TPM: The Philosophers' Magazine by janet Joyce

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ISSUE ýý

tpm Best of luck

the philosophers’ magazine

Philosophy and chance

The silence of the lambdas Interview with Kit Fine

PLUS Q Raymond Tallis on mind Q Jesse Norman interview Q Altruistic machines Q Illness Q Cyberwar Q Portraits of philosophers Q Disgusting art Q News Q Columns Q Reviews

THOUGHT PROVOKING THOUGHTS

100

of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy

JUST THE ARGUMENTS EEdited by Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone Cutting through dense philosophical prose, C 1100 famous and influential arguments are ppresented in their essence, with premises, cconclusions and logical form plainly iidentified. Key quotations and contextual bbackground provide a sense of style and aapproach.

NEW!

Designed to offer a quick and compact D rreference to everything from Aquinas's ""Five Ways" to prove the existence of God to tthe metaphysical possibilities of zombie minds, Just the Arguments is an invaluable m oone-stop argument shop. ISBN: 9781444336382 | September 2011 | c.424pp | ÂŁ14.99

For further information about this title and more, please visit

www.wiley.com/go/philosophy Wiley-Blackwell books are available from all good bookshops or direct from www.wiley.com

highlights Issue ýý • üth quarter úøùù

COVER STORY Take your chances Moral luck, knowledge, freedom and more

þø ùā Philosophy’s deep waters Kit Fine on objects and possibilities

Neuroneurosis Raymond Tallis knocks your brains out

ûù 4TH QUARTER 2011

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Contents Issue ýý • üth quarter úøùù

ACTIONS & EVENTS

4 5

From the editor News

Obituaries

Mediawatch

Threads Feature: Fighting closure Word of Mouse

82 87

Sci-Phi Nice robots finish first

Illness or moral failing? Rachel Cooper on disorders

Letter from … Joe Friggieri in Malta

Pop culture Is Superman un-American?

Snapshot: Thomas Reid James A Harris perceives things

TPM Essay Raymond Tallis on the brain

Suffering misfortune

THE LOWDOWN

Kit Fine’s cure for vagueness

You don’t believe in luck

Alexander Brown on social justice

THOUGHTS The Interview

Luck of the draw

Darren Domsky explains why

Waging cyberwar

Luck and happiness

Nafsika Athanassoulis on morality and jammed guns

Nina Power examines the strategies

The problem of lucky guesses

John Sellars takes the stoics’ tough line

Working-class heroes

An open future

Duncan Pritchard has a solution

Philosophy and philosophers in the mass media

Alfred Mele on chance and choice New protest, New College

8 10

FORUM

Pyke’s portraits Cynthia Freeland considers the faces of philosophers

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ÿú

The Philosophers’ Magazine, ü Saddler Street, Durham, DHù ûNP, UK Tel: øùāù ûĀûù ĀĀā Fax: øùāù ûĀþú ýüú editor@philosophersmag.com www.philosophersmag.com Editor Editor-in-chief Reviews editor Obituaries

James Garvey Julian Baggini Jean Kazez Adam Ferner

Editorial Advisory Board Miranda Fricker, Simon Glendinning, Daniel D Hutto, Susan James, David Papineau, Nina Power, Anthony Price, Jonathan Rée, Richard Schoch, Barry C Smith, Jonathan Wolff

āÿ

Illustrations/Graphics Felix Bennett, Adam Ferner, Gareth Southwell

REVIEW

100

New books, etc Selves, poems, votes, beers and a film

114

Author Q & A Carolyn Korsmeyer on disgusting art

116

Contributors' Notes Contact the editor to submit proposals. Please do not send unsolicited manuscripts.

Imagine that Balloon world

119

Review of reviews What the critics said about Dworkin and Ramachandran

Printed by MPG Books Group

My philosophy Jesse Norman on big ideas in politics

127

UK distribution Central Books, 99 Wallis Road, London E9 5LN Tel: 020 8985 4854 North America distribution Source Interlink, 27500 Riverview Center Blvd., Bonita Springs, Florida 34134 Tel: (239) 949-4450

LAST WORD

120

Contributors Michael Antony, Nafsika Athanassoulis, Ophelia Benson, Alexander Brown, Rachel Cooper, Darren Domsky, Luciano Floridi, Cynthia Freeland, Joe Friggieri, Wendy M Grossman, Steven Hales, James A Harris, Alan Haworth, Robert J Howell, Mathew Iredale, Rodger Jackson, Troy Jollimore, Jane Clare Jones, Amy Kind, John Koethe, Carolyn Korsmeyer, Alfred Mele, James O’Connor, Duncan Pritchard, Nina Power, George Rowe, John Sellars, Raymond Tallis, Andrew Terjesen

The Skeptic When science is messy

ùùþ

All views expressed in TPM represent those of the authors of each article and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the editors or publisher. Cover Original artwork by Felix Bennett

4TH QUARTER 2011 4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm tpm

editorial

from the editor

here’s this bit in The Clouds, one of Aristophanes’ digs at Socrates:

Meanwhile, at least some philosophers get tied up in knots over problems no one else is even able to see. Many ages harbour a mind

Student of Socrates: Socrates asked Chaerephon

who’s just too far ahead of the game. What must

how many of its own feet a flea could jump –

that be like, how would it feel to be a genius

one had bitten Chaerephon’s brow and then

accused of time wasting by the pointy-headed

jumped to Socrates’ head.

Aristophanes of your day? Think of Frege, who

Strepsiades: And how did he measure the jump?

died largely misunderstood and uncelebrated,

Student: Most ingeniously. He melted wax,

never knowing his place at the start of analytic

caught the flea, dipped its feet, and the hard-

philosophy. But at least he knew he had the

ened wax made Persian slippers. Unfastening

goods. He left his papers to his adopted son,

these, he found their size.

with this note:

Strepsiades: Royal Zeus! What an acute intellect! “Dear Alfred, It’s slightly disconcerting that the view of philos-

Do not scorn my handwritten material. Even if

ophers as oddballs drawn to their own pointless

all is not gold, there is gold in it nevertheless. I

problems is still alive in some quarters 2,000

believe that some of it will one day be held in

years later. The uncharitable will suggest that

much greater esteem than now. See to it that

maybe there’s something to it.

nothing gets lost.

Maybe there’s something to it. Aristophanes can make you wonder whether philosophical problems matter at all to anyone

With love, your father It is a large part of myself that I here bequeath to you.”

other than the person with the flea in his hair. Is that possibility such a bad thing?

There’s truth in that last line. When a phil-

The headlines might turn out to be all wrong.

osophical problem bothers you, you really do

Maybe philosophy isn’t the love of wisdom or the

put a part of yourself in your answer. If others

pursuit of truth. It might be nearer an effort to

aren’t connected to the problem in the same way,

think through your own conception of things, make

then they might hear only yammering about flea

things clearer for yourself, and render coherent

feet. It can make you wonder how sure anyone

your own outlook. If someone else is interested too,

pushing Aristophanes’ line can ever be about the

wonderful, but in stockpiling all of your premises

interests of philosophers. Unless you’re bound

and conclusions, the only person you will ever

up in philosophy, you’ll never get hold of what-

convince is yourself. And that’s if you’re lucky.

ever it is.

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actions & events/news

news Big society protest PHILOSOPHERS HAVE RESIGNED over plans to make research funding dependent on government objectives. The Observer reported that the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), the UK’s main research funding body, must spend a considerable percentage of its £100 million funding on research involving the prime minister’s vision of the “big society”. Disquiet among UK academics is growing. A petition against the requirement has over 4,000 signatories, and public letters of protest from academics and over thirty learned societies call for plans to be scrapped. On 21 June more than forty members of the AHRC’s peer review college announced that they intended to resign en masse if “no clear steps” were taken to remove references to the big society from the AHRC delivery plan for 2011–15. According to Thom Brooks, who is involved in the campaign, nearly ﬁfty senior academics have so far resigned, including the philosophers Antony

Duff at Stirling, Emma Borg at Reading, and Leslie Green at the University of Oxford. Brooks, a reader in political and legal philosophy at Newcastle, told tpm that resignations are a matter “of principle, not politics”, arguing that “a political campaign slogan” has “no place in research council delivery plans”. Borg explained her resignation to tpm by emphasising the importance of keeping “research priorities … free of party political ideology”. The AHRC has not changed the wording of its delivery plan, despite what Brooks describes as “genuinely unprecedented opposition”. While being “very disappointed” by the Council’s response, Brooks told tpm that the campaign remains active, and he intends to explore a possible inconsistency between the plan and the AHRC’s code of practice. According to Brooks, this states that there must be no “grounds for criticism that public funds are being used for private, partisan or party political purposes.” Jane Clare Jones

Crispin Wright rambles ON úý JULY CRISPIN WRIGHT, professor of philos-

ophy at New York University and director of the Northern Institute of Philosophy, began walking the 268 miles of the Pennine Way in the company of his son. The sponsored ramble will raise funds to allow early career philosophers to visit the Institute, and is intended to support its mission of fostering

philosophical collaboration, building a “developmental environment” for PhD and post-doctoral researchers, which Wright regards as “brilliantly successful”. Over the course of twenty-one days Wright will answer the most popular twenty-one questions as voted for by sponsors on the Institute’s website (abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/nip). JCJ

4TH QUARTER 2011

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The NCH was then accused of “syllabus plagiarism” days after publishing its own course speciﬁcations. Author, presenter and historian Amanda Vickery tweeted: “NCH seems to have ripped off London Univ’s international programme in history”. The NCH spokesperson explained that their “students will be following the published University of London syllabus, as part of what New College of the Humanities will be doing is preparing students for degrees awarded by the University of London through its International Programmes. This is the syllabus that is on our website.” In a response to an open letter of objection written by colleagues at Birkbeck College, Grayling wrote in the Guardian, “I cannot see why independent initiatives must be demonised or blocked because of our anxiety about what is happening in the public domain. What is the logic of that? In all the criticism – and from some quarters the painful personal hostility – I have seen only an emotional case for scapegoating our project.” The college’s ﬁrst student intake is scheduled for September 2012.

ON ý JUNE THE PHILOSOPHER A C GRAYLING

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George Rowe

Matthias Asgeirsson

announced plans to open a privately owned university in London, called the New College of the Humanities. Fourteen “celebrity academics” are on board, including Richard Dawkins, Stephen Pinker and Ronald Dworkin. But as Grayling told the Guardian a few days later, the move made him a “figure of vitriol” among students and academics. Questions first arose as to how much regular teaching the high-flying professoriate would actually do. Grayling explained in the Guardian, “All these people are partners in the enterprise. They are not the full-time academic staff who are delivering the curriculum”. Nevertheless, he said, “All of them have agreed to come and give lectures in the college.” tpm contacted the college’s media office, and when asked what made the courses worth fees double the national average, a spokesperson for “the NCH team” replied, “The added value of study at NCH lies in the intensity and quality of the teaching and learning, including increased contact hours, one-to-one-tutorials, lectures by highly distinguished professors, and an exceptional staff-student ratio.” Not everyone is convinced. Sally Hunt, general secretary of the University and College Union, told the BBC, “While many would love the opportunity to be taught by the likes of A C Grayling and Richard Dawkins, at £18,000 a go it seems it won’t be the very brightest but those with the deepest pockets who are afforded the chance.” Grayling has become the target of protests by students concerned about high fees in education generally. At an event called “The Arts in Britain – Death by a Thousand Cuts”, where he appeared just two days after announcing plans for the new college, he was loudly heckled during his talk. The room was evacuated when a protester let off a smoke bomb.

actions & events/news 6

School of hard knocks

Richard Dawkins

SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier claim that the human ability to reason evolved primarily to allow us to persuade each other. Their “argumentative theory” of reasoning directly challenges the orthodox view that the main function of reasoning is to improve our knowledge and decision-making. An outline of the theory, with commentaries and a response from the authors, was published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in March. Much of the subsequent coverage focused on the adversarial aspects of the argumentative view of reasoning: “Reason Seen More as Weapon Than Path to Truth”, as The New York Times headline had it in June. Some found Mercier’s and Sperber’s

approach excessively narrow, with psychologist Darcia Narvaez remarking in the same journal issue: “The research tasks used and interpretations employed seem to presume that humans are primarily self-interested, a notoriously implausible view outside the West.” In responding to critics, Mercier and Sperber contend that argumentative reasoning has not only rhetorical but also evaluative goals. To counter our susceptibility to being misinformed in the course of mutual persuasion, they suggest in other publications, that “epistemic vigilance” may have evolved biologically alongside the argumentative function of human communication. James O’Connor

Gaga not friends with Žižek shocker cc

THE BLOGOSPHERE HUMMED IN ANTICIPATION as

Stephen Carlile

Lady Gaga

Lady Gaga and Slavoj Žižek were expected to speak at a University College Union strike in London on 22 March. Rumours then circulated that the fashionable Marxist philosopher struck up an unlikely friendship with the Mother Monster. On 21 June The New York Post reported that the pair spent time together “discussing feminism and human creativity”, and cited a blog in which Žižek referred to Gaga as his “good friend”. The entry, entitled “Communism Knows No Monster”, praises Gaga’s meat dress for highlighting the “linking in … patriarchy of the female body and meat”. Those familiar with the philosopher’s work will perhaps be unsurprised to learn that Žižek has not developed an ardent concern with patriarchal objectiﬁcation. Indeed, Žižek told the Post that the blog was a “fake” and that the “only thing I share with her is the support for the strike”. JCJ

4TH QUARTER 2011

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actions & events/news

The origin of specious

actions & events/news 8

In memoriam ALASTAIR GUNN, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Waikato, died on 21 May 2011. Having studied at the University of Sussex, Gunn moved to New Zealand in 1969 to teach at Waikato. According to his colleague, David Lumsden, Gunn only intended to stay for two years, but the department became his home for the next forty-two. During that time he introduced a number of innovative new courses to the syllabus, perhaps most notably a course in environmental ethics in 1979, a ﬁrst for Australasian universities. In addition to his work on the environment, Gunn published on business and health ethics, and wrote three books on

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

engineering ethics with Aarne Vesilind. He was renowned about the campus as a teacher whose courses inspired and challenged generations of students. In an interview in 2010, he describes how greatly he enjoyed teaching, researching and writing: “They feel more like hobbies”, he said, adding, with a dryness most academics will appreciate, “it’s the markings and meetings that feel like work”.

His Libertarianism: A Political Philosophy for Tomorrow became one of the movement’s foundational texts, and in 1972 he stood as the ﬁrst Libertarian, and, indeed, ﬁrst openly gay nominee for president. (In later life, his relationship with the party became fraught, over issues of immigration, and he left to help set up the Republican Liberty Caucus.) He is also known for his brief, but intense, friendship with the novelist Ayn Rand, and more recently his controversial defence of the Iraq War in a revised edition of Libertarianism.

JOHN HOSPERS, professor

of philosophy and the ﬁrst presidential nominee for the US Libertarian party, died on 12 June 2011 at the age of 93. Born and raised in Pella, Iowa, Hospers studied at the University of Iowa before receiving a scholarship to Columbia University in 1941. There, he worked under G E Moore, and completed his PhD in 1944; his doctoral dissertation was published as Meaning and Truth in Arts. In addition to his research and writing on ethics and aesthetics (his book Human Conduct remains in wide use), Hospers is known for his involvement in the formation of the American Libertarian party.

GARETH B MATTHEWS,

professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, died on 17 April 2011. Matthews was awarded his BA at Franklin College in Indiana in 1951, and received his PhD from Harvard ten years later. Working mainly in the ﬁelds of ancient and medieval philosophy, and the philosophy of religion, his focus was on the ontological argument. (This remained a life-long interest, from his papers on Anselm in 1961, to his most recent work with Lynne Rudder Baker, “The Ontological Argument Simpliﬁed”.) Matthews also wrote and taught about philosophy and children,

actions & events/news

authoring three books on the subject: Philosophy and the Young Child (1980), Dialogues with Children (1984), and The Philosophy of Childhood (1994). As well as his proliﬁc output of books, articles and essays, Matthews was a dedicated teacher, and, as described on the University of Massachusetts philosophy home page: “a gentle presence in the department [who] made it a better place”. He is survived by his wife Mary, two daughters and one son, and seven grandchildren.

DAVID ORTON, activist and deep green philosopher, died on 12 May 2011, at his home in Watervale, Nova Scotia. Orton

was born in Portsmouth in 1934,

ﬁghting”. He is survived by his

where he apprenticed as a shipwright before winning a place at Durham University. He moved to Canada in 1957, attended Concordia, and went on to receive his MA from the New School for Social Research. Throughout his life, Orton campaigned with the Deep Ecology movement, and developed a theory of “Left Biocentrism”. The philosophical account he offered was one that emphasised the profound interdependence of organisms within eco-systems, and combined this “deep ecology” with arguments against consumerism, capitalism and industrialisation. Shortly before he died, Orton posted thanks on his blog to those who had encouraged his philosophical work, and wrote “we all eventually return to the Earth. Goodbye and keep

wife, Helga, and their daughter, Karen; by his son and daughter from his previous marriage, Karl and Johanna; by his brother Michael; and by his grandchild, Alex.

David Orton

ALAIN-PHILIPPE SEGONDS died on 2 May at the age of 68. As the Director of the Société d’Edition Les Belles Lettres, he published and translated a vast range of works of classical and Hellenist scholarship. Among others, he produced innovative new editions of the work of a number of Neoplatonic philosophers, from Porphyry, and Iamblichus to Marinus and Damascius. But his research interests were not limited to Greek philosophy. As a historian and philosophy of science he also edited and translated Renaissance works of astronomy, including those by Rheticus, Kepler, Tycho Brahe and Giordano Bruno. Segonds was one of the last members of the group of French Platonic and Neoplatonic historians who followed Henri Bergson and Pierre Hadot, and was greatly involved in the renewal of French scholarship in this area. He is survived by his wife, Myriam Fleischmann, and his children, Nicholas and Rachel.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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actions & events/mediawatch

mediawatch

Philosophy and philosophers in the mass media

Traditionally, these are questions for philosophy,

a high level of consideration and maybe some

but philosophy is dead.

Kantian reasoning thrown in. It turns out it is

ut almost all of us must sometimes wonder: Why are we here? Where do we come from?

Stephen Hawking, quoted in Telegraph, ùÿ May

thought that monogamous pair-bonding was something one determined for oneself, with

mediated by biology in a very real way. Patricia Churchland, quoted in Chronicle of Higher

ussell’s history was biased and idiosyncratic,

Education, ùú June

I suppose that’s what qualifies me too.

Anthony Kenny on his new history of philosophy, Spectator, ü June

n recent years, seemingly technical economic questions have crowded out questions of

justice and the common good. I think there is a

ut here is the thing: the room was full. Three hundred people craned forward, anxious to

join in the conversation, to engage in the philos-

growing sense … that G.D.P. and market values do not by themselves produce happiness. Michael Sandel, quoted in New York Times, ùü June

ophy, to laugh at the jokes. Sarah Crompton on a talk by Onora O’Neill at the Hay Festival, Telegraph, þ June

e told me that no medieval philosopher was worth reading and he was proud to be able

ecently, I overheard a fellow Amtraker back off a conversation on politics.”You know, it’s

because I’m a libertarian,” he said, sounding like a vegetarian politely declining offal. Stephen Metcalf, Slate, úø June

to say that he had not read one word of Thomas Aquinas. A N Wilson on A J Ayer, New Statesman, ā June

f it is our concern to find moral monsters, to

hesus monkeys appear to understand what René Descartes meant when he made the

famous statement: “I think, therefore I am.” Daily Mail, þ July

find war criminals, to find butchers, then we

than Gadafi … I am talking about killing and who

gets killed. The numbers count.

Hegel I should be writing.

Ted Honderich, Counterpunch, ùø June

Slavoj Žižek, Guardian, ùý July

have in Blair and Bush two stronger candidates

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lot of what I write is blah, blah, bullshit, a diversion from the 700-page book on

actions & events/mediawatch

ptions • subscriptions • subscriptions • subscriptions • subs

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actions & events/threads

Ophelia Benson

threads The new college try

he fuss over A C Grayling’s New

resources by the bankers and financiers they

College of the Humanities (see page 6)

educated, are not best served by a bunch of

gave a few people a joyous opportunity

prima donnas jumping ship and creaming off the

for Working-Class Hero posturing.

bright and loaded.”

The drama had its risible aspects, given that no

A year earlier, Grayling had reviewed

one can really have thought Grayling fit the part

Eagleton’s book On Evil in the New Humanist,

of Top Profiteering Elitist Enemy, and that some

not very favourably. Eagleton reviewed Grayling’s

of the working-class heroes are quite comfortably

planned new college with a good deal of …

prosperous themselves.

energy. “The intersection of class and liberal

Terry Eagleton, for instance, is Excellence in

secularism present in Grayling’s college should

English Distinguished Visitor in the Department

not be taken lightly,” he wrote. “The exclusion of

of English at the University of Notre Dame,

religious voices (and certain political voices) goes

where the undergraduate tuition is $41,417.

hand in hand with the exclusion of the persons

It was droll to see him ask at the Guardian’s

who utter them, persons who happen to come

Comment is Free (guardian.co.uk/commentis-

from the marginalized communities that make up

free), “why should anyone be surprised at the

the majority of the world’s population, and who

prospect of academics signing on for a cushy job

will not be justly represented in this institution.

at 25% more than the average university salary,

We can reasonably expect that Britain’s largest

with shares in the enterprise to boot?”

minority group, South Asians who are predom-

The Excellence in English Distinguished

inantly Muslim, to be conspicuously absent at

Visitor went on, “What would prevent most of

Grayling’s college, doubly excluded on the basis

us from doing so is the nausea which wells to

of ideology and social class. Is this double exclu-

the throat at the thought of this disgustingly

sion coincidental? I don’t think so.”

elitist outfit. British universities, plundered of

A more disinterested reviewer (especially one fêted for Excellence in English) might have paused to realise that his prediction of what we

Ophelia Benson is editor of butterfliesandwheels.com and co-author of Why Truth Matters (Continuum, úøøþ)

can “expect” will happen is not the same as what has in fact happened, and that it is a little unfair to moralise about this expected “double exclusion”

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Billlion cc

Terry Eagleton in Manchester, 2008

as if it were a known fact as opposed to a rather

simply has to set up a new show outside of all

snide guess.

that silliness.”

Eagleton however was suavity itself compared

Kat Gupta at mixosaurus (mixosaurus.co.uk)

to Ian Burzynski at State of Formation (stateof-

liked some of the plans. “The things I do find

formation.org). “I would like to propose that the

interesting are the focus on critical thinking and

coincidence between this privatized (read: classist)

scientific literacy, and the way these degrees

model of university and the hegemonic and exclu-

are aimed at those who don’t want to go into

sionary ‘humanism’ of Grayling and friends is not

academia. Critical thinking and scientific literacy

merely incidental,” Burzynski elegantly observed.

are important (although teaching critical thinking

“What the New College of the Humanities

to people who are paying twice the going rate for

amounts to is little more than the shameless use

a UoL degree could be … interesting).

of wealth and privilege to insulate a dominant

“I’m also intrigued by the focus of a degree

ideology from critique. Secured in the comfortable

that is aimed at passionate, engaged students but

bubble of a homogeneous faculty and student base,

isn’t an elaborate pyramid scheme and doesn’t

comprised of a wealthy and (it can be assumed)

just flail about going ‘um, transferable skills! yes!

predominantly white, secular, European popula-

those are useful!’. I didn’t apply to study English

tion, a particular worldview and reading of history

because I wanted to develop excellent commu-

can be propagated without contest by those who

nication and time management skills – I did it

are marginalized by it. This is precisely the intent

because I loved words and language and wanted

of Grayling in establishing this new ideological

to know how they worked.”

platform; the exclusion is built into it by design.”

William Cullerne Bown at Research Blogs

Back on planet Earth, others managed a sober

(exquisitelife.researchresearch.com) had mixed

awareness that the issue was a small college for

feelings. “On the one hand,” he wrote, “it’s easy

teaching humanities students, as opposed to the

(and very British) to knock people who try some-

opening of a major new front in the class war.

thing new. But I like new ideas and I admire the

The classicist Mary Beard at A Don’s Life (times-

enterprise. What chutzpah to start your own

online.typepad.com/dons_life) wrote, “I have to

university!” He also hinted that the reaction

confess to some sympathy with this: if there is to

had been slightly over the top. “More, I think a

be a sustained assault on the humanities, then

little of the spice of private sector competition

maybe someone has to get off their ass and take

is a useful ingredient in overwhelmingly public

the teaching into their own hands; and if there

soups such as higher education or the NHS. And

are to be more and more central demands from

to worry about the NCH is to succumb to a tiny

central government (many of them tick-box, but

distraction while the whole of our university

still hugely time-consuming), then maybe one

system goes through gigantic convulsions.”

4TH QUARTER 2011

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actions & events/threads

AC Grayling signing books at 2010 Global Atheist Convention

actions & events/closures 14

Whenever departments do face threats, people rightly demand to know why. It is instructive to look at the different types of reason given by management, in answering campaigns against closure, to understand why a department has finally been forced to disband or not.

Anatomy of a closure NINA POWER INVESTIGATES DEPARTMENTS UNDER THREAT

t’s been an uneven and often trying time

losses or department closures, or both. Keele,

for UK philosophy departments in the past

Liverpool, Greenwich, London Metropolitan,

couple of years, although significant battles

King’s, and Middlesex have faced one sort of

have been fought and won. Philosophy

threat or another. But a significant pattern is

departments seem to be seen as easy targets by

emerging: of the departments saved, none have

management, not least because philosophy tends

been at post-92 institutions, that is, former poly-

to be a small subject with a few dedicated staff.

technics and colleges that were given university

Perhaps management also fall into the misguided

status in the Further and Higher Education Act

and money-driven trap of thinking that philos-

1992. While it’s true that Middlesex’s Centre

ophy is a “useless” subject – despite the fact that

for Research in Modern European Philosophy,

philosophy graduates have a much better chance

housed in a post-92 institution, was moved to

of being employed after their degree than many

Kingston, the undergraduate department there is

other arts and humanities graduates.

still set to close in a year’s time, with minimal staff

There have been threats to a significant number

teaching out the programme. Other institutions,

of institutions in recent months, whether it be staff

such as Roehampton, have suspended single honours recruitment, while Royal Holloway, by threatening to “discontinue” its classics depart-

Nina Power is senior lecturer in philosophy at Roehampton University

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

ment, plans to move philosophy staff to a different programme.

management at post-92s may be more interested in, for example, developing overseas campuses, as

the forthcoming loss of the block grant to arts

Middlesex have done, or in reframing what they

and humanities subjects, but the way in which

think a university should provide – large courses,

different institutions are handling government

for example, or STEM subjects that won’t lose

cuts varies across the board. In a recent piece

government funding in future. It is certainly the

for the Times Higher Education, John Morgan

case that where institutions have academics sitting

suggests that “Post-1992 universities are being

on senates, advising those who run the universi-

more heavily affected by the government’s deci-

ties, departments are less likely to close. Other

sion to withdraw the teaching grant from all

reasons are sometimes given for an attempted

but science, technology, engineering and math-

philosophy closure. These include low recruit-

ematics (STEM) subjects, and some fear the

ment, although this is rarely true in the case of

creation of a new category of purely vocational

philosophy, which remains an extremely popular

institutions for disadvantaged students.”

choice at undergraduate level. Sometimes medi-

While fierce campaigns have been launched

ocre research performance is mentioned – this

to save philosophy departments, petitions

was one of the reasons cited by Liverpool manage-

created, buildings occupied by students, massive

ment, for example. Some express the fear that,

publicity drives pushed on Facebook and so on,

come the massive rise in tuition fees, students will

the rate of the success of such campaigns reveals

no longer want to take philosophy, and thus a pre-

that of the departments still slated to close, all of

emptive strategy of closure is allegedly required.

them are post-92 institutions. As Jonathan Wolf

Or, as the staff at Middlesex were told, it’s not

put it the Guardian when troubles at Middlesex

that the department wasn’t making a profit, it’s

were announced: “Philosophy is often under

that they weren’t making enough of a profit, and

threat, particularly in the new universities …

by cutting philosophy they could develop more

the chilling thing is that there doesn’t seem to be

lucrative areas of university provision, despite the

anything specially problematic about Middlesex

fact that philosophy was academically and popu-

philosophy, and the reasoning that has led to its

larly their top-rated department.

announced closure could be applied very widely throughout the universities.”

What we mean by a “university” though is an ongoing struggle – can we still pretend to univer-

Whenever departments do face threats,

sality when only a few subjects are represented

people rightly demand to know why. It is instruc-

and only a few subject areas remain? As one of the

tive to look at the different types of reason given

students involved in the (successful) campaign

by management, in answering campaigns against

to save Liverpool put it: “How can it even be a

closure, to understand why a department has

university without a philosophy department?”

finally been forced to disband or not. Following

Fights to save philosophy have followed a

a strong campaign against closure, older institu-

similar course, regardless of their outcome: initial

tions may be more likely to fear negative publicity

shock on the part of staff and their colleagues, who

and worry about their reputation, whereas

have often been fighting to preserve what minimal >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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actions & events/closures

Cuts to philosophy departments can look like part of a pre-emptive attempt to plan for

only being taught at institutions that have a low

on the part of the students who quickly organise

proportion of working-class and ethnic minority

meetings, Facebook groups, petitions and some-

students. (On the topic of London Metropolitan,

times occupations to defend their lecturers and

the institution has more black and ethnic minority

their subject; perhaps a piece or two in the press

students than does the whole of the combined

or on a high-profile philosophy blog, such as Brian

twenty universities who belong to the Russell

Leiter’s “Leiter Reports”. Sometimes then, under

Group, according to the minutes of a meeting of

pressure, management will back down. At other

its board of governors). While philosophy prides

times they wait, ride out the storm, and then

itself on being universal, open to anyone prepared

quietly close departments anyway.

to take time over its arguments, and of general

But what are the implications for the future

relevance, if the patterns we see happening now

of the subject in the UK if philosophy is taught

continue, and it disappears from post-92 institu-

at only a handful of institutions, and barely at all

tions, we run the practical risk of it being open to

at newer universities? John Morgan in the same

only a small portion of the population.

Times Higher article points out, for example, that

It is necessary to learn from the campaigns to

“London Metropolitan University, which has the

save philosophy at these different institutions, to

highest proportion of working-class students in

see where and when battles were won or lost, and

the country, is to scrap subjects such as history,

why. Perhaps what is most important is a sense of

philosophy, performing arts and Caribbean

solidarity between different departments, large

studies”. The immediate knock-on effect is

or small, Russell Group or new university, with an

clear: philosophy and other serious humanities

understanding that what unites them is greater

subjects such as history and classics could end up

than what separates them, and that increasing the quality teaching of philosophy across a variety of different institutions can only serve to benefit the

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

User:Justinc

discipline as a whole.

London Metropolitan University; Libeskind building in foreground

actions & events/closures 16

security they might have for many years; outrage

actions & events/word of mouse

Luciano Floridi

word of mouse

Just cyberwar theory

yberwar is the continuation of

we shouldn’t be too optimistic about the non-

conflict by digital means. It is a new

violent nature of cyberwar. The more we rely on

phenomenon, which has caught

ICT (information and communication technolo-

us by surprise. With hindsight, we

gies) the more lethal cyber attacks will become.

should have known better, for several reasons. Take the nature of our society first. When

it was described as industrial, conflicts had

Soon, crippling an enemy’s communication and information infrastructure will be like zapping its pacemaker rather than hacking its mobile.

mechanised features: engines, from battleships

Consider next the nature of our environ-

to tanks to aeroplanes, were weapons, and the

ment. We have been talking about cyberspace

coherent outcome was the emphasis on petrol

for decades. We could have easily imagined,

and nuclear power. There was an eerie analogy

even without reference to science fiction, that

between assembly lines and warfare trenches.

this would become the new frontier for human

Conventional warfare was kinetic warfare, we

conflicts. We have been fighting each other on

just didn’t know it, because the non-kinetic kind

land, at sea, in the air and in space. Predictably, the

was not yet available. The Cold War and the

infosphere – as I prefer to call it, given the constant

emergence of asymmetric conflicts were part

erosion of the divide between online and offline –

of a post-industrial transformation. Today, in a

was never going to be an exception. Information

culture in which the word “engine” is more likely

is the fifth element and the military now speaks

to be preceded by the word “search”, advanced

of cyberwarfare as “the fifth domain of warfare”.

information societies are as likely to fight with

Finally, think of the origin of the Internet. It

bytes as they are with bullets, with computers

was the military outcome of the arms race and of

as well as guns, not least because digital systems

nuclear proliferation. We were distracted by the

tend to be in charge of analogue weapons. I am

development of the Web and its scientific origins >>>

not referring to the use of intelligence, espionage, or cryptography, but to cyber attacks of the kind witnessed in Estonia (2007) or in Iran (Stuxnet worm, 2010), or to the extensive use of drones in Afghanistan. From robots in physical environments to software agents in cyberspace,

Luciano Floridi (philosophyofinformation.net) holds the research chair in philosophy of information at the University of Hertfordshire and is president of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy

4TH QUARTER 2011

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actions & events/word of mouse 18

and forgot DARPA (Defense Advanced Research

considered in terms of last resort? And within the

Projects Agency). History has merely caught up

jus in bello, what level of proportionality should

with us.

be attributed to a cyber attack? Or, how do you

The previous sketch should help one under-

surrender to a cyber enemy?

stand why information warfare is causing radical

Equally developed, in this case since Greek

transformations in our ways of thinking about

times, is our understanding of military virtue

military, political, and ethical issues. Are we going

ethics. How can virtue ethics be applied to

to see a new arms race, given the very high rate

phenomena that are actually reshaping the condi-

at which cyber weapons “decay”? After all, you

tions of the possibility of virtue ethics itself?

Societies are as likely to fight with bytes as bullets

Bear in mind that any virtue ethics presupposes a philosophical anthropology (Aristotelian, Christian, Confucian, Nietzschean and so forth), and information warfare is only part of the information revolution, which is also affecting our self-understanding as informational organisms.

can use a piece of malware only once, for a patch

Take for example the classic virtue of courage: in

will then become available, and only within, and

what sense can a tele-pilot be courageous when

against, a specific technology that will soon be

manoeuvring a drone? Indeed, will courage still

out of date. If cyber disarmament is ever going

rank so high among the virtues when the capacity

to be an option, how do you decommission cyber

to evaluate and manage information and act upon

weapons? Will the Pony Express make a patri-

it wisely and promptly will seem to be a much

otic come back in 2060 as the last line of defence

more important trait of one’s character?

against an enemy that could destroy anything

Similar questions seem to invite new theo-

digital and online? Some questions make one

rising, not merely the application of old ideas.

smile, but others are increasingly problematic.

Perhaps, instead of updating our old theories

Let me highlight two sets of them that should be

with more and more service packs, we might

of interest to philosophers.

want to consider upgrading them by developing

The body of knowledge and discussion behind just war theory is detailed and extensive. It is the

a new macroethics. Information warfare calls for an information ethics.

result of centuries of refinements since Roman times. The methodological question we face today is whether information warfare is merely one more area of application, or whether it represents a disruptive novelty as well, which will require new developments of the theory itself. For example, within the jus ad bellum, which kind of authority possesses the legitimacy to wage cyberwar? And how should a cyber attack be

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Cyberwar training course

The silence of the lambdas

KIT FINE TAKES JAMES GARVEY INTO THE DEEP WATERS OF SERIOUS METAPHYSICS

f you want to furrow the brow of a philoso-

you, but I hear nothing but the silence of the

pher, you might try saying just four words:

lambdas.

“the philosophy of mathematics”. If that

What’s the relationship of a part to a whole?

doesn’t do it, I suggest “possible world

How should we think of possible objects? Is a

semantics”, “multimodal logics”, “mereology”,

thing the same as its matter? How can thinkers

“arbitrary objects” and “vagueness”. It’s the deep

and speakers mean just the same thing? What

stuff lurking beneath the ground floor of logic

does it mean to exist not just in space, but in

and metaphysics, and it’s where Kit Fine lives.

time? In what way do numbers exist? What are

For the past thirty years he’s brought origi-

the limits of abstraction? These are just some

nality to ancient puzzles at the very heart of our

of the questions that Fine addresses, and his

conception of objects, thought and language. His

answers quite often depend on alarmingly tech-

university website is right to say that his ground-

nical logical manoeuvring. Scanning the titles of

breaking article “‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’ is

his books and papers, even reading one or two

widely thought to have profoundly altered the

articles before reaching for a gin miniature I keep >>>

course of a debate that has been going on among philosophers for thousands of years”. When he agrees to an interview, I suspect that I’m about

James Garvey is editor of tpm

to take one for the team. Logic might speak to

4TH QUARTER 2011

thoughts/interview

“Mathematical objects are not exactly of our own making, but we actually have to do something to get them. There’s something out there which we prod, but there’s the prodding that’s also required. Numbers are not exactly out there or in us, but somehow in between.”

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thoughts/interview

at my desk in case of emergency, I’m not sure

know what would have happened. Maybe I would

that I see a way in. But when I ask him how he

have become a chef.”

explains what he does to those unfamiliar with,

We press on with the question of mathemat-

say, the philosophy of mathematics, he shows me

ical reality. Are the objects of mathematics – such

around entirely agreeably, and the clouds break

things as numbers and sets – created or discov-

quickly.

ered? Fine explains that his view is somehow in

“In the case of mathematics you can just ask people to consider the question of what kind of

reality mathematical reality is. It doesn’t seem to

“Are numbers out there waiting to be discovered?”

the paradoxical middle of these two traditional possibilities. “A natural thought is that things exist in different ways. When it comes to mountains we’re inclined to think that they’re out there waiting to be discovered. When it comes to fictional objects, something like Sherlock Holmes or Hamlet, we tend to think of them as created by authors and not just out there, waiting to be

be part of the physical universe. We don’t seem

discovered. Those views might be incorrect, but

to be talking about our own thoughts. So are we

they’re views that we’re very inclined to have.

talking about a third realm? If so, how are we

“But when it comes to the objects of math-

in a position to do that? Most people can get a

ematics, it’s perhaps not so clear at least in terms

grip on that question. They might be baffled by it,

of that dichotomy where they should lie. Are

perhaps think there’s nothing to say, but at least

they out there waiting to be discovered and if so,

they can see that there is a problem.”

where and how discovered, or do we somehow

The problem is one that Fine has pursued in

create them? I think there are strong indications

some detail, and he has been at it for a while.

pointing in either direction. So it’s a genuine

He first read philosophy in his high school

puzzle.”

library, devouring Bertrand Russell’s A History

There are, then, two standard views – a

of Western Philosophy and his Introduction to

Platonic one, which holds that numbers exist

Mathematical Philosophy. Russell’s work on

independently of our world and our thoughts,

mathematics changed his life.

and a constructivist one, which says that we

“I had doubts,” he says, “doubts about the

somehow create numbers by an act of mind. I

definitions that were being given in calculus,

ask him to explain the attraction of what strikes

without being able to articulate what those doubts

me as the oddest of the two. Why would anyone

were. In Russell I found an articulation of what

think that numbers exist in some third reality?

was worrying me, and how those doubts might

“The extreme version of the Platonic view was

be resolved. I was about sixteen when I looked

held by Gödel. He thought there was something

at those books.” He pauses, thinking of how his

akin to sense perception, by which we can just

life might have been had some now-forgotten

grasp these objects. We can have some sense of

librarian stocked the shelves differently. “I don’t

what he has in mind when we just try to intuit

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thoughts/interview 21

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/interview 22

the number series. That’s something we do in our

seem to have a kind of freedom with numbers

imagination, where the numbers appear before

too. Fine explains, “One remarkable piece of

us like an endless series. There is a possibility

evidence from the history of mathematics in

that by consulting this picture we can read off

favour of this view has to do with the extension

facts about the numbers. For example, for every

of the number system. As Kronecker said, ‘God

number there’s a unique successor, there’s no last

made the integers; all else is the work of man.’

number, and so on. That would be an example of

“It does look as if there’s something like inven-

an extreme Platonism. There is this third dimen-

tion or construction going on when we extend

sion, this realm of reality, and we have something

the number series. Initially we don’t envisage

akin to sense perception by which we might

that there are negative numbers, for example,

apprehend it.” There is something to the idea. What numbers are and what we do with them is not entirely up to us. We’re not fully in charge, as we are with other creations, like fictional characters. Fine explains that, if we think we have something like sense perception when it comes to numbers, we might say that, just as the external world is somehow forced upon us – that when we open our eyes we have no choice but to take what we see before us as existing – mathematical facts are just forced on us too. As he puts it, “Someone who opens his eyes to the natural number series can’t fail to recognise various facts about numbers.” Just as I see the attraction of mathematical Platonism, Fine fleshes out the opposing view, and that gradually looks reasonable too. “According to the constructivist view, we actually construct these objects. They aren’t already there. It’s through the various constructions that we make that we discover what the mathematical facts are. So in some sense the facts are of our own making. Perhaps somewhat in the same way that fictional facts, facts about Sherlock Holmes say, are Conan Doyle’s making.” So even granting the Platonist’s point about the apparent reality of numbers, what’s attractive about constructivism is that mathematicians

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

author imagining a character. It’s more like intel-

imaginary numbers. If we need them there’s

lectually bumping into something, where the

some sense in which we make them up – we just

bumping and the something result in a new grip

suppose that they’re there. Just as for purposes

on mathematical objects. But he suggests that

of a story you might imagine that there’s a super-

the objects, once we have them, in a sense have

hero, mathematicians invent super numbers that

always been there. I ask him how he makes sense

seem capable of doing what would otherwise be

of the idea.

impossible. That does look like construction.” Fine’s own position, though, is somehow in

“The right picture isn’t one in which we just create the objects the way you might create a

between Platonism and constructivism, or

“Someone who opens his eyes to numbers can’t fail to recognise various facts”

anyway different from both. He says that the view is Kantian. Recall that, for Kant, we do not passively experience the world; we’re not just mirrors of nature. Instead, the mind is active, has a role in creating the things

thoughts/interview

or rational numbers or irrational numbers or

we experience. It does something to whatever is

statue, bring into existence something that didn’t

given to us in sensation – it categorises that some-

exist before. What you’re doing when you postu-

thing into a world of objects that causally interact

late is extending the domain of quantification,

in space and time. Fine thinks something similar

you’re extending the objects about which you’re

is going on with mathematical objects.

talking. It’s not that you’re bringing them into

“Dummett at one point gives expression to

existence. You’re targeting the domain of quanti-

such a view – he talks about prodding objects into

fication, a domain of discourse which hadn’t been

existence. Mathematical objects are not exactly

previously targeted. These objects are themselves

of our own making, but we actually have to do

mathematical objects that don’t exist in time, in

something to get them. There’s something out

fact, if they exist they necessarily exist. So it’s not

there which we prod, but there’s the prodding

that they didn’t previously exist, it’s just that you

that’s also required. So that’s a picture according

now managed to target a new domain of eternal,

to which numbers are not exactly out there or in

necessary existence.”

us, but somehow in between, but as Dummett

When I stare at him blankly, he’s very accom-

himself points out it’s very hard to know what

modating. “Here’s an analogy. Suppose I’m

such a view would amount to, in the end. I think

talking about English people. I could then start

you could see my view as a species of this kind

talking about British people, so I’m thereby

of view.”

talking about a wider domain of people. I don’t

Fine’s position is called “procedural postu-

bring those new objects into existence; I just

lationism”. When we postulate, when we do a

now have a more comprehensive domain of

certain sort of reflection on mathematical objects,

discourse. Postulation does something similar.

our acts in a sense bring those objects into exist-

It expands the domain of discourse, but not by

ence. But what’s going on is not quite like an

lifting a restriction that was previously in play, as >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/interview 24

in the previous case, but by doing something else.

they’re talked about, isn’t up to us. That’s the

That’s the curiosity of the position. Somehow

quasi-paradoxical view that I have.”

you’re able to talk more comprehensively about

Fine has interesting ideas about not just

what there is, even though previously there was

mathematical objects, but objects as such. Again

no restriction on what you were talking about.

we’re in deep waters, considering objects in

We do something here. What we talk about is

abstraction. Fine has done a lot of thinking about

up to us. And even though what we talk about

the parts of objects, and what it takes for parts

is up to us, the existence of these objects, once

to form wholes. He argues that in many cases, a

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would be to misunderstand something very

that a thing is not the same as its matter, because

important about sentences, namely that they’re

a thing is matter structured in a certain way. So

words structured in a certain way. Just as it is

the matter and the thing can be in the very same

important to try to understand the structure of

place and the very same time. We start with parts

language, so it’s important to try to understand

and wholes.

the structure of the material world. I follow

“Logical and philosophical investigations

Aristotle in thinking that there’s this other thing,

into parts and wholes have been dominated by

he called it the form, which is involved in under-

a certain tradition that goes under the name

standing what these things are.”

‘mereology’. According to mereology,

“Mathematical objects don’t exist in time, in fact, if they sum of its parts. The only difference between the whole and the parts is exist they necessarily exist” that the whole is one while the parts are there’s just one way of getting a whole

from parts, and the whole is a mere

many. I hold the view according to which there

Fine has also turned his attention to perhaps

are many different ways in which parts can form

the shiftiest objects of all: possibilia or possible

wholes, and many of those ways are not mere

objects. When a road sign warns of possible

sums. I think it’s unfortunate for philosophy that

traffic ahead, is it referring to anything? How

philosophers focus so much on mereology as

could it, if the traffic is merely possible? Actual

traditionally conceived.”

traffic might be inconvenient, but possible traffic

But how can a thing be more than the sum

shouldn’t make much difference. Fine identifies

of its parts? Where does the more come from?

four positions one might take with regard to any

Fine explains, “If you take a tower of blocks

subject matter and applies them to the case of

that a child might make, that’s composed of the

possibilia.

blocks, but it’s not a mere sum of the blocks. The

First of all, he explains, “you might be what’s

blocks have to be in a certain order, one has to

called an eliminativist and just deny the intelli-

be on top of the other. I’m inclined to think of

gibility of talking about possible objects. Just as

that tower as the blocks in a certain arrange-

you might think that there’s no intelligible way

ment. So when you think of it in that way it’s not

to talk of phlogiston, because there’s nothing

a mere sum of the blocks. If you want to actu-

to be talking about, so when people are talking

ally understand mereological structure as it’s

about possible objects there’s just the illusion that

presented to us, it’s very rare that we’re going to

there’s something to be talking about.”

be talking about mere sums. We’re going to be

But Fine rejects this view, because we really

talking about objects structured in a certain way

do seem to talk intelligibly about possible things.

to constitute a whole.

He talks about possible electrons, and asks how

“Take a sentence. You might think that a sentence is just a sequence of words, but that

many possible electrons there might have been, given what we know about the way the universe >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

thoughts/interview

thing is not just the sum of its parts. He also says

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thoughts/interview 26

“Even though what we talk about is up to us, the existence of these objects, once they’re talked about, isn’t up to us” works. “It seems to be perfectly intelligible. On

“This is the view I myself have,” he begins. “If I

the face of it, we’re talking about possible elec-

say, for example, ‘There is a countable infinity of

trons. I would always prefer to take at face value

possible electrons’, I would say that all that really

what appears to be intelligible. I’m inclined to

comes to is that there’s a possibility that there

think that almost always when a philosopher says

is a countable infinity of electrons. So it’s not as

that something is unintelligible, they’re wrong.”

though I’m speaking about the possible objects,

A second view about possible things, also

I’m just saying there are certain possibilities, the

rejected by Fine, takes it that talk of possible

possibility of the actual objects being such and

things is intelligible but non-factual, that is

such in number.

to say, it makes sense but states no facts. Fine

“Whenever you have a construction where

explains, “Perhaps the most famous view of this

you talk about some possible object X, and say

sort is the expressivist view in ethics. According

what’s possible for it, we can understand it in

to this view when we make moral claims we’re

terms of there being a certain possibility, the

expressing certain normative or evaluative atti-

possibly that there is an X. So we never find

tudes to things. When I say abortion is wrong,

ourselves talking about these possible objects.

I’m expressing my disapproval of abortion. And

Instead we’re always talking about possibilities.

so it might be thought that in an analogous way

That’s the hope, that we can understand one kind

this talk of possibility is not really in the busi-

of case in terms of the other.”

ness of stating the facts. In one version of this

The final view, which gets a lot more atten-

view, we engage in some kind of pretence, like

tion than the others, is the idea that our talk of

we’re playing a game, performing a play. I’ll make

possible things is factual but not reducible to talk

many claims, but I’m not actually asserting, I’m

about actual things. Metaphysics goes large, in

not stating facts. Similarly you might think when

other words. Possible things are things, just like

we talk about possibilities we’re playing a kind of

actual things are things. “Maybe someone like

game, we’re pretending there are these things.

Lewis holds this view, or Williamson. So we just

I think it’s implausible in itself, but also I think

accept that there are possibilia, and when we talk

there are detailed objections. We don’t seem to

about them this is factual discourse, but there’s

be engaging in any kind of pretence when we talk

no reduction. There just are these things.

in this way.”

“We shouldn’t try to understand talk of

According to the third view, there are facts

possible objects in terms of actual objects. There

about possible things, but such facts reduce to

just are all these objects, and it’s not as though the

nothing more than facts about actual things.

actual ones are somehow ontologically privileged,

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notion of borderline case which is relevant to the

terms of them. Without going into detailed argu-

phenomenon of vagueness. We have to achieve

ments, I’d be happier if there were some sort of

an understanding of vagueness in some other

reduction. If you’ve got a robust sense of reality,

way.

there’s something slightly metaphysically offen-

“An analogy I sometimes make is in terms of

sive about this view. It’s hard to believe that in

some stepping stones being uneven. There’s one,

reality there are these possible objects.”

there’s another, and then there’s a drop. Then it

We come finally to Fine’s influential views on

goes back up. This is a global feature of the step-

vagueness and the so-called “sorites” paradox.

ping stones. It’s a feature of the stepping stones as

The name comes from the Greek word for heap,

a whole, not a single stepping stone. Single step-

“soros”. Eubulides, an ancient Greek philoso-

ping stones are not uneven in this sense. I have a

pher with a thing for paradoxes, asked, roughly,

similar view of vagueness. It’s a global phenom-

when do you go from a few grains of wheat to a

enon that has to do with the general application

heap? One grain doesn’t count, neither do two or

of the predicate, not its application in a partic-

three or four, but keep adding grains and, even-

ular case. That goes against the view of almost

tually, you’d say that you do have a heap. The

every other philosopher who has talked about the

trouble is that for a range of borderline cases, we

matter.

don’t know what to do with the predicate “is a

“Take a sorites series and start off with a

heap”. There are a number of instances in which

completely bald man and go to one who’s very

“This is a heap” is neither true nor false, but how

hairy through gradual increments. The predi-

could that be? When I ask Fine about his views

cate bald is indeterminate in its application

on vagueness, he thinks for a very long minute,

to that series of cases. It’s natural to think that

noticeably brightening as he does so, and finally

that’s because there’s some particular case that’s

tells me he’s found an entirely new way to think

borderline or has some sort of borderline status.

about vague predicates.

The new thought is that that’s a mistake, that the

“I can briefly outline my new view, which is very radical.” He goes on, half smiling, “If I’m right almost everyone else is wrong.” I lean in.

indeterminacy cannot be localised in that way. We cannot point our finger at any one case. “It means everyone else has been wrong. It

“Predicates can be vague. Take a predi-

leads to a very different conception of vagueness,

cate like bald. It’s vague. Perhaps one way

the logic of vagueness, how you handle various

of expressing that is that the predicate is not

problems. It leads to a completely new logic. It’s

completely determined in its application. Many

something I’ve been thinking about.”

people have thought that the phenomenon of

Sometimes seismic shifts way down in the

vagueness is to be understood though borderline

depths of our grip on logic and metaphysics do

cases: what it is for a predicate to be vague is for

more than cause ripples up here on the philo-

there to be borderline cases. My view is that this

sophical surface. If Fine’s right, his fresh line of

approach to the problem of vagueness is funda-

thought could be just the start of new waves in

mentally misguided. There is no intelligible

our understanding of logic, objects, and language.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/interview

and we’re to understand talk of the possible in

thoughts/sci-phi

Mathew Iredale

sci-phi

Altruism in artificial life 28

he origin and persistence of altruism

r > c/b, where c is the reproductive cost to the

is one of the enduring puzzles in

altruist, b is the reproductive benefit to the recip-

biology and the social sciences. Why

ient and r is their genetic relatedness. In other

should an individual carry out a behav-

words, altruism is favoured the more closely

iour that benefits another individual at a cost,

related you are to the recipient, and if the benefit

sometimes a significant cost, to itself? It seems

to the recipient is likely to be high and the cost to

to go completely against the Darwinian idea of

you is likely to be low.

“survival of the fittest”. Populations of altruists

One classic example of kin selection in action

are vulnerable to invasion by cheaters who do not

is an ant colony, which is generally composed of

cooperate, but gain the benefit from those who

one queen, who spends all her time laying eggs,

do cooperate, so we would not expect altruistic

and hundreds to thousands of workers who do all

behaviours to be maintained in a population. Put

the other jobs, from rearing the eggs to foraging

formally, altruism should not be evolutionarily

for food. These workers are sterile, and so unable

stable.

to reproduce. They altruistically give up this

This apparent paradox appeared to be

opportunity to spend their time helping to rear

resolved by William Hamilton’s “inclusive fitness

the offspring of the queen. As the queen is usually

theory”, at least, as far as altruism between rela-

their mother, they are rearing brothers and sisters,

tives is concerned. More commonly known as kin

and so kin selection explains their altruism.

selection, it makes specific the idea that individ-

Similar life cycles occur in other insects, such as

uals are not only able to transmit copies of their

termites, and many wasps, bees, and aphids.

genes directly, through their own reproduction,

But there are problems with Hamilton’s

but also indirectly by favouring the reproduction

theory. One prominent critic is the biologist

of kin, such as siblings or cousins. By helping a

Edward Wilson, who points out that ant and

close relative reproduce, an individual still passes

wasp colonies are not the exemplars of altruism

on its own genes to the next generation, albeit

they are taken to be. Social ants and wasps are

indirectly.

often founded by unrelated queens; workers

Hamilton expressed his theory in the form of

do not show preference for their own mothers

an equation, Hamilton’s rule, which states that

in multiple-queen colonies, and only occasion-

altruism is favoured by natural selection when

ally for their sisters; and colonies remain well

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

foraging tasks, such as pushing seed-like objects

their workers are only very distantly related or

across the floor to a destination – can evolve over

not at all.

multiple generations. Each robot has an arti-

Another problem for Hamilton’s theory

ficial genome, or genetic code, initially made

is that although advocates point to the many

up of a random string of zeros and ones, which

studies that appear to provide qualitative support

encodes the neural network that produces the

for kin selection theory, there is a clear lack of

robot’s behaviour. Those robots not able to push

studies providing quantitative support. The

the seeds to the correct location are selected

problems facing such a study are considerable,

out and cannot pass on their code, while robots

as any research involving live animals would

that perform comparatively better see their code

need to span hundreds of generations before

reproduced, mutated and recombined with

being able to reach any conclusions, and would

that of other robots into the next generation – a

involve far too many variables. But researchers

minimal model of natural selection.

Dario Floreano, Laurent Keller and Markus

For their latest experiment, groups of eight

Waibel from the Laboratory of Intelligent

micro-robots and eight food items were placed

Systems in Lausanne, Switzerland, have found

in a foraging arena with one white wall and three

an ingenious way around these problems and

black walls. The team chose a collective foraging

have, for the first time, provided quantitative

task to investigate the evolution of altruism,

support for Hamilton’s rule. Their solution,

because foraging efficiency is a key factor for

recently published in the open-access journal,

many biological social groups such as ant or

PloS Biology, is to use tiny robots smaller than a

bee colonies. The performance of the robots

matchbox to test Hamilton’s rule.

was proportional to the number of food items

Previous research by Floreano and Keller has

successfully transported to the white wall, and

shown that micro-robots – when doing simple

the robots were given the option of allocating the fitness rewards of successfully transported items to themselves (selfish behaviour) or sharing them equally with all the other group members (altruistic behaviour). The researchers conducted 500 generations of selection in a population consisting of 200 groups of eight robots. The probability of robots to transmit their genetic code from one generation to the next was proportional to how well they performed the task. The selected codes were randomly assorted and subjected to crossovers and mutations to create the 1,600 new genomes (200 groups of eight robots) forming the next

swarm robots

generation. This experimental setup allowed the >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/sci-phi

organised and stable even in extreme cases when

thoughts/sci-phi 30

researchers to independently manipulate the

The team found that when the c/b value was

relatedness between robots within a group and

very small, the level of altruism was very high in

the cost to benefit ratios of helping. To quan-

the populations where within-group relatedness

titatively test Hamilton’s rule for the evolution

was positive, but that it was close to zero when

of altruism, they investigated how the level of

robots were unrelated. In experiments with other

altruism (defined as the proportion of food items

c/b values, the level of altruism was also very

shared with other group members) changed over

low when the relatedness was close to zero, but

generations in populations with five different c/b

rapidly increased when the relatedness became

ratios and five relatedness values, making twenty-

higher than a given value. In all cases, the transi-

Natural selection also applies to synthetic organisms

tion occurred when r became greater than c/b, as predicted by Hamilton’s rule. The authors conclude that Hamilton’s rule is vindicated: kin selection theory always accurately predicts the minimum relatedness necessary for altruism to evolve. At the same time, they have

five different set ups in all. For each of these set

demonstrated that kin selection does not require

ups, the selection experiments were conducted in

specific genes devoted to altruism or sophisti-

twenty independently evolving populations.

cated cognitive abilities, as the neuronal network

Because of the impossibility of conducting

of their robots was composed of only thirty-three

hundreds of generations of selection with real

neurons. But what is perhaps most fascinating is

robots, the team used simulations that precisely

that they have shown that a fundamental prin-

model the dynamical and physical properties of

ciple of natural selection also applies to synthetic

the robots, having previously determined that

organisms when these have heritable properties.

evolved genomes can be successfully imple-

The question naturally arises: what other areas of

mented in real robots that display similar

evolution may be testable using synthetic organ-

behaviour to that observed in the simulations.

isms, where the insurmountable difficulties that

Because the robot’s genes were initially set to

would face quantitative studies involving living

random values, their behaviour was completely

organisms need not apply?

arbitrary in the first generation, with some robots just rocking backwards and forwards while others randomly moved around the arena or simply remained stationary. However, their perform-

Suggested reading “A Quantitative Test of Hamilton’s Rule for the

ance rapidly increased over the 500 generations

Evolution of Altruism” by Markus Waibel, Dario

of selection and most importantly the level of

Floreano and Laurent Keller, PLoS Biology (May

altruism also rapidly changed over generations

2011).

with the final stable level of altruism varying

“The evolution of eusociality” by Martin Nowak,

greatly depending on the within-group related-

Corina Tarnita and Edward O. Wilson, Nature 466

ness and c/b ratio.

(26 Aug 2010).

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

thoughts/the tpm essay

It is evident that every moment of our life we depend on having some kind of brain in working order. But it does not follow from this that we are a brain in working order.

My brain made me do it, your honour

RAYMOND TALLIS ON NEURODETERMINISM AND NEUROLAW It is almost impossible to pick up a newspaper

only arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests,

without encountering a new story about what

as well as our sorrows, pains, grief and tears”.

brain scientists, armed with the latest technology,

This is a remarkably precise anticipation of what

have discovered about us. Functional Magnetic

Francis Crick wrote a few years ago: “You, your

Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scans are as ubiqui-

joys and sorrows, your memories and ambi-

tous in the broadsheets and red tops as scantily

tions, your sense of personal identity and free

clad women in the tabloids. The word is out

will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of

that, if you want to understand the true nature

a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associ-

and origin of our experiences, emotions, memo-

ated molecules”. In short, the apparent relevance

ries, motives, thoughts, and ethical, aesthetic,

of recent advances in neuroscience to under-

economic, political and religious behaviour, you

standing ourselves rests on an ancient idea: “You

need to look at brain activity.

are your brain”.

>>>

The source of this excitement is billed as being due to advances in neuroscience, in particular those that have been made possible by new non-invasive ways of looking at the living, awake human brain. In fact it owes more to assumptions than empirical discoveries. The most important goes back 2,500 years to Hippocrates who

Raymond Tallis was professor of geriatric medicine at Manchester University and a consultant physician. He was elected to the Academy of Medical Sciences for his research in neuroscience. He now writes poetry, fiction and books on philosophy, most recently, Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity (Acumen, úøùù).

asserted that “it is from the brain and the brain

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/the tpm essay 32

In what follows, I want to

self, is dependent on brain func-

examine this assumption and its

tion. That much is beyond doubt.

relevance to our thinking about

What is in question is whether

free will and criminal liability.

we may conclude from this that

I will first set out the case for

our consciousness is identical

“neurodeterminism” – the notion

with brain activity, and that brain

that neuroscience has provided

science will consequently tell us

independent support for doubting

what we are. I shall return to this,

that we truly are agents who can be held responsible for our

Hippocrates by Peter Paul Rubens

but I want first to look at some widely discussed studies that

actions, since we are mere sites through which

seem to bear directly on the notion that, when it

the laws of nature, in particular the laws of biolog-

comes to action, our brains are calling the shots.

ical nature, are expressed. I will then critique the

The first is a famous set of experiments,

claim that neuroscience has anything specific to

carried out by the neurophysiologist Benjamin

say on this matter, first by arguing against the

Libet in the 1980s and repeated and refined

fundamental assumption that we are our brains

many times since, which seem to show that our

and then by subjecting to sceptical examina-

brain makes decisions to act before our conscious

tion a couple of widely discussed examples of

mind is aware of them, so they are not really our

research that is supposed to support that assump-

decisions at all. In a typical experiment, Libet’s

tion. Finally, I will glance at the application of

subjects are instructed to make a simple move-

neurodeterminism to the law and to the plea of

ment – to bend their right wrist or the fingers

diminished responsibility.

of their right hand – in their own time. Using

The case for neurodeterminism rests on the

electro-encephalography,

the

experimenter

belief that we are identical with activity in parts

records a particular activity in the brain that

of our brains. This belief seems to have a lot

indicates a readiness to move. This so-called

going for it, and the most compelling evidence

“readiness potential” (RP) is seen in the part

comes from quite homely sources. For example,

of the cerebral cortex most closely associated

decapitation results in a steep decline in IQ; a

with voluntary movement. Libet also asked his

bang on the head makes you behave oddly or lose

subjects to recall the position of a spot revolving

consciousness. More sophisticated observations

round a clock face in order to determine the

have uncovered close correlations between brain

time when they were first aware of their urge or

dysfunction and mind dysfunction – holes in the

intention to make a movement. To his surprise,

brain, for example, are associated with holes in

he found that the RP occurred a consistent third

consciousness and mental capacity. Over the last

of a second before the time at which the subjects

century or so, there have been ever more detailed

reported being aware of a decision to move.

demonstrations of the way every aspect of our

Libet concluded from this that the brain (not the

consciousness, from the most primitive tingle

subject or the person) had “decided” to initiate

to the most exquisitely constructed sense of

or at least to prepare to initiate the act before

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

button. Remarkably, the relevant regions (in the

a decision having been made. Put more simply,

part of the cerebral cortex associated with volun-

the cerebral causes of our actions seem to be in

tary movement) lit up a full 5 seconds before the

advance of our conscious awareness of deciding

individual was aware of having made a choice.

to perform them.

Moreover, there were other areas in the frontal

These findings are open to a range of inter-

cortex (traditionally ascribed executive func-

pretations, as we shall see, but they cannot be

tion) that were active no less than seven seconds

dismissed as mere artefacts of the method of

before awareness of the decision. If the delay in

recording. Nor can the gap between the elec-

the response of the fMRI scanner detecting the

trical signal of the initiation of action, the RP, and the awareness of the intention to perform the action be explained away as the interval between forming an intention and being sufficiently

Decapitation results in a steep decline in IQ

reflectively aware of the intention to allocate it to a particular time. This has been demonstrated

activity was accounted for, the interval increased

rather dramatically by more recent work using

to ten seconds. Such a long delay could not be

fMRI.

due to the subject mistiming the intention to

Chung Siong Soon and colleagues presented

move – a possible explanation for Libet’s original

a succession of letters on a screen. Subjects were

findings, as it is somewhat tricky to time one’s

asked to press a left or a right button at a moment

own decisions. The authors concluded that there

of their own choosing and to note the letter being

is a network of high level control areas “that

displayed when they felt that they were making

begins to prepare an upcoming decision long

a decision to press the button. The letter was a

before it enters awareness”. It looks like we don’t

time marker. The regions that lit up in the brain

know what we are doing until we have found that

predicted the subject’s choice of left or right

we have done it. Libet’s original interpreta-

tion of his own experiments was

Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1987-1209-027 / CC-BY-SA

that they demonstrated that we do not have free will: the brain “decides” to move, the brain “initiates” movement. As he put it in a more recent paper: “If the ‘act now’ process is initiated unconsciously, then the conscious free will is not doing it”. We do, however, have “free won’t”: we can inhibit movements that are Eye tracker

initiated by the brain. Instead >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/the tpm essay

there was any reportable subjective awareness of

thoughts/the tpm essay 34

fMRI

of initiating voluntary processes, we “select and

Conscious Will that the only connection between

control them”; either by permitting the move-

willing and acting is that both come from the

ment that arises out of an unconsciously initiated

same unconscious source.

process or “by vetoing progress to actual motor

I shall presently subject Libet’s and Soon’s

activation”. This has been expressed as our ability

experiments to a critical examination, but I want

to “rubber stamp” decisions that have already

first to examine their background assumption. It

been made by neural networks. It is, however,

is, put simply, that we are identical with observ-

not very clear why the decisions should require

able neural activity, so that what the EEG or

rubber stamping. In the personless world of

fMRI reveals tells us what we are. If observations

neuroscience, it makes no more sense for us to

of neural activity fail to demonstrate free will, our

“rubber stamp” the decisions of our brain than

free will is put into question: what neuroscience

for a falling pebble to endorse the gravitational

cannot find isn’t real.

field. Even so, it remains a highly popular view.

It is of course hardly surprising that, if we are

On the basis of this and other observations

identical with physical events in a material object

of the unconscious influences on our behaviour,

such as the brain, then we should turn out not

Daniel Wegner has argued in The Illusion of

to have the freedom we ascribe to ourselves. All

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

expect of something is that it should seem like

physical causes have physical causes in turn.

itself. The usual defence against this objection

This causal genealogy will ultimately go back to

is that neural activity in the visual cortex and the

the Big Bang, which clearly ante-dates anything

experience of the visible world are two aspects

which we can claim to have initiated. If we are

of the same thing, rather as (to use John Searle’s

brain activity, we are merely sites through which

example) molecules of H2O (which are not slip-

the material universe unfolds in accordance with

pery and shiny) are the same as water (which

the unbreakable laws of physical nature. In short,

is). Neither this defence – nor the comparable

neurodeterminism is merely a variant of deter-

idea that neural activity and conscious experi-

minism and requires no empirical proof. The critique of neurodeterminism must begin therefore with questioning the presupposition that consciousness (and the self, and the putative

What neuroscience cannot find isn’t real

agent) is identical with neural activity. The belief that neuroscience has provided

ences are the same thing seen at different levels

evidence for this identity is based on an elemen-

or under different descriptions – will work, for

tary error. It is evident that every moment of our

the simple reason that the notion of “different

life we depend on having some kind of brain in

aspects” (or “levels” or “descriptions”) presup-

working order. But it does not follow from this

poses an observer from which they are observed.

that we are a brain in working order. Likewise

The difference between neural activity and expe-

the ever closer correlations observed between

riences cannot be due to observers experiencing

neural activity and aspects of consciousness do

one or other of them in differing ways.

not demonstrate identity between them. To put

For those who are not knocked down by this

it another way, the fact that neural activity is a

knock-down argument, there is another that

necessary condition of consciousness does not

undermines the identity theory at an equally

demonstrate that it is a sufficient condition, that

fundamental level. Supposing my seeing an

neural activity is by itself sufficient to construct

object in front of me, such as a glass, was due

us so that the neurological properties of our

to the effect of light originating from this glass

brains define what we are.

producing activity in my visual cortex. This

As it turns out, the more closely we look at

forward causal link between the glass and my

the supposed identity between consciousness

brain is not sufficient for me to be aware of

and neural activity, the less convincing it seems;

the glass. The events in the cortex have then

indeed, it is self-contradictory. The most obvious

to be about the glass, which is explicitly quite

problem is that neural activity looks nothing

separate from them. This “aboutness” or “inten-

like the elements of consciousness. There is,

tionality” would have to reach from the visual

for example, nothing about the contents of the

cortex in the darkness of my cranium, back up

visual cortex that is in the least like the appear-

the causal chain, to those events in and around

ance of the visible world, but the least you might

the glass that brought about the nerve impulses >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/the tpm essay

physical events have physical causes, and those

thoughts/the tpm essay 36

and construct the presence of the

point of origin of events, that it has

glass out of them. The identity

selfhood, and that it is responsible

theory, in other words, requires of

for some events rather than others?

nerve impulses that they should

Those who assert that selfhood and

do something that no other kinds

agency are illusions must explain

of physical event (including most

how these illusions might arise in

nerve impulses) do – namely reach

bits of the material world.

back up causal chains in order to

There are many other very

be about their proximate causes.

serious problems with the assump-

The neural theory of conscious-

tion that we are identical with brain

ness translates being aware of

activity. The unity of conscious-

something into an utterly anoma-

ness, whereby I am both aware

lous property, ascribed to certain

of a myriad of items at any given

nerve impulses, of reaching out

moment, but still experience them

to something that is both spatially

as connected in a single field of

and temporally separate from

co-consciousness over time, has no

them. This reaching out is not, of

possible material basis. The unity

course, reverse causation. It is something even

of self over time is similarly resistant to mate-

more difficult to accommodate in the materialist

rialist explanation. In both cases, the standard

philosophy upon which neurodeterminism rests:

explanation of the convergence of neural path-

a mode of connectedness that is, as it were, at

ways does not explain how merging occurs

right angles to the causal net.

without mushing; how the conscious self is not

This is not the end of the problems faced

a place of unholy confusion. This is exacerbated

by the neural theory of consciousness. By over-

by the fact that we have an explicit aware-

looking intentionality (which tears open the fabric

ness of things that are past as being past, and

of the causally closed material world) it reduces

of possible future events as being located in a

the mind to a material, causal way station where

future. Material objects such as brains cannot

there is no basis for the difference between inputs

house or generate tensed time. As Einstein said,

and outputs, no point at which events “arrive” or

“we believing physicists know that past, present

are “received” (as perceptions); it offers nothing

and future, are simply illusions albeit stubborn

to locate the “brainified” person in the centre of

ones”. We have no grounds for supposing that

egocentric space; and even if it were to cope with

tenses could be generated in certain privileged

this by denying the self as a point of arrival and

enclaves of the physical world such as the stuff

origin, it would be left entirely unable to account

inside our skulls.

for the undeniable fact that we do have a sense

All of these difficulties arise from a yet more

of self, and agency, and of being the centre of

profound problem: the fact that the brain is a

our worlds. Why should part of the causal net

piece of matter whose fundamental properties

become possessed of the notion that it is the

are not different from those of the rest of the

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

thoughts/the tpm essay

The unity of consciousness has no possible material basis material world. For the â&#x20AC;&#x153;lowdownâ&#x20AC;? on matter, we

eyes of physics for which it is a piece of matter,

turn to physics, and this gives an account of what

it is none of those things. One could go further

there is that is entirely lacking appearance and

and state that it has no phenomenal appearance.

viewpoint. For several hundred years, physicists

And this is true of all pieces of matter: they have

have argued that the truest portrait of matter

no appearances in themselves. How could they,

is mathematical, and this by-passes the quali-

given that they are viewed through the lens of

ties that we experience. That table over there is

mathematics and not from a particular view-

brown, sturdy, beautiful, handy and so on. In the

point? In the absence of a subjective viewpoint, >>>

cc AaronY, and brain image from J. Talairach & P. Tournoux, Co-planar Stereotactic Atlas of the Human Brain (New York: Thieme, 1988).

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/the tpm essay 38

items do not have appearances. A rock has a

of the wrist, a mere movement. That move-

certain appearance when looked at from the

ment, however, was only a minute part of a long

back, from the front, from above, from below,

sequence of movements adding up to a large-

from the outside looking in or the inside looking

scale action which could be described as “taking

out. But it has no appearance viewed from itself

part in Dr Libet’s experiment”. This large-scale

as it were, because this would require that it

action began at least as far back as getting up in

should have all of these appearances (which are

the morning to visit Dr Libet’s laboratory (after,

incompatible with one another) at once. As we

perhaps, setting the alarm to make sure one was

treat items purely as pieces of matter, there is a

not late); involved consenting to take part in an

disappearance of appearance; and this must be

experiment whose nature and purpose and safety

just as true of “biomatter” such as brains as of

was fully understood; and required (among many

rocks and clouds. It seems hardly possible, there-

other things) listening to and understanding and

fore, that the brain, lacking appearance in itself,

agreeing to the instructions that were received

can have the capacity to make other things (that

– and then deciding to flex the wrist. In other

have no intrinsic appearance) appear. But this is

words, the immediate prior intention, the

what the identity theory requires it to do as the

psychological event timed by Libet, was not the

supposed seat of consciousness.

whole story of the action, only a tiny part of it. It

That there is nothing inherent in neural

was preceded by many others that were minutes,

activity capable of making things appear is revealed indirectly by the fact that there is no fundamental difference between neural activity in parts of the brain that are, and parts that are not, supposed to be associated with consciousness. The hunt for distinctive “neural correlates of consciousnesses” has proved baffling and disappointing. This should be enough to make us less impressed by the experiments of Libet, Soon, and others: the relationship between neural activity and consciousness, and hence conscious behaviour, is not at all clear. But let us look more closely at what led them to conclude that, as the neural events supposedly preparatory to action occur before the subject is aware of making the decision to act, it is the brain, rather than the subject that is the agent. Recall that the action the subjects were asked to perform was extremely simple: a flexing

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Brain image from J. Talairach & P. Tournoux, Co-planar Stereotactic Atlas of the Human Brain (New York: Thieme, 1988).

hours, perhaps days before the action. The real

it shows us what is suspect about determinism

story is not just the flexing of the wrist but one

more broadly construed. If you want to make

of a sustained and complex resolve being main-

voluntary actions seem involuntary the first thing

tained over a very long time. This includes many

to do is to strip away their context – the self from

large items of behaviour – getting on and off

which they originate, the nexus of meanings that

buses, looking for the laboratory, cancelling or

is the world to which they are addressed – and

declining other commitments so as to be free to

then effectively break them down into their phys-

attend the lab, and so on – that have many thou-

ical elements. This gets you well on the way to

sands of motor components.

eliminating the difference between a twitch and

Once this is appreciated, then the temporal

a deliberate action, and to make an action seem

relation between the last step, the wrist flexing,

as if it could be explained by a burst of nerve

and the Readiness Potential seen in the lab

impulses, embedded in a no-person neural

becomes unimportant. The decision to partici-

reality that has nothing to do with a first-person

pate in the experiment, which alone gave the

world, where behaviour is not atomic but inter-

wrist flexion its meaning, began not millisec-

connected. The true locus of our free will is a

onds, seconds, or minutes, but hours before the

field of intention, rooted in the self and its world,

wrist was flexed. Perhaps weeks, when the person

which extends far beyond a few moments in a

decided to become a subject in the experiment.

laboratory. No wonder, in the lab setting, actions

The flexing of the wrist is just the last compo-

look simply like events that happen to the actor.

nent of this action called “taking part in Dr

They are seen to be “effects”.

Libet’s experiment” which would itself be part of

If, incidentally, we really were the uncon-

a greater intentional whole, such as “wanting to

scious, helpless playthings of our brains, it would

please Dr Libet” or “wanting to help those clever

be difficult to know how we could deliberately set

scientists understand the brain, as it might one

out to demonstrate this – to become conscious of

day help doctors to treat my child’s brain injury

our unconsciousness and voluntarily devise exper-

more effectively”. This would be very difficult

iments that demonstrate our inability to initiate

to find in a study which recorded small slices of

voluntary actions. The source of our selfhood and

neural activity.

our freedom cannot of course be located in the

Libet’s experiment illustrates how the (neuro)

no-person world of the brain. No, the theatre in

determinist case against freedom is not only

which we lead, rather than merely organically

based on ropy metaphysical assumptions but

live, is the human world, the boundless field of

is also rooted in a very distorted conception of

shared intelligibility, or the community of minds

what constitutes an action in everyday life, and

in which, courtesy of our brains, we participate.

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

thoughts/the tpm essay

There is nothing inherent in neural activity capable of making things appear

thoughts/the tpm essay 40

It is through that outside-of-the-brain that we

voluntary behaviour. Laboratory determinism

are able to express our freedom in numerous

looks a little patchy.

ways, including launching investigations into

The “pick and mix” nature of neuro-

the workings of our own brains. In an entirely

determinism

neurodeterministic world, none of this would be

neuroscience-based pleas of diminished respon-

possible. This is what makes some of the ambi-

sibility. The defendant who says “it was my

tions of so-called neurolaw self-contradictory.

brain what made me do it” is usually referring

We are now better placed to challenge the claim

to the crime with which he is being charged:

that our brains are calling the shots. This idea lies

the action in which he stole money, beat up a

Neurodeterminism is no different from determinism period

seen

most

strikingly

person who irritated him, or reduced to rubble a pub in which he had been denied a sixteenth pint. He does not offer this explanation as to why he turned up in court, retained counsel and listened to his advice, why the QC defended him, why he offered this plea, or why the judge

behind the increasing expectation that we ought

should accept it. If he subscribed to neurode-

to look at brain activity to determine whether or

terminism, it would be global, and he would

not defendants are actually responsible for the

have to assume that everyone else in court was

crimes they may have committed: it is, in short,

equally helpless.

the founding assumption of neurolaw.

What is more, given that his brain is a mate-

We should be suspicious of the plea, “my

rial object wired into the material world – so

brain made me do it”, because it leaves unre-

that events in the brain are the effects of events

solved who (or more precisely what) is making

outside of the brain – his plea would amount to

the plea, is passing the blame on to the brain –

“the Big Bang made me do it”. The notion of

another bit of the brain, presumably. But there

being coerced by a piece of the causal net that

are further grounds for suspicion that apply

happened to target him would also be problem-

also to those experiments that seem to demon-

atic: why should a particular brain single him out?

strate that we are unfree. The research that

Only if he was his brain. In which case, “my brain

Daniel Wegner summarises in The Illusion of

made me do it” would amount to “I made me

the Conscious Will reveals situations in which

do it”, which is hardly an argument for mitiga-

we are less free than we think we are. But, if

tion. What this illustrates is how the very act of

neurodeterminism were true, there would be no

blaming one’s brain actually presupposes a posi-

“more” or “less” free. Likewise, the participants

tion outside of the neurodeterministic frame

in Libet’s and Soon’s experiments presumably

of reference in which the role of the brain is

signed consent forms that made it clear that they

visible. This position is, of course, the commu-

knew exactly what they were doing and why. So

nity of minds that lies outside the individual brain

there seem to be little arias of set-piece deter-

housing a self, acting in a world that cannot be

minism against a background of what seems like

reduced to neural activity.

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

siasm of the aficionados of the practitioners of other neuro-prefixed disciplines such as

thoughts/the tpm essay

The limited role of neuroscience in the law should incidentally temper the enthu-

neuroaesthetics, neuroeconomics, neuropolitics, neurosociology, neurotheology and neuroethics who wish to see the traditional humanities replaced by studies of the brain. While it is clear that normal brain function is Once this is appreciated, neuroscience loses

a necessary condition for everyday consciousness

its metaphysical traction and just becomes one

and ordinary behaviour, it does not follow from

piece of evidence among others. It is perfectly

this that it is a sufficient condition of conscious-

obvious that, if I have a frontal lobe tumour, I

ness and an explanation of behaviour, even less

may be less inclined to control my impulses. But

that consciousness is identical with neural activity.

such obvious cases (acknowledged long before

Experiments that seem to demonstrate that we

the present era of neuromania) are obvious

are in the grip of our brains overlook the context

because they arise out of particular, unusual

in which the experiments take place and the

circumstances, not out of our general relation-

conditions that make it possible for scientists to

ships to our brains. The extension of the plea of

set up the experiments and, as we have seen, for

mitigation to include people whose scans show an

subjects to take part in them. Even those who are

imbalance between one part of the brain (such

committed to neurodeterminism seem to apply it

as the frontal cortex) and another (such as the

in a pick and mix way in real life situations, when

amygdaloid body) – and the prediction that justice

they are judging whether some actions are less free

will eventually be better served by neuroscience

than others. They should not allow a “more or less”.

than by the conventional forensic disciplines – is

Given that the brain is a material object, neuro-

an empirical claim that needs to be tested and

determinism is no different from determinism

not one that is rooted in what we think we know

period, placing us in the network of causation that

of our general relationship to our brains. What is

unfolds from the Big Bang to the Big Crunch. It is

more, it will have to be tested against standards

not only incompatible with free will but also with

that have been established long before neuro-

the apparent discovery that our free will is an illu-

sciences started hankering after a curly wig. The

sion. The fundamental error is that of believing

more general claim (by writers such as Semir

that an empirical inquiry – a set of actions, presum-

Zeki) that with the advance of neuroscience the

ably freely undertaken – could demonstrate

untidy, ill-informed decision-making processes in

whether or not we are determined to behave as

the law courts will be replaced by a “biological

we do. Contemporary neurodeterminism works

justice” that can connect actions with the neural

within, rather than demonstrates the truth of, an

activity that drove them and the wider biological

assumption about human nature that goes back

bases of that activity, is clearly self-contradictory.

2,500 years. And it is an incorrect one.

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

thoughts/illness

Trying to figure out the contours of the concept of disorder is worthwhile because whether something counts as a disorder frequently makes a huge difference to us in everyday life. Suppose I drink a lot – if I think alcoholism is a disease I may visit a doctor, if I consider it a moral failing I may blame myself for my weakness of will.

For good or ill

RACHEL COOPER CONSIDERS JUDGEMENTS OF NORMALITY AND DISORDER

here is the line between the

Trying to figure out the contours of the concept

normal and the pathological?

of disorder is worthwhile because whether some-

How can we tell whether a

thing counts as a disorder frequently makes a

condition is a disorder (which

huge difference to us in everyday life. Think of

I take to be an umbrella term that encompasses

various controversial cases – alcoholism, mild

all diseases, illnesses, injuries etc.) or something

depression, psychopathy, ADHD and sex addic-

else? Cases where it’s unclear whether a condi-

tion. We want to know whether these conditions

tion is a disorder or a moral failing include drug

are disorders as this makes a difference to how

addiction, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

we treat others and think of ourselves. Suppose

(ADHD), and personality disorders. Cases where

I drink a lot – if I think alcoholism is a disease I

it’s hard to distinguish disorders from normal

may visit a doctor, if I consider it a moral failing >>>

states include middle-aged male impotence, mild depression, and forgetfulness in old age. Sometimes a condition may not actually be a bad thing and so just be a difference rather than a disorder. Some groups argue that conditions such as Asperger’s syndrome, asexuality and deafness are not harmful and so should be seen as differ-

Rachel Cooper is senior lecturer in philosophy at Lancaster University. She is author of Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science (Acumen, úøøÿ) and Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Springer, úøøý).

ences rather than as disorders.

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

thoughts/illness 44

Determining whether a condition is a disorder might involve values I may blame myself for my weakness of will. Or

might be partially genetic, and yet we wouldn’t

as another example, suppose my child struggles

want to pathologise such states. Even if the physi-

to pay attention in class. If ADHD is a disorder

cian can tell us that the state is likely to cause

then he may qualify for special help. If it’s not,

an early death or infertility, we may still resist

then he’ll just have to try harder.

the conclusion that it is a disorder. A predis-

Physicians are generally considered the

position to great heroism might be unusual, it

authorities when it comes to determining whether

might be genetic, it might tend to lead to early

a condition is a disorder or not. Whenever there’s

death, and yet we might consider it of such value

a debate in the media, an authority in a white coat

that it would be considered a good thing rather

will soon be asked to tell lay people what’s what.

than a disorder (suppose, it was discovered that

Thus we will be told that ADHD is a disorder

Ghandi, Mandela and Martin Luther King all

because some brain differences can be detected,

had the heroism trait). This example shows that

for example, or that women who have little

determining whether a condition is a disorder is

interest in sex suffer from a disorder because

intimately connected with questions about the

they can be treated with drugs. But deter-

good life for human beings, and this is why phil-

mining whether a condition is a disorder is not

osophical, as well as medical input may be of use.

merely a medical matter – there’s work for others

But, as the proof of the pudding is in the eating,

(including philosophers) in figuring this out too.

let’s consider some concrete examples. Here we

The major reason why philosophical thought

will examine two cases that help make it clear

is needed to help determine whether various

how it is that determining whether a condition

conditions should be considered disorders is that

is a disorder might involve values, and can be

any physical difference, no matter what it might

the sort of problem that philosophical thought

be, is plausibly not a disorder unless it is also

can contribute to solving. The first case, homo-

a bad thing. A physician can tell that a state is

sexuality, was controversial in the late 1960s and

statistically unusual – but this on its own is incon-

1970s. The second case, complicated grief, is

clusive. Suppose that 1 per cent of the population

currently being debated.

is found to have unusual brain activity. On its own

In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association

this isn’t enough for us to conclude that they have

voted to remove homosexuality from its classifi-

a disorder. Perhaps the brain activity is associated

cation of mental disorders. In the years leading

with something unusual but good, for example,

up to the vote, the inclusion of homosexuality in

great musical ability. Even if the state is genetic

the manual had become increasingly controver-

and runs in families, we cannot conclude that it

sial, with pressure for removal coming from both

is a disorder. Good things, like musical talent,

gay activist groups and within the profession.

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

thoughts/illness

usually does that contributes to the overall goals of the organism, which are taken to be survival and reproduction. Thus the function of the eyes is to enable us to see, the function of the lungs is to take oxygen into the body, and so on. When we are healthy all our subsystems function normally. Of course, the functioning that we can expect from a subsystem depends on our age and sex. Boorse says that we can consider a subsystem to dysfunction whenever its functioning falls below the level that would be statistically normal for other people of our sex and age. On Boorse’s account it will be hard to deterHysteria chronophotography, from Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière (Jean Martin Charcot,1878)

mine whether homosexuality is a disorder. The biological causes of homosexuality are contested. From an evolutionary point of view one might

While gay activists picketed psychiatry meet-

expect that humans are designed to be sexu-

ings, research papers were presented that found

ally attracted to members of the opposite sex.

that homosexuality was more common and that

Sexual attraction facilitates sex, which, so long

homosexuals led lives that were more “normal”

as it’s between opposite sexes, tends to lead to

than previously thought.

offspring – all good from an evolutionary point

Homosexuality is an interesting test case for

of view. This being the case, one might suspect

thinking about the concept of disorder. If one

that homosexuality occurs when some mental

thinks that whether a condition is a disorder

mechanism dysfunctions and leads to someone

depends only on biological facts, it is very hard

who was supposed to be attracted to members

to resist the implication that homosexuality may

of the opposite sex being attracted to their own

well turn out to be a disorder. The best known

sex. Things are not so clear-cut, however. I share

biologically based account of disorder has been

much genetic material with my relatives, so if I

put forward by Christopher Boorse. In his 1975

help raise my siblings, and nieces and nephews,

paper “On the Distinction Between Disease

and there are enough of them, this may be as

and Illness”, Boorse claims that we can think of

good from an evolutionary point of view as having

human beings as being made up of numerous

children myself. For such reasons, only one

subsystems – where subsystems are things like

female in a colony of naked mole rats breeds, and

bodily organs (the heart, kidney and so on), more

the other females help raise the babies. Some

diffuse bodily systems (like the nervous system),

theorists have suggested that homosexuality in

and also mental mechanisms (such as the mental

humans might arise via such “kin-selection mech-

systems that enable us to recognise faces). Each

anisms”. The truth will be hard to determine, but

subsystem has a function, which is whatever it

the key point to note is that if one adopts Boorse’s >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/illness 46

Courtyard with Lunatics, Francisco de Goya, 1794

account of disorder, whether homosexuality is a

disorder-status of homosexuality have to do with

disorder will depend on the details of biological

whether it is harmful rather than its biological

fact. In so far as it may turn out to be a biological

origins, one should abandon Boorseâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s account,

dysfunction, homosexuality may turn out to be

and instead accept that a condition can only be a

a disorder.

disorder if it is harmful. Only on an approach that

During the debates over the disorder-status

sees values as central to determining the bounda-

of homosexuality, however, many thought that

ries of the normal can one say that homosexuality

theorising about the biological basis of homosex-

is not disorder.

uality missed the point. Those who thought that

Suppose a close friend dies. You feel grief; you

homosexuality should be demedicalised thought

lose your appetite, activities that once pleased you

this because they considered homosexuality

no longer seem worthwhile, you think about your

not to be a bad thing. In so far as it is plausible

friend and spend time going to visit their grave.

that the important questions to do with the

If this goes on for a few months, then we may

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

thoughts/illness

Homosexuality may turn out to be a disorder think it an understandable response to a great

circumstances arise. Suppose, for example, that

loss. But what if it goes on for years and seems

I love my son. This commits me to feeling various

to get no better? What if you become so preoc-

other emotions in different circumstances. If my

cupied with reminiscences of your friend that

son does well, I will be happy. If he is in danger,

you become a poor employee and lose your job?

I will feel worried. And if he dies, I will feel grief.

What if you decide that life is no longer worth

Such reasoning suggests that feeling grief when

living and try to kill yourself? Such a response, we

a loved one dies is conceptually tied to having

may think, appears pathological. But given that

loved them. Seeking to get rid of normal grief

it is plausible that there are normal and patho-

would thus be a mistake, as normal grief is linked

logical forms of grief, where, and how, might the

to positive human emotions such as love.

distinction between normal grief and pathological grief be drawn?

Can we conclude that normal grief is a part of the flourishing human life and thus normal,

One way to address this question is via

while pathological grief is grief that is dispropor-

considering why it would be unwise to medi-

tionate? Unfortunately, matters are not quite so

calise normal grief. In their 2003 report Beyond

clear-cut. Issues become complicated because

Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of

the amount of grief that is perceived to be propor-

Happiness, the President’s Council on Bioethics

tionate to a loss varies from culture to culture. In

asks us to consider the following thought experi-

current European cultures one might expect to

ment. Suppose you die, and looking down from

grieve for a partner for around six months, but in

heaven you observe the behaviour of your loved

other cultures much shorter or longer periods of

ones. You are expecting them to be huddled

mourning are expected. Given that our expecta-

round your grave, drying their tears, but instead

tions are clearly culturally shaped, distinguishing

life for them seems to carry on as normal. None

between normal grief and grief that is too intense

of them seem to be bothered that you’re dead.

or lasts for too long is difficult. We can say that

Would you consider this a good thing? Most

grief is not a disorder so long as it plays a proper

people do not want their family and friends to

part in enabling us to lead flourishing lives, but it

simply move on. The worry is that those who are

is unclear how we might decide how much grief

ungrieved in death were unloved in life.

a flourishing human should feel. At bottom the

We can usefully use Bennett Helm’s account

question depends on decisions about the sorts of

in his book Emotional Reason to get a clearer

individuals we want to be and the sorts of socie-

grip on the links between grief and love. Helm

ties we want to live in – and these are hard issues

argues that for me to feel an emotion at one

indeed. Once again conceptions of the good life

time is conceptually tied with me also feeling

play a key role in determining the boundaries of

various other emotions, should the relevant

disorder.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/letter from …

letter from …

Malta 48

JOE FRIGGIERI THINKS WHILE THE SUN SETS

alta is the smallest state of the

splendour of the Baroque churches and palazzi

European Union, of which it

built by the Knights of the Order of St John, the

became a member in 2004,

impressive fortifications surrounding Valletta

forty

gaining

and the Three Cities on the other side of Grand

its independence from Britain. Occupying

Harbour, the Gozo Citadel, the Caravaggio

122 square miles and supporting a popula-

and Preti masterpieces, are among its main

tion of 420,000, it lies at the very heart of the

attractions.

years

after

Mediterranean, with Sicily to the north and

The Maltese language constitutes one of the

Libya directly south. The former fortress colony,

most important ingredients of our national iden-

heavily hit by Mussolini’s bombers and Hitler’s

tity. All political parties are very strongly aware of

Luftwaffe during the Second World War, now

their responsibility to promote it, since it is the

attracts over a million tourists annually to its

only language with Arabic roots to be adopted as

shores. Roughly half of them come from the UK.

an official medium of communication in the EU.

Malta’s cultural heritage is a result of its long

While “il-Malti” is the national language,

and chequered history. There is no other country

English is recognised as the other official

its size where you can find such a concentration

language together with Maltese, and is widely

of archaeological and artistic treasures. The

used as the main means of communication in

awesome grandeur of the prehistoric temples,

many fields. The language of instruction at the

the indelible marks of Roman and Arab rule, the

university is English, most of the books in the library are in English, as are the films shown in our cinemas and the two locally produced news-

Joe Friggieri is professor of philosophy and head of department at the University of Malta

papers with widest circulation. Together with our temperate climate, the widespread knowledge and use of English is

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

faculties, departments and institutes. Thanks to

many foreign students to our shores. The atmos-

the hard work and dedication of our sixth-form

phere on campus reflects the cosmopolitan feel

teachers, all of whom received their philosoph-

of the rest of the country. Maltese students know

ical education in the department, and most of

at least one other language apart from English

whom are either in possession of or reading for

and Maltese, and this makes it possible for them

a PhD, we have had a steady intake of students,

to establish friendly relations with their foreign

some of whom take philosophy as their main or

counterparts without any difficulty. Social scien-

second area in the BA course, but most of whom

tists familiar with Wittgenstein’s aphorism that

choose it as a subsidiary subject in conjunc-

to understand a language is to share a

We help students see how their beliefs fit together multilingual, multicultural society like Malta. way of life are often led to reflect on the

significance of this claim in the context of a

Like looking through a pair of old binoculars, it takes time for the mind to bring things

tion with their main course outside the faculty

into focus from the past, and even then most

of arts.

images are blurred. There were only six hundred

The number of students who are required

students on campus when I joined the BA

to take a number of philosophy credits as

course in philosophy and modern languages at

part of their course is always on the increase.

the University of Malta forty-five years ago. Now

These include students reading for a degree in

there are over ten thousand, spread over an area

theology, law, political science, European studies

that’s at least four times larger than it was then.

and communications, as well as those following

The number of faculties, institutes and centres

courses in the history of art, theatre studies,

for specialised research has more than doubled.

psychology, the MA course in human rights and

The function of the department of philos-

democracy, and the Edward de Bono Institute

ophy at the university is not restricted to running courses for its own students, but essentially includes giving multiple services to other

for the Design and Development of Thinking. We strongly feel that practically all students can benefit from doing at least some philosophy >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/letter from …

clearly one of the main factors attracting so

thoughts/letter from … 50

One course will deal with some of the wonderful stories told by philosophers at the university. Despite the small size of the

systematically, though ultimately it would be up

department, the syllabus covers a wide range

to them to decide which ones to hang on to and

of areas and provides a well-rounded philo-

which to discard.

sophical education. The history of the subject is

“Philosophical anthropology” is the name of

well-covered, and students are exposed to both

the most important study unit offered in the first

Anglo-American and continental traditions in

year of the course. It consists of a discussion of

modern and contemporary philosophy.

the main issues related to perception, language

Asked to comment about his own work,

and action, and introduces students to topics like

Eugenio Montale, one of the six twentieth-

sensory communication, the relation of signs to

century Italians to be awarded the Nobel Prize

the world, speech acts and conversation, the logic

for Literature, once said: “The subject matter of

of practical reasoning and the will, freedom and

my poetry is the human condition considered in

responsibility. This last topic receives fuller treat-

itself: not this or that historical event. This does

ment in the course on ethics, while philosophy

not mean cutting oneself off from what goes on

of mind and metaphysics are dealt with in the

in the world; it means knowing the difference

second and third years.

between what is essential and what is transitory, and refusing to trade off the one for the other.”

On top of these compulsory core subjects, students are also expected to choose from a

What Montale says about his poetry can also

number of optional or elective study units.

describe the role of philosophy as we see it at the

These include political theory, aesthetics, philos-

University of Malta. Like most young adults else-

ophy of religion and the social sciences, medieval

where, those who come to us to study philosophy

Islamic philosophy, philosophy of science and

do so because they are interested in discussing

mathematics, Far Eastern philosophies, as well

those basic questions concerning “the human

as a number of selected texts from the great

condition considered in itself” that form the core

philosophers, ancient, medieval, modern and

of the subject as we know it. So what we do in

contemporary.

the first year of the course is introduce students

Everybody likes a good story, so one course

to such questions and teach them how to think

we intend to introduce in the near future will

clearly about them, how to argue coherently

deal with some of the wonderful stories told

and convincingly, how to distinguish between

by philosophers down the centuries. Plato’s

good and bad arguments by applying some very

cave, Aristotle’s sea-battle, Avicenna’s flying

simple and basic rules. What we’re aiming at is to

man, Descartes’ evil spirit, Wittgenstein’s

help students see how their more or less uncon-

beetle, Quine’s rabbit, Searle’s Chinese box, and

nected beliefs fit together, how to organise them

Putnam’s twin earth will feature prominently in

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

divorced from the conflicts that mark the course

extraordinary thought experiments invented by

of human history.

philosophers in connection with the problem

Though not likely to face a firing squad for

of personal identity – from Locke’s prince and

their political militancy, the present members

pauper fairy tale to Sydney Shoemaker’s brain

of the philosophy department do not live in an

transplantation,

mind-

ivory tower. Refusing to “cut themselves off from

cleaning machine and Derek Parfit’s Star Trek

what goes on in the world” (Montale again), they

fantasy of teletransportation.

are often invited to take part in discussions of a

Bernard

Williams’s

As I write this piece in my room on the second floor of the humanities building, I can see the sky getting darker by the minute, though it still manages to preserve that kind of phosphorescent luminosity the Germans associate with what they call die blau stunde, the blue hour. The weather today was glorious,

theoretical or practical nature on radio and tele-

Eclipse, the faculty cat, sleeps on top of a boxful of students’ essays

following yesterday’s freak summer storm, and

vision, and they also contribute articles to the

the pine-trees outside my window sparkle under

local press on topics of current national and inter-

the reflected glow of the yellow floodlights stuck

national interest. Many of them are also involved

on top of the assembly hall, a building named

in activities of a cultural nature that go beyond

after Sir Temi Zammit, Maltese scientist, archae-

their normal academic and administrative duties

ologist and historian who discovered the source

on campus.

of undulant fever in goats’ milk and showed

In this part of the world, twilights are short

how the transmission of the disease that killed

and night takes over from day in a matter of

hundreds of people could be prevented.

minutes. When I’m alone in my room, after the

Another building, covered at this time of year

students and most of my colleagues have gone

by a thick red carpet of bougainvillea, is dedi-

home, I can hear Plato and Aristotle, Descartes

cated to the heroic figure of Dun Mikiel Xerri,

and Hume, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger and

the best-known professor of philosophy at the

Wittgenstein whispering their secrets from the

university, immortalised in our history books not

books stacked behind my back, as I draw comfort

because of his philosophy but on account of his

and inspiration from the theatre posters hanging

patriotic zeal. Xerri was shot by a French firing

on the wall in front of me.

squad for plotting against the regime during the

Eclipse, the faculty cat, sleeps on top of

very brief spell of French rule, a year after the

a boxful of students’ essays left lying in the

Order of the Knights of St John, who had ruled

corridor, right outside my door. He serves to

the island for two and a half centuries, capitu-

remind members of the department, lecturers

lated to Napoleon in 1798. Xerri’s fate, like that of

and students alike, that when a philosophical

Socrates, shows that what is generally regarded as

problem becomes intractable, it might be best

an “unworldly” discipline has never been entirely

to sleep over it.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/letter from …

these lectures, together with the cluster of quite

thoughts/portraits 52

“The contents of a photograph are not facts, nor reality, nor truth. They are a means we have created to extend our way of seeing on a search for truth.”

Philosophers CYNTHIA FREELAND TAKES A LINGERING LOOK AT STEVE PYKE’S PORTRAITS

hat does a philosopher look

philosophers through photographs – Bertrand

like? The label calls to mind

Russell (angular head, white hair, pipe), Jean-

a classical bust of a man with

Paul Sartre (wall-eyed, thick lips gripping a

noble brow, beard and blank

cigarette) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (hand-

inward-seeing eyes. His high forehead conveys

some and aristocratic). Women philosophers

deep wisdom, like those super-smart aliens on

too entered our consciousness, from Simone de

the original Star Trek with their big-brained bald

Beauvoir with her elegant chignon to the Afro-

heads. In art history, philosopher portraits range

crowned activist Angela Davis.

from the impish-looking Descartes (possibly)

What do philosophers actually look like?

painted by Frans Hals to Holbein’s Erasmus,

Rather odd, I’m afraid, or if truth be told,

sensitive hands carefully crafting a letter. Or

unappetizing – at least if we are to go on this

there is the moustachioed Nietzsche painted

collection of portraits by Steve Pyke. The book

posthumously by Edward Munch, gazing across

includes an interview with Pyke by Jason Stanley,

a blustery Expressionist landscape. In the twen-

and there the artist explains that, given his own

tieth century we acquired iconic images of

origins among the working classes, he initially approached intellectual heavyweights like A J Ayer feeling intimidated. But now he sees them

Cynthia Freeland is professor of philosophy at the University of Houston. She is the author of Portraits and Persons and But is it Art?, both published by Oxford University Press.

as more human. The pictures suggest that Pyke also finds philosophers strange. Here we find philosophers, warts and all: wild eyebrows, unkempt beards, lank hair, lantern jaws, crossed

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

of philosophers are more specific. The label is

philosophers are rare. Among the few who do

often employed as an honorific, designating

smile, one appears gleeful (Robin Jeshion) and

someone with wisdom and depth. Not everyone

another maniacal (Hartry Field). Pyke seems to

who is a philosophy professor can claim to be a

have wandered into the territory of Théodore

“philosopher” in this sense. To pose as a philoso-

Géricault who depicted people suffering from

pher, an individual must rise to the occasion. What should a philosopher look like? In a

I have argued in my book Portraits and

fascinating but frustrating introduction to the

Persons (Oxford, 2011) that we are drawn to

volume (“The Face of Philosophy: Steve Pyke’s

portraits in part because in human evolution it

Gallery of Minds”), Arthur Danto (who is

was important to recognise individual faces and

himself included) says that all the people shown

track the facial expression of others’ emotions.

here look “fiercely smart”. I beg to differ. A few

We encounter other human beings through their

(you will understand my not naming names)

bodies and prepare responses to actions forecast

look a bit vacant. Judith Thomson looks mischie-

by their faces. But the reasons to look at images

vous, Peter Singer tired, Timothy Williamson

“monomanias” in the asylum at Ivry in the 1820s.

thoughts/portraits

eyes, weak chins, bad teeth, weird noses. Smiling

>>> Hartry Field

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thoughts/portraits

Harry Frankfurt

meek, and Sydney Morgenbesser sad. Some of

Curtis’s Native Americans, August Sander’s

them (Ernie LePore, Harry Frankfurt) just look

Germans, Diane Arbus’s outcasts and socialites,

like nice guys to have a beer with at the local

Richard Avedon’s denizens of the still-wild West).

pub. Why the “fiercely smart” label, anyway?

The artist in effect compiles a sociological study

Philosophers should be smart, sure; but why

with possibly diverse aims, from Curtis’s glorifi-

“fiercely” so? There are other qualities we might

cation of “noble savages” to Arbus’s penchant for

wish for from our philosophers, such as that they

the freakish.

be judicious, insightful, sceptical, kind, witty or

Pyke too is undoubtedly moulding the

compassionate. (The face of the Dalai Lama

subjects he photographs in some way. The

comes to mind.)

problem is that there is not really anything to

The representation of individuals as members

be seen about philosophers per se. The group

of a type is of course not new with Pyke. There

in question displays no characteristic uniform

are many previous examples both in painting

or accessory attesting to its activities. One might

(Rembrandt’s

Gerhard

as well guess instead “chemists” or “magicians”.

Richter’s 48 Portraits) and photography (Edward

Their outward appearance can seem unkempt.

Night

Watchmen,

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thoughts/portraits

Malcolm Budd

Pyke is interested in the fact that these philoso-

from Michael Friedman, who is shown in front

phers form a community, but this suggests that a

of a blackboard covered in glyphs (and, inciden-

group shot might have been more intriguing (if

tally, wearing a zippy tie). We don’t see Brian

harder to arrange). I love the thought of a photo-

Leiter, prominent blogger, before a keyboard,

graph constructed à la The Night Watchmen, in

nor Aristotle scholar Alan Code puzzling over the

which philosophers from a given field – say, ethics

Greek text of Metaphysics Zeta. We don’t see any

– are shown as an investigative team bursting out

other people here working in the settings where

from interior spaces of moral darkness, led into

philosophers do work: at a desk, in a classroom,

the light of certainty by some stalwart individual.

at a convention, or even, in these days of cogni-

Related to the problem of trying to show a

tive science, examining an fMRI. There are no

community by depicting its members in isola-

Peripatetics here, no Cynics walking around with

tion is another problem: the philosophers seen

lanterns seeking an honest man.

here are mostly heads (remember those aliens

Traditionally,

philosopher

portraits

did

from Star Trek). Rarely do they have bodies. Nor

depict tools of the trade: Helleman showed

do they employ any tools of their trade – apart

Descartes with his foot on the works of Aristotle, >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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thoughts/portraits 56

and Ramsay placed Tacitus’s history under

are naked, of course, but their clothes are irrele-

Hume’s plump arm. Often philosopher portraits

vant, since after all they are simply heads, homes

showed more of the thinkers’ bodies in action,

for minds. Scorn for fashion has long been a hall-

conversing, as in the famous juxtaposition of

mark of the profession, ever since its beginning

Plato and Aristotle, hands gesturing impatiently

in barefoot Socrates. The rare exception here

upwards or down, in Raphael’s The Academy of

is Frances Kamm, whose beautifully patterned

Athens. Or think of David’s Socrates, with sturdy

shawl must have compelled the camera’s respect.

leg and strong chest, firmly pointing to the soul’s

Let us infer some things, if we can, from the

higher destiny even as he reaches for the fatal

heads of philosophers shown here. Pyke shoots

cup of hemlock while those around him wail and

with a twin-lens Rolliflex using Tri-X film and

weep. (Now there’s a picture of a community!)

available light. In some cases the result he gets

Removing the body from a portrait erases a lot

is quite beautiful, as in his portrait of Robert

of information about size, posture, and setting, all

Stalnaker, shown in three-quarter view with

of which are used by artists to convey character,

lovely side lighting. His portrait of Malcolm

including status and duties. Ramsay famously

Budd is powerful: Budd confronts us directly,

depicted Hume in an elegant (the king thought

and the bristles of his incipient beard add inter-

too elegant) scarlet uniform while Rousseau, in

esting visual texture. In a surprising number

the companion portrait, wore rustic furs and a

of cases, though, the results are blurry enough

bed-coat.

to have been rejected by a regular studio artist

Clothing is often a clue enabling us to read

(Ludlow, Strawson, Papineau, Longuenesse, and

people’s identity in pictures. Scholars hypothesise

Langton). I cannot tell that this blurriness has any

that when Rembrandt’s Aristotle contemplated

specific emotional or aesthetic effect. Pyke’s New

the bust of Homer, he did so wearing costly robes

York exhibit of the series included original proof

and a jewelled belt (the putative gift from his

sheets, and it would have been very interesting

former student Alexander) to illustrate the choice

to peruse these to examine his choices, including

between the unadorned life and a more magnifi-

the reasons for occasional profile views.

cent one. In photographs too, clothing is crucial,

Pyke’s lens choices (I suspect he uses

as with the impressive headdresses in Curtis’s

Rolleinar close-up attachments) can distort

Native American portraits. Dress is also revela-

facial features in unflattering ways, making

tory in Sander’s oeuvre, from the ill-fitting Sunday

nice-looking people appear to be missing chins

suits on his workers going to town to the slinky

or to have huge noses. In more than a few

black silk of his androgynous secretary. Arbus’s

cases the philosophers look either cross-eyed

famous little girl twins are made more creepy

or wall-eyed (an impolite name for the condi-

by their matched dresses with Peter Pan collars

tion Sartre suffered from, strabismus). There

and white hair bands. And Avedon’s waitresses,

are several cases in which the prints show the

drifters, and carneys wear shabby and even filthy

face of a sitter as bright white against a dark

clothes that speak of their bitter lives. But Pyke’s

background, making it seem to float above the

philosophers have no clothes. It’s not that they

picture plane (Mothersill, Sperber and Williams).

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

drama, inducing a kind of alienation effect.

thoughts/portraits

Such faces are frozen like painted masks in Noh These instances contrast with some more fullbodied portraits, as in the wonderfully sculptural image of a reflective Arthur Danto. A few of the portraits in Pyke’s series seem to have wandered in from another photographer’s studio, such as the chiaroscuro silhouettes of Ruth Millikan and Ruth Barcan Marcus, which would fit well in the Peter Ludlow

nineteenth-century Romantic pictorial oeuvre of Julia Margaret Cameron. Perhaps his respect for

wise, older women prompted Pyke to associate them with icons of the Victorian period. It has been argued that photography affords a superior form of realism: Kendall Walton alleges that we literally see Abraham Lincoln, for example, in photographs of him. In the interview, Pyke tries to deflect claims about truth, saying, “The contents of a photograph are not facts, nor reality, nor truth. They are a means we have created to extend our way of seeing on a search for truth”. However the book’s presentation screams “Truth”, with its black and white format and spare layout – just one photograph printed Mary Mothersill

full-frame on each two-page spread. And further-

more the specimens are exhibited in alphabetical order, “Philosophers from A-Z, Albert to Žižek”. As sociology, Philosophers reveals various things about the profession. The ratio of women to men is about twenty per cent, fairly representative of women’s lamentably low inclusion in the field. More disgraceful is the paucity of nonCaucasians (Anthony Appiah and Jaegwon Kim are the only two). Among the women more are smiling here than men. Is this because women simply did smile more at Pyke, since women in general seek to please in social interactions? The non-smiling women are austere. This renders any >>> Ruth Millikan

4TH QUARTER 2011

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looks toward her father as he talks, but this

flash of an earring, startling in contrast with their

could connote filial respect rather than gender

overall sober mien. The two images of philoso-

hierarchy.

pher relationships, at the back of the volume, are

I have written so far as if the book includes

interesting. (There could have been more, but in

only photographs, but this is not correct. Pyke

the book two well-known philosophy couples, the

asked each person to provide a digest definition of

Kitchers and the Churchlands, are shown indi-

philosophy. It is intriguing to see how the diverse

vidually, not pairwise.) In their joint photo, Sally

figures here met the capsule challenge, probably

Haslanger gazes off to the side while husband

more so for those of us in the business than for

Stephen Yablo looks at the camera. Haslanger

others. But the blurbs bear little relationship to

looks as if she would rather not be there. Their

the image on the facing page. The only exception

poses reverse the common trope of marriage

might be the image of Louise Antony. She speaks

portraits in nineteenth-century photographs,

about her lifelong desire to “figure it all out”, a

showing a wife who looks towards her husband

sentiment that fits perfectly the image showing

while he gazes straight ahead. (I have just such a

her as rather toothily voracious.

wedding photograph of my great-grandparents.)

The most interesting of the comments for my

In the photograph showing daughter–father

purposes was also the only one that connected

couple Elizabeth and Gilbert Harman, she

philosophy to the portrait process itself, by

thoughts/portraits 58

small adornments, like a trace of lipstick or the

Sally Haslanger, Stephen Yablo

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shares. He does not pretend that we can under-

thoughts/portraits

for creative activity because it is something he stand philosophy, as he puts in it in the book, “by looking at the faces of its practitioners”. Rather, he is showing people as part of a community or almost a family. He explains, “The Philosophy Tribe is made of thinkers, which is an honourable profession that deserves a wider audience. My series ‘outs’ these thinkers”. The problem I have Louise Anthony

with this may come back to the ambiguity of the label “philosopher”, between the honorific sense

Richard Moran. Moran says he doesn’t recall the

and its usage as the title for someone who works

moment of each picture or what he was expressing,

as a university teacher of philosophy. “Outing”

and this means it is just up to the viewer to see.

philosophers in Pyke’s oeuvre appears to involve

“This abandonment of control over meaning can

showing them as people who are fixated on some-

seem to compromise one’s autonomy; it can also

times odd problems and pursuits. They have a

seem a condition of embodiment and expressivity

form of life that is alien to many and that does

at all.” Pyke echoes Moran’s sentiments when he

not require meeting conventional standards

describes the person in a photographic portrait

of attire or grooming. Publicity from his New

as experiencing a sense of puzzlement about the

York Gallery, Flowers, puts the point this way:

picture, “How is that me?” This is indeed the

“Through the stark detail of his portraits Pyke

ultimate challenge of the portrait encounter:

is able to erase the lofty reputation that is often

the artist is in control of the depiction, but

placed on philosophers who ponder life’s seem-

must also render the subjectivity – the person-

ingly unanswerable questions” (my emphasis).

hood – of the sitter. Portraiture often places the

The aims of “outing” and “erasing lofty reputa-

artist and subject in a competitive relationship,

tions” may account for the somewhat odd look

a struggle for dominance about who controls

of so many of the people in these portraits. But

the final image. Many famous portrait artists

it also means, unfortunately, that if we seek the

detested their work because of the requirement

mystique of the philosopher as sage here, we will

to please sitters. Those who work today without

not find it.

such restrictions, like Lucian Freud, can afford to treat subjects (even the Queen!) with hostility. In an Youtube clip called “Mind the Gap”, Pyke says that using the Rolliflex meant he had a more passive relationship with his subjects, looking down at the camera to focus rather than through it and at them, getting “in their face”.

Steve Pyke’s Philosophers is published by Oxford University Press The Philosophers Exhibition moves to Flowers Gallery, Cork Street, London, from ÿ September to ý October. See www.pyke-eye.com for more details.

He says he appreciates philosophers’ passion

4TH QUARTER 2011

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tpm/forum

Best of luck

hat are the philosophical implications of chance? It turns out that there’s talk of luck almost everywhere in philosophy – in morality, theories of knowledge, debates about free will and determinism, thoughts about justice, even in reflection on the best way to live. A few questions will give you a feel for it. Whether or not someone does something wrong is often just a matter of luck – so how can we hold each other morally responsible for what we do? How free are we, if luck plays a large role in what we take to be our freely chosen actions? Can I really be said to know something if my knowledge depends on a bit of luck? What is the right response to the bad luck we encounter in life? Does justice demand that we help those who are down on their luck, through no fault of their own? It’s slightly weird that something as slippery as luck can figure in to questions at the heart of philosophy – questions about who we are and how we ought to live. Maybe we’re getting at something near the centre of our understanding of things, when we wonder about luck.

What does the idea that you could have done something else at the time come to? According to some philosophers, it comes to this: in a hypothetical universe that has exactly the same past as our universe and exactly the same laws of nature, you do something else at this very time.

forum/lucky choices

Chance, choice and freedom ALFRED MELE SPINS THE NEURAL ROULETTE WHEEL BEHIND OUR DECISIONS

ou’re enjoying a leisurely walk in

else instead at the very time you made that

the woods when you come to a

decision.

fork in the path. You pause to think

What does the idea that you could have done

about what to do, and you decide

something else at the time come to? According

to go right. According to some philosophers, if

to some philosophers, it comes to this: in a hypo-

free will was at work at the time, you could have

thetical universe that has exactly the same past as

acted differently.

our universe and exactly the same laws of nature,

Philosophers tend to be cautious about theo-

you do something else at this very time. In our

retical matters. Decided to go left is a different

universe, you decide on the right fork at noon.

mental action from deciding to go right. But we

And in a possible universe that would have been

might say that deciding a bit later than you actu-

actual if you had behaved differently at noon –

ally did – say, deciding on the right fork after an

one with the same past as the actual universe >>>

extra thirty seconds of thought – is another way of acting differently. Other alternatives include deciding to turn back and deciding to sit for a while. The main point, according to the philosophers I have in mind, is that if you freely decided

Alfred Mele is William H and Lucyle T Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University and author of Free Will and Luck (Oxford University Press, úøøþ)

on the right fork, you could have done something

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/lucky choices

How do your decision-making processes work? right up to noon and the same laws of nature –

deciding to turn around, deciding to sit down,

you do something else at noon. Having a label

and so on. When the wheel is activated, a tiny

for this idea will save space: I’ll call it Openness.

neural ball drops onto it. The ball bounces

Does Openness fit your experience of

along the wheel and eventually lands in a slot.

decision-making, at least in some cases? I predict

Its landing in a slot represents an outcome –

you’ll say yes. I’m not saying that you experience

for example, deciding to take the right fork or

other possible universes. The question is whether

continuing to think about what to do. Two adja-

it sometimes seems to you that, when you decide

cent slots represent the same outcome only when

to do something, you could have done something

one outcome is represented by more than five

else instead – and not just in the sense that if the

hundred slots. What determines the distribution

past (or the laws of nature) had been different,

of slots are the things I mentioned – your beliefs,

you would or might have done something else.

desires, reasoning and so on.

Your answer, I’m guessing, is yes. How do your decision-making processes work

how you work as a decision-maker if and when

if and when you have Openness? A simple model

you have Openness. But it is a model, and it may

might help. Here’s one. When you are unsettled

help you think about the nature of Openness.

about what to do, your beliefs, desires,

I’m not claiming that this is the only model of

wishes, hopes, habits, reasoning and the like all feed into a tiny neural roulette wheel in your head. The

The model suggests that your deciding on the right fork at noon was partly a matter of luck. Until the ball settled into a slot for that decision, there

wheel has a thousand slots. The

was a chance that it

slots represent outcomes. For

would land in a slot for

example, two hundred slots

another outcome.

may represent your deciding

Openness can be

on the left fork at noon while

frightening. Imagine a pres-

another two hundred repre-

ident who believes it would be

sent your deciding on the

best not to order a nuclear attack

right fork then. Continuing

but is considering doing it anyway. He

to think at noon about which

has Openness, the launch button is in

fork to take may be repre-

front of him, and pressing it is represented

sented by five hundred slots.

by several slots on his wheel. Pressing the

And the remaining hundred may

button would probably start World War III,

be divided among such things as

as the president knows.

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I prefer a less frightening

away, and his wheel is

story. Here’s one. Joe is down

activated. He decides

on his luck. He was expelled

to fire a warning shot. But

from college for cheating a

he’s nervous and shaky. He

few months ago, and his parents

accidentally shoots the cashier

disowned him. He’s been strug-

in the hand. Things could have

gling to make ends meet. Joe’s

turned out very differently.

complaints about his condition in a

I’ll return to Joe shortly, after a brief note on brain science. Some

ance to offer to sell him a gun. “With

scientists have reported what they

this,” the acquaintance says, “you can

regard as evidence of indetermin-

raise a lot of money in a hurry.” Joe’s

istic brain processes that influence

wheel starts spinning. He has never

behaviour. Indeterministic processes,

committed a violent crime and he

by their nature, leave open more than

has never handled a gun, but he is

one outcome. The experiments I have

open to the possibility. He decides

in mind were done with fruit flies, not

to buy the gun. In another possible

human beings. But if tiny brains are indeter-

universe in which everything is the same right

ministic organs, big ones might be too. The tiny

up to the moment he makes that decision, he

neural roulette wheel is a cartoon image of how

declines the offer.

an indeterministic brain might work in producing

A couple of days later, Joe’s thoughts turn to

decisions. I will not speculate about the low-level

the gun. He considers selling it for a small profit.

mechanics of indeterministic brain processes, but

His wheel starts spinning. Joe decides to keep the

I will mention an alleged possibility. In his book

gun for a while, but he could have decided to sell

The Mindful Universe, Henry Stapp suggests that

it. If the ball had landed one slot away, that’s what

there are quantum probability clouds associated

he would have done.

with calcium ions moving toward nerve termi-

A week later, Joe is wondering how he will pay his rent. He thinks again about selling the gun.

nals. This low-level openness can underwrite Openness.

And again the wheel starts spinning. He decides

Back to Joe. He had a string of bad luck. He

to use the weapon at a small shop on the other

made several bad decisions. Joe definitely isn’t a

side of town. Joe’s plan is to brandish it while

hardened criminal; and he’s far from thoroughly

loudly demanding money. He’s confident that the

bad. He’s good enough to have decided not to

cashier will simply comply; he definitely has no

buy the gun, to have decided to sell it without

intention of firing the gun. Unfortunately, things

ever using it, and so forth. And, each time, if the

don’t go according to plan. As Joe is speaking to

ball had landed just a slot away, he would have

the cashier in what he hopes is a very threatening

made a better decision.

voice, he sees the man reach under the counter – perhaps for a weapon. Joe thinks about running

Does Joe’s bad luck get him off the hook? Does it mitigate his moral responsibility for his >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/lucky choices

sketchy saloon prompt an acquaint-

forum/lucky choices

Your deciding is partly a matter of luck bad decisions? Or what? These questions are

that includes Openness and leaves nothing to

difficult. Some reflection on Joe’s internal work-

chance. They may believe that only this kind of

ings might help.

control – call it Magic – can make it truly up to

In the roulette wheel model of Openness, as

them what they do. But this kind of control is

I mentioned, a person’s beliefs, desires, wishes,

just as impossible as a delicious cake sitting on

hopes, habits, reasoning, and so on all feed into

my kitchen counter even though I just devoured

the tiny wheel and determine what its slots

it. Why? Because indeterministic control in the

represent (including how many slots a possible

absence of chance is impossible. If Joe decided

outcome gets). All these things are influenced

with Openness to buy the gun, there was, right

by past decisions the person has made and his

up to the moment he made that decision, a

or her past behaviour. People can and do learn

chance that he would not make that decision

from their mistakes and from their successes; and

then.

what they learn has an effect on how the wheel

Some believers in Magic may be irresistibly

is divided up when it’s time to make a decision.

drawn to the conclusion that Joe lacks free will

Efforts at self-improvement can also have an effect on this. A person who has been smokefree for a year is likely to have a very different distribution of outcome slots when he feels tempted to smoke now than he did a year ago.

The same is true of a person who has made a lot of progress in overcoming a tendency to procrastinate or overeat. With this in mind, we might be inclined to see Joe as having significant responsibility for how his wheel is configured when he makes the decisions I described and for the decisions he ends up making. After all, he spent years shaping his wheel. To be sure, whenever there was Openness in his decision-making, some luck (or chance) was involved – but “some luck” might not be enough to absolve him of responsibility entirely. There are people who want to have their cake and eat it too. Some such people may want to have a kind of control over their decisions

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

and moral responsibility. But some of us seem

eliminate (or at least reduce) luck in an impor-

to be free to struggle with the question how free

tant sphere of life. Blackjack players who want

will and moral responsibility can coexist with

to maximise their chances of winning (legally, of

Openness. I struggle with this question in my

course) should learn how to minimise the poten-

book Free Will and Luck – even though I’m not

tial consequences of bad luck and to maximise

convinced that free will requires Openness.

the potential consequences of good luck. So they should learn to count cards, memorise a good set of blackjack tables, and play accordingly. What

moral responsibility. I thought about discussing

might rational folks do about the luck involved

a second kind of luck here (one associated with determinism), and I decided to settle the question

whether

would by tossing a coin. Given the outcome, I’ll

Scientists have reported evidence of indeterministic brain processes

stick with Openness.

Openness,

given

their aspirations? One thing they might do is to try to become so good at resisting temptation that there is no longer a chance that they will decide contrary to what

Many games involve a mixture of luck and

they judge best. If you see no good reason to

skill. In blackjack, players compete only with

prefer the left path to the right, and vice versa,

the dealer, whose every move is dictated by the

a wheel that gives you a fifty percent chance of

rules. Unlike the dealer, the players have options:

each decision should be fine with you. But when

for example, they can hit (request another card),

you know that it would be much better to go left

stand (refuse additional cards), double their bets

than to go right, a wheel that gives you a chance

in certain situations, and split pairs (for example,

of deciding to go right is potentially dangerous.

two aces) into two hands. What cards one gets is

Rational folks also try to learn from their

a matter of luck, and skilled players have memo-

mistakes and successes, and they sometimes

rised and are guided by reliable tables about

embark on projects of self-improvement. Again,

when they should hit, stand, and so on. Very

in the roulette wheel model of free agency, these

skilled players keep track of the cards they have

efforts shape decision wheels.

seen – they “count cards” – and they adjust their playing strategy accordingly.

In “Gimme Shelter,” Mick Jaggar warned that war is just a shot away. In a decision-maker

Free will may also involve a mixture of luck

with Openness, war might be just a slot away.

and skill. According to one way of thinking about

Fortunately, decision-makers who can shape

free will, just as luck is an essential part of (legal)

their wheels are not entirely at the mercy of

blackjack, the kind of luck involved in Openness

luck. And with luck, free agents may be able

is an essential part of becoming a free agent.

to configure their wheels in such a way that

But whereas luck is an ineliminable part of legal

they have no chance at all of making very bad

blackjack, free agents might reasonably seek to

decisions.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/lucky choices

Even if Openness is an illusion, other kinds of luck may seem to threaten free will and

forum/lucky knowledge

Our judgements about luck – and about related things, like risk – are for the most part sensitive to what is happening in close possible worlds rather than probabilities.

Knowledge or just a lucky guess? DUNCAN PRITCHARD EXPLORES NEARBY POSSIBLE WORLDS

t is a platitude in epistemology that knowl-

So, for example, a gambler who bases her

edge excludes luck. Epistemologists mean

belief about which horse won the 4.20 race on

something very specific by this claim,

mere guesswork, and who by luck happened to

however. In particular, they are not denying

be right, did not know what she believed. This is

the obvious fact that it is sometimes a matter of

because it is just a matter of luck that her belief is

luck that someone acquires knowledge (think,

true. In contrast, someone who forms her belief

for example, of lucky scientific discoveries, like

about which horse won the 4.20 race by seeing

the discovery of penicillin). Rather, what they

for herself the winning horse cross the line (in

are claiming is that if someone’s true belief is to

clear light, at close range, and so on) does know

amount to knowledge, then it cannot be a matter

what she believes. But in this case it is not down

of luck that the belief in question is true.

to luck that her belief is true. That knowledge is incompatible with luck in this way thus explains why mere true belief

Duncan Pritchard is chair in epistemology, school of philosophy, psychology and language sciences, at the University of Edinburgh. He is author of Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, úøøý).

cannot amount to knowledge, since merely true belief can be lucky true belief. But what needs to be added to true belief to eliminate knowledgeundermining luck and thus put that true belief into the market for knowledge? Here’s a natural

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

so on). We can now imagine the farmer believing

“justification”). If you saw the horse cross the line

on this basis that there is a sheep in the field.

for yourself in good conditions, then you’re in a

This belief is surely justified, in that the farmer

position to offer good reasons in support of what

can offer good grounds in support of his belief

you truly believe. If, on the other hand, you are

(for example, that the object in question looks

merely guessing which horse won, then you are

just like a sheep, that as a farmer he’s good at

not in a position to offer good grounds. Having a

spotting sheep, that he got a clear look at it, and

justification for your true belief therefore seems

so on). But now suppose that what the farmer

to suffice to exclude knowledge-undermining

is actually looking at is a sheep-shaped object

epistemic luck, and thus suffice for knowledge. Unfortunately, matters are not so simple, as Edmund Gettier showed in his famous threepage 1963 article which was published in the

Knowledge is incompatible with luck

journal Analysis (you can read the paper yourself at ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html). Gettier

which is not a sheep (but a big hairy dog, say).

offered some counter-examples to the idea that

Moreover, suppose that the farmer’s belief is

knowledge is justified true belief. Crucially for

nonetheless true because there happens to be a

our purposes, these examples appealed to the fact

sheep hidden behind this sheep-shaped object,

that even justified true beliefs could be subject to

away from the farmer’s view. The farmer thus has

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.

a justified true belief, but it is not a case of know-

Here is an example of a Gettier-style case

ledge, and the reason why is that it is merely a

(not one of Gettier’s own, but due to Roderick

matter of luck that his belief is true. After all, his

Chisholm). Suppose that a farmer sees what

belief is only true because there just happens to

looks very much like a sheep in the field before

be a sheep hidden from view behind the sheep-

him (in good light, at sufficiently close range, and

shaped object.

67 >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/lucky knowledge

answer: good grounds (what epistemologists call

forum/lucky knowledge

Even justified true beliefs can be subject to knowledge-undermining luck

The upshot of Gettier-style cases is that

not a justification strong enough to eliminate

merely having justified true beliefs will not

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck, as we

suffice to eliminate knowledge-undermining

have just seen. Interestingly, however, Lottie is

epistemic luck. But that prompts the question of

able to come to know that she’s lost the lottery

what is required in order to have knowledge if it

by having a justification which is, from a purely

is not justified true belief? In particular, if having

probabilistic point of view anyway, much weaker.

a justification for your true belief won’t eliminate

For example, reading the result in a reliable

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck, then

newspaper is a good way of finding out whether

what will eliminate it?

your ticket has won. But the odds of even a reli-

Notice, first, that simply demanding a higher

able newspaper printing the wrong result, while

level of justification won’t help you deal with

no doubt very long (since a lot hangs on news-

Gettier-style cases. Imagine someone – let’s call

papers getting things like this right), are surely

her “Lottie” – who buys a ticket for a lottery with

much lower than a million-to-one. But why then

very long odds (a million-to-one, say). The lottery

can Lottie come to know that she’s lost via this

has been drawn, and the winner declared. Alas,

route but not by reflecting on the odds involved?

Lottie hasn’t won, but she hasn’t heard the result

In order to explain what is going on here, we

yet and so she doesn’t know this. Suppose that

need to make use of the notion of possible worlds.

Lottie now reflects on the long odds involved

(There are philosophical issues surrounding the

and so forms the true belief that she hasn’t won.

notion of possible worlds, but we don’t need to

Consequently, she tears up her ticket. Intuitively,

worry about them for our purposes – just think

though, Lottie can’t come to know that she’s lost

of these worlds as a helpful heuristic device.) The

on this basis (if it helps, imagine that it’s your

way things actually are is the actual world. But

lottery ticket that she tears up). Moreover, the

the world could have been different from how

reason why she lacks knowledge is that her belief

it actually is. I could have not eaten that bacon

is only luckily true. Her ticket could have been

roll this morning, and had fruit instead. The

the winning ticket after all, and if it had been,

capital of France could have been Lyon rather

then Lottie would have just made a very big

than Paris. Bill Gates could have been two-feet

mistake indeed in tearing up the ticket.

taller than he actually is. And so on. When we

Here’s the thing. Given that the odds are

imagine the world as being different from the

massively stacked against Lottie winning the

actual world, we are imagining a possible world.

lottery, and given that she knows this, her justi-

So, for example, there is a possible world which is

fication for thinking that she’s lost is about as

just like the actual world except that in this world

good a justification as it could be. But it’s still

Bill Gates is two foot taller than he actually is.

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order for you to be a winner (just a few coloured balls need to fall in a slightly different configuration). In other words, the possible world in which you win the lottery is a very close possible world, and it is in this sense that it “could” be you. This highlights something interesting about our ordering of possible worlds in terms of their similarity to the actual world, which is that close

The possible world where you win the lottery is a very close possible world We can think of these possible worlds as being more or less similar to the actual world in terms

worlds in which highly unlikely events, like

of how much would need to change about the

a lottery win, occur. Interestingly, our judge-

actual world in order to make it like the possible

ments about luck – and about related things, like

world. So, for example, a possible world in which

risk – are for the most part sensitive to what is

all that is different is that I am wearing blue

happening in close possible worlds rather than

rather than brown socks is much more similar to

probabilities.

the actual world than a possible world in which

For example, suppose the odds of me winning

London and Tokyo have switched places. Call

the 100m sprint at the 2012 Olympics are a

possible worlds that are very similar to the actual

million-to-one, just like the odds of our imaginary

world, close possible worlds.

lottery (in fact, I suspect these odds might well

With this framework in place, we can now

flatter my athletic potential). Would you think it

understand what is going on in the Lottie case.

a good bet to put a £1 punt, at those odds, on me

The slogan for the UK national lottery is “It

winning? I think you would be crazy to do so,

could be you”. Given the long odds involved,

and the reason for this is not the odds involved,

this is clearly not the “could” of probability, since

specifically, but rather the fact that the possible

from a probabilistic point of view it (basically)

world in which I win the 100m sprint at the 2012

couldn’t be you. The slogan makes sense though,

Olympics is simply too different from this world.

and that’s because the “could” question is not the

This is just not the sort of thing that happens in

could of probability. Rather, what the slogan is

worlds like the one we are in (think of all the

saying is that if you play the lottery, then very

things that would have to change about the actual

little needs to change about the actual world in

world in order to make it a world where someone >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

forum/lucky knowledge

possible worlds can nonetheless be possible

like me wins this race). As far as this bet goes,

a way that she could very easily have formed a

then, it couldn’t be you in either of the senses of

false belief.

forum/lucky knowledge

“could” distinguished above.

that she had lost the lottery by reading the result

odds is not so crazy though (which is not to

in a reliable newspaper, then she would not be

say that it is rational), since while the odds are

exposed to anything like the same degree of epis-

still against you, this is the sort of thing which

temic risk. Reliable newspapers, after all, have

happens in worlds like the one we are in. That’s

sophisticated systems in place to ensure that

why even though most of us have the good sense

they don’t make errors of this sort (and for good

not to place bets on crazy events obtaining, lots

reason – think of all the problems that would be

Knowledge requires that our belief couldn’t have easily been false

caused by printing the wrong result), and so quite a lot needs to be different about the actual world before Lottie would form a false belief via this method. More specifically, the possible world in which Lottie wins the lottery but falsely believes that she hasn’t by this method is not nearly as

of us nonetheless play lotteries. We’re not being

close as the possible world where she forms

inconsistent in this regard. Rather, we’re being

the same false belief by reflecting on the odds

responsive to the fact that lottery wins, unlike

involved.

crazy events, obtain in close possible worlds (even despite the long odds). Putting all these points together, we can

In contrast, if Lottie had formed her belief

“Betting” £1 on a lottery ticket with the same

start to get a sense of what is going on in the Lottie case. The possible world in which Lottie wins the lottery is a world just like the one she is in; it is a close possible world. Now imagine this possible world where all that has changed is that Lottie’s ticket has won. Since Lottie forms her belief about whether she has won by reflecting on the odds involved (which of course have not changed), in this possible world Lottie will continue to believe that she has lost even though she has won. In this close possible world she will thus believe falsely, and that’s why her true belief in the actual world is subject to knowledge-undermining epistemic luck, even despite the excellent justification she has for her belief. For she is forming her belief in such

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

We can now see what we need to add to true belief in order to eliminate knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. What we are looking for is

forum/lucky knowledge

a belief which is not only true in the actual world,

famer continues to believe that there is a sheep

but which is also true in possible worlds that are

in the field on the basis of the sheep-shaped

similar, and thus close, to the actual world. What

object that he sees, and yet believes falsely (that

we are doing here is in effect trying to eliminate

is, the possible world where all that is different

high levels of epistemic risk from our beliefs. If

is that the sheep in question has wandered into

our true beliefs would have been false in close

a different field). That’s why the farmer lacks

possible worlds, then the success of that belief

knowledge in this case.

being true in the actual world was a risky success,

Having a true belief which is justified, even

in that it was a success that could so very easily

where that justification is very strong from a prob-

have been a failure. But knowledge ought not to

abilistic point of view, will not suffice to eliminate

be “risky” in this way. Knowledge thus requires

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck, and

not merely that our belief is true, but also that it

hence knowledge cannot be justified true belief.

couldn’t have easily been false.

Instead, we need to think about knowledge as

We can see this point in action in the Gettier-

demanding something which, in addition to true

style cases. Take the “farmer” case offered above.

belief, also ensures that one’s belief is true in

While this belief was both justified and true, that

close possible worlds. Epistemologists have done

it was true was still epistemically risky in that

a lot of work in the last few decades exploring

the belief could so very easily have been false.

what this “something” might be. But that is a

That is, there is a close possible world where the

topic for another occasion.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/stoic luck

The worst thing that can happen to us is to be blessed with a life of unending luxury, comfort, and wealth, for such a life would make one weak and lazy. But worst of all, the longer we experience a comfortable and easy life, the harder it will hit us when our luck finally changes, as it surely one day will.

Tough luck JOHN SELLARS EXPLAINS HOW THE STOICS DEALT WITH ADVERSITY

here is a sense in which all of Stoic

philosophy is happiness or well-being. The way

philosophy is about luck. Strictly

in which the Stoics think we can achieve well-

speaking this is not true, of course, as

being is by looking closely at our relationship

the ancient Stoics developed a philo-

with the external world and at the way in which

sophical system addressing a wide range of topics

we ascribe value to things. In particular they

(from logic to politics, astronomy, and grammar),

suggest that we ought never to ascribe value to

but if one were forced to try to summarise the

external objects, situations, or even people. The

general thrust of Stoicism in just a few words it

only thing that has genuine value for the Stoics

would be tempting to say that it is most concerned

(or “goodness” in their technical terminology) is

with luck.

virtue, which might be glossed as an excellent

Let me try to flesh this out some more. Like

internal mental state. Conversely the only thing

the majority of other ancient philosophers the

that is truly bad is having a terrible mental state.

Stoics are eudaemonists, and so the goal of their

By happy coincidence, our internal mental state is practically the only thing that we can claim to have any control over, the Stoics suggest, making

John Sellars is a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of the West of England and the author of The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy (Duckworth, úøøā) and Stoicism (Acumen, úøøþ)

our well-being completely within our grasp. All those other things like wealth, success, health, and family that fate, fortune, and luck can withhold from us or take from us turn out to be completely unnecessary for a happy and good

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

To achieve happiness we must rethink our notion of luck There are two ways in which one might

that in order for us to achieve happiness or well-

unpack this doctrine, both of which I suspect

being we must completely rethink our notion of

will seem unpalatable to most modern readers.

luck.

The first would be to emphasise the fact that

In particular the Stoics suggest that we ought

the Stoics also believe that the universe is prov-

to reject our everyday notion of “bad luck”.

identially ordered. Without going too far into

Usually we talk in terms of being unlucky or

Stoic cosmology and theology, for our present

having bad luck when some unfortunate event

purposes we can simply note that the Stoics claim

occurs, or something we hold to be valuable is

that everything that happens is part of a deter-

taken away from us, or even when we fail to attain

mined and providential plan expressing the will

something that we hold to be valuable. In short

of a divine rational principle within Nature. So,

we think we experience bad luck when we lose

if it comes pass that my beloved pet cat should

or fail to attain some external thing that we think

die today, not only should I not be upset because

can contribute to our happiness. According to

the loss of my cat ought not to affect my virtue,

the Stoics such negative judgements are wholly

but I should also welcome the death of my cat

misplaced, for no external object or state of affairs

as a necessary part of a rational and providential

can either bring us happiness or impinge on our

divine plan. If “welcome” is too strong a word, I

happiness. Only our internal mental state can do

ought at the very least calmly to accept its death

that. Once we have the correct mental state, we

today as a necessary and inevitable moment in

shall realise that these supposed instances of “bad

the order of events.

luck” are no such thing; indeed, they ought to be of no consequence to us at all.

A second way to read the Stoic position would be to remain agnostic about the existence >>>

If one accepts this way of thinking, then it is equally so that there is no such thing as “good luck”. When we say that someone is lucky or has experienced good luck we suppose that something of real value has been gained or retained. Yet as we have seen, the Stoics will argue that this also mistakenly ascribes value to externals. I can experience neither “bad luck” nor “good luck” for whatever the external world might throw at me it can never take away or supply anything of genuine consequence for my happiness.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/stoic luck

life. The essence of Stoicism, then, is the claim

forum/stoic luck

of providence, as indeed a number of ancient

affect the spirit of a brave man”. The fact that

Stoics occasionally did, and treat external events

here and throughout On Providence Seneca’s

and states of affairs as just chance and random

references to “adversity” suggest he is closer to

occurrences. On this reading, there is certainly

the second reading of the Stoic position that I

no reason for me to welcome the death of my

outlined a moment ago. Even so, Seneca goes on

cat, or even to accept it as something necessary;

to argue that these adverse events not only don’t

I might instead see it as a completely random

affect the virtuous but are also genuinely posi-

event. Nevertheless I still ought to remain

tive for the rest of us too. We should approach

undisturbed by his death, ever conscious of the

any adversity we encounter in our lives as a “training exercise”. Like wrestlers who welcome

Why it is that good people suffer?

challenges that life throws at us as opportunities to develop our character. What we might be inclined to think of as “bad luck” should instead

fact that this cannot impinge on my inner virtue,

be embraced as valuable experience. Here

which, in turn, secures my happiness.

Seneca comes closer to the first reading of the

In the first reading there is no good or bad luck, for whatever happens is the necessary product of divine providence; in the second reading there is no good or back luck because whatever happens is of no significance for us. Strictly speaking the first reading is the orthodox

strong opponents, we too ought to welcome the

Stoic view, although ancient Stoics such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius do sometimes write as if adopting the second reading, either because they are trying to persuade someone who doesn’t accept the existence of providence or because they themselves are conscious of the limits of their own grasp of the way the universe works. Many of these issues are explored in Seneca’s essay On Providence, in which he tries to answer the question why it is that good people suffer misfortunes in a supposedly providentially ordered world. As one would expect, Seneca challenges the assumption standing behind the question: “nothing bad can happen to a good man … adversity’s onslaughts are powerless to

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Stoic position, and indeed he goes on to suggest

Like wrestlers who welcome strong opponents, we ought to welcome challenges that we ought to think of these sorts of so-called

has something to say to us: such adversities may

adversities as not only positive but also deliber-

well be genuine evils, but if that is the case then

ately sent by divine providence.

all the more reason to train oneself to be able to bear them more effectively. The only serious training available is to suffer them first hand, so

adversity or bad luck, he suggests that it can have

suffering them does have its benefits.

two distinct positive roles: it can train virtue, and

As well as training the imperfect, these

it can test virtue. Those of us who are a long way

adverse events also test the perfect. Seneca

from having an excellent mental state (and that’s

quotes the Cynic philosopher Demetrius:

almost all of us, according to the Stoics) ought

“nothing seems to me more unhappy than the

to welcome adverse events as a form of training.

man who has no experience of adversity”, adding

I have already noted Seneca’s use of an analogy

“for he has not been allowed to put himself to

with wrestling, but now he uses use the more

the test”. We only find out who we are and what

graphic image of cauterisation. Poverty, hunger

we are made of when we are put to the test. If

and bereavement are all painful but necessary

we were never to experience any kind of bad

cures that will toughen us up and make us better

luck in our lives then we would never know how

prepared to cope with these same things in the

we would respond. Only when faced with a real

future.

challenge do we find out who we really are, and

It might be objected here that Seneca vacil-

that may be someone quite different from who

lates between the two readings of the Stoic

we thought we were. In any case such adversi-

position. If adversities such as poverty, hunger

ties are an inevitable part of life, so wanting to

and bereavement are not really bad at all, then

avoid them completely simply displays a failure

why do we need to be trained to endure them?

to grasp the nature of the real world. It is part

Surely we shouldn’t be thinking of these things

of the human condition to be tested in this way:

as needing to be endured at all, if they cause us

things will not always work out the way we would

no genuine harm. That would certainly be true

like; our plans will be thwarted some times; our

if we had mastered virtue, but while we are still

loved ones will die. Given these are simply facts

imperfect, I take it that these sorts of events

about the way the world works that reflect our

will continue to feel unwelcome for some time

limited power to control events, the real choice

to come, and the sceptic will of course say that

left to us is to decide whether to learn from

they will always feel unwelcome because they are

such experiences or simply moan about them.

genuine evils. But note that if one were to follow

As Seneca puts it, “disaster is virtue’s opportu-

that sceptical line of thought, then Seneca still

nity”. As for those who have never faced disaster, >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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forum/stoic luck

As Seneca develops his thoughts about the positive nature of what we might ordinarily call

forum/stoic luck

“no one will know what you were capable of, not

one weak and lazy. But worst of all, the longer

even you yourself”.

we experience a comfortable and easy life, the

So, Seneca suggests that truly great people will delight in bad luck, treating it as both further

harder it will hit us when our luck finally changes, as it surely one day will.

training and an opportunity to show their true

So, turning all of our ordinary thinking about

worth. If one is minded to believe in divine

good and bad luck on its head, Seneca argues

providence then, given these benefits of adver-

that the truly unlucky are those that have never

sity, one might even see bad luck as a gift or

experienced adversity. As for us, we ought not

blessing from the gods. We should think of such

only to welcome what we ordinarily call bad luck

tests as compliments, a bit like the soldier who

but also be very wary of good luck. The tradi-

is selected by his commander for an especially

tional problem of evil that opens Seneca’s essay

difficult mission.

– why bad things happen if the universe is provi-

If this sounds a bit extreme, Seneca goes even

dentially ordered – simply vanishes, for those

further. Not only should we welcome what we

supposedly bad things are in fact of great service

might ordinarily call bad luck; we should also

to us. The same thought was expressed many

shun what we usually think of as good luck:

centuries later by Friedrich Nietzsche, when he

“the greatest danger comes from excessive good

wrote “that which does not kill me makes me

fortune”. The worst thing that can happen to us

stronger”. This line of thinking offers a powerful

is to be blessed with a life of unending luxury,

challenge to how we ordinarily think about luck,

comfort, and wealth, for such a life would make

even if we might not be entirely convinced.

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Even before we come to consider the influence of luck in terms of the results of our actions or the types of situations we come across, luck plays a decisive role in who we fundamentally are.

NAFSIKA ATHANASSOULIS PONDERS CASES OF MORAL LUCK

To understand the problem of moral luck we

connection between assigning moral responsi-

need to take a step back and consider what is

bility to agents for their actions and assuming that

involved in making moral judgements. When we

they had control over their action.

make judgements of moral praise and blame,

Moral luck poses a problem because it chal-

we do so on the assumption that the actions

lenges this fundamental assumption about

we are judging are attributable to the person in

morality and control. In cases of moral luck, a

question. In other words, what the person did

significant aspect of the action is outside the

was, in some sense, under his control. So, for

agent’s control, but we nevertheless still think

example, if A slaps B, fully intending to cause B

that moral praise and blame are appropriate

harm, we would hold A responsible for the slap.

responses. It’s not clear why we should. Bernard

However, if instead it so happens that A suffers

Williams calls moral luck an oxymoron, because >>>

from unpredictable, involuntary movements, and B unknowingly moved into A’s space so that A’s jerking hand made contact with B’s face, we would no longer think it appropriate to hold A morally responsible for this act. It was not something A had control over. Morality presupposes

Nafsika Athanassoulis is lecturer in ethics at the Centre for Professional Ethics at Keele University and author of Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility: Fortune’s Web (Palgrave, úøøý)

control, and there seems to be a fundamental

4TH QUARTER 2011

forum/moral luck

The good, the bad, and the lucky

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forum/moral luck

morality presupposes control and responsi-

gun works, and he kills his intended victim. The

bility, but luck is about the lack of control. Cases

second is not, because his gun jams, and rescuers

of moral luck bring to the surface exactly this

step in to prevent him from taking further action

tension between morality and luck, and leave

– his intended victim survives unharmed. It

us wondering about the validity of our moral

seems that the only difference between the two

judgements.

men is the quality of their guns. In the end, one

Thomas Nagel described cases of moral luck

man stands over a corpse, and the other has not

as falling into three broad categories: resultant

caused any harm. The results – the presence of

luck, situational luck, and constitutive luck. We’ll

a dead victim in one case and a lucky survivor in

consider some examples of each, and then briefly

the other – might be what leads us to conclude

consider some responses to the problem of moral

that the successful murderer is more morally

luck.

reprehensible than the unsuccessful murderer.

To get a handle on resultant luck, imagine two

We draw this conclusion despite the fact that it is

people plotting murders. They both take steps to

only a matter of luck – something entirely outside

carry out their vicious intentions: they load their

of their control – that separates them.

guns, point them at their victims, and pull the

It’s not just rare events like murders that

triggers. The first agent is “successful” in that his

are affected by luck. There are far more

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Luck challenges assumptions about morality and control The difference in law is partly because of an

changing the outcomes of our actions. Many

important legal principle which says that legal

drunken drivers have the good luck to make it

sanctions are only applicable for what people

home in one piece without harming anyone else,

have actually done, as opposed to what we

but a number of them will, unfortunately, swerve

might think could have happened. While for

onto pavements just as pedestrians happen to

the purposes of a philosophical example we can

cross their path. Many overworked parents take

imagine two agents whose intentions to kill are

their eyes off their children at bath time, but only

identical, for legal purposes evidence of guilt

a few will suffer the horrific consequences of a

is only established based on what the agents

child drowning because they happened to look

actually did, rather than what they might have

away at just the wrong time. What differentiates

done had things been otherwise. So it may be

the agents who get away with their inattention or

less problematic to draw a sharp division in

their drunkenness from those who do not is often

terms of our legal judgement of murderers and

just a matter of luck.

attempted murderers than in terms of our moral

While we want to hold people responsible for

judgement of the same agents. It is anyway

the results of their actions, there does seem to be

not unusual for legal and moral judgements to

an incongruity in letting some off with a lighter

diverge. It is illegal to ride a bicycle on a foot-

judgement simply because something outside of

path, but there’s nothing immoral about this,

their control prevented a disaster from occurring.

and while it is immoral to betray one’s partner

There is both a sense that the outcome should

with an adulterous relationship, there’s no

sway our moral judgements in these cases, and

reason that this transgression should be dealt

a sense of the underlying unfairness that that

with by the law.

chance should make such a huge difference to our evaluations.

We come now to situational luck. The proverb “There but for the grace of God, go I” captures

It is perhaps worth pausing here to make an

in a very evocative manner the recognition that,

important point about the distinction between

sometimes, luck is all that separates us from the

moral and legal judgements in cases of moral

fate of others.

luck. The severity of legal judgements in cases

Consider two German citizens just before

like the ones above may well vary depending

the start of the Second World War, who have

on elements of luck. We give the successful

pretty much similar moral characters in terms of

murderer a long sentence, but the attempted

their ability to stand up to moral inequities. One

murderer gets off with a shorter one. But how

of them happens to emigrate to Latin America

could a jammed gun make a moral difference?

shortly before the rise of the Nazi party, just >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

forum/moral luck

commonplace examples of this kind of luck

forum/moral luck 80

because he is fed up with the cold weather in

from actors or people posing as authority figures.

Northern Europe. As a result, he avoids all of the

The surprising results of the experiments were

subsequent moral challenges involved in living in

that while 100% of subjects predicted that they

Nazi Germany. Simply because he is no longer in

would resist being forced to behave immorally,

the country, he does not need to decide whether

up to 60% of subjects in experimental situa-

to collaborate or not, he is not tempted by Nazi

tions gave in to authority, to the point where

inducements or threats to behave in morally

they were willing to seriously harm and possibly

abhorrent ways. The other German citizen

kill another human being simply because they

happens to continue living in the country, and

were being told to do so. The problem here is

How could a jammed gun make a moral difference?

that while we want to hold those who fail such moral tests responsible for their actions, there is a sense of unease that others escape the same moral judgement merely by luckily avoiding certain situations altogether. Since the situations we find ourselves in are largely governed

therefore his ability to continue to behave morally

by luck, this seems, again, to sever the link

is put to the test. He faces the pressure of social

between moral responsibility and control over

conformity and the threat of punishment for non-

oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s actions.

compliance. While some people did successfully

We can generalise this point to include

resist the Nazis, at huge cost to themselves and

not merely situations involving great tempta-

their families, a lot of German citizens at the time

tions or threats, but all situational factors that

failed this moral test. However, the disturbing

go towards shaping who we are. Situational

conclusion of this example is that many more

luck then broadens to become a kind of devel-

people might fail moral tests if they are exposed

opmental luck, for all sorts of arbitrary factors

to them. The reason they were not is down to

go towards determining the sorts of people we

nothing more than the luck of their situation.

are. Factors such as where we are born, what

In the example above, a coincidental move to

kinds of role models we are exposed to, who our

another country at the right time got a person

friends, influences and peer group are, how we

out of a morally difficult situation.

are educated, and so on â&#x20AC;&#x201C; all of this shapes our

While we would all like to assume the best

personalities.

for ourselves and would think that, faced with

Imagine a child exposed to the worst influ-

great temptation or great difficulty, we would

ences and role models. This child has a much

rise to the occasion, empirical evidence suggests

more difficult situation to overcome than a child

that this is just wishful thinking. In the 1960s,

who is exposed to much better influences and

the American psychologist Stanley Milgram

role models. The first childâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s failure on the road

conducted famous experiments which placed

to virtue may be the result of the kinds of influ-

participants in situations that tempted them to

ences he was exposed to, rather than a personal

perform immoral acts, pushed on by pressure

characteristic under his control which we might

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

think naturally merits moral blame. And what

factors outside the agent’s control affect moral

holds true for children often holds true for adults

judgements. At the centre of this response is the

as well, for the road to vice or virtue is a long one,

Kantian idea that the goodness of the good will

one that involves a lifetime of gradual and deli-

is entirely independent of external factors. One

cate development. We can be easily diverted by

is good or bad no matter what the consequences

factors we have little control over.

of one’s actions are. Think again about the two people planning murder. Neither the dead victim nor the lucky escapee are relevant. The agents’

third type of moral luck that is even more perva-

intentions were identical in both cases, and it’s

sive than the first two: constitutive luck. We have no control over the tendencies and character traits that form who we are in the first place. When we observe even small infants we can sometimes see temperamental differences, differences which may eventually make virtuous

One is good or bad no matter what the consequences are

choices a lot easier for some than for others. For someone who is naturally even-tempered, kind,

the will of the agent that matters in judgements

and fair-minded, it will be much easier to culti-

of moral praise and blame. So Kant can side-step

vate these natural tendencies into stable and

the problem of moral luck. Both the attempted

fixed dispositions. Someone who is naturally iras-

murderer and the murderer are equally blame-

cible, self-centred, and rash might have a natural

worthy. There’s a Kantian reply to problems

tendency towards vice to constantly overcome.

associated with developmental luck too. For

This seems to suggest that even before we come

Kant, the freedom to make good choices is avail-

to consider the influence of luck in terms of the

able to anyone at any time, so developmental and

results of our actions or the types of situations we

constitutive factors do not carry the weight we

come across, luck plays a decisive role in who we

might think they do.

fundamentally are.

Finally, a second approach accepts the influ-

So the problem of moral luck affects a wide

ence of luck but argues that this is a positive

range of our moral judgements. And in many

feature of human experience. This approach,

cases there is a tension: we both want to hold

broadly speaking, has its roots in the work of

people morally responsible for aspects of their

Aristotle. It is the very fragility of our moral

behaviour and, at the same time, we feel uneasy

endeavours that give human lives their interest

in the recognition of the influence of luck in

and richness. We should neither deny the influ-

shaping these aspects.

ence of moral luck, nor abandon ourselves to it.

Broadly speaking there are at least two

Instead, we should embrace it as a fundamental

general responses to the problem of moral luck.

feature of what it means to live distinctively

The first resolves the tension created by the

human lives. Morality is fragile, and all the more

problem of moral luck by refusing to accept that

precious for being so.

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

forum/moral luck

If resultant and situational/developmental luck were not problematic enough, there is a

forum/luckless

People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.

No such luck DARREN DOMSKY’S THOUGHTS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LUCK

wo men walk to the middle of a

blocks their view. This particular pair of pedes-

highway overpass in order to do a

trians is disappointed by this, because it makes

terrible thing. They are going to drop

their evil task extra difficult. They can hear the

bricks down onto the road underneath.

steady stream of cars passing underneath, but

Tragically, people sometimes do this without

they have no idea when exactly to throw. They’ll

realising what could happen, but these two men

have to guess.

know exactly what could happen. If a brick hits

To reduce later uncertainty, each spray paints

a car, it will go right through, and instantly kill

his brick a distinct colour, and gains a useful nick-

anyone it hits. From the tops of overpasses,

name in the process. Red sprays his brick red,

dropped bricks are like fired cannonballs, and

and Green sprays his brick Green. With the paint

these two men know it.

still wet, they throw their bricks over the wall,

On many overpasses, pedestrians can see the

and down onto the passing traffic.

cars passing down below, but on this particular

As it happens, one of the bricks hits the

overpass they can’t, because a tall brick wall

pavement, and smashes into harmless pieces. The other smashes through a car roof, and kills someone instantly.

Darren Domsky is assistant professor of philosophy at Texas A & M University Galveston

Obviously these two men are terribly blameworthy. They have each done a terrible thing, on purpose, and with malice aforethought. But

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

forum/luckless

are they equally blameworthy? Put another way,

only once. I’m not sure that Green is twice as

when you find out that one of the bricks killed

blameworthy as Red, but he certainly might be.

someone, do you need to know its colour?

Many insist that Red is more blameworthy.

If you say yes, this means that you believe in

They insist that blameworthiness hinges on the

moral luck. If you say no, this means that you

luck of outcomes. Yes, in one sense, Red and

don’t. I don’t. To my horror and amazement,

Green did exactly the same thing: they know-

though, many do.

ingly and deliberately risked killing innocent

To make our contrast clearer, let’s add two

people. But in another, very important sense,

details to the story. As it turns out, the brick that

Red did something in addition to this: he actu-

killed was the red brick. But as it also turns out,

ally killed someone. For some, this just matters;

Green did not throw just one green brick, but

and it matters a lot.

two. The one red brick killed someone. The two green bricks shattered harmlessly on the road.

I suspect that this has been one of our strangest, most difficult to catch errors. It is

Now the blameworthiness has to be unequal.

widely, even standardly believed that when you

But which person is more blameworthy? I say

try to do an evil thing, and succeed, then obvi-

it is obviously Green. He did a terrible thing –

ously the thing to say is that you did an evil thing.

he knowingly and deliberately risked killing an

Though the outcomes of their actions were

innocent person – and, even worse, he did it

uncertain, Red did an evil thing, and Green only

twice. Red did the exact same thing, but did it

tried to.

>>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

forum/luckless

Most people expect that their futures will be lucky

Nonsense. Red tried to do an evil thing, and

In two articles, “There Is No Door”, and

that is all that Red did. Green also tried to do

“Tossing the Rotten Thing Out”, I offered an

an evil thing – twice – and that is all that Green

explanation that seemed to do better. Our belief

did. Obviously things worked out differently with

in moral luck, I argued, stems from the combina-

the different bricks, but this is because of how

tion of two biases: a selfish bias, and an optimistic

Red and Green’s doings interacted with the rest

bias.

of the world’s doings. Red and Green only modi-

To be selfishly biased is to be tempted

fied the probabilities of what might happen, and

toward moral beliefs that you would like to be

made various outcomes possible. The world then

true. If your name is Mr Aardvark and you are

resolved those probabilities, and made certain

a white graduate student, then it is not terribly

outcomes actual.

surprising if you are morally appalled by affirm-

We fail to see this in the case of Red and Green

ative action and flat taxation, but morally fine

because we fail to see such things in general. As

with mandatory retirement and alphabetical first

Gilbert Harman originally noted on this topic,

authorship.

human beings reliably commit what researchers

To be optimistically biased is, in effect, to

describe as the fundamental attribution error. We

believe that you have a special, even magical

tend to over credit agents, and we tend to under

knack for being lucky. Most people expect,

credit features of those agents’ situations, in our

and seem to expect, that their futures will be

explanations of behaviours. I’ve always suspected that this explanation was not enough. As it turns out, so has Harman. In correspondence, Harman describes a problem that he noticed right from the start. For whatever reason, people tend to commit the fundamental attribution error selectively. When they judge others, they typically commit the error; but when they judge themselves, they typically resist committing the error. This predicts that people would blame others for their bad moral luck much more than they would blame themselves for their own. In reality, though, we see the opposite pattern. People blame themselves more.

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

You probably suffer from the illusion of control disproportionately more lucky than the futures

use this power. In other words, in my particular

of similar others.

case, negligence plus bad luck is probably not negligence plus bad luck at all. It is probably negli-

belief that most of us are selfishly tempted to

gence all the way down. I negligently took a risk

hold, but on irrationally optimistic grounds. If I

that I shouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t, and I negligently failed to use my

have a magical gift for being lucky, and if a belief

special powers to prevent the unlucky outcome. I

in moral luck will allow this gift to systematically

am especially blameworthy because I am blame-

favour me, by letting the ungifted shoulder much

worthy for two reasons, instead of just one.

more statistical blame than the gifted in cases

Even when I submitted them, though, I could

of equal negligence, then I will be tempted to

tell that these two articles did not go far enough.

uphold this belief. This, I insisted, is where our

If Sally is morally unlucky, and someone gets hurt

belief in moral luck comes from.

or killed as a result, Sally probably does not react

One of the best features of this explanation

like someone who rarely experiences bad moral

was that it got the pattern right. If I see myself as

luck. She probably reacts like someone who

having a magical gift for being lucky, then I will be

never does. But how could this be?

especially horrified when I am morally unlucky,

As a precursor to a possibly improved answer,

because this means that I had the power to avoid

let me ask an interesting question. Do you really

the unlucky outcome, but somehow failed to

believe in luck?

forum/luckless

The two biases combine to produce a moral

>>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

There are many reasons to doubt that you do.

forum/luckless

Let’s survey four examples.

does, I am likely to suspect that Fred deserved

To begin with, you probably suffer from illu-

this good fortune, and am likely to like Fred more

sion of control. If we set up a randomly blinking

than before. These phenomena are described

light and a button, and ask you to figure out

in the research as just-world phenomena, and

how to control the light with the button, you are

they become much easier to make sense of if we

very likely to figure out a method, even though

hypothesise that people do not actually believe

there is none. The button is not connected to

in luck.

the randomly blinking light. You only think that

Fourth, if, by luck, you survive something (a

it is. The same goes for rolling dice or flipping

battle or a car crash) and others do not survive

coins: we are easily tempted to think that we have

it, you are likely to suffer survivor’s guilt. This

control when we do not. For laughs, consider

mental condition is complicated, and it is typi-

asking your friends why they find it so difficult

cally subsumed under the broader category of

to watch a sporting event after it has taken place.

post-traumatic stress disorder, but notice the

This can be surprisingly difficult for people to do,

common thread. People who suffer survivor’s

and, time and again, only one explanation really

guilt reason that, if they survived while others

fits. We believe, as TV viewers, that we can affect

didn’t, then this must be because of the choices

the outcome of live televised sporting events. If

that they made, and that others did not make.

I cheer just right, my team will win. This can

In other words, people with survivor’s guilt

be embarrassing to realise. But does realising it

feel just the way they would feel if they did

change anything?

not really believe in luck. Again, unless it turns

Second, you probably have a tendency toward

chance, Fred wins something and no one else

out that people do not actually believe in luck,

hindsight bias. In other words, you probably

this phenomenon can be very difficult to make

overestimate how foreseeable – and personally

sense of.

foreseen – events and outcomes were before

If I am right about this, and human beings

they happened. Unless you doubt the reality of

don’t really believe in luck, then no wonder so

resultant luck, this belief is hard to make sense of.

many of us blame Red more than Green. Deep

Third, if, purely by chance, something bad

down, without necessarily realising or even

happens to someone, you probably cannot help

suspecting, we think that Red must have tried

but like that person less than before. Strangely

harder, or better, than Green did. Red killed

enough, we humans read meanings and expla-

someone because he really tried to. Green did

nations into purely chance events. If my friends

not because Green did not really try to.

and I draw straws to see who pays, and if, just by

But wait a minute. If I am right, then why do

chance, George comes up short, I am likely to

only many of us blame Red more than Green?

suspect that George must have deserved to come

Why do some of us – me included – blame Green

up short, and am likely to like George slightly

more than Red?

less than before. Similarly, if a group of us buy scratch-and-win lottery tickets, and if, just by

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

These are excellent questions. Something is still missing. But what?

What is it that makes the involuntarily unemployed, those suffering from genetic disorders and congenital illnesses, and the victims of unforeseen natural disasters the rightful recipients of assistance?

forum/just luck

Should a just society neutralise luck? ALEXANDER BROWN CONSIDERS THE POSSIBILITIES

hilosophers have had much to say

the freedom to take risks and trust to good

on the subject of luck and justice. In

fortune enables individuals not merely to accu-

her book Justice By Lottery, Barbara

mulate wealth at a pace that would otherwise be

Goodwin proposes the use of lotteries

very difficult or impossible, but also to express

for settling certain questions of distribution, such

to other people the type of characters they are.

as the allocation of places at elite universities, as

Since the early 1980s, however, discussion

an alternative to distribution-by-merit, which

of another type of luck has become prevalent

is susceptible to deadlock, error in judgement,

in philosophical books and journals. A number >>>

bias and freak results. For Goodwin, luck is the servant of just outcomes. A more general point of consensus is that the influence of luck per se does not make outcomes unjust. So, for example, Ronald Dworkin insists that it is perfectly just for inequalities of wealth to develop on the basis of “option luck”, which is “a matter of how delib-

Alexander Brown is lecturer in social and political theory at the University of East Anglia. He is the author of Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Equality: Domestic and Global Perspectives (Palgrave, úøøā) and Personal Responsibility: Why it Matters (Continuum, úøøā).

erate and calculated gambles turn out”. Having

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

Suffering “brute luck” can be a source of claims in justice

forum/just luck

of philosophers are persuaded by the idea that

However,

before

luck

egalitarians

can

suffering “brute luck” can be a source of claims in

convince the rest of the philosophical commu-

justice. The popularity of this idea owes much to

nity to adopt the luck-neutralising aim − not to

the popularity of the late Oxford philosopher G A

mention those legislators who are responsible

Cohen. For Cohen and other “luck egalitarians”

for doing something about it − there is a large

(as Elizabeth Anderson calls them) a just society

amount of scepticism and unease which remains

is one that attempts to neutralise the influence

to be conquered and dispelled.

of brute luck on people’s life prospects. What

Some of that scepticism derives from

is it, for instance, that makes the involuntarily

uncertainty about what qualifies as brute luck.

unemployed, those suffering from genetic disor-

Metaphysical theories of brute luck appeal to

ders and congenital illnesses, and the victims of

the notion of circumstances that lie beyond the

unforeseen natural disasters the rightful recip-

control of the individual. Cohen freely admits

ients of assistance? That they have all suffered

that his theory of brute luck “subordinates

brute luck of course.

political philosophy to metaphysical questions that may be impossible to answer”. Hence, if the philosophical theory of hard determinism is true, and there is no such thing as a genuine choice between two or more actions, then

everything is down to brute luck. Or, as Cohen ironically puts it: “We may indeed be up to our necks in the free will problem, but that is just ‘tough luck’.” Yet many political philosophers are disinclined to follow Cohen down this road. Moralised theories of brute luck, by contrast, describe brute luck in terms of circumstances that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view”. One prominent idea is that something is arbitrary from a moral point of view if it is “undeserved”. In his A Theory of Justice, for example, John Rawls describes the contingencies of people’s starting place in society and the distribution of natural abilities as undeserved. At first glance it remains unclear what makes

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

But even the more limited task of persuading

fact that it lies beyond the control of the indi-

egalitarians to become luck egalitarians depends

vidual. But for some moralised theories it makes

on how the category of brute luck is to be speci-

more sense to think of the terms “brute luck”

fied. It might be tempting to see this as a matter

and “undeserved” as placeholders for the more

of social convention. Brute luck is simply what-

complex idea that, in a society of equals, it is

ever different cultures deem it to be. But then

departures from equality which stand in need

this opens the door to an objection from moral

of justification, and there are some things that

relativism. For it seems to rule out the possibility

a society of equals rejects as grounds for such

of external criticism of what another society does

departures.

or does not deem to be brute luck − the possibility

This way of thinking about brute luck answers

of criticising a society that regarded localised

another objection that has dogged luck egali-

flooding as divine punishment as opposed to

tarianism over the years, and which Susan

brute luck, for example. Even so, there is an

Hurley articulates in her book Justice, Luck and

alternative way of developing a moralised theory

Knowledge. From the mere fact that individ-

of brute luck that avoids the charge of relativism.

uals suffer underserved circumstances it does

It is to provide an objective account of what any

not follow that society has a duty to neutralise

successful political community must deem to be

or mitigate the impact of those circumstances.

brute luck, where success is defined in terms of

After all, just because someone does not deserve

fulfilling its most basic function over time, that >>>

forum/just luck

something underserved if not the metaphysical

to be ditched by his girlfriend it does not mean that he has a right to expect someone else to take her place. This is not how luck and justice work. However, the luck egalitarian does not claim

that the existence of undeserved circumstances alone renders people entitled to assistance. Rather, he claims that a society of equals is one in which everyone has a right to a certain range of basic opportunities, and brute luck does not have a rightful bearing on whether or not people enjoy such opportunities. What this means, of course, is that luck egalitarianism is unlikely to attract those who deny the basic premise that it is departures from equality that stand in need of justification. But then again, perhaps luck egalitarianism was never intended for those people who deny that basic premise. As Cohen puts it, “I take for granted that there is something which justice requires people to have equal amounts of.”

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

of protecting life and providing ample opportu-

aim is only one among other important aims

nities for comfortable living for all its members.

of justice and the good, so its pursuit must be

Arguably a society could not be successful in

subject to those other demands. While turning

these terms if it systematically failed to regard

over institutions to strong luck egalitarianism

genetic disorders and congenital illnesses, for

could well bankrupt a society, there is less

instance, as brute luck.

reason to be fearful of moderate luck egalitari-

However, whether brute luck is defined in

forum/just luck

metaphysical or moral terms, many philoso-

phers harbour deeper worries about what they

Brute luck is simply whatever different cultures deem it to be

anism, its aim being to neutralise brute luck only as far as is reasonable, all things considered. Nonetheless, some philosophers remain sceptical about luck egalitarianism because they say it ignores the distinction between justice and charity. If someone is in dire straits we may be more inclined to help her if we know she was the victim of brute luck than if she made reckless decisions. But that surely is a matter of charity,

see as the potentially disastrous consequences

not justice. Justice has to do with addressing the

of pursuing the luck-neutralising aim. Dworkin

consequences of human trespasses such as theft,

was among the first political philosophers to

fraud, exploitation, oppression, abuse, and negli-

be labelled “luck egalitarian”, yet he himself

gence. Perhaps theft, fraud, and so on, can all be

rejected the label on the grounds that in order

viewed as so much bad luck from the perspec-

to fully neutralise the influence of brute luck

tive of the victim. But to call these things “bad

on people’s life prospects it would be necessary

luck” is to overlook the fact that they are perpe-

in some cases to provide a level of compensa-

trated by human beings. And strictly speaking

tion that imposes an unbearable cost on society

justice is a matter of making amends for acts of

at large − “to spend all it could to improve the

humanity as opposed to “acts of God”.

position of those who had become crippled in

However, on closer inspection it can be hard

an accident, for instance”. How can it be just

to differentiate between human trespasses and

to bankrupt an entire community for the sake

natural misfortunes. For example, one might be

of neutralising the brute luck suffered by only a

tempted to categorise the victims of the drug

few of its members?

thalidomide as victims of human negligence

However, Dworkin’s misgivings about luck-

and the victims of childhood polio as simply

neutralisation overlook an important distinction

“unlucky”. But this is called into question if one

between two kinds of luck egalitarianism.

reflects on the facts that thalidomide passed the

Strong luck egalitarianism is the view that the

drug safety standards of the time and insuffi-

luck-neutralising aim is the principal or domi-

cient funding of polio vaccination has caused

nant aim and must be pursued at all costs, in an

millions of infections in the third world − a situ-

unqualified way. Moderate luck egalitarianism,

ation that is itself a product of man-made global

by contrast, is the view that the luck-neutralising

inequalities.

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Justice is a matter of making amends for acts of humanity as opposed to “acts of God” mitigating the influence of social contingencies like family life on the distribution of life chances

being disabled is not the fact of being unable to

inclines in the direction of abolishing the family.

walk or hear or see but being forced to live in a

So much for luck egalitarianism.

society where access to valuable forms of work

But perhaps luck egalitarianism could be

and play are made conditional on being able

upheld without abolishing the family, provided

to walk or hear or see. For the most part we as

that more families, that is, more parents, are

citizens get to choose how our societies will be

willing to assume responsibility for engaging

organised, and if we have chosen to organise

in luck-neutralising activities − or at least

things (or have allowed things to be organ-

refraining from activities that make the distri-

ised) such that some individuals among us are

bution of advantages dependent on brute luck.

prevented from carrying out activities we take

What might this entail? Andrew Mason suggests

for granted, then this is a matter of justice after

that if the agreed aim is to neutralise the influ-

all. To the sceptic who says, “Nobody said life

ence of brute luck on people’s life prospects,

was fair”, one can reply, “True, but as citizens we

then it follows that parents should refrain from

have a responsibility to make society fair.”

reading bedtime stories to their children for fear

A final cause of unease surrounding luck

of placing them at an unfair advantage over chil-

egalitarianism has to do with the site of justice.

dren whose parents do not read such stories.

Many political philosophers share Rawls’s view

Mason regards this as a highly counter-intuitive

that the primary subject of justice is the “basic

implication of the luck-neutralising aim.

structure” of society, meaning the way in which

However, it is possible to avoid this implica-

major social and economic institutions shape

tion by appealing once again to moderate luck

the distribution of advantages that arise through

egalitarianism. Even though parents have a

social cooperation. It does not take long to

luck egalitarian reason to refrain from reading

recognise that the family is one major social

bedtime stories to their children, they also have

institution which actively enables brute luck to

other reasons to continue as they are. Shlomi

influence people’s life chances. A person’s will-

Segall avers one such reason: the desires of

ingness to make an effort in life will be partly

parents and children to develop close, loving

determined by upbringing, meaning that so

familial relationships. This falls under the more

long as there are variations in family life there

general heading of what Harry Brighouse and

will not be equal life chances. Rawls surmises

Adam Swift call “legitimate parental partiality”.

that “taken by itself” the aim of neutralising or

So long as parents are acting from the motive of >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

forum/just luck

More generally, disability rights campaigners have long argued that what is disabling about

forum/just luck

It would be wrong to think of luck as the enemy of justice

wanting close, loving familial relationships it is

no objection to luck egalitarians to point out that

not the end of the world that they are thereby

they have a long way to go in this endeavour.

failing to luck-neutralise. What we want is a

A stronger objection would be that teaching

society of reasonable luck egalitarians not a

parents to feel guilty about reading bedtime stories

society of luck egalitarian zealots.

to their children is either impossible or contrary to

Nevertheless, Mason insists that our intu-

what it means to be a parent. That encouraging

itions in this area are strongly against luck

parents to become luck egalitarian is either a waste

egalitarianism: what we intuitively feel is not that

of time or alienating. But how could one definitely

a luck egalitarian motive for parents refraining

prove that parents are incapable of feeling guilty

from reading bedtime stories to their children

about giving their children unfair advantages or

is being trumped by other concerns but that

that such guilt is contrary to the essence of parent-

parents have no reason whatsoever to refrain

hood? After all, do not (some) progressive parents

from reading bedtime stories. The evidence for

who send their children to expensive private

this putative strong intuition is the fact that most

schools feel a little bit guilty about this practice?

parents do not report feeling guilty about failing

My own experiences as both a parent and progres-

to luck-neutralise combined with the assump-

sive are that feeling guilty about what I do for my

tion that if the luck-neutralising aim did matter

own child comes as easily as feeling guilty about

to patents, then they would report feeling guilty

what I do not do for other peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s children. The

about setting it aside. This evidence must be

struggle that comes with believing that I have

taken with a pinch of salt, however, since it can

special duties toward my own child and general

be explained in a number of ways. It might be

duties to do the right thing by other peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s chil-

that some parents do experience these feelings

dren strikes me as entirely normal.

of guilt but simply do not admit it to others. Or

To sum up, while it would be wrong to think

it could be that the human psyche is capable

of luck as the enemy of justice, luck egalitarians

of unconscious suppression of certain forms of

believe that how societies respond to certain

guilt as a coping mechanism when faced with

kinds of luck can be just or unjust. That there are

the emotional challenge of parenthood. But

different ideas about what the relevant kind of

even if the evidence does suggest that at present

luck is and what governments and individual citi-

very few parents are luck egalitarians, this is

zens should do about it is a source of scepticism

hardly a knock-down objection to luck egalitari-

and unease concerning this theory. But that is to

anism itself. The ambition is to make the world

be expected. Few theories of justice escape it.

more luck egalitarian: to socialise new parents

Besides, the scepticism and unease is not always

into adopting this sort of egalitarian ethos. It is

well founded.

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PP CULTURE His renunciation of citizenship is a symbolic denial of American exceptionalism, but it is not an abandonment of America or the values that it – but not it alone – represents and promotes.

Un-American hero WAS SUPERMAN RIGHT TO RENOUNCE HIS CITIZENSHIP, ASKS ANDREW TERJESEN

uperman caused a bit of a stir in

Strip, Superman favours giving her a light

the real world when he announced,

sentence. Jimmy Olsen is outraged that he would

in the landmark 900th issue of

turn a blind eye to the danger she had posed, but

Action Comics, that he was going to

Superman answers him with a speech in defence

renounce his US citizenship. One conservative

of second chances: “That’s what America is about, really. That’s

displayed a “blatant lack of patriotism” and that

the American way. Life, liberty, the pursuit of

Superman was “belittling the United States as

happiness – and second chances. None of us

a whole”. Though this seems to be mostly an

are forced to be anything we don’t want to be …

example of media overreaction during a slow

People from all over America – from all over the

news cycle, why did it cause such a stir?

world – who went to the city to live the lives they

It’s worth noticing at the start that, for

wanted, to be the people they wanted to be. That’s >>>

decades, Superman has been seen as a distinctly American superhero. After all he fights for “truth, justice, and the American way”. But what exactly is the “American way” that he is fighting for? In a story that appeared just weeks after Action Comics #900, Superman explains what the American way means to him. After preventing

Andrew Terjesen is assistant professor of philosophy at Rhodes College. This article is abridged from Superheroes: The Best of Philosophy and Pop Culture, edited by William Irwin, and is part of a continuing series of extracts from the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series.

the villain Livewire from destroying the Vegas

4TH QUARTER 2011

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the lowdown/pop culture

activist told Fox News that Superman’s actions

the idea that America was founded on, but it’s not just for people born here. It’s for everyone.”

In his book Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Kwame Anthony Appiah

This statement dovetails very nicely with what

argues for a modern form of cosmopolitanism.

Superman said when he threatened to renounce

Instead of claiming that we are all part of one

his citizenship: “I can’t help but see the bigger

rational being or creature, as the stoics did,

picture. I’ve been thinking too small. I realize

Appiah appeals to the fact that we need to be

that now.” Superman may have meant that the

responsible for the effects our actions have on

values of America are not limited to America,

people around the world. Appiah emphasises

in which case it’s not clear why renouncing his

connectedness, as did the stoics, but he does not appeal to a single standard of the good.

What is the “American way” Instead, Appiah embraces the idea that there is more than one way to live a good that he is fighting for? life, and explains that cosmopolitanism has

the lowdown/pop culture

to find a way to balance the interconnectedness

citizenship is so controversial. Superman is

of peoples, and the obligations between them,

just trying to show how universal those values

with mutual respect for their differences.

are, and that there is no reason why one has to

Critics of cosmopolitanism fear that respecting

be an American in order to stand for them. If

everyone else’s life choices would create a

anything, renouncing his citizenship would serve

community based entirely on twenty-something

as a message to the world that those values are

hipster irony. Instead of patriotically defending

for everyone.

their community from threats, people would

The idea that we should think in global terms is

“patriotically” defend their community, going

known as cosmopolitanism, a word that combines

through the motions but not really believing that

the Greek words for the world (cosmos) and city-

it was truly worth saving. Since the members of

state (polis). Cosmopolitans are people who see

the community can’t fully commit emotionally to

themselves as part of a worldwide community

its defence, it is likely that they would not fight

and who try to experience and understand the

as vigorously as they otherwise would. Despite

larger world. As a philosophical view, cosmopoli-

what some commentators in the media may say,

tanism is the idea that we should organise society

Superman has not really rejected America. His

in order to create such a worldwide community.

renunciation of citizenship is a symbolic denial of

Many ancient Greek and Roman stoics

American exceptionalism, but it is not an aban-

endorsed a cosmopolitan worldview, according

donment of America or the values that it – but

to which the entire universe was a sentient

not it alone – represents and promotes.

and rational being that made sure everything

In all of the brouhaha surrounding Superman’s

happened in a rational manner. Endorsing a

decision, very little attention has been paid to the

strong form of cosmopolitanism, the stoics sought

context in which he says he is surrendering his citi-

to supplant particular cultures with a universal

zenship. In Action Comics #900, we see Superman

rational culture.

talking to the US national security adviser, who is

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

very upset because Superman created an inter-

authority he needs to demonstrate the essential

national incident when he travelled to Tehran to

traits of a moral person, especially impartiality.

support anti-government protesters. Rather than

We tend to think of an impartial person as

throw his weight around, he took no actions against

having an abstract point of view that transcends

the government forces, even when it seemed that

any particular feelings, but there is another

they would hurt the protesters. Instead he merely

way to think about impartiality. In The Theory

stood in the public square for twenty-four hours

of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith proposed a

in tacit support of the protesters. The Iranian

theory of moral judgement that hinged upon

government nonetheless interpreted this as the

what he called the “impartial spectator”, but

American government, acting through Superman,

this meaning of “impartial” is not unemotional.

supporting the protesters, and voilà – we have an

Instead, Smith’s sense of “impartial” simply

international incident and further erosion in US–

refers to someone who does not have a partic-

Iranian relations.

ular interest in the outcome nor any connections

Superman feels compelled to renounce his

to anyone who is affected by the outcome. Notice

citizenship because as long as the most powerful

that Smith did not call for us to imagine an

being on the planet appears to be affiliated with

“unemotional spectator”. In fact, Smith thought

a particular government or nation, he is always

that our emotions conveyed important informa-

seen as acting in its best interests rather than

tion, although they need to be pure in order to

those of the world in general. As he says, “I’m

give us the right picture of the situation. If we are

tired of having my actions construed as instru-

personally interested in the outcome, we might

ments of US policy.” Superman sought to be a

not feel the right way about it. Whenever we think that someone has a

government and the protesters to resolve their

particular interest in something, we begin to

issues peacefully. But in order to exert moral

question their judgements on that topic. As >>>

the lowdown/pop culture

moral force in Iran, putting pressure on both the

4TH QUARTER 2011

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Laura Hudson, a blogger at comicsalliance.com,

involved with the American government. In many

points out, as long as Superman is viewed as a

professions, conflicts of interest are dealt with by

US citizen “it would indeed be impossible for a

creating a so-called “Chinese wall” that blocks

nigh-omnipotent being ideologically aligned with

the flow of information between different parts

America to intercede against injustice beyond

of an organisation. Superman needs to maintain

American borders without creating enormous

a wall between him and the US government, so

political fallout for the US government.” Anything

that he does not appear to be receiving national

that Superman did that had indirect benefits for

secrets or taking orders from the president.

the US would be called into question. Superman’s

Superman is inescapably an American icon in that he is deeply embedded in American society.

“I’m tired of having my actions construed as US policy”

More accurately, he’s an icon who happens to be American. To some extent he will always favour America, but not because there is any clear set of distinctly American values that only America promotes or embodies. Still, Superman has to avoid creating the impression that his commit-

presence in Tehran could be viewed as support for

ment to America is also a commitment to US

a democratic movement, or it could be viewed as

foreign policy and its national interests. So the

an American attempt to destabilise an unfriendly

symbolic gesture of renouncing his citizen-

government. So the question we need to consider

ship might help in distancing himself from the

is whether Superman should feel morally obli-

American government in people’s minds.

the lowdown/pop culture

gated to avoid the appearance of impropriety.

The renunciation is not enough on its own,

To answer this question we need to recognise

however. Superman needs to show that he does

that impropriety is an unavoidable fact of life if

not take national interest into consideration

one is to maintain any commitments or close ties

when he acts, and the best way to do that would

at all. Rival newspapers undoubtedly think that

be to spend more time helping on a global scale.

Superman is “in bed with” the Daily Planet, but

Appiah’s modern cosmopolitanism encourages us

the fact that he often grants them interviews and

to broaden our perspective without giving up the

that they tend to portray him in a favourable light

culture that makes us who we are. Superman can

is more a function of his close contact with the

affect the world in ways that far exceed Appiah’s

members of the staff (one in particular). If we

examples of interconnectedness, so the argument

want to avoid the appearance of impropriety alto-

for cosmopolitanism is much more compelling

gether, we would need to shun any commitments

for Superman. If nothing else, the symbolic act of

that would produce normal associations. That, of

renouncing his citizenship would help Superman

course, is impossible, since our connections and

to think like a modern cosmopolitan when he

associations are part of who we are.

looks at the world’s problems – or, as the bumper

Even so, Superman does have a moral responsibility to make sure that he is not too closely

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

sticker says, he should act locally while thinking globally.

SNAPSHOT

Thomas Reid by James A Harris

homas Reid (1710–96) was the most

professorial system, so Reid was a “regent”, and

influential British philosopher of the

taught the whole curriculum to assigned cohorts

eighteenth century. David Hume is

of students. This demanded a wide range of learning, and for the rest of his life Reid maintained an interest in a large number of academic

taken positive inspiration from Hume’s writ-

subjects in addition to his specialism in philos-

ings. Hume had no disciples in his own time,

ophy. Philosophy was itself then a very much

and founded no school. Until the early twentieth

more capacious subject than it is now, and had

century Hume’s philosophy survived as some-

yet to be decisively separated off from empirical

thing to be refuted rather than as something

natural science, or from what we now call the

to be refined and extended. Reid, on the other

social sciences. Reid was a more than capable

hand, played a key role in the establishment of

mathematician, and was actively engaged in the

a method and body of doctrine that in the nine-

ongoing business of clarifying and developing

teenth century was taught in Scotland, France,

Newton’s scientific achievements.

Germany and Italy, and that also quickly crossed

Reid moved from Aberdeen to the chair of

the Atlantic to America. His influence waned

moral philosophy at Glasgow in 1764. He took his

at the beginning of the twentieth century, but

professorial duties as seriously as he had done his

the past thirty years has seen a major revival of

work as a regent, and letters survive in which he

interest in Reid and his style of philosophising.

complains, much as present-day academics do,

He is now once again a major figure in the phil-

about how teaching and administrative matters

osophical landscape, the subject of books and

are getting in the way of reading and writing.

conferences, and the first complete edition of his works is being published by Edinburgh University Press. Reid began his teaching career at Aberdeen, which then had two separate universities: King’s College in the old town, and Marischal College

James A Harris is senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of St Andrews and (with Knud Haakonssen) editor of Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers for the new Edinburgh Edition. He is writing an intellectual biography of Hume for Cambridge University Press.

in the new. Aberdeen had yet to switch to the

4TH QUARTER 2011

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the lowdown/snapshot

now considerably better known, but it

is only relatively recently that philosophers have

The best way to approach Reid’s philosophy is

conscience, and the will. Very much a man of the

to see it in its original context, the context of the

Enlightenment, Reid saw it as his task to get his

classroom and the lecture hall, and to take seri-

pupils to understand the powers, or abilities, that

ously the idea, which Reid certainly believed in,

made them distinctively human, and to under-

of philosophy as a way to teach people how to

stand also how they might take responsibility for

form their beliefs and direct their actions. All of

themselves by exercising these powers in the best

Reid’s published works concern what he called

possible way. While still at Aberdeen, Reid read Hume, and

perception, imagination, memory, judgement,

came to the conclusion that Hume had brought

the lowdown/snapshot

“the powers of the human mind”: notably sense

uth

ret

o hS

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

to light a scepticism that was inherent in Lockean

account of the powers of the human mind, Essays

empiricism. This scepticism was not, according

on the Intellectual Powers (1785) and Essays on

to Reid, a merely theoretical or academic issue.

the Active Powers (1788). In both works he insists

It was a scepticism about, precisely, the powers

on the activity involved in the life of the mind

of the human mind, and about the capacity of

as human beings know it. Hume presents the

human beings to know the world they lived in,

mind as a kind of machine, a machine moved by

and also about their capacity to engage practically

causal interactions between mental representa-

with that world in the manner of autonomous

tions. Reid, by contrast, conceives of thoughts as

moral agents. This scepticism, Reid thought, was

actions performed by persons. Action considered

dangerous, because if people took it seriously, they would be bound to live more intellectually and morally impoverished lives than they might do otherwise. An important aspect of Reid’s published writings was therefore a concerted effort to refute Hume’s arguments, not so much

What we perceive with our senses are things, not ideas

by showing them to be invalid as by showing that they proceeded from false premises.

quite generally, he argues, requires an agent, and agents are (so Reid says) by definition free in the

Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764)

way they use the powers at their disposal. Reid, in

is a brilliant assault on what Reid took to be the

other words, is a proponent of “agent causation”,

fundamental principle of modern scepticism

and rejects the view that actions, as such, can be

(Hume’s included), the claim that the immediate

caused by mental events. He gives a powerful

object of perception is always a mental repre-

series of arguments against the assumption that,

sentation, an “idea”, not the three-dimensional

at its most basic, the world is to be conceived

world of material entities. Reid argues that no

in terms of law-bound relations between events.

one has ever given a good reason to believe that

Reid’s renewed appeal today perhaps lies in

ideas exist, and that no one has ever explained

the fact that he enables us to say things that we

how, even if they do exist, they make percep-

are naturally inclined to say before we come into

tion possible. Reid proceeds by means of patient

contact with the arguments of philosophy: that

analyses of each of the five sense modalities, and

what we perceive with our senses are things,

he was one of the first philosophers to question

not ideas; that our actions are performed by us,

the assumption that vision should be regarded as

rather than being the product of causal chains

the paradigm case of sense perception. He gives

over which we have no control. He is wise

special attention to touch and vision, but also has

enough not to try to prove these things to be

fascinating things to say about smell, taste, and

true. He restricts himself to providing arguments

hearing.

against assumptions upon which they seem not to

Reid left it until he had retired from teaching to publish his magnum opus, a two-volume

be true. The burden of proof, according to Reid, always lies with the sceptic.

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the lowdown/snapshot

Reid’s first book, An Inquiry into the Human

Make your self scarce ROBERT J HOWELL ON AN INVITING INTRODUCTION TO THE PUZZLES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY The Ego Trick: What Does it Mean to be You? by Julian Baggini (Granta) £ùü.āā (pb)

review/ego trick

ulian Baggini confidently walks the

questions, this one can seem both mind-bogglingly

tightrope of popular philosophy writing,

profound and annoyingly slippery. Baggini helps

consistently

that

us find our footing by asking more concrete

producing

books

convey the excitement of philosophy

questions: “Are you the same person as you were

without dumbing it down. The Ego Trick, his

when you were four?”; “Is the Alzheimer’s patient

latest, introduces the puzzles surrounding the

next to me the same person as the witty woman

self and personal identity, as well as his own take

I married?”; “Are we the sorts of things that can

on those puzzles, with humour, style and insight,

survive death?” Furthermore, by conducting

making it an inviting entrance to this debate for

interviews and telling stories of people who

the non-academic philosopher.

face versions of these questions, Baggini keeps

Baggini aims to answer the question, “What,

issues firmly in the human realm, and well away

if anything, is the self?” Like many philosophical

from philosophical fictions involving teleportation and brain-swapping. Instead, the reader is introduced to real life relatives of Alzheimer’s

Robert J Howell is associate professor of philosophy at Southern Methodist University. He is author of The God Dialogues (with Torin Alter) and Subjective Physicalism (forthcoming), both from Oxford University Press.

100

tpm did not review any of Julian Baggini’s books under his editorship. Now that the reviews section is produced without his input, we’re pleased to bring you this review of his latest book. (Jean Kazez, reviews editor)

patients, people who have undergone gender reassignment, a former prostitute, individuals with “multiple personality disorder”, and Buddhist tulkus who claim to be reincarnations. But philosophers and cognitive scientists are not simply left behind; woven into each chapter are conversations with Richard Swinburne, Galen Strawson, Derek Parfit, Daniel Dennett, David

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

“The solidity of the self is an illusion; the self itself is not” Chalmers, Susan Blackmore, Philip Zimbardo

can’t say much more than that without returning

and many others.

to a version of the pearl view.

Baggini does not simply report, however.

Baggini’s bundle view, which has precedents

Throughout the book he works to undermine

in Hume, Parfit and others, seems profound and

the commonsense view, which he calls the “pearl

can appear inevitable once one loses hope for the

view”, that there is a persisting core within each

existence of an immaterial soul. However, this

person that makes us who we are and explains

may be partly because the thesis is left some-

why we are, while fat and forty, the same people

what sketchy. Baggini tries to satisfy sceptics by

we were when we were naive and nineteen.

asserting that all entities are bundle-like construc-

Instead, Baggini argues for a “bundle view” of the

tions (excepting perhaps the basic microphysical

self that maintains that each of us is a collection

constituents of the universe), but that leads one

of “mental, neural and physical” activity, lacking

to wonder whether there is anything particularly

clearly defined borders and ever evolving.

constructed and fragile about the self. Baggini also sometimes shifts between what

thing which has a strong sense of unity and

are actually subtly distinct topics – for example,

singleness from what is actually a messy, frag-

between numerical and qualitative identity.

mented sequence of experiences and memories,

It’s one thing to say, “I was a different person

because all mental experience emerges from a

before I quit drinking.” It’s another to say of

messy, fragmented, and hugely complicated set of

two presidents, “The George Bush who failed

processes in the brain”. So, although it is not true

to catch Saddam is a different person from the

to say there is no self, it is also false that that there

one who caught him.” Baggini notes this distinc-

is a pearl-like core to the self. Each of us is, instead,

tion halfway through the book, but it’s not always

a sort of construction, with parts that come and

clear which sort of identity he’s addressing. And

go. “The solidity of self is an illusion; the self itself

sometimes the arguments move a little too fluidly

is not.”

between nearby topics, such as the self and the

The boundaries of the self are fuzzy, and what

sense of self, personality and what it is to be a

makes us the same selves over time depends

subject of experience. Some of this, though, is

on many factors, with memory and continui-

an understandable consequence of the book’s

ties of conscious thought playing crucial roles.

impressive scope. Baggini’s aim is to make the

Nevertheless, we should not always expect to get

reader think about a cluster of related problems,

a single, final answer to the hard questions, such

to challenge some of her deepest assump-

as whether the Alzheimer’s patient next to me is

tions about the self, and to keep the topic vivid,

the same person as the woman I married. Some

grounded in real life and enjoyable. In all these

things are the same, others are different, and we

tasks, The Ego Trick is a success.

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review/ego trick

The “ego trick” is the construction of “some-

101

Inhabiting philosophical ideas JOHN KOETHE APPLAUDS POEMS ONLY A PHILOSOPHER COULD WRITE At Lake Scugog: Poems by Troy Jollimore (Princeton University Press) £ùù.āý/$ùþ.āý (pb)

review/Jollimore

hilosophy and poetry have had an

It is perhaps surprising then that so few

uneasy relationship at least since

people have been both philosophers and poets:

Aristophanes ridiculed Socrates in

Plato himself was also an astonishing stylist;

The Clouds and Plato returned the

Lucretius presented a view of the natural order

favour by banishing poets from his Republic. In

in verse; Coleridge engaged in extended (and

the popular mind both represent paradigmatically

tedious) Kantian reflections; T S Eliot completed

useless pursuits. Looked at more sympathetically,

a Harvard dissertation on F H Bradley, which he

both are often motivated by similar reflections

declined to return to the United States to defend.

and concerns: the nature of the self and its rela-

I know of only four living American philosophers

tion to the world; the relations between reality,

who have achieved a degree of recognition for

thought, perception and the imagination; the

poetry, and two of these (including myself) are

nature of time and its relation to experience and

retired. One of them is Troy Jollimore, a philos-

memory; happiness and the search for a satisfying

opher at California State University, Chico who

and meaningful life.

did his graduate work at Princeton under Harry Frankfurt and has written books on ethics and friendship, and on love. His first book of poems,

102

John Koethe’s last book of poems, Falling Water (HarperCollins), received the Lenore Marshall Prize from the Academy of American Poets. He is distinguished professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and last year was the Bain-Swiggett professor of poetry at Princeton University.

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Tom Thompson in Purgatory, received the 2006 National Book Critics Circle award for poetry, and his second, At Lake Scugog, was published last spring by Princeton University Press. There is a sense in which “philosophical poetry” is an oxymoron, if it means poetry in which

the activity of doing philosophy is conducted.

The sentence is the unit of thought, and since

Philosophy and poetry might both begin in, say,

the thoughts involved in philosophical and other

a wonder at the relation of the mind to the world,

abstract forms of reflection involve obsessive clar-

but to respond to that wonder philosophically

ification and qualification, they demand sentences

involves staking out and clarifying a view of what

of complementary syntactic complexity, sentences

that relation is, and arguing for it and defending

capable of accommodating, for example, subjunc-

it against alternative views and objections, all

tive modes and subordinate clauses. One of the

subject to strict constraints of consistency and

distinctive aspects of Jollimore’s poetry is his

coherence. Poetry on the other hand is largely

ease with an idiom that allows him to elaborate a

free of such constraints, which is a source of the

complex line of thought:

exhilaration and the sense of freedom it allows. What poetry can do, and which Jollimore does brilliantly in a great many poems in At Lake

What land grew the plant whose powder composed

Scugog, including the poem “The Solipsist” (see

this ink? What ship carried it in what bottles?

overleaf), is imaginatively inhabit and explore

I have seen it half-flashed, subliminally sensed

philosophical ideas by dramatising and person-

against a blank field of sky

ifying them. This isn’t an idle or ornamental

through whose invisible perforations

exercise. Imaginability is commonly taken by

the starlight would soon come flooding.

philosophers as a criterion of possibility, yet As this brief excerpt from the fairly extended

imagines or conceives. The vividness with which

poem “Stain” may suggest (although the labyrin-

a poet can inhabit a philosophical position can

thine quality of his poems makes them difficult

thus reinforce the sense of its genuine possi-

to excerpt), one thing Jollimore excels at is the

bility, whether the possibility is solipsism, or the

working out of what are often called meta-

possibility of a disembodied existence central to

physical conceits, tropes of a kind associated

traditional arguments for mind–body dualism, or

with so-called metaphysical poets like Donne

the Kantian experience of the sublime that lies at

and Herbert: comparative or analogical lines of

the heart of high romanticism.

thought which gesture at abstractions that resist

Another impediment to poetry that might be

being directly conveyed. It is in this, rather than

called philosophical is the language character-

in the enterprise of propounding and arguing

istic of much contemporary poetry, which tends

for philosophical theses, that Jollimore’s poetry

either towards the fragmented and disjunctive or

is genuinely philosophical. Of course, there

towards the straightforwardly declarative. These

are many pleasures of more familiar sorts to

modes may be fine for tracing the phenome-

be found in At Lake Scugog – for example, the

nology of perception or enacting the suspension

lovely concluding poem, “His Master’s Voice” –

of thought in a swoon of sensation one critic has

but what makes the book exceptional is the way

called “the rhapsodic fallacy”, but they aren’t well

it embodies a style of language and thought only

suited to thought of any subtlety or complexity.

a philosopher could deploy so effortlessly.

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there is often a question about just what one

103

The Solipsist

review/Jollimore

by Troy Jollimore

Don’t be misled:

which the world is, retires.

that sea-song you hear

Someday it will expire.

when the shell’s at your ear?

Then all will go silent

It’s all in your head.

and dark. For the moment,

That primordial tide –

however, the black-

the slurp and salt-slosh

ness is just temporary.

of the brain’s briny wash –

The planet you carry

is on the inside.

will shortly swing back

Truth be told, the whole place,

from the far nether regions.

everything that the eye

And life will continue –

can take in, to the sky

but only within you.

and beyond into space,

Which raises a question

lives inside of your skull.

that comes up again and again,

When you set your sad head

as to why

down on Procrustes’ bed,

God would make ear and eye

you lay down the whole

to face outward, not in?

universe. You recline on the pillow: the cosmos grows dim. The soft ghost in the squishy machine,

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“The Solipsist” is from At Lake Scugog (Princeton University Press, úøùù). First published in Poetry magazine.

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Chester by John Koethe

Wallace Stevens is beyond fathoming, he is so strange; it is as if he had a morbid secret he would rather perish than disclose … Marianne Moore to William Carlos Williams

Another day, which is usually how they come: A cat at the foot of the bed, noncommital In its blankness of mind, with the morning light Slowly filling the room, and fragmentary Memories of last night’s video and phone calls. It is a feeling of sufficiency, one menaced By the fear of some vague lack, of a simplicity Of self, a self without a soul, the nagging fear Of being someone to whom nothing ever happens. Thus the fantasy of the narrative behind the story,

review/Jollimore

Of the half-concealed life that lies beneath The ordinary one, made up of ordinary mornings More alike in how they feel than what they say. They seem like luxuries of consciousness, Like second thoughts that complicate the time One simply wastes. And why not? Mere being Is supposed to be enough, without the intricate Evasions of a mystery or off-stage tragedy. Evenings follow on the afternoons, lingering in The living room and listening to the stereo While Peggy Lee sings “Is That All There Is?” Amid the morning papers and the usual Ghosts keeping you company, but just for a while. The true soul is the one that flickers in the eyes Of an animal, like a cat that lifts its head and yawns And stares at you, and then goes back to sleep.

“Chester” is from Ninety-Fifth Street (HarperCollins, úøøā), copyright úøøā by John Koethe

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105

Get the vote out ALAN HAWORTH FINDS A BOOK THAT TICKS ALL THE BOXES

review/voting

The Ethics of Voting by Jason Brennan (Princeton University Press) £úø.āý/$úā.āý (hb)

hy should you vote? The

on the result. Maybe you should just stay home

answer is that – well – maybe

and watch TV.

you shouldn’t; at least not if

Such is the negative case argued by Jason

you are a “wrongful” voter

Brennan in this intellectually incisive, lucidly

motivated by immoral bigotry, who votes from

argued book. But Brennan also has a positive

ignorance or is quite inept at weighing arguments

case to make, namely that you are under no obli-

and evidence. There is also the consideration that

gation to vote, but that if you do, you should

your individual vote will likely have a negligible

“vote well”. In other words, you should exer-

effect on the outcome of an election. Worse, you

cise “civic virtue” by voting for what is, in your

may be a resident of North Dakota, in which case

considered judgement, most likely to promote

the probability of your causing an accident as you

the common good. (If you can’t do that, then

drive to the polling-station will be far higher than

you shouldn’t vote, and you may even be enti-

that of your vote’s having any appreciable impact

tled to sell your vote to someone else.) This is an interesting thesis, partly because it contradicts many a received view, including the view that every citizen has a duty to vote. Brennan makes

106

Alan Haworth’s most recent book is Understanding the Political Philosophers: From Ancient to Modern Times (Routledge, úøøü). He is currently preparing the second edition.

short work of the latter in his opening chapters. His thesis requires definitions of “civic virtue” and “the common good”, conceptions of which he advances an “extrapolitical” account. This is

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

another interesting feature of his argument, for

means that anyone who reads it will find his or

it runs counter to the liberal commonplace that

her own points of disagreement. Personally, I

“the common good” denotes nothing more than

was bothered by his claim that there must be

a fancy abstraction.

a “motivational component” to the exercise of

According to Brennan, then, the exercise of

civic virtue; that is, you must both act to promote

civic virtue is, quite simply, a matter of acting

the common good and intend to do just that if

in ways which tend to promote the common

you are to count as exercising civic virtue. This

good; the common good itself being that which

seems right, but I would tentatively suggest that

“promotes the interests of most people either

it sits uneasily with his claim that individuals can

without harming others’ interests or, if it does harm them, without exploiting them”. This is an eminently sensible, level-headed view, and in line with his equally level-headed conviction that “political institutions are like hammers”, to be judged “in the first instance by how functional

Maybe you should just stay home and watch TV

they are”. Accordingly, Brennan takes an attrac-

promote the public good, when pursuing purely

tively unpretentious view of liberal society as “an

private ends, which would seem to imply that one

institutional framework in which individuals can

can promote the public good unintentionally.

best serve their vision of the good by also serving others”.

I would also suggest that Brennan may have a tendency to underestimate what he calls “the symbolic value” of voting. If personal trainers writing political philosophy would have a

pursuing their own private ends. Brennan is

tendency to overestimate the value of exercise

critical of social theorists and others who enjoy

then mightn’t it be that philosophers writing

participatory activities – and who therefore

about politics have a tendency to overplay the

idealise the society of the politically engaged – on

rational and to downplay the symbolic? In 1994,

the grounds that they should be more self-critical

South Africans queued for hours to vote in the

and remember those to whom political activity

first free elections since the end of apartheid.

can be aversive. As he says, “If personal trainers

Many will tell you it was the most moving experi-

wrote political philosophy, I suspect they would

ence of their lives. Again, in 2009, Iranians were

deemphasise political deliberation and instead

prepared to risk their lives demonstrating against

stress the value of exercise.” Just so.

the outcome of a fixed election. What was it that

The real value of books such as this lies in

moved those South Africans, and what was it

their potential to raise the level of public debate.

those Iranians were prepared to die for? If it is

If only they were read by more people. Brennan’s

an implication of Brennan’s argument that they

argument is detailed and searching, which means

might as well have stayed home and found other

that it presents a challenge to anyone prepared

ways to exercise civic virtue, it’s hard to say. Were

to take it seriously. Its detailed character also

they were just being irrational? Really?

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review/voting

It is within that framework, he claims, that individuals can exercise civic virtue, even when

107

All due respect MICHAEL ANTONY ON A CALL FOR REASONED DEBATE Reasonable Atheism: A Moral Case for Respectful Disbelief by Scott F Aikin and Robert B Talisse (Prometheus Books) £ùĀ.āā/$úø (pb)

review/atheism

his book is aimed primarily at reli-

Believers who think that atheists, no less than

gious believers who think that “atheists

theists, can be moral, trustworthy, intelligent,

must be dishonest, irrational, amoral,

and so on – and there are many such believers

untrustworthy, mean, deceitful, delu-

as well – are thus unlikely to feel that their views

sional, and unintelligent”. Although there’s little

are being directly addressed throughout much of

doubt that millions of believers do view atheists in

the book. The same will hold for most atheists

this way, it’s safe to say that this is a philosophically

and agnostics. But there’s enough in Reasonable

unsophisticated bunch. Authors Scott Aikin and

Atheism to make it a worthwhile read for all three

Robert Talisse wish to show that such believers

groups.

have “false beliefs about atheists”, and should

One of the book’s central themes is that a

view atheists “in roughly the same way they regard

proper concern for our beliefs – caring that they

those who subscribe to religious faiths different

be true – requires that we intellectually engage

from their own” – namely, as reasonable and moral

in a respectful manner with people with whom

people with false beliefs about reality. This is how

we disagree. Pursuing truth demands that we

the authors view thoughtful religious believers.

subject our views to criticism, and attempt to understand where our opponents (or we) have erred when we fail to persuade. This presupposes

108

Michael Antony is senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Haifa

that we treat our critics as generally reasonable people (for otherwise what value would their criticisms hold?), and accord them the respect

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

that such reasonableness warrants. This impor-

believers must recognize as one option that

tant discussion is aimed at persuading the book’s

sincere, intelligent, and honest people could

primary intended readership – believers unsym-

adopt after a competent and thorough examina-

pathetic to atheists, essentially – to view atheists

tion of the evidence and arguments”. Given the

more charitably. But it’s also directed at the New

numerous arguments in their book, however,

Atheists and their followers (given their oft-

this will come across, even to those untrained in

adopted confrontational, schoolyardish stance),

philosophy, a bit like an artist who insists that her

and indeed at anyone concerned with the debates

aim isn’t to make a painting but rather to demon-

on religion.

strate her artistic talent, which she proceeds to

Aikin’s and Talisse’s book is chock full of argu-

do by making a painting. Of course the authors

ments. There are two against unsophisticated

are making a case in their book against theism

versions of the cosmological and teleological

and for atheism, even if it is not, as they say, their

arguments, which is excusable if the authors are

“full case”. After all, it is only by presenting a

right that these versions are popular with their

case for a view that one can hope to make such a

target theist audience. There’s a useful critique

view appear reasonable to someone who doesn’t

of the New Atheists’ appalling treatments of the

hold it. It may be that the authors get themselves into

attempt to construct an ontological argument

this minor muddle because they insufficiently

against theism. The authors’ discussion of evil,

appreciate how difficult it is to make sense of

while admittedly inconclusive, illustrates well

mutually recognised reasonable disagreement.

the enormous challenge this problem presents

The authors appear to believe – and with this I

for the theist. Their discussion of the Euthyphro

sympathise – that it must be possible somehow

dilemma, however, wholly ignores a standard way

for participants in a debate to view each other,

of navigating through the horns of the dilemma

not only as reasonable people, but as reasonably

by locating goodness in God’s nature rather than

holding their opposing views. In recent years,

outside of God. The book contains many other

however, epistemologists have found it exceed-

discussions, several interesting, centred on the

ingly difficult to show how this can be possible.

concepts of worship, hell, religion and politics,

I won’t suggest anything here, other than to

among others. Even if these fail to convince, they

say that the answer can’t involve participants in

will challenge the book’s intended readership,

disputes claiming that they aren’t trying to argue

and help show that atheists can be reasonable,

for their views.

intelligent, moral, respectable individuals.

review/atheism

ontological argument, and a less-than-impressive

Philosophically unsophisticated believers who

But there’s an odd tension running through

see atheists as irrational and amoral are unlikely

Reasonable Atheism. The authors repeatedly

to be disturbed by this issue, even if they have

claim that their aim is not to present a case

some vague awareness of it. Mainly, the book’s

either against religious belief or for atheism.

arguments will challenge their worldview, and

Rather, they “aspire to demonstrate that atheism

illustrate the manner of respectful debate the

is a reasonable position, a view that religious

authors are urging us to engage in.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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109

Under the truth table STEVEN HALES RAISES A GLASS TO PUB PHILOSOPHY Philosophy on Tap: Pint-Sized Puzzles for the Pub Philosopher, by Matt Lawrence (Wiley-Blackwell) £ùú.āā/$ùā.āý (pb)

review/beer

hilosophers are of mixed minds about

Matt Lawrence knows how to hook his

popularisers. On the one hand there

audience. Perfect for loquacious imbibers,

are periodic complaints that contem-

Philosophy on Tap consists of forty-eight short

porary philosophy, especially the

chapters, each pairing a beer with a specific phil-

analytic strain, is too hermetic; disconnected

osophical problem. There’s plenty of scaffolding

from a wider world, it is seen as an obsolete

to help the neophytes along, including thought-

parlour game for logic-chopping eggheads. On

provoking questions at the end of each chapter, a

the other hand those who do attempt to bring

tasting chart for each beer, and plenty of graphics

philosophy to a popular audience are derided as

and illustrations.

unserious TV dons. It’s a classic catch-22. What’s

The questions and conundrums are largely

more, it is the rare scholar who knows how to

drawn from Western philosophy, from the

convey complex ideas to a wider audience; the

ancient Greeks up to contemporary analysis. Yet

finest philosophical minds rarely have a knack for

other traditions get a fair showing too. Chuang

popular communication.

Tzu’s butterfly dreaming that he is a man gets a chapter, as do Buddhism’s notions of anatta (no self), the ideas of nirvana and the Enlightenment, Zen koans, and even Taoist non-being. Sartre’s

110

Steven Hales is professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg University and editor of Beer and Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell)

bad faith and Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence also rate chapters. Lawrence does a good job of demonstrating the breadth of philosophy by

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

including posers from logic (the liar paradox),

puzzlers, there is no sense that there is any struc-

philosophy of time and even race theory. The

ture to what philosophers do, no feeling that there

book does seem a little heavy on philosophy of

are specific areas of study. Nor is there a hint that

religion, but questions about God, souls, intel-

a solution to one puzzle might bear on another

ligent design, divine command theory and so

topic. If we have no free will (chapter 12) that

on occur to people with no philosophical back-

definitely puts a damper on the free will solution

ground and are a good way to draw them in.

to the problem of evil (chapter 28). Yet Lawrence

Even better, Lawrence does know his beer.

doesn’t draw out this connection. Philosophy is

As an American author his beer choices are

not just a random collection of brain teasers, but

weighted heavily towards American microbrews; not necessarily a bad thing, as America brews the greatest variety of beer and is the most open to experimentation. But he also includes fine beers from the UK, Belgium, India, Mexico, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Australia, Greece and even Tibet. This reviewer was sold on his beer acumen when he mentioned the legendary, and

If a pint spills in a forest and there’s no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?

near-mythical, Westvleteren 12. Some of the discussions work better than others and lend themselves to the beer and pub

is a systematic field of inquiry. It would be nice to get even a rudimentary sense of that. There are also occasional odd turns. One

pickings, but Lawrence also gives an amusing

chapter addresses the question of if a pint spills in

lesson on how to get out of buying a round with

a forest and there is no one there to hear it, does it

logical dilemmas. Tell your mates that you’ll buy

make a sound? A perfectly fine question to raise,

another round of beer, if and only if they can

but Lawrence uses it to jump into a discussion

guess correctly whether you’ll do so or not. If they

of Berkeley’s idealism, which is a curious choice.

guess that yes, you’ll buy, then inform them that

The reality of unheard sound should lead into a

they guessed incorrectly. You weren’t planning to

discussion of secondary qualities, which can be

buy a round. Since they got it wrong, you’re off

better motivated than by Berkeley’s unintuitive

the hook. If they guess that you won’t buy, then

view. For example, does ultraviolet light have a

tell them that you were in fact planning to buy

colour? If the answer is no, because no one sees

a round, but since they guessed incorrectly, you

ultraviolet light, then surely the spilled pint in the

can’t do so after all. This sort of thing explains

forest is soundless by the same reasoning.

why philosophers get out of paying for drinks

Overall Philosophy on Tap is a pint of Sharp’s

(remember Socrates ever picking up the tab at a

Doom Bar bitter for a Carling lager drinker. It is

symposium?), but also why we aren’t very popular.

a worthy and engaging first step for a newcomer

There are some ways in which the book

not yet ready for Three Floyds Oak Aged Dark

could be improved. Since the topics are random

Lord Russian Imperial Stout.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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theme more readily. Aesthetics questions are easy

111

Metaphysics at the multiplex AMY KIND ON A FILM WITH A PHILOSOPHER AT THE HELM Source Code is directed by Duncan Jones, written by Ben Ripley, and stars Jake Gyllenhaal, Michelle Monaghan and Vera Farmiga

review/source code

ollywood has offered up many phil-

Jones’s first film, Moon, picked up on themes

osophical movies in recent years,

relating to selfhood and the nature of mind that

and the release of Source Code this

he first explored in an undergraduate paper enti-

past spring brings even more meta-

tled “How to Kill Your Computer Friend: An

physics to the multiplex – this time, with a bona

Investigation of the Mind/Body Problem and

fide philosopher at the helm. Having graduated

How It Relates to the Hypothetical Creation of a

from the College of Wooster with a bachelor’s

Thinking Machine”. In many ways, Source Code

degree in philosophy, director Duncan Jones

picks up right where Moon leaves off – playing

spent two and a half years in a doctoral program

on the idea that your true identity may be quite

at Vanderbilt University before deciding that

different from what you realise, a theme that has

movie-making was his true calling. In abandoning

long captivated Jones.

the academic pursuit of philosophy, however,

As the film opens, Army Captain Colter Stevens

Jones by no means abandoned the subject alto-

(Jake Gyllenhaal) is jolted awake to find himself on

gether. He now teaches philosophy to the masses

a Chicago-bound train. He has no idea how he got

through his movies.

there; his last memories are of a helicopter mission in Afghanistan. Surrounded by people he doesn’t know, he soon realises that he’s also in a body he

112

Amy Kind is associate professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna College

doesn’t recognise, that of teacher Sean Fentress. As the train approaches Chicago exactly eight minutes later, it explodes and kills everyone aboard

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

– everyone, that is, except Stevens, who regains

make a film that resolved all of the philosophical

consciousness to find himself in what appears to

paradoxes that it raised; as the Times’s reporter

be some kind of military escape pod.

described it, Jones “obsessed over crafting the

We soon learn that Stevens’s presence on the

end of Source Code to make sure that every loose

train was a virtual one, facilitated by a mysterious

end came together in a way that even a philosophy

new military technology known as “source code”.

professor couldn’t question”. Although Jones fares

According to its creator Dr Rutledge (Jeffrey

better at this task than most directors – and his

Wright), source code allows a person to trans-

concern to treat philosophical problems seriously

port into the consciousness of someone who has

is evident throughout the movie – I’d hesitate to

recently died and replay the last eight minutes of

pronounce Source Code an unqualified success on

their life. By utilising this technology, Rutledge

this score. To mention just a few questions that

hopes that Stevens will be able to uncover the

remained in this philosophy professor’s mind at

identity of the train bomber and thereby prevent

the movie’s end: why eight minutes? If Stevens is

a second, more deadly attack that is yet to come.

connected to the events on the train via Fentress’s

The captain is thus sent back to the train, again

consciousness, how could source code give him

and again, each time for the same eight minute

access to aspects of the past that Fentress himself

period, and each time gathering more and more

never experienced? And – although this question

clues to the bomber’s identity. (If I had to summa-

is hard to state clearly without spoiling too much

rise the movie in five words or less, I’d describe it

of the movie – how are we supposed to understand

as Avatar meets Groundhog Day.)

Stevens’s ability to “travel” between the different

Rutledge is insistent that source code cannot

universes in the multiverse? Still, I’m not sure we should worry too much

mission is to gather information that will change

about Jones’s inability to meet his own goal, for

the future, not the past. Source code, according

the goal itself strikes me as unrealistic. Won’t

to Rutledge, does not allow for time travel but

there always be something for a philosophy

rather for time reassignment. But as each eight-

professor to question? Even the most influen-

minute foray into Fentress’s consciousness plays

tial philosophical texts in the canon have loose

out slightly differently, Stevens starts to suspect

ends that philosophers continue to pick at, so it’s

that source code doesn’t work exactly as its crea-

hard to imagine that a Hollywood film is going

tors envisioned. From here, the movie takes

to succeed where philosophers such as Plato,

considerable twists and turns, and I’ll refrain from

Descartes and Kant have failed. And loose ends

detailing them in the hopes of avoiding unneces-

aside, Source Code is an impressive film – it’s fun,

sary spoilers. With each twist and turn, however,

it’s engrossing, it’s well-acted, and it’s intelligent

the audience is confronted with a new philosoph-

without being inaccessible. It certainly deserves

ical conundrum, and the issues raised range from

to be grouped among the top philosophical films

personal identity to free will to multiverse theory.

of recent years, and I’d recommend it to anyone

In an interview with the Los Angeles Times

who wants to be served up a dish of philosophy

last spring, Jones expressed his determination to

along with their popcorn.

4TH QUARTER 2011

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prevent the train from exploding. Stevens’s

113

Q&A

CAROLYN KORSMEYER’S GUT REACTION What is aesthetic disgust?

Usually when we find something disgusting, our

What do you mean when you say that disgusting objects “can sometimes exert a grisly allure”?

review/q&a

response is recoil and rejection – almost entirely negative. But when works of art adroitly exploit

Disgust alerts us to things that are noxious, infec-

the arousal of disgust, the response becomes

tious, putrefying – things that we want to avoid.

appreciative. The term “aesthetic disgust” is

At the same time, sometimes there is a paradox-

shorthand for the appreciative response to

ical tendency to seek out the objects that revolt,

aspects of art that arouse disgust. In these circum-

perhaps to discover more about them, even to

stances disgust is not so much rejection as visceral

dwell momentarily on the feeling. The second

recognition of something significant. Disgust is a

look that one might be tempted to take at a

strongly physical emotion, so its aesthetic mode

squirming nest of worms would be an example. I

is especially powerful – literally a gut response.

endorse the perspective of the phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai, who recognised an approach-

What truth is apprehended in the experience of aesthetic disgust?

There is no single truth, but insofar as it registers decay and corruption, disgust is a compelling means by which we recognise material vulnerability and mortality.

avoidance element in disgust. It must be stressed, however, that the avoidance factor is considerably stronger! What do you say to the thought that disgust is relative to culture, and therefore there’s not much that’s philosophically interesting about it?

Cross-cultural studies indicate that disgust

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Savoring Disgust: The Foul and the Fair in Aesthetics by Carolyn Korsmeyer is published by Oxford University Press at £ùĀ.āā, $úā.āý (pb)

is recognised in most – maybe all – cultures, although the particular objects that fall into disgusting categories vary. Most emotions are

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

taken seriously for the insights they afford.

to rage. “Disgust” is usually employed – at least

Fear informs us of danger, sorrow of loss and so

in English – only to refer to extreme revulsion.

forth. Disgust, however, is an emotion that lots

But there are many more nuanced varieties of

of people want to disclaim as only the result of

the emotion as well. A lot of what I defend as

contingent education and culture.

aesthetic disgust comes in relatively subtle forms.

To my mind, this tendency is misguided.

An example of what I mean is presented by

Disgust is uniquely sensitive to certain impor-

Emily Dickinson’s poem that begins “I heard a

tant truths about life and death, and without it

fly buzz when I died …”. The combination of the

we would lose a dimension of understanding.

carrion fly and the fate of a corpse resonates with

As for philosophical importance: emotions in

disgust, and yet the poem is elegant. One might

general are salient modes of knowing and valuing.

object that the poem is not disgusting at all, but

They have a place therefore in epistemology,

I think that part of its power derives from the

ethics, and aesthetics, not to mention philosophy

fact that a potentially revolting scene is rendered

of mind. Disgust figures in all of these areas.

with such delicacy. The visceral response may be slight, but it delivers indispensable insight.

How might one take pleasure in disgusting art?

I continue to refer to such milder forms of the

The concept of pleasure at work in aesthetic

affect as “disgust” in order to foreground the

contexts is very complex. Think of art that is

intensity that they contribute to the experience

uncomfortable and demanding, such as a tragedy

of art.

or a war narrative. Such works often present illness, grievous injury or cruelty in graphic

Is disgust incompatible with beauty?

Most traditional aesthetic theories have held

extremely important for the effect of the work.

that disgust completely interrupts the experi-

The emotions aroused by such works – and there

ence of beauty. Certainly if a disgusting piece

are many in such subtle forms that it is hard to

of art is also beautiful, it would be a difficult

name them precisely – can be painful to experi-

sort of beauty. In the book, I try to extend the

ence. And yet without them, we would not grasp

understanding of disgust to include certain

the insight that the work offers. Is this pleasure?

works that we would also consider beautiful.

It is certainly a positive and valuable experience.

The Dickinson poem I just mentioned might be

Disgust plays a role within the panoply of such

a candidate for a work that combines a disgust

emotions, usually in concert with other affects,

quotient with beauty. Other examples might

with which it often blends.

come from the many Renaissance and Baroque

review/q&a

ways that are disgusting and horrid but are also

paintings of Judith beheading Holofernes, Most people think disgust is an extreme emotion – why do you think it’s more subtle than that?

such as those by Artemisia Gentileschi or

Emotion types possess variations in strength;

But their paintings are good candidates for a

anger, for instance, varies from mild irritation

difficult kind of beauty as well.

Caravaggio. A murder is a terrible sight, and these artists spare none of the gore and horror.

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

115

Jean Kazez

imagine that

Balloon World

review/imagine that

t the Nasher Sculpture Center in

all. Each explorer was alone to make something

downtown Dallas, the British artist

of the situation, and make their own plans. My

Martin Creed had an entertaining

immediate instinct was to go all the way to the

installation over the summer – a

edge of this alien universe. After much accidental

large room filled with 9,000 gold balloons (Work

walking in circles, I made it to the outer limits,

No. 1190: Half the Air in a Given Space, 2011).

and the terrible truth was revealed: a white wall.

Lovely to behold through one glass wall, the real

The installation couldn’t have been more simple,

treat was being inside balloon world. A guard

but the resulting brain whirr was immediate and

opened the door and we quickly squeezed our

delightful.

way in, as balloons started to float out. I was

Another part of the show was equally

instantaneously an explorer in another universe,

elemental. Creed had covered the elegant steps

pushing my way through light mega-molecules

down to a lower-level gallery in musical carpeting.

that surrounded me. Within seconds I had lost

A trip down the steps played a descending major

my two kids, but could still make verbal contact

scale. So? The so is that the sounds seem to

above the din of collisions. Who knew balloons

tell us about ourselves and others. My descent

could be so noisy … and so clingy? Moving a few

sounded plodding, I have to admit. We care-

feet took much flailing and battling, despite each

fully arranged ourselves on the steps so that

obstacle being light as a feather.

we’d create harmony as we walked back upstairs.

The balloon universe was isolating, but also

Would other visitors cooperate and wait until we

connecting. A push by one person (how many

got to the top? Our harmony was quickly messed

were in the room?) was a gentle shove against

up, giving us instant aural evidence about human nature. A month later, I ran into the ultimate in minimalism at the Museum of Modern Art in New

116

Jean Kazez is the author of The Weight of Things: Philosophy and the Good life, and Animalkind: What We Owe to Animals. She teaches philosophy at Southern Methodist University.

York, or rather, I didn’t run into it, because a guard stood by, protecting a thick splat of white paint, about 10 inches in diameter, fused onto the gallery floor. This was a 1968 artwork with

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

the unpoetic title Gloss white lacquer, sprayed for 2 minutes at 40lb pressure directly, by American artist Lawrence Weiner. The best part of viewing the work was talking to the guard (not part of the installation). “You could be guarding the Mona Lisa, but you’re guarding a splat”, I observed. He said he didn’t mind, and actually enjoyed the conversations he had all day. The splat is renewed every six months, he told us. What the museum owns is the concept, the detailed instructions. I promise I never said “My kid could

be paid for their minimal productions, and others not. Why is the splat worth guarding, but not a little pile of Cheerios I could pour on the gallery floor? Surely we’re supposed to ask that question, it’s part of the artist’s intention. What – as

Photographer: Kevin Todora

make this splat!” but I did find myself pondering what entitles some people to

Martin Creed, Work No. 1190: Half the Air in a Given Space, 2011 (detail), Nasher Sculpture Center, Dallas

The night before, I wondered about this in

A Nasher Center publication helps the visitor

a room just off the observation deck at the top

find meaning in minimalism by saying Creed’s

of the Rockefeller Center, where I was lingering

work is about “dichotomous physical states: pres-

because of my not minimal fear of heights. The

ence versus absence, being versus nothingness,

ceiling and walls were covered with arrays of

and doing versus not doing”. I prefer what the

coloured lights that were responsive, in strange

artist says in text art at his website (martincreed.

and indirect ways, to the motion of people in the

com): “I don’t know what I want to say, but, to try

room. Motion also triggered bell-like sounds,

to say something, I think I want to try to think. I

giving the visitor an interestingly heightened self-

want to try to see what I think. I think trying is a

awareness. The thing is, though, this was billed as

big part of it, I think thinking is a big part of it,

fun for the kids, not as Art, so there wasn’t quite

and I think wanting is a big part of it, but saying

the same cascade of meanings, which comes

it is difficult, and I find saying trying and nearly

about as the visitor tries to make sense of this

always wanting. I want what I want to say to go

thing (whatever it is) being located in a deluxe

without saying” (Work No. 267: I Don’t Know

and prestigious art museum.

What I Want to Say).

4TH QUARTER 2011

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review/imagine that

they say – is art?

117

An explorer who has yet to leave the coast RODGER JACKSON ON WHAT THE CRITICS SAID

threshold where he does already limits our obliJustice for Hedgehogs by Ronald Dworkin (Harvard University Press) £úü.āý/$ûý (hb)

gations to others; it strikes me as not limiting them very much.” Unfortunately, there isn’t an adequate theory

ver thirty leading scholars couldn’t

for how to set those limits – “we can only know

wait for Dworkin’s Justice for

when we are displaying contempt for their lives if

Hedgehogs to hit the bookshops,

we first know what we owe them. Dworkin’s view

so they put together a symposium

presupposes an account of what we owe, it does

review/round-up

on it and published the proceedings as a special

not generate one.”

issue of the Boston University Law Review.

Russ Shaefer-Landau has a similar on-the-

While they all respect the depth and breadth of

one-hand approach, although with regard to

his project, most also have a bone to pick with

Dworkin’s treatment of scepticism. “Dworkin’s

him.

discussions of error skepticism are lively and

Kwame Anthony Appiah “admires and

wide-reaching. But I think that they can be

accepts” Dworkin’s general strategy for balancing

improved in certain ways, and since I am on his

the duties we have to ourselves and to each

side in this respect, I would really like to see these

other. However, he writes, “you cannot live a

improvements incorporated to make the case

life of dignity – a life in which the central ethical

against error skepticism yet more compelling.”

facts about you are properly acknowledged – if

Others, like A C Grayling, agree with his

you are scrambling for subsistence from day to

defence of moral objectivism. In the New York

day, uncertain where the next meal will come

Review of Books, he writes, “His argument is

from for you and your family. I know this. So do

novel, but I find it convincing. If he is right, we

you. Dworkin appears to think that setting the

cannot sensibly ask for a neutral, morally uncommitted account of what makes one moral or political judgment right and others wrong.”

118

Rodger Jackson is associate professor of philosophy at Richard Stockton College

Although Simon Blackburn, writing in the Guardian, professes to admire Dworkin’s writing, he’s alarmed at his over-reliance on the law. “It

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Calle Eklund/V-wolk

Further, he appears not fully to appreciate that the interior of this vast continent he is mapping may be at war.” Anthony Gottlieb, in the New York Times, might seem likely that even such moral and political ideas as are visible in the better parts of that law are absent in the worst parts … Although it has been the crux of his attack on ‘positivism’, in this work Dworkin simply sidesteps the issue, urging that the problem of bad law is ‘of almost no practical importance’, and that whether we say that bad laws are no laws at all is ‘sadly close to a verbal dispute’. Sadly too, I suppose, when Sophocles wrote Antigone he mistook this for a real problem.”

praises his ability to translate the results of his research into “lively treatments of three areas in which Ramachandran has himself done pioneering work: visual perception, pain in amputated ‘phantom’ limbs, and synesthesia”. In spite of these gifts, or perhaps even because of them, Gottlieb says the research is never clearly developed into a coherent thesis. Part of the problem is that since he is “an exceptionally inventive researcher who tosses off suggestions at a dizzying pace, readers may sometimes lose track of what is firmly established, what is tentative and what is way out there. His fondness for

The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human by V S Ramachandran (Norton) £úø/$úþ.āý (hb)

evolutionary explanations can be particularly freewheeling.” Colin McGinn raises a similar concern in the New York Review of Books. “There are

times when the impression of theoretical over-

and largely unmapped mental continent about

qualify his more extreme statements by assuring

which, he admits, ‘we still have precious little

us that he is only proposing part of the full story,

understanding’. With its 100 billion nerve cells

but there are moments when his neural enthu-

and infinite array of pathways, the human brain is

siasm gets the better of him.”

casts the author of The Tell-Tale Brain “as

reaching is unmistakable, and the relentless

a cross between Sherlock Holmes and Dr

neural reductionism becomes earsplitting. This is

Livingstone”. Ramachandran is “a behav-

progressively the case as the book becomes more

ioural pioneer exploring the mysteries of a huge

ambitious in scope. Ramachandran will often

capable of making more connections than there

Still, McGinn sees the book as having signif-

are particles in the universe. How can we chart

icant merits. “His writing is generally lucid,

it?”

charming, and informative, with much humor

But it’s not a particularly successful expedi-

to lighten the load of Latinate brain disquisi-

tion. “Ramachandran wanders along intriguing

tions. He is a leader in his field and is certainly

neural pathways, pausing to investigate strange

an ingenious and tireless researcher. This is the

disorders, but he leaves the impression that he

best book of its kind that I have come across for

is an explorer who has yet to leave the coast.

scientific rigor, general interest, and clarity.”

4TH QUARTER 2011

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review/round-up

n the Telegraph, Nicholas Shakespeare

119

MY PHILOSOPHY “We shouldn’t be scared of philosophy. Ideas are always in charge, we might as well get self-conscious about what they are.”

Taking the BS out of The Big Society JESSE NORMAN MP TALKS POLITICS WITH JULIAN BAGGINI

last words/my philosophy

“

don’t think the electorate is stupid at

Over tea at Portcullis House, Parliament’s

all. I think the electorate is very smart.”

smart contemporary annex, Norman told me

When a politician says something like

about his first brushes with philosophy, which

this, you know that they’ve either

were typical for people of his generation:

completely rejected Machiavelli or embraced him

watching Brain Magee’s television series, Men

very closely indeed. In our sceptical age, it would

of Ideas, and reading Bertrand Russell’s The

seem naive to believe the former, but having met

Problems of Philosophy and his pot-boilers of

the member of parliament for Hereford and

the 1950s and 1960s, such as Why I am not a

former philosophy lecturer Jesse Norman, and

Christian. His interest was piqued but he didn’t

read his work, I’m inclined to give him the benefit

fall in love with the subject until, when staying

of the doubt. After all, anyone who gave up a

with a friend in Greece, he discovered a summary

high-flying career at the age of 35 to do a PhD on

of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. “I fell on it like

Euclid’s geometry can hardly be accused of being

a thirsty man in the desert on a glass of water”,

a cynical career climber.

he says. “That lit a fire which then took me about twenty years to discharge.” That discharge turned out to be slow and

120

Julian Baggini is editor-in-chief of tpm and author of The Ego Trick: What Does it Mean to be You? (Granta, úøùù)

intermittent. He went to Merton College, Oxford to read classics, which had a strong philosophy component. Still, it was not yet his prime focus,

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

and after graduating he went to live in America

What is unusual about these interests is the

for six years, first setting up a company dealing

pairing of the very formal, rigid mathematical

with shareholder rights and corporate govern-

thinking of logic and geometry with a conserva-

ance, then working on Wall Street, and finally

tive approach to politics, which completely rejects

running a charity setting up free institutions and

any attempt to order society by appeal to first

giving away medical textbooks in Eastern Europe,

principles, rooting itself instead in the often hazy

before and after the fall of communism.

wisdom of experience and practice. This is no

Having worked his way up the east coast and

paradox, however, if you take on board the central

realising “another job would have landed me in

idea of praxeology, that “there is a particular kind

St John, Newfoundland or Nova Scotia or some-

of practical reasoning which is related to how

where” he returned to Britain in 1991 to work

you take action, and that’s categorially distinct

for Barclays BZW, “because I thought at that

from reflection about subjects that aren’t action-

point, what eastern Europe really needed was not

guiding. But, as it were, you can have a view of the

philanthropy but commercial advice and money”.

whole landscape while being sensitive to which

The CV fits Norman’s advocacy in his later

part of the landscape you’re in. And so thinking

political life of “Compassionate Conservatism”,

about formal reasoning in different ways is indi-

the title of his 2006 Policy Exchange pamphlet.

rectly a way of getting to understand a part of a

Most of his projects were in the private or volun-

landscape which might then help you to under-

tary sector but with a clear social benefit purpose.

stand a rather radically different part.” This reminds me of Aristotle’s famous remark

actually want to go and do piece of philosophical

about how the mark of the trained mind is to

work”. So he went to University College London

expect of any given subject matter only that degree

to do an MPhil, followed by a PhD entitled “Visual

of precision which it allows, no more and no less.

Reasoning in Euclid’s Geometry: An Epistemology

“Yes I love that as well, I totally agree. It’s

of Diagrams”, which he completed in 2004. By

rather connected to that lovely idea which you

that time he had been teaching and lecturing for a

find in Keats of negative capability. You know,

few years and even had a PhD student of his own.

the ability not to rush to judgement, to hold a

Norman’s switch from the very practical to the

topic in front of you until its lines becomes clear

abstractly theoretical looks like a dramatic mid-

and until it becomes intellectually or practically

life U-turn. In fact Norman had for a long time

tractable. Of course, at the moment there is an

maintained his theoretical and practical interests

enormous array of incentives which range from

in parallel. In 1998, for instance, he organised a

the economic to the psychological to cut too early

conference at the Polish Academy of Sciences, on

and you constantly see this mistake being made.

the Polish idea of praxeology, addressed by the

It’s a very rare person who has the intellectual self

“legendary” leader in the field, Kotarbinski. And

discipline and the practical authority to be able to

when Michael Oakeshott died in 1990, Norman

maintain that distance.”

edited a book of obituaries, The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott.

But how on earth is it possible to maintain that distance in the hurly-burly of front-line politics, >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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last words/my philosophy

However, in 1997, he said to himself, “sod that, I

121

with the necessity of making decisions now and

good at spotting phoneys. And actually TV is often

the pressures to get things done, and seen to be

a good way of helping them to spot phoneys and

done?

our collective ability to detect insincerity has gone

“It’s almost worse than that because to make

last words/my philosophy

a really big mistake you need a kind of theory,

122

up over the last few years as we’ve become slightly more socially wise.”

but you don’t need a big theory to make a lot of

Talk of social wisdom and collective abilities

stupid, small mistakes. All you need is a kind of

reflects his conservative trust that the institutions

rationalising ideology or assumption, and the

and practices we inherit contain a value that we

rationalising assumption is that you have to feed

may not be able to defend from first principles

a media machine that is a 24-hour beast.” So how

or even properly explain rationally. However, as

do you resist getting sucked in? “I’m not senior

Norman himself explains in his book, there is a

enough in politics to have had those pressures.

difference between a true wisdom of crowds and

I’m a first-term backbencher. I’m the lowest form

a pernicious group-think, whereby false ideas are

of life in the political pond, but I do think it isn’t

reinforced by the mere fact that they become the

perhaps quite as difficult as people think it is. One

accepted norm. That’s how slavery and the disen-

of the simple rules is: don’t be a phony, stick to

franchisement of women could persist for so long

what you know and don’t get pulled into having to

when to contemporary eyes they are so obviously

say something prematurely.”

unjust. So how does a conservative distinguish

The comments about the press were particu-

between those parts of the inherited tradition

larly apt given that we were talking just as three

which are ripe for reform and those which express

of the most powerful people in the newspaper

a deep wisdom, when the whole point is that this

industry – News Corporation’s James and Rupert

wisdom may not be evident to us?

Murdoch and Rebekah Brooks – were being

“It’s certainly true that there’s no sure-fire way

questioned in the very same building about their

of distinguishing between idiotic received opinion

papers’ role in phone hacking and other illegal

and a widely shared common view that comes

practices. Norman says he doesn’t know if this

from the wisdom of crowds”, he concedes, before

marks the moment when senior politicians finally

providing his answer in the form of an anecdote.

realise they do not need to pander to the press as

“When Isaac Newton was asked how he came to

much as many have done in the recent past. What

write Principia Mathematica, he paused and said

he does think is that this error has been fed by a

‘by thinking very hard’.”

“pathology”, namely “the idea that the electorate

As an example of this, he cites moves to

is stupid, that voters are like cattle and that they’re

replace the unelected second chamber of the

really only shaped by the impressions they receive

British parliament, the House of Lords, with an

from the news media, and in particular the press,

elected one. This is an idea which he believes “has

because the press is less neutral than the broad-

enormous plausibility for many people, because

casting media. I just don’t think that’s true at all.

they think of all legitimacy as being through

I think people have fantastically well-developed

the ballot box”. But “it really takes a great deal

bullshit detectors built into them and they’re very

of thought to see, while reform is undoubtedly

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think there is a recipe for determining truth from

to have reflected on different kinds of legitimacy

falsehood here. I think it requires a reflection and

and how the British constitution preserves those

it requires being imbued in our culture and in our

– what you might call the fixed versus the moving

institutions. But then I’m a conservative. I don’t

parts of the British constitution. You have to have

think there’s a universal mechanism for anything.”

reflected on the evolution of the Lords as an insti-

To understand where this kind of conservatism

tution; you have to have thought about what the

comes from philosophically, you have to consider

conventions are that govern the more powerful

two fundamentally different ways of thinking

lower house from the less powerful upper house

about politics and ethics that go right back to

and how those would be changed if you had a

ancient Greece.

directly enfranchised upper house. This is not

“If you look at Plato you have in the Republic

an easy thing, and you can see how people who

a class of rulers distinguished by their knowl-

just thought everything ought to be elected if you

edge of abstract universals whose knowledge is

want to have legitimacy might buy that. So I don’t

attained through a parable of revelation. That >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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last words/my philosophy

needed, that is a profoundly bad idea. You have

123

last words/my philosophy 124

very much fits with what then becomes thought

draws a distinction between what you might call

of as what Pascal would call l’esprit géométrique,

natural or metaphysical rights and rights as they

the geometrical idea that somehow political ideas

are actually expressed in common law and in prac-

are a priori workings out of a certain rational

tice. Those things might look the same to people

ideal through human action. Then you have the

who haven’t really thought about it, and they

Aristotelian idea, which is much less abstract,

might have the same names, but they turn out

descriptively anchored and therefore very open

to be radically different. So what knits together

to criticism from the Platonic side as being poten-

Burke’s position on the American Revolution

tially merely adventitious. But actually if you look

and the French Revolution is that Burke was

at the issue of how to govern, it turns out that the

hostile to the assertion of abstract rights in defi-

Aristotelian approach is a far better one.”

ance of established order though liberté, égalité

He gives several examples of the kind of

and fraternité in the French case, and he was

thinking from first principles that has disas-

also hostile to the British government’s asser-

trous political conclusions, one of which is “this

tion of the abstract right to govern the colonies

Hobbesian social-contract notion, which is a way

in America in defiance of the actual ability to

of taking a very thin set of assumptions about

enforce it, or to recognise the facts on the ground,

human motivation – people really just care about

or to acknowledge the claims of the colonists to

the fear of violent death – and extracting from

degrees of self-determination in areas of taxation

that a gigantic rabbit from a hat, which is a theory

etc. So there is a deep coherence in Burke’s view,

of legitimate government”. Then there is neoclas-

and people who think that, as many people did,

sical economic theory, which “suggests that

that somehow he was in favour of the American

people are as oriented towards gain as they are

Revolution, therefore he must be in favour of

averse to loss. It turns out that’s not true. They’re

the French Revolution, completely misunder-

roughly twice as averse to loss as they are in favour

stand the character of his thought. It is to Burke’s

of gain. Once you understand that, you can under-

enormous credit that because his conceptual

stand why it would have been a good idea to have

repertoire was so well developed, he had thought

more regulation of these low-load mortgages

so deeply, he was instantly able to see this and

which give you 2% mortgage and then 10% for

prophesy accurately the disaster of the terror as

the back 15 or 20 years. So these things have prac-

arising out of the destruction of the established

tical consequences. So I would argue myself that

order.”

provided that it doesn’t become merely a series of

This set Burke against “all those bien

just-so stories about how you were right all along,

pensant intellectual right-thinking types such as

which is always the danger of a muddling through

Wordsworth, Coleridge and Mary Wollstonecraft,

approach, I think Aristotelian approaches offers

who’d absolutely embraced the French

you a much richer repertoire for government.”

Revolution. To his credit, Wordsworth comes

A rather nice example of how the two

back afterwards and acknowledges that Burke was

approaches can have subtle but important differ-

right. Of course Burke was dead by that point, but

ences comes from Burke’s views on rights. “Burke

he was bloody well right.”

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Although this kind of conservatism is similar to the one advocated by another philosopher, Roger

conservatism as such, is specifically the father of that line of thought.”

Scruton, it is not really a philosophy or ideology

Within this strand, several things generally

at all, but a “disposition”, to use Oakeshott’s term,

assumed to be of the left can be seen as being

“to conserve what is good. And because what we

equally at home with conservatism, perhaps most

have at the moment is an inheritance, it sets up a

surprisingly, cooperatives. “The line of thought

relationship of trust between those who currently

that might make you think they were intrinsi-

enjoy the inheritance, those who gave it to them

cally of the left is essentially Marxism. If you

and those who will receive it from them.”

see everything as the expression of a primeval

However, this doesn’t seem to have been the

struggle between capital and labour, then it looks

conservatism of the British Conservative party in

like co-ops and mutuals are expressions of a kind

its recent history, particularly during the Thatcher

of labour solidarity because they tend to be very

years.

heavy on working capital, i.e. people’s nous and

“It certainly has been my criticism of

energy, and very light on finance capital and

Conservative parties in the past at times that they

industrial capital. But that line of thought isn’t

have been inadequately conservative”, he says.

really very plausible. What’s more plausible is to

But this Burkean brand of conservatism is only

see co-ops and mutuals as very local expressions

one of three “at least three relatively clearly defin-

of a desire for people to control their own destiny,

able strands within conservatism”. One other is

to be able to build something, a little platoon in

“what you might call a libertarian strand which

their right. Even to say this creates a very clear

came out with Mrs Thatcher”, while the third is

linkage to Burke, because it’s in living the little

“a more paternalistic strand which came out with

platoon that we express our identity as Britons.” Suggestions like this reflect a broader truth

tive writings of politicians in the 1940s and 1950s,

that we live in an interesting time for political

some of them you can imagine being dictated by

ideas, because it’s no longer clear what views one

the Central Presidium of the Communist Party

should associate with left and right.

of the Soviet Union. They’re all about how poli-

“That’s right and that’s what’s rather good.

ticians are on the bridge of the ship of state and

We’ve moved away from a rather boring period

their job is to pull the levers to make the economy

of cluster thinking in which you could allegedly

go forward. Meanwhile the working man strives in

know what someone thought overall by knowing

the factory to make …” The sentence is left to tail

one view about them.”

off disdainfully. “This is nonsense, a completely

Norman seems to be genuinely trying to

false conception of how people actually are.”

address this new complexity with the length

Nevertheless, Norman is optimistic that what is

and subtlety of thought required. Hence he says

often called the “one nation” strand, which “does

of The Big Society, “Hopefully it’s a one line of

think very deeply about social cohesion, is the

thought book, but not a one idea book. One of the

one that I think is uppermost at the moment. I

problems we have in this country is that we have

take it that Burke, as well as being the father of

too many ideas and not enough viewpoints, and so >>>

4TH QUARTER 2011

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last words/my philosophy

Macmillan. If you had looked at many conserva-

125

about that. My view is, I’m a philosopher: these things are what they are. As my children insist on saying to me, in the words of Bishop Butler, everything is what it is and not another thing.” Whatever you think of his politics, Norman’s willingness to very overtly discuss numerous philosophical ideas in his book is refreshing for a serving MP, and stands in contrast to the approach of another former lecturer, Oliver Letwin, who once told me that being seen as a philosopher was a “massive” disadvantage in politics and “I do my best to conceal it.” Norman is careful not to criticise his colleague’s desire to keep his philosophical hat off in public, saying, “I think everyone has their own style and of course the British public is famously nervous about what it sees as abstract ideas or academic talk.” Perhaps this is down to a political idea tends to be something that is here

loyalty: Norman helped Letwin campaign in the

and gone in just a few hours sometimes, and I’m

2005 election, although they didn’t discuss philos-

not that interested in those. But I do think elabo-

ophy because “You never talk about anything in a

rating a viewpoint is rather important.”

political campaign, because there is just no time

last words/my philosophy

The book certainly does real philosophical

126

at all.”

work: drawing out assumptions about ideas and

However, he does maintain that “we shouldn’t

how people think, trying to question them, and

be scared of philosophy. Ideas are always in charge,

then suggest a better set to work on. But it is

we might as well get self-conscious about what they

striking that although it illustrates his point that

are. Part of the problem in politics is that there

you need a great deal of thought to work any idea

isn’t quite enough understanding of where people

through, it remains true that in the absence of a

are coming from intellectually or what animates

simple definition of what the big society means,

them, and that’s one of the reasons why politicians

the public and press end up saying it’s a vacuous

have a poor reputation, because sometimes – not

idea.

always – there is rather an interesting core of ideas

“That’s right, they do”, he agrees, but insists,

expressing itself. One needs to be sensitive to what

“I don’t think it’s the worst thing in the world for

those are, and if people understood them better

an idea to be slow in getting to its elevator pitch.

they would be more sympathetic.”

The problem with the world is not that there are

Norman’s book has certainly made it easier for

too many deep ideas lacking a snappy summary,

people to understand Conservatism and the big

it is that there are too many shallow ideas with

society better. Whether that makes them more

a snappy summary. I’m not particularly worried

sympathetic remains to be seen.

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

Wendy M Grossman

the skeptic Messy science

hen I was a child, I read many

Last year, The Atlantic ran a lengthy profile of

stories of scientific discovery

Greek researcher John Ioannidis, whose studies

– the medical detective stories

of medical journal articles discovered that the

of Berton Roueche, Paul de

effects found in as many as half of randomised

Kruif’s The Microbe Hunters, Crick and Watson’s

controlled studies are later contradicted or signifi-

The Double Helix – clear-cut triumphant tales.

cantly reduced

Like the Hollywood historical dramas of the

In December, the New Yorker followed up

day, the heroes were heroes and everything was

with “The Truth Wears Off”, in which writer

very clean. Today, just as contemporary histor-

Jonah Lehrer discussed the “decline effect”.

ical dramas make a point of showing dirt and bad

Over successive studies, he said, positive research

teeth, science is a lot messier.

results drop off, so that (for example) drugs whose

Consider a spate of recent articles which seem to show that the practice of science is not working

effects look good in initial clinical trials seem to become less effective in subsequent trials. “It’s as if our facts were losing their truth”, Lehrer wrote, going on to note the decline

Proving the Obvious”. Writer Eryn Brown found

effect’s presence in multiple fields from medi-

a mix of reasons, from the need to repeatedly

cine to ecology. “If replication is what separates

hammer home the message to policy-makers to

the rigor of science from the squishiness of pseu-

a bias among funders toward timid, incremental

doscience, where do we put all these rigorously

research.

validated findings that can no longer be proved?”

Also in May, Popular Science ran a top-ten

Lehrer went on to examine the effect from

list of studies testing the (it-seemed) obvious.

all angles, largely concluding that the “decline

Again, influencing policy-makers by producing

effect” is in fact a “decline of illusion”.

last words/the skeptic

the way we think. In May, the LA Times ran “‘Duh’ Science: Why Researchers Spend So Much Time

>>>

hard numbers was a theme; but the scientists approached by writer Laura Allen also said they don’t assume anything, even the apparently obvious, but test it. That is, of course, exactly how

Wendy M Grossman (pelicancrossing.net) is founder and former editor (twice) of The Skeptic Magazine (skeptic.org.uk)

scientists are supposed to think.

4TH QUARTER 2011

tpm

127

Long contact with scepti-

c r y p t o g r a p h y. M e r k l e

cism makes it easy to think of

set about submitting the

plenty of reasons why further

resulting paper, only to

research might dilute the

meet two years of rejec-

effectiveness found in earlier

tion, usually on the grounds

studies. The whole article

that it did not fit in with the

discusses many of them. But

then-current thinking on the

if you read only the begin-

subject. Several more years

ning, your first reaction

passed before Whitfield

might be that the “decline

Diffie and Martin Hellman

effect” sounds uncomfortably like parapsychology’s “shyness effect”: that trained observation seems to deter psychic

Merkle says that the way overworked reviewers

phenomena from appearing. Lehrer doesn’t

screen ideas for both journal publication and

mention this, but parapsychology – J B Rhine’s

grant funding favours easily understandable,

studies of ESP – does lead him to regression to

incremental advances rather than radical new

the mean – that running more tests enlarges the

approaches. Public key cryptography was a revo-

sample, smoothing out clustering effects.

lution in that field (and a successful one: you use

last words/the skeptic

His bigger issues are selective reporting and

128

published similar ideas; both now give Merkle equal credit.

it every time you buy something online).

publication bias. Both funders and editors want

One of the consequences of all this is a notice-

positive results, a bias first noted as long ago as

able growth in what’s known in US academic

1959. The basis of science is supposed to be inde-

circles as the “least publishable unit”. The

pendent replication. But Lehrer quotes several

tenure track’s demand for a steady stream of

journal editors who are reluctant to publish

publications seems to leave most people two

reports of replication failures, and several scien-

alternatives. Either you take a major piece of

tists who aren’t interested in replicating others’

work and sequentially publish small pieces of it

work but rather in doing their own. According

or you come up with lightweight ideas that can be

to Nature, Lehrer says, a third of science papers

studied relatively quickly and easily and that have

never get cited, let only replicated. And if you

mass appeal. The former isn’t objectionable; the

are a scientist whose career was made by a single

latter is unnerving. I am not a scientist, and yet I

startling finding, trying to replicate it represents

find myself reading research papers that even I

a significant risk.

can tell are thin.

Curiously enough, some researchers say that

Ultimately, Lehrer’s goal, as he writes in a

journals and grant funders also tend to reject ideas

follow-up response, was to look at the messy

that are too radical. Ralph Merkle, for example,

reality of science: truth is slippery. He concludes,

as a late-1970s cryptography-obsessed graduate

“Just because an idea is true doesn’t mean it can

student came up with one of the earliest imple-

be proved. And just because an idea can be

mentations of what is now known as public key

proved doesn’t mean it’s true.”

tpm 4TH QUARTER 2011

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