved in some way in NATO activities, not least in the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace. The only exception is Cyprus.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Member of the European Parliament, Conservative Defence & Security Spokesman in the European Parliament, a leading member of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, and Vice-President of the European Conservatives and Reformists. He was previously a senior British military officer. He can be contacted at: geoffrey.vanorden@ europarl.europa.eu

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Reunited Cyprus as an active security partner in the alliance of democracies

The current explanation for this exception is twofold. Firstly, as long as the Republic of Cyprus had blocked recognition of the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey had refused NATO engagement with Cyprus in addition to being lukewarm about any NATO relations with the EU. Secondly, as long as the Cypriot communist party, AKEL, had a direct hold on political power, it would continue to serve Moscow’s ends and hinder Cypriot involvement in NATO.

The British Sovereign Bases The two British Sovereign Base Areas on the island, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, are British Overseas Territories. They are not therefore part of the Republic of Cyprus and Britain is free to use them for whatever military purposes it chooses. The importance of the strategic airfield at Akrotiri has been given fresh impetus for Britain and its allies, given the proximity of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and the battle against ISIS/Daesh1. The vital role of the signals intelligence facilities near Dhekelia are similarly underlined. Not only has Akrotiri been vital to British humanitarian missions as well as reconnaissance and strike operations against Daesh in Northern Iraq and Syria but the French have also been offered facilities to support their operations in the region2. Cyprus has current and potential port facilities that could be developed to support commercial traffic and offshore energy activities as well as military operations in the region. This would include support for NATO and other allied maritime forces transiting on counter-terrorist and counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Cypriot ports have already been used by ships engaged in coalition actions against Daesh, including the French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, which docked in Limassol in October3.

The Guardian, RAF planes bomb Islamic State targets in Iraq for the first time, 30th September 2014. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/raf-planes-bomb-islamic-state-targets-iraq-first-time) The Daily Telegraph, Britain says France can use Cyprus RAF base for Syria strikes on ISIL, 23rd November 2015, (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12011727/Britain-says-French-can-use-Cyprus-RAF-base-for-Syria-strikes-on-Isil.html) The Cyprus Mail, French Aircraft Carrier docks in Limassol, 16th October 2016. (http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/10/16/french-aircraft-carrier-docks-limassol/)

GEOFFREY VAN ORDEN

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Military Forces in Cyprus Previous treaties limited the size and scope of military forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The presence of a large Turkish garrison in the North has also been a serious bone of contention. Both these difficulties would be overcome if a reunification agreement were to be reached. I have long argued that Turkey should reduce its forces in Northern Cyprus as a confidence building gesture. They would probably all have to go under the terms of an agreement. At the same time, a standing military force drawn from both communities, with agreed command and control arrangements, would undoubtedly be included in any agreement. Rapid inclusion of a unified Cyprus in NATO’s Partnership for Peace would mean that NATO allies could assist this process. And it should not then be too difficult for the new Cyprus to raise its defense spending from the Republic’s current 1.8% of GDP to the NATO minimum guideline figure of 2%. Russian role A thornier issue is the relationship with Russia. The election of AKEL’s Demetris Christofias in 2008 saw the elevation of the “first pure-bred pro-Russian president in the history of Cyprus”4. His admiration for the old Soviet Union and then for Russia were undiluted. He left a poisonous legacy for Nicos Anastasiades, his successor, who recently expressed his desire “to deepen our [Cypriot and Russian] cooperation and further solidify the deep political, cultural and religious links between our countries and peoples, which have proved resilient both through time and a number of different challenges we have faced.”5 The Russian Government restructured a €2.5bn loan to the Cypriot government to help overcome its financial crisis. In return, with the Ukraine conflict raging and Russia subject to EU sanctions, the Cypriot government offered Russia use of naval port facilities. A few months later, Russia was positioned to intervene in nearby Syria with all the tragic consequences that have flowed from this. President Putin commented “I don’t think [the Russia/Cyprus relationship] should worry anyone……our friendly ties aren’t aimed against anyone.” It was also revealed that the two countries were discussing the possibility of Russia using an air base on Cyprus, perhaps Paphos, for “humanitarian relief missions”6. 4 5

The Cyprus Mail, The Christofias - Moscow Axis, 3rd May 2016. (http://cyprus-mail. com/2016/05/03/christofias-moscow-axis/) Address by the President of the Republic Mr Nicos Anastasiades at the 11th Cyprus-Russian Festival, 4th June 2016. (http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/257dd326cd3d2743c22575150033e6a7/3d3c405f10d5fdf9c2257fcd0035583f?OpenDocument&print) Joint Press Conference between President Putin and President Anastasiades at the Kremlin, 25th February 2015. (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739)

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

Reunited Cyprus as an active security partner in the alliance of democracies

Meanwhile the Russian population in Cyprus has grown enormously. The official figure puts it at 9,000 although it is widely estimated that over 40,000 live on the island7. And recent years have seen large Russian money movements into Cypriot banks and investments in the island, arousing suspicions of money laundering and evasion of Western sanctions against Russia. Russia certainly sees Cyprus as an instrument of influence in the EU with President Anastasiades notably speaking against EU sanctions on Russia and AKEL MPs in the Cypriot parliament calling for sanctions to be lifted. Ten years ago Russia had no significant presence in the Mediterranean, an area of Western dominance for centuries. Bold use of its greatly expanded military forces, coupled with more subtle methods of hybrid warfare have enabled Russia to establish her presence in the Eastern Mediterranean with Cyprus playing an important role. In normal circumstances this would greatly complicate Cypriot membership of NATO. But with the prospective decrease in British influence in the EU, the rise of dangerous EU ambitions for strategic “autonomy” from America, the upsurge of parties in France, Germany and elsewhere that favour neither the EU nor America, and with the election of Donald Trump, it is clear that we live in uncertain times and are entering a phase of strategic reassessment. It will be even more important to confirm and strengthen the NATO alliance and the credibility of its defensive guarantees.

Conclusion The Syrian conflict, the war against Daesh, the refugee crisis and international terrorism, fueled by a range of malign forces in the greater Middle East, will continue for the foreseeable future. In an era of uncertainty and international crisis, the geo-strategic importance to the West of a reunified, stable, prosperous and democratic Cyprus, so close to all the areas of deepest torment, should not be underestimated. Additional effort now needs to be made to ensure that the glowing opportunity for a Cyprus settlement is not lost again. This will enable a newly united Cyprus to be firmly embedded amongst the transatlantic western democracies, sharing with them the burden of defense and security.

The Guardian, Russian Expat Invasion of Cyprus has Sinister Overtone, 26th January 2012. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/cyprus-russian-invasion)

GEOFFREY VAN ORDEN

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AFTER THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM Andreas LOIZOU* The aim of this paper is to examine the necessity and the role of the armed forces in the Republic of Cyprus after the solution of the Cyprus problem. Initially it will be examined the Cyprus geopolitical situation, then the threats, the necessity and finally the role and the mission of the mixed armed forces in the new Republic of Cyprus, after the solution of the Cyprus problem. Actually the Cyprus problem is a security and geopolitical problem. After the solution of the Cyprus problem the new State must be free from guarantor states and establish a new security system1. There is no common model of how to create and establish armed forces in a democratic society and how to exercise control over the military2. Multiple parameters designate the reasons to create armed forces and their role. What is the role of the armed forces for the new Cyprus state?

A Brief Geopolitical Situation It will be presented in brief analysis of the different parameters, the geography and the geopolitical situation of the Middle East countries3, especially: A. Turkey B. Syria C. Lebanon D. Israel E. Egypt F. Cyprus

Colonel (r), Teaching Fellow at University of Central Lancashire (UCLan) Cyprus

1 2 3

ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΗ ΑΠΕΙΛΗ, (TURKISH THREAT), BY Fivos Klokkaris, Epifaniou 2011, page 91. The role of the Military forces in Democracy, by Major General H Kujat GEAF. The analysis based on the writers personal views.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

The Role of the Armed Forces in The Republic of Cyprus after the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

TURKEY Turkey is considered to be the gateway between Europe and Asia; Turkey situates where three continents meets. It is a Eurasian country located in the Mediterranean stretching across the Anatolian peninsula in southwest Asia and the Balkan region of southeastern Europe. Turkey is bordered by, the Black Sea, the Marmara Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey’s form of government is considering as “republic” but the 18% of the Kurdish population is suffering of discriminations. About 90000 former governmental officials (judges, armed forces officers, academics, high ranking officials, teachers, professors and other people) dismissed from their positions and many of those are in the prison. Turkey is a very important NATO member state, which is dispose more than half a million soldiers and modern weapons. Its population is 76 millions, of which, 81% Turks and 19% Kurds. There are also many minor entities, as Greeks, Assyrians, Arabs, Jews e.t.c. Turkey it’s a country with unstable security and terrorists actions and its diplomatic relations with the rest countries of the Middle East are not the appropriate ones. Turkey is involve to diplomatic games between, USA and Russia in order to make geopolitical profit.

SYRIA After the Turkish defeat in World War I, Syria mandated to France and became independent after the defeat of Vichy troops by the Allies in 1941. From 1958 to 1961, Syria united with Egypt as the United Arab Republic. It lost the Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 war. Syria is ruled by the alawite Bashar al Assad and it is influenced by Russia and IRAN and is in bad relations with Turkey and Israel. Syria is the only Mediterranean country, which is provide, military facilities to Russia. (Syria is the most important Russian allay in Mediterranean Sea). Today the political and military situation in Syria is very complicate because of the civil war, the Turkish invasion and the occupation of a part of its territory from the fundamental Muslims, ISIL.

LEBANON Lebanon is an unstable country suffering from intractable internal political problems for decades, which continue until today, resulting in perpetual instability and keeping foreign businesses away. 100

ANDREAS LOIZOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Political instability and security issues arising from the Syrian crisis just across the Lebanese border. In Lebanon there are the armed forces of 1.

HEZBOLLAH (Shi’a Islamist militant group and political party, based in Lebanon).

Lebanese Armed Forces

ISRAEL Israel is the most powerful country of the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is also a stable country keeping good relations with USA, Russia, Japan and China. Israel Armed Forces apart from the modern and sophisticate weapons dispose also Nuclear Weapons. In Gaza strip is based the HAMAS (Radical Islamic Terrorist Organization, founded in 1987. Its an expansion of the Muslim Islamic Fundamental Brotherhood, with 20 000 fighters).

EGYPT Egypt is the biggest Arab country and also a leading country in the Arab world and in good relations with Israel. Egypt has been experiencing its own set of political problems including fundamental terrorists in the last six at least years. The uncertainty of the country attacked tourism, which is among the primary sources of income. Egypt disposes large Armed Forces with more 270 000 men and women.

CYPRUS Cyprus situates in the unstable area of the Middle East4. The north part of the island occupied by Turkey since 1974 with strong military forces and since then suffering from must illegal colonization. Although its political problem with Turkey and the financial problems faced the last five years Cyprus remains a stable country. In the island based the majority of the international companies basin oneself in the Middle East countries, especially in Syria and Lebanon. There is a variety of contrasting opinions among researchers and policy-makers about the role of geopolitics in the persistence of the Cyprus conflict. 4

ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΗ ΑΠΕΙΛΗ, (TURKISH THREAT), BY Fivos Klokkaris, Epifaniou 2011, page 96.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

101

The Role of the Armed Forces in The Republic of Cyprus after the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

Some people argue that the island of Cyprus has geopolitical importance for regional and global powers. According to this view, regional and super powers will constantly try to dominate – control on the island and its people and never let Cypriots rule their own land. (This is the reason why Turkey wants to control Cyprus). Others claim that emphasizing constantly the geopolitical importance of the island and securitizing the Cyprus problem hinders the resolution process of the Cyprus conflict. Since the antiquity Cyprus played a critical role in all wars. The last 25 years Cyprus offers facilities and infrastructure to the USA, Canada and European Union countries during the Gulf war, the Iraq war and for the anti-terrorist war. Cyprus also played an important supporting role in the Lebanese crises of 1976, 1982, 2006 and 2015. The agreements on security issues signed by the Republic of Cyprus with other states, the last ten years, increase the Cyprus credibility. The importance of Cyprus geopolitical position also prove by the existence of the British Bases (2.8 percent of the islands surface) on the Island, and of course from their contribution to the area conflicts.

THREATS Internal threats against the new Republic of Cyprus. 1.

Possible unexpected hostility, among nationalist groups of the two big communities in the Island.

Agents (running foreign interests) actions, against the new Cypriot state.

Possible Targets in Cyprus •

Foreign countries diplomatic mission.

•

Governmental and public Infrastructures.

•

Gas and oil reserves installations.

•

Airports.

•

Ports.

•

Hotels and tourist resorts, in tourist areas, especially during the summer period.

•

Culture events with the participation of mass of people.

•

Military and police installations.

102

ANDREAS LOIZOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Concerning the external threats. Although the nature of the island (it’s a security place by its self) is weak and there are lots of kinds of threats. External Threats5 1.

Turkey with its illegal policy and plans to control the hole island of Cyprus, and its hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East area.

Piracies

Mass distraction weapons dispersed.

Smuggling of conventional weapons.

Organize crime (drugs, prostitution, human trafficking etc).

Fundamental religious groups (ISIL).

Terrorism (ideological or/and religious).

Provocative and terrorism actions, (from foreign services against foreign officials).

Cyber war

Asymmetric threats in combination with the Middle East existing problems (in Syria, the Cyprus problem, the Palestinian problem, the Kurdish wars, the Arabs – Israel conflict, the Iraqi unstable situation and other minor problems), creates a combustible situation threatening the world peace, security, stability and the world economy. Asymmetric threats are impersonal and ambiguous and unpredictable. Its obvious and well proved that a country without Armed Forces and with only police forces could not act accordingly. Police mandate is to maintain the law and order within the countries sovereignty and armed forces mission is to protect the country from any external threat. The Government of Cyprus, In order to encounter terrorism must cooperate at the international level, and especially at the intelligence level and it’s a costly operation. None of the independent countries, even the US, may encounter terrorism alone. For example the NATO – EU operation named ATALANTA against the piracy in Somalia, threatening the hydrocarbon transportation and the comers from Asia to Middle East and Europe. The security strategy of the EU, the NATO and the USA are focusing mainly to encounter the asymmetric threats and to secure the energy sources and the energy transportation from Middle East to Europe. 5

Contemporary security studies, Alan Collins, pages 239 – 262.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

103

The Role of the Armed Forces in The Republic of Cyprus after the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

Cyprus Cooperation for Security Cyprus government in order to protect its security and assist the security of the other countries (partners and allies) and is fighting against asymmetric threats is cooperate with many countries especially the USA, Russia, Israel, Egypt, Greece and European Union member States. In this effort the primary role is belonging to the Intelligence Service and the Police of the Republic of Cyprus. After the solution of the Cyprus problem this cooperation must continue and if possible be extented. New Security System The new security system after the solution of the Cyprus problem should be base on three pillars6. 1.

The capability of the self-defense of the new state and of course its interests in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Cyprus as an island in order to organize reliable armed forces must build apart the land forces, also strong and efficient naval and air force powers.

The full participation of the new state in European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and joining the Partnership for Peace and NATO7. As a NATO member State, Cyprus will be safer than it is today.

The establishment of alliances with countries based on common interests and become member of the organizations of Collective Security.

Mission of the Armed Forces 1.

To defend their own country (self defense) from several threats, (conventional and asymmetric threats).

To participate in the collective defense and security Alliance (EU/ Lisbon Treaty).

To secure and defend the Energy sources.

To provide humanitarian aid, when and where the police can’t do it.

To perform search and rescue missions.

To provide assistance in disasters.

To provide assistance in accidents.

6 7

ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΗ ΑΠΕΙΛΗ, (TURKISH THREAT), BY Fivos Klokkaris, Epifaniou 2011, page 93. Why NATO? According to Yiannos Charalambides book, GLOBAL TITANS and SWORN SOLDIERS, page 26, ‘NATO contributes the main Defensive Alliance, which operates within the regional and global system in terms of ‘collective security’

104

ANDREAS LOIZOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

To participate in maintaining the public order, with and without arms, by providing administrative assistance, by performing protective functions, and assisting the police in emergencies or other operations.

The first three mentioned missions, are curried out only by the armed forces and its obvious that a state without armed forces may not be able to fulfill them.

The New Cyprus State without Armed Forces Among the member states of the United Nations only two, are without armed forces, Costa Rica and Island. Costa Rica has close relations with United States and they sign bilateral defense and security agreements. Island although an unarmed state, but is a NATO member state and on its territory based permanently NATO armed forces. (Especially, US armed forces). There are also few other states with small size armed forces, such as Vatican, Antigua and Barbuda, Seychelles, Barbados, Luxembourg (NATO member state), Gambia, Bahamas, Belize, Cape Verde and few others, but all of them have defense agreements with powerful states, (USA, United Kingdom and Australia)8 A state without armed forces cannot secure its sovereignty in land, sea and air.

Open Matters Between Greece and Turkey Because of Turkeys claims over Cyprus and Greece, certain very serious matters will remain open - unsolved and of course the new Cyprus state without armed forces in case of war (between Greece and Turkey) will remain hostage of Turkey (because of the proximity of Cyprus to Turkey) and in a weak position. These open matters (Turkish claims) in Thrace and in the Aegean are: 1.

The Territorial Waters.

The Continental shelf

The Exclusive Economic Zone.

The Contiguous zone.

The National Airspace.

The Flight Information Regions.

The Demarcation of the Aegean Sea and the claim of some islands by Turkey.

The Turkish Over flights violating the Greek sovereignty.

Essential Militaria, by Nicholas Hobbes, page 112.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

105

The Role of the Armed Forces in The Republic of Cyprus after the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

The Demilitarization of the Greek Aegean Islands.

10. The search and rescue area. 11. Turkey is trying to present the Muslim Greeks lived in Thrace, (according to Lausanne Treaty signed in 1923, they are consider as Greek civilians), as Turkish citizens, and always intervene in order to provoke problems and disturb the Greek government.

Conclusion After the aforesaid analysis, 1.

USA and the EU recognize Cyprus as the key place to support their peace operations and interventions in the Middle East. (Lebanon 1976, 1982, 2006, Iraq war 1991, 2003) (that proves the high standard of the islands infrastructure (services, communications, living facilities, ports, airports and the safety of the island).

Although the escalation of the asymmetric threats, Cyprus remains among the most secure states in Europe and the most secure state in Middle East.

The Cyprus bilateral relations with all Middle East and Arab countries make Cyprus more secure and allow Cyprus to play an important intermediate factor among the area states.

Cyprus alliances with Egypt, Israel and Greece secure its position in the Middle East.

Turkey remains an unstable state with a lot of internal and external problems (Caucasus, Syria, Israel, Greece and Cyprus).

Because of the proximity to Turkey, which has expansionist plans the new Cyprus state has to improve its Armed and Security forces (especially its Secret Cervices) to build reliable defense capabilities. According to the German General Helmut von Moltke, “eternal peace is a dream’9.

106

WAR, by Lawrence Freedman, Oxford 1994

ANDREAS LOIZOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

BIBLIOGRAPHY •

ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΗ ΑΠΕΙΛΗ, (TURKISH THREAT), bY Fivos Klokkaris, Epifaniou 2011.

•

The Role of the Military Forces in Democracy, by Major General H Koujat GEAF.

•

Contemporary security studies, Alan Collins, Third edition, Oxford 2013.

•

Essential Militaria, by Nicholas Hobbes, Atlantic Books, London 1988.

•

WAR, by Lawrence Freedman, Oxford 1994.

•

The Third World War, GLOBAL TITANS and SWARN SOLDIERS, by Dr Yiannos Charalambides, ERPIC, Larnaca

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

107

PART IIII REVISIONIST POLICY AND ENERGY GAMES

109

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

DOES THE CYPRUS EEZ FOLLOW THE MODEL OF THE AEGEAN SEA? The threat of annexation and the turkish revisionist policy Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES*

1. Introduction Cyprus issue remains frozen and therefore it is a source of conflict from which a wider Greco-Turkish war is always likely to break out. Even if the eruption of a war is an extreme scenario, it cannot be excluded, particularly in the current period in which deposits of gas have been discovered within the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Noble Energy 2011, LNG World News 2011, Barkat 2010, Shemer 2011) and Turkey questions the sovereign and special rights of the Republic of Cyprus, stemming from the provisions of the International Law of the Sea. Beyond International Law, military strength is a crucial factor through which international relations are regulated and defined. In this regard, Turkish war-fleet constitutes a permanent threat on Cyprus, along with the Turkish troops, which are illegally stationed in the island since the invasion conducted in 1974. Many efforts have been undertaken throughout the years by the International Community under the auspices of the UN, but no positive outcome resulted. In the current period, there is an ongoing intensive initiative based on the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal federal political system, which is planned to replace the existing unitary state of the Republic of Cyprus with two constituent states of equal status (Joint Declaration Anastasiades – Eroglu, 2014). The one is the free areas of the Republic of Cyprus in the context of some territorial adjustments and the other it is the existing non - recognized “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. If a solution results, both constituent states will coexist under the umbrella of a federal government and of an equal legal status of a condominium. The Joint Declaration, concluded by the two leaders, President Nikos Anastasiades and the former Turkish -Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu, refers to: “…the sovereignty which is enjoyed by all member States of the United Nations under the UN Charter and which emanates equally from Greek Cypriots *

110

Doctor of International Relations and European Studies, Head of the Department of M.A. in International Relations, Global Economy and Strategic Analysis, Ledra College - Vuzf University

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

and Turkish Cypriots”. Two are the main points we should remark: Firstly, the source of power and secondly, the absence of the legal concept of a single people. Since no reference exists to a single people but only to two communities, the legal vague is likely to be covered by contradictory legal theories about two peoples. These contradictory legal theories are expected to be ratified by a solution, which will be legally enshrined through two separate referenda on the basis of article 1 par. 2 of the UN Charter. That is the right of self determination, which is granted to peoples and not to communities. Thus, regarding the Joint Statement, we have a reference to a single sovereignty, but with a double source of power. Therefore, one may argue that the single sovereignty splits down the middle in terms of a political and legal equality existing between the two constituent states. This is the Turkish legal narrative that nobody should ignore. Accordingly, we underline, what the Joint Statement maintains about equality and condominium: “The federal laws will not encroach upon constituent state laws, within the constituent states’ area of competences, and the constituent states’ laws will not encroach upon the federal laws within the federal government’s competences” (Joint Declaration Anastasiades – Eroglu, 2014). Although the Joint Declaration stresses that, “the Federal constitution shall be the supreme law of the land and will be binding on all the federation’s authorities and on the constituent states”, the only legal binding clause existing, between the constituent states and the federal constitution, is the concept with regard to the residual of power, directly belonging to the constituent states. The federal constitution is the supreme law. However, all three constitutions of the new “United Federal Cyprus” will be of “equal validity”. None of the three constitutions – the federal one and those of the two constituent states - can legally predominate the others. In fact, condominium is implemented in two levels: the first one is the federal level where the two communities will jointly exercise the power of the federal government. The second one is that of the two constituent states, which are of equal status with confederal characteristics penetrating into the solution. Accordingly, the Joint Declaration underlines the following: “the constituent states will exercise fully and irrevocably all their powers, free from encroachment by the federal government” (Joint Declaration Anastasiades – Eroglu, 2014).

2. Aim and questions The question is whether a federal political system, like the one which is planned to be established in Cyprus, will induce a comprehensive and viable solution or the “new state of affairs”, which might result, will lead to the new stage of Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

111

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

the problem. Thus, legal and geopolitical aspects of the problem are of eminent importance as they have their own impact on the solution. The gas deposits lying in the EEZ of Cyprus constitute an issue, which comprises of both geopolitical and legal aspects. Therefore, this article deals with geopolitical and legal issues of the Cyprus gas resources and the risk, which might result if the solution to the Cyprus conflict will be not based on a concrete legal and geopolitical framework, being acceptable by all. The question is whether a scenario, which is relevant to the dispute of the Aegean Sea, might be realized and furthermore whether Turkey, and under what conditions, can annex Cyprus regardless of the solution to the problem. This analysis is to be seen through the lens of the Turkish revisionist policy, which is still alive and affects the political developments in a regional level. In this regard, we should underline that the Turkish revisionist policy traces back to 1973 once the Turkish government questioned the sovereign rights of Greece in the Aegean Sea and the air space1 . In an effort to put the Aegean dispute in order we could note the following issues that it consists of: •

Delineation of territorial waters. This is an issue, which is inherent in national sovereignty (Republic of Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

•

Delineation of Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelf (Republic of Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016). These issues are pertinent to gas and oil resources lying in the Aegean Sea.

•

Delineation of national airspace and delineation of Flight Information Regions (FIR) (Republic of Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016). These two issues are relevant to the control of military flights, security issues and the geostrategic domination on the region (Republic of Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

•

Demilitarization of Greek islands (Inan, 1998, Republic of Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016). This topic refers to security issues and balance of power. Turkey alleges that the military forces stationed in the islands constitute a permeant threat on Turkish coasts. On the other hand, the Greek islands will be a prey to the Turkish army if a status of demilitarization is imposed.

112

On November 1, 1973 the Turkish government published in the official Turkish Government Gazette a map upon which areas of the Aegean Sea had been designated as part of the Turkish sovereignty and a license had been issued to the Turkish Petroleum Company for research activities. The problem was raised because the Turkish map had included areas, which are considered as legally belonging to Greece. This was the first sign about the Turkish revisionist policy in the Aegean Sea, which is, among others, relevant to the oil and gas resources, which might exist in this certain region.

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Certainly, behind the Turkish policy, the exploitation of gas and oil recourses is hidden and the megalomania stemming from the imperial ambition of the “Deep State” to revive the Ottoman Empire. During a speech that he delivered in Bosnia – Herzegovina, where he uncovered his vision about restoring the Ottoman Empire, the former Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davoutoglu, stated on October 16, 2009, the following: “Like in the 16th century, which saw the rise of the Ottoman Balkans as the center of world politics, we will make the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of world politics in the future. This is the objective of Turkish foreign policy, and we will achieve this. We will reintegrate the Balkan region, the Middle East and the Caucasus, based on the principle of regional and global peace ,for the future, not only for all of us but for all of humanity.”(ESI, 2010) The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 created a fait accompli, of which the legalization can come through the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal, federal system as it has been designed by the Turkish government with the British support in 1956 (Government House Cyprus, 1956; Charalambides 2011, pp 378380). Cyprus, and the way that its problem is expected to be solved, constitute fundamental pillars that the Turkish revisionist policy is based on. Accordingly, when we refer to the revisionist policy we mean the strategic efforts undertaken by the Turkish state in purporting to change and legalize a new geopolitical status quo, which is in line and serves Ankara’s national interests. Such a revisionist policy covers a region, which is extended from Marmaris to Alexandretta, and it is deemed by Ankara as being a “Turkish lake” full of gas and oil. As Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan stated on September 26, 2013: “The Mediterranean sea was always a Turkish lake. However, during the last period, as we did not get there, some found the landscape free. It is neither place for celebration nor a place for ramble. What business Israel has to do there? Israel is not a country which is specialized in oil research”. This is a statement which particularly refers to Israel. However, as Israel constitutes a regional power, which possesses, not only conventional, but nuclear weapons too, it would be very difficult for Turkey to implement a tough policy in practice. The Turkish President follows an aggressive rhetoric, which is not accompanied by military actions and particularly by the use of the Turkish warships like it happens in the case of Cyprus. This is an example showing how important military strength is in terms of a preventive policy and strategy. The Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

113

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

norms of international law are not as strong as it should be in order to prevent external threats. Gas and oil recourses are in fact a challenge for a regional power such as Turkey, particularly in case that the state which has the legal rights is militarily weak and cannot effectively protect its “butter” from neighboring “cannons”.

3. Turkish steps In light of what is mentioned above, the Turkish government took a number of legal and military steps in order to successfully carry out its revisionist goals either with or without a federal solution to the Cyprus issue. Firstly, Turkey invaded of Cyprus in 1974. The consequences of these military operation are in line with the Turkish revisionist policy and induced a de facto partition of the island. The legalization of this “fait accompli” is depicted in the establishment of a federal system with a bizonal and bicommunal character. Secondly, the Turkish Military Navy is used as a strategic instrument through which Ankara can prevent the efforts of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit its gas recourses. The gunboat diplomacy is a favor threat launched by Turkey to coerce Cyprus government with the aspiration of making the Republic of Cyprus to give up from its legal rights in its EEZ. In September 2011, the researches in the Cyprus EEZ and particularly on offshore “Plot 12”, called “Aphrodite”, have been coincidentally concluded. It was a case in which national interests among Cyprus and Israel had been met and pushed the US to take some concrete steps to prevent a crisis, stemming from the Turkish threats (Reuters 2011, Daljecom 2009). Around the offshore platform where the researches had been carried out, a US destroyer used to patrol on a permanent basis not allowing the Turkish warships to “make serious troubles”. Thirdly, the “Peace Pipeline” through which Turkey channels water to the northern part of Cyprus. It is a project, titled “Peace Pipeline” (Hadjicostis, 2014), which should be examined in the context of some other projects such as the ones concerning the production of electricity2 (Sengul, 2016) and the functioning of telecommunication, which are sectors under Turkish control. Thus, the Turkish government put forward a double phase plan. Either there is or there is not a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Turkish aim leads 2

114

Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Berat Albayrak and the so called “TRNC” Economy and Energy Minister Sunat Atun signed on October 11, 2016 an energy protocol for the construction of an undersea electricity cable link between Turkey and the occupied northern part of Cyprus. As Albayrak stated: “The electricity deal with the TRNC will contribute not only to the well-being of the TRNC but also the entire region” (Sengul 2016).

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

to the following same outcome: the annexation of the northern part of Cyprus to Turkey. The tools that the Turkish policy uses to attain its strategic goal is the control over strategic sectors, which are necessary for a state in order to normally function and not to be under guardianship. We also underline that Turkey controls the Turkish Cypriot Banking Sector and does not allow the EU and more precisely the European Central Bank to vent the Banking situation in the view of an upcoming solution to the Cyprus issue and thus to move forward for making the relevant stress tests required by the European Central Bank (Georgiades, 2016). This is a crucial issue as it is a precondition for the euro to be the official currency from the first moment of the solution; from the “day one”. 3.1 The gas pipeline What is mentioned above are only some of the essential steps that Turkey has already taken in order to annex the northern part of Cyprus. Beyond these steps, there is another one which is of utmost importance. We refer to the Turkish claim about the construction of a gas pipeline from the Cypriot to Turkish coasts (Psyllides, 2016, Phileleftheros, 2015). This issue is pertinent to the wider Turkish strategy on the Cyprus problem. In this context, Turkey achieved to manipulate the procedures of the negotiations where the legal basis of the solution to the Cyprus problem is the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal, federal political system. Turkish aim is to legally take control over the gas and oil resources legally belonging to Cyprus and Greece and thus to cut off the maritime region where Cypriot, Greek and Egyptian Exclusive Economic Zones are osculated (UN General Assembly 2016). This is why the Turkish government constructed a policy based the following dimensions: it questions the Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea and particularly in Kastelorizo (Daloglou, 2013; Pipes, 2012). Accordingly, Turkey provides the allegation that this certain island has not the right of delineating an EEZ in the context of the Greek sovereignty, while at the same time, it put in question the Cypriot EEZ by raising two legal arguments: A. Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, and therefore it argues that the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has its own EEZ. In this regard, on September 21, 2011, Turkey has illegally signed two agreements with the so called Turkish Cypriot Authorities. The one is about the exploitation of gas recourses by Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO Activities, 2011, p.103) and the another concerns the delineation of the Turkish continental shelf with the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (Republic of Turkey, Ministry OF 3

The agreement has been officially concluded on November 2, 2011.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

115

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

Foreign Affairs, 2011), which is not recognized by the International Community as the UN Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 provide for. B. Turkey has already submitted in the UN its own legal document in which it delineates its own continental shelf. This is a legal and political step being in line with the first information note transmitted by Turkey to the UN on May 2, 2004 (Ioannides, p. 25). The result of this Turkish movements is the de facto trisection of the existing EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. The one part legally belongs to the Republic of Cyprus and the other two parts, which are also included in the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, are illegally claimed by Turkey and the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. This Turkish political, legal and geopolitical position is to be legalized in the context of the solution of the Cyprus problem or it will trigger the new phase of the Cyprus problem. A possible case scenario might be a status quo similar to the one existing in the Aegean Sea and to the “gray zones”, which have been consolidated as a result of the Imia crisis in 1996. However, in the Aegean Sea there is a sort of balance of power between Greece and Turkey. A similar balance of power does not and will be not exist between Turkey and Cyprus. Thus the Turkish task will be much easier to be realized through the institutional structure of a tricky federal system due to the role that the Turkish Cypriots will play in the new federal governance; a role which might be led by the Turkish state. Ankara possesses enormous military power and Cyprus is scheduled to be a demilitarized political system. Moreover, as already said, the Authorities of Ankara have already set the northern part of Cyprus under their economic and banking dependence with other strategic sectors such as water supply, electricity (Daily Sabah, 2016) and telecommunication (Central Intelligence Services, 2014) to be under Turkish absolute command. Telecommunication is a very sensitive sector, which is connected with security issues and the new cyber-warfare. There are cases such as the ones in the Crimean and Georgian wars once the Russians successfully conducted the Cyber - War. The main Russian advantage was the access to infrastructure since the Soviet era and therefore it was an easy task for the Russian malware and virus to penetrate into both the Ukrainian and Georgian devices and thus paralyzing the military and public services in the war time. The Ukrainian system of telecommunication and the apparatus of intelligence services had been constructed during the Soviet Empire. The Russians could identify the technological knowhow and they were in a position to take appropriate measures and thereby to paralyze the Ukrainian public and military sectors in terms of a cyber - war. In fact, they exploited their technological advantages in using “malicious software” 116

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

- “Ouroboros” or “Snake” - which is characterized by high sophisticated techniques and capabilities (Defense Update, 2014). The name “Ouroboros” draws its origin from the Greek mythology and it symbolizes a “snake” or a “dragon”, which seems to bite its tale. The truth is that the snake does not swallow its tale, but it helps itself to recycle its flaking skin. “Ouroboros” malware invaded the public, government and military networks for surveillance purposes and thereby stealing information and useful data. Simultaneously, it disrupted and paralyzed the public computing system and particularly that of critical and strategic infrastructures of industry and communications. The “smart snake” of “Ouroboros” is capable of combining multiple techniques and its skills and effectiveness are compared with those of “Stunxent” malware, which successfully hit the Iranian nuclear program (Kelley, 2013). 3.2 Turkish power The Turkish military strength is an important factor, which should be taken into consideration when a conflict and geopolitical and geostrategic relations among states are analyzed. Military strength influences and defines political and energy even legal developments. As already said, the Turkish illegal fait accompli created in Cyprus by the Turkish troops is to be legalized through a federal system. Besides, federation is a Turkish goal and it is mapped out by the Turkish invasion in 1974 once a de facto partition resulted on the level of population, administration and territory. Turkey is a powerful state and meets the main component elements of strength such as: 1.

Population size. Turkey’s population is about 80 million citizens (Worldomteters, 2016). However, we should underline that there are many other national minorities living in Turkey, such as the Kurds with whom the Turkish troops are engaged in a perpetual guerilla war.

Turkish military power. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and the biggest in Europe (GFP, 20016).

Belligerent Army. The Turkish troops conducts military operations in the war against the Kurdish militants of PKK and in the current era are fighting in the Syrian battlefield (Deed, 2016).

Pivotal geopolitical location. Turkey invests in its pivotal geopolitical position in order to be an energy hub through which national interests of Great Powers are met and served. This is a reality which offers Turkey the opportunity to implement a “pendulum policy” and thus swinging between Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

117

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

the US and Russia depending on the service of the national interests of both countries. A relative specimen is the meeting held in Moscow on August 9, 2016 between Russian and Turkish Presidents Vladimir Putin and Tayyip Erdogan. When the American Vice President John Kerry warned the Turkish President that his country run the risk of being expelled from NATO if the death penalty was to be enacted by the Grand Turkish National Assembly (Kerry, 2016), Russia outstretched hand to President Erdogan on the basis of the service of common interests such as the commercial, touristic and energy ones and the establishment of a nuclear reactor in Akkuyu, which is estimated to cost about 20 billion US dollars (World Nuclear Association, 2016). In 2013 the trading volume between Russia and Turkey was around 34 billion dollars, with the Russian Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz indicating that it was not particularly ambitious goal to overcome these transactions worth over 100 billion dollars (Hurriet Turkish Daily News, 2013). Furthermore, the Turkish Minister of Energy underlined in a press conference that more than 500 Russian companies operate in his country and Turkish construction companies have profits of exceeding 50 billion dollars in transactions with Russia (Hurriet Turkish Daily News 2013). This policy has been badly injured after the crisis erupted between Turkey and Russia. The cause was the shooting down of a Su-24 by a Turkish F-16 in the air space of Turkey very close to the boarders with Syria. However, common interests and power games could not allow both countries to sacrifice their interests at the altar of a Su-24. 5.

Control of water resources through “Ataturk dams” (De Chatel, 2003). A relevant case is the “Peace Pipeline” channeling water from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus (Daily Sabah, 2015). Therefore, Turkey possesses and control water recourses and expects to acquire nuclear power for civilian purposes. However, there is always the risk of producing nuclear weapons. This is not an easy task, mainly, due to the Russian surveillance, but it is an option not to be excluded. Accordingly, there exists an analysis, which is relevant to this issue, and depicts the main dimensions of the Turkish Nuclear Plan, underlining that: “Concerns over the Turkish nuclear plant facilities, [are] largely [expressed] because of nuclear’s high ‘hidden’ costs and waste disposal problems, environmental groups tend to oppose all nuclear projects. In the case of Turkey, the area is also prone to earthquakes, with a 6.2 Richter-scale earthquake having hit Adana, 180km from the plant site. While the plant is being designed to withstand earthquakes of up to 6.5 on

118

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

the Richter scale, the possibility of a stronger quake has caused concerns. A second reason for resistance in western countries is the possibility of nuclear weapons. Civil power plants can produce plutonium for military uses. The volatility of internal Turkish politics, along with the country’s chequered history with some of its neighbours, has made this another matter for concern” (Power -technology.com). 3.3 Exclusive Economic Zones Turkish efforts aim at annexing the northern part of Cyprus through various ways and thus consolidating the illegal fait accompli created in 1974 regardless of the solution. All these efforts fall into a strategy, which purports to exercise political and diplomatic pressure, delivering, at the same time, an extortionate message: the “annexation” has been already carried out. The exclusive rights offered, in the context of the negotiations, to the “Turkish Cypriot Constituent State” for signing agreements and Treaties on commercial and touristic areas (Kavkalias, 2016) constitute an additional legal and political tool for Turkey to obtain its goal of annexation and thus legalizing its interference in the “new state of affairs”. In this regard, beyond the legal aspect of this issue, a geopolitical one exists. Accordingly, the Turkish plan is to legalize the de facto illegal annexation. It is evident that the Turkish side led the negotiations, either with or without the finding of a solution, to its own strategic end. In rational, Turkey wishes to achieve its strategic goals in the frame of the solution to the Cyprus problem because this is the best way to legalize the illegal fait accompli established in 1974. If the legal issues concerning gas and oil (which means the delineation of the continental shelf and that of the EEZ) are not settled in the context of the solution, the Cyprus issue will get into a new phaseTurkey will not allow the exploitation of Cypriot gas unless a new delineation of the EE Zones is to be signed between Turkey itself, Cyprus and Egypt. On April 28, 2016, the Permanent Representative of Turkey in the UN, Halit Çevik sent a letter to the UN General Secretary, maintaining among others the following: “Accordingly, Turkey, in written form, raised her objections to and her non recognition of the agreement between the Greek Cypriot Administration and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the “delimitation of the exclusive economic zone” of 17 February 2003. I would like to reiterate that several of the so-called hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licence areas declared by the Greek Cypriots partly remain within

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

119

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

Turkey’s continental shelf. I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that, in the latest round of the “international tender” mentioned in the aforementioned letter, one of the tendered areas lies directly on the Turkish continental shelf”(UN General Assembly, 2016) Ankara has no scruple to use its military fleet and air forces if its national interests are not served in line with its revisionist policy. Compared to the issue of the Aegean Sea, the new phase of the Cyprus problem will be much easier to be managed by Turkey. This view is founded on the new structure of the federal system, which might be established in Cyprus. In this regard, Turkey will use the Turkish Cypriots and the federal institutions to serve its interests. Military strength is a factor through which a national policy is applied particularly when a new political system, like the one which is planned to be established in Cyprus, has no army. Such a political system cannot respond to the main missions that a state has to accomplish in terms of national sovereignty. The two main missions of a state are to offer protection to its citizens within its territory and to defend its national boarders from external threats. The capability of a state to exercise its sovereignty depends on the degree of its power, mainly the military one. Certainly, one may allege that a United Federal Cyprus will be a member state of the EU and thereby security has much more chances to be consolidated. However, although the Republic of Cyprus is already a member state of the EU, when the Turkish warships sailed in the Cypriot EEZ and threatened to cause a crisis, the EU issued a number of conclusions and resolutions (Joint Motion For Resolution, 214; European Council, 2014; European Council, 2014a) supporting the Republic of Cyprus but no concrete measures had been taken against Turkey. The truth is that no measures had been taken, not only because of the tolerance that the EU showed, but also due to the policy of appeasement followed by the Cyprus government; a policy which does not intend to cause cost to Turkey, albeit the declaration issued on September 21, 2005, which flatly states that the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, is a precondition for the Turkish accession to the EU (Declaration by the European Community and its Member State, 2005, Council of the European Union, 2016). If this statement, which is an integral part of the acquis communautaire, was the basis for the solution of the Cyprus issue, the content of the settlement would be extremely deferent compared to the one being in configuration. This is a policy falling into the concept of appeasement and cannot produce positive results as no change has been recorded throughout the last years or the last period regarding the Turkish policy. In the current

120

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Turkish claims on the EEZ around Cyprus

This is a map showing how Turkey and Turkish Cypriot concept the distribution and the structure of plots around Cyprus EEZ

This is a map which illustrates the trisection of the Cypriot EEZ and how Ankara aims to turn the maritime region from Marmaris to Iskenderun into a Turkish lake. Source:theoptimisticconservati ve (http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/)

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

121

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

era, the situation might be more complicated compared to the past, as the US policy does not exclude the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region in Syria in the view of a federal solution4. Thus, Cyprus is likely to be the return to Turkey in order to accept the “new state of affairs” in Syria. This is a scenario which cannot be ignored. It is also related to the permanent Turkish claim in the Aegean Sea. President Erdogan repeatedly stated that he does not recognize the Treaty of Lausanne upon which the boarders between Greece and Turkey had been defined (ekathimerini.com, 2016; Jones, 2016). As already underlined, the Turkish revisionist policy extends from the Balkan Peninsula to the Middle East. In the context of this policy, Turkey has de facto trisected the Cypriot EEZ among itself, the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and the areas which are under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish expectation is to legalize such an illegal status quo through a “new state of affairs” – which is depicted in a federal political system- and thus to take a leap with regard to its revisionist policy. Turkey has the power, and if Cyprus continuous the policy of appeasement, the geopolitical environment will be in favor of Turkish strategic goals. Since Cyprus did not achieve to construct coalitions and preventive strategy, Turkey imposes its political will either with the use of force or with the shadow of its strength. This means that the Cypriots are to be adapted and aligned with the Turkish national interests which could be served and legalized through the federal institutions where a condominium will exist among the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of the political equality stemming from the legal concept of the two Constituent States of equal status. An additional step which is to be taken by Turkey in order to achieve its national goals, is the construction of gas pipeline connecting the Cypriot with the Turkish coasts. In this case, the advantage does not belong to those who control the energy valve, but to those who have the power.

4. Pillars of gas control Taking into consideration what mentioned above, we underline the following: Who has the military strength has the upper hand and the advantage to be the master of the energy game. The case of Cyprus is similar to, but not the same with that of Ukraine. The actors of these two cases have deferent and, at the same time, similar roles. The Russian role is similar to that of Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey 4

There are three Kurdish cantos (Afrin, Jazira, Kobani) within Syria across the boarders with Iraq. The territorial and administrative connection of these cantos is the basis upon which a Kurdish autonomous entity in the context of a federal system.

122

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

possesses military power, albeit Cyprus will be the country, which will legally control the valve of gas supply. On the contrary, regarding the Ukrainian case, Russia has both the control over the tap and the military power. At this point, we should underline the following: 1 The central federal government, where the energy competences will belong to (Anastasiades 2014), will consist of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in terms of an equal sharing of the constitutional power. In this regard, how difficult will be for the Turkish government to exploit the Turkish Cypriots legal power and thus to block any decision might be not in line with or against its interests? 2. As long as Turkey has military power and Cyprus has not reliable military forces and preventive strategy, Ankara will be in a position to impose its political will. Under these conditions, what the reaction of the Federal Cyprus might be if new threats might be launched by Turkey? To make a war? This is out of question. Without power, a state cannot accomplish its missions and effectively exercise its sovereignty. It is doomed to be a protectorate political system. In this regard, these are the outcomes that might occur: A. Turkey will control the exploitation of gas resources lying in the Cypriot EEZ. B. Cyprus will not effectively exploit its resources unless Turkish Forces allow it. This scenario should be seen through the lens of the Turkish interests but, at the same time, we should take into consideration the interests of the multinational companies and those interests of other states which are involved in the exploitation of Cypriot gas resources. One should also analyze the policies of other countries of the region such as Israel in terms of interests and whether such interests are at stake, and to what extent, due to the Turkish policy. The same applies for the Great Powers of which the interests are served in the region. In this regard, stability is of utmost importance for the service of their interests. However, international practice teaches that even the Great Powers cannot have an absolute control on the regional, let alone on the global system. This is a view which reflects in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria where the US as the most dominant power, acting in the context of a multipolar system, failed to successfully end the conflicts yet. Thus, it does not achieve to consolidate stability and peace. By definition, it is not certain whether other Regional and Global Powers will come to support and protect a tiny state such as Cyprus. Besides, they did not do it in 1974 when Turkey invaded the island. The Security Council of the UN did not put in force Chapter 7 (VII) of the UN Charter (United Nations, 2016), which provides for a number of measures such as economic and non flight zones, even the use of military operations, as it occurred in the case of Kuwait War (Gulf War) in 1991 (UN SC Resolution 678, 1990). At that time, the relevant argument proCyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

123

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

vided by the Great Powers was that international stability and peace were under threat. As no concrete and written legal criteria in detail have been defined and required to be met, the decision on the level of the UN Security Council are made on the basis of political criteria which are formulated by the national and strategic interests of the five permanent members states (the US, Russia, China, the Great Britain and France). These political criteria are legalized through the decisions of the Security Council. Great powers, usually evoke the democratic and ethical principles that states and civilized society should respect. This is a political practice purporting to project the moral character of their decisions in terms of “missionary diplomacy”. Thus, the UN, and particularly the Security Council, are not a legal organization and institution of global governance, but the mirror of the victorious powers stemming from the ruins and ashes of the devastating Second World War. Given that, the international system has an anarchic character, and therefore states should be in a position to defend themselves on their own (Self-defense article 51 of the UN Charter, see United Nations, 2016) or in the frame of alliances. In other words, if a state wants to be respectable, it should firstly construct its own defensive system and then to go through by establishing coalitions in term of preventive strategy. This is a strategic practice that particularly the states, which are under threat, should follow and thereby formulating coalitions in line with the classical realistic tenet which says: the enemy of my enemy is my fried. This is one of the steps that a state should take in order to establish a coalition. This is a tenet depending on the conflicting and convergent national interests of the countries involved. Accordingly, the other step is that of common interests. This is why there is a fruitful ground for the establishment of a coalition between Cyprus and Israel. Firstly, as Israel is surrounded by Arab and Muslim states, it has no strategic depth and Cyprus constitutes the only way out for the Israelis. In this context, Turkey attempts to consolidate itself as a regional power and thus its strategic goals are in contrast to those of Israel. Secondly, Cyprus and Israel have common interests in the field of energy. Thus, Israel is like a shelter for Cyprus, which is the strategic outlet of Israel, while both countries face the Turkish threat. Such a strategic coalition could increase the degree of stability and peace in the regional system and furthermore it could manage the Turkish threat, which is fueled by the lack of a Cypriot and Greek reliable preventive strategy as well as by the policy of appeasement. This is an option which is too late to be realized as the ongoing negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus issue are running their last stage. Accordingly, a strategic coalition between Cyprus and Israel might emerge again on the surface of the geopolitical 124

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

landscape either if the ongoing negotiations come to a wreck or if the result of the referenda will be negative. In the view of the solution of the Cyprus problem, the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias publicly stated that his country proposes a “Pact of Friendship” between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey as a return to the void of the Treaty of Guarantors (Kotzias, 2016). Such a “Pact of Friendship” could be viable and functional if a balance of power and strong common interests could be consolidated among the parties involved. However, there is another factor, which affects the viability of the solution and a likely “Pact of Friendship”. This is the Turkish revisionist policy. So far, no sign exists that Ankara intends to alter its policy. On the contrary, on September 16, 2016 Tayyip Erdogan publicly questioned the Treaty of Lausanne (ekathimerini.com, 2016). This imperialistic policy is fuelled by the Turkish military strength and the Greek military weakness. Besides , we should not ignore history. Those who ignore history are doomed to be punished. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact signed on August 3, 1939 and the German – Soviet Commercial Agreement did not prevent Hitler from attacking. The Soviets leadership did the same mistake as the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier and his British counterpart, Neville Chamberlain did before Nazi invaded of Czechoslovakia in 1939. On September 30, 1938, the two leaders, Daladier and Chamberlain, signed the Munich Pact in an effort to appease Germany. However, neither the Russians nor the French and the British read Hitler’s policy or they did not want to believe what the Germans obviously intended to do. They convinced themselves that the reality was not the one which was clearly risen before them - having the phase of the Nazi war machine- but other that they wished to be and bear in mind. This is a wishful thinking, an illusion.

5. Conclusion The establishment of a federal system in Cyprus does not unmake the existing fait accompli created by the Turkish troops in 1974. On the contrary, it would be an ideal political system for Turkey to annex the northern part of Cyprus Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

125

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

and control the entire political system through the federal institutions and the constitutional privileges that the Turkish Cypriots will have on the basis of condominium. The territorial proximity is one of the main geopolitical and geostrategic parameters which is in favor of Turkey. When such a parameter is combined with military forces, we have a status quo through which Turkey has the opportunity to absolute power. Certainly, there are other parameters, which have been analyzed in this article such as water, electricity, telecommunication and banking sector. They play a catalytic role to the Turkish policy aiming at annexing Cyprus, irrespective of whether a solution to the problem results. All these sectors are under the absolute control and command of the Turkish government. These are the main strategic sectors of a state and therefore: who controls these strategic areas can control the “Turkish Cypriot Constituent State” and thereby the whole federal system with the shadow of its military strength, which is a permanent threat looming over Cyprus. As Turkey will be in a position to control the new Cypriot federal political system, the solution cannot be viable unless: 1) Ankara takes over the exploitation of Cyprus gas recourses either on its own or in cooperation with other actors which have interests to serve. 2) All the legal issues raised by Turkey regarding the continental shelf and the EEZ to be resolved before the settlement of the Cyprus problem comes into force. If these issues are left to be solved after the settlement, the Cyprus problem will get into a new phase, which might be very similar to the model of the Aegean Sea. Without military forces, and functioning in the frame of a federal system - where the Turkish Cypriots will enjoy a legal status of political equality in terms of condominium - Cyprus could not exploit its gas resources unless Turkey allows it to do so under the following condition: any exploitation should be in line with and not against the Turkish national interests. In light of these conditions, the best case scenario will be the one in which the exploitation of Cypriot gas resources will freeze, like the model imposed by Turkey in the Aegean Sea. The worst one is that in which Turkey will implement the gunboat diplomacy causing even a crisis. And thus, the settlement of a frozen conflict will turn into a “warm zone” and source of disputes, frictions and instability, threatening, at the same time, the regional peace. The other option that Cyprus has is to be fully adapted with the Turkish policy and strategy becoming in fact a protectorate political system in terms of finlandazation. No optimist scenario and outcome can befall unless in the context of a solution based on the values and principles of the EU without derogations. Besides, it is obvious that any derogation from the EU values and

126

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

principles will be used by Turkey in order to legalize the illegal dichotomous fait accompli created by its troops in 1974. An alternative strategy might be adopted and put in practice if the ongoing negotiations fails or if the result of the referenda will be negative. Such a new strategy should be built on the basis of deterrence and not on that of appeasement (Charalambides, 2011 pp 562-588). This might be the last effort for survival, albeit one should never say never. As the ancients Latins used to say: Dum Spiro Spero.

Bibliography •

Anastasiades, 2014, First the solution and then the management, Kathimerini, interview – Adelinis L, November 30, viewed: November 28, 2016, http://www. kathimerini.gr/793950/article/proswpa/synentey3eis/n-anastasiadhs-prwta-hlysh-toy-kypriakoy-meta-h-syndiaxeirish

•

Central Intelligent Services, 2014, published 5 December 2013. Retrieved 7 January, 2014, viewed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_ Agency

•

Charalambides Y, 2011, Cyprus: Diplomatic Plots, Strategic Deficit and options, Piotita, Athens

•

European Council, 2014, Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, General Affairs Council meeting

•

Brussels, 16 December 2014, viewed: November 22, 2016, http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/404-page-not-found/?aspxerrorpath=/.../downloadasset.aspx

•

European Council 2014a, EUCO 169/14, CO EUR 13 CONCL 5, October 24, viewed: December 1, 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST169-2014-INIT/en/pdf

•

Daily Sabah, 2015, Turkey wraps up landmark project for Cyprus water pipeline, August 7, Viewed: November 21, 2016, http://www.dailysabah.com/ nation/2015/08/08/turkey-wraps-up-landmark-project-for-cyprus-water-pipeline

•

Daily Sabah, 2016, Turkey-Cyprus to sign undersea electricity deal, October 9, Viewed: November 23, 2016, http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/10/10/ turkey-cyprus-to-sign-undersea-electricity-deal

•

Daljecom 2009, OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION, Cyprus To Continue Oil Search Despite Turkey, June 10, viewed 14 April 2011,http://dalje.com/en-world/ cyprus-to-continue-oil-search-despite-turkey/264417

•

Daloglou T, 2013, Greece Considers Exclusive Zone in Offshore Gas Fields, ALMONITOR, January 9, 2013, viewed: November 23, 2016, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/greece-eez-turkey-natural-gas.html

•

Declaration by the European Community and its Member States, 2005, C/05/243 Brussels, 21 September 2005, 12541/05 (Presse 243), viewed: November 21, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dtr20051123_13/d-tr20051123_13en.pdt Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

127

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

•

De Chatel F, 2003, Turkish Water Project: Curse or Blessing?,onislam, Viewed August 12, 2014, http://www.onislam.net/english/health-and science/ nature/443794.html

•

Deed A, 2016, Operation ‘Euphrates Shield’ ends ISIL rule in Jarablus, Al Jazeera, August 26, viewed: November 14, 2016: http://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/inpictures/2016/08/operation-euphrates-shield-ends-isil-rulejarablus-160825085704650.html

•

Defense Update, 2014, The Ukrainian crisis – a cyber warfare battlefield, Dombeyian-crisis-cyber-warfare-battlefield.html#.VduPdiXtmko

•

Ekathimerini.com, 2016, Erdogan disputes Treaty of Lausanne, prompting response from Athens, September 29, viewed: November 23, 2016, http://www. ekathimerini.com/212433/article/ekathimerini/news/erdogan-disputes-treaty-oflausanne-prompting-response-from-athens

•

ESI (European Stability Initiative) 2010, Multikulti and the Turkish Balkan, September 4, 2010, viewed: December: 11, 2014, http://www.esiweb.org/ rumeliobserver/2010/12/04/multikulti-and-the-future-of-turkish-balkan-policy/

•

Georgiades Ch, 2016, “Far West”, the Banks in the occupied Cyprus, Capitalauto, January 13, Viewed: November 23, 2016, http://capital.sigmalive.com/ auto/12641261/upoik-san-agria-dusi-oi-trapezes-sta-katexomena

•

Government House Cyprus, 1956, Top Secret, X123, A Memorandum on Possible Schemes for the Partition of Cyprus, Secretariat, Nicosia, 10 Novembre

•

GFP, 2016, Turkey, viewed: November 10, 2016: http://www.globalfirepower. com/

•

Joint Declaration, Anastasiades -Eroglu, 11 February 2016, viewed: November 22, 20016, http://www.foreignaffairs.gr/pdf-files/Joint-Declaration.pdf

•

Joint Motion For Resolution, 2014, European Parliament resolution on Turkish actions creating tensions in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus (2014/2921(RSP), November 10, viewed: November 21, 2016, http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P8-RC2014-0211&language=EN

•

Jones D, 2016, Turkey Questions Historical Treaty Defining Regional Borders, Middle East, October 12, viewed: November 12, 2016, http://www.voanews. com/a/turkey-erdogan-treaty-of-lausanne-borders/3547651.html

•

Hadzikostis M, 2014, Cyprus water plan: Peace pipeline or Trojan Horse? The Times of Israel, March 1, viewed: http://www.timesofisrael.com/cyprus-waterplan-peace-pipeline-or-trojan-horse/

•

Hurriet Turkish Daily News, 2013a, Russia not to ‘risk’ Turkey for Cyprus, April 20, viewed: August 12, 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-not-torisk-turkey-for-cyprus.aspx?pageID=238&nID=45295&NewsCatID=344

128

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

•

Inan Y, 1998, The Aegean Islands and their legal status, Hurriet Turkish Daily News, July, 30, viewed: November 12, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/the-aegean-islands-and-their-legal-status.aspx?pageID=438&n=the-aegeanislands-and-their-legal-status-1998-07-30

•

Ioannides N, 2015, Cyprus Gas Resources and Geopolitical Games, Eurodialogue Volume 4, Published by Ledra College, VUZF University and European Rim an Investment Council (ERPIC)

•

Kavkalias G, 2016, Trade and Tourism in the menu of the Treaties, Sigmalive, October 5, viewed: November 23, 2016, http://www.sigmalive.com/news/ kypriako/368595/emporio-kai-tourismos-sto-menou-ton-diethnon-symfonion

•

Kelley M, 2013, The Stuxnet Attack On Iran’s Nuclear Plant Was ‘Far More Dangerous’ Than Previously Thought, Business Insider – Military & Defense, November 20, viewed November 12, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/ stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11. Kerry J, 2016, Turkey coup could threaten country’s Nato membership, John Kerry suggests, Independent, July 18, viewed: November 18, 2016, http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-could-threaten-countrys-natomembership-john-kerry-warns-a7142491.html

•

Kotzias N, 2016, Withdraw of Military Forces for the Solution, AlphaRadio, the statements of N. Kotzias are cited in NewsBomb, November 27, viewed: November 28, 2016, http://www.newsbomb.gr/ellada/ethnika/story/749359/ kotzias-apoxorisi-ton-toyrkikon-strateymaton-gia-lysi-sto-kypriako

•

LNG World News, 2011, Noble Energy says could deliver Gas in Cyprus by 2014, June 24, viewed: November 14, 2016, http://www.lngworldnews.com/nobleenergy-says-could-deliver-gas-to-cyprus-by-2014/

•

Noble Energy, 2011, Eastern Mediterranean, viewed: 23 November 2016, http:// www.nobleenergyinc.com/fw/main/Eastern-Mediterranean-128.html

•

Pipes D, 2012, Kastelorizo: Mediterranean Flashpoint? THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA, An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis Volume XIV, Issue # 27, February 7, 2012 Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., Editor, Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles Ensures a Nation’s Strength, Progress, & Prosperity, viewed: November 25, 2016, http://www.proconservative.net/PCVol14Is027PipesKastelorizo.shtml

•

Phileleftheros, 2015, Inauguration of a Pipeline from Turkey: Akinci spoke about the “water of peace”, October 17, viewed: November 24, 2016, http://www. philenews.com/el-gr/eidiseis-politiki/39/281749/egkainia-agogou-apo-tourkiagia-nero-eirinis-milise-o-akintzi-eikones

•

Power -technology.com, 2016, Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, Mersin, Turkey, viewed: November 21, 2016, http://www.power-technology.com/projects/ akkuyu/

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

129

Does the Cyprus EEZ follow, the Model of the Aegean Sea?

•

Psyllides G, 2016, Akinci focuses on the regional benefits of Cyprus-Turkey gas pipeline, Cyprus Mail, October 10, viewed: November 21, 2016, cyprus-mail. com/2016/10/10/akinci-focuses-regional-benefits-cyprus-turkey-gas-pipeline

•

Republic OF Turkey, Ministry OF Foreign Affairs, 2011, No: 216, 21 September 2011, Press Statement On The Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Turkey And The TRNC, September 11, viewed: November 11, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_-press-statement-on-thecontinental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-signed-between-turkey-and-the-trnc. en.mfa

•

Republic OF Turkey, Minister OF Foreign Affairs, 2016, Background Note on Aegean Disputes, Turkey’s General Approach, viewed: November, 23, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa

•

Reuters 2011, Cyprus to offer 12 blocks for gas/oil search, Noble (NBL.N) has to drill by 2013, Estimates of 10 tcf in one block, 10 January, viewed: November 18, 2016, “http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/10/cyprus-energy-explorationidUSLDE7091ES20110110

•

Sengul E, 2016, Turkey, TRNC sign landmark energy deal, AA Anadolu Post, October 11, viewed: November 23, 2016, http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkeytrnc-sign-landmark-energy-deal/662870

•

Shemer N, 2011, UBS says it’s gung hot on Israeli gas, The Jerusalem Post, April 4, viewed: November 18 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Business/BusinessNews/ Article.aspx?id=215318

•

TPAO Activities, 2011, viewed: November 24, 2016, http://www.tpao.gov.tr/ tpfiles/userfiles/files/2011_activities.pdf

•

UN SC Resolution, 1990, Security Council, November 30, viewed: November 23, 2016, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm

•

United Nations, 2016, Self-Defense article 51 of the UN Charter, Chapter VI, viewed: November 27, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chaptervii/

•

UN General Assembly, 2016, Letter dated 28 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, General Assemble, Seventieth session, Agenda items 44 and 79 (a) Question of Cyprus, Oceans and the law of the sea: oceans and the law of the sea, Viewed: November 14, 2016, http://www.un.org/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/855

•

Worldometers, 2016, Turkey Population, viewed: October 29, 2016: http://www. worldometers.info/world-population/turkey-population/

•

World Nuclear Association, 2016, Nuclear Power in Turkey, update, 2016, viewed: November 12, 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/ country-profiles/countries-t-z/turkey.aspx

130

YIANNOS CHARALAMBIDES

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

A GEOPOLITICAL COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN KIRKUK AND THE CYPRUS POLITICO – ECONOMIC PROSPECTS Pavlos VOSKOU*

1. Introduction: Proposing the Comparison Last decade, Cyprus, and other states in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea are exploring and developing their offshore hydrocarbon energy resources. Hydrocarbons turn to be sometimes a conflicting and sometimes a co-operative variable between states in the region. In terms of the relevant principles of maritime law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, each state has the lawful right to exercise its rights in its own exclusive economic zone. However, oil and gas energy resources as a potential factor that can promote national interest and upgrade state capabilities through wealth and geopolitics turned to be the apple of discord between regional powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Every state struggles to play its role gaining power and wealth. Either through the possession and distribution of oil and gas revenues or by being part in the exploration and transition process of oil and gas. Coalitions are formed in the region in a strict count and focus based on the interest of absolute and relative gains. In addition, the Eastern Mediterranean region attracts global powers like the US and Russia, to participate among ongoing procedures of exploration and game power having in their agenda over which state must have or not the politico – economic gains from the exploration. Energy is interrelated with vital aspects of Cyprus as well as for other states in the region, meaning economics, politics, geostrategic, viability on national security issues, recognition on seigniorage and many others (Kasinis 2015, p.54). Turkey strives to emerge as a regional military and economic power by invigorating regionally its energy role whereas Israel, the current regional power, sees any control of the area by other regional powers as matters of struggle for survival and national security. Current Cyprus oil and gas politico – economic prospects – problems, have many similarities with the oil and gas rich Kirkuk city’s politico – economic issues after the US invasion in 2003. The Kurds of Iraq, Bagdad, Turkey, and other regional and global powers have been interacting to *

Artillery Captain/National Guard of Cyprus

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

131

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

manage and impose their interest. The future of Kirkuk for each player have been issued as a matter of survival, domination, and security for the future. This essay’s purpose is to compare the two issues and propose based on the case study of Kirkuk - KRG, and Ankara’s foreign policy, issues of concern for the Cyprus politico – economical oil and gas prospects.

2. Politico Economic Clashes in Kirkuk – KRG and Baghdad After US Invasion in 2003 Levels of Analysis Political competitions – struggles are composing the multiple separable but related levels of analysis for the future of Kirkuk. At local level, it is the struggle among the rival ethnicities to control the city. Kurds want to strengthen their de facto dominance whereas, Turkmen and Arabs to block and change Kurdish control. At national level, it is the struggle between Kurdish Front (KDP and PUK) and Arab leaders for the integration of Kirkuk into KRG or not. The Kurds efforts were through constitutional mechanism and Arabs against by delaying and obstructing the process. At regional level, the two Kurdish parties PUK and KDP have put the between them disagreements aside and struggle together for their national primary cause, incorporating Kirkuk. Possible failure might raise tension between them as well as in case of success when their fragile balance of power could be disturbed. At the international level, the struggle for Kirkuk has compelled states with restive Kurdish population to participate negatively in the process for resolving disputed places. Turkey’s, Syria’s and Iran’s efforts were to obstruct Kurdish ambitions for autonomy in Northern Iraq (Anderson & Stansfield, 2009, p.95-96). The disquieting is that at all levels the struggles it has become a zero-sum game. Energy aspect The other crucial issue that KRG and Iraqi government struggle, which concerns directly Kirkuk city, is the distribution of oil and gas revenues and the management of new oil – gas fields in regions and governorates. Articles 111 – 112 of the constitution despite the fact that their provisions said that present field of oil – gas owned to the people of Iraq and federal government must provide fair distribution of revenues, KRG completed its own regional oil – gas investment law. Moreover, KRG authorized new production and sharing agreements with several international companies in new fields like Twake, operated by Norway’s

132

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

DNO International, and Taq Taq, where Addax Petroleum runs a joint business enterprise with Turkey’s Genel Enerjil. The clashes and controversy between regional and central government arise because KRG demands regional autonomy and management in oil and revenue decision making for the future oil and gas fields within the region, while the central government through oil ministry the authority previews and approves present and future contacts in Iraq. The ambiguities in the relation between the federal and regional governments with respect to future oil and gas fields in article 112, plus the powers of regions and governorates, articles 115, 112, 114 and 110, in combination with article 121 referring to a contradiction between regional and national legislation gives the predominance, when applied in the region, for oil and gas legislation to regions (Anderson & Stansfield, 2009, p.224). In addition to these ambiguities and other disorder problems the constitution has, the UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) commentary on the Constitutional Review Committee’s Draft Report found the proposed amendments a major breakthrough for functional Iraq state (UNAMI). Both are aware that power lies where control of the money is held. The exportation however of oil and gas through the pipe lines needs the authority of the oil ministry. The clash until June 2014 was greater and raised a series of violence in case of annexing Kirkuk, one of the oil – gas richest field of the country, by KRG. The ambiguity up to 2011 was that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Shi a generally needed Kurds in parliament to hold the majority over Sunnis, therefore approved article 140, whereas later most Shi a politicians attempted to delay and ignore the Kurds towards the specific article (Mazeel, 2010, pp.74-75). The position of Baghdad has weakened as it loses territory. Firstly, they cannot control most of the Sunni areas without cooperating with the Kurds. Therefore, the United States realizes that the Kurds are necessary to keep Iraq together and to fight ISIS. Secondly, which is and the main advantage over Baghdad, Kirkuk’s oil can now only be exported through KRG to Turkey. Ceyhan pipeline has been damaged and cannot be repaired because it passes through ISIS controlled areas. The Iraqi Kurds have managed through the proper geostrategic means to achieve their geopolitics on energy (oil and gas) in the area. They are the key players between conflicting interest in mutual gains among two regional players, Turkey and Bagdad needs for Kirkuk’s oil keep flowing. The situation and the uncompromising mentality of the Iraqi government could lead the Kurds to break away from Iraq if they are able to get support from Turkey. Kurdish borders are now

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

133

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

clearly demarcated and they are likely to benefit from controlling Kirkuk’s oil resources (Van Wilgenburg, June 26, 2014). System of Governance As for the most prominent system of governance that the constitution promotes is a federal Iraq. However, the difficult part is the kind of federation and the level of central governments’ centrality (Wanche, 2005, p.187). Confederation raises fears for secession whereas federation needs defined relation between central government and regional government, since ethnic federations run the risk to civil war (Eland, 2009, p.47). The relation between each political solution for the future of Iraq and KRG is closely related with the future of Kirkuk.

3. Under What Status Kirkuk Serves Turkey’s Agenda and How Turkey changed its Attitude towards Iraqi Kurds Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy influences Iraqi state directly. Security, economic interdependence, cultural coexistence, plurality and finally dialogue as a means of solving disputes are the four principles that Turkey rests to further establish its position in the Middle East (Davutoglu, 2008, p.84-85). Iraq as a neighbor state with a new order and an unshaped federalism yet, attracts the influence of the neighboring states. PKK bases in Quandil Mountains inside KRG in Northern Iraq, the upgraded role of KRG in Iraq as well as Turkey’s role as an emerging regional power in the Middle East has complicated politically, economically and militarily Turkey’s investment and actions. In order to be able to analyze how Turkish prospects and interest shape, press and influence Kirkuk issues, this essay must first understand and review the environment and the players that affect Turkish foreign policies and finally implement it. Turkey, up to 1997 conducted almost freely cross–border operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq. However, the influence Turkey had gained up to that point was lost in March 2003 when Kurdish Peshmerga forces operated together under U.S. command in Iraq at the second front (ICG, 13 November 2008, p. 2). Turkish parliament rejection to the U.S. offered bill has showed to have several negative effects to Turkish policy towards Iraq. On the 9th of April 2003 PUK Peshmerga entered Kirkuk unilaterally and in force. Despite Turkish red line for military response in case of unilateral entering and action by Peshmerga in Kirkuk, Turkey did nothing and lost its credibility of any future threats. This political decision cost Turkey because it marginalized itself for debate of 134

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

the city’s future and lost intimidation as a weapon to influence events in Kirkuk in an early stage (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009, p.90-94). Moreover, Turkey’s efforts to contain PKK in Northern Iraq through cross-border operations lost and PKK gained additional freedom of movement. Lastly, it deteriorated its bilateral relations with the U.S. As a result, two years later, they could not prevent the transformation from a unitary to a federal Iraqi state and the establishment of autonomy KRG from central government (ICG. 13 November 2008, p.2). The new constitution created a federation state (McGarry & O Leary, 2007, p.16). On the other hand, Iraqi Kurds became U.S. trusted ally and had the most powerful ally in the world (O Leary et al., 2005, p.225). Turkey remained with the option of bargaining for Kirkuk Turkmen in order to advance Turkish interest against Kurdish ambitions ((Anderson & Stansfield, 2009, p. 94). After 2005 elections and the failure of Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) in Kirkuk to attract voters, the success of Kurdish parties made Turkey understand that it was isolated from Iraqi’s developing politics. Turkey realized the difficult situation and the need to shift its course thereforetherefore, reappraise its strategic posture in Northern Iraq (Anderson & Stansfield, 2009, p.126). In 2007, Turkey’s foreign policy in Iraq concentrated on two pillars. Firstly, the rising PKK organization in Kurdish region and the PKK enclaves that were becoming their bases located in North Iraq. Secondly, to postpone the article 140 and lay the ground for a possible compromise locating Kirkuk outside Kurdish region. According to Davutoglu the aims of increasing violence from PKK were to bring Turkey against Iraq – U.S. and Arab world ensuring their isolation. Hoping for Turkish military response in Northern Iraq, KRG would have succeeded bringing Turkey into confrontation with the international community and earning a freer hand in Kirkuk (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.2). However, AKR managed to reverse isolation with the use of “soft and military power … enjoyed in coherence” (Davutoglu, 2008, pp.86-87) were the means that Turkey used to reverse the awkward political situation. Therefore, Turkey with its diplomatic, military and economic strategies managed to promote its interest. The two aims PKK and Kirkuk managed to be separated. After contained PKK, Turkey tried to confront and avoid Iraq’s disintegration. Kirkuk was the key city in order to implement its new strategy of a unified Iraq. A unified Iraq is serving its task of cementing Kurdish region into Iraq. The city’s

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

135

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

plurality and cultural coexistence is essential for Turkey to maintain, in order to establish order in the Middle East (Davutoglu, 2008, p. 85). Kirkuk is a fertile ethnic city like Iraq and a solution of peaceful coexistence and tolerance it would give hopes for peaceful solution among the Iraqi communities as well. It was examined before how Turkey would succeed its objectives, thus must be analyzed why Turkey has been striving against the disintegration of Iraq. According to ex foreign minister Davutoglu, Turkey prefers a unified Iraq to maintain its balancing role instead of falling into chaos because of consecutive surges that want to destabilize the country and its borders (Davutoglu, 2008, p.85). Ankara objects the federal structure of Iraq and is afraid of the possibility of becoming a loose confederation based on ethnicity with a weak central government. Such an outcome would pave the way for Iraq disintegration especially if Kurds consider it as a step towards independence. Therefore, Turkey worries: Firstly, of Iraq’s de facto partition and establishment of a nine governorate Shiite region in the South, increasing Iranian influence. Secondly the increase Kurds tries to expand Kurdish region incorporating Kirkuk, this would lend to format secession, which might inflame Kurdish nationalist passions inside Turkey. However, it mainly depends on the type of the federal system it will take (ICG, 13 November. 2008, p.11). Although it is highly implausible to go on to independence. Kirkuk serves Turkey’s plans for a unified Iraq as a barrier to Kurdish ambitions for border expansion. In order to implement its goals and objectives regarding Kirkuk is taking several measures in a comprehensive long term planning. The main of them are: Diplomatic, Economic, Political and Energy Policies. Diplomatic Dimension Turkey managed to bring the regional players, U.S., EU and Iraqi government closer and reverse its own isolation. The major opponent to Ankara plans was KRG and its efforts to incorporate Kirkuk through article 140. As countermeasures Turkey recognized a central government in Bagdad. In 2007, president Maliki visited Turkey twice and Ali Babacan Foreign Minister visited Bagdad. Turkey’s Prime Minister and President had not met with KRG president Barzani, until March 2009 in a visit of Turkey’s president Abdullah Gul in Bagdad and after Barzani and Talabani confirmed that they opposed the idea of an independent Kurdish state (Hale, 2009, p.147). Before that no Kurdish official had met with Turkish officials in a high level meeting. Until now, Ankara did not use the term KRG but “local administration in the North”, because KRG had not declared

136

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

PKK as a terrorist organization and put an end to its operations in the North. Lastly, Turkey’s efforts to improve relations with Iraqi government in 2008, ended with the partnership agreement. In its principles support to Iraqi government in territorial integrity, Iraq’s independence, full sovereignty and national unity against threats are included. Moreover, respect of multi-cultural and multi-religious structure of Iraq, peaceful coexistence of all and respect of Iraqi identity. All these principles targeted to outline Kirkuk diversity and push it further away outside KRG (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.19). Economic Dimension AKR realized that the more economic dependent the KRG is on Turkey the more leverage Ankara would enjoy. Therefore, AKR has redoubled its efforts and strengthened its economic relations. Major measures are the trade that expanded to an average trade of $5 billion per year mainly on construction and contracting services in the Kurdish Region (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.13). KRG collects 10 million from the merchandise that crosses the Habur gate every year (Cagaptay, 2008, p.14). Habur is the only gate between Turkey and Iraq, so crossing through KRG is necessary (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.13). On the other hand, KRG realized the importance and the need to sustain and improve the economic relations with Turkey. As a land locked region, Turkey is the channel to global markets especially for Kurdish oil (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.13). The increasing economic ties with KRG are becoming more independent to Turkey, it creates a more stable Kurdish region. A stable Kurdish region will be a buffer zone between Turkey and theand the rest of Iraq in case of a descent again in clash of interest, having in mind in 2008 that U.S. withdrawal is close and Iraqi future is still uncertain with lot of ethnic competitors (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.21). Oil Policies Two Turkish oil exploration companies (Pet Oil and Genel Energi) have already signed contracts with KRG to develop and explore fields inside KRG. Investing in KRG the two companies are planning to stay for a very long period . An important strategic investor has a long arm in the region’s political decisions because of the huge financial benefits of the capital investments (ICG, 13 November 2008, p.14-15). Oil companies will bring more than only oil revenues and physical infrastructure. There would be investments on public infrastructure such as roads, waste systems and water. Except the financial prospective for the companies and the region from exploration, Turkey would benefit from pipe line revenues.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

137

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

However, the debate over the hydrocarbon law in Iraq, it serves Turkey politically but complicates oil companies and KRG. Since Iraq’s oil minister declared contracts null and void and blacklist those companies, KRG cannot explore oil even though KRG has passed its own hydrocarbon law, provided legally by constitution, Turkey decided to resist providing assistance on the energy sector and prohibited to explore oil through and to Turkey. Hydrocarbon law is vital for Turkey because it would give extended authorities to central government and ensure equitable revenues sharing. Therefore, KRG would be dependent and further cement into Iraq. Any efforts to incorporate Kirkuk into Kurdish region and aspirations to exploit oil in a seceded regional government would need a safe oil pipeline route through Turkey to Mediterranean facility port at Ceyhan. As a result, Turkey would be able to manipulate and pressure Kurdish regional Government in case of attempts to incorporate Kirkuk. Turkey on the other hand, can upgrade its role as a strategic hydrocarbon hub between Central Asia and Europe with its investments in Iraqi Kurdistan (ICG, 13 November 2008, pp.1415). In future plans, new projects, like the Genel’s Energy Company, is expected to reach by 2019 gas exports up to 10 bcm from 2 KRG’s natural gas fields to Turkey. Region with the entrance of others companies could reach up to 20 bcm gas exports to Turkey, of its 5 trillion cubic meters estimated natural gas. Political Dimension In order for Turkey to establish its position in the Middle East the fourth principle of their foreign policy rests on cultural coexistence and plurality. Kirkuk is one of them that has to maintain its composition in order to establish order in the governorate and the country (Davutoglu, 2008, p.85). This political choice of Turkey serves its interest in several ways. Firstly, it complicates the claim of Kirkuk from the Kurds and abandons their exclusive claims. Secondly, it will protect Kirkuk’s Turkomen ensuring their rights in the city. Thirdly, it will protect from Kurdish manipulation of city’s demography through the constitutional process called “Normalization”. This process serves the Kurds since it is designed to reverse Saddam’s Arabization program, meaning the return of the IDPs (Internal Displaced Persons) who the majority of them are Kurds in Kirkuk and the displaced of “waffadin” (newcomers Arabs). Despite Ankara’s position in the Middle East, they politically focused on cementing Kirkuk in Iraq by promoting their preferable political solution. They were pleased when the referendum provided by article 140, firstly postponed for six months and secondly the new deadline passed with an undefined new 138

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

date for fulfillment (ICG, 13 November 2008, pp.18-19). That allowed Turkey with other international powers to press for their proposed solution. Turkey sees as a possible outcome, an agreement to turn Kirkuk into a stand-alone federal region or a special status, solutions. This agreement could be ratified by a referendum, as constitutional article 140 requires, but it must be acceptable to all Iraqis (Anderson & Stansfield, 2009, pp.145-146). Therefore, Ankara proposed that UN should be involved and allow the entire Iraq population to vote on the future of Kirkuk. According to the constitution the determination of the will of the Kirkukis is not predetermined nor can it be determined by any negotiated settlement between the parties. Furthermore, Turkey proposed an equal power sharing arrangement (32% each the rest on minorities) between the three communities for an interim period until they can reach a final status agreement. Kirkuk standing alone region or special status governorate has been an objective that Turkey tries to achieve by several ways, in order to serve its broader goals of prohibiting a self-sufficient KRG and a unified Iraq. Until 2014, Kirkuk status under Bagdad rule even with Kurd-dominated provincial council serves Turkey’s agenda (ICG 13 November 2008, p.20). Ankara will continue being vigilant on Kirkuk future and alertness to combine the use of the above measures and in need to use threats and hard power to deal issues of national security. There has been a shift in their foreign policy on the way they have been approaching some issues but the objectives have remained the same. On the other hand, Turkey is a candidate member for EU accession. Respecting of Kurdish minorities rights in Turkey as well as non-foreign intervention in Northern Iraq are essential in order to meet Turkey EU accession standards. A democratic liberal reformed European Turkey ready for membership would be less likely to fear even an independent KRG (Gunter, 2005a, p.228), because if Turkey joins EU its membership would guarantee its territorial integrity (Gunter, 2005b, p.128). Turkey’s EU accession serves both Turkey and KRG politically and economically (Gunter, 2005a, p.227). Kurds however must proceed with prudence in their relations with Turkey because their U.S. ally left Iraq and Turkey remain next door.

4. Cyprus oil and gas politico-economic prospects U.S company Noble Energy International Ltd was the first company that signed in 2008 a Production Signing Agreement for Block 12 of the Cyprus EEZ. Since then according to Syliciotis, former Minister of Energy Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Nicosia “…had set as clear strategic objectives the safeguarding of

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

139

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

our energy self-sufficiency, the strengthening of the geostrategic role of Cyprus through the recording of the energy potential and the rational utilization of the energy raw materials and ultimately the transportation of our country into a regional energy center for the assembly, processing, passage and transportation of energy resources from the surrounding region to the EU and international markets …”.

The outcome after the three licensing rounds concerning proved reserves of oil and gas was the discovery of natural gas in Aphrodite Field in Block 12 by Noble Energy in 2011. After Nobles success in 2nd round in 2012, 33 applications from 15 consortia and giant companies from 14 countries had been received (url). Significant contracts after Noble’s were Italian-Korea consortium ENI - KOGAS for Blocks 2, 3 and 9 and with French company TOTAL for Blocks 10 and 11. Another important transition was the transfer of 30% of the rights of Noble Energy to Block 12 to the Israeli companies Delek and Anver. Levant Basin What reformed the energy outlook in the Eastern Mediterranean is the natural gas discoveries in the Levant Basin. Exploration successes in Israel and Cyprus, and to a lesser degree in the Palestinian Territories, have shown great offshore gas production in the Eastern Mediterranean. Noble Energy Company discoveries of the Noa field in 1999 and the Mari-B field in 2000, also discoveries in 2009 of Dalit and Tamar in 2010 the Leviathan and 2011 Aphrodite and Tannin con140

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

firmed estimated significant quantities of natural gas in the Levant Basin. Except the recoverable resources of natural gas oil is expected to be located as well in the discoverable fields. Lebanon and Palestine have territories with potential natural gas fields but not discoverable yet. Syria which possesses the largest proved reserves of crude oil among the Eastern Mediterranean countries, postponed its exploration due to the conflict between government and opposition forces, ISIS, and other terrorist’s groups destruction (U.S. EIA, 15 August 2013, p.5). Being the center of resent energy exploitation in the EM Levant Basin is estimated by the U.S. Geological Survey that has probable undiscovered oil resources, 1.7 billion barrels and probable undiscovered natural gas resources of 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf). If USGS estimates proved as region reserves that would increase the oil region’s proved reserves by approximately 70% and that of natural gas more than six times the region’s current proved reserves. These oil and gas estimations entails oil region’s demands for 20 years, while natural gas for almost indefinitely (U.S. EIA, 15 August 2013, pp.3-5).

Having to deal with these substantial discoveries of natural gas and the potential new discoveries of the estimated oil and gas region’s resources, Cyprus perspecCyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

141

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

tives upgraded obtaining a new EU and global role (Kasinis, 2015, p.49). So far, Cyprus signed trilateral agreements with Egypt and Greece and bilateral with Israel in the fields of energy, finance, security and others. Its first aspirations for building an LNG terminal on its Vasilikos coast abandoned temporary and the vision for transforming Cyprus into a regional center for the liquefaction and export of natural gas to world markets ended for the time. New energy plan adopted and turned Cyprus to regional markets like exporting Aphrodite field gas to Egypt (Kasinis, 2015, pp.48-50). That does not necessarily mean that Cyprus abandoned the vision of transforming Cyprus into a regional energy center, contributing with many ways to the region’s prosperity and strengthen the EU’s energy security. Eastern Mediterranean estimated natural gas resources could contribute to the establishment of one or more of the following: •

The creation of the South Eastern Mediterranean Natural gas corridor as a diversified energy corridor for the EU. Meaning the construction of an underwater pipeline linking Israel and Cyprus, natural gas toward EU (Greece and Italy LNG terminals).

•

A high voltage undersea electricity cable linking Israel. Greece and Cyprus and by Extension the EU (Euroasia interconnector).

•

The construction of an LNG facility in Cyprus or FLNG to serve region’s existing and new natural gas explorations. The risks of the viability of such high cost facilities as well as security consideration of the infrastructures are vital for Cyprus success. However, as mentioned above the project has not been adopted for the time.

•

Cyprus and Israel can export natural gas to Turkey via pipeline that would form the south corridor (Pelaghias, 2015, pp.74-75).

These options are not easily taken, but include deep strategic analysis in many sections, economic, political, strategic, and national security, such complex decisions must have in mind the regional and the international powers involvement. Small states like Cyprus have to engage in alliances of a win-win relation with common or serving regional and international power interests. Cyprus rational decision making and management on oil and gas as well as the need for strategic movements on geopolitical and economic challenges has to be analysed and taken in accordance with its 42 years’ political problem. In 1974 Turkish troops invaded Cyprus under the excuse of restoring the constitutional

142

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

order. After the collapse of Greek Junta, Turkish troops never restored the constitutional order as they said they do, but established the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), a “puppet state” in the North of Cyprus, since Ankara put forward its strategic plan, the establishment of a loose, as much as they will manage to succeed, federation or a confederation (Charalambides, 2014, pp.38-39). If they succeed so, they will legalize TRNC, the “fait accompli” created by the Turkish troops in 1974 and recognized only by them on 15th November 1983, contrary to the UN Security Council’s resolutions (541 and 550). The UN Security Council declares the TRNC not valid and not recognizable by the international community, based on article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter which clearly defines that no state, and authority can be recognized as a result of the use of force (UN Charter, 1945b, p.3). Turkish troops occupy forces, stationed in the north of the island in the so called TRNC. TRNC is under control of the Turkish troops, therefore the European Court of Justice and Human Rights issued a decision against Turkish government for the responsibility of the violation of property and human rights in the occupied part. Among others was the force by invading Turkish troops that used to coerce the lawful inhabitants of the Northern part of Cyprus (82% were Greek-Cypriots) to abandon their homelands. At the same time Turkey compelled the Turkish-Cypriots living peacefully in the southern part of the island to resettle in the northern part. Simultaneously, they transferred population from Turkish mainland to Cyprus, too (Charambides, 2011, pp.133). The current population living in the North is illegal and is considered a war crime named colonization, under the 4th Geneva Convention 1949. Therefore, many Turkish Cypriots and all Turkish settlers are not an indigenous population of the northern part of Cyprus and do not have the right of self-determination (Charalambides, 2014, pp. 40-41). Turkey, similarly to other cases, is taking several measures in a comprehensive long-term planning, in order to implement Nihat Erim’s strategic plan in Cyprus. For the last 60 years, Turkish governments follow without any variation the strategic plan and their political goals and objectives in Cyprus, as they had been set by Nihat Erim in his two reports in 1956. The dichotomises of Cyprus through the legalization of TRNC, and the continuous Turkey’s presence and control of Cyprus, because of security issues and its Middle East policy, are the main long term Turkey’s strategic pillars (Athanasiou, 30 Dec 2011). According to Charalambides, the Turkish strategy is composed by three stages in order

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

143

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

to attain its strategic goal in Cyprus. The first was the invasion and occupation by Turkish troops of Northern Cyprus. Secondly, the colonization of Northern Cyprus with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers. Lastly, the legalization of their fait accompli created “state” caused by Turkish Troops in 1974, with the Greek Cypriots accepted compromise solution in the frame of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal political system. If the two communities reach to an agreement based on the federal or confederal political system, then the unitary state of Cyprus will be turned into two “constituent states”. Turkey will manage to legalize its illegal actions and materialize its geopolitical and geostrategic national goals, after six decades of power game planning. Under such circumstances Turkish Cypriots could be easily seceded and recognized as an independent state, because of any type of crisis erupts, especially if it does not shove and meet Turkish interests. Turkish Cypriots under the excuse of a problematic federal political system could easily excuse the partition of Cyprus like in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, and others (Charalambides, 2014, pp. 42, 45). Recent reveals from Poliviou (member of the negotiation advisory group) considering documents and developments, concerning the ongoing negotiations in the area of federal governance, point out that in case the central government stalemates and collapses or does not operate it would dissolve in two autonomous administrations. Therefore, a way must be found to continuously function the state in case of deadlock, because it would be impossible to revert to the previous stage of affairs (Charalampous, 6 September 2016, p.2). Turkey’s main measures that has been using to implement its objectives are similar to those adopted in case of Kirkuk: Diplomatic, Political – Legal, Energy – Economic and Oil Policies. All of them are countermeasures against Greek Cypriots’ administration, recognised as the legitimate Republic of Cyprus having sovereignty over the entire Cyprus Island. They have never recognized them as representative of the Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus as a whole, either “de jure” nor “de facto”. As such, Greek Cypriots’ administration is not eligible to negotiate, conclude international agreements and approve laws for the exploitation of natural resources on behalf of the entire island. This is the main Turkey’s legal stance on which it builds its measures. “De facto” Cyprus is split into the North controlled by the TRNC (actually by Turkish troops) and the South controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.

144

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Diplomatic Dimension Since 1974, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots communities are in continuous negotiations. In every stage Turkey, in coordination with the Turkish Cypriot leader, demands more in its favour, accusing Greek Cypriots for any stalemate or rejections on proposed solutions, like in Anan plan. Implementing their above legal stance, Turkey’s officials have never accepted to meet with Cyprus’ president or any other official in Turkey or in any formal forum in the world. On the contrary, they have made several meetings with Turkish Cypriot leaders, attributing to them the privileges of the head of a state. Moreover, continuous efforts to upgrade the internationally unrecognised TRNC and downgrading the Republic of Cyprus in any ways are usual incidents. In the dinner hosted by Turkish president Recep Tayip Erdogan at the World Humanitarian Summit held in Constantinople for the head of the states and other officials, invited as well the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci. In addition to this, Turkey arranged a meeting between Secretary General Ban Ki Moun and Akinci. This unexpected show up, despite president Anastasiades’ warnings and UN assurances, prompted him to shun the event and leave Turkey (Cyprus Mail, 25 May 2016). Another example of Ankara’s pursue of its national interest is the EU – Turkey relations on which Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate for full membership since 1999. In 2005, Ankara issued a declaration in the signed protocol extending its custom union to the EU, that it did not mean recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, it refused to open its ports and airports to Cyprus. Turkey is so dedicated to its objectives that partly freezed its relations with EU for six months during the Cyprus presidency started in July 2012 (Nathanson & Levy, 2012, p.62). Until now Ankara has not fully implemented the Additional Protocol and the Association Agreement set out in the 2004 Ankara Protocol, which later included in the country’s negotiating framework for EU accession. As a result, 8 of the 35 chapters are currently blocked (Euractiv.com, 7 January 2016). According to the Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek, “the choice between the EU and Cyprus would always be to stand next to Turkish Cypriots” (Turkish Weekly, 16 November 2009).

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

145

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

Political Dimension As explained in previous paragraphs, after the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus and the establishment of TRNC, Turkey proceeded among others with political measures to legalize TRNC. The agreed compromise solution of bi-communal, bi-zonal federal political system is not a win – win situation. This federal political system has been created through years of negotiations and Cypriots concessions. As analysed this political system is fragile and dangerously destructive because of the possibility of secession. Having in mind the strategic pillars of Turkey in Cyprus, we can degrade Turkey’s political measures. Its strategic pillars are the dichotomises of Cyprus and the permanent Turkish present and control of Cyprus for security and Middle East policy reasons. In addition to this, the essay points out, that Turkey after 2003 (delimitation agreements between Cyprus – Egypt) intensified its actions promoting its interests in Cyprus. On the 2nd of March 2004, Turkey transmitted an information note to the UN Secretary General making clear that it does not recognise Cyprus – Egypt arrangements. Moreover, it declares its interest in respect of the continental shelf. Lastly, it mentioned again its non – recognition of the republic of Cyprus, using the term “Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus”. In addition to this, “Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus” does not represent the Cypriot people in its entirety, so it is not entitled to conclude international agreements on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots (Ioannides, 2014, pp.25-29). In 2005, Turkey issued another note verbale similar to its previous position, paraphrasing deliberately general principles of the International Law of the Sea (enclosed or semi closed sea) where state has to co-operate with each other in exercise of their rights. In 2007, after Cyprus – Lebanese delimitation agreement, Turkey transmitted again a letter to the UN on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot leader. It noted the particular treaty null and void, because the Republic of Cyprus does not represent the Turkish Cypriots. A similar letter was transmitted to the UN declaring their objection to Cyprus delimitating agreement of Cyprus with Israel (Ioannides, 2014, pp.25-29). In January 2011, Turkey changed its strategy and in another transmitted letter to the UN against Israeli Cyprus treaty, emphasizing that unilateral steps on behalf of the Greek Cypriots should be refrained. Such unilateral actions according to them are creating a fait accompli in the Eastern Mediterranean and consist a destabilizing factor. Therefore, it urged Greek Cypriots leadership to focus on the 146

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

negotiations process and the maritime boundary delimitating processes should be concluded after a solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus replied and found support from the EU Council concerning its sovereign rights on concluding agreements and its right on exploring and exploiting its natural resources (Ioannides, 2014, pp.25-29). Cyprus got the necessary support from the International Law and the EU acquis and managed to armour its sovereign rights. However, Turkey cleverly connected the rightful Republic of Cyprus sovereign rights on exploiting and exploring agreements with the holistic solution of the Cyprus political problem. Moreover, Greek Cypriots declared that revenues and benefits from Cyprus EEZ belong and would be distributed to all Cypriots. Turkey shows its intensions to resolve maritime disputes with political negotiations with neighbouring states whereas Greece considers them a legal nature so it requires a judicial solution in the Aegean. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot leader announced that this issue will be discussed in the third round of negotiations or at the end with the last amendments. Essays disagree and will be explained in the next points, comparing the clashes and controversies between regional and central government, in the case of KRG and Bagdad, with respect to the revenues, exploration and exploitation of oil and gas fields. These rhetoric declarations or decisions of oil and gas issues on behalf of Greek Cypriots, might have to be co-ordinated with the proposals on the negotiation process. For example, Turkish Cypriots as we are informed from Poliviou revealed documents, when it comes to issues of law (civil and criminal) they desired and achieved its constituent state to have its own legal system. Only constitutional law and related matters would be federal (Charalampous, 6 September 2016). Similarly, then why each constituent state does not have its own oil and gas investment law with defined allocation revenues for central government. In that case if partitioning of federal Cyprus happens, they can have their own investment law in their EEZ. Energy – Legal Turkey after 2003 acted imperatively in Nicosia’s energy – political moves on oil and gas issues as analysed above, because of its long- term planning on energy issues as well. Turkey’s energy profile and strategy, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, demands aims to realize its own energy security and materialize its vision of becoming an energy trade hub (Republic

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

147

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

of Turkey, MFA). Its position as a geo – political hub and its transformation to an energy trade hub are the main pillars of becoming an important regional power in the last decade (Nathanson & Levy, 2012, p.62). Its energy strategy consists of goals which strengthen its position between the South – North and East – West energy corridor and which ensure its energy supply security and become an energy trade hub. Turkey has a rapidly growing economy and becomes one of the fastest growing markets worldwide (Republic of Turkey, MFA). Many existing pipelines and planned projects, shown on the map below, justify geopolitically its importance. It is located close to more than 75% of world proven reserves, and next to the EU consumer. Turkey’s Existing and Planned Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines

Source: Fossil Energy International US Department of Energy

Contrary to the Cyprus energy aspirations, Geyhan Marine terminal, located 270 km in Turkey’s mainland in the Eastern Mediterranean, is planned to be an important energy hub in the region. All ready exports 1 million barrels of oil per day to global markets and is following the construction of an LNG terminal as well (Republic of Turkey, MFA). Turkey’s geostrategic planning in the Eastern Mediterranean on energy issues was to restrict Cyprus for having EEZ as an island and delaminates it to its territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. When failed to implement its task, Turkey claimed that Cyprus because of its size should have smaller continental shelf. Turkey’s claims are taking part in Cyprus fields and do not recognize Kastelorizo’s con-

148

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

tinental shelf which is deliberately excluded. Similarly, TRNC’s EEZ and claims hydrocarbon blocks according to Turkey, are overlapping with the Republic of Cyprus. In 2012 Turkey signed a continental shelf agreement with TRNC and has granted a hydrocarbon exploration license to Turkish Petroleum Company to conduct explorations (Nathanson & Levy, 2012, pp.13-14, 23-25). According to Tzimitras Turkey’s official position does not recognize and accept the rights of the Republic of Cyprus to represent de jure and de facto the whole island and has to proceed with two options. Either stop implementing its oil and gas procedures to the aftermath of a comprehensive settlement, or “…for the two communities bring the issue before the UN Secretary General and determine, ad hoc, jointly the future exploration and exploitation”. He goes on mentioning that Ankara’s position for Greek Cypriots is to decide either to share Cyprus resources with Turkish Cypriots or share it with them (Nathanson & Levy, 2012, p.26). The Republic of Cyprus EEZ delimitations and hydrocarbon research blocks, and Turkey’s continental shelf claims

Source: International Crisis Group, ‘Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue? Europe Report no. 216 (April 2, 2012).

Counteracting against the ongoing exploration and drilling activities of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey sent in 2012 firstly the Turkish seismographic vessel Piri Reis in Aphrodite plot and two Turkish warships for surveillance. Later, Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

149

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

because the particular vessel was old and not adequately equipped for the task, Turkey sent its new seismic exploration vessel Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa twice to the region (mainly Cyprus EEZ) in 2014 - 2015, for its own drilling purposes and one warship for the surveillance of foreign platform vessels being used for oil exploration in the Cyprus EEZ. During the negotiations issued two Turkish Navtex, therefore Cyprus president had suspended the reunification talks. The Republic of Cyprus accused Turkey for the stagnation, the suspension of the talks and the threat for further instability in the area. The Turkish Cypriots’ claimed hydrocarbon research blocks.

Source: International Crisis Group, ‘Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue? Europe Report no. 216 (April 2, 2012).

150

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Oil Policies Cyprus contacted three licensing rounds until now. The major achievement concerning its oil and gas objectives is the signing agreement with US Noble Energy in block 12, which have 5tcf of technically recoverable resources. Noble Energy is the company behind the most significant natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean. As we know well because of Noble’s Energy success in the 2nd licensing round in 2013 three giant companies and consortium applied. ENI – KOGAS and TOTAL signed contracts with the Republic of Cyprus for certain blocks. Furthermore, a strategic transition was the transfer of 30% of the rights of Noble Energy to block 12 to Israeli companies Anver and Delek. Before this essay proceeds with Turkey’s measures on oil policies, At this point, we have to point out the importance and the strategic role of oil companies that would proceed to exploitation of proven reserves. Another important variable that concerns Cyprus is the country interests of the oil company’s origin. Anver and Delek oil companies serve Israel’s interest which Israel has concluded with the Republic of Cyprus unitization agreements, involving government commercial cooperation. Moreover, giant oil companies have the ability to form their interest that derives from their huge, compared to small states, budget and the state’s power of their origin. Turkey failed to impose its will through its aggressive threatening measures against oil companies and signed licensing and exploitation agreements with the Republic of Cyprus. Firstly, it made threatening statements that will not allow drilling in the block 12. In addition to this, Turkey declared that it would prohibit and blacklist international companies which operate under the Republic of Cyprus licensing blocks, to participate in future Turkish energy projects (Nathanson & Levy, 2012, p.58-59). Turkey implemented its threats by sending in 2012 seismographic vessel Piri Reis in Aphrodite plot with two Turkish warships. Later in 2014 to 2015, it sent Barbaros twice for drilling purposes, based on “TRNC” – TRAO oil agreements, with a warship for the surveillance of foreign platform vessels which were drilling for the Republic of Cyprus. So far Turkey failed to threaten oil companies and stop the Republic of Cyprus explorations and drilling activities. The establishment of unstable environment and insecure investment in the Eastern Mediterranean did not succeed The geopolitical – strategic and economic objectives for Turkey to marginalize the Republic of Cyprus and stop any ongoing oil and gas procedures failed. The Turkish Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan quoted, at that time, during a speech to

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

151

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

mark the delivery of a Turkish frigate, that: “Our country’s interests in the seas start from the Suez Canal and spread to the Indian Ocean.” “We are determined to take security measures to protect not only our commercial interests, but our interests in the natural resources of our seas,” he said, adding, “We know that we are a big and strong country. And we define our policy based on our size and strength.” Therefore, Turkish expansionist policy diminished any hope for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean on the principle of mutual game mentality between Turkey and the neighbouring states in the region.

5. Comparison Between Kirkuk Case Study and Cyprus Coming across the KRG’s – Kirkuk and Cyprus’ political, diplomatic, energy and oil policies at national and regional level, we distinguish many similarities and differences that clarify mainly geo-strategically inter-communities and state interactions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moreover, and very importantly is Turkey’s aggressive revisionist policy that follows to implement its objectives, in the area as an upcoming regional power. At national level, firstly we have to compare the aftermath of the two conflicts. In 1968, Ba’athist party began the “Arabization” campaigns in Iraq. These campaigns engaged in ethnic cleansing of non-Arabs in Kirkuk and other strategic places. Instead of implementing the 1970 Peace Accord, Saddam changed boundaries leaving out areas with Kurdish majority and included areas with Arab majority. By the end of 1974 to 1975, war found Saddam dominating and the Kurd faced with harder Arabization campaigns. Executions, tortures, populations transferred to South and changed of demographic balance in disputed areas, like in Kirkuk with the Arab majority to prevail (Mc Dowwall, 2009, pp. 332-340). Later, from 1985 to 1988 Saddam introduced Anfal operations I – VII. They gassed civilians, destroyed 4000 villages, 1,5 million forcibly resettled and 45000 km2 had been cleared from Kurds (Mc Dowwall, 2009, pp. 352-360). In a similar way, lawful Greek Cypriots inhabitants of the northern part of Cyprus approximately 80% were forced to abandon their homes, with the use of force. Turkish Cypriots forced to relocated in the north and Turkish population transferred from the Turkish mainland to Cyprus. The invasion of Turkish troops and colonization of the Northern Cyprus with the ultimate purpose of the establishment of a separate entity was an illegal action. Therefore, in both cases there were illegal actions with the use of force and colonization in order to legalize the fait accompli they created. Arabs and Turkish Cypriots in Kirkuk and Northern Cyprus do not 152

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

have the right of self-determination since they are not an indigenous population. However, after 2013 in Kirkuk things changed and Kurds gradually became the majority. “Arabization” campaigns and forced relocation of Cypriot population and colonization created several problems. The occupied properties of Greek Cypriots in the North and the abandoned properties of Turkish Cypriots in the South, have to do with economic, social and legal aspects of the problem. Efforts in Cyprus to reach a compromising agreement on a proposed solution have to take into consideration, the issue of property restitution or compensation and to address whose rights will prevail on the case of properties, former or current residents. Moreover, to learn by experience and avoid a property restitution committee which lacks capacity and legitimacy. The problem is subject to property dispute where it has to be decided who will have the right to decide for property, the former or the current residents. In a similar way, the Iraqi constitution defines that the Kirkuk’s IDPs have the right to regain their properties, giving in that way the right to the former residents to restore their properties and when it is unfeasible the Iraqi government compensates them. Furthermore, the Iraqi government has to ensure that the current residents will be resettled and receive compensation or a new land (CPA, 2004). Despite the constitutionally defined rights of the former residents, the committee failed in the implementation process. It lacked the required political will, the substantial funding for compensations and functioned in a country where rule is a “politicized administration that works in the service of local and national political elites” (Ferris, 2008, pp.27-28). The committee was reluctant having to take tough decisions and lacked the necessary funding despite the promises from the US, other states and international NGOs. Moreover, in Kirkuk the proposed amendments of the solution were clearly defined as “Normalization” plan in “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL) and later included in constitution but without the state being able to implement the processes. It managed to proceed to resettlement of many Kurdish IDPs after the Kurdish parties (PUK and KDP) gave money instalment to families for houses, paying salaries to teachers, Kurdish Security Forces and generally the creation of economic mobilization. Greek and Turkish Cypriots have not reached a compromising solution yet. However, the essay argues that Kirkuk case can be an example showing that money for compensations are not an easy task and nobody would pay for, despite promises and rhetoric. In addition to this, although it was included in the Iraqi constitution and clearly defined legally in the Kirkuk case,

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

153

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

it did not have the political will, which until now in Cyprus proposed solution is not clearly defined. The political will in the decision-making process, in Cyprus, is going to be “a system of casting a lot” with 50% chances to each side, according to the recent reveals from Poliviou considering documents and developments. Another variable that initiates decisive role in the two cases is the military strength. KRG maintains a significant military power, consisting of 46000 “peshmergas” (“those who face death”), under KRG operational command and since 2009, 60000 functioning under federal operational control. Apart from the huge number, consisting that those are the active service members, their loyalty is the KRG and are deployed in KRG and around contested areas like Kirkuk, Mosul and Diyala provinces (LTC Chapman, 2008, p.170-176) (Cagaptay, 2008, p.14). Despite their military strength, KRG did not proceed with the annexation of Kirkuk, because of the negative attitude of international, regional and national actors, like the US, Turkey and Iraqi Arabs. Although it would have been considered as a liberating force, since the Kurds were the lawful indigenous habitants of Kirkuk and never stopped claiming their rights, they waited and proceeded with political and legal means. After 2003 Kurdish military strength in the area managed to control politically, economically and reversed, ethnic alterations due to the “Arabization” campaign, and turned to their favor the Kurdish majority in Kirkuk in case of a referendum. However, in June 2014 international, regional and national powers allowed and even called the KRG to act saving Iraqi cohesion against ISIS, when Iraqi government forces fled from Kirkuk governorate. KRG manages to solidify control of the Kirkuk at all levels (Van Wilgenburg, June 26, 2014). On the contrary, Turkish troops invaded in Cyprus and never restored as they claimed that they came to do the constitutional order of Cyprus, but they established the “TRNC”. They cannot be considered as a liberating force. The Republic of Cyprus was never in a position of military superiority against its intruders, therefore instead of claiming their rights they continuously compromised to dangerous political solutions. Both cases are pointing out the decisive role of military strength, as explained by Charalampides, in exercising the rights of self-determination and the creation of de facto situations (Charalampides, 2014 p.48). Created de facto situations are above International Law, especially when they occur with the consent of international powers. As explained in point 4, Turkey shapes its political maneuvers according to its interests, avoiding Iraqi disintegration and maintaining a unified Iraq. Since KRG’s ability for secession is interwoven with the annexation or incorporation of 154

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

Kirkuk, Turkey took several measures in a long-term planning, serving their task of cementing Kurdish region into Iraq. Essay explained Ankara’s objection to the federal or loose confederation structure of Iraq based on ethnicity with a weak central government. Such an outcome would pave the way for Iraq disintegration especially if Kurds consider it as a step towards independence. At this point we must mention the justifiable argument of some scholars of the inconsistencies between Turkey’s denial to Kurdish independence or ethnic federalism in Iraq and its demands for either independence of the so called “TRNC” or a solution based on ethnically federalism or loose confederation structure in Cyprus. According to Michael Gunter, when he mentioned this inconsistency at a scholarly conference in the occupied part of Cyprus, they informed him that there was not such case. Turkish position in Cyprus had been guaranteed by its constitution and the international treaty that had originally established a bi-national Cyprus state in 1960, they explained. It is obvious that they deliberately ignored the fact that in 1970 Saddam himself officially recognized the Kurdish people as a distinct national entity and therefore with the right of autonomy, as a representative of Ba thists government in Iraq (Gunter, 2005a, pp.226-227). Thus, Turkey, as a state based its strategic planning and actions not on principles of international morality, UN decisions, law and democratic values, but on its soft and hard power (military strength) and its national interest and objectives. In energy, legal and oil policies measures, essay argues that there are interdependent and shaped under Turkey’s energy and political agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until now Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and Greece have common interests that have been promoted by the cooperation between them. This cooperation implemented easily because of their common maritime borders and threats. Turkey and its aggressive revisionist energy policy in the region, made regions energy resources instead of mutual gain and win-win situation to a zero-sum game. In both cases, Kirkuk – KRG and Cyprus, Ankara took similar measures to serve its interests. Firstly, it did not recognise any contract concluded between oil companies and the Republic of Cyprus or the KRG. Regarding Cyprus, it has been analysed in point 4. Especially, for KRG according to Iraqi constitution it can conclude oil and gas exploitation agreements, as a region, on new oil and gas fields. Secondly, Turkey has threatened oil companies to stop because otherwise they will be excluded from current and future oil and gas projects in Turkey. Thirdly, if it is possible it uses its military power to develop unstable environment and decisiveness in its claims.

Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

155

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

One of the most significant issues is the control or access to oil – gas infrastructure, as well as the accessibility to interested consumers. Both factors determine a successful oil reach state. Kirkuk and KRG, despite the already existing oil and gas exploitation fields, there are new oil signed contracts for new oil fields in KRG and other that are waiting for exploitation. However, because of the existing infrastructure in Iraq, KRG oil and gas can only be exploited through and to Turkey or for internal consuming to Baghdad. Turkey prohibited the exploitation through and to Turkey for the reasons this essay argued in point 4, despite the financial prospective for the Turkish oil companies and the region from exploration, and benefits from pipe line revenues. Two Turkish oil companies Pet Oil and Genel Energi have already signed contracts with KRG. On the other hand, Baghdad prohibits oil companies in order to press for Kirkuk and gain control of all oil contracts, in new and existing oil fields. In the case of Cyprus, oil infrastructures have to be planned cleverly and in such a way that it would have the ability to gather and transfer the oil and gas of the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas fields to the biggest oil and gas consumers in the world, the EU and East Asia. These infrastructures could bring financial and political profits and significance, too, even in case when Cyprus resources drain out or are never sufficient for exploitation. Cyprus could be a transporter state even without having oil and gas resources. The Mediterranean is going to be a huge oil field and Cyprus could be a junction center between the Middle East and the EU for energy issues, reversing the role of Turkey. Turkey’s way of pursuing its interests in KRG’s case, has to be taken under consideration from Cyprus and Israel especially from those who consider exporting Eastern Mediterranean gas to Turkey via pipeline (South Corridor). Diplomatically, Turkey has been implementing the same strategic stance against KRG and Cyprus. Ankara never recognized KRG and the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, it did not use the designation “Kurdish Regional Government” and for Greek Cypriots the “Republic of Cyprus” but “Local Administration of the North” and “Greek Cypriot Administration of the Southern Cyprus” accordingly. At the same time, it recognized the central government in Baghdad and the “TRNC”. In both cases Ankara, has been using its regional power and influence at all levels, regional and international, to leverage its opposition to the Republic of Cyprus and the Kurdish Regional Government recognition against their political – legal – and energy rights. Turkey has been acting according to its regional interests adopting as essay explained above inconsistency policies. Lastly, Ankara has never accepted meetings between KRG or Cyprus officials. On the 156

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

contrary, Ankara has always and deliberately contacted formal meetings with those state’s officials that promote its interests, meaning in KRG case with Iraqi central government and in Cyprus case with the so called “TRNC”. The Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, contacted with KRG’s president Barzani a meeting only after officially confirmed his opposition to an independent Kurdish State. Furthermore, the meeting took place in Iraqi capital Baghdad and not in Ebril (KRG Capital) in order to clearly reaffirm that KRG is not an independent region but under Baghdad central government. It is obvious that Kirkuk and Cyprus struggles are in the center of conflicting national, regional and international interests. Regional and international powers are playing a decisive role defining the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East future. In the between them comparison we realize that oil and gas are very important in the equation of pursuing each member its vital interests. All states and NGOs interactions in politics, economics, oil policies and others are variables in the between them power games, according to their inherent conflicting and convergent objectives and their agenda. Turkey in both cases implemented ruthlessness its long term strategic planning. Analyzing its measures comparing the two case studies we distinguish a similar way of pursuing its interests. Currently, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are in advanced negotiations momentum, but Turkey is the key player towards the final form of the solution. The Republic of Cyprus must be vigilant in the negotiation process, studying Turkey’s moves and interactions with other states in the region. In addition to this, it has to be able to comprehend and be aware of the balance of power of each member involved in the negotiations and its capability to influence global and regional powers. Constructing alliances and global power interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region can shift the balance of power and shaped the solution. Similar case studies are very helpful decoding your negotiating partner intensions, proceed with correct planning and protect your interests.

6. Concluding Remarks This essay began highlighting the importance of oil and gas energy resources and the fact that sometimes turned to be a cooperative and sometimes a conflicting variable among the states of the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus as it was explained above has many similarities with the case of Kirkuk. However, the most significant are the similarities of Cyprus case that have to be aware in the ongoing negotiations process, comparing with Kirkuk – KRG case, and Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

157

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

the implemented Ankara’s foreign policy. Since the negotiations processes are at the most critical junctures with all the chapters on the table, in order to find the final decision of the proposed solution, they have to proceed in a compromising solution. Compromise means to stepping back from their current position and truthfully continue to coexist under the same state. Both communities in Cyprus and broadly the states in the Eastern Mediterranean have different agendas. Each one defines a case of coexistence in a way that undermines the other’s agenda diverting possible mutual gains from cooperation to a zero-sum game. Turkish and Greek Cypriotsin order to develop a mutual gain mentality must firstly create an environment where the security interest of one side should not undermine those of others. This environment should have been developed by the U.N. who is operating as a mediator, and the U.S. and the EU as external influencing powers. External authorities and the U.N. should structure the rules and conditions of interactions between them in order to encourage mutual trust and cooperation, such as facilitating communication, collective decision making, binding agreements and generally determining structures of pay offs in a direction faraway of prisoners dilemma preference structure. Despite the U.N. and others efforts, they fail to achieve the desired structure level in order to be constructive for a further cooperative environment. Therefore, Cyprus which seems to be another example, where relative versus absolute gains raise again the neo-liberalism and neo-realism debate. Waltz argued that in case where there is the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states are compelled to ask “Who will gain more?” not “Will both of us gain?” The essay argued in Chapter 4, that Turkey demands permanent Turkish military present and control of Cyprus for security and Middle East policy reasons, otherwise threatens for dichotomises of Cyprus and this is one of many other examples. Moreover, Waltz, in his work argued that “conditions of insecurity and uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions, works against their cooperation” (Waltz, 1979, p.105). Under this environment and their conflicting past Greek and Turkish Cypriots – Turkey has very few possibilities of cooperation leaving Cyprus as an endless disputed place. Greek Cypriots perceive Turkish Cypriots – Turkey’s actions and intentions as a threat to Cyprus’s cohesion towards their ulterior motive of secession and independence of TRNC, with the preferred type of governance as the final step they need to achieve. Turkish Cypriots on the other side perceive Greek Cypriot’s action (in oil and gas plans and others) and intentions as a threat to their achieved privileges in the between them agreements and Turkey as a threat

158

PAVLOS VOSKOU

EURODIALOGUE Journal of International Relations, European, Economic and Social Studies

to its energy planning. Grieco emphasized in his work that “fundamental goal in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities” (Grieco, 1988, p.498). On the other hand, Keohane argued that states, in our case study we can refer to “constituent states”, “would seek cooperation when they have, or think they have a common interest to pursue” (Keohane, 2005, pp.6-7). Cyprus somehow reflects both arguments. Firstly, they do not have common interest to pursue and secondly, in their compulsory relationship, they strive to prevent each other from achieving any advances in the between them relative capabilities. Why are they still “walking the same road”? As argued in the essay, the U.N. since 1974 have been trying to develop an environment in Cyprus in order to found a solution and become a democratic modern state, a paradigm state of “Thick” liberal order like the other states in the EU. Greek and Turkish Cypriots are encircled in a “Thin” liberal order, trying to reach a compromise solution according to Sorensen’s argument on two liberal orders proper the “thick” and the “thin” (Sorensen, 2006, pp.257-268). The objective of the two communities should have been prudent arrangements towards the implementation of the liberal values. The U.S. in a similar way, in order to impose the “liberal values” to Iraq, instead of acting with prudence it acted with imprudence. It lacked legitimacy and made the U.S. plans and benchmarks unattainable. Therefore, the proposed solution to the Cypriot people should be decided and desired by them for them, to earn legitimacy and sustain efforts towards success. Concluding, compromised peaceful solutions on Cyprus, would be easier to implement under a defined state governance and structure, doubtless under the auspice of the U.N., U.S. and EU for safe transition before the U.N. withdrawal. The current “cloudy” environment in combination with Ankara’s imposing interventions minimizes a possible peaceful transition to any compromising solution on Cyprus. Without question the solution on Cyprus problem is not determined. There are so many “fluid” variables and claimant, influencing the players who strive to pursue their political and economic agenda, that its future could only be speculated under a comprehensive approach, since these are the interactions of the system that would determine the future of Cyprus. Despite the struggle at national and international level global powers are going to play their decisive role in the formation of Cyprus final status. Hidden and obvious policies and intentions of the actors at all levels, are going to be revealed clearly in the proposed Cyprus solution. Cyprus future and the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas development are two issues that are bound together. Cyprus Issue: Sliding On A Knife-Edge

159

A geopolitical comparative study between the case study of Kirkuk and the Cyprus politico - economic prospects

Bibliography •

Anderson, L. & Stansfield, G. (2009) Crisis in Kirkuk: University of Pennsylvania Press.

•

Athanasiou T. (2011, December 30) “Το μεγάλο σχέδιο της Τουρκίας και η επιτυχής υλοποίηση του-Νιχάτ Ερίμ: Ο εμπνευστής της διχοτόμησης” [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://www.sigmalive.com/archive/news/politics/443476

•

Bengio, O. (2005) ‘Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective’ In: O’ Leary, B. & McGarry, J. & Salih, K. (eds.), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 173-185.

•

Blanchart, C. M. (2009) Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U. S. Policy: Diane Publishino

•

Cagaptay S. (2008) ‘360 Degrees from Irbil: The KRG’s Views of Its Neighborhood’ S. Cagaptay (ed), The Future of the Iraqi Kurds: Policy Focus 85, pp.12-20.

•

Charalambides Y. (2014) “The Trojan War and the “Porcelain Of Prague”: A Comparative Analysis Between the Conflicts of Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo”, 21st CENTURY, № 1 (15), pp.25-55

•

Charalambides Y., (2011), “Cyprus Issue: Diplomatic Plots, top secret documents and testimonies from 1950 to 2010”, Athens Piotita.

•

Charalambous C. (2016, September 16). “Ηχηρές διαφωνίες Πολυβίου Αποκαλυπτικά έγγραφα” [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://www.sigmalive. com/news/kypriako/360285/ixires-diafonies-polyviou-apokalyptika-eggrafa

•

Chon, G. (2009) ‘Iraq Passes Key Election Law and Prepares for January Vote’ Wall Street Journal, 9 November. http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB125770031185936775.html/ [accessed 11 February 2011].

•

Coalition Provisional Authority (2004) ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’ http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/TAL. html [accessed 14 February 2011].

•

Cyprus Mail. (25 May 2016). Anastasiades says he will not accept any downgrading of the RoC. [Web log post]. Retrieved from: http://cyprus-mail. com/2016/05/25/un-not-arrange-meetings-constantinople-says-haq/

•

Daly, J.C.K. (2009) ‘Analysis: Kirkuk elections and Iraqi Oil’, United Press International, 2 June. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/EnergyResources/2009/06/02/Analysis-Kirkuk-elections-and-Iraqi-oil/UPI31501243950233/ [accessed 4 April 2011].

•

Davutoglu, A. (2008) ‘Turkey’s Foreign Vision: Policy an Assessment of 2007’ Insight Turkey. 10 (1) pp. 77-96.

•

Eland, I. (2009) Partitioning for Peace an Exit Strategy for Iraq: The Independent Institute.

160

PAVLOS VOSKOU

•

Ferris, E. G. (2008) ‘The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq’ Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper 5.

•

Grieco, J. M. (1988) ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ International Organization. 42 (3) pp. 485 – 507.

•

Grygiel, J.J. (2006) Great Powers and Geopolitical Change: John Hopkins University Press

•

Gunter, M. M. (2005) ‘Turkey’s New Neighbor, Kurdistan’ In: O’ Leary, B. & McGarry, J. & Salih, K. (eds.), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp.219-232

•

Gunter, M. M. (2005) ‘Turkish Membership in the EU and the Kurds’ In: Muller, M. & Brigham, C. & Westrheim, K. & Yildiz, K. (eds.), International Conference on Turkey , the Kurds and the EU: European Parliament, Brussels, 22-23 November 2004: Kurdish Human Rights Project. pp.121-133.

•

Ioannides N. (2015) “Turkish diplomatic Response to the Delimitations Agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea”, Eurodialoque, Volume 4, pp.2429

•

Hale, W. (2009) ‘Turkey and the Middle East in the ‘New Era’’, Insight Turkey. 11 (3) pp. 143-159.

•

International Crisis Group (2008) ‘Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation’, Middle East Report No 81, 13 November.

•

International Crisis Group (2011) ‘Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears’, Middle East Report No 103, 28 March. http://www.crisisgroup.org/ en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/iraq/103%20Iraq%20 and%20the%20Kurds%20Confronting%20Withdrawal%20Fears.aspx [accessed 9 May 2011].

•

Kasinis S. (2015) “Natural Cas – Fundamentals, Geopolitics and the Way Forward”, Eurodialoque, Volume 4, pp.32-59

•

Keohane, R. O. (2005) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy: Princeton Classic Editions

•

Mazeel, M. A. (2010) Iraq Constitution Petroleum Resources Legislation and International Policy: Disserta Verlag.

•

McDowall, D. (2009) A Modern History of the Kurds, third edition. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.

•

McGarry, J. & O’Leary, B. (2007) ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription’ International Journal of Constitutional Law. 5(4), pp.670 – 698. http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/4/670.full.pdf; [accessed 4 January 2011].

•

Natali, D. (2008) ‘The Kirkuk Conundrum’, Ethnopolitics. 7 (4), pp. 433 - 443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449050802443323 [accessed 6 May 2011].

•

Nathanson R. & Levy R. (2012), “Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Casus Belli or Chance for Regional Cooperation?” Tel Aviv, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Institute for National Security Studies

•

O’ Leary, B. & McGarry, J. & Salih, K. (2005) The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq: University of Pennsylvania Press.

•

Pelaghias G. (2015) “Eastern Mediterranean Gas Fields and a New Energy Corridor to Europe”, Eurodialoque, Volume 4, pp.59-80

•

Republic Of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey’s Energy Profile and Strategy”. Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy. en.mfa

•

Reuters (2016, June 16) “UPDATE 1-After Kirkuk, Kurds want quarter of Iraq oil revenue” [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/ kurdistan-oil-idUSL5N0OX5EJ20140616

•

Sorensen, G. (2006) ‘Liberalism of Restrain and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium’ International Relations 20 (3). pp. 251 – 272

•

Sylikiotis N. (2015) “Energy Strategy to the Benefit of Cyprus and the Cypriot People”, Eurodialoque, Volume 4, pp.16-24

•

Trend News Agency (16 November 2009). “Turkish Cypriots are more important than EU: Minister” [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://en.trend.az/world/ turkey/1581053.html

•

UNAMI (2005), ‘Iraqi Constitution’ Final Version http://www.uniraq.org/ documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf [accessed 17 April 2011].

•

UNAMI OCS (2007) Commentary on the Constitutional Review Committee’s Draft Report.NAMI. http://www.forumfed.org/pubs/UNAMI_OCS_ ResponseENG.pdf. [accessed 3 Feb 2011]

•

U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013), “Overview of oil and natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean region” https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ analysis_includes/regions_of_interest/Eastern_Mediterranean/easternmediterranean.pdf [accessed 3 Sep 2016]

•

Van Wilgenburg W. (2014). “Hot Issue: Iraqi Kurdistan’s New Security Challenges” The Jamestown Foundation 0(0) pp.1-4

•

Waltz K. (1979) Theory of International Politics: New York: MacGraw-Hill

•

Wanche S. (2005) ‘Awaiting Liberation: Kurdish Perspectives on a Post-Saddam Iraq’, in B. O’ Leary et al. (ed.), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 186-194.

L E D RA

COLLEGE N I C O S I A