Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Summer 2014

Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology www.exceptionalpsychology.com Published by the Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology.

Volume 2

ISSN 2327-428X

Number 1

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Summer 2014

Editor Erika A. Pratte, M.A.

Board of Reviewers Jean-Michel Abrassart, Ph.D. Candidate Institute for the Analysis of Change in Contemporary and Historical Societies (IACCHOS) Catholic University of Louvain

Shaye Hudson, M.A.

Jack Hunter, Ph.D. Candidate University of Bristol

Eberhard Bauer, Ph.D.

Jennifer Lyke, Ph.D.

Institut fĂźr Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene

Richard Stockton College

Callum E. Cooper, Ph.D. Candidate Centre for the Study of Anomalous Psychological Processes (CSAPP) University of Northampton

Kini Roland, M.A. Student University of West Georgia Leslie W. O’Ryan, Ed.D., NCC, LCPC Western Illinois University

Alexander De Foe, Ph.D Candidate Monash University

Annalisa Ventola, B.A. Executive Director of Parapsychology Association

Renaud Evrard, Ph.D Center for Information, Research and Counselling on Exceptional Experiences University of Strasbourg Cover Artwork Erika A. Pratte, M.A.

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Table of Contents Letter from the Editor …………………………………………………………………………………..4 Heterodoxies’ Merging: Lacanian approaches to exceptional experiences…………………….….6—15 Renaud Evrard A State Cultivation Model……………………...…………………………………………….......16—23 Alexander De Foe Clarification of Terms and Concepts Defining Parapsychology and Related Disciplines: Comments on Mathijsen (2009, 2013), Abrassart (2013), and Evrard (2013)……………………..……………24—46 Michael Tremmel Five Exceptional Experiences………………..……………………………………………..…….48—54 Brad Fulton Live a Psychic Day……………….…………………………………………………………...….55—57 Julie Hagen Trance/Journey Work with the Ancient Horned God of Great Britain: A collection of four paintings ………………...……………………………………………………………………………….…58—61 Christina Marvel Domestic Abuse Rehabilitation: A research proposal……………………………..……………..63—66 Terence Palmer Epistemological or Ontological? A Reply to Mathijsen (2013)…………………………...……...67—69 Jean-Michel Abrassart Conversations with Ghosts…………………………...…………………………………………..70—72 S. Alexander Hardison

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Letter from the Editor

Welcome to another round of the Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology (JEEP). As usual, we are first met with research articles, followed by personal accounts. The first article is a philosophical inquiry titled “Heterodoxies’ Merging: Lacanian approaches to exceptional experiences” by Renaud Evrard.

The second article is one written by JEEP’s newest review board member, Alexander De Foe, called the “State Cultivation Model.” And the third article by Michael Tremmel is self-explanatory and is called “Clarification of Terms and Concepts Defining Parapsychology and Related Disciplines: Comments on Mathijsen (2009, 2013), Abrassart (2013), and Evrard.” Our two personal accounts are brought to you by Brad Fulton and Julie Hagen.

I am very excited to introduce JEEP’s first published artwork inspired by exceptional experiences titled “Trance/Journey Work with the Ancient Horned God of Great Britain: A collection of four paintings,” done by Christina Marvel. These paintings are truly a great start to what I hope is just the beginning of artwork submissions!

Followed by this is Terence Palmer’s request for research into a “spirit release procedure” with convicted felons of domestic violence, titled “Domestic Abuse Rehabilitation: A research proposal.” The next letter to the editor is one by Jean-Michel Abrassart, titled “Epistemological or Ontological? A Reply to Mathijsen (2013)” which is a reply to Mathijsen’s letter to the editor that was published in JEEP, Vol. 1, No. 2. And in closing, we have a book review by S. Alexander Hardison of Callum E. Cooper’s newest publication Conversations with Ghosts.

A warm thank you to all the authors and the review board members who continue to do great work. I hope you enjoy this newest publication of JEEP and come back for the next installment in December.

Best wishes,

Erika A. Pratte Editor

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Peer Reviewed Articles

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Heterodoxies’ Merging: Lacanian Approaches to Exceptional Experiences Renaud Evrard Abstract To intermix psychoanalysis with some apparently obscure issues (i.e., Exceptional Experiences, or ExE) is not something commonly wished. Indeed,ExE are not a foreground subject in Lacanian psychoanalysis. But, as for Freud, the topic has been mainly addressed through the notion of "telepathy." Lacan approached this topic both in his theory and his clinical practice: examples discussed in this article came from the debate on intersubjectivity, and on the place of Freud’s occultism in the psychoanalytic field; and, for the clinical practice, with the telepathic delusion of Gérard Primeau. Freud and Lacan argued that, in some ways, telepathy can’t be a psychoanalytic object because it’s out-of-language. But their arguments for extraterritoriality are limited.

Lacanian approaches of ExE however became a fruitful topic of discussion in the 1970s, because the Lacanian clinical criteria that help to distinguish between neurosis, psychosis, and perversion, also help to disentangled “psychosis” and “paranormality.”

Keywords: Jacques Lacan, exceptional experiences, psychoanalysis, psychosis, intersubjectivity, Jean-Claude Maleval, Pascal Le Maléfan

Psychoanalysis is not famous for its alliance with parapsychology, despite some recent contributions along this line (Méheust, 2006, 2007). However, at many times, its history crosses with the field of psychical research, starting with Sigmund Freud’s fascination with this topic (Moreau, 1976), which includes the interest of many of his close disciples (Rabeyron & Evrard, 2012; Evrard & Rabeyron, 2012).

But there is a psychoanalytical movement whose relationship to parapsychology is mostly unknown: Lacanian psychoanalysis. Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) is not known for having openly addressed this subject, although he did in his famous Séminaire. Followers of Lacan also generally kept their distance with the paranormal, even though they consider themselves subversive intellectuals (e.g., the book by Granoff & Rey, 2005; or the interventions of the showman Gérard Miller, 2005). Nevertheless, some of them addressed the issue of exceptional experiences (ExE) in an original and fruitful way. In this article, I will attempt to show their unique journey and what it could bring to a psychology of ExE. Lacan, Psi and Intersubjectivity In 1953, Lacan began his seminars that would make him famous in the post-WWII intellectual world.

He returned to Freud’s psychoanalysis trying to avoid its misapplication (for example, as in “egopsychology”) by mixing psychoanalysis with the structuralist movement thereby giving birth to controversy in the psychoanalytic community. In this context, he criticized such notions as “intersubjectivity,” which refers to the register of the Imaginary; he then moved onto articulating the Symbolic register, before approaching the role of the Real at the end of the Séminaire. It was during a session of the second year of his Séminaire (sessions of the 23rd and 30th of March, 1955) that he addressed this issue through an example borrowed from Edgar Allan Poe (Lacan, 1978, p. 211-214).

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology The lesson was about a game where an individual must guess whether another person hid in his/her hand an even or odd number of balls. In Poe’s story, a child was able to guess each time if the answer was even or odd. How to explain this? The child said he identifies himself with the other person to the extent so as to guess his/her thoughts. The narrator concluded there was a divination through detailed observation and appreciation of the opponent (so-called “cold reading”). Lacan stopped there to tell his students that this mode of reasoning raised a number of issues.

Renaming “ego-mimicry” or “psychological insight” the underlying process supposedly used by the child, he said that this psychological interpretation is based on intersubjectivity. Then Lacan argued against this reasoning in several steps: the child must guess whether his opponent will put in his hand a number of balls equal to the previous trial. For example, if at the first trial, the opponent has two balls (even), at the second trial, the child can think that the other may change (odd). But the opponent may also try to trap him by keeping the same number of balls (even). It’s true that we have an issue here: it’s a forced choice between two possible answers, each possibly motivated by an infinity of reasons. Is this intersubjectivity or something else?

Lacan’s answer is surprising: “Something like divination may be used there, a problematic divination of the subject in a kind of sympathetic relationship with the opponent. It’s not excluded that such a child – who guessed more often than we can expect by chance alone, what we should define as a success – has once existed.

But the substance of the issue lies in another register: the imaginary intersubjectivity.” 1 Then, what is the question? Could it also be in the registry of psi? Indeed, such a divination game looks like an ESP experiment.

If one eliminates the normal sensory channels, a child whose hits exceeded chance’s expectancy could be taken as a psi gifted subject. But this is unthinkable for Lacan: “The inter-psychological experience, I do not consider it excluded there, but it fits into the fragile framework of the imaginary relation with the other, and is suspended to that uncertainty. Within this context, the experience is completely vanishing. It can’t be put into logic.”2 Lacan then turned to another path - one that would fit into logic and would appeal to the structure of language. He used another example: what if the same game is played between the child and a machine? If we find coincidences, if the child wins against the machine – or if the machine wins more than what we can expect by chance alone – should we rely on the “symbolic efficiency” of Lévi-Strauss (1958)? But, in this case, “Can we think that the symbolic efficiency is due to the human? All our discourse here calls this into question.”3 Then Lacan asked his students to simply and concretely play this game during his lesson. He thus taught highlighting the opposite of symbolic efficiency; that is to say, the Symbolic inertia of the unconscious subject. He took these experiments seriously, encouraging his students to give him their results at the end of the meeting. But the scene that happened was not quite to his liking. One student (Octave Mannoni) actually achieved a huge amount of success and explained that his method was based on “random” answers, i.e., his answers were derivate from imaginary or real series of signs (e.g., saying “even” for each vowel, and “odd” for each consonant, in the words written on the board). Lacan, somewhat puzzled, asked other students not to proceed in the same way.

1

My translation of : "Il se peut que s'exerce quelque chose comme une divination, d'ailleurs problématique, du sujet dans un certain rapport sympathique avec l'ad-versaire. Il n'est pas exclu qu'il ait existé, ce petit enfant qui gagnait plus souvent qu'à son tour - ce qui est la seule définition qu'on puisse don-ner du mot gagner en l'occasion. Mais le fond de la question se situe dans un tout autre registre que celui de l'intersubjectivité imaginaire."

2 My translation of "L'expé-rience interpsychologique, je ne la considère pas comme exclue en cette occasion, mais elle s'insère dans le cadre fragile du rapport imaginaire avec l'autre, et elle est suspendue à son incertitude même. A l'intérieur de ce cadre, l'expérience est complètement évanouissante. Elle n'est pas lo-gicisable."

3 My translation of "Peut-on penser que l'efficacité symbolique est due à l'homme ? Tout notre discours ici le met en question."

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology If we carefully follow what happened, it seems that Mannoni derived his correct answers from subjective clues, and then obtained improbable coincidences. The meeting of independent causal chains is the very definition of a coincidence. And intentional success in this case holds as a kind of anti-randomness that we can call “psi” to put it into parapsychological language. One may consider that Mannoni’s result wasn’t a convincing psi effect. Nevertheless, the logic of this experiment can lead to the production of such ostensibly nonrandom results. Lacan’s changing of the instructions in order to suppress Mannoni’s method was an indication of his difficulty to understand how and why Mannoni achieved such success.

Lacan, Psi and the Occult Another incident occurred much later, in the 1973 seminar entitled “The Nondupes Wander.”4 A sassy student dared to ask, before the start of the course: “What do you think of psi phenomena?” Lacan seemed to understand what “psi phenomena” refers to, and devoted two sessions of Le Séminaire to answer that question.5 To do this, he made a semantic shift from “psi” to “the occult.” It’s the same vague term that Freud had used for a variety of phenomena which he claimed, at first, to fight against; in a second time, around 1920, through several talks and articles, Freud had claimed being able to extract their rational core, namely: the thought transference or telepathy (Moreau, 1976).

Lacan therefore took the opportunity of this question to make Freud’s parapsychological excursion more congruent with psychoanalytic orthodoxy. A recent conference in Germany6 focused specifically on this topic and therefore allows us a better understanding of the underlying issues.

Lacan took up Freud’s arguments on thought transference where Freud left off. He reformulated them without adding any new thoughts. For Freud, telepathy is primarily a “non-analytical thing” which, after refinement, can become material for an unconscious processing. That’s why it must be taken into account by psychoanalysis; psychoanalytic deciphering could reveal it.

In his own way, Freud distinguished a different science studying these phenomena, outside the psychoanalytic field. Several arguments marked the extraterritoriality of telepathic phenomena: they seem to have a character of immediacy, of communication from thought to thought, without using language and, therefore, are not analyzable; and they seem to occur off-language, without any possible interpretative refinement, thus outside the psychoanalytic clinical framework. Thus, a purely telepathic dream will no longer be a dream, but “a telepathic event within a sleep condition.”

The description of telepathy chosen by Freud and Lacan excluded it from psychoanalytic theory, without creating any amendment as for the analyzable and uninterpretable nature of the death instinct or for the novelty of the telepathy dream. It even built a “watertight boundary between psychoanalysis and telepathy” (Turnheim, 2008) to protect the psychoanalysis of a possible challenge based on telepathy, considered at worst as a secondary intrusion in the analytic space. Even if Freud admitted that telepathic phenomena might potentially subvert the scientific model, according to him, psychoanalysis would still be safe. If there is telepathy in dreams, the psychoanalytic theory of dreams will remain valid. Turnheim understood these reThis title “Les Non-dupes Errent” is a play on words with the French expression “The Names-of-the-Father,” a famous concept of Lacan.

5 All following quotes are from this unpublished seminar.

6 From 17 to 20 May, 2007, was held in Dhaun, Germany, a Franco-German psychoanalytic conference on “The Limits of Interpretability – Die Grenzen der Deutbarkeit,” from the title of one of the three supplements of Freud’s final Traumdeutung. Lacan evoked and commented on this text, and on the third supplement “The occult meaning of dreams” (Die okkulte Bedeutung des Traumes) in Lessons 2 and 3 of the seminar “Les non-dupes errent" (lessons from November 20 and December 11, 1973). The real topic of that conference was the relationship between psychoanalysis and occultism.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology marks as “self-reassuring,” hiding a more complex problem. A different description of telepathy, closer to what is observed in the analytic situation, would bring another construction of psychoanalysis in its relationship with science (Turnheim, 2008; Evrard & Rabeyron, 2012).

In his Séminaire, Lacan taught that the limits of psychoanalysis are to be found “in the symbolic function, that is to say […] language.” Any phenomenon that cannot be grasped from the Symbolic order does not concern psychoanalysis. If telepathy is actually a pure thought-to-thought transmission, then it is excluded.

One can say that Lacan radicalized the Freudian argument of an outside-language and therefore outsidelistening telepathy.

The second Freudian argument of immediacy is also enriched by Lacan: the telepath who says “I know he/she knows” would only objectify the unconscious. What differentiates the psychoanalyst is that this objectification of the unconscious requires, for him, a repeating: “I know he/she knows I know he/she knows.” A transferential mediation is then launched.

Again, as with Freud, we observed this quite fragile manner of redefining telepathy in such a way it can be excluded. It requires at first to talk about an off-language “pure telepathy,” an ideal phenomenon which does not correspond to what would be encountered in the analytic space, and which eventually could never be empirically attested. In a second step, telepathy is described as a poor interpersonal situation, animated by an objectifying desire, and thus implicitly contrary to the psychoanalytic ethics, whereas we don’t see why this necessary repeating of thought could not take place with everyone.

In his commentary on the Lacanian discussion on the occult, Pierre Bruno (2007) noted that Lacan was more radical than Freud in the construction of a boundary between psychoanalysis and the occult. According to Lacan, “there is nothing common between the unconscious and the occult.” Freud may have erred, or worse, he made a mistake when thinking that the scientific discourse had to handle “all facts.” Against appearances, Lacan could claim that the occult is not a set of hidden facts, something that make a hole in the psychoanalytic theory. It is not hidden, Lacan said, it is “elsewhere.”

Yet Lacan maintained, against Ernest Jones’ opinion, that the chapters on dream and occultism should have been included in the supplements of the final version of the Traumdeutung in 1930, following Freud’s wish. Indeed, Lacan found some theoretical interest in them, supporting his thesis of a mathematizable structuration of the desire. Thus he sought – always in his epistemological claim – to wash Freud of the suspicion that Jones maintained: Freud’s interest in the occult was not an outlet of scientific discourse. Two safeguards are summoned to show that Freud was epistemologically sane: Freud did not accept the resurrection after death; and he didn’t believe that the elements of the future could be calculated. These remarks from Lacan are incongruous: one could still find many other occult beliefs that Freud didn’t endorse. But when are Freud’s beliefs "rational" and when are they "irrational?" Lacan’s selection is quite arbitrary.

Lacan’s conclusion on telepathy confirmed Freud’s: this phenomenon recognized by Freud (Lacan therefore didn’t posit himself) is material in the construction of dreams, not a mechanism of dreams. This claim is quite disturbing. If telepathy is not a mechanism of the psychic apparatus, then it belongs to a different domain based on other laws, such as physics for example. It would be a more fundamental phenomenon, not only associated with psychological functions that could modulate it. Thus, the telepathic content would arise as a hetero-psychic material in the dream; it should float in the atmosphere, breaking in during sleep, but probably also during vigilant states of consciousness. In sum, with so much detachment of telepathy from the understanding of the human psyche, one build a phenomenon difficult to integrate, which reinforces some delusive ideas about telepathically sent or received messages without any moderating mental barrier.

Bruno (2007), following Lacan, added two consequences. First, that the occult would always be con-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology nected with transference phenomena. Second, that the question of the occult cannot be resolved through an initiation (conceived as a science of the jouissance), but through the pass (a Lacanian model of transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge). In sum, Bruno looked for a middle ground in order to not shrink from a possible real of telepathy, while avoiding too much wandering into the occult field. Bruno said explicitly that the occult issue is “always perilous and definitely a little fishy.” Rather than sliding face into it, one must address it as part of transference and the pass, and thus ensure that telepathy is not a kind of spiritual intrusion into psychoanalysis. In short, psychoanalysts are advised to maintain Freud’s ambivalence and dissonance, so formulated

by Lacan: “He was dupe of the real, even if he didn’t believe in it”7 (11 December 1973).

The Clinical Impasse?

Lacan’s comments have an echo in clinical practice (see Rigal, 2007), which shows well how the closure to the dimension of psi may lead to an impasse. In 1976, during the clinical presentation of Gérard Primeau, Lacan described a psychosis that reinforced Lacanian theory by using a point of strangeness: the patient claimed to have telepathic and levitation experiences. Indeed, the case of Primeau involved great psychotic thinking about his patronym; about the registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real; about his obsession with language as a poet identifying himself with some difficult authors (Nietzsche, Artaud, Mallarmé, Roussel, Novalis and… Lacan!); about a morbid family environment with a missing father and an anguished mother; about the position of the subject in the center of a new and lonely world, perceived by him as limitless; about intrusive auditory hallucinations, very similar to Paul Schreber’s ones; and also with questioning regarding becoming-woman. In short, virtually all aspects of the logic of psychoses such as articulated by Lacan (Maleval, 2000).

It is interesting to see how Lacan suggested the patient make his ideas explicit, even going so far as to attempt to contradict himself or to show him his own contradictions. This case is so compliant at the doctrinal level – Lacan would even speak of a “Lacanian psychosis,” and the patient having read his Ecrits (1966) – that it begs the question of a transference relationship which echoed Lacan’s theory of transference regarding “occultism,” especially with Lacan’s insistence on the fact there is no way he is a “telepathic receiver.” Lacan was very influential at this period, both on his followers, his critics, and his patients (Borch-Jacobsen, 1991).

Maybe he tried to deny his magico-religious charisma so that psychoanalysis keep its scientific prestige?

Lacan gave a poor prognosis for this case: Gérard Primeau is desperate – to the extent he attempted to kill himself – by the feeling that his thoughts are heard outside through telepathy, which he perceived on the faces and attitudes of people he crossed. This is a common symptom in psychotic disorders, but Primeau interpreted it as a gift of “emitting telepathy.” Through these means, Primeau took the role of a telepathic agent, an agent of his delusion, although there were “no messages” transmitted, as he said. Lacan admitted during his presentation that he didn’t know how to work clinically with such cases, because “this is a clinical description that was never shown, even in the good clinical school as the one of Chaslin.”8 Therefore there is a lack of clinical elaboration on the relationship between psychosis and paranormality, and Lacan ended his presentation by inviting further consideration on the matter.

7 8

My translation of "Il était dupe du réel même s’il n’y croyait pas ."

My translation of “C’est un tableau que l’on ne nous a pas décrit, même dans les bonnes cliniques comme Chaslin.”

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology The Lacanian Clinical Practice with Exceptional Experiences Lacanian psychoanalysis seemed doomed to miss a dialogue with the field of parapsychology. But it turns out that in France, during the 1970s, two intellectual movements experienced a spike of interest after the historical civil unrest and social movement of May 1968 in France: parapsychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Many students were then passionate for both movements and tried to make the junction. Their works were received in the same way as Nandor Fodor’s attempt to build a bridge between parapsychology and Freudian psychoanalysis in the 1930s (Timms, 2012): there was a rejection from both sides.

For example, an article by Jean-Claude Maleval on magic, in an anthropological and Lacanian perspective, was rejected by the board of reviewers of the Revue de Parapsychology, the organ of the Groupe d’études et de recherches en parapsychologie (archives of GERP; Evrard, 2010). Pascal Le Maléfan succeeded in publishing few articles with a more historical and clinical orientation in the same journal and in the Revue de Psychotronique, sometimes after some talks in parapsychological institutions (Le Maléfan, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1990), but his ideas were not discussed at the time. Other Lacanian psychoanalysts became interested in this topic but remained more discreet. Even if Lacanian psychoanalysis was at its peak, it remained highly controversial and could not be further compromised by an “against nature ” alliance with parapsychology. How could it be possible to merge these two heterodoxies?

Nonetheless, the connection between the two will come through one of the paths traced by these researchers: the clinical approaches to ExE. These clinicians had met many people who claimed to live paranormal events in and outside of clinical settings . In all cases, psychiatric models which assimilated these experiences with psychotic symptoms seemed to play out the prejudices of overpathologization.

In the 1970s, Maleval undertook a work that became the topic of his first book (Maleval, 1981): the study of “hysterical madness,” that is to say, the manifestations of hallucinations and delusions in neurotic subjects. Widely observed at the turn of the twentieth-century by many clinicians, including Freud and Pierre Janet, these phenomena were phagocytized by the entity “schizophrenia” because of its extremely blurred contours, and its major shortcoming: the assimilation of all kinds of “dissociations” (or altered consciousness) to psychotic processes (Le Maléfan, 1999).

Maleval (1981) rehabilitated the distinction between neurotic delirium and psychotic delusion. He reanalyzed some classical psychiatric cases and some psychoanalytic cases studies of his time in the light of this distinction, restoring a very precise semiology, allowing to correct some diagnostics and to apprehend more rigorously these cases, then awkwardly termed with such paradoxical denominations as “hysterical psychosis.”

Cases like that of the medium Hélène Smith, studied by Flournoy (1900), were chosen as prototypical examples of the “crepuscular hysteria.” Later, cases of people claiming to have been abducted by aliens, as those collected under hypnosis by the psychiatrist John Mack, were presented as exemplary cases of deliriums (Maleval & Charraud, 2003).

By reformulating the categories identified by Maleval, I proposed to call these manifestations of hallucinations and delusions in neurosis, “extraordinary neurosis” (Evrard, 2013). They constitute a limit of the “ordinary” neurotic structure, a wobble of the fundamental fantasy that usually structures the subject. However, these manifestations differ phenomenologically from hallucinations and delusions in psychosis, or “extraordinary psychosis” (Maleval, 2011). The differential diagnosis based on criteria from Lacanian clinical practice explains why one can see a continuum of ExE in two distinct sub-populations: people who integrate 9

My translation of : "à partir du sacrifice fondateur qui a privé le sujet d’être le phallus et d’une part de lui-même à jamais voilée."

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology them into a neurotic structure (post-traumatic issues, caught in a sexual fantasmatic structure, conditioned by the entrance into dissociative states, etc.); and people who integrate them into a psychotic organization (position of exception; suppletion to the open bite of the structure; telepathic persecution as a psychological intrusion of the signifier, etc.) (Evrard, 2014).

Let there be no mistake: these clinicians do not see psychopathology everywhere. They say nothing about apparently undisturbing ExE. But, when difficulties come with these experiences, they come to offer a wider range of diagnostics, instead of the psychosis diagnosis and its derivatives which tend to be prematurely and unjustifiably imposed. Moreover, even in psychosis, the paranormal can take on a different place from the usual deficit perspective. For instance, Anne Juranville studied possession (2001), clairvoyance and mediumship (2005) as products of a melancholic potentiality which used paranormal archetypes as socializing suppletion .

Clinical studies by Pascal Le Maléfan helped clarify further the mechanism that may be common to these extraordinary manifestations of neurosis: the (salutary) hallucinatory. His work explored a large number of ExE: telepathic or veridic hallucinations (Le Maléfan, 2008), mediumship (Le Maléfan, 1999), near-death experiences (Le Maléfan, 1992, 1995, 2010; Le Maléfan & Latreille, 2002), out-of-body experiences (Le Maléfan, 2005, 2011), and apparition experiences (Le Maléfan & Lemercier, 2012). Le Maléfan proposed a structural analysis, inspired by the works of Lacan and Allouch (2011) on mourning. Instead of the classical conception derived from a certain reading of Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917), the Lacanian concept of death made it a hole in the real, to which the subject responds by the projection of the phallic signifier at this place – phallus which will be sacrificed and then mourned in a second stage. This would be the inverse of the foreclosure, and therefore the opposite of a psychotic hallucination taken as a confrontation with a hole in the symbolic which revealed a defect in the structure.

In the near-death experience (Le Maléfan, 2010), the subject’s experience would be a form of hallucinatory activity that is “salutary” in the sense that it would support a revival of subjectivity in extreme critical situations where it, and the life itself, may disappear. These extreme situations are moments of wobbling or gap in the fundamental fantasy that structures the subject. Some subjects react by an elaboration responding to the traumatic real, but it’s not the case for everyone, and it’s not for all in the same manner. The persistent memory of the experience may take form as a “new origin point for the subject.” According to Le Maléfan, it’s not the subjectivity which changes, but some ego-instances in the personality, especially the ego ideal. The ExE then just adjust the structure of certain subjects through the imaginary register, as if the latter made suppletion by causing subjective reshuffles.

From this structural analysis of several ExE, for psychic structures that are not located on the psychosis side, one might generalize a typical process in extraordinary neurosis. It essentially would be a vacillation of the fundamental fantasy that structures the subject, caused by a hole in the real or extreme situations where the subject anticipates its own demise. A break occurs, for which the model of the paradigmatic rupture and its resolution (Mathijsen, 2010) could be just the cognitive facet. The hallucinatory instance is summoned to substantiate this rupture, during all the time of the vacillation of the fantasy, or extraordinary state of the neurotic structure. In some subjects, depending on their subjective construction, this rupture will result in egorearrangements introducing a new relationship to desire. This type of production is not automatic and is dependent on the manner of the desire – and therefore the fantasy – was constituted, “from a founding sacrifice which deprived the subject of being the phallus and of a forever veiled part of himself”9 (Le Maléfan, 2010).

This process would be salutary because it would allow a stabilization and a transformation of the fundamental fantasy that wobbled, joining the notion of a “paranormal solution” (Rabeyron, 2012).

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Conclusion In summary, our broad review of Lacanien approaches of ExE teach us several things: ExE are not a foreground subject in Lacanian psychoanalysis. But, as for Freud, the topic has been mainly addressed through the notion of "telepathy." Lacan approached this topic both in his theory and his clinical practice: examples discussed in this article came from the debate on intersubjectivity, and on the place of Freud’s occultism in the psychoanalytic field; and, for the clinical practice, with the telepathic delusion of Gérard Primeau. This review is far from exhaustive, and other examples may have been discussed, as Lacanian approach of mysticism and mystics.  Freud and Lacan argued that, in some ways, telepathy can’t be a psychoanalytic object because it’s out-oflanguage, but their arguments for extraterritoriality are limited.  However, Lacanian approaches to ExE became a topic of discussion in the 1970s, because the Lacanian clinical criteria that help to distinguish between neurosis, psychosis and perversion, also help to disentangled “psychosis” and “paranormality.” The description of a salutary hallucinatory process may help to overcome the overpathologization of ExE.



To intermix psychoanalysis with some apparently obscure issues (i.e., ExEs) is not something commonly wished, especially during these times of “crisis” it undergoes (at least in France). Some believe that this association between psychoanalysis and parapsychology could only be detrimental to the former, while others currently write the opposite (Méheust, 2006; Allouch, 2007).

It remains that parapsychology is still a discipline that can benefit from numerous perspectives, invigorating and regenerating it through a transdisciplinarity which allows it to adapt to many intellectual fashions.

This article shows that parapsychology was not an easy or even welcomed topic to discuss among Lacanian psychoanalysts, who generally preferred to ignore it. And yet it is quite possible that it contributes, through the clinical differential practice with ExE, the advancement of Lacanian theory in its identification of subjective expressions of neurosis and psychosis, going against a trend that urged some Lacanian psychoanalysts to study hallucinations and delusions only in the context of the psychotic structure. And in doing so, this merger benefitted the field of the psychology of ExEs through the sophisticated intellectual approach of Lacanian theory, which articulates its concepts in an extremely rigorous manner by extracting them from classical clinical descriptions, case studies and clinical monographs.

References Allouch, J. (2007). La psychanalyse est-elle un exercice spirituel ? Réponse à Michel Foucault. Paris: EPEL. Allouch, J. (2011). Érotique du deuil au temps de la mort sèche, 3ème édition [1ère édition : 1995]. Paris: E.P.E.L. Borch-Jacobsen, M. (1991). Lacan: The A bsolute Master. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bruno, P. (2007). L’occulte et le réel : critique de l’initiation. Psychanalyses, 10(3), 33-40.

Evrard, R. (2010). Parapsychology in France after May 1968: a history of the GERP. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 24(2), 283-294.

Evrard, R. (2013). Extraordinary Nevrosis: An Introduction. Researches in Psychoanalysis, 15, 78a-86a.

Evrard, R. (2014). Folie et Paranormal. V ers une clinique des expériences exceptionnelles. Rennes: Presses

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Evrard, R., & Rabeyron, T. (2012). Les psychanalystes et le transfert de pensée: enjeux historiques et actuels.

L'Evolution Psychiatrique, 77(4), 589-598.

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Freud, S. (1917). Mourning and Melancholia. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works, 237-258.

Granoff, W., & Rey, J.-M. (2005). La transmission de pensée [2 ed.]. Paris: PUF. Juranville, A. (2001). Figures de la possession : Actualité psychanalytique du démoniaque. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble Juranville, A. (2005). Voies de l’inspiration. Psychologie Clinique, 19, 45-60.

Lacan, J. (1978). Chapitre XV : Pair ou impair ? Au-delà de l’intersubjectivité. In Le Séminaire, livre II, “Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse”. Paris : Seuil.

Le Maléfan, P. (1984). Freud, Jung, Fodor. Histoires autour du mot “Poltergeist.” Revue de Parapsychologie, 17, 11-17.

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Le Maléfan, P. (1992). Tentative d’identification d’une expérience non-ordinaire. Approche structurale et différentielle des expériences de mort imminente. In E. Sarah-Mercier (dir.), La mort transfigurée (pp. 282293). Paris: Belfond.

Le Maléfan, P. (1995). Vécu de mort imminente et onirisme. Un chapitre inattendu de l’histoire de la psychologie dynamique. L’information psychiatrique, 8, 773-780.

Le Maléfan, P. (1999). Folie et spiritisme Histoire du discours psychopathologique sur la pratique du spiritisme, ses abords et ses avatars. 1850-1950. Paris: L’Harmattan.

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Le Maléfan, P. (2008). L'hallucination télépathique ou véridique dans la psychopathologie de la fin du XIXe siècle et du début du XXe siècle. L'Evolution Psychiatrique, 73(1), 15-40.

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Méheust, B. (2007). Spychanalyse, spichanalyse : de la rivalité à la reconnaissance réciproque? Colloque: Fonction psy et “réalité psychique,” Paris, 6 et 7 octobre 2007.

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Rabeyron, T. (2012). Psychopathological and Psychodynamic Approaches to Anomalous Experiences: The Concept of a Paranormal Solution. In C. Murray (Ed.), Mental Health and A nomalous Experiences (pp. 125-140). London: Nova Science Publishers.

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Rigal, E. (2007). Je ne parviens pas à m’identifier. http://www.apjl.org/spip.php?page=resu&id_article=202 Sauret, M.-J. (2008). Topologie, Religion, Psychanalyse. Psychanalyses, 11(1), 5-23.

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Biography Renaud Evrard is a clinical psychologist working in adult psychiatry and associate member at the psychology laboratory EA 3071 at the University of Strasbourg, France. In 2012, he obtained a Ph.D. in psychology at the University of Rouen, with a thesis on clinical differential practice with exceptional experiences. With Thomas Rabeyron, he co-founded in 2009 the Center for Information, Research and Counselling on Exceptional Experiences(www.circee.org).

University of Strasbourg 4 Rue Blaise Pascal 67081 Strasbourg, France evrardrenaud@gmail.com

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A State Cultivation Model Alexander De Foe

Abstract Research in the field of transpersonal psychology has made an instrumental contribution to academic and clinical attitudes toward altered states of consciousness (ASC); psychologists now more widely recognize that ASC can involve aspects of extraordinary human potential encompassing the “all-self,” rather than presuming that these experiences are indicative of psychopathological factors. Extraordinary human experiences thus tend to be explored from a phenomenological framework, as this approach highlights the potential of expanding the personal spectrum of consciousness. Rhea White’s Exceptional Human Experience (EHE) classification is a well-known workable framework for integrating praxis and theory in exceptional experience research. This paper proposes a model for cultivating EHEs, in line with White’s classification. Additional research avenues for developing the therapeutic cultivation and integration of EHEs are also considered.

Keywords: Exceptional experiences, transpersonal psychology, altered states of consciousness, extraordinary human experiences, Rhea White

Extraordinary human experiences, which often involve “peak states” (Harung, Heaton, Graff, & Alexander, 1996) and “transcendent states” (Mayer, 2000), have been associated with altered states of consciousness (ASC) in which one’s self/reality experience is transformed (Storm & Rock, 2009). White’s (1994) work on exceptional human potential highlighted the transpersonal nature of many ASC, her research marked a significant turning point in how scholars in the field of parapsychological science categorize these states. A broader range of researchers have since reformed their stance on ASC, from theorizing that such states are associated with pathological, anomalous, or paranormal events, toward considering particular ASC as glimpses of broader human potential and expanded consciousness (Dick, 2013; Palmer & Braud, 2002). Rhea White developed a comprehensive classification of transcendent experiences reported throughout literature (such as altered reality experiences and experiences with transcendental states of bliss), and formulated an umbrella concept, “Exceptional Human Experience” (EHE) to encapsulate over 500 variations of spiritual and transpersonal experiences.

Though EHEs can be reported in numerous significant or non-significant life circumstances, such experiences can often have a tremendous emotional and spiritual impact upon individuals (White, 1997). Myriad accounts in literature have shown that EHEs, such as out-of-body experiences (OBEs), for instance, can have a spiritual and existential impact, although these experiences do not necessarily correspond with particular external casual factors, and occur more broadly in the general population. However, it is worth noting that some EHEs occur in particular circumstances; for example, near-death experiences (NDEs) which can feature a characteristic of leaving one’s body, are, in most cases, reported after close encounters with death (Groth-Marnat, 1994). It is interesting to note that Greyson (1981) found some individuals report a spiritual transformation after having an NDE. In particular, Greyson reported that those who had suicidal tendencies experienced an inhibition of their inclination to re-attempt suicide after experiencing a newfound sense of inner peace in which Vol. 2 No. 1

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology their existential perspective had been altered post-NDE. OBEs and NDEs are both included in White’s EHE classification, and in light of this, it is worth considering that some scholars have argued clinicians ought to place greater emphasis on assisting patients in bringing about exceptional states of consciousness (without the trauma that often precedes experiences such as NDEs; see Twemlow, 1989). For example, Schenk (2006) developed a technique to induce NDE-related states of consciousness, however his method did not require a person to have an NDE. Schenk’s work involved the use of “waking dreams” in order to assist clients to recall and cultivate a similar state of consciousness, with a comparable phenomenological canvas, to that of an NDE or OBE. The “waking dream technique” involves a light trance combined with visualization in order to induce a hypnagogic state in which dreamlike imagery occurs. This state of consciousness (marked by predominant theta brainwave activity) can serve as a progressive means to having an OBE, or at minimum, experiencing partial characteristics of an OBE, such as a sense of floating or inner peace (De Foe, Van Doorn, & Symmons, 2013).

It is important to note here that the induction of certain states of consciousness cannot be considered in isolation of one’s personal degree of self awareness. Although approaches such as Schenk’s (2006) waking dream technique were developed with the aim of cultivating a certain state of consciousness (i.e., in that case, a waking dream state), it would be detrimental to consider such techniques as causal triggers in light of the subjective nature of EHEs. Brown (2000) argued that EHEs cannot be replicated on a demand-basis, as each experience is subjective and unique to the individual reporting it. Brown proposed that EHEs can be conceptualized as transcendent experiences in which a degree of integration into one’s personal frame of reference must occur in order for an individual to recognize these states as encounters with a broader Self-experience. An inward-focused approach that emphasizes the impact of an EHE on one’s internal experience is thus beneficial in regard to the consideration of potential factors that could help induce and accentuate certain EHEs. To further this point, EHEs can be considered intrinsic to one’s progressive spiritual development, rather than singular, isolated experiences that occur in a seeming random fashion (Brown, 2000). Brown noted that EHEs tend to occur in progressing degrees of intensification, and a failure to integrate these experience can lead to cognitive dissonance or a rejection of an EHE outright, whilst positive integration occurs when one “accepts, assimilates, and integrates all life experience into a coordinated, authentic collective representation of self” (p. 83). Brown further suggested that EHEs contribute to one’s spiritual connectedness and understanding in an active and integrated manner. Likewise, EHEs can often contribute to the development of one’s experience of the all-self, and a connection with broader consciousness states. Thus, it is suggested here that the degree of integration of an EHE, as well as its overall personal impact, are essential considerations in the potential cultivation of future instances of such states of consciousness. It is also worth noting that an EHE can re-occur on numerous instances, as a person begins to integrate the experience in a progressive fashion.

Though research has highlighted a general association between ASC and EHEs (see Rao & Palmer, 1987, for instance), further research should consider the factors that permit the effective cultivation of EHEs within therapeutic frameworks. For example, Rao and Palmer noted that certain conditions are conducive to the cultivation of EHEs in which extra-sensory perception (ESP) has a greater likelihood of occurring. These authors stipulated that meditation and relaxation practices are conducive to bringing about ESP (such as telepathic communication or precognitive ability) in subjects (two of the EHEs included in White’s classification).

This suggests that certain factors such as relaxation, meditation, trance-work and visualization could be effective in cultivating a transpersonal state of consciousness conducive to the occurrence and re-occurrence of certain EHEs. On that point, it should be noted that numerous techniques aim to induce ASC in a direct manner, but

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology these tend to relate to external induction factors rather than internal processes. For example, ShannahoffKhalsa (2004) proposed a series of Kundalini Yoga practices and poses in order to facilitate cathartic emotional release. Likewise, Gelkopf and Meyerson (2004) utilized guided visualization practice to induce OBEs. Further, there are numerous techniques to induce an ASC such as an OBE, remote viewing experience, lucid dreaming, and so forth, in the New Age literature.

Rather than endeavoring to explore a specific technique for cultivating a state of consciousness conducive to EHEs, this paper aims to address the question of which phenomenological factors assist with integrating and expanding the personal/transpersonal impact of EHEs in general. This paper proposes a pilot “State Cultivation Model” (SCM) in order to address this question. As part of this model, EHEs can be considered experiences that occur within one’s frame of transpersonal experience, rather than products of external stimuli.

The pilot SCM thus emphasizes the personal nature of EHEs and one’s potential to cultivate these states of consciousness. In line with prior research (i.e., Brown, 2000; White, 1997) this model therefore emphasizes the process, rather than technique,-oriented nature of EHEs in terms of a person’s degree of self-realization and spiritual progression.

State Cultivation The notion of a “state” of consciousness can be defined here based on Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) theory, in which a specific experience is defined as an occurrence that stands out in some manner from the consistent flow of consciousness known as continual-life-experience. Though methods such as IPA provide a research-oriented framework for experience-states, the notion is transferrable to praxis. For example, a person who has had an OBE might refer to an OBE-state when discussing the essential “quality” of their experience, which emphasizes and distinguishes this experience from a wakeful state of consciousness.

Yet, over time, insights and experiences learned from EHEs such as OBE can be integrated into one’s overall wakeful state of consciousness. This suggests that whilst exceptional states of consciousness might appear discrete and isolated occurrences, it is important to consider EHEs on a consciousness continuum.

Based on “Emergence Theory” (Sawyer, 2002), certain states of consciousness appear to occur via internal processes, rather than being induced via external processes. This contradicts the basic assumptions of a reductionist model, in which it is more important for a researcher or practitioner to locate the specific exterior cause of an EHE. The pilot SCM instead encourages practitioners to explore client EHEs from a phenomenological stance. Phenomenological research methods such as IPA highlight the inherent value of direct human experience and its relation to transcendental states of being. The process of focusing on the phenomenal (or most impactful being-state) qualities of an EHE permits a person to immerse themselves in a certain state of consciousness to a much greater degree.

Therefore, the foundational emphasis introduced here is based on the direct experience of the EHE that a patient or client has reported. The meta-content, or social constructs associated with such an experience are not as relevant as the inherent value of the experience itself. Following, all linguistic interpretations, cognitive beliefs, and contrived ideologies (i.e., spiritual or religious connotations that might be inferred from certain EHEs) must be put aside in favor of the direct experience reported.

EHEs can be considered life-enhancing experiences, facilitating a connection with one’s broader self (or all-self). Yet, as mentioned earlier, an individual must be willing to consider how such experiences contribute or conflict with their life narrative, in order to engage with and integrate the EHE(s) (White, 1997). The denial or rejection of an EHE can be noted in cases in which a person finds it difficult to integrate the experi-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology ence into their belief frameworks (Brown, 2000). For example, it is well known that kundalini awakening experiences (experiences in which a person experiences ego-loss and connection with a broader “cosmic” consciousness) have been associated with pathological states (i.e., psychotic episodes) in patients who have not integrated the EHE into their self-concept (Valanciute & Thampy, 2011). During such instances, a clash of worldviews occurs, as Brown (2000) described it, and the individual is unable to reconcile their EHE with their existing cognitive framework and personal beliefs about the world.

Following from this, in the pilot SCM, it is important for practitioners to first render their focus on the inherent value of an EHE, rather than striving to enforce the cognitive definitions about the experience (which can serve to further cognitive dissonance as old and new worldviews clash). Basic definitions such as “extraordinary” or “exceptional” can even cause detriment in this process, as individuals who have persistent EHEs often find that such experiences become integrated into their broader Self-experience and are no longer perceived as exceptional at all, but rather as intrinsic to self, their exceptional nature thus becomes normalized to some extent (White, 1994; 1997). Hence, although integrating EHEs into one’s personal life experience is an essential step in Brown’s (2000) approach, as a foundational basis of the SCM practitioners are advised to minimize post-hoc assessment or judgment from the outset, and instead to facilitate the embodied experience of the EHE. It is possible to introduce discussion on how the EHE(s) has/have impacted on one’s personal life narrative at a later time (after the phenomenological impact of the being-state has been explored and emphasized).

In addition to an overarching focus on the inherent value of experiencing, focusing, and emphasizing the phenomenological nature of an EHE, this pilot model includes three proposed stages for cultivating the phenomenological qualities of EHEs in a clinical framework. Clinicians are encouraged to; Emphasize the presence of a continuous, rather than discrete state of being  Emphasize the causation as intrinsic to self  Emphasize the phenomenological impact of the experience 

In line with Brown’s (2000) conceptualization of EHEs as progressive experiences, the SCM is thus proposed here as a process-oriented approach to facilitate client-therapist discussion after, rather than during, an EHE account. However, this model could also be applied during the commencement of an EHE in order to guide and encourage a patient to cultivate a particular state of consciousness.

In the first stage of SCM, practitioners are encouraged to emphasize the presence of a continuous, rather than discrete state of being. The practitioner recognizes that an EHE is not a discrete random event, but rather a meaningful experience in the patient’s life and progressive spiritual development. This notion been inferred in prior literature, but this should be made more explicit in praxis and clinical dialogue.

Following from this, in the second stage, the practitioner emphasizes the causation of an EHE as intrinsic to the patient’s personal experience. The aim here is to highlight that the experience has an inextricable role in broadening the patient’s personal self-awareness, as well as the patient’s broader transpersonal connection.

Rather than defining the experience as an outlier, exception, anomalous event, hallucination, or non-significant event, practitioners are encouraged to recognize the EHE (no matter how minor or major from the patient’s account) as an essential aspect of the patient’s personal and spiritual development.

Kohls and Walach (2006) noted that those who have EHEs can disown the potential value of their experiences at first, attempting to explain their encounter with a broader Self-experience as a mere hallucination or distorted world experience, discrediting its inherent value. At first, patients might ask questions such as

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology “what happened?”, “was it real?”, “what caused this?” and so forth, with the aim of understanding an external cause that triggered the experience. During this stage, it is critical that practitioners reassure the patient that the EHE was not separate or somehow external from their frame of reference (i.e., that it was imagined or somehow unreal). As EHEs can expand one’s frame of personal reference, it is important to consider the importance of owning and integrating an experience as an aspect of one’s broader Self-awareness. From such a stance, practitioners highlight the internal, rather than external, origin of an EHE(s).

During the final stage, in line with prior EHE frameworks (such as Brown’s, 2000 EHE process), practitioners emphasize the phenomenological impact of the experience. The patient is encouraged to focus on the overall feeling and being-state associated with the experience (rather than intellectualizing the experience). In line with IPA approaches, the aim is to derive the conscious essence of the experience without cognitive judgment or presumption about its implications. Here, practitioners can utilize a number of supporting techniques such as encouraging the patient to focus, expand, and work toward an embodiment of the experience (the use of other clinical approaches such as Rogerian counselling and Gestalt embodiment techniques are suggested here as two potential supporting techniques). This process is intended to cultivate a state of experience conducive to bringing to the forefront of one’s consciousness the EHE, as well as facilitating the integration of the experience.

Note, the final stage is facilitated in conjunction with the prior two steps (recognizing that the experience is an integral aspect of one’s self-consciousness, and recognizing the experience as having arisen within one’s personal frame of life experience, rather than as a result of an external causation). It should also be noted these three steps are not intended as linear processes, but rather circular process that can be utilized in various orders and repetitions as required in each individual case until the experience is cultivated and integrated.

Example: OBEs One example area that the SCM could be applied in is that of OBE cases. De Foe (2012) posited that not all OBEs are exceptional experiences, though some OBEs can be classified as EHEs. An OBE can contain two particular phenomena; first, a perceptual experience of leaving one’s body, and second, an emotional and spiritual dimension of experience, the latter often relating to an EHE (De Foe et al., 2013). The first aspect is intrinsic to the defining characteristics of the OBE, whereas the second aspect does not occur in all cases. As some OBEs encompass transcendent experiences, De Foe (2012) argued that it is beneficial to cultivate, in a wakeful state of consciousness, the spiritual and transcendent qualities of these experiences. De Foe (2012) canvassed a number of techniques which involved a patient focusing the emotional and spiritual aspects of their transcendent OBE(s). De Foe also argued that an OBE state of consciousness can be brought about with the use of interpersonal dialoguing, exploring in depth the personal significance of the experience (using Rogerian listening skills), as well as the use of guided visualization (see also Schenk, 2006).

In line with the SCM, three considerations should be made in terms of the OBE example above (considered here in terms of the three processes proposed in the above section). Based on stage 1 (emphasize the presence of a continuous, rather than discrete state of being), transcendent OBEs would be considered as aspects of one’s continuous spiritual and life experience. This is consistent with the research that Levitan and LaBerge (1991) conducted, which demonstrated that in certain OBEs and lucid dreams a person can find themselves exploring a broader realm of experience in each occurrence of their lucid dreams/OBEs (comparable to a dream narrative that unfolds over several nights). Thus, OBEs can be regarded as progressive with each occurrence, in terms of one’s spiritual emergence and development. New Age literature is rife with anecdotes in

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology which participants experience an OBE and find it difficult to move or explore aspects of the OBE-world on first instance, but in future instances find it easier to learn new skills such as interacting with other realms/ beings during their OBEs (a broad range of non-academic literature that has documented these accounts can be alluded to, not limited to the work of Robert Bruce, Graham Nicholls, or William Buhlman, for instance).

In stage 2 (emphasize the causation as intrinsic to self) it should be noted that although OBErs might seek an explanation as to which external factors caused their experience to come about, it is important to highlight that their OBE occurred from within their frame of consciousness, and was not triggered via an external event (an external event could have had a role, but the emphasis on the inner experience is paramount here).

Some scholars have also suggested that although during an OBE, a person appears to travel out of their body, these experiences should be considered as an “in-body” experiences of exploring one’s internal world (Thalbourne & Houran, 2000). Such a perspective is useful in considering EHEs more broadly as experiences that occur within one’s frame of reference, even though their manifestations might appear external and linked to exterior influences. The value of perceiving EHEs, such as transcendent OBEs, as self-produced, also offers an empowering starting point for cultivating such experiences in future.

The third stage (emphasize the phenomenological impact of the experience) can include techniques such as guided visualization to assist the patient in their recollection of their prior OBE(s) (in particular, what the experience/state felt like), as well as therapeutic dialoging in order to cultivate the essence of the OBEstate.

It is argued here that the SCM can be applied in this fashion to a number of EHEs, in particular, those in which an individual (1) reports an intermittent connection with broader Self-consciousness and has expressed a desire to develop this connection within a therapeutic framework, (2) is willing to recognize the experience as an intrinsic aspect of their conscious self, rather than the product of an external cause, and (3) is willing and prepared to cultivate aspects of that state within a therapeutic framework.

Discussion This paper challenged a number of assumptions prevalent in a materialist-reductionist approach to ASC in which such states are considered as discrete, anomalous phenomena that must be cultivated within rigorous scientific conditions. An alternative model, emphasizing the transcendent role of ASC, was proposed in line with transpersonal literature. The pilot SCM encapsulates certain exceptional experiences as fundamental to a patient’s spiritual emergence and progression. It was argued that such consciousness states arise within one’s personal frame of awareness and can be cultivated in therapeutic sessions in which a patient feels comfortable exploring the phenomenological aspects of their experience(s) in more depth.

This cultivation approach has a number of benefits from a research stance, foremost as a patient’s direct experience is considered more important than the objectively observable phenomena associated with EHEs. The issue of replication is too well-known in the realm of parapsychological science, and some scholars have cited that certain individuals appear to have a greater predisposition for demonstrating psi effects (observable processes that can relate to EHEs, such as telepathic communication or mind-over-matter phenomena) (Irwin, 2000; Rao & Palmer, 1987). In that sense, transpersonal models such as the SCM could have a future role in explaining the lack of observable replicable psi effects (in light of the fact that EHEs appear to be individually-manifested, rather than on-demand experiences, that occur contingently based on one’s personal degree of spiritual development and predisposition).

The pilot SCM is limited in that it is mainly based on White’s classification. Future revisions should

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology incorporate other classifications, such as Fach’s (2011) representation of EHEs based on self-model and worldmodel anomalies. Fach argued that EHEs can consist of internal or external manifestations. Further, Fach developed a definition of “dissociative EHEs,” which occur when diffusion in one’s conscious experience can be noted, this is most common when a discord between one’s self-model and world-model is noted. Although this description bears some resemblance to Brown’s (2000) process of experience integration, a closer evaluation of how the SCM could accommodate alternative EHE frameworks would serve to strengthen the model, in particular with an exploration of how dissociative (or disorienting) experiences could be best integrated into one’s self-concept as part of the process.

In conclusion, future EHE research should explore further the precipitating factors and maintaining factors relevant to EHEs. At present, scholars consider EHEs as remarkable, outstanding facets of human consciousness (i.e., rare states of experience). Additional research would serve to normalize these experiences as alternative (rather than exceptional) states of consciousness. This would be consistent with the SCM proposed here, as patients are encouraged to integrate EHEs into the all-self, rather than perceiving them as discrete, external phenomena. However, more work is required to first evaluate this model in research and praxis frameworks, with a particular focus on specific transcendent experiences, as well as more parsimonious classifications of EHE that consider the integration of dissociative/disorienting experiences.

References Brown, S. V. (2000). The exceptional human experience process: a preliminary model with exploratory map.

International Journal of Parapsychology, 11(1), 69-111.

De Foe, A. (2012). How should therapists respond to client accounts of out-of-body experience?. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 31(1), 75-82.

De Foe, A., Van Doorn, G. H., & Symmons, M. A. (2013). Floating sensations prior to sleep and out-of-body experiences. Journal of Parapsychology, 77(2), 271-280.

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Fach, W. (2011). Phenomenological aspects of complementarity and entanglement in exceptional human experiences (ExE). A xiomathes, 21(2), 233-247.

Gelkopf, M., & Meyerson, J. (2004). Therapeutic utilization of spontaneous out-of-body experiences in hypnotherapy. A merican Journal of Psychotherapy, 58(1), 90-102.

Greyson, B. (1981). Near-death experiences and attempted suicide. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 11, 10-16.

Groth-Marnat, G. (1994). Cross-cultural perspectives on the near-death experience. A ustralian Parapsychological Review, 19, 7-11.

Harung, H. S., Heaton, D. P., Graff, W. W., & Alexander, C. N. (1996). Peak performance and higher states of consciousness: A study of world-class performers. Journal of managerial psychology, 11(4), 3-23.

Irwin, H. J. (2000). The disembodied self: An empirical study of dissociation and the out-of-body experience.

Journal of Parapsychology, 64(3), 261-278.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Mayer, J. D. (2000). Spiritual intelligence or spiritual consciousness?. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 10(1), 47-56.

Palmer, G., & Braud, W. (2002). Exceptional human experiences, disclosure, and a more inclusive view of physical, psychological, and spiritual well-being. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 34(1), 29-61.

Rao, K. R., & Palmer, J. (1987). The anomaly called psi: Recent research and criticism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10(04), 539-551.

Sawyer, R. K. (2002). Emergence in psychology: Lessons from the history of non-reductionist science. Human Development, 45(1), 2-28.

Schenk, P. W. (2006). The hypnotic use of waking dreams: exploring near-death experiences without the flatlines. Williston, VT: Crown House Publishing Ltd. Shannahoff-Khalsa, D. S. (2004). An introduction to Kundalini yoga meditation techniques that are specific for the treatment of psychiatric disorders. The Journal of A lternative & Complementary Medicine, 10 (1), 91-101.

Storm, L., & Rock, A. J. (2009). Imagery cultivation vs. noise reduction: Shamanic-like journeying as a psiconducive alternative to the ganzfeld protocol. A ustralian Journal of Parapsychology, 9(1), 5-31.

Thalbourne, M. A., & Houran, J. (2000). Transliminality, the Mental Experience Inventory and tolerance of ambiguity. Personality and Individual Differences, 28(5), 853-863.

Twemlow, S. W. (1989). Clinical approaches to the out-of-body experience. Journal of Near-Death Studies, 8 (1), 29-43.

Valanciute, A., & Thampy, L. A. (2011). Physio Kundalini syndrome and mental health. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 14(8), 839-842.

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White, R. A. (1997). Dissociation, narrative, and exceptional human experience. In S. Krippner & S. Powers (Eds.), Broken images, broken selves: Dissociative narratives in clinical practice (pp. 88–121). Washington, DC: Brunner-Mazel.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank both reviewers and the Editor for the most helpful feedback and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

Biography Alexander De Foe is a PhD Candidate at Monash University’s Psychological Studies Department. His doctoral research centers on out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and body ownership illusions.

Alexander De Foe Wellington Rd & Blackburn Rd, Clayton VIC 3800, Australia enquiries@exceptionalpotential.com

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Clarification of Terms and Concepts Defining Parapsychology and Related Disciplines: Comments on Mathijsen (2009, 2013), Abrassart (2013), and Evrard (2013) Michael Tremmel

Abstract This article comments on a discussion among Mathijsen (2009, 2013), Abrassart (2013), and Evrard (2013) and their usage of terms. Although Mathijsen’s article (2009) purports to be exclusively about research into paranormal beliefs, it cites several articles from a debate about parapsychology’s research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena. Although Mathijsen called it an epistemological debate, ontological questions are addressed based on empiricism, which suggests to call it an ontological debate. Parapsychologists’ definition of the paranormality of paranormal experiences and phenomena is narrower than the definition of the paranormality of paranormal beliefs. Paranormal experiences and phenomena are defined as in principle explicable by science, which makes ostensibly paranormal experiences and phenomena legitimate objects of research. The terms (para-)psychic, parapsychological, paranormal, and psi differ in their connotations. The term anomalous is not synonymous with these terms as it means deviating from what is standard, common, normal, usual, or expected. The term anomalous experiences, as used by Abrassart, relates to the discipline of anomalistic psychology, which, however, is exclusively concerned with subjectively anomalous experiences instead of the full range of anomalous experiences. The term exceptional experiences, as used by Evrard, is neither synonymous with psychic experiences, paranormal experiences, and so forth, nor ideologically neutral as it connotes subjectivity and specialness. The concept underlying it neither applies to all phenomenological approaches in parapsychology nor should be the only basis for approaches in clinical parapsychology. Researchers should use terms and concepts mindfully as they influence research to a great extent.

Keywords: Abnormal psychology, anomalistic psychology, anomalous, clinical parapsychology, conceptualization, definition, epistemology, exceptional experiences, objectivity versus subjectivity, parapsychology Introduction

A discussion of things paranormal, anomalous, and exceptional has been ongoing in the previous issues of this journal. Mathijsen (2009) suggested that the study of the paranormal should abandon the epistemological debate related to it and refocus on individual experiences. Abrassart (2013) held that this suggestion implied that psychological research should stand outside the ontological debate about paranormal phenomena and should be limited to paranormal beliefs and the phenomenology of anomalous experiences. In turn, Evrard (2013) defended the epistemological step taken by Mathijsen, and Mathijsen (2013) claimed that Abrassart had confused epistemology with ontology and had overlooked the fact that Mathijsen’s article was exclusively about paranormal beliefs.

In this article, I will comment on each of the previous articles and focus on the terms that have been used—paranormal beliefs, paranormal experiences, paranormal phenomena (Mathijsen, 2009, 2013), anoma-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology lous experiences (Abrassart, 2013), and exceptional experiences (Evrard, 2013)—, including their conceptual background, as these terms need some clarification. I will show that the particular meanings of the respective terms, although such meanings may be fairly common, are based on specific and in some cases inappropriate usages of the adjectives involved. Thus, the use of these terms with such meanings may cause confusion about what is actually being researched. Moreover, I will argue that an exclusive focus on the subjective aspect of ostensibly paranormal experiences would be ill-conceived. To begin with, I will elaborate on Mathijsen’s usage of the term paranormal.

Paranormal Phenomena versus Paranormal Beliefs According to Mathijsen’s correction (2013), his article (2009) is exclusively about research into paranormal beliefs and not about research into paranormal phenomena. However, this is not obvious because Mathijsen (2009) did not only use the term paranormal beliefs but also the terms the paranormal, paranormal study, paranormal experiences, and paranormal phenomena and referred to a debate that is actually about research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena. This combination may have led Abrassart (2013) to think that Mathijsen’s article is not exclusively about research into paranormal beliefs.

The statement “definitions of phenomena considered paranormal and associated beliefs [i.e., paranormal beliefs] do not always take into account the same facts …” (Mathijsen, 2009, p. 321) suggests that Mathijsen did not differentiate between the paranormality of paranormal beliefs and the paranormality of paranormal phenomena. This undifferentiated usage would not need clarification if he had referred exclusively to phenomena that are considered to be paranormal only by individuals that hold paranormal beliefs, that is, exclusively phenomena that form the basis of paranormal beliefs. If that had been the case, the paranormality of both paranormal beliefs and paranormal phenomena would have been identical.

However, as stated, the debate Mathijsen referred to is not about research into paranormal beliefs (Irwin, 2009) but about research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena (Irwin & Watt, 2007). The research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena constitutes a separate research area in its own right, namely that of parapsychology, that may define paranormal and in particular the paranormality of paranormal experiences and paranormal phenomena divergently, as addressed below. The scientific discipline of parapsychology is not a pseudoscience, although for some researchers its scientific status is a matter in dispute, and, according to parapsychology’s distinguished critic Alcock (2003), parapsychologists who are scientists and concerned with serious parapsychological research ought to be differentiated from people of the general public who call themselves parapsychologists.

The mix-up of research areas becomes apparent in a section (pp. 320–322) in which Mathijsen cited several articles that are part of an instance of the mentioned debate and were published as a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (Alcock, Burns, & Freeman, 2003). As a side note, his presentation of this debate is one-sided. Although both proponents and critics have been published in this issue, he cited exclusively critical arguments from these articles. The only supporting argument he cited in this section stems from a master’s thesis by Mousseau (for full reference see Mathijsen, 2009).

It is confusing that Mathijsen referred to this debate in an article that is supposed to be exclusively concerned with paranormal beliefs. The recurrent usage of the terms believers and skeptics in this debate to refer to the debate’s protagonists and the fact that two out of eleven articles are actually concerned with paranormal beliefs in detail (Brugger & Taylor, 2003; French, 2003) may have led him to do so. (Although in this instance of the debate, the term believers is hardly used at all to refer to this group of researchers. Most of the articles

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology use the more neutral term parapsychologists by default.)

Indeed, the metaphorical usage of the terms believers and skeptics and the impassionated nature of the debate may be overlooked. The editorial article of the special issue (Freeman, 2003) cites an earlier instance of the debate (Alcock, 1987; Rao & Palmer, 1987). This earlier instance was commented on by Benassi (1987), who had already pointed out that the research of parapsychologists is no more influenced by their beliefs than the research of scientists in general is influenced by scientists’ beliefs. Additionally, a later instance of the debate clarifies the intended meaning of the terms believers and skeptics and introduces the more unambiguous terms advocates and counteradvocates (Krippner & Friedman, 2010).

In brief, the proponents of the so-called psi hypothesis (the hypothesis that paranormal phenomena exist) are not necessarily individuals that hold paranormal beliefs, and the critics of the psi hypothesis are not necessarily individuals that do not hold paranormal beliefs. However, even the usage of the terms proponents and critics oversimplifies matters because parapsychology is concerned with multiple issues, and various opinions about each issue may exist (Hövelmann, 1988; Truzzi, 1998).

The article by Brugger and Taylor (2003) discusses paranormal beliefs in order to make sense of experimental research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena. The article by French (2003) discusses paranormal beliefs in order to make sense of ostensibly paranormal experiences, which are relevant for both research into paranormal beliefs and research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena. Thus, none of the articles support the idea that the actual topic of the debate were paranormal beliefs.

Epistemological or Ontological Debate?

This debate is not an epistemological debate (i.e., a debate on what and how things can be known and explained), as Mathijsen called it, but an ontological debate (i.e., a debate on what kinds of things exist). In fact, the arguments put forward by Mathijsen (2009) suggest calling it an ontological debate. He stated, A first point of disagreement concerns research paradigms. Those who strictly reject any psychological approach to this field cite the argument of scientific impossibility. Stanovich (2004) recalls that, in 90 years of ESP [i.e., extrasensory perception] research, it has not been possible to create anything which could be considered duplicable or real. Neither have those studies yielded convincing evidence (Jeffers, 2003). For Burns (2003a), this will always be the case, since there is no method based on the laws of physics as we know them today which would enable a reliable (re)production of paranormal beliefs or experiences. In addition, most of the studies are based on data obtained through self-administered questionnaires. According to French (2003), the variables which correlate with “false memory” also correlate with a tendency to report paranormal experiences. Consequently, a lack of prior knowledge, generalised methodology and clear patterns leads to the problem of non-duplicability, and thus unpredictability, rendering it impossible to falsify hypotheses. Stanovich (2004) concludes that this creates confusion between a pseudoscience and psychological science and states that continuing this kind of research threatens the scientific credibility of psychology (p. 320).

Because Mathijsen (2013) insisted on framing the debate as an epistemological debate, it has to be assumed that by “scientific impossibility” he meant that paranormal phenomena are in principle inaccessible to scientific investigation. However, the arguments presented do not support such an impossibility. Instead, each of the arguments either is nonsensical or supports the idea that, according to current scientific knowledge, the

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology existence of paranormal phenomena is improbable because evidential support is inadequate. This accords with the mainstream view that science is concerned with probabilities rather than absolute possibilities. Thus, improbability must not be confused with impossibility and non-proof not with disproof (Truzzi, 1998).

The failure of 90 years of extrasensory perception research to produce anything real (a simplistic claim as results may have been inadequate but not null; see, e.g., the meta-analysis by Storm, Tressoldi, & Di Risio, 2010b, their reply, 2010a, and the reply by Storm, Tressoldi, & Utts, 2013, to critique; see Radin, 2013, for a current overview of parapsychological research from a supporting perspective) might suggest that the existence of extrasensory perception is improbable. However, it also demonstrates such research is in principle possible.

“Burns (2003a)” points erroneously to a flawed reference to the whole special issue (correctly Alcock et al., 2003). “Burns (2003b)” may be meant, the only article by Burns in the special issue (Burns, 2003). If this article is meant, it is incorrectly cited here. Burns’s article is concerned with experimental research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena, not with research into paranormal beliefs or paranormal experiences.

Moreover, she did not assume that such research would always fail to (re)produce convincing evidence as she concluded that “psi should not be written off as having negligible chance of existing simply because it is not consonant with presently known physical laws” (Burns, 2003, p. 25). Regarding the argument stated by Mathijsen, if the lack of a method based on presently known laws of physics made it impossible to ever reliably (re)produce paranormal phenomena, science would become dogmatism.

Furthermore, it is not the case that most of the studies are based solely on data obtained through selfadministered questionnaires. This may be the case for research into paranormal beliefs but not for research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena, which, as mentioned, is the debate’s actual focus. In the latter research area, most of the studies (though not all) obtain their data through experiments and may only use selfadministered questionnaires as a secondary data source.

Although according to French (2003) there is a connection between false memories and ostensibly paranormal experiences (not the only explanation proposed for ostensibly paranormal experiences), this connection seems to be of minor importance for experimental research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena. Neither this connection nor methodological problems of replicability and predictability, which exist in parapsychology, demonstrate a scientific inaccessibility of paranormal phenomena.

Stanovich (2004, pp. 176–178), who did not contribute to the debate in the journal from 2003 but wrote a critical book, was afraid that psychology may be confused with pseudoscience in public awareness.

His concerns were based on unscientific literature on the paranormal and the negative results of past research.

Yet he acknowledged that serious research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena had already taken place.

Thus, he obviously did not question the possibility of this research.

All of the arguments put forward are based on empiricism, which is applied to address ontological questions. The epistemological question, whether something can be investigated empirically or not, cannot be answered on empirical grounds alone. A philosophical discussion on how to define paranormal is needed to answer this question.

Definitions of Paranormal The term paranormal was introduced in the early parapsychological literature and was presumably derived from the term parapsychology. Dessoir coined the term parapsychology in 1889. He used the prefix para - to convey that parapsychology is concerned with phenomena “halfway between the normal and abnormal,

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology pathological situations” (Dessoir, 1985–1986, p. 227).

In a similar fashion, Ducasse (1951) defined paranormal in a way that positions paranormal phenomena between, on the one hand, normal and abnormal phenomena, and, on the other hand, supernatural phenomena.

That is, Ducasse expected that paranormal phenomena, although yet unexplained, would find their place among normal and abnormal phenomena with progress of knowledge. He classified supernatural phenomena as in principle inexplicable. This notion—unexplained but in principle explicable by science—can also be found in other definition attempts (Braude, 1978; for a revised version see Braude, 2002; Broad, 1949), which are cited in the parapsychological literature and explicitly include a scientific conflict, like an explanation necessitates major revisions in current scientific theory. (Of course, what counts as a major revision is subjective.) This is the meaning of paranormal in a narrow sense (see also Truzzi, 1978).

Ducasse pointed out that paranormal and psychic are not wholly synonymous because the latter term suggests an involvement of the mind whereas the former does not. However, it was and is common to use these terms synonymously, and Ducasse was aware of this usage. Today, this also concerns the terms parapsychological, psi, and—presumably based on lay people’s usage—miraculous (“ Paranormal,” 2003). In fact, parapsychology is not a research into any imaginable paranormal experience or phenomenon but the research into only ostensibly psychic experiences and phenomena (including extrasensory perception, psychokinesis, and potentially phenomena related to the survival of death, e.g., out-of-body experience; Irwin & Watt, 2007, Chapter 1; for the difference between psychic and paranormal see below).

The terms paranormal, parapsychological, psi, and psychic have found their way into public awareness.

There too, paranormal may be used synonymously with the other terms, but these terms may also be used in a broader sense that includes all kinds of exceptional phenomena. Remarkably, the scientific efforts of parapsychology are hardly noticed. The definition of paranormal as in principle explicable by science is usually not recognized and the term may be associated with supernatural.

Mabbett (1982) reviewed existing definitions. Some of his statements indirectly support the presented view. He noted that the three mentioned definitions of paranormal (Braude, 1978; Broad, 1949; Ducasse, 1951) share the conception as unexplained but in principle explicable by science and that the usage of this conception is especially prevalent among parapsychologists. Furthermore, he noted on the conception as in principle inexplicable by science that “ the paranormal is commonly felt to be in some way fundamentally in conflict with science” (Mabbett, 1982, p. 344). It can be supposed that commonly here means by lay people.

Additionally, Hövelmann (1983), commenting on Mabbett’s article, stated that parapsychology, in order to be scientific, must attempt to explain paranormal phenomena. Again, it should define them as in principle explicable by science. Apparently, parapsychologists and lay people have differing conceptions of paranormal. Notably, researchers’ conceptions of paranormal beliefs are based on those experiences and phenomena that lay people consider to be paranormal. There are various paranormal beliefs and no real consensus on which beliefs are to be included in a definition. Nevertheless, definitions of paranormal beliefs typically do not only include belief in psychic processes but also belief in cryptozoological creatures, belief in extraterrestrial aliens, superstitions, and traditional religious beliefs, to name a few (Irwin, 2009, Chapter 1).

Consequently, parapsychology’s standard definitions of paranormal are too narrow to be applied to a definition of paranormal beliefs. For example, cryptozoological creatures like the Loch Ness monster, provided they exist, are merely anomalous as they are unexplained and yet their explanation will presumably not necessitate major revisions in current scientific theory. On the other hand, some elements of traditional religious beliefs, like God, are supernatural as they are inaccessible to scientific investigation (Irwin, 2009, Chapter 1).

Thus, the paranormality of paranormal beliefs needs to be distinguished from the paranormality of par-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology anormal experiences and phenomena as defined by parapsychology. Still, some critics may misleadingly argue as if parapsychology regarded paranormal experiences and paranormal phenomena as supernatural (Truzzi, 1998).

Interim Conclusion In his article, Mathijsen (2009) concluded that, the paranormal, whether in the form of beliefs or experiences, seems to have a particular system of knowledge [i.e., an intuitive system], with specific laws and limits. However, to study a system which has its own rationality and logic from the viewpoint of another system of knowledge [i.e., an analytical system] can only lead to an epistemological impasse. The arguments put forward by sceptics of PB [i.e., paranormal belief] on one hand, and by supporters of PB on the other, are the products of the epistemological context in which they find themselves. Each addresses a different issue, using different terminology and different scientific approaches. (pp. 328–329) Again, more differentiation is needed. Individuals who hold paranormal beliefs may have a different system of knowledge than individuals who do not hold such beliefs. However, proponents and critics of the psi hypothesis share the same system of knowledge and neither support nor oppose paranormal beliefs when concerned with research. Alcock (2003), who has participated in all three mentioned instances of the debate and was also referenced by Mathijsen (2009), made this clear when he stated.

As much as they [i.e., proponents and critics of parapsychology] may differ in terms of their views on the paranormal, it is important to note that the contributors are “all on the same side� in at least one important way: all share a deep respect for science and are committed to the scientific method as the appropriate approach to exploring reality. They are all seeking truth, not delusion; fact, not fiction. Arguably, the only significant differences that distinguish the proponents from the sceptics in this collection of articles are in terms of their a priori subjective weighings of the likelihood that psychic phenomena exist, which in turn may influence their evaluations of the adequacy of the research protocols that have been employed in parapsychological research and the quality of the data thus obtained. (p.

30) The debaters do not argue using different terminologies but simply different terms, which are generally understandable once defined. Moreover, their various scientific approaches help to increase knowledge. Nevertheless, the debaters do not only address different issues but exchange differing opinions about shared issues, like adequacy of research protocols and quality of data. Thus, there is no epistemological impasse, and future debates ought to take place, particularly in mainstream scientific journals, like the instances mentioned from 1987 and 2003. It is normal in science that such debates do not always lead to a consensus. Simply, more research is needed.

Mathijsen (2009) concluded further: In studying the impact of religion, spirituality or transcendence on the human experience, psychology does not seek to prove the existence or non-existence of God since this falls outside its paradigmatic field. Similarly, they [i.e., supporters and sceptics of paranormal belief] should not, in our opinion, seek to prove or disprove paranormal phenomena as such (regardless of the form they take: real or illusory,

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology objective or subjective), but should instead take into account that some individuals do adhere to these [paranormal] beliefs. (p. 329) This statement was the bone of contention for Abrassart (2013), and he rightly pointed out that psychology’s failure to continue to investigate the ontological nature of ostensibly paranormal phenomena would evade the ongoing debate and unnecessarily limit psychology to the perspective of the social sciences.

Mathijsen’s analogy hints that he may consider paranormal phenomena to be inexplicable in prinicple by science, as does his claim that “the ontological debate is not, in my opinion, the domain of the psychological sciences, as the essence or nature of paranormal phenomena cannot be established at this time with the knowledge we currently possess” (Mathijsen, 2013, p. 52). However, although the nature of paranormal phenomena is currently not established and their existence has been deemed improbable, Mathijsen failed to demonstrate that it is impossible for (para-)psychology to establish the nature of paranormal phenomena and expand knowledge.

His analogy may hold true for supernatural phenomena, which constitute one part of the basis of paranormal beliefs (though even this may be challenged as it depends on the underlying epistemological framework; Abrassart, 2013, p. 20). However, as demonstrated, ostensibly paranormal experiences and phenomena can be, have been, and still are being investigated as they remain—even if genuine—explicably paranormal by the definitions applied in parapsychology. Thus, they are legitimate research objects, just like paranormal beliefs.

Nevertheless, a discipline has emerged that is concerned with paranormal beliefs, ostensibly paranormal experiences, and other ostensibly anomalous experiences from a reductionistic perspective and that is called anomalistic psychology. Furthermore, even from within parapsychology, there is a movement that neglects the ontological question and aspires to study only the subjective aspect of ostensibly paranormal experiences, which have become conceptualized as exceptional experiences as a consequence of this movement.

Before discussing anomalistic psychology and exceptional experiences in detail, a return to and more detailed discussion of the terms that define parapsychology or are related to it will be useful.

Terms Defining Parapsychology The terms that define the scientific discipline of parapsychology—psychic, parapsychological, paranormal, and psi—are often used synonymously, although they are not wholly synonymous. The first of these terms to define parapsychology was psychic, with the derivative psychical giving the discipline of psychical research, as it was then called (and in the UK is still called), its name (“ Parapsychology,” 2003).

Psychic. In one sense, psychic means relating to the mind or psyche (“Psychic, A. 1.” 2013). Presumably either Crookes (1871) or Cox (1871) coined the term psychic by using it as an element in psychic force to refer to a paranormal energy or power in the context of what would become the field of psychical research (cf. “Psychic, A. 3.” 2013; “Psychic: Psychic force,” 2013). Today, the latter meaning has become the predominant meaning of the term psychic (“Psychic,” 2010), and the term demarcates most closely parapsychology’s research matter as it relates to phenomena that are deemed to be a direct manifestation of mind, including extrasensory perception, psychokinesis, and phenomena related to the survival of death (Irwin & Watt, 2007). Nevertheless, the term is problematic because it suggests that these phenomena are related to the mind, which is a presupposition that may not hold true (Ducasse, 1951).

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Parapsychic and Parapsychological. As mentioned above, Dessoir coined the term parapsychology in 1889. Hövelmann (1987), on the other hand, argued that he may possibly have coined it already in 1888. The prefix para- means beside, alongside, or beyond, in combinations often amiss or irregular, and denotes modification or alteration (“Para-,” 2010; Thalbourne & Rosenbaum, 1985–1986). In parapsychic (a term also coined

by Dessoir, 1889), the prefix simply emphasizes the meaning that the term psychic implies in the context of parapsychology.

By contrast, when the term parapsychological is used synonymously with (para-)psychic, paranormal, or psi, it is used as a metonymy (i.e., a term that substitutes another actually meant and semantically associated with it) because it actually denotes pertaining to parapsychology. However, the experiences and phenomena that are investigated in parapsychology and therefore are called parapsychological are ostensibly psychic experiences and phenomena, which possibly may not turn out to be genuinely psychic (Irwin & Watt, 2007, Chapter 1); and psychic experiences and phenomena, provided they exist, can also happen outside the scientific context, of course. Additionally, the term is in the same way problematic as the term psychic because it suggests an involvement of the mind.

Paranormal, Now. Presumably Maxwell (1903, 1905) coined the term paranormal. Since then, Broad (1949), Ducasse (1951), and Braude (1978, 2002) have attempted to define the term in more detail. The term, as it is conceived by these philosophers (as elaborated above), is problematic because it is defined negatively, in terms of what it is not. Once paranormal phenomena are rudimentarily explained, they cease to be paranormal in the strict sense, so either parapsychology would need to look out for another unexplained topic or such defintions are inappropriate in the first place (Irwin & Watt, 2007, Chapter 1; Poynton, 1996–1997).

Examining the individual definitions more closely, Broad (1949) stated that paranormal phenomena cannot be explained within the framework of what he called Basic Limiting Principles (BLP). He conceived these principles as inherent in current scientific theory and he modeled them in such a way that they conflict with the existence of psychic phenomena listed above. In this way, he basically equated paranormal phenomena with psychic phenomena and therefore used the term paranormal as a collective term for the research objects of parapsychology.

Ducasse (1951) oriented himself toward the definition found in W ebster’s dictionary, and therefore his definition responded to the general public’s conception of the term paranormal. He defined paranormal phenomenon as “ any occurrence whose cause is neither that from which it ordinarily results, nor any other yet known to the natural sciences as capable of causing it” (p. 130). In contrast to the definition in the dictionary, as mentioned above, he differentiated between paranormal, which he characterized as in principle explicable by science, and supernatural, which he conceived as in principle inexplicable by science. In his view, paranormal is not synonymous with psychic as paranormal phenomena may instead be caused by other means, possibly “paraphysiological or paraphysical” (p. 131) in nature.

Braude (2002) built upon the definitions of Broad and Ducasse. According to his preferred definition, a phenomenon is paranormal if the phenomenon “is inexplicable in terms of current scientific theory; […] [the phenomenon] cannot be explained scientifically without major revisions elsewhere in scientific theory; […] [and the phenomenon] thwarts our familiar expectations about what sorts of things can happen to the sorts of objects involved in [the phenomenon]” (p. 211). He, too, differentiated between paranormal and parapsychological (i.e., psychic) phenomena.

It is difficult to come up with an actual example of a paranormal but not psychic phenomenon though, and singing or grasping trees (Braude’s example) are presumably not actively researched. Astrological relations may be an example of a paranormal phenomenon that is not deemed to be psychic right away and that is

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology actively researched (see, e.g., Mayer & Garms, 2012).

Considering the last assumption of Braude’s definition, his definition is clearly influenced by how the general public conceives paranormal, also apparent from his considerations that a phenomenon needs to be “sufficiently bizarre” (p. 201) or extremely strange (p. 209) to be paranormal instead of only anomalous, such as black holes.

Paranormal, Back Then. The definitions presented orient themselves toward the conception of paranormal as conceived by the general public or toward the research matter of parapsychology in general. Interestingly, none of the definitions consider what paranormal was originally meant to denote. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the earliest of them, Broad’s definition, was elaborated almost half a century after Maxwell had used the term.

The term had been used repeatedly in the psychical research literature before Broad’s definition, in particular in the sense Maxwell had used the term. Maxwell (1903, pp. 298–299; 1905, p. 376) compared psychokinesis to movements produced by muscular activity and extrasensory perception to ordinary phenomena related to sensitivity.

Redefining the term in line with Maxwell’s conception, paranormal can mean relating to additional processes, relationships, or attributes that exist beside normal, usual, or ordinary processes, relationships, or attributes and that typically act analogous to them (cf. Truzzi, 1977, 1987, who used parasciences to denote research into unexplained relationships between ordinary things and contrasted it with cryptosciences, which he used to denote research into unexplained things). This definition does not imply that those additional processes, relationships, or attributes need to be unexplained to be called paranormal.

The definition includes phenomena like extrasensory perception (a perception beside the normal perception), psychokinesis (a movement beside the normal movement), and out-of-body experience (experience of a body beside the normal body). Like Ducasse’s and Braude’s definition, it does not equate paranormal with psychic and also incorporates phenomena like astrological relations (relations beside the normal astronomical relations) and synesthesia (an induced sensation beside the normal sensation), the latter also not being a paranormal phenomenon in the contemporary sense. Thus, paranormal usually tends to be more inclusive than psychic.

Apart from that, the definition conforming to Maxwell differs radically from usual definitions. Today, the definitions applied in parapsychology depend on the research context and depart from general public’s conception of paranormal. Likewise, the definition conforming to Maxwell belongs to the research period that spans the first half of the 20th century. Its virtue is that it remains faithful to the origin of the term and the meaning of the prefix para-.

Nevertheless, the term defined in such a way is problematic because it suggests that phenomena that are deemed to be paranormal are based on additional processes, relationships, or attributes that act analogous to normal ones, which is a presupposition that may not hold true. In any case, paranormal has been used in several meanings, and one ought to pay attention to the meaning implied.

Psi. According to Thouless (1942), his colleague Wiesner coined the term psi phenomenon. The experimental research at the time suggested clairvoyance, precognition, and telepathy might be based on a single underlying process, and J. B. Rhine proposed to adopt extrasensory perception as a collective term for this process. Thouless, however, rejected the term because it implies a non-sensory kind of perception, a theory that in his view could mislead research. He proposed to use the more neutral term psi phenomenon instead (Thouless, 1942, 1942–1945). Thus, psi was originally suggested as a counterproposal to the theory that also underlies Maxwell’s conception of paranormal.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Only a few years later, Thouless and Wiesner (1946) began to consider psychokinesis as the “motor aspect of psi” (p. 116). Developing a theory, they termed extrasensory perception psi-gamma and psychokinesis psi-kappa (Thouless & Wiesner, 1946–1949). Thus, the once neutral term ironically became theory-laden itself. Although the whole theory is usually not implied when the term is used today, psi has become a collective term for processes or personal factors that are conceived as underlying the psi phenomena extrasensory perception and psychokinesis, the core objects of parapsychology (“Glossary,” 1946; Irwin & Watt, 2007, Chapter 1).

The term psi can be used either as an adjective or noun. Used synonymously with psychic, parapsychological, or paranormal, it can also apply to phenomena related to the survival of death (“ Psi,” 2003). The term has found widespread acceptance in parapsychology because it is seemingly a more neutral term than its alternatives. Nevertheless, it is problematic because in the strict sense it implies that extrasensory perception and psychokinesis share one or more underlying factors, which is a presupposition that may not hold true.

Problematic Terms without Alternatives As illustrated, all of the terms mentioned are neologisms (or more precisely in the cases of psychic and psi semantic extensions of existing terms) coined in the context of parapsychological research. They were invented relatively recently, either in the second half of the 19th century or the first half of the 20th century. In addition to the problems mentioned, these terms have become problematic because all of them have quickly found their way beyond the research context and into public awareness, where they have been used in a much broader sense and associated with the supernatural. Even the meaning of the term psi has changed considerably under the influence of public awareness. Outside of the research context, along with psionic, it is now associated with psychic powers or forces, similar to what Crookes and Cox referred to as psychic force (“Psionic,” 2010).

As a consequence, researchers have sought to alternatively use more established terms or even replace terms with others that seemed more neutral and were less associated with the supernatural. The terms anomalous and exceptional have seemed especially suitable. However, because these terms are more established, they already carry certain meanings that cannot easily be ignored, and using them synonymously with the terms presented above creates more problems than it solves.

Anomalous versus Paranormal and Abnormal Palmer (1988) pointed out that the terms in parapsychology are often used in a way that does not make clear if a phenomenon in question (e.g., produced in an experiment) is simply in need of an explanation or in need of an explanation that violates some of Broad’s BLP. Palmer proposed a new terminology that was supposed to differentiate between these cases. In his scheme, a phenomenon is paranormal if it is explained by science and the explanation violates one or more of the BLP; a phenomenon is anomalous if it is apparently paranormal and is not adequately explained by science; and a phenomenon is a psi phenomenon if it is believed to be either anomalous or paranormal.

Although well-intentioned, Palmer’s alternative conceptualization is questionable. By the time he proposed it, the terms anomalous, paranormal, and psi had been in use for a long time, and to arbitrarily redefine them does not contribute to clearer understanding. Nevertheless, Palmer’s proposal had some impact, as reflected, for example, by the definition of psi in Thalbourne’s Glossary of Terms Used in Parapsychology

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology (“Psi,” 2003).

A more reasonable solution is to call phenomena by their names without ascribing new meanings to them. A phenomenon that is explained by science and whose explanation violates one or more of the BLP may be called a psychic, paranormal, or psi phenomenon (as paranormal need not be equated with unexplained as shown by the definition conforming to Maxwell) or whatever fits the explanation best. A phenomenon that is apparently paranormal and is not adequately explained by science may be called an ostensibly paranormal (Irwin & Watt, 2007, Chapter 1) or unexplained phenomenon. And a phenomenon that fits either category may be called an anomalous phenomenon.

In a similar vein as Palmer, Truzzi (1987) defined anomaly as “something unexplained” (p. 13) and in contrast abnormal as “merely irregular or rare” (p. 14) but scientifically explained. However, the definition in the dictionary, which he cited, does not support such a contrasting use of these terms. Truzzi pointed out that the term anomaly is used in this sense in the anomalistic literature. However, that anomalies presented in the literature are often unexplained does not necessarily imply the meaning ascribed by Truzzi. What he actually referred to is a more specific type of anomaly, a scientific anomaly, that is, a phenomenon that is anomalous because it is not conformable to current scientific theory and thus is scientifically unexplained.

In fact, the term anomalous alone generally does not imply being unexplained. In a literal sense, anomalous means irregular or uneven. The major dictionaries basically agree that it is defined as deviating from what is standard, common, normal, usual, or expected (“ Anomalous,” 2002, 2003, 2010, 2011). The term has already been used in that sense in the 17th century (L’Estrange, 1655, p. 137). It may be used synonymously with abnormal. However, abnormal has a slightly different meaning and the major dictionaries basically agree that it may imply a deviation that is undesirable, inferior, prejudicial, subnormal, or worrying and thus deficient and possibly pathological (“¹abnormal,” 2002; “Abnormal,” 2010, 2013).

Another attempt to use the term anomalous in the context of parapsychology was made by May, Utts, and Spottiswoode (1995). They proposed replacing extrasensory perception with anomalous cognition, psychokinesis with anomalous perturbation, and psi phenomena with anomalous mental phenomena. Braude (1998) rightly criticized this advance because it uses the term anomalous in an overly restrictive manner. In fact, these new terms are too inclusive to be used synonymously with the established terms. For example, anomalous mental phenomena does not only apply to psi phenomena but also to occurrences of synesthesia.

Apart from this advance, anomalous has been misused in the opposite way, excluding genuinely paranormal experiences and phenomena. To bring it back to the discussion whose terms are meant to be clarified, Abrassart (2013) used the term anomalous experiences, referring to Mathijsen’s suggestion (2009) to only investigate the subjective aspect of ostensibly paranormal experiences. Abrassart’s usage relates directly to the topic of anomalistic psychology.

Anomalistic Psychology and Anomalistics Zusne and Jones (1982, p. 2, 1989, p. ix) coined the term anomalistic psychology in 1980, referring to Wescott (1977). Wescott (1973/1975) coined the term anomalistics in 1973, which he defined as “the serious and systematic (rather than sporadic and sensational) study of phenomena of all kinds which fail to fit the pictures of reality provided for us by common sense or by the established sciences” (p. 22; see also Wescott, 1980).

Wescott (1973/1975, 1980) explicitly included parapsychological research in his conception of anomalistics. Research into ostensibly anomalous phenomena is published, for example, in the Journal of Scientific

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Exploration.1 Many of the phenomena investigated underlie paranormal beliefs, including phenomena that are usually not covered by parapsychological research, such as, astrological relations, cryptozoological creatures, and UFOs. According to Zusne (1982), anomalistic psychology is concerned with ostensibly paranormal phenomena, but without implying that a paranormal explanation would be needed. He conjured up connotations of skeptics opposing believers, already criticized above, and depicted anomalistic psychology as opposing parapsychology.

French and Stone (2014, p. 18) conceived of anomalistic psychology as complementing parapsychology. In line with Zusne, French (2001) defined anomalistic psychology as a discipline that, attempts to explain paranormal and related beliefs and ostensibly paranormal experiences in terms of known (or knowable) psychological and physical factors. It is directed at understanding bizarre experiences that many people have, without assuming that there is anything paranormal involved. While psychology, neurology and other scientific disciplines are rich with explanatory models for human experiences of many kinds, these models are rarely extrapolated to attempt to explain strange and unusual experiences. (p. 356) This definition has partially or completely been adopted in recently published textbooks that bear the title anomalistic psychology (French & Stone, 2014, pp. 1–2; Holt, Simmonds-Moore, Luke, & French, 2012, p. 6), notably all co-authored by French.

A similar definition can also be found on the website of French’s research unit, including the statement that “the aims of anomalistic psychology would still be valid even if the existence of paranormal forces were to be established beyond doubt because there is little question that most paranormal claims can be plausibly explained in non-paranormal terms” (“What is anomalistic psychology?” 2009, para. 6).

Consequently, this conceptualization of anomalistic psychology has gained prominence. A bnormal psychology has included both reductionistic and parapsychological approaches (Evrard, 2013). Anomalistic psychology as it is currently conceived has been criticized for its exclusively reductionistic approach (Charman, 2013; Luke, 2011) and is hardly a direct successor of abnormal psychology (cf. Evrard, 2013).

French’s definition is questionable because it a priori excludes any hypothesis involving psi-related approaches. Normally, the definition of a discipline is based on the discipline’s topics, not on the exclusion of certain hypotheses related to such topics. In parapsychology, too, not only the psi hypothesis is investigated but also reductionistic hypotheses (see, e.g., Valášek et al., 2013).

Anomalistic psychology’s topics are paranormal and related beliefs and experiences that can be termed paranormal, bizarre, strange, or unusual. It is quite subjective if an experience should be designated by one of these terms. In other words, anomalistic psychology’s topics are paranormal beliefs (in the broad sense, as elaborated above) and so-called exceptional experiences (a term that connotes subjectivity, see the next section for a definition), although from a solely reductionistic perspective. Nevertheless, this is a legitimate approach.

However, the term anomalistic psychology is a misnomer for the discipline as it is thus conceived. The discipline does not cover the full range of experiences that can be termed anomalous in accordance with the definitions in the dictionaries and with Wescott’s conception of the term anomalistic.

It does not cover experiences that deviate from what is common among a population (like synesthesia), experiences that deviate from what is normal or usual by occuring infrequently (like lucid dreaming), or expe1

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology riences that deviate from what is expected according to ordinary scientific explanations of the world (like genuinely psychic experiences) (cf. Cardeña, Lynn, & Krippner, 2014a). If the existence of, for example, genuinely psychic experiences were to be established (e.g., based on the existence of paranormal forces), the discipline would not be concerned with it, as can be inferred from the statement above.

It covers solely experiences that deviate from what is expected according to ordinary unscientific, personal explanations of the world (like ostensibly psychic experiences). Such experiences are subjectively anomalous experiences (i.e., exceptional experiences). It seems unwarranted to term a discipline that is concerned exclusively with subjectively anomalous experiences anomalistic psychology, just as it is imprecise to call subjectively anomalous experiences anomalous experiences.

Nevertheless, all of the anomalous experiences mentioned are being researched, and advances in these researches were published in the edited volume V arieties of A nomalous Experience (Cardeña, Lynn, & Krippner, 2000, 2014b). The volume is the only major contemporary work to date that is concerned with various anomalous experiences and proposes a definition that remains faithful to the definitions in the dictionaries (Cardeña et al., 2000, p. 4, 2014b, p. 4).

The work by Holt et al. (2012) falls somewhere in between. It cites the definition by Cardeña et al.

(2000) (pp. 1–2), although it is concerned solely with exceptional experiences in detail. It discusses synesthesia and lucid dreaming but only in relation to exceptional experiences. It states to examine its topics in nonparanormal terms (p. 6) yet does not exclude non-reductionistic explanations entirely.

As mentioned by Evrard (2013), Zangari and Machado (2011) already called for a more inclusive anomalistic psychology. Similarly, Cardeña (2012), using the term anomalous psychology, proposed to integrate parapsychological research into a wider research context (like research into all kinds of anomalous experiences, it can be supposed). However, this term is ambiguous as the adjective normally modifies the noun.

Thus, the term anomalistic psychology might be preferable and actually appropriate for a discipline that covers the full range of anomalous experiences.

Redefining the term, this discipline of anomalistic psychology is concerned with the scientific study of anomalous experiences, that is, experiences that deviate from what is common among a population (like synesthesia), experiences that are widely distributed but occur infrequently and thus deviate from what is normal or usual (like lucid dreaming), and experiences that deviate from what is expected according to ordinary (scientific or unscientific) explanations of the world (like psychic experiences). This study is not restricted to the adoption of a certain working hypothesis.

Exceptional Experiences and Exceptional Psychology

Evrard (2013) used the term exceptional experiences, defending the epistemological step taken by Mathijsen (2009). White (1990) coined the term exceptional human experience, which she used to promote phenomenological research into subjectively paranormal experiences2 and other exceptional experiences. In later publications (e.g., White, 1997), she differentiated between exceptional human experience, an experience that is subjectively anomalous and part of a transformative process, and exceptional experience, an experience that is merely subjectively anomalous.

2

Neppe (1983) introduced the similar term subjective paranormal experience. However, these terms are not synonymous. For example, an experience of extrasensory perception is a subjective paranormal experience because extrasensory perception is experienced subjectively. Nevertheless, this experience is an objectively paranormal experience if it has been scientifically ascertained that the experience has a paranormal origin.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Hofmann and Wiedemer (1997) coined the term außergewöhnliche Erfahrungen (German for exceptional experiences) in reference to White’s term exceptional human experience. The German term has been retranslated as exceptional experiences in subsequent English-language publications without adopting White’s differentiation between exceptional human experience and exceptional experience. It evolved, particularly under the influence of German parapsychologists, and became associated with clinical practice, in particular with an empirically well-founded phenomenology of and a counseling approach to exceptional experiences (Belz, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Belz & Fach, 2012; Fach, Atmanspacher, Landolt, Wyss, & Rössler, 2013).

In the context of this evolvement, Belz (2012) defined exceptional experiences as “experiences, which—from the point of view of those affected by these experiences—are incompatible with their personal and environmental explanations of reality as far as the quality, process and origin of the experiences are concerned” (pp. 223–224; see also Belz, 2009b, p. 5).

The term has been proposed as a collective term that is ideologically neutral and comprises experiences that are usually termed anomalous, paranormal, parapsychic, psi, supernatural, and so forth (Belz, 2009b, p. 5; Hofmann & Wiedemer, 1997). It is neutral in terms of the objective reality of such experiences but not in terms of their subjective reality, emphasized in its definition.

Thus, the term is not synonymous with psychic, paranormal, and so forth. A psychic experience is only an exceptional experience if it is believed to be psychic or in any other way exceptional, and a non-psychic experience is still an exceptional experience if it is believed to be psychic or in any other way exceptional.

The term is not ideologically neutral because it represents ostensibly psychic experiences and the like as exceptional, that is, unique, rare, or inexplicable (Belz, 2009b, p. 5). An ostensibly psychic experience that the experiencer believes to be psychic is still not exceptional if it occurs frequently and the experiencer believes it to be ordinary and explicable.

Taking into account that ostensibly psychic experiences are commonly regarded as exceptional, this conception puts emphasis on ostensibly psychic experiences recognized as such and marginalizes unrecognized ones. Using the term (ostensibly) psychic experiences does not turn unrecognized experiences into recognized ones but is more neutral in this regard (see also the following section).

Additionally, the term exceptional connotes specialness and superiority (“Exceptional,” 2002, 2012).

Thus, it has a positive undertone. By contrast, anomalous, halfway between exceptional and abnormal, recommends itself as neutral, denoting deviation without explicit quality.

Despite its shortcomings, the term exceptional experiences has rapidly gained acceptance. It has been applied to several book publications related to parapsychology (e.g., Henry, 2005; Simmonds-Moore, 2012a) and is often carelessly used synonymously with psychic, paranormal, and so forth. Parapsychologists’ renewed interest in phenomenological research has also promoted new journals, such as Paranthropology3 (another term coined by Wescott, 1977) and the Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology.

In continuation to this development, Simmonds-Moore (2012c) coined the term exceptional psychology, which has already been embraced (Evrard, 2013; Glazier, 2014). (Again, as the adjective normally modifies the noun, the alternative term psychology of exceptional experiences might be preferable as it is less ambiguous.) Unfortunately, this development also seems to promote a rhetoric that misrepresents parapsychology as an “experimental science of psi phenomena” (Evrard, 2013, p. 29) or “experimentalist science” (Glazier, 2014, p. 33).

Although experimental research has dominated parapsychology for a long time, phenomenological research has existed continuously alongside it, featuring prominently the research of Louisa E. Rhine (Irwin & 3

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Watt, 2007). The phenomenological research tradition is greatly overlooked in the attempt to establish a discipline that is supposed to be distinct, and yet conforms to concepts rooted in experimental research.

The meaning of the term exceptional experiences is in accordance with the idea that acausality and elusiveness are inherent properties of psi (Belz, 2009a). This idea is based on the decline effect, a term originally used for observations made in experimental research and later on also used for observations made in phenomenological research. Although it has become a predominant paradigm in parapsychology, other explanations of this effect have been proposed, too (Colborn, 2007).

Phenomenological research is neither bound to a single paradigm like that one, nor synonymous with qualitative research. It should be reconciled with the development of new explanatory models that, in turn, are to be experimentally tested (cf. Glazier, 2014). Otherwise, it runs the risk of isolating itself, just like experimental research, and ultimately dividing parapsychology.

Clinical Parapsychology and Clinical Psychology The coinage of the term clinical parapsychology has been ascribed repeatedly to Ullman (1977). However, Bendit had already used this term in 1948, when he contrasted it with academic parapsychology. The discipline took shape, beginning in 1985, after several panel discussions and conferences were held and is currently gaining momentum, with recent book publications concerned with topics of clinical parapsychology (Kramer, Bauer, & HĂśvelmann, 2012; Murray, 2012; Simmonds-Moore, 2012a; for historical overviews see Belz, 2009a; Simmonds-Moore, 2012b).

Clinical parapsychology is currently dominated by the concept of exceptional experiences and related paradigms. In such an early developmental stage, however, it is important for clinical parapsychology to remain open to other approaches, as different conditions may indicate different approaches.

The normalization of problematic exceptional experiences is an important step in the treatment process (Belz, 2009a). However, the term exceptional experiences is not particularly conducive to the normalization of such experiences because of its connotations, discussed above.

Moreover, people with exceptional experiences determine themselves whether an experience is exceptional or not while the ontological status of the experience is not usually considered in the treatment process (Belz & Fach, 2012; Evrard, 2013; Fach et al., 2013). Assuming that genuinely psychic experiences exist, this approach neglects those cases in which an experiencer fails to assert that an experience is actually psychic, although such an experience might need a distinctive method of treatment.

Imagine a person diagnosed with schizophrenia is hearing voices and believes them to be hallucinations related to his disorder. He tells his therapist what he is hearing in detail. His therapist recognizes that what his patient is reporting corresponds exactly and repeatedly to his thoughts. His patient seems to be telepathic without realizing it. Genuinely paranormal experiences, provided they exist, might be recognized by others but not by experiencers themselves. Even without the schizophrenic telling what he is hearing, genuinely psychic experiences might theoretically be recognizable.

Jaspers (1963, 1968) had a lasting impact on the methods used in clinical sciences, particularly on the methods for diagnosis. He distinguished between form and content of mental phenomena, that is, for example, “the fact of a hallucination is to be distinguished from its content, whether this is a man or a tree, threatening figures or peaceful landscapes� (Jaspers, 1963, p. 58). Due to his work, symptoms have come to be diagnosed based on form.

Such a differentiation is also important for the recognition of non-pathological anomalous experiences.

For example, a hallucination itself is not necessarily a pathological symptom (Bentall, 2014). An experience is a synesthetic experience because a specific inducer (e.g., a stimulus) elicits a specific concurrent (i.e., an addi-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology tional experience), not because the concurrent manifests itself in a specific content (Simner, 2012). A dream is a lucid dream because the dreamer knows he is dreaming while he is dreaming, not because he dreams of a specific content (LaBerge, 2014).

By contrast, exceptional experiences are conceptualized as subjectively recognized anomalous localizations or relations of mental representations in the mental model that the experiencer creates to make sense of reality. This conception does not differentiate between form and content. The objective forms of exceptional experiences are neglected as they currently cannot easily be distinguished from the forms that symptoms of mental disorders take on (Belz, 2009a, 2012; Belz & Fach, 2012).

Still, at least in connection to ostensible extrasensory perception, phenomenological research has identified several form-related characteristics, such as the occurrence in the form of a dream or hallucination (Irwin & Watt, 2007, Chapter 3). If phenomenological research refocused on form, psychic experiences might be recognized by the convergence of several form-related characteristics alone one day, counteracting the failure to assert actually psychic experiences. In whichever way clinical parapsychology advances, it should not fail to reconcile with clinical psychology.

Conclusion The terms anomalous and exceptional are not synonymous with the terms (para-)psychic, parapsychological, paranormal, and psi, let alone replacements for them. Thus, they should be used mindfully. Both terms are valuable additions, putting parapsychological research into a wider context, anomalous being more inclusive and associated with an objective approach (i.e., an approach that considers the ontological status of what is termed anomalous), exceptional tending to be more inclusive and associated with a subjective approach.

Both terms are also associated with a renewed interest in phenomenological research, which is a positive development, considering that such a shift in research focus has been called for repeatedly (e.g., by White, 1990).

Both parapsychologists and their critics have misused the term anomalous by restrictively applying it to their field of study in the past, and critics have misused the term anomalistic psychology. Nevertheless, a term can be used in the right way, that is, according to its meaning. Thus, as yet another call for an inclusive anomalistic psychology, I propose not only “the reclamation of ‘the experience’ from anomalistic psychology” (Luke, 2011, p. 188), but the reclamation of anomalistic psychology itself, particularly by researchers who investigate objectively anomalous experiences. The importance of continuous usage with a particular meaning cannot be overstated as it determines what becomes general use in the long run.

Parapsychologists have always been resourceful when it comes to coining new terms (Zingrone & Alvarado, 1987). Nevertheless, the terms that define parapsychology have been long in use now, despite their imperfections. Parapsychology needs new terms in close association with sound conceptualization more than it simply needs new terms.

The differences in meaning discussed may seem trivial, but they are not. Take for example the case of fantasy proneness. Interpretations of this personality trait usually imply a deficiency in the ability to differentiate between what is real and what is imagined. However, many items on the scale used for measuring fantasy proneness (Barber, 2000) suggest that the construct is confounded with the ability to have eidetic imagery (Marks & McKellar, 1982). It can be supposed that many interpretations would have been different if the construct had been termed eidetic imagery.

Ironically, fantasy proneness is related to parapsychological research, and critics have repeatedly taken advantage of its connotation (e.g., Mathijsen, 2009). The terms and concepts that researchers use influence to a

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology great extent how research is designed and carried out, which individuals are recruited, and how findings are interpreted and communicated.

Synesthesia is another case in point. For a long time, research into synesthesia was similarly disreputable as parapsychological research (see, e.g., Cytowic, 2002, p. xxi). It has, however, recently advanced especially well, not least because consistency was made one of synesthesia’s defining criteria. It turned out that synesthesia may not occur as rarely as previously thought (Simner et al., 2006), and consistency may not even be a defining characteristic (Simner, 2012). Thus, this research may have fallen prey to a selection bias that promoted its advance. Today, synesthesia is an acknowledged phenomenon based on evidential support produced by multiple methods.

Phenomenological research in parapsychology conceptualized as exceptional experiences is moving in the opposite direction. It operates on the presumption that ostensibly psychic experiences are widely distributed and usually occur spontaneously. It, too, could have fallen prey to a selection bias that impedes its advance.

Thus, a more promising direction for phenomenological research may be to refocus on experiences of ostensible psychics (Anderson, 2006), some of whom may be able to consistently evoke relevant experiences.

In any case, the use of multiple methods based on a close collaboration between all of the mentioned disciplines and approaches is surely favorable.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Biography Michael Tremmel, Dipl.-Psych., studied psychology and medicine at the University of Giessen, Germany. He is currently a doctoral researcher at the Bender Institute of Neuroimaging, University of Giessen, and is studying Indo-Tibetology at the University of Marburg, Germany.

Bender Institute of Neuroimaging, Justus Liebig University Giessen Otto-Behaghel-Str. 1 0H 35394 Giessen Germany tremmel@bion.de

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Personal Accounts & Creative Pieces

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Five Exceptional Experiences

Brad Fulton

Abstract This is a personal account of five psychic experiences I had that foretold some unfortunate and unexpected deaths. Not only were these tragic for those who died and for their families, they include painful memories for my wife and our family. We’re coming forward in the hope that some good will come of this. Other than Margaret and Mary, the names given are fictitious.

Keywords: Exceptional experiences, psi, psychic experiences, personal account

I

met Margaret in 1991 while sitting in the sauna at the gym. She looked like an elegant swimsuit

model as she walked into the sauna, smiled and sat down. I was hooked. As we got to know each other I learned that, although our ages differed, we had the same birthday, and our mothers also shared a birthday.

She had two sons by a previous marriage, as well as a daughter named Mary who died shortly after birth on January 28, 1976. She came from a large family, with eight brothers and sisters. We became engaged in 1994. By then I knew that Margaret grieved every January 28. For a few reasons, but partly in a quixotic attempt to erase the tragedy of that day, we chose to marry on January 28, 1995.

It was also during this period that I came to know Vincent. We weren’t close friends, but would commute together occasionally and talk about work and life. He was feisty, a little contentious and sometimes went too far. He was also an avid pool player who organized tournaments at several local bars. When we were installing our swimming pool in 1995, Vincent stopped by the house to take a look, and also admired the professional pool table that Margaret set up in the family room for her sons. I avoided the pool table because of back problems.

Before I met Margaret, I had been meditating on a regular basis with an audiocassette recorded for me by a transpersonal psychologist, but I lost the habit as our lives became more chaotic: Margaret changed jobs, our house needed major renovations, and her sons got married and started families within a year of each other.

I didn’t see much of Vincent anymore.

My spiritual life was about to take a new turn. Maybe Vincent always wanted to come back to the house to play pool, or perhaps Mary did not appreciate having the anniversary of her birth and death co-opted.

The Psychic Experiences Friday, January 28, 2000 - Margaret and I celebrate our fifth wedding anniversary in Lake Tahoe.

The same night, Vincent begins choking on some food at a bar he frequents. He goes to the restroom to clear his throat, but loses consciousness and is not discovered for several minutes. By the time an emergency team gets there, he is in a coma. Vincent is rushed to a hospital and put on life support.

Margaret and I return home on Sunday, January 30. Nobody has been in the house all weekend. Our living room sofa has two throw pillows in each corner that weigh approximately one pound apiece. When we

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology walk into the living room, we find three of the pillows laid out in a row on the sofa’s seat cushions, resembling a prone body.

I learn about Vincent the next day. He remains in a coma and dies the following Friday.

Tuesday, January 28, 2003 - I’m attending a meeting in Oklahoma City on our eighth anniversary, but will fly home to Oakland today. I board a flight to Denver and take the window seat in the second row on the starboard side, where I can enjoy the scenery but still exit the plane quickly after landing. The ground crew loads baggage through the compartment door below me, next to the starboard engine.

As the jet takes off and climbs, it banks to the right so that I’m staring directly down at the droning engine and, thousands of feet below, a flat layer of clouds covering the Great Plains. This has never bothered me before, but now a sense of unease develops. I recall the deaths that occurred when a plane lost part of its fuselage over the Pacific Ocean due to a problem with the baggage compartment door. Although the plane did not crash and was able to limp back to Honolulu, some passengers seated over the door were sucked into the starboard engines.

The unease turns to dread, and then to full-fledged panic. Convinced I’m about to die, I turn my head from the window and grip the armrests as my heart pounds and sweat pours out of me. I sit in silent terror for a few awful moments. Finally the plane levels out and I’m able to calm down, relaxing my grip as my pulse returns to normal. The rest of the trip is uneventful, and I enjoy viewing the Rockies as we land in Denver.

That Saturday, February 1, the space shuttle Columbia breaks up in the same area, killing seven astronauts.

Saturday, October 7, 2006 - I have a vivid dream about J oseph, a sixty-five year old family member.

He appears to be sitting outside his home, with the green hills of central California behind him and a bright blue sky overhead. A small child stands next to him, but its face is blurred. Joseph looks at me sadly, as if saying goodbye, but does not speak. In a flash, I realize he is dead.

I tell Margaret about the dream when I wake up. We decide not to say anything. On November 10, Joseph falls from a ladder while picking fruit and dies shortly after. When we learn of it, I feel numb and regret not speaking out.

Maybe someone snuck into our house in January 2000 and moved the pillows without disturbing anything else, and perhaps it was coincidence that I thought I was about to die horrifically four days before the Columbia disaster, but now we know we’re in the Twilight Zone. I’ve been a strong materialist ever since graduating from college with an industrial engineering degree. I’m not an atheist but always disliked religious doctrine, viewed God as an uninvolved Prime Mover, and the afterlife as an unanswerable question.

By 2009, I’m worried about the three-year interval between these events. Despite the fear of being disbelieved and ridiculed, I begin discussing them with family members and friends. The typical reaction: “If you have a dream about me, I don’t want to know about it!” On Mother’s Day, I learn that Joseph had a daughter by a previous marriage that fell and died at age 6. Now I know the identity of the child in the dream.

Wednesday, December 16, 2009 - I’m falling asleep as Margaret gets ready for bed, but then wake up and frantically call her from the bathroom. I tell her I need to do something about these premonitions, although I don’t remember dreaming and have no idea why I’m saying this. I calm down and we go to sleep.

Five days later, a fourteen year old family member named Jasmine dies unexpectedly. She had been ill with strep throat but seemed to be recovering. In keeping with the cultural and religious traditions of Margaret's family, eight days of rosaries are held. Margaret and I agree to host the rosaries since our house is large enough to accommodate the family as well as Jasmine's friends, schoolmates and teachers.

A month after Jasmine’s death, on January 21, 2010, I dream of a scene with Margaret’s family. Eve-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology ryone is seated in rows facing me. Family members start looking behind me with fear in their eyes and say, “It’s coming, it’s coming!” I feel a presence looming behind me, and something grabs my heart. I wake up yelling, “Get the hell away from me!” It’s dark and Margaret sleeps beside me. I go back to sleep. Was this the rest of the dream from December 16?

Shortly after this, we learn of Jasmine’s autopsy results and final moments. An infection had attacked her heart. As she was dying in the hospital, she yelled “It’s coming!” and tried to hide.

After Jasmine’s death, I have to find out what is happening and begin searching the Web for answers. I discover the Parapsychological Association (http://parapsych.org), an affiliate of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and become a supporting member. Soon I’m reading books, journals and bulletins from professionals directly involved with the scientific study of psychic phenomena. The statistics and industrial psychology courses I took forty years earlier really come in handy.

Friday, July 20, 2012 - I dream I’m in the Denver area, but have no idea why. It’s at night and small groups of people are standing around quietly. Then I move down a darkened street and stop next to a Prairie or Craftsman-style bungalow with a front porch supported by thick tapered posts. I look at it for a moment, and then wake up.

I turn on the television to learn of the theater shootings in Aurora.

Discussion These episodes ranged from unsettling to surreal to absolutely terrifying, and timing varied from five weeks before to a month after the connected event. I felt the terror of death with the Columbia astronauts and Jasmine, contrasted by calm acceptance in the case of Joseph and the Aurora victim.

They did have common elements:  They all concerned lives cut short by tragic unexpected death.  Each precognitive dream had significant details that didn’t make sense until later. Joseph’s included a girl I didn’t learn about for three years. In Jasmine’s case, the heart pain, the words, “It’s coming,” and my urge to hide or flee were echoes from her last moments. In the 2012 dream, I knew I was in the Denver area, although it was dark and I saw nothing except the people and the house.  They happened every three years.  Each was connected with a girl who died or was already in spirit. The first two were on Mary’s birthday.

Joseph’s daughter appeared in the next one. The fourth involved a fourteen year old girl, and there was a six year old female victim in the Aurora shootings.

The first two elements occur often in cases of precognition. Disasters and tragedies create large sudden increases in entropy, the scientific term for chaos or disorder. As a survival mechanism, humans and other beings may unconsciously sense these changes before they happen. Radin (2006) has demonstrated this in presentiment experiments using photographs with strong emotional content. In remote viewing, another field of parapsychology, S. A. Schwartz (2007) found that practitioners are drawn to objects where energetic change creates high entropy.

Dream confirmation, the second common element, is reported in cases of near-death (NDE) and out-ofbody experiences (OBE) as well as precognition. Alexander (2012) learned four months after his NDE that a woman he encountered was a deceased sister he never knew. Van Lommel (2010) reported several NDEs. Although the experience may be surreal, there are accurate details to ground it and guarantee validity, demonstrating that the dream is not a fantasy or random visualization, but a connection with the spiritual realm. For me, those moments provided the most convincing proof for life after death and the existence of the soul. I felt as if I was temporarily possessed, and experiencing the world through the senses of those who died. It was

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology utterly unique, and not a feeling one forgets. The last two elements are definitely uncommon and much harder to explain, unless one considers the possibility that spirits can control events in the material world, or of concepts such as reincarnation and karma.

The movement of sofa pillows at Vincent’s death would lend support to the first possibility. In their study of recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis (RSPK), Roll and Joines (2013) theorize that a PK agent undergoing a disturbing event or interpersonal conflict may experience temporary seizure-like conditions in the brain that generate weak electromagnetic emissions, but the effect usually extends no more than fifty feet.

Vincent was approximately four miles from our house when he fell unconscious; at the hospital he was about seven miles away. Since this was a one-time event, an RSPK model may not apply unless the underlying mechanism is similar. Perhaps the intensity of the crisis produced a focused intent sufficient to span the distance.

If Vincent was not the agent, was it Mary, or could the two collaborate? Could Margaret or I have been the agent when we were in proximity to the house? If so, it would either be an unconscious response to an unconsciously-received telepathic message from Vincent or someone who knew of his plight, if that is possible, or a PK event unrelated to Vincent’s death. Some PK events involve items flying around in apparently uncontrolled fashion, but in this case the pillows were moved and placed precisely, requiring focus and dexterity. If it was Vincent, he may have thought he was still at the bar playing pool, but by 2000 we had dismantled and stored the pool table in order to convert the family room into our new kitchen. Perhaps moving the pillows was his way to leave a calling card when he couldn’t run the table.

Shortly after July 5, 2010, when I sent my membership application to the Parapsychological Association, we began to have RSPK events at the house. Margaret and I were both home when they happened.

On Saturday, July 10, I woke up and found five rarely-used pill bottles scattered on their sides among the dishes on the kitchen counter, directly beneath the cabinet they occupied. Inside the cabinet, the bottles in front of them were undisturbed. I don’t recall if the cabinet door was open or shut. Three weeks later, on Saturday, July 31, I woke up, opened the door of the bathroom cabinet and found a tube of petroleum jelly moved.

It was placed precisely in a spot to raise the above shelf, where the contents sat tilted but undisturbed. Either I did it in my sleep or a PK agent was responsible, but focus and dexterity had apparently returned.

Nearly six weeks later, on Friday, September 10, I saw a large round white light with no navigation lights move slowly and silently across the night sky. It stopped and hovered for a few seconds, then shot straight up and disappeared. A faint white trail that terminated in a small red dot was visible as it rose. If this was ball lightning, it may have been psychokinetic in origin.

There was one last minor event on November 11, four years after Joseph’s death. I dreamed of waking up in a hospital bed, but didn’t know how I got there. Nobody noticed as I got out of bed, pulled the sheets around me and walked out of that room into a waiting room full of people I didn’t recognize. I left the waiting room and went into a hallway looking for Margaret. No one was there, but when I turned around there was a bright light. As I began walking toward it, I woke up.

Perhaps I was experiencing Joseph’s journey to the afterlife, but it’s also possible I created that dream without assistance. I thought about finding the hospital where he died, but didn’t want to remind family members of that day. If I’m ever in Colorado, I may look for the house from the 2012 dream.

Conclusion The three-year interval and connection with spirits of young girls that are common threads in these ex-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology periences remain mysteries. I’ve wondered if the association with January 28 meant these deaths were part of a plan to get my attention or to awaken my spirituality. If so, the waste of human life is appalling, and I simply can’t accept that so much suffering was necessary, unless to pay karmic debt. I do think I’m a better and happier person as a result of these experiences, but I haven’t felt the urge to renounce my lifestyle and become a saint, at least not yet.

The three-year interval may have a psychokinetic basis, but if so, it goes back to the question of agency and purpose. Other possibilities are that I sent these psychic episodes from my future self (Taylor, 2013), or arranged them as part of a pre-incarnation plan before I was born. These scenarios are more plausible in the last three episodes, as they were all dreams. In the case of Columbia, it is impossible to conceive of the number of individual pre-determined acts by me and others that resulted in those conditions on that date. If Mary orchestrated the January 28 episodes, she did an incredible job.

A pre-incarnation plan would also explain the connection with young girls’ spirits. Not all tragedies happen because of karma, but in some cases, especially with the souls of children, a spirit may choose to incarnate in a life that ends this way in order to work off bad karma or earn good karma. An old soul who has experienced many lifetimes may willingly incarnate in a body that will die young from illness or accident (Bostwick, 2007). I often thought that Jasmine had much more grace and sweetness than other children, and wondered where that came from.

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about this chain of events, looking for conventional explanations and possible errors in my recollections. I’m very fortunate to have Margaret as a witness to some of them, and also to have so many date-specific associations. The best, simplest, most direct explanation for this set of facts is that these were contacts with personalities who once lived on Earth. They continue to exist in an afterlife, and communicate with us, influence our thoughts and actions, channel healing energy, move objects, change matter, and provide glimpses of a spiritual reality beyond anything we can comprehend.

Not all personalities in the afterlife are benign angels. Such spirits indeed exist, but so do those have not progressed, and retain the flaws, addictions and behavior they died with. The spiritual realm is divided into at least seven planes, with the lower levels inhabited by those who, for example, frequent bars to get the essence of alcohol (Bostwick, 2007). Perhaps Vincent fell victim to one. With habitual use, the Ouija board can summon a malevolent spirit who infiltrates the user’s consciousness (Zammit, 2013). The afterlife can be as beautiful as heaven or dark as hell.

Another inescapable conclusion is that the future is known to some extent, although the degree is uncertain and may depend on free will. Would anything have changed if I had warned Joseph about my dream or the family about the strange episode before Jasmine’s death? Possibly. If able to comprehend them, I will certainly take such prophetic events much more seriously in the future, although they seem to have become more fleeting and vague over time. My conscious mind may be trying to avoid these experiences.

Which brings me to 2015.

Hopefully the knowledge gained over the last fourteen years will help me understand and prepare for whatever lies ahead. The prospect of another connection with lives cut short is not appealing, although it is part of the cycle of birth and rebirth. Despite the sad nature of these experiences, I feel extremely blessed because I know beyond a reasonable doubt that we survive bodily death, and are possibly eternal. Bostwick (2007) describes how many people aren’t ready for the transition, and that those who die unexpectedly, as in these cases, have an even harder adjustment. Someone who is killed instantly may not realize they are dead for some time, and need counseling in the afterlife to understand what has happened.

If life is eternal, then our purpose in coming here is to learn, grow and evolve. I’ve found an extensive

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology body of knowledge about psychic phenomena, the survival hypothesis and reincarnation since joining the Parapsychological Association, in addition to abundant and compelling information concerning the afterlife and karma. If I can accept everything as real that has happened so far, it isn’t much of a leap to seriously entertain the latter.

That presents a problem, however. While parapsychology can be studied scientifically and reincarnation has been proven by careful investigation of personal accounts, the afterlife and karma are only known by dialogue with the spiritual realm through mediumship, or by past-life regression. Both present challenges.

Mediums must translate the thoughts and images they receive into words and an unfamiliar concept may be difficult to articulate. There have been documented successes, such as the cross-correspondences conducted by a deceased Frederic Myers from 1901 to 1932 with up to a dozen mediums, where the messages received made no sense individually but formed a coherent communication from the afterlife when combined. But it was a laborious process; at times the mediums lost patience conveying words they couldn’t understand from the scholarly Myers (Carter, 2012).

I have seen mediums perform in public and been impressed by their abilities, and also, as Robertson (2013) describes, by the trust they place in the information they relay and the courage it takes to face an audience. While individual readings may be accurate and veridical, books about mediumship and past-life regression offer widely different answers to basic questions such as the number of times we reincarnate. Is it eight, eighty, or eight hundred? Prophet and Spadaro (2001) hold that abortion tragically disrupts divinely-inspired pre-incarnation plans, while Weiss (1988) and Bostwick (2007) assert that it is more of a mutual decision by the spirits of the mother and fetus. The karmic benefits of crime reductions from legalized abortion (Levitt and Dubner, 2005) are not mentioned. Assisted suicide is against divine law, according to Martin and Moraitis (2010), while Bostwick relays gratitude from spirits who were assisted by Dr. Kevorkian and call themselves “Jack’s Group.” These disparities make one wonder if some mediums allow personal views to influence their readings, or if they reflect a diversity of viewpoints in the spiritual realm. The topic of collective karma, especially concerning race, requires careful interpretation to avoid misunderstanding and over-generalization.

The impetus for completing this project came from a visit to the Spiritualist Church of Two Worlds in San Leandro, California, and it is also an intriguing story. I got an inspiration to start a website about my experiences in late 2013, but between the holidays and other priorities, I had not returned to the project. In midJanuary 2014 I felt an urgent need to attend a Spiritualist Church and found it on the Internet. Everyone was very friendly and welcoming, and I relaxed and felt much better during the healing part of the service. Then the mediums began approaching people in the audience and offering to connect them with departed loved ones.

Although she knew absolutely nothing about me, a medium said that the vibrations of my mother and grandmother were present and had a message for me – to get started on the project and not worry about how to finish it.

I’m 63 but look younger, so it’s conceivable that my mother is still alive, yet the medium knew without hesitation that Mom was in spirit and at her side. She identified loved ones and gave specific messages to others in the audience, so my experience was not unusual. I didn’t always listen to my mother or grandmother when growing up, but I’m trying to make amends for that now. I began writing this narrative for the website but when I learned about the Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology, I decided to submit it here first.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology References Alexander, E. (2012). Proof of Heaven. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Bostwick, M. (2007). W hat goes on beyond the pearly gates? Bandon, OR: Robert D. Reed.

Carter, C. (2012). Science and the afterlife experience. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions.

Levitt, S. D. and Dubner, S. J. (2005). Freakonomics. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Martin, B. and Moraitis, D. (2010). Karma and reincarnation. New York, NY: Tarcher/ Penguin Prophet, E. C. and Spadaro, P. R. (2001). Karma and reincarnation. Gardiner, MT: Summit.

Radin, D. (2006). Entangled minds. New York, NY: Paraview/Simon & Schuster.

Robertson, T. J. (2013). Things you can do when you’re dead. Guildford, UK: White Crow.

Roll, W. G. and Joines, W. T. (2013). RSPK and consciousness. Journal of Parapsychology, 77, 192-211.

Schwartz, S. A. (2007). Opening to the infinite. Buda, TX: Nemoseen.

Taylor, J. (2013). The Nature of Precognition. Journal of parapsychology 77, 177-179.

Van Lommel, P. (2010). Consciousness beyond life. New York, NY: Harper/Collins.

Weiss, B. (1988). Many lives, many masters. New York, NY: Fireside/Simon & Schuster.

Zammit, V. and Zammit, W. (2013). A lawyer presents the evidence for the afterlife. Guildford, UK: White Crow.

Biography Brad Fulton is retired and lives in the San Francisco Bay Area. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in industrial engineering and a master’s degree in business administration. His interests include parapsychology and cosmology.

bradfult@gmail.com

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Live a Psychic Day Julie Hagen Abstract This is a personal account regarding precognitive experiences and synchronicities.

Keywords: Exceptional experiences, personal account, precognition, synchronicity

Each day brings welcome psychic opportunities and confirmation that I have uncovered the science of how information moves through thin air. The simple nature of the process can be so subtle that to some it might seem coincidence or luck, but to me it is part of the physical laws that govern life. Travel with me through a normal day and see for yourself how powerful our own psychic abilities can be.

A day in my normal life starts simply with a shower to prepare for the day. It is there that I “hear” the word glutathione repeat in my head. Having neither the time nor the knowledge to know what that means I leave well enough alone and go about my day.

First order of business is my early morning dental appointment, which I allotted plenty of time for the travel across town. As the traffic slowed my nerves almost started to work against me. The way it was planned, I was to arrive a few minutes early, now I would certainly be late. Time to send out a signal for change, I called the dental office and explained my location and the congestion. The cheerful receptionist informs me that just before my call, regarding my 10:00 a.m. appointment, the 11:00 a.m. patient had called and canceled.

She offered to move me into that slot. Which allowed me to be 20 minutes early instead of 40 minutes late, my message hit the perfect target. As with every cleaning my hygienist has some small talk to distract from any nervous feeling that might come on. She asked me during that visit if I had ever been to the Bakken Museum of Electricity. Barb the hygienist said that she had been thinking about me, and thought I might find the Museum interesting. Shocked, I didn’t even know there was a museum of electricity, all my work is related to electricity, it was confirmation I was on the right track. No time for a museum today so off I went.

After the dentist I needed some retail therapy, the joy is finding something special. I spotted a thrift store and sent a signal for a piece of my linden hills pottery to be for sale. It’s a beautiful light background with hand painted fuschia flowers made in Minnesota. Thanks to being normal, I went into the store and forgot what I went in for. Distracted by books, lamps, and baskets I wandered through the store. Turning into one of the isles, I leapt towards a linden hills pottery vase, 12” tall by 4” wide it was glorious. I had never seen this pattern of leaf only, it was beautiful. Different than I imagined but perfect for me, and at $2.99 I had saved over $30.00 from a full price at their art booth.

That had me floating on cloud nine, my dental appointment was saved and I got my pottery. Tickled by the find, I wanted to share my excitement, I called my boyfriend. He works during the day and didn’t really appreciate the interruption about the thrift store. He didn’t say any particularly mean words but in his tone I felt the call didn’t go well. Wondering if he was mad or just limited for time I drove on and asked for a clue for clarity. I realized it wasn’t so terribly important and reached to turn the radio on. The instant it was clicked on was the same instant that Foreigner’s Double Vision began to play. My boyfriend’s favorite guitar feature in a song, I cranked it up and smiled knowing he wasn’t mad, just busy.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Next on the list of things to do was go to my brother’s house. He had been to our parent’s the weekend before and brought my golf hat that I had left behind. So after retrieving my hat, we did the usual update chit chat in the garage as he checked my car over for any maintenance it might need. As we talked, he asked me if I remembered an embroidered pheasant our Aunt had made many years ago. I said, “Sure, why?” He asked if I knew she embroidered her signature into the piece, I said, “Yup, she did.” My brother said he was thinking about that for about a month or so. I said, “Really? You’re thinking about that?” Our aunt had passed away the previous year and had made the pheasant at least 30 years earlier. My brother said it was strange to him, but whenever he relaxed like when he was walking to the mailbox, mowing the yard, washing his car, he would see that picture in his mind. I said maybe Joyce is putting it there for you to see. He went on to tell me when he was about to leave our parent’s house, Dad brought the pheasant to him and asked if he would be interested in having it. My brother was puzzled and asked Dad why? Dad told him he had been thinking about it for a month and thought he might like it. I was excited by the connection from my aunt to my brother and father.

Then I was invited into my brother’s house to see where he hung it. In the entry, where there is textured wallpaper which matches the picture to perfection. My brother was so thrilled to get it and so puzzled how it happened.

Onward back home, I called my parents to let them know I got my hat back. My Mother was in the mood to talk and took over the direction of the conversation. She asked me if I knew what the most important historical discovery was. She went on to tell me that it was electro-magnetism. That changed the modern world. All the radar, radio television, cell phone signals all are possible after the discovery of electromagnetism. Going on with her story she explained that before that farm kitchens had metal counters and cupboards, but the electro-magnetic waves that would drift off the wires passing by would cause too much sparks and currents, so metal was changed to wood and later Formica. Dairy farms near any of the major power lines went out of production because the cows would get shocked from the stanchions. There was a need to understand and manage electricity early on. I talked to her about my understanding of the human body’s production of electricity and its twin electromagnetism. She told me that whenever there is a new idea it is met with opposition from the skeptics. She told me when she was a child people were trying to say there was wind. The skeptics said, “There’s no such thing.” Even with the evidence of the impact of wind, being invisible made it a difficult concept in convincing the mass population. Air is just air. There was great opposition to the concept of air being made up of various elements e.g. oxygen, hydrogen, etc. She told me to be glad that I am living in a day and age where new ideas and new thoughts don’t get you run out of town or even worse.

That conversation lasted all the way home, encouraged I was on the right track I had to shift back to reality. Laundry, house work, and cooking the never ending chores, but before going back inside I thought I should get the mail. As I walked to the mailbox, I felt a nudge on my left side. At that particular instant I wondered about my class reunion. I shrugged it off as I had no interest in a class reunion. I quickly calculated the year to graduation year ratio. “Weird, it’s a match.” How do 35 years pass so fast? My mind wandered to the last reunion I attended 5th, 10th, and 15th. I swore I would never go to another. The loud music that played at the parties always jangled my nerves. Finally got to the mailbox and low and behold there it is the invitation to Save-The-Date for the class reunion. Being the target of information traveling on a wave, I understood there may be a physical alert system of the nudge I had just experienced.

Before I knew it, the clock showed it was time for work. On the way, I stopped for gas in my little town. Was it coincidence my chiropractor/nutritionist was on the other side of the gas pump? After the friendly hellos, glutathione could be heard in my ear again, so I asked him, “Hey Dr., what does glutathione do?” He knew right away; “Helps with kidney function, you can get it in an avocado or in a couple different supple-

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology ments.” I thanked him and wished him well smiling with the “I should have known” smile. My Mother had recently been diagnosed with low kidney function. While chatting with my brother it was one of the things we discussed, we have both experienced early warning signs and agreed we have inherited that weakness. With that I was on the road to work at the local casino.

I have proudly been able to send a signal out for individual customers to come to our workplace for quite some time. I will say a name, identifying who I have commanded to come in and during our shift that person will come in. My gift of ability has transitioned to offering to call in customers for other employees, all with pinpoint accuracy and success. Today was different. I couldn’t decide who to call for. My joy at saving the dental appointment, my brother with the pheasant picture and the class reunion invite still had me revved up. I really didn’t need a customer to come in for a pick me up. Almost an hour into the shift, a supervisor approached me and asked who I had signaled. I told him I hadn’t. I offered for him and he responded, “Why don’t you just call in every big tipper, so you can make a bunch of money?” That was genius. One by one they came in and by the halfway point of the shift we had 5 of the biggest players of all time. That supervisor complemented me several times on what a good job I did. No surprise to either of us, we made more money than any other shift in our at least recent history.

When that glorious day came to an end, I still couldn’t find my car in the parking lot and still living in my little condo with bills to pay. But the joy in my happy heart, and my understanding of how to move information by using my own body is pretty amazing. When embraced by the rest of the world this idea that psychic information and the law of attraction is activated by the electro-magnetic wave released when electricity flows through the nervous system will change life as we know it. The tingle in the spine, goose bumps, and high level excitement are indicators that electricity is surging in the nervous system, add to that any information, desire, image, or message at that same moment and they will bond. When released that wave carrying information will magnetically attract the perfect match to your dreams. Psychic messages reach the target like chemical bonds that form naturally.

Listen to how many times the reference to vibes, energy, amped up, charged up, animal magnetism, (relationship) chemistry, sparks flying (between new lovers) and other electrical references in our language identify human interaction to confirm this reality. When an event is given fate, destiny, happenstance, coincidence or luck as a reason for existing, it was more likely the physical science law that carries dreams on an electro-magnetic wave, is responsible. As we go forward to understand more on the duality of electromagnetism we will embrace the idea that those waves are released with every electrical pulse or current and are capable of carrying information. In the same way that we experience the sixth sense or sense danger, electromagnetic waves have delivered information and our brain to interpret as a form of communication. The law of thermodynamics gives us the concept of “nothing moves without adding energy.” Electro-magnetic waves will provide the energy to move thoughts.

Biography Julie Hagen was born with the gift of psychic ability and insight to identify what she calls the physical science law of “the Duality of Electromagnetism.” She puts forth in detail in her book A re Y ou V ibrating?, that bio-electrical electromagnetism is the energy source for the activation of the law of attraction as well as every psychic message sent or received. Julie attended the University of Wisconsin River Falls and enjoys northern Minnesota lakes and recreation. juliehagen@msn.com

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Trance/Journey Work with the Ancient Horned God of Great Britain: A Collection of Four Paintings Christina Marvel

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He Who Guards Inner Torment

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He Who Guards the Grove

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He Who Hides Within Biography

Christina originally studied English in Ohio and while there, fell in love with art. She envied how artists could create worlds with paint and brush: vivid vibrant worlds full of rich color and form. She started with painting her poems in simple forms. Later, she took night classes to fill in some of the gaps in her training. In some circles, she is known as a spiritual artist but she sees herself as a poet who loves to paint. Most days, you can find her under a tree with a good book or in front of canvas.

christinamosher@gmail.com

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Letters to the Editor & Book Reviews

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Domestic Abuse Rehabilitation: A research proposal Terence Palmer

Abstract Scientific research begins with the observation of unexplained phenomena or anecdotal evidence.

This paper centres on an anecdote from my own personal experience, and provides the foundation for a research proposal that is designed to test the hypothesis that emerged from the experience.

Domestic Violence - The Facts

The U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS) outlines the stark facts and figures for domestic violence in England and Wales.

In England and Wales:            

Domestic abuse results in 125 deaths a year.

Two women are killed by a partner or ex-partner each week.

One man is killed every second week.

Domestic abuse has more repeat victims than any other crime.

On average, there will have been 35 assaults before a victim calls the police.

One in four women and one in six men suffer domestic abuse in their lifetime (Council of Europe 2002; Home Office).

635,000 incidents were reported in England and Wales in 2001/02 - 81 per cent of the victims were women and 19 per cent were men (Home Office).

It is estimated that police receive a call from a victim of domestic abuse every minute (Stanko 2000; Home Office).

Domestic abuse incidents account for 16 per cent of all violent crime (Home Office).

Less than 35 per cent of actual domestic abuse is reported to the police. Some surveys put the proportion as low as 11 per cent (Stanko 2000; Home Office).

Domestic abuse costs the UK NHS £1.22 billion per year in addressing the physical damage.

The costs in related mental health services are estimated at £0.25 billion per year.

An Anecdote

In 2006 I was invited to be interviewed for a television documentary on complementary therapies in the United States. I can’t remember the precise date, but it was on a Sunday in January when I boarded the aircraft at Gatwick that was bound for Chicago where I would make my connection for my final destination, New York. I settled into my seat and a man in his mid-forties settled into his seat beside me. I attempted to engage

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology him in conversation in order to alleviate the boredom of a seven-hour flight, but to no avail. He was more interested in reading his Sunday papers and sleeping for the duration of the flight. We didn’t engage in any conversation until the aircraft began its descent into Chicago. This was when he asked me the reason for my trip to the US. When I told him he informed me that he had been in psychotherapy for the past twelve years. I didn’t ask him what the problem was and he didn’t volunteer the information, but as we were leaving the aircraft, on a spontaneous impulse I asked him. “What is it that makes you value yourself less than does your own creator?” My question stopped him in his tracks, and he replied, “I have been in therapy for twelve years and you have just given me the solution to my problem. Thank you.” He went on his way with a huge smile on his face, and I never saw him again.

After my interview for the TV documentary I was introduced to a man who was responsible for running a rehabilitation programme for convicted wife beaters and sexual abusers. These felons were ordered by a court of law to attend the course for one year in order for them to learn how to control their abusive tendencies.

The facilitator was a man who had served in the US military in Vietnam, and struck me as a strong and capable manager of men who had serious aggressive problems. I shall call him Richard. Richard had been the facilitator of the programme for fifteen years. I asked him what his success rate was and he told me that it was about 85%. I told him that I thought it was an impressive achievement, and asked him if he would be interested in improving it further. He raised an eyebrow in surprise and replied in the affirmative. “OK.” I said. “Sit down and I will show you how right now.”

He immediately moved towards the door, making his excuses, and saying he had no time. His spontaneous resistance and his immediate attempt to escape gave me a clue of what to expect.

I reminded him that he had just told me that he would be interested in improving his success record, and I told him that this was his one and only chance to learn something that would be of great value to him and his clients. I moved to the door, closed it, and motioned for him to sit down with a gesture of an open hand to an empty chair, and saying, “Richard, this will only take a minute.” He sat down.

I took another chair and sat immediately opposite to Richard. I invited him to close his eyes and imagine that he could see my outline in his mind’s eye. I suggested that my outline may appear similar to what one may expect to see when looking at an x-ray negative, a little vague at first, light and dark. I asked him to describe what he saw from the top of my head to the bottom of my entire frame. He described what he saw just as I had suggested. The image of my head was pale light against a dark background. I asked Richard to move down my outline and describe what he saw. When he reached my hip region he described a dark shape that appeared to be attached to my right side (his left). I silently asked (in thought) for the shape to be removed, and Richard opened his eyes with a look of shock and astonishment, wide eyed with his mouth wide open. “What the hell was that?” he asked with an astonishment that matched the expression displayed on his face. “What was what?” I asked.

“One minute there was this dark patch on your right hip and the next minute there was a flash of light and it was gone. But the flash of light was so fast and so intense. What is going on here?”

“I will explain,” I replied. “But first I want you to close your eyes again and relax.”

When Richard had composed himself and closed his eyes again I invited him to imagine that mentally we had swopped places, and he was now in my position looking at himself. Immediately he began to growl like a bear and tore at his own chest as if he were trying to rid himself of some kind of restraint, like chains or bonds around his chest. Again I asked for the offending energy form to be removed and he immediately became quiet and calm. Richard opened his eyes, displaying wide-eyed astonishment and confusion. “What is going on here?” he now demanded to know. Now he was listening, and now I could tell him.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Any attempt to explain to someone such an unusual phenomenon from an objective perspective can only be met with disbelief at best or derision at worst. The only way to explain these phenomena is through a personal interactive experience; that is from the experience of physical, emotional and cognitive engagement with the phenomenon oneself. I had effectively demonstrated to Richard, through direct subjective engagement with him on different levels of consciousness, two examples of spirit attachment and release. I could now go on to explain to him what had happened.

The dark form that Richard had seen attached to me was picked up on the aircraft when it no longer had anything to hang on to when the host had realised his true value and his true nature as a spark of divine light. I asked the higher powers to remove it and what Richard witnessed was the Light removing the entity.

Then it was Richard’s turn, and I asked him to describe his own experience. He described the feeling that something was trapped within his chest and wanted desperately to escape. There was intense fear connected with this need to escape, and this was the reason why he had tried to leave at that moment when I had suggested he would learn something of value. It was not Richard that had wanted to leave – it was the entity that was attached to him, and it recognised the threat that it was about to be confronted with. For Richard, the realisation that there had been something intangible, spiritual and intelligent attached to him without his conscious knowledge or consent was beyond immediate acknowledgement, and he asked for time to reflect on the experience. Richard, the competent and highly successful facilitator of convicted domestic abusers left in a daze of confusion. Two days later he called me on the telephone.

“We have got to do something with this.” Richard was gushing. He had taken two days to think about his experience, and the more he had thought about it the more amazed he became. He knew that he had experienced something so profound that it was beyond belief, but at the same time he knew that it was a reality that was not to be denied. He had come to recognise that he, as the facilitator of a group of wife beaters in their rehabilitation, had become infected with a negative energy that had probably been attached to one of his convicted clients. He had been wondering just what were attached to his clients and to what degree these discarnate entities had been responsible for their crimes. The implications for his convicted clients and the potential for increasing his own efficacy were beyond projection at this early juncture. However, what was becoming clear to Richard was the fact that here was a procedure that had earth-shattering potentials. He concluded his telephone deliberation by saying, “What do we have to do?”

I suggested to Richard an experiment with volunteers from his group of convicted felons, and he agreed. Following these experiments with volunteers, and their positive outcomes, Richard approached his employers at the State Legislature, and he presented his case for the introduction of a spirit release procedure into the rehabilitation programme for his group. The response he received was not as dismissive as I had predicted.

They responded by saying that they would endorse an initial research project to test the efficacy of the procedure with Richard’s group of offenders if such a project were to be supervised by an accredited scientific research institution. This was accepted as a very wise response by Richard and me, and I have endeavoured to seek out such an institution for the scientific supervision of this project since that time. I am still looking for an institution to take this proposal seriously.

The implications of proving the efficacy of such a rehabilitation adjunct are wide-ranging. Consider for just a moment the benefits of reduced recidivism in domestic violence and sexual abuse in terms of rehab costs, criminal justice system costs, mental health treatment costs, and for the sufferers themselves the incalculable value in getting their own lives and their sense self, personal identity, self-efficacy and self-esteem back on track in order to live a constructive and happy life that is the prerogative of all. Now who can deny them

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology that? Anyone representing a scientific research institution with an interest in this research proposal should contact:

palmert55@gmail.com http://www.tjpalmer.org/research/

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology

Epistemological or Ontological? A Reply to Mathijsen (2013) Jean-Michel Abrassart

I was quite taken aback by Mathijsen’s reaction to my article “Paranormal Phenomena: Should Psychology Really Go Beyond the Ontological Debate?” (Abrassart, 2013). It seems that he took my article very personally. From my perspective, this article was not at all a strong critique of Mathijsen's position. I clearly stated: “I am using Mathijsen’s article (2009) only as an example in order to launch a discussion.” (Abrassart, 2013, p. 18). I thought at the time that the quote I took from his article (and that I quoted in extenso) was a good start for a discussion about the question of the ontological debate in psychology.

Many psychologists do advocate the idea that psychology shouldn’t engage in the ontological debate.

To give a concrete example of this, Mavrakis (2010), in his PhD thesis in psychiatry about the UFO phenomena, writes in his introduction (my translation from French): “We will consider in this thesis the psychiatric aspects of the phenomena. We will also consider the medical aspects, the psychological ones and the sociological reactions associated to the discussions of UFOs and their scientific study. We will not discuss the question of the reality of UFOs as physical phenomena.” (Mavrakis, 2010, p. 7). It seems to me that if there are alien spacecrafts flying daily in our atmosphere, the fact that at least some witnesses are actually reporting accurately what they are seeing should clearly be taken into account while considering the psychological aspects of the phenomena. The discussion would be quite different if the author thinks that UFOs are paranormal in nature or if he thinks that the UFO phenomena can be reduced to mundane explanations. You cannot separate the psychiatric, medial, psychological and sociological aspects of the phenomena from the model you believe is the right one to account for it (extraterrestrial hypothesis, psychosocial hypothesis, and so on). The position I was advocating in my article is that Mavrakis (for example) should “discuss the question of the reality of UFOs as physical phenomena”. Or at least, he should have stated clearly which explanatory model he subscribes to, as it informs everything else. The quantitative research I did in the context of my “European Diploma of Advanced Studies in Psychology of Religion” (Abrassart, 2010) was about paranormal beliefs and didn’t engage with the ontological problem. I did it that way because that’s what is expected from researchers in the field of psychology of religion, at least in my faculty. I think this is an unfortunate state of affairs. The ontological debate shouldn’t be limited to the field of parapsychology or to theology. There is a place for it in psychology of religion and in anomalistic psychology (especially if one advocates for an “inclusive anomalistic psychology” like Evrard, 2013). This was the topic of my article. That is to say, I didn’t have the impression of making a strong critique of Mathijsen’s position. That was not my intention at all while writing that article. I’d also like to point out that some psychologists that I have the upmost respect for do also advocate the position that psychology shouldn’t engage in the ontological debate.

One of the reasons why Mathijsen took my article very personally is that I used the word “ontological debate” in my article whereas he used “epistemological debate” in his article (in his title and several times in the text). He stated in his rebuttal: “Here, either there is a lack of understanding of the two concepts at play, which would seriously compromise Mr. Abrassart’s argument, or he is intentionally attributing ideas to me that I have never expressed, which goes against the most basic principles of good science.”. This is a classic false dichotomy: either I don’t understand those concepts or I had malign intent. I didn’t have any malign intent as I

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology explained above. I used “ontological debate” instead of “epistemological debate” beause I thought that it is what Mathijsen was really talking about, especially in the quote I was commenting on. For me, when he writes the following, he is clearly talking about the ontological debate: “In studying the impact of religion, spirituality or transcendence on the human experience, psychology does not seek to prove the existence or non-existence of God since this falls outside its paradigmatic field. Similarly, they should not, in our opinion, seek to prove or disprove paranormal phenomena as such (regardless of the form they take: real or illusory, objective or subjective), but should instead take into account that some individuals do adhere to these beliefs.” (Mathijsen, 2009, p. 329). My reading of this quote was (and still is) that psychology shouldn’t engage in the ontological debate about the existence of God and about the nature of paranormal phenomena. Psychology should study the beliefs, but not the things themselves that are believed in.

Thus, according to my reading of his article, the epistemological debate Mathijsen is referring to is “should psychology engage in the ontological debate?”. In this context, using the words “ontological debate” in my article instead of “epistemological debate” wasn’t deceptive, like he’s implying it was. Or was he talking about another epistemological debate? If this is the case, he should have been clearer. Classical examples of epistemological debates in philosophy are the demarcation problem between sciences and pseudosciences or the problem of induction. I don’t think he was actually talking about one of those in his article. Ontological questions are: Does God exist? Are there any genuine paranormal processes and, if yes, what are they? The bottom line is: Even if what I call “ontological debate” is for Mathijsen an “epistemological debate”, I didn’t think of it as a big issue at the time, just a preference in vocabulary usage.

Moreover, in his rebuttal, Mathijsen (2013, p. 52) states: “(...) the ontological debate is not, in my opinion, the domain of the psychological sciences, as the essence of paranormal phenomena cannot be established at this time with the knowledge we currently possess.”. This confirms my initial interpretation of Mathijsen’s position: for him, psychology shouldn’t engage in the ontological debate. He just adds here the reason why psychology shouldn’t do it, according to him: because we don’t have the necessary knowledge to do so, at least for now. I thus fail to see how I misrepresented his position in my article, since while clarifying his position in his rebuttal he actually confirms the view I ascribed to him originally. Moreover, in an interview for a Frenchspeaking radio channel (in the radio show “Témoins pour aujourd'hui, François Mathijsen, spécialiste du paranormal”, Radio Chrétienne Francophone Liège, broadcasted on April 1st, 2013), he makes it clear that he believes in genuine paranormal phenomena for theological (especially scriptural) reasons. He is even clearer in a recent book he wrote, “Les expériences paranormales” (Mathijsen, 2014). In this book, he distinguishes the psi hypothesis from the spi (for spiritual) hypothesis, and advocates for the second one. The spi hypothesis considers (as defined by Mathijsen) that at least some genuine paranormal phenomena are best explained by supernatural forces, especially immaterial intelligences that express themselves through a human disposition or sensibility (Mathijsen, 2014, p. 46). All of this makes clearer why he does think that psychology shouldn’t engage in the ontological debate, since he thinks that those answers can be found in theology. My own take on this issue is that if debating the existence of God indeed belongs to the fields of metaphysic and theology (especially apologetic and counter-apologetic) and not science (because of methodological naturalism), psychology is well -equipped at this point to contribute to the ontological debate about at least some paranormal phenomena.

Furthermore, Mathijsen states in his rebuttal: “...I am perplexed when Abrassart states, “The fundamental question I want to ask in this article is: is the paranormal falling outside of psychology’s paradigmatic field?” (p. 20) while the entirety of the article that he is critiquing presents an overview of the empirical litterature of the pas ten years concerning the study of paranormal beliefs in mainstream psychology (Mathijsen, 2009, pp. 319 et 320)...” (Mathijsen, 2013, p. 51). It’s seems obvious to me that studying paranormal beliefs is

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology not studying the paranormal, like studying the belief in God is not engaging the ontological question “does God exist or not?”. This shows to me that Mathijsen and me have been talking past each other, probably because the way we use concepts is not the same. He agrees on that in his rebuttal, just going one step further by asserting that if I don’t use “ontological” and “epistemological” the same way as he does, then clearly “there is a lack of understanding” on my part. Having done a master’s degree in philosophy, I find that quite insulting and, quite frankly, uncalled-for. I didn’t write about this issue in my original article because, as I stated above, this article wasn’t at all about criticizing Mathijsen. For that reason, I didn’t think it was necessary to define “ontological debate” and the way I use it in contrast to the way Mathijsen uses “epistemological debate”. I realize now that I should have.

References Abrassart, J.- M. (2010). La croyance au paranormal – Facteurs prédispositionnels et situationnels. Saar brücken, Germany : Éditions Universitaires Européennes.

Abrassart, J-M. (2013). Paranormal phenomena: Should psychology really go beyond the ontological debate?

Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology, 1(1), 18-23.

Evrard, R. (2013). What should psychology do with exceptional experiences? Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology, 1(2), 27-33.

Mathijsen, F., P. (2009). Empirical research and paranormal beliefs: Going beyond the epistemological debate in favour of the individual. A rchive for the Psychology of Religion, 31, 319-333.

Mathijsen, F., P. (2013). The study of the paranormal in psychology: An ontological or epistemological Debate? Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology, 1(2), 48-49.

Mathijsen, F., P. (2014). Les experiences pararnormales. Namur, Belgium: Editions Fidélité.

Mavrakis, D. (2010). Les OV NI : A spects psychiatriques, médico-psychologiques, sociologiques. Saarbrücken, Germany: Éditions Universitaires Européennes.

Jean-Michel Abrassart abrassart1@yahoo.fr

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Book Review Conversations with Ghosts S. Alexander Hardison

Available in paperback and for tablet

Title: Conver sations with Ghosts Authors: Alex Tanous, D.D. with Callum E. Cooper ISBN:1908733551 Publisher: White Cr ow Books Price: $14.38/ÂŁ9.99

Value may be inherently relative, but, in any case, the relevance of the topics explored in parapsychology seem to be nestled securely somewhere in the fathoms of the human psyche. Psychic phenomena, whether genuine or imagined, bring up questions; in turn, these questions can undermine many of the assumptions we make about the strata of reality. In my own view, the most quintessential inquiry, as it relates to the human enigma, is whether or not Man, as Frederic Myers once said, "has an immortal soul; or -to avoid the word immortal, which belongs to the realm of infinities- whether or no his personality involves any element which can survive bodily death"(1903, p.1).

Alex Tanous (1926-1990), a unique combination of parapsychologist and psychic, would apparently have inclined toward a positive endorsement of a hereafter and this assertion can readily be met with support if one were to even passively read through a few pages in Conversations With Ghosts. The largest portion of the material therein details personal investigations that Dr. Tanous engaged, along with his scientific consort, Dr. Karlis Osis, into hauntings and ghostly claims; how much of his assertions are the result of embellishment or exaggeration can only be gauged with good sense and, possibly, with a good deal of research into the experimentation done with Tanous at the American Society for Psychical Research and elsewhere. So, while this book does not grant one conviction as to the authenticity (or lack thereof) of some of Tanous' abilities, it does give us some sorted insight into his thoughts, beliefs, experiences and emotions; it may be that the approach he adopted is one that should be appreciated and explored more by contemporary parapsychologists.

The book is largely in first-person perspective, relayed as if Tanous were in the room with you recounting his explorations. There are six chapters and four appendices, most of which contain different examples of cases Tanous wrote that he investigated. The first chapter, affectionately titled "Ghosts and the Hunters," gives a summary of his explorations with Osis into the types of cases which the book lays emphasis (apparitions, hauntings and OBEs). The process in which requests for investigations underwent is discussed there, along with a description of some of the apparatus used when allegedly haunted sites were being inspected. Some of his thoughts on the concepts of ghosts and spirits are explored in this chapter, though the subject is elaborated on in more depth once the reader gets to chapter five.

Chapter two deals with "Houses with Multiple Manifestations," or the idea, which Tanous accepted, that some haunted places can actually contain different layers of "consciousness"; he thought that some initial trigger event could create a ripple effect on later residents to such sites, inducing behavior in them comparable to the original occurrence(s). This is labeled "the spiraling effect" and several cases are detailed therein.

Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology Chapter three will certainly spark something in any soul with an eye fond of romance stories from beyond the grave. Here we are met with loves that have allegedly survived death; persons tragically separated, in some cases, across the barren, intangible space of the unknown, immersed in a trench of longing just beyond the physical adventure. In death, it seems that these lost lovers cannot find one another, so they go on searching and, according to Tanous, sometimes they just look in the wrong places (especially if they died in different times). In this chapter, we are met with anectdotes of Ouija boards and ghosts who manage to cope with their living companions, becoming like any other ordinary household guest; all while telling their stories, a recurrent theme in Tanous' otherworldly applications of psychological therapy.

There are some nice pictures intermitted between the third and the fourth chapter, but the "Dandy House and Frolic House" take center stage next, followed by the above-referenced chapter 5: "Ghosts, Souls and Spirits?" In Callum Cooper's opening note for this chapter, he explains that the chapter had been taken from an interview with Dr. Tanous, one which shed light on his "views on hauntings, spirits and also, on characteristics of ghosts" (p.65). It is here that Tanous describes his beliefs regarding the reality of ghosts, accompanied with what Cooper calls "the more theological debate" of alleged demonic possession and its relation to ghostly phenomena. One thing, in this chapter, which might be of note to students of philosophy of mind with an interest in the paranormal, even though Tanous doesn't engage in any brilliant philosophical discourse about the nature of the "self" and its constituents, are his attempts to make distinctions between the concepts of the "spirit" and "soul" and the relevance to ghosts and apparitions (starting on p.72).

The final chapter deals with the survival question more directly and actually makes distinctions between Tanous' experiences, his beliefs and the scientific inquiry into the question of survival itself. After explaining why Tanous became so engulfed by the question, he goes on to relate some of his initial experiences as a child, the emergence of "Alex2" (his "double" in OBE experiences) and the OBE work he conducted with Osis at the ASPR. Of note, before speaking of his experiences and the scientific research he'd participated in, Tanous explained that he believed them to be equally important. Is the experiential-side a missing element for most psychical researchers and parapsychologists? The experimental aspect of Tanous' interests certainly seems to be lacking amidst most of the roaring, New-Age absorbed, belief-inclined and self-proclaimed psychics of today. But perhaps beliefs can be seen as being logical in the context that they are derived.

Cooper is to be commended for piecing together so much obscure material: as he stated in the introduction, "Dr Tanous left behind a wealth of writings, and Conversations with Ghosts was one of them. However, it was an unpublished manuscript consisting of only three chapters." Soon after, he continues, "...I felt it was time for the book to be completed by bringing together a number of Dr Tanous’ unpublished notes and personal thoughts on hauntings and apparitions, to fill in the missing gaps in the manuscript." After reading the chapters themselves, the appendixes provide additional material, including an interview that Loyd Auerbach held with Tanous (reprinted from an earlier book by Auerbach), an analysis of the Amityville "case" (if one wants to be so kind as to label it thusly), recollected memories of Tanous by his friend, Jennifer Allen, and a final one -"Alex Tanous -Ghostbuster."

Understanding the ongoing experiences of supposed psychic interaction may be something truly reserved for those with continua of it. If that really is the case, then Tanous, along with a few other "psychics" of yester-year who walked the borderland between the extraordinary and more-or-less fringe science of parapsychology, may have been onto something that the largest portion of us with an academic interest in the paranormal haven't yet grasped; not only a captivation with the mysterious chimera of transcendentality, but an immersion -a fusion- into its wings.

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Journal of Exceptional Experiences and Psychology References Myers, F. H. W. (1903). Human Personality and its Survival of Death. London: Longmans.

S. Alexander Hardison

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