How cyber-attacks are influencing global politics

by Professor Dr Thomas Jäger, Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Cologne University, Cologne

The international order is currently undergoing a geopolitical realignment. While the Unites States (US) and China are fixed as the two centres of the future world order, other powers are also striving for a place as world powers. But the prospects for Russia and the European Union (EU) are bleak for different reasons, and India will not be able to assume this role in the foreseeable future either.

In this regard, Russia’s war against Ukraine, which was intended to usher in dominance over Europe, is acting as a catalyst in several directions in cyberspace. First, these capabilities have a major impact on the current war effort. Second, they illustrate the value of technological advances to a politically and economically dominant international position. Third, they redefine the gap with states with lesser cyber capabilities. Fourth, they describe the challenges for a new form of cooperative arms development – or its failure.

A new form of warfighting

Russia’s war against Ukraine is often discussed in terms of analogies of the first world war: trenches, war of attrition, artillery skirmishes. But it could not have been fought by either side without intensive reconnaissance, the close networking of cyber capabilities with other weapons systems. One of Ukraine’s advantages lies precisely in being more effective and efficient here, and therefore faster. The importance of the

Starlink satellite service to warfare documents this, as it makes real-time warfare possible.

In addition, a total of 2,194 cyber-attacks were carried out by Russia in Ukraine in 2022 and 1,655 cyber-attacks on civilian infrastructure since the beginning of the war. Such cyberattacks have also been registered in other states and campaigns of disinformation have been run by Russia. Throughout the west, companies are said to be weakened by blackmail and trade secrets are stolen. More significant than these current actions, however, is the question of who will have the most advanced capabilities in the future.

Reducing technological dependencies

In order to use the determining advantage for itself in the future, investments in semiconductor production are promoted. Thus, a parallel rivalry for the manufacturing capacities of semiconductors and microchips is being waged. Production capacity is being built in the US and EU to reduce dependence on Taiwan’s TSMC and other companies production abroad. The US has launched a $52bn subsidy through the Chips Act for America 2022, which has since triggered $122bn in investment from TSMC, Intel and Samsung in the US. The EU is in the process of lining up $43bn in subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing in the EU. At the same time, the US has imposed trade restrictions on China to slow China’s progress on semiconductor manufacturing. The Chinese government is already investing heavily and plans to implement another $143bn investment programme starting in 2025. The goal is technological self-sufficiency, after the US has repeatedly restricted the access of China’s companies – for example, by imposing sanctions on Huawei. Chinese companies are currently far from the technological progress of the US or Taiwan. As things stand today, China will neither be able to meet the 70% semiconductor target through its own production by 2025, nor will it be able to match the technological developments of American and Taiwanese companies.

Even before the war, governments sought to renationalise production of strategically important goods because of the pandemic and disrupted supply chains. Russia’s war against Ukraine and China’s threats against Taiwan’s independence have accelerated this process. Production capacities and trade relations are being adapted to the new geopolitical situation. This is because the availability of semiconductors and microchips has become a matter of national security, and technological progress in this field has become an imperative for superior weapons systems. Therefore, it is not only a matter of being at the forefront of this technological progress, but also of preventing others from having these capabilities. Countering industrial espionage becomes a vital interest. This has implications for economic relations beyond the defence equipment itself.

A coordinated design of cyberspace

In addition to building the capabilities, their use must be analysed and designed. Cyberspace must be surveyed, exploited and protected. For NATO, this means that members must coordinate their design of cyberspace to be able to act collectively and support each other. This coordination simultaneously increases vulnerability. This will involve clearer standard operating procedures in the future, with the leading power, the United States, imposing its cyber culture as the benchmark. China does not have this challenge due to a lack of allies but will pass this on to interested governments via surveillance techniques.

For the two world powers, this defines a new space of capabilities that combines economic and military agency and produces conflicting cultures. The cooperative use of this space has failed so far, and the upcoming conflicts do not suggest a different development. A state with the ambitions of a world power cannot fall behind here. However, technological progress and production capabilities are not something that can be conquered militarily.

Thomas Jäger, Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, University of Cologne, Editor of the Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik

Documentation

ENISA Threat Landscape 2022

(Ed/nc) In November 2022, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) published the tenth edition of its annual Threat Landscape report identifying major cyber threats, most affected sectors, and the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

The eight top cyber threats

The ENISA report identifies eight major threat groups:

• Ransomware: hackers seize control of someone’s data and demand a ransom to restore access

• Malware: software that harms a system

• Social engineering threats: exploiting human error to gain access to information or services

• Threats against data: targeting sources of data to get unauthorised access and disclosure

• Threats against availability – Denial of Service: attacks preventing users from accessing data or services

• Threats against availability – Internet threats: threats to the availability of the internet

• Disinformation/misinformation: the spread of misleading information

• Supply-chain attacks: targeting the relationship between organisations and suppliers

The six top sectors affected

1. Public administration/government (24% of incidents reported)

2. Digital service providers (13%)

3. General public (12%)

4. Services (12%)

5. Finance/banking (9%)

6. Health (7%)

The impact of the war in Ukraine

As regards the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on cyberthreats, the report states that the cyber sphere has been influenced by the war in many ways. According to ENISA, cyber operations are used alongside traditional military action. Hacktivist activity (hacking for politically or socially motivated purposes) has increased, with many conducting attacks to support their chosen side of the conflict.

Disinformation was used by both sides: Russian disinformation has focused on finding justifications for the invasion, Ukraine has used disinformation to motivate its troops.

Deepfakes with Russian and Ukrainian leaders expressing views supporting the other side of the conflict were also used. Extorsion of money from people wanting to support Ukraine was tried by cybercriminals via fake charities.