Delusion, Deceit or Neither?

UK’S ‘GLOBAL BRITAIN’ VISION: Delusion, Deceit or Neither?

Chee Leong Lee April 27, 2021

The first discourse draws from the European-centric perspective in which Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney published their piece in Foreign Affairs magazine. Calling the ‘Global Britain’ vision as a delusionary promise, both authors see the Johnson government not facing the reality of which the UK is in. From COVID-19’s economic and public health impacts to the nation’s financial constraint, the two scholars view the UK as a middle power that is short of having the necessary conditions in pulling out an expensive plan as the ‘Global Britain’ vision. Instead, both suggest that the Johnson government seeks its strengths closer at home and for that purpose, charts its economic and foreign policy paths through close cooperation with the EU. In other words, Shapiro and Witney see no basis for the UK to engage Asia or Indo-Pacific independently since its economic, cultural and geographical fortunes lie with the European continent and not the other part of the world. The second discourse comes from the Chinese-centric perspective that is evident in Gao Jian’s commentary in Global Times. Coining the ‘Global Britain’ vision as a strategic deceit of the Johnson government, Gao’s scepticism is based on the three rationales from economic, diplomatic and strategic domains. Economic wise, Gao sees Britain caught within its domestic economic crisis and as such, lacks the material basis to push such global vision. In terms of diplomacy, the UK is not only having an uneasy relationship with the EU, but also facing deteriorating ties with China (second’s largest economy) as well as mired in disadvantageous alliance with the US. Such challenges, to Gao, is not working in favour of the UK’s ‘new’ role within the ‘Global Britain’ vision. As far as strategic domain is concerned, Gao considers the UK as losing its own strategic autonomy in its alliance with the US and this, in turn, hampers its strategic manoeuvring in responding to the volatile international environment today.

The Three Realities

Regardless of either of these two discourses, these scholars have yet to take into account the three stark realities in Asia or Indo-Pacific (as coined by the US-led alliance and the UK) region. First and foremost, Asia or Indo-Pacific is the future in which the global economy will revolve around. In particular, the fast-emerging ASEAN region has the potential to be an even bigger economic driver in spite of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the total e-commerce market size of six Southeast Asian

Chee Leong Lee is currently the Collaborative Fellow with Anbound Malaysia, an independent think tank based in Kuala Lumpur. Previously the Taiwan Fellow and Visiting Scholar for China, his research includes China’s sub-national diplomacy in the ASEAN region, Taiwan’s soft power in Southeast Asia and ASEAN affairs in general. He holds a PhD from Monash University.

countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines) is slated to expand to US$53 billion in 2023 – making these countries among the most dynamic future economies in Asia or the Indo-Pacific. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic era, their potential as their future economy continues unabated. In fact, the pandemic accelerated the realisation of such potential, with digital consumers increasing by 36% from 2019 to 2020 alone. Of course, this has not taken into account the potentials in other technological sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), in which Southeast Asian nations (except Singapore) have yet to tap effectively as compared to their Chinese counterpart. Considering these hard facts, it is perfectly logical for any power, whether superpower, middle power or even small nations, to engage this part of the world as external partners. This is even more crucial for the UK’s case as it faces challenges in its economic relations with the EU in the postBrexit era. With free hand in charting its economic and diplomatic course today, a ‘Global Britain’ vision is timely to prepare the nation for a new age that will surely involve the diversification of its international trade and adjustment to its foreign/security policies vis-à-vis Asia or the Indo-Pacific. Second, Asia or Indo-Pacific is much bigger than China in terms of the economy and as the matter of fact, the US in the diplomatic domain. Arguably, within Asia or the Indo-Pacific, there are Southeast Asia (ASEAN bloc), Indian sub-continent (especially India) and East Asian nations that belonged to either developing or developed countries in the world economy. While Gao emphasizes China as the second largest economy that the UK must engage, the story does not end there for sure. Indeed, the dynamism of other Asian or Indo-Pacific economies rarely feature prominently in the analytical equations of many scholars around the world. This is despite the fact that Southeast Asia for instance, continued to import more goods from China than the other way round – resulting in the former running trade deficits with the latter for many years. Without such recognition of Southeast Asian nations as actors with agency, any analysis will fall into the conventional insight that postulates the Chinese market as the ‘sole’ supporting pillar of global consumption without its neighbours. On the other hand, the US, while being the prevailing world’s superpower, continues to face hurdle in imposing its strategic agenda in the region. Without ASEAN’s participation and support, most of Washington’s Indo-Pacific push will be far from successful in Southeast Asia. Given such reality, Washington has no choice but to cooperate with ASEAN in an array of regional forums to which the Southeast Asian bloc is at the driving seat. As of today, the East Asia Forum (EAF), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and (ADMM Plus) are among those regional forums in which both the US and China participated as external partners to the Southeast Asian bloc to articulate their respective agendas. By all means, these two economic and diplomatic realities in Asia or the Indo-Pacific, are virtually missing from Gao’s assessment that situates the ‘Global Britain’ vision solely within the context of US-China rivalry. Finally, the UK has a long-standing presence in several Southeast Asian nations that spanned beyond the EU’s formal establishment of ties with ASEAN in 1972. While Shapiro and Witney are right to point out that EU remained to be the UK’s main external partner that is closer to home, they certainly overlook the cross-domain foundation in Asia or the Indo-Pacific that the UK already possessed. In fact, the British colonial legacies in Southeast Asia have left the UK with strong economic stakes in Malaysia and Singapore while at the same time, retained special defence arrangements with Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore. This is not to mention the Commonwealth of Nations in which these Southeast Asian countries and the UK working together to tackle global issues – ranging from poverty, economic inequality to racism – ever since the signing of Singapore Declaration in 1971. Surely, such cross-domain foundation is facilitative to the British government’s push for a ‘new’ role in Asia or the Indo-Pacific region.

Operationalisation is the Issue

By all means, the ‘Global Britain’ vision is neither a delusion nor a strategic deceit as articulated by Shapiro, Witney and Gao. As far as Asia or Indo-Pacific is concerned, it is a vision that has a logical rationale, with a specific focus on certain countries of the region and is predicated upon the UK’s long-standing presence in this part of the world. The real issue, however, will be about operationalising the ‘Global Britain’ vision within Asia or Indo-Pacific region. This will entail follow-up questions: How much resources to be distributed in achieving the four objectives as outlined in the vision and how to distribute them? Which government agencies taking charge and how will they push such vision? Who are the British government’s local and international partners (private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) as well as how to coordinate all these actors into a collective action that earns the UK a ‘new’ global role in the next decade? Without detailed planning and execution, the ‘Global Britain’ vision will remain as a concept waiting to be operationalised on the ground.