‘Safe Third Countries’ Before the Court of Justice (C-406/22): Was Another Reading Possible?
Francesco Munari 1
In CV v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky et al 2 the Court was called upon to decide on certain issues relating to the granting and revocation of refugee status, as governed by Directive 2013/323, in particular the notion of safe country of origin. As most people know, when a person seeking international protection comes from a country considered safe, their application may be decided by means of a simplified procedure, and in the meantime the applicant may not be allowed to remain in the territory of the Member State.
In this case, the State of origin of the applicant for international protection was Moldova, recognised by the Czech Republic as safe, except for a part of its territory, Transnistria, which is problematic due to heavy Russian interference. For reasons related to the energy crisis, Moldova has also suspended the application of the ECHR in its territory, to which it is a contracting party, having invoked the so-called state of emergency pursuant to Article 15(2) ECHR.
The three questions referred by the national court were the following: whether a State which has declared a state of emergency under Article 15(2) ECHR automatically loses its status as a safe country; whether the Member States are precluded from regarding a country as safe only in part, i.e. with territorial exceptions; and finally, if the answer to one of the preceding questions is in the affirmative, whether the national court, when hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection examined under the fast-track regime applicable to applicants from safe countries of origin, should find that there have been substantial breaches of the procedure adopted by the Member State, even if this issue was not raised by the applicant.
1. Francesco Munari is full professor of EU law at the University of Genoa. His main interests concern EU law, with a focus on competition and market regulation, environment, monetary union, migration, port, maritime and transport law (see his publications here). He is or has been an aggregate or visiting professor at several universities, including the World Maritime University, LUISS, the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, the Université Panthéon-Assas. In 2014, he was awarded a Jean Monnet Chair in EU Environmental Law. A previous version of this Long-Read has appeared in Italian in rivista.eurojus.it, Fascicolo n. 4 – 2024 ‘Le torri (d’avorio?) di Kirchberg: rifessioni a margine della sentenza CV c. Ministerio dell’Interno della Repubblica Ceca’.
2. Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 October 2024, CV v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky et al. (C-406/22, EU:C:2024:841). For a first comment on this judgment see also Di Pascale, A.; “Safe Countries of Origin: whose Margin of Appreciation? (Case C-406/22, CV) and its Impact on the Application of the Italy-Albania Protocol”, EU Law Live, 16/12/2024.
3. Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.
The Court answered the first question rather bluntly, excluding the automatic effects of the declaration of a state of emergency pursuant to Article 15(2) ECHR on the qualification of a country as safe. Instead, after a lengthy digression, it ruled out the possibility that the provisions of Directive 2013/32 allow Member States to proceed with a partial designation of a country as safe. After this affirmative answer to the second question, it also held that that such designation constitutes a substantial breach of the directive, which the national court is required to establish ex officio, pursuant to the principles of effective judicial protection enshrined in Articles 46 of the Directive and 47 of the Charter.
Yet, this judgment does not appear convincing; above all, it overlooks the delicate dynamics characterising the European Zeitgeist on migrants.
Migration in the EU: Between Perceived Reality and True Data.
For many years migration has been putting the Union under heavy pressure. For instance, one of the main reasons for Brexit was that of the alleged (excessive) entry of foreigners into the UK. Furthermore, the inadequacy of the Dublin regime in the face of migratory flows from the south and east has resulted in strains among Member States, and a widespread negative perception of Europe and the Union, both by the so-called Member States of first entry and by the others: the former, because they feel they have been abandoned by their European partners; the latter, because they fear that the EU rules, namely the so-called Schengen area, would enormously amplify –apparently eluding the Dublin regulation– the influx of third-country nationals from (first entry) Member States. Thus, border controls have been from time to time reintroduced, or even abused.4
The inadequacy of the Dublin regime in the face of migratory flows from the south and east has resulted in strains among Member States, and a widespread negative perception of Europe and the Union
4. Advocate General Saugmandsgaard’s Opinion of 6 October 2021 in NW (Joined Cases C 368/20 and C 369/20, EU:C:2021:821).
Above all, the migration issue is the perfect fuel for populist and anti-European voices, which inject toxins into public opinion with a virulence unprecedented in EC/EU history. Moreover, the narrative concerning the ‘fear’ of migration is neither conditioned by statistics, by the level of truth or reliability of (sometimes frankly abhorrent) information, nor by the insights provided by those who rightly warn that a substantial share of foreigners is necessary for the economies of many European States. The ‘naïve’ view of information, according to which knowledge of real data or events brings people closer to the truth, unfortunately no longer stands the test of facts.5 And the jurists must also come to terms with this perceived reality.
Beyond perceptions, according to the International Organization for Migration6 (IOM), the number of migrants in the world has tripled since 1970 and has almost doubled since 1990. In 2020 there were 281,000,000 migrants in the world; however, destinations are not equally distributed: Europe (not only the EU) is in fact the main destination for people on the move, with 86,700,000 people in 2020, equal to about 30% of all migrants (including intra-EU movements).7
In the EU, there are currently about 28,000,000 migrants from third countries, and about 42,500,000 people were born outside the EU and have been naturalised.8 This percentage is substantially higher than the world one and does not even consider EU citizens established in another Member State.9 These latter citizens, moreover, have different levels of integration in the population of the individual Member States, determined by the time in which each of them joined the EU.
In 2022 alone some 5,100,000 people entered the EU.10 The number of foreigners legally admitted to the EU has gone from 1,759,841 people in 2014 to 3,741,015 in 2023. Moreover, with the exception of 2020 due to the COVID pandemic, year after year the increase in legal migrants is constantly growing.11
Taking the figures of 2023,12 applications for international protection in the EU have almost tripled since 1990, and almost doubled since 2020, with some 75% of them concentrated in Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece, while elsewhere there are essentially no applications (e.g. Hungary with 30 applications in 2023).
In 2022, about 300,000 persons were granted refugee status13 out of over 960,000 requests.14 In 2021 this was less than 200,000 and in 2023 over 350,000.
5. Yuval Noah Harari, Nexus: A Brief History of Information Networks from the Stone Age to AI, Random House, 2024.
6. World Migration Report 2024, International Organization for Migration.
7. Migration and asylum in Europe – 2023 edition, Eurostat, 2024.
8. Statistics on migration to Europe, European Commission, 5 November 2024.
9. Migration and asylum in Europe – 2023 edition, Eurostat, 2024.
10. Migration and migrant population statistics, Statistics Explained, Eurostat, March 2024.
11. Statistics on migration to Europe, European Commission, 5 November 2024.
12. Asylum applications in the EU, European Council/Council of the European Union, Infographics, 11 April 2024.
13. Asylum decisions - quarterly statistics, Statistics Explained, Eurostat, 9 December 2024.
14. Asylum applications in the EU, European Council/Council of the European Union, Infographics, 11 April 2024.
The total number of refugees worldwide is 35,300,000,15 including some 5,900,000 Palestinians seeking refuge in neighbouring Middle Eastern countries and 4,200,000 Ukrainians fleeing the war. One out of 9 migrants is a refugee. Excluding Ukrainians, about 3,800,000 refugees live in the European Union and represent 14% of resident third-country nationals.16 At present, after the Ukrainian crisis, 20-25% of all world refugees live in the Union.
The number of irregular immigrants is higher than that of refugees: excluding people who absconded upon their entrance to the EU, in 2023 the Member States’ authorities identified 1,265,000 people illegally present on the territory, rejected about 120,000 people at the border, and expelled about 118,000.17
The ‘Safe Third Country’
The above data highlights that, beyond real or induced perceptions, the phenomenon has considerable substance, especially in its prospective vision. The efforts made by Member States to welcome third-country nationals, both economic migrants and applicants for international protection, appear to be steadily growing over the years. That said, within the EU the situation is not encouraging: the management of external borders and the related burdens remains somehow a ‘shared’ competence, which lacks solidarity and is characterised by fragmentary ‘second-best’ solutions. It is thus for the jurists to strive to find a systematic coherence.
In particular, and to get closer to the issues covered by CV, in relation to the right to remain in the Member State where the request for international protection was lodged and the prohibition of restricting the personal freedom of asylum seekers during the examination period of the requests (C-601/15 PPU),18 a six-month maximum time limit for processing them is generally established by Article 31 Directive 2013/32, even though it is hardly ever met due to the number of applicants.19 Within this time period applications for international protection must be subject to an ‘appropriate examination’, pursuant to the criteria established by Article 11 ff. of the Directive.
Within the EU the situation is not encouraging: the management of external borders and the related burdens remains somehow a ‘shared’ competence, which lacks solidarity and is characterised by fragmentary ‘second-best’ solutions
15. World Migration Report 2024, International Organization for Migration, Chapter 2, Refugees and Asylum Seekers.
16. World Migration Report 2024, International Organization for Migration, Chapter 2, Refugees and Asylum Seekers.
17. Enforcement of immigration legislation statistics, Statistics Explained, Eurostat, 30 April 2024.
18. Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 February 2016, JN v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (C 601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84).
19. Asylum Report 2023, European Union Agency for Asylum, Section 4.4.10.
The rules in question are considerably simplified if the applicant comes from a so-called safe country. The notion of safe country therefore assumes crucial importance: firstly, it allows applications for international protection to be assessed according to principles of proportionality and adequacy, which in turn is also useful in allowing a more in-depth and nevertheless timely examination of requests from persons coming from countries not considered safe, especially in a situation where the number of pending asylum applications in the Union has doubled20 and is steadily growing post-COVID, as is the duration of investigations. Secondly, it becomes a probable ‘pivot’ on which to distinguish migrants entitled to remain in the territory of the Member States from others. Thirdly, for foreign applicants from these third countries, the possibilities of staying on the territory of the Member States, and of receiving the relevant reception, are significantly reduced until the validity of their application for protection is definitively established.
Not surprisingly, the Procedures Directive deals extensively with the notion of ‘safe country’, breaking it down into ‘safe country of origin’ (Articles 36 and 27), ‘safe third country’ (Article 38) and ‘safe European third country’ (Article 39): in essence, a country is ‘safe’ when there is no risk of persecution or serious harm within the meaning of Directive 2011/9521 (Qualification Directive) against an asylum seeker, or, if the country is not the country of nationality of the applicant, if in that country the person will not suffer persecution, serious harm or inhuman and degrading treatment in accordance with international standards, nor will he be subject to ‘refoulement’ to unsafe countries. Ultimately, if the asylum seeker does not risk persecution or serious harm in any such third country, his asylum application will be expedited, simplified, will take place at the border or in other transit zones, and will frequently be rejected. This, however, is consistent with the rule of customary international law according to which States tend to be free to admit foreigners to their territory or not, except for persons in need of international protection under the Geneva Conventions.
20. Asylum applications - monthly statistics, Statistics Explained, Eurostat, 5 December 2024.
21. Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of thirdcountry nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9.
A State is considered safe in the light of objective criteria and evaluations, which are the responsibility of the Member States, who are required to periodically update their assessments and keep the Commission informed.
The Interpretation of ‘Safe Country of Origin’ in C-402/22…
In the case at hand, the applicant, a Moldovan national, stated that he had entered the Czech Republic in 2016, with a false passport, after receiving threats and attacks in his country of origin, as a witness to a serious road accident. He had complained that the police authorities had not identified the responsible persons. After having submitted a request for asylum in 2022 before the Czech authorities, CV declared his refusal to return to Moldova because of the war in Ukraine. The Court noted that Moldova is not affected by the conflict,22 nor that CV could run any risk of persecution in Moldova because of his personal position.23 Tellingly, on the basis of the information available to the Court, it seemed rather easy to agree with the decision of manifest groundlessness of the application for international protection submitted by CV, on which the Czech Ministry had ruled.
Instead, without even considering issues of receivability of questions 2 and 3 that indeed seemed to be serious,24 the Court held that Article 37 of the Procedures Directive does not allow Member States to designate a third country as a safe country of origin with the exception of certain parts of its territory. In order to reach that conclusion, in the absence of any express indication contained in the provision in question, the Court develops a reasoning entirely internal to the Directive, on the basis of ‘the wording [of Art. 37], … of its context, of the objectives pursued by the legislation of which it forms part and, where appropriate, of its origins’, by assessing both Annex I to the Directive, the positions adopted by the Commission in the context of the legislative navette concerning Directive 2013/32, and the previous Procedures Directive, namely the repealed Directive 2005/85,25 which instead provided for the option exercised by the Czech legislature.
Furthermore, assuming that the accelerated procedures constitute a ‘special regime’ as compared with the ‘general’ regime’ applicable to unsafe non-member States, the Court considers that allowing a designation such as that of the Member State concerned ‘would infringe the restrictive interpretation to which derogating provisions must be subject’ 26
Nor is it relevant that in the new ‘migration package’, as per Regulation 2024/1348,27 Directive 2013/32 is repealed taking effect from 12 June 2026 and it is (expressly and again) provided that the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin at both EU and national level may be carried out with exceptions for certain parts of its territory. According to the Court, ‘it is the prerogative of the EU legislature to go back on that choice, by carrying out
22. Judgment of the Court of Justice, CV, para 35.
23. Judgment of the Court of Justice, CV, para 36.
24. Francesco Munari, ‘Le torri (d’avorio?) di Kirchberg: riflessioni a margine della sentenza CV c. Ministero dell’Interno della Repubblica Ceca’, Eurojus.it rivista, 2 December 2024.
25. Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ 2005 L 326, p. 13.
26. Judgment of the Court of Justice, CV, para 71.
27. Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, OJ 2024 L 1348.
a new balancing exercise’, and yet that fact ‘supports the interpretation according to which the EU legislature did not provide for that option in Directive 2013/32’.28
With all due respect, the Court’s reasoning does not seem to be free from elements worth criticising.
… and its Shortcomings
First, no one contests the need to consider the ‘context’ in which the concept of safe country of origin is placed; yet, it would perhaps have been preferable not to limit ourselves to a ‘vertical’ examination of the Qualification Directive, and rather conduct a systematic interpretation, extended to all the relevant rules in the field. Such an interpretation, undisputed since CILFIT,29 has been moreover applied also to asylum cases.30 Had this form of interpretation been followed, a different solution would have been (easily) obtainable in the light of the Qualification Directive: Article 8 of that Directive even allows Member States to exclude international protection if ‘in a part of the territory of the country of origin’ there is no risk of persecution or serious harm. This proviso seems to capture the situation of CV, and the lack of attention paid to it does not seem consistent with an interpretation of relevant EU law that requires one rule to be interpreted also by means of the others.31 Conversely, the solution provided by the Court risks causing an aporia in the system, because even in cases such as ours it requires Member States to carry out the procedure provided for problematic situations, only to be able to reject the request for international protection precisely because in some parts of the territory of the country of origin there is no risk of persecution or serious harm.
Also criticisable is the second assumption made by the Court, i.e. that the accelerated procedure would be ‘derogatory’ from that provided for ‘unsafe’ third countries. In reality, looking at (a) the significant growth in asylum applications as a whole and the difficulties of the Member States in processing applications for international protection within the time limits provided for by the directive, and (b) the regulatory provision of guarantees also with respect to foreigners coming from safe countries, it would seem more persuasive to read the two paths ‘ordinary’ and ‘accelerated’ not in relation to each other as a rule with an exception, but as (a) alternatives according to the different situations, (b) functional to ensure a proportionate allocation of the resources dedicated to the examination of the applications that the Member States are required to examine, and, ultimately, (c) more respectful of the rights of individual applicants and the objectives of speed required by the system. Besides, this interpretation seems suggested by the Italian Corte di Cassazione in a more recent judgement32.
28. Judgment of the Court of Justice, CV, para 82.
29. Advocate General Capotorti’s Opinion of 13 July 1982 in CILFIT v Ministry of Health (C-283/81, EU:C:1982:267).
30. Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 January 2024, WS (C 621/21, EU:C:2024:47); Judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 February 2009, Elgafaji (C-465/07, EU:C:2009:94); Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 April 2024, M.N. (C 670/22, EU:C:2024:372); Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 September 2024, Banco Santander (Joined Cases C 775/22, C 779/22 and C 794/22, EU:C:2024:679).
31. Koen Lenaerts and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice’, EUI Academy of European Law Working Paper 2013/9.
32. Judgment of the Corte di Cassazione of 19 December 2024, no 33398, at 11.
Finally, the refusal by the Court to consider the regime established by the new Regulation 2024/1438 seems unconvincing in light of the theory of consistent interpretation, to which the Court has accustomed us with respect to rules that are not yet effective but already in force. Admittedly, the aforementioned regulation will be applicable only from June 2026; however, being in force already, it should impose itself on the national court as an interpretative source as of 23 May 2024.33
Conversely, the result reached by the Court ends up requiring the national court to disapply its domestic law (even though this is already consistent with Regulation 2024/1348), which will however only be temporary, since it will shortly be EU law itself that will confirm a reading of the concept of the safe country of origin in accordance with the provisions of Czech national law. This also has undesirable effects on the other standstill obligation incumbent on national courts with respect to EU rules already in force but not yet applicable, and which requires them not to generate situations that are contradictory to the objectives pursued by those rules.
In short, the Court’s approach does not seem to help settle the overall problematic framework characterising the subject matter and the application of its rules, an activity which the administrations and judges of the Member States are engaged in daily.
The result reached by the Court ends up requiring the national court to disapply its domestic law (even though this is already consistent with Regulation 2024/1348), which will however only be temporary, since it will shortly be EU law itself
33. Cf. Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinion of 30 June 2005 in Mangold v Helm (C-144/04, EU:C:2005:420, para 117).
Some Concluding Remarks
Firstly, notwithstanding the preliminary ruling, it is likely that the decision refusing international protection issued against CV will be confirmed. Certainly time will pass and in the meantime CV will be able to remain in the territory of the Czech Republic. That being said, if the purpose of the rules in question is to manage the growing applications for international protection, which the Member States are required to process with reasonable speed and adequate – i.e. proportionate – guarantees, i.e. suitable for ensuring conditions of equal rights and dignity to the foreigners concerned, then perhaps the ruling does not help.
Secondly, it is necessary to be very precise and to interpret the Court’s answer to the third question as merely a confirmation of an obligation on the part of the national court to establish substantial infringements of the procedures for examining applications for international protection. Such an obligation, in and of itself, hardly appears to be contestable, but it would be rather improper to assume that, as far as the powers of the national court are concerned, the judgment wants to go beyond that. The procedures for examining applications for international protection are the responsibility of the Member States’ administrations, which follow precise indications and constraints established by EU law and national transposition rules. In relation to the decisions adopted, the review of judges appears to be aimed at verifying compliance with the rules and procedures, and the Court tells us that substantial violations of the same can also be detected ex officio. However, everything that does not correspond to the violation of the principle of legitimacy identified above must remain firm, for the sake of not derailing the system. To this end, the Corte di Cassazione has suggested that the judge is obliged to take into account the designation as a safe country made by the States’ administrations so long as such designation appears ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with the criteria laid down by the EU or national legislation34, or when ‘overcomes the external boundaries of reasonableness and has been done in a manifestly arbitrary manner, or when has become ictu oculi no longer consistent with the actual situation’35 .
In particular, it seems frankly unfounded to infer from the judgment the opening of room for interpretation for national courts with regard to the concept of safe third countries, which would allow them to identify further cases in which to depart from the assessments made ‘by the Member States’ (i.e. the national legislature, the government, or the competent administrations appointed for this purpose by them). It is therefore highly perplexing what some authors have argued, namely that a third country is never considered safe except in its entirety even with respect to all the people who are nationals of it or come from it.36 Such a reading appears clearly to be in contrast with the rationale of the institution of international protection, which is guaranteed by reason of ‘the individual situation and personal circumstances of the applicant’ (Art. 4(3)(c) of the Qualification Directive). And certainly the Court, in the unfortunate answer to the second question referred for a preliminary ruling, does not seem to have decided to distort also the structure of the legislation under consideration here, which recognises a right to judicial protection for the interested parties, not also a right to demand subjective interpretations from the judges as to the characteristics of the countries of origin of the asylum seekers.
34. See judgment no. 33398/2024, above note 32.
35. Order of 30 December 2024 no 34898, at 34 (translation by the author).
36. Marco Borraccetti, ‘Il trattenimento off-shore negato: prime note sull’ordinanza del Tribunale di Roma, con uno sguardo al futuro’, Eurojus.it rivista, 4 November 2024.
In fact, also the Italian Corte di Cassazione37 has rejected this interpretation, and has suggested the Court to consider its view as a contribution to the ‘dialogue’ between national judges and the Court when the latter shall address this issue on occasion of the next preliminary ruling expected to be pronounced upon request by several Italian courts38.
The above perspective is confirmed by Article 61 of the new Procedures Regulation which allows Member States (and also the Union), to designate ‘a third country as a safe country of origin ... with exceptions for certain parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons’. Enhanced via judgments such as C-621/21,39 this provision confirms the principle that a country can remain safe for some categories of people even if it is not so for all, in line with the notion of refugee, which has always required the identification of a persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group’, and not for the mere ‘origin’ from a particular State. On the other hand, we avoid falling into the otherwise inevitable Hegelian night, in which not only the cows are all black, but the status of foreigners who present themselves at the EU’s external borders is obscured with great confusion, to the detriment of the effectiveness of the asylum policy itself, which we have seen is already under considerable pressure.
Let’s try to draw some conclusions. The judgments of the Court of Justice are binding on national judges, who cannot escape the primacy of EU law and the effects of preliminary rulings without incurring their own liability and that of the Member State to which they belong, and without the Member States having any power to ‘sanction’ them for having disapplied domestic law deemed to be in conflict with European Union law.40
Precisely for this reason, the Court is required to take on the responsibility of assessing what consequences its preliminary rulings may have, even more so in sectors characterised by high political sensitivity, and related conflicts, not only political.
In these areas, the interpreter of the rule should assume in principle its conformity with the system, which should not be evaluated exclusively with respect to the particular situation, and therefore to the rights of the individual, but with a careful look also at the consequences in general of the rights of all as allocated overall by the legislator, national or European.
The historical and quantitative evolution of the movements of people in the world and in Europe, and of those who request international protection, poses a challenge to us jurists. It is necessary to ask ourselves how to reasonably protect the individual rights of people, in a situation in which, however, it is necessary to take into account not only other rights and prerogatives in some way opposed to the former, but also to bear in mind that the very application of identical procedures to different situations risks jeopardising the position of those most in need . The reception of refugees and migrants does not end with the mere entry into the territory of a Member State, or with their stay there pending a final decision on the status of the person concerned. It requires, in the best interests of those persons, the implementation of integration policies affecting public, administrative and financial resources.
37. Order no 34898/2024, above note 35.
38. The cases are numbered as C-758/24 and C-759/24.
39. Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 January 2024, WS (C 621/21, EU:C:2024:47).
40. Advocate General Collins’ Opinion of 20 January 2022 in RS (C 430/21, EU:C:2022:44).
Not only that: these policies compete with others, and in any case require that, in the interest of European citizens, migrants (whom we certainly need) integrate quickly and contribute to the satisfaction of their needs but also of the society that has welcomed them. In this situation, it is essential to be able to effectively apply the criteria for accepting foreigners or not, because this conditions the relative choices, timeframes and costs that must remain under the control of those responsible, according to the standards set by the regulations. In the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, the judicial function also needs to consider these aspects.
From this point of view, the judgment in CV v. Ministry of the Interior probably appears to be too focused on the individual situation of the applicant, and less on that of the Member State concerned. In doing so, however, there is a risk of complicating the necessary dialogue that must exist between institutions in the common interest, and above all this same dialogue risks being jeopardised also within the Member States. The Court will soon have other opportunities to further focus these topics which, at least in some member States, has created tensions between the governments and the judiciary41. The matter is therefore still ongoing.
The reception of refugees and migrants does not end with the mere entry into the territory of a Member State, or with their stay there pending a final decision on the status of the person concerned. It requires, in the best interests of those persons, the implementation of integration policies affecting public, administrative and financial resources
41. Di Pascale, above note 2.