Weekend Edition Nº134

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SELECTION AND PROMOTION OF JUDGES IN EUROPEAN LAW

FIVE NEXT STEPS IN DEFENCE OF INDEPENDENT JUSTICE

law

Some reflections on the selection and promotion of judges in European

Five next steps in defence of independent justice

Inaugural speech 10 March 2023 Maastricht University, Eleven 20231

Kees Sterk 2

1.Introduction

In this inaugural speech, I will address some issues of initial appointments, and promotion of judges to Courts of Appeal and Supreme Courts. e reason I chose this subject is that, in my view, the key to long-term political control over the judiciary lies in political dominance over the selection and appointment processes for judges and Court Presidents, while judges in Europe appear critical of the selection processes, as shown in the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary(ENCJ)surveysoverthelastsevenyears.

Responding to a question on rst appointments in the 2022 ENCJ Survey (3), large numbers of respondents believed that judges are not selected solely on the basis of merit and experience: 35% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 39% in Croatia, 42% in Hungary and 32% in Bulgaria.Anaverageof20%ofrespondentsbelievedstronglythatjudgesare promoted based on factors other than on the basis of ability and experience, with almost 40% of respondents in Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain responding negatively, while 65% of respondents from Spain and 52% from Hungary expressed the opinion that appointments to apex courts are not based only on ability and experience, and in Germany (34%), Italy (36%) and Portugal (38%) the percentages arealsohigh

3.ENCJSurveyontheIndependenceofJudges(2022),pp35and36,availablehere

1.efulltextofthespeechisavailablehere

2.KeesSterk isprofessorofAdministration ofEuropeanJusticeatMaastrichtUniversity Since1993,heisajudgeintheNetherlands,servinginaDistrictCourt, an Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. From 2014 to 2020 he was Vice-President of the Council for the Judiciary From 2018 to 2020 he was president of the EuropeannetworkforCouncilsoftheJudiciary.

2. ree remarks on the context in which the EuropeanTreatiesoperate

2.1.Introduction

Both the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)andtheEuropeanUnionTreaties(Unionlaw)requirethatEuropean Law (Convention and Union law) is applied uniformly. For the functioning of the Treaties it is vital that European judges are independent. Because almost all European judges are selected by national selection processes, the national processes of selecting judges must also serve the purpose of selecting independent European judges erefore, it is important to know the selection rules and how these rules work out in the national practice. is can only be done within the context of the countries in which the selection rules operate. at is why I will start my speech by briey touching upon three important contexts in Europe that inuence the selectionrulesforEuropeanjudges.

2.2.AacksonnationaljudgesactingasEuropeanjudges

To prevent the catastrophe of WW2 ever happening again, either causedbyfascismorcommunism,countriesdecidedtocreateaninternational system intended to safeguard peace and justice by means of a rule-based order that effectively protects everyone ’ s fundamental rights In line with this idea, the Council of Europe and the European Union were founded, with the Strasbourg Court as the ultimate arbiter of human rights as set out in the Convention, and the Luxembourg Court as the ultimate arbiter of the rights via the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union e application of these rights in case law is done by national judges acting as Europeanjudges

Over the years, governments of countries did not like the outcome of the case law of the Courts and initiated strategies that undermined the concept of a rule-based order for justice and peace Aer theinvasionofUkraine,on24February2022,Russiadepartedcompletelyfromtherule-basedsystemforpeaceandjusticeinEurope

Because almost all European judges are selected by national selection processes, the national processes of selecting judges must also serve the purpose of selecting independent European judges

Poland and Hungary have a strategy of remaining party to the Treaties, probably for nancial reasons, but by socalled ‘judicial reforms’ both countries have signicantly undermined the European systems’ key concept that national judiciaries must be independent for the system to be effective As a result, in Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal held that all case law of both European Courts concerning the requirements for the independence of thejudiciarywasnullandvoidinthePolishnationallegalorder

2.3.SystemicenforcementgapofUnionstandardsregardingtheindependenceofthejudiciary

Both Treaties essentially rely on the national enforcement by countries who are party to one or both Treaties. eCommissionisapivotalenforcerofUnionlaw.Ithasmanyinstrumentswithwhichtodoso,includinglaunching infringement proceedings, applying penalty payments in case of non-compliance with judgments of the Luxembourg Court, and making the independence of the judiciary a pre-condition for payments from Union Funds. I want to briey point out two aspects of enforcement by the Commission: the discretionary power to launch infringement proceedings and the discretionary power to enforce judgments of the Luxembourg Court intheeldoftheindependenceofthejudiciary.

2.3.1.Discretionarypowertolaunchiningementproceedings

e rst point concerns the Commission’s exercise of its power to launch infringements to stop and reverse the aacks on judicial independence in some Member States It is widely believed that the enforcement strategy of theCommissionisineffective.

e Commission has acknowledged the ineffectiveness of its enforcement strategy and explains it either as resultingfromalackofnecessarytoolstodefendjudicialindependence, or that it could not afford to lose a case before the Luxembourg Court, or that it had other important crises at hand. In his 2022 inaugural lecture, Morijn addressedtheissue,andwasveryclear:‘No,thereis noproblem of too few instruments’. On the contrary ‘(..) it is mostly a problem of using tools that are effective to confront illiberal national governments (..), and simply not using other potentially effective options that are available already.’” In my own words: it is not a lack of instruments that is holding back the Commission, but a lack of legal courage and a lack of political will. As an explanation for the lack of political will, Keleman and Pavone argue that the Commission is afraid of losing intergovernmental support for its policy proposals if it were to enforcethestandardsaggressively(4).

Whatever the exact reasons for the ineffective enforcement of the standards for the independence of the judiciary are, it is now without doubt that (geo)politics play a big part in it. e 2022 Union decision to unblock EUR 36 million to Poland under conditions not addressing the ongoing destruction of judicial independence in that country, clearly shows this: the Union valued its unity against Russia more than the protection of Polish independentjudges

From a geo-political point of view, this might be wise, but this role of the Commission, prioritizing geopolitics over compliance with the Charter’s and Treaties’ duty to uphold the standards of the independence of the judiciary, especially to systemic infringements such as in Hungary and Poland, causes a ‘systemic enforcement gap regarding an issue that is fundamental to the identity and functioning of the Union. Because of this systemic gap, I raise the question whether it is still justiable that the Commission should mainly have the power to launch infringement proceedings to protect the independence of the judiciary. e danger of not lling the gap is that, over the long term, it undermines the very identity and functioning of the Union as a union of democratic countries under the rule of law. e paradox of defending our very identity as democracies under the rule of law against Russia while in the process destroying independent judiciaries within the Union itself, is in urgent need of resolution. Is part of solving this paradox the creation of an (a)political body tasked with the duty to defend the independence of the judiciary to (also) launch infringement proceedings in defence of independent justice?Or,areothersolutionspossible?

4. Keleman and Pavone, Where Have the Guardians Gone? Law Enforcement and the Politics of Supranational Forbearance in the European Union, 2021, available Forthcoming,WorldPolitics 74(4)(Fall2023). here

It is not a lack of instruments that is holding back the Commission, but a lack of legal courage and a lack of political will

2 3 2 Discretionarypowertoenforcejudgmentsofthecourts

is brings me to my second point: the discretionary power to enforce judgments of the Courts on judicial independence. is point needs some introduction. As of 1 January 2021, the Union established a new instrument for enforcing the rule of law: it made the independence of the judiciary a pre-condition for payments from Union Funds. As a result of this instrument, Poland’s EUR 36 billion from the National Recovery and Resilience Plan were frozen. On 17 June 2022,theEuropeanCouncilapprovedaCommissionproposaltoreleasethatmoney,providedPolandimplementsthreemilestones.

Shockingly enough, the duty to reform the selection body for judges is not one of the milestones, although Strasbourg case law is extremely explicit that this body is politically dominated. Is the reason for this omission that only the Strasbourg Court is explicit in its case law on this issue, and not the Luxembourg Court? If so, that would deny the Union law rule, in existence for many years now, that the rights on judicial independence have the same meaning and scope as those in the Convention In other words: the case-law of the Strasbourg Court as to the systemic lack of independence of judges is part of Union law In my opinion, the duty to reform the selection body for judgesshouldclearlyhavebeenoneofthemilestones,becauseapolitically dominated selection body for judges is most important for a long-termpoliticalcontrolofthejudiciarybytheexecutive.

Goingbacktothemilestones,oneofthemisthereinstatementofPolish judges, suspended unlawfully by the ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ of the Polish Supreme Court. In the agreement between the CommissionandPolandthis milestoneis elaboratedasaprocedureofreview of the judges, lasting at least a year or more, without guaranteeing the result of reinstatement of the judges is milestone is obviously contrary to the judgment of the Luxembourg Court to reinstate the judges at once, without any review, and an example of the Commission not strongly enforcing judgments of the Luxemburg Court as to judicial independence It, again shows the danger of the Commission having discretionary power for enforcing clear judgments on issuesfundamentaltotheidentityandfunctioningoftheUnion

e duty to reform the selection body for judges should clearly have been one of the milestones, because a politically dominated selection body for judges is most important for a long-term political control of the judiciary by the executive

One of the requirements of the rule of law is that the executive must enforce judgments of independent courts erefore, the systemic enforcement gap should be remedied. e Luxembourg Court may contribute to lling the gap by introducing a strict duty on the Commission (and other Union Institutions) to enforce these judgments in full, without delay and by all available instruments. It could introduce such a duty, considering that the systemic gap emerged for political reasons in the last decade, was never intended in the Treaties in the rstplace,andthatthesubjectrelatestoanissuefundamentaltotheidentityandfunctioningoftheUnion.

Another way to ensure that Union Institutions enforce judgements of the Courts concerning the independence of the judiciary, is to grant interested parties, such as representatives of European judiciaries, the Strasbourg Court labelled them ‘rule of law watchdogs’, access to the Luxembourg Court. is is the goal of the law suit being launched on 27 August 2022 by four European organizations of judges In the light of the systemic enforcement gap, it provides the Court with the opportunity to take a next, in my view, necessary step to ensure legal protectioninUnionlaw,wheretheEuropeanCommissionandCouncilarefailingtheirdutytoenforce

3.Europeanlawrequirementsfortheselectionandpromotionofjudges

Iwillnowgototheheartofthemaer:thelegalrequirementsfortheselectionandpromotionofjudges Topositiontheserules,andexplaintheirnature,Iwillstartwiththreeintroductoryremarks.

3.1.Introductoryremarks

Both the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg Court, do not seek to redesign national judiciaries. ey limit themselves to examining whether rules that concern the organisation and functioning of national courts comply with the principle of judicial independence. e Courts consider all relevant factors individually, yet assess all thesefactorsholistically.

e history, culture or legal system of a European country, can never be a justication not to full its duty to achieve the results of an independent judiciary; the history, culture or legal system of a country are only relevant for answering the question as to which instruments are best suited to full this duty

Most fundamental in this assessment is that the requirements for the independence of the judiciary are sufficiently clear as to the results. So the history, culture or legal system of a European country, can never be a justication not to full its duty to achieve the results of an independent judiciary; the history, culture or legal system of a country are only relevant for answering the question as to which instruments are best suited to full this duty Sometimes politicians or diplomats seem to forget this, and use cultural or economic reasons to lower the legal requirements for some countries. is forgetfulness is, however, dangerously wrong: the requirements of the independence of the judiciary are European law in force, and must therefore be applied and enforced as such.

e legal requirement of judicial independence is in force, no maer how many or what competences the Member States have conferred to the Union I will explain this a lile bit more Some constitutional courts feel that the Luxembourg Court is creating more and more powersfor the Union, and want to stop this trend. In political circles, the level of integration is hotly debated. I will not go into the merits of the discussions, but the point is that no maer what level of integration Member States agree to in the Union, at every agreed level, the Union needs the independence of national judiciaries to function well, because the Union is founded on the concept thatUnionlawisapplieduniformlyineveryMemberState.

3.2.Europeanlegalrequirementsforselectionandappointmentofjudges

e selection and appointment processes are aimed at identifying persons who possess the right qualities for a judge,asrequiredbyEuropeanlaw(independenceandimpartiality),anddoingsoinamannerthatis legitimate in order to sustain public condence in the judiciary I will now engage in identifying and discussing the factors inthecaselawofbothCourtsrelevantinaainingthatpurpose.

3.2.1.estandardforselectionbodies:majorityofjudges,electedbytheirpeers

Both European political and judicial organisations hold that selection bodies for judges should be composed at least half by judges who are elected by their peers, to guarantee the independence of the body from the executiveandthelegislature.

In three cases against Poland, the Strasbourg Court held that the Polish selection body for judges lacked sufficient guarantees of independence from the legislature and the executive, although it had a majority of judges. e Court gave several reasons, one of them was that the judges in the selection body were not elected by their peers, but appointed by the Polish Parliament. In accordance with its traditional methodology, the Court assessedthereasonsasawhole.

e results of these judgments are to be welcomed. In the future, however, a more strict reasoning of the Court is needed in my view. For instance, judgments based on a presumption that disregarding the European standard ‘elected by their peers’ establishes undue inuence by other state powers, unless proven otherwise. For two reasons this would give effect to a changing context in Europe. First, the unanimous support for the standards by

the most important European political and judicial organisations. But more importantly, the fact that more and more countries are changing domestic law – Luxembourg and Chechia are recent examples – to comply with the standard, while already quite a lot of European countries – especially in the Union – are in compliance with it. In other words, a new European common constitutional tradition in the Union israpidlybeingestablished.

3 2 2 SelectionofCourtPresidents

Court Presidents have various competences in Europe, but usually they havesomeinuenceonthecompositionofpanels ofjudges,onappointing presiding judges, on assigning judges to chambers, on case allocation, on the transfer of judges, on the promotion of judges, and on disciplinary charges against judges ese powers may, and in some countries are being used to exert pressure on, or political control over judges. Poland is the most open and brutal example of this pressure, but in othercountries,likeHungary,itismorehiddenandvillainous.

e fact that Court Presidents may potentially inuence judicial independence is in my opinion all the more reason to apply the standardthattheselectionbodymustconsistofamajorityofjudgeselectedbytheirpeers

In Hungary, the selection system for Court Presidents theoretically involves judges, but the system in practice bypasses the involvement of judges I will explain how this works In each court, its judges vote on candidates for the presidency of that court and inform the executiveoftheranking.eexecutivemaydeviatefromtherankingbutis not allowed to appoint a candidate who did not receive a majority of votesofthejudgesinthatcourt,unlesswiththeconsentoftheCouncil for the Judiciary. Whenever the executive does not like the outcomeoftheselectionprocess,andknowsitwillnotgetthemajorityvote in the Council for the Judiciary, it annuls the selection process and appoints ad interim Presidents, year on year, without any involvement of judges. is has been going on for years now, creating a practice of systemically bypassing ordinary processes of selecting Court Presidents, and giving the executive an enormous inuence on such Presidents, and through them on judges, because ad interim Presidentshavetobereappointedeveryyear.

A new European common constitutional tradition in the Union is rapidly being established

e fact that Court Presidents may potentially inuence judicial independence is in my opinion all the more reason to apply the standard that the selection body must consist of a majority of judges elected by their peers

3.2.3.edutyoftheexecutivetowardsrecommendationsbyselectionbodies

Adecisivepowerfortheexecutiveintheprocessofappointingjudgesdoesnotnecessarilygiverisetolegitimate doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of appointed judges to inuence from the executive as to the neutrality vis-à-vis the interests before them. However, in certain circumstances the exercise of power by the executive may give rise to such doubts. What circumstances do the Courts consider in assessing the doubts mentioned in this paragraph? I will mention seven. For examples I refer to the text of my speech publishedonline.

From the examples in my text online, I conclude that Hungarian and Polish cases seem rather obvious examples of undue inuence by the executive over the selection process for judges. Systemically, probably, more interesting is the Iceland judgment. In that case, the Strasbourg Court imposed a Convention duty of very-high level reasoning on the executive in the case of a refusal to appoint a recommended judge, because the reasoning is not allowed to endanger the objectivity of the selection process. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque argues in his – on this point – dissenting opinion, that the Court should have laid down the principle that the manipulation of the appointment of a judge to a court in violation of the relevant eligibility criteria is an absolute procedural error that cannot be remedied. My question is: did the Court not, by introducing the duty – effectively – rule that the executive is only allowed to refuse a recommendation by a selection body on the basis of compelling reasons regarding the objective criteria (domestic law) of the selection process? I would argue that it did, but I agree with the judgethattheCourtcouldhavebeencleareronthemaer.

4.Conclusion

e work of the European Courts on the subject of independent national judiciaries is quite impressive, but I am sorry to say not quite enough yet to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. erefore, I identied ve steps that are necessary for the Courts totakeinordertoprotectindependentjusticeinEurope.

1.Startllingthesystemicenforcementgap;

2.Enforcetheenforcementdutyeffectively;

3 Give more effect to the standard ‘majority of judges, elected bytheirpeers ’ ;

4. Establish a duty for selection bodies of judges to give reasons fordecisions;

5 Establish a rule that the executive is to refuse recommended candidates solely on the ground of non-compliance with objectiveselectioncriteria.

e work of the European Courts on the subject of independent national judiciaries is quite impressive, but I am sorry to say not quite enough yet to safeguard the independence of the judiciary

News Highlights

6 to 10 March 2023

Global treaty to protect high seas and biodiversityconcluded

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Global negotiations have resulted in a Treaty of the High Seas, concluded at the 5th Intergovernmental Conference in New York, to protect the ocean, ght climate change and prevent biodiversityloss.

CourtofJusticestreaminghearingincase concerning a parliamentary commieeofinquiry’sactivitiesandapplicabilityoftheGDPR

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e Court of Justice held a hearing in its Grand Chamber formation in Österreichische Datenschutzbehörde (C-33/22) concerning the scope of EU law in relation to a parliamentary commiee of inquiry’s activities and the applicability of the GeneralDataProtectionRegulation.

Request for preliminary ruling concerning Brexpats’ right to vote in European elections

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General Court to hear action for annulment of Commission Decision on state aidinthepostalsector

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An action pending before the General Court seeking the annulment of the Commission decision in case SA.55208 (2020/C) — Compensation to Czech Post implemented by Czechia for the provision of the universal postal service obligation for the period 2018-2022, declaring the State aid to be compatiblewiththeinternalmarketwaspublishedintheOfficialJournal:ZásilkovnavCommission(T-784/22).

EU consumer protection: WhatsApp commied to being more transparent onchangestoitstermsofservice

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Following a dialogue with EU consumer protection authorities and the European Commission, WhatsApp commied to being more transparent on changes to its terms of service andmakingiteasierforuserstorejectupdateswhentheydisagreewiththem

Court of Justice to rule on jurisdiction of Member States in the EU audiovisual sector

Tuesday 7 March

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On 9 November 2022, the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged two preliminary ruling requests concerning jurisdiction issues on audiovisual media services: RTL Belgium SA and RTL BELUX SA & Cie SECS v Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) (C-691/22) and RTL Belgium SA and RTL BELUX SA & Cie SECS v Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) (C-692/22)

EEA brieng on improving the assessment of costs and benets for climate changeadaptationmeasures

Tuesday 7 March

e European Environment Agency published the brieng ‘Assessing the costs and benets of climate change adaptation’, highlighting the urgent need to speed up the implementation ofadaptationmeasurestocounterclimatechange

Commission carries out unannounced antitrust inspections in fragrance sector

Wednesday 8 March

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e European Commission conducted unannounced inspections at the premises of companies and an association in the fragrance industry in various EU Member States, while also sending out formal requests for information to several othercompaniesactiveinthesamesector.

Tuesday 7 March

e Ombudsman made a nal decision nding that the EU Intellectual Property Office failed to inform the complainant properly about its decision to communicate electronically when in previous proceedings led by the complainant the EUIPO communicated with the complainant by post (case 2241/2021/LDS).

New regulatory framework for Europeanlong-terminvestmentfundsadoptedbyCouncil

Wednesday 8 March

e Council adopted a new regulatory framework for European long-term investment funds as part of the capital markets union, which aims to create a single market for capital to facilitateinvestmentsandsavingsacrossallMemberStates.

Ombudsman conrms maladministration in EUIPO’s change of communication policy without properly notifying to the party in an ‘opposition proceeding’

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Wednesday 8 March

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e General Court annulled the restrictive measures imposed by the Council on Ms Violea Prigozhina, mother of Yevgeniy Prigozhin, in relation to Russia’s war against Ukraine: PrigozhinavCouncil(T-212/22)

General Court annuls four Council Decisions concerning restrictive measures against Syria in so far as they concern MrNizarAssaad

Wednesday 8 March

eGeneralCourtannulledtheCouncilImplementingDecision 2021/751, the Council Implementing Regulation 2021/743, Council Decision 2022/849 and Council Implementing Regulation 2022/840 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, in so far as they concern MrNizarAssaad:AssaadvCouncil(T-426/21).

Inspection decisions vitiated by noncompliance with interview recording obligationareinvalid:CourtofJustice

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General Court rules on 8 actions seeking annulment of Decisions concerning restrictive measures against the DemocraticRepublicofCongo

Wednesday 8 March

e General Court dismissed six actions seeking the annulment of Council Decision 2021/2181 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Council Implementing Regulation 2021/2177 implementing Article 9 of Regulation No 1183/2005 imposing certain specic restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo However, the General Court also annulled those decisions as far as those acts concern Mr Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary and Mr Kalev Mutondo: Ramazani Shadary v Council (T-93/22)andMutondovCouncil(T-94/22).

ACER Board of Appeal’s powers of review and nancing support procedure for interconnectors claried by Court ofJustice

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eCourtofJusticerendereditsjudgmentinACERvAquind (C-46/21 P) clarifying the power of the review that the Appeal Board of the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators is required to exercise over ACER’sdecisionsonexemptionrequests.

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e Court of Justice delivered its judgments in the cases Les Mousquetaires and ITM Entreprises v Commission (C-682/20 P), Casino, Guichard-Perrachon and Achats Marchandises Casino v Commission (C-690/20 P) and Intermarché Casino Achats v Commission (C-693/20 P) concerning actions for annulment against the General Court’s judgments that partially dismissed applicants’ actions seeking annulment of Commission decisions ordering the companies to submittoaninspection

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Court of Justice claries scope of judicial review of ECHA decisions identifying a chemical substance as being of veryhighconcern

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Court of Justice rules on determination ofbiofuelincorporationpercentages

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Court of Justice: European Certicates of Succession must identify the propertyatissuetobecomplete

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e Court of Justice rendered its judgment in Registrų centras (C-354/21), a case concerning the division of competence betweentheauthorityresponsiblefortheissuanceoftheEuropean Certicate of Succession and the authority responsible fortheRealPropertyRegisterinadifferentMemberState.

Court of Justice claries to what extent electricity used for the generation of electricityisexemptfromtax

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e Court of Justice has delivered its judgment in RWE Power (C-571/21), ruling that only electricity used in operations that are indispensable and contribute directly to the technological process of electricity generation may be exempted fromtax.

Court of Justice rules on courts’ annulmentofcreditagreementswithoutconsumers’requestoracquiescence

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e Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Sogenancement (C-50/22), concerning whether national courts can declarecreditagreementsnull andvoidwhentheyhaveraisedof their own motion domestic provisions sanctioned under national law by the nullity of the contract and aer the time limit to seek the nullity of such an agreement by the consumer has elapsed.

Call for papers for Conference on “European Law and e Authority of Judgments”,Nantes,8-9September2023

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A call for papers has been announced for researchers to submit their papers for the European Law And e Authority Of Judgments Conference, which will take place in Nantes on 8 and9September2023.

New Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework adopted by the Commission

Friday 10 March

e Commission introduced a new Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework to support sectors important for a netzeroeconomy,aspartoftheGreenDealIndustrialPlan

General Block Exemption Regulation amended to support EU’s digital and greentransitions

Friday 10 March

e Commission approved a targeted amendment to the General Block Exemption Regulation to support the EU’s digital and green transitions, making it easier for Member States to grant aid directly without requiring prior notication to or approvalbytheCommission.

Council and Parliament reach provisional political agreement to reduce nal energyconsumptionatEUlevel

Friday 10 March

e Council presidency and European Parliament have reached a provisional political agreement to reduce nal energy consumptionby11 7%atEUlevelin2030,withMemberStatesbenetingfromexibilitiesinreachingthetarget.

Friday 10 March

e European Court of Auditors raised concerns about an “ assurance and accountability gap” in the EU’s main pandemic recovery fund, the €724 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility, which Member States can use to restore their economiesinexchangeforreformsandpublicinvestments

NewDirector-GeneralappointedforCouncilLegalService

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European Court of Auditors raises concerns about an “ assurance and accountability gap” in the EU’s main pandemic recoveryfund

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by Giovanni Zaccaroni

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Op-Ed on the judgments of the Court of Justice in Commission v. Italy (C-623/20 P) and Commission v. Spain and Italy (C-635/20 P) that are the last chapters of a case law on linguistic discrimination in the recruitment policy of the European Union institutions. is policy, which deviated from the unique language regime established by secondary legislation, should be now changed in a way that is compatible with the judgments

Lexitor (C-383/18) vs UniCredit Bank Austria (C-555/21): A Different Answer to the Same Consumer Pro-

by Daniel Wasser, Nardin Maarouf-Wasser and Vagelis

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Op-Ed on the 5th anniversary of the application of the General Data Protection Regulation and decision by the Court of Justice in FC v X-FAB Dresden GmbH & Co. KG (C-453/21) concerning the protection of Data Protection Officers against dismissal

by Madalena Narciso

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Op-Ed on the UniCredit Bank Austria and VKI (C-555/21) case concerning a standard contract term in a mortgage credit agreement and whether it is incompatible with Article 25(1) of the Mortgage Credit Directive, as claimed by VKI, due to the non-reimbursement of processing costs not dependent on the agreement's duration in the event of early repayment bytheconsumer.

Papakonstantinou

Dismissing data protection officers in Germany – a maer of good cause and majordifficultiesforemployers!

Whenisthesystematiccollectionofgeneticdatafortheghtagainstcrimelegitimate?

(Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti and génétiques par la police, C-205/21)

by Enza Cirone

Analysis of the Court of Justice’s ruling in Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti () and génétiques par la police) (C-205/21), holding that the systematic collection of biometric and genetic data, for their registration by the police, of any formally accused personiscontrarytotherequirementofensuringgreaterprotectionconcerningtheprocessingofsensitivepersonaldata.

Library - Book Launch

Res Judicata in European Union Law

By Araceli Turmo

e latest book edited by the EU Law Live Press is an exhaustive analysis of the role of the principle of res judicata in Union Law and its implications in national courts and also in Union courts. is is a key feature of the Union’s legal system that reects the principle of legalcertaintyintheproceduralterrain

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Maja Brkan, Marco Lamandini, Adolfo Martín, Jorge Piernas, Ana Ramalho, René Repasi, Anne-Lise Sibony, Araceli Turmo, Isabelle Van Damme, Maria Dolores Utrilla and Maria Weimer

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