positive safety culture endorsed by management and the lack of a comprehensive safety management system.”93 The Board in its final report reiterated its previous recommendation to revise laws such that, “all Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish safety management system programs (A-16-36).”94 Over the road and light rail accidents have also spurred Congressional intervention. From 2000-2009, the NHTSA recorded 87 fatal crashes with 209 occupant fatalities by over the road buses.95 In 2009, a Red Line train crashed on Washington D.C.’s Metro rail system killing nine passengers and injuring fifty-two. The NTSB cited Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (WMATA) lack of a safety culture as one of the contributing factors.96 An outside analysis performed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission further detailed three contributing factors to a lack of safety culture at WMATA. These include senior management not demonstrating leadership in safety values and actions, problem identification and resolution, and lack of personal accountability.97 In response to these and other trends in highway, roadway, and public transportation safety, Congress passed safety-related provisions in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act ("MAP-21"; P.L. 112-141) This law mandated public transportation agencies to establish, “comprehensive safety plans, thus encouraging a culture of safety.”98,99 Tragedies like these trigger safety agencies to respond with a mixture of voluntary and compelled measures. But there is also a larger framework of continuing goals and policies set by the Department in their pursuit of national transportation safety objectives. Both steer the course of the DOT as it pursues advances in safety culture.
3.3 DOT’s Approach to Drive Adoption of Safety Culture Across Transportation Modes This section examines methods DOT and component agencies historically have used to promote adoption of safety culture. These have been applied to industries ranging from those never subject to safety culture regulation, such as the 15-passenger motor coach industry, to long-standing ones, such as commercial aviation, where safety culture concepts were first developed. The examples demonstrate that tools and regulatory models exist within DOT that may be useful in promulgating safety culture within unmanned aviation. While this industry externally appears different, DOT has successfully worked with industries in similar circumstances. In fact, there may be little need to think too far outside of the box for solutions. Historically, DOT has been proactive and consistent in setting annual goals and targets for safety culture and implementation of safety management programs. A review of DOT Guiding the New UAS Industry to Safety Excellence
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