Academic Preparation Kit Riga 75th International Session of the EYP

ACADEMIC

PREPARATION KIT

introduction

Dear delegates, One of my favourite things about the European Youth Parliament is the fact that it gives an opportunity for us to look at important political, social and economic issues from the point of view of a young person. Through debates we have at the EYP, you and I have a chance to look provide our opinion and our insight into how we think EU-wide issues should be addressed, and explain why matters like dealing with an ageing population are just as relevant to 16 year olds as they are to 65 year olds.

The session is a unique chance to have some of the most interesting, controversial, passionate discussions with your peers – be it during committee work, at the general assembly or during your lunch break. As someone who has spent 10 years in those committee rooms myself, I have only one piece of advice for you as you prepare for Riga 2014 – do not become that person who arrives at the session without having read a single article in preparation. Use the upcoming weeks. Do your research. Come to the session armed with expert knowledge of your topic, exciting facts and jaw-dropping statistics. Impress us not with your trendy outfits or cool playlists, but your knowledge, your insight, your brilliant ideas.

This Academic Preparation Kit has been put together by your chairs in order to provide you with a bit of inspiration and a solid starting point for your academic preparation. Do not feel limited by the information provided in this booklet - your chairs are certainly counting on you to find truly interesting and eye-opening information that stretches beyond the first page of results in a Google search. Watch videos, read articles, talk to relevant actors, attend talks - this information will be invaluable when it comes to writing your committee Resolution.

I can assure you that the delegates you will meet in Riga will be some of the brightest and most insightful young people you will ever meet. The secret is - you too are one of them. I look forward to meeting you in three weeks!

Yours, Milda Sabunaite President of the International Session of the EYP in Riga 2014

HOW TO USE THE ACADEMIC PREPARATION KIT The Academic Preparation Kit has been put together by the Chairs’ team in order to provide you with a solid starting point in your academic research for Riga 2014. We hope it provides useful guidance in understanding the committee topics and doing individual research.

Topic Overviews The overviews in this booklet have been written by the committee chairperson to offer a succinct introduction to the topic. They aim to identify the key issues and determine the topic area.

The topic overviews are written with the aim of providing a balanced representation of the issue; however, in order to encourage your critical thinking, they may raise some of the more controversial ideas that are prominent in the debate related to the topic.

Keywords The non-exhaustive list of keywords provided at the end of the overview intends to provide a starting point as you search for relevant information online and offline.

Links for Further Research Each overview comes with a compilation of links to research material that the committee chair found to be relevant and interesting for your research. The list is by no means exhaustive, and aims to encourage you to search for further information individually. Please note that the EYP is not responsible for the contents on various websites; the texts reflect the opinions of their authors only.

Research Papers In addition to individual research, each delegate is asked to write a Research Paper that reflects their analysis of the topic from various perspectives. The Research Paper should be up to 500 words in length and answer the question “What course of action can the EU take regarding the topic at hand? Briefly present 3 potential alternatives.” The Research Paper is an encouragement to approach the topic considering a variety of points of view and potential for action. It also draws your attention to research EU competences related to your topic area. Please send your Research Paper to info@eyp.org with your name, surname, country and committee in the document title. The deadline for submissions is the 3rd of March, 10am CET. Delegates may also receive additional research suggestions and assignments from their committee’s chair.

Good luck!

AFCO I

Chair: Oscar Stenbom (SE)

“It is my conviction, that the Union which 28 countries have at their disposal, with its flaws and its qualities, always a work in progress, that this Union is an essential means for Europeans to advance in the world, together.” – Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council

Safeguarding the future of the Union: To what extent is a multi-tiered or multispeed approach instrumental in ensuring greater stability of the economic and monetary union?

There are two analogies used to describe European integration; the ‘motor’and the ‘bridge’. The Franco-German ‘motor’ drives integration by forming a ‘core Europe’ that leads the way whilst the ‘bridge’ sees integration as a common path to a unified Europe.

The question of the future of the Union is as divisive as it is old; the history of the EU has been defined by constant questioning of common goals. The principle reasons for continued contention are natural differences and asymmetric benefits. Whilst we celebrate being ‘united in diversity’, our diffuse political ideals, national preferences and economic capabilities mean European nations often seek different things from the Union. To make things murkier, it can be difficult to accurately predict what the true long-term costs and benefits of integration may be. The European project is an intricate one; the scope for integration is constantly widening and deepening. Given these difficulties, what methods of integration are possible?

The unitary principle of integration, based on solidarity, aims at equally integrating all members to the same level at the same pace. This way of integration formed the thinking behind the European community as a peace project. However, in reality the community building process is a patchwork of collaborations, with different states joining at different times. It is an ever-changing venture defined by big leaps through treaties. These treaties fostered ‘differentiated integration’ – allowing integration at different paces. When lacking consensus on a unifying goal, differentiated integration, defined as letting some states integrate further in certain areas, solves the common ‘collective action’ problem where some party refuses to co-operate.

It is debatable whether the differences in integration are permanent (known as ‘variable geometry’) or temporary (‘multi-tiered’). Some cases of differentiated integration are temporary, such as Sweden’s de-facto opt-out of the Euro by intentionally not complying with the convergence criteria. The UK’s opt-out of the Euro is formally accepted by the rest of the Union, and therefore permanent.

The reality of differentiated integration was further revealed by enlargement, widening and deepening. In this context, differentiated integration became necessary to maintain the momentum of integration in light of disparate willingness and ability of the newly joined Member States to integrate.

Similarly, the ‘drag-effect’ of laggards meant that formal opt-outs were granted to states unwilling to progress in certain areas. The legal enshrinement of these opt-outs, to Denmark, the UK, Poland and Ireland, are problematic as they clash against the idea that the nations who do further integrate have a ‘gravitational pull’ and lead the way for others in a ‘transition phase’. Thus the question remains whether the practice of varied integration has gone too far, following the argument that unity also breeds stability. Furthermore, it must be determined to what degree further differences in integration are acceptable, specifically for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

The EMU, aiming for economic and monetary coordination by all 28 Member States in steps, is itself an example of differentiated integration. The two types of integration are mixed inside the EMU. The unitary principle prevails as the single market and competition policy are enforced universally. Simultaneously, ‘circles’ of European monetary governance in the Eurozone,

the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) show differentiated integration caused by unequal incentives to join the Euro. Finally, financial market infrastructure and fiscal co-ordination combine both methods, exemplified by the Banking Union and Stability & Growth Pact.

The effects of differentiated integration on the stability of the EMU are complex and paradoxical.

Unequal integration has caused imbalanced burdens in the sovereign debt crisis, although it was differentiated integration that rescued European integration from the ERM crises of the late 20th century. Shifting configurations of pacesetters and laggards within the EMU make it hard to figure out whether economic stability is supported by differentiated integration, or if stability comes from political unity.

The scope for further differences is partially determined by potential side-effects. The practice of differentiated integration has minimized the need for a greater European vision, values outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria and Article 4(3) of the Lisbon Treaty. This lack of vision has encouraged a murky, technocratic and depoliticized integration process; arguably contributing to voter indifference and the perception that the EU is unable to deal with everyday issues. Additionally, it may cause the marginalization and polarization of states not part of a ‘core Europe’. Yet, given it has also rescued the EU from the pressures and demands of a seemingly impossible unitary integration process, certified the EU’s promotion to sceptical publics and transformed a patchwork community into an entity in its own right, it may still be integral for ensuring the economic and political stability of the EMU and the Union as a whole.

Keywords: Differentiated integration, Variable geometry, Multi-speed Europe, Economic and Monetary Union, Enlargement, Core Europe, Enhanced Cooperation.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Official Sources Definition and explanation of the Economic and Monetary Union “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union” – European Council Report Council Roadmap for Completion of EMU Definition of Enhanced Cooperation Academic Sources Strengthening the Core or Splitting Europe? Prospects and Pitfalls of a Strategy of Differentiated Integration – German Institute for International and Security Affairs “Differentiated Integration in the EU – From the inside looking out” – Centre for European Policy Studies “Differentiated Integration in the European Union: Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few Data” – Holzinger & Schimmelfennig Opt-Outs Summary of UK opt-out Summary of Danish opt-out “UK needs EU opt-out” – The Telegraph UK report on JHA opt-in and Schengen opt-out Summary of Problems with the Freedom of Movement & Opt-outs from it http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25237742 Miscellaneous ‘Debateabase’ Overview of a part of European Integration Theory Timelines of European Integration: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3583801.stm http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/download/OS.15.TimelineEUIntegration.pdf

Chair: Arnolds Eizenšmits (LV)

AFCO II “That we have the vote means nothing. That we use it in the right way means everything.” Lou H. Hoover

EP elections 2014: How can the EU successfully cooperate with the governments of its Member States in order to achieve a high rate of voter turnout whilst ensuring that the electorate is well-informed?

“This time it’s different,” claims the European Parliament’s (EP) media campaign for the May 2014 elections. But in what way?

These will be the first EP elections with the Treaty of Lisbon in force, which has tried to address the concerns of insufficient legitimacy of the EU by strengthening the role of the EP – the only directly elected body of the EU. For example, for the first time, the EP will influence (though not determine) the election of the new President of the European Commission (EC).

EP elections are typically regarded by the electorate as being second-order. As a result, voters are more passive and those who do come to the polls often are more inclined to vote with their ‘hearts’ rather than making a truly informed choice. Political parties also contribute to the problem: election campaigns are organised and financed by domestic parties rather than by the political groups of the EP. Unsurprisingly, parties mostly campaign about domestic issues and on national platforms, failing to inform citizens about matters relevant on the EU level.

This creates a space for populist movements to influence the voter more easily; for example, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) might become the most voted party in May’s elections, despite having never won a single seat in the House of Commons.

Moreover, mass media is to a certain extent responsible for the lack of not only information, but also failing to generate interest about EP elections. Pan-European issues receive limited media coverage in comparison to national politics. Meanwhile, more than 8 out of 10 EU citizens say that an important boost for their motivation to vote in the EP elections could be receiving more information on EP election candidates and their programmes, on the impact of the EU and on the elections themselves.

Some argue that the problem of passive voters roots deeper – namely, in the lack of political education in the national curriculum.

When examining the extent to which voters are encouraged to take part, electoral procedures do matter, and this is one of the areas significantly influenced by Member States (MS). Currently, differences regarding many aspects of electoral procedures persist and whilst most countries allow the possibility to vote in EP elections from abroad, several confer the right to vote only to those citizens living abroad in another EU MS (e.g., Bulgaria). Moreover, elections to the EP currently take place on different days in different Member States. This limits the impression that European elections are a common endeavour.

Some steps have been taken to incentivise higher turnout on the EU level. For example, European political parties have officially committed to designate their frontrunners and nominees for the EC President post ahead of the 2014 elections, thus hoping that voters will be able to better identify the direct impact of their vote on the leadership of the next EC. Moreover, the elections were brought

forward by the EC so that they would not coincide with the Pentecost weekend, a potential deterrent.

Yet, the impact of these measures remains unclear. Both the issue of low turnout and insufficient information still seem inadequately addressed.

Ultimately, this Committee will have to consider many aspects to successfully tackle the topic at hand.

What further steps can the EU take to restore the legitimacy of the EP and to what extent is high voter turnout necessary? How can we ensure that voters make informed, thought-through decisions?

What role should national governments play in attempts to mobilise voters? What is the relevance of other actors, such as the EC or mass media, when tackling the problem of democratic deficit?

Keywords: Democratic deficit; European Parliament (EP) elections 2014; legitimacy; political education; protest vote; second-order elections; voter turnout.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background material Statistics on the voter turnout at previous EP elections ‘Voter turnout in national and 2009 European Parliament elections’ An infograph by European Parliamentary Research Service visualising differences in electoral procedures ‘One Year to Go Until the 2014 European Elections’, opinion of EU citizens on EU-related matters, including democracy and EP elections Official documents ‘The European Parliament: Electoral Procedures’, a key document contrasting common rules on the EU level with practices to be determined on the national level A consolidated version of the ‘Treaty on European Union’ (TEU), particular relevance of Title II (‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’), pages 8-9 ‘Resolution on improving the practical arrangements for the holding of the European elections in 2014’, a Resolution by the AFCO Committee of the EP on how to tackle problems related to the upcoming elections ‘Preparing for the 2014 European elections: further enhancing their democratic and efficient conduct’, a Recommendation adopted by the EC Articles ‘EU elections 2014: Online tool aims to get the youth voting’ ‘The 2014 European Parliament elections will see populist parties make gains, but they will remain a battle for control between mainstream parties’ ‘Political education classes ‘should be compulsory’’ Video material ‘Act. React. Impact.’, the advertising campaign by the EP for 2014 elections Additional material ‘The European Parliament elections 2014: Watershed or, again, washed out?’, a discussion paper by European Policy Centre ‘Why the 2014 European Elections Matter: Ten Key Votes in the 2009–2013 European Parliament’, an analysis by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies ‘Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU?’, an academic analysis by A. Follesdal (University of Oslo) and S. Hix (London School of Economics) ‘One Year to Go Until the 2014 European Elections’, elaborate results of an extensive EP Eurobarometer survey ‘Fears of a growing protest vote’, an article on the rise of populist parties

AFET

Chair: Kieran McNulty (IE)

“Democracy; from Greek dēmokratia, dēmos ‘the people’ + -kratia ‘power, rule’” – Oxford Dictionary

Following the public protests in response to Ukraine’s withdrawal from signing an association agreement with the EU: How should the EU approach Ukraine’s government and its people in developing a future relationship with its Eastern neighbour?

“And if it’s a bullet in the forehead, then it’s a bullet in the forehead, but in an honest, fair and brave way.”- Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukrainian opposition leader.

“Only an inclusive dialogue offers a viable way forward. The doors to dialogue and a political solution have to be kept open.” Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has been a point of ongoing concern for the EU with regard to its foreign policy in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the country is an important trading partner, and the EU has put effort into supporting Ukraine’s transition towards becoming a modern European democracy. It is a priority partner country of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), an EU instrument which offers financial support, economic integration, easier travel and access to EU markets in exchange for a commitment to establish the rule of law and protection of human rights.

Ukraine is also supported by the Eastern Partnership, an initiative that governs the EU’s relationship with six post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe.

In addition, Ukraine holds a symbolic value for Europe. If Ukraine was to choose a close association with the EU, it would be seen as a decisive move towards uniting Europe. Many Ukrainians have hoped for this decision. However, today’s Ukraine is a divided country, with its eastern and southern regions in particular looking towards a union with Russia.

Since 2012, the EU and Ukraine had been negotiating an Association Agreement, the successor to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement of 1998. The Association Agreement, the first agreement based on political association between the EU and any of the Eastern Partnership countries, would have established a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine. It placed high value on democratic processes and the rule of law, along with respect for fundamental human rights. However, on 21 November 2013, in an unexpected move, the Ukrainian government backed out of the deal. The decision was in part attributed to pressure from Russia, who offered Ukraine a bailout in a deal that saved the Ukrainian budget and tied the nation even closer to Russia.

Today, the headlines proclaim chaos in the country, with particular focus on its capital Kyiv. Protesters, dubbed the Euromaydan protesters, are defying President Yanukovych, who passed stringent anti-protest laws in an effort to quell dissent. These laws, among other measures, included restriction on freedom of speech and the right to assembly. In the backdrop of protests, Prime Minister Azarov resigned and the anti-protest laws were struck out by the Parliament.Currently, the world is watching as the protests became strikingly more brutal by the day, with at least 25 casualties thus far, many missing and the use of torture evidenced. The bitter events that split the capital have devolved into chaos, with escalating violence and warnings of an “anti-terrorist” operation to clear away the protesters. In the meanwhile, country is still torn between European and Russian interests, with the latter declaring that the EU should not get involved with the situation in Ukraine.

The EU’s voice towards the situation has been one of general opposition, but not necessarily one of unison. President of the European Commission Barroso has threatened action which was widely interpreted as an indirect hint at sanctions. Commissioner for European Enlargement Stefan Fule and the High Representative Catherine Ashton visited the country, urging an end to violence and a return to peaceful dialogue. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has called for

sanctions on the country. At the same time, promises of financial aid are being mentioned. With a number of potential approaches on the table, yet no consistent standpoint, the EU itself seems divided on the issue, with Poland standing out as one of the most enthusiastic proponents of Ukrainian association.

The US, on the other hand, has been more forceful, revoking visas for those linked to violence and threatening financial sanctions. It has been questioned whether Brussels and the US should co-ordinate their response in order to strengthen Western influence on the country, in a similar way as relations with Belarus are managed.

The Ukrainian people are demanding recognition and protection of their human rights, while the Ukrainian government is sending a clear indication that the EU’s involvement in the Non-Member State’s affairs is not wanted. The EU is an actor that holds economic interests in the region, yet also one that proudly declares its commitment to uphold democratic values and human rights as key values and core elements of ENP and EP. Considering the Ukraine’s backing out of the Association Agreement, the subsequent internal protests and the Ukrainian government’s harsh response to the protesters, the question remains unanswered – what approach should the EU take in its future relationship with Ukraine, considering both the short- and the long-term? Most importantly, what does the situation mean for the future of Eastern European countries and the tug of war between these states, the EU, and Russia?

Keywords: Ukraine, Euromaydan, bilateral treaties, anti-protest laws, EU foreign relations, protest, Russian-EU relations, Association Agreement.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background material A quick summary of political events in Ukraine prior to the current crisis EU policy on Ukraine Guide to the European Neighbourhood Policy A closer look at the competing interests for Ukraine Phonecall between President Barroso and President Yanukovych An overview of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine Old paper on EU and Ukrainian relations Opinions/Articles Paper on Ukraine in the EU Prospectives on Ukraine and its importance to both Europe and Russia Opinion on what the EU and US can do for Ukraine A look at possible Ukrainian accession to the EU Report and video on the current state of the crisis EU- Russian summit Article on the EU’s power in Ukraine Article on Russian affairs Additional material List of human rights violations in the country Direct updates from Ukraine Updates from the protests in Kyiv Video on the protests

Chair: Vivek Gathani (UK)

CULT I “Sport (…) is more powerful than governments in breaking down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of all types of discrimination.” – Nelson Mandela

In light of the recent outbreaks of racist and homophobic behaviour during international sports events across Europe: How can the EU aid the governing bodies of different sporting associations in the fight against discrimination?

“Hating people because of their colour is wrong. And it doesn’t matter which colour does the hating.

It’s just plain wrong” – Muhammad Ali When I was five years old, I went to my first football match. The man standing next to me in the stands was shouting the most abhorrent and racist things toward a black football player. The man was swiftly removed from the ground. Even as a five year old, I knew that the language used, from one human to another, was not something we should hear in a civilised society. Twenty years on, by almost all measures, standards of living have improved, standards of education have improved, yet discriminatory chanting at sporting events has worsened.

There are a plethora of sporting institutions who are trying to tackle the problem of discriminatory behaviour in a sporting environment. FIFA’s “Say No to Racism” campaign and the PFA’s “Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football” campaign have both been lauded by the Council of Europe, the European Commission and the sport’s governing body (FIFA) for not only fighting against racism in football but also sexism, homophobia and other forms of discrimination. Although the campaigns launched by football organisations receive the most media spotlight, the fight is not only confined to the football pitch. In recent years, there have been a number of discriminatory incidents on the basketball court and the ice hockey rink. Yet, there is a clear disparity between the attention given to football compared to other sports across Europe.

The issue has proven to be particularly prevalent with regards to the Summer and Winter Olympics of 2012 and 2014 respectively. Although London 2012 took a firm line on any form of discrimination towards the Olympians, there were still isolated instances of racist chanting from the stands. Conversely, the build up to the Winter Olympics in Sochi has been shrouded in controversy regarding the host country’s stance towards homophobia. This has sparked a response from athletes, celebrities and politicians alike with the public demonstrating their discontent through protests in Russia as well as through the “Principle 6” campaign.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 gives the EU explicit focus in the field of sport, and obliges the EU to tackle all forms of discrimination across the Member States. Currently, occurrences of discriminatory behaviour are often trusted to be dealt with at a national level. However, according to a recent report from the Fundamental Rights Agency, only 10 Member States systematically record and monitor discriminatory incidents in sporting events, while discrimination in amateur sports remains largely unaddressed. Across the EU, only 16 National Equality Bodies take an active role in tackling racist and discriminatory behaviour. On an EU level, we see a number of initiatives, platforms and institutions that work with discrimination or a specific form of discrimination in sport. Examples include the “Pride in sport” EU initiative and the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS) as well as pan-European networks of national organisations, such as Football Against Racism in Europe (FARE), Media Against Racism in Sport (MARS) and The European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

While the EU boasts a vast number of initiatives, platforms and networks that have been set up with the goal to tackle discrimination, the focus must remain on quality not quantity. The analogy says that “men can move mountains” but surely this is only the case when the men all pull in the same direction with co-ordination and co-operation? In order to effectively address outbreaks of racism, homophobia and discrimination in sport, efforts have to be concerted among the variety of actors, and means for exchange of good practice among organisations are crucial for building a strong defence line in this field.

Before answering the question of how the EU can aid the governing bodies of different sporting associations in the fight against discrimination, the Committee on Culture and Education I must first consider the following ideas: • • • • • • • • • •

What is the currently EU doing to tackle the issue of discrimination in sport?

Is this effort well coordinated?

Why are people racist in the first instance in a sporting context?

Does the age of the person matter and is education the answer?

How do we police discriminatory behaviour in a sporting environment?

What punishments should be dealt to those found guilty of discriminatory chanting?

Does banning the individual fix or simply mask the situation?

Should the punishments differ for discriminatory chanting, banners and gestures?

Is one form of discrimination worse than any other, or should they be punished equally?

Should the solution be grass roots up or top down?

The only concrete idea that this overview should leave you with is that discrimination in the field of sport is wrong, in any form. We’ve asked a lot of questions, now it’s time for you to provide the answers.

Keywords: Discrimination in sport; EPAS; FARE; FRA; MARS; ENAR.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Issue Analysis http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1203-Infosheet-racism-in-sport_EN.pdf http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/archive/pages/act05arw.htm http://www.enar-eu.org/ http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/mars/default_en.asp http://www.farenet.org/ www.principle6.org Articles www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/25104404 www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/26243455 http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/winter-olympics-2014-sochi-protesters-arrested-over-banner-citing-olympic-charters-words-against-discrimination-9115916.html http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/06/ban-ki-moon-condemns-homophobia-sochi-organiserssay-talk-sport-not-politics/ http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/03/russia-sochi-games-highlight-homophobic-violence

Chair: Christian Macht (DE)

CULT II “The main hope of a nation lies in the proper education of its youth” – Erasmus of Rotterdam

With the Pisa Report 2012 revealing a worrying disparity between educational performance across Europe: How can the EU support its Member States in providing the highest possible standard of school education?

Let’s get this right from the start: Standardised tests are deeply flawed and PISA is no exception.

Opponents criticise it for being unfair towards students unfamiliar with multiple choice formats as well as translation issues adding to the confusion. PISA has been called out for drawing conclusions based on very small margins when comparing countries, even though the differences in performance within the same nation often have higher significance than the deviation between two countries.

Standardised tests are accused of their narrow range of subjects, their blindness to social structure and cultural differences as well as the pervasive overuse of tests taking up the students’ time – time that could be better spent learning. Are standardised tests then just a very expensive random number generator?

With PISA, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills of 15-year-old students in maths, science and reading. Large-scale testing is necessary to assess global trends in education as well as to provide data that national policy makers can work with. Standardised tests help evaluate if students are learning what is expected from them through national curricula, hold educators accountable and give them feedback on gaps in learning as well as determine whether educational reforms are working as predicted. PISA has also revealed socio-economic inequity in participating nations as a factor hindering students’ success. In short, despite their flaws, tests like PISA or TIMMS are valuable tools when aiming for the highest possible standards in education.

Without a doubt, the mere presence of learning standards helps improve the effectiveness of schools and the quality of teaching by prioritising learning contents and managing expectations, making school systems more transparent. The question is not whether curricula should be implemented, but how they should be put into action; and towards what goal they should be geared. At the very core of the debate lies the question, what is the purpose of school education? Is it preparing students for a specific career or teaching them to become critical thinkers? Is it helping them to compete in a global market or preparing them for citizenship? These have all been goals that shaped education over the decades. Today, it is often modelled on economic interest and future employability rather than development of well-rounded human beings.

EU Member States address these goals very differently, with widely varying curricula and diverse school systems. The EU only has supporting competence in this field, meaning that it can only coordinate or complement actions of Member States. Is merely “contribute[ing] to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States” enough?

To build a Europe of knowledge, the EU has several of initiatives in place: programmes like ERASMUS+ and COMENIUS foster exchange, while experts from school policy working groups exchange best practices and set the agenda for the future of education. Their priority areas include focus on

competence-based learning through modernising curricula and pupil assessment, inclusion, especially of migrant children, combating early school leaving and supporting educators.

But with national approaches differing so widely, perhaps Member States should just follow the example of top performers like Finland – or are there cultural differences that make this impossible?

How can we ensure that high quality education is not just measured in numbers but is well-rounded in its pursuits including arts, health and physical well-being?

Keywords: education, learning standards, PISA, educational equity, standardised test, national education systems, educational attainment.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Video Changing Education Paradigms OECD promotional Spoken Word: I will not let exam results...

TED & PBS Talks on Education Stream from PISA 2012 Launch & Presentation Background information and issue analysis OECD official site PISA reports & Sample questions Marita Moll (Ed.): Passing the Test – The (false) promise of standardized testing EC Education and Training Eurydice – Network on education systems & policies in Europe The Glossary of Education Reform EC: EU School Report (3.12.2013) EC: Erasmus Plus Overview Measures already in place http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Educational_policies_and_initiatives_of_the_European_Union Teaching and E-Learning: The Future of Education (Article, 4.11.2013)

Chair: Osman Arda Sezer (TR)

ECON I “It is too early to declare victory (…) we must continue working to modernise the European economy, for sustainable growth and job creation.” – Olli Rehn, Vice-President of the European Commission

With the Eurozone officially out of recession and Ireland being the first country to end its bailout: What steps should be taken to sustain the momentum of the European economic recovery process, and to what extent could a social market economy model be a modern solution?

Adopted for a ten-year period in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy broadly aimed to “make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”. However, poor coordination and conflicting priorities, followed by the recession period have caused European countries to neglect Lisbon Strategy as well as the Stability and Growth Pact, and focus on shortterm stimulus packages instead. Will this be the case for the Euro 2020 strategy as well? Will the aim of “smart, sustainable, inclusive, growth” be reached by 2020? Although it applies not only for the Eurozone but for the whole EU, Euro 2020 is a starting point to examine the needs and flaws of the Eurozone.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is an independent entity, both in the political and monetary sense, and national governments are bound by treaties to respect the independence of the ECB. Furthermore, decisions made by the ECB are solely for the purpose of ensuring price stability. Interest rate adjustments and changes in foreign reserves are made regardless of the individual interests of Member States. However, the ability of structurally diverse countries within the Eurozone to comply with the disciplinary fiscal requirements varies. Countries take certain precautions, such as additional taxes, cuts in public spending and other steps to meet the requirements of the pacts. Consequently, growth pace decreases and fragmented growth occurs.

One of the main aims of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was to ensure the effective implementation of fiscal policies in the Member States. However, as countries neglect to fulfill already established deficit and national debt limits, the effects of the fiscal policies designated by the ECB become harder to predict. Hence the Euro Plus Pact (EPP), advocated by the German and French governments, was created to develop a more realistic approach towards the resolution of the Commission’s predictions since the implementation of the SGP remained inconsistent. Although EPP suggests more up-to-date goals, sets certain measures and proposes fines in case of noncompliance, it is still legally non-binding.

“If you want to be in the club, you have to play by the rules,” said the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in July 2011, three months after the creation of Euro Plus Pact; “Member States not willing to make themselves a ward may choose to make use of the option to leave the Eurozone.” Indeed, only 2 out of 18 countries in the Eurozone fully complied with the SGP and the Netherlands are not amongst them.

The concerns raised regarding the future of the Eurozone are not entirely groundless. Latest polls show that 52% of Germans do not want their next government to commit to further loans for crisis-hit countries such as Greece and Portugal and 53% of Latvians oppose the switch to the Euro.

Lack of trust in the Eurozone grows both in bailout countries and the countries providing the funds.

Fear of losing economic sovereignty and implication of harsh measures, possible spill-over effects and lack of concrete results come forward as the main reasons behind the growing skepticism.

All EU Member States (except for the United Kingdom and Denmark) are obliged to join the Eurozone as soon as they meet the criteria. Given the volatile state of the Union, anti-Euro sentiments brewing in several countries can be regarded not as “normal” but “natural”. Eurozone has technically overcome the recession, which proves the existence of a certain momentum of the recovery process.

On the other hand, unemployment rate is currently at an all time high of 12.1 per cent, the output gap is at its peak and most importantly, the overall GDP growth rate is still not close to the desired level.

Growth is the incontrovertible goal: yet through which means and at what price can it be achieved?

Is the dilemma of growth versus unfragmented growth a valid one? Can unfragmented, fast and sustainable growth be achieved in spite of structural differences and individual interests of the countries in the Eurozone? Are radical changes in the structure of the Eurozone necessary or would it only cause more volatility at the end of the day?

Keywords: European Central Bank, Eurozone crisis, Euro 2020, European Stability Mechanism, Stability and Growth Pact, Eurogroup, Euro Plus Pact, Lisbon Strategy, European Fiscal Compact, output gap, social market economy.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Official sources European Commission Regional Policy EuroGroup Work Programme of the EuroGroup Council of the EU- Multiannual Financial Framework European Semester Statistical Research http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-14112013-AP/EN/2-14112013-AP-EN. PDF http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=66&c=xx&l=en Articles ECB easing decision in March 2014 Potential Green Development in Greece Media The State of the Crisis Fiscal Union Growth expectations European Growth Comparing to US and China Additional material Ongoing Crisis European Investment Bank- Regional Development Projects European Central Bank- Role of Euro Social Market Economy

Chair: Marko Fischer (DE)

ECON II “Let me issue and control a nation’s money and I care not who writes the laws.” - Mayer A. Rothschild

With the EU moving towards a pan-European banking union: How can Europe successfully balance between EU-level and state-level regulation?

“Global banks are global in life and national in death.” – Lord Turner, former Head of the UK Financial Services Authority Sovereign states can be overwhelmed by their financial industry. The default of Lehman Brothers triggered enormous distress across the entire global financial system and led to a contraction of the global economy by -2,1%. States such as Iceland, Ireland, Spain or Cyprus were close to a sovereign bankruptcy as a result of their financial institutions’ struggles, a phenomenon called a feedback loop.

In response, the EU has resolved to establish a banking union. This became necessary because even though banks were permitted to entertain global and European businesses, they are still subject to a variety of independent national regulatory agencies, which often fail to effectively oversee these operations. Furthermore, sole national responsibility for the resolution of a defaulting bank poses a significant threat to the respective state’s national budget.

While accusations of too little regulatory success are true, the twenty biggest economies (G20), the EU and EU Member States are in the process of adopting a variety of measures intended to enhance stability in the financial industry, including credit institutions, i.e. banks, and investment firms, i.e. funds.

There are three main regulatory frameworks on the EU level, which are either being implemented or discussed: 1. Banking Union: intends to establish a common European supervision over the 15o biggest financial firms, led by the European Central Bank (ECB), called Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) and a common European mechanism for managing the default of a financial firm, called the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Additionally, some banks will need to contribute to a 50 billion Euro crisis fund and the idea of a common European deposit guarantee is envisioned for the future.

2. Capital Requirements Directive IV: essentially includes the Basel III measures, i.e. capital requirements, leverage regulation and remuneration rules.

3. EU Recovery and Resolution Directive: obliges every financial firm to prepare a recovery plan, commissions the regulators of the respective firm to draft a resolution plan and grants authority to the regulators to invoke this resolution plan, if certain conditions are met.

With regards to future crisis mechanisms, such as the banking union, there are many questions that need to be addressed in order to define the character of these measures. Firstly, which authority should the EU level regulation have, i.e. what power will the ECB assume? Currently, the complexity of the decision-making bodies makes it difficult to respond to a crisis with immediacy. But in an emergency situation, how can EU and Member State-level regulation be balanced to ensure a swift reaction? Secondly, how does the adoption of certain Eurozone-wide measures affect national sovereignty? Finally, can the ECB effectively handle this increase in responsibility or will it potentially impair its integrity in managing the Eurozone’s monetary policy?

Before the measures are implemented, the ECB is to carry out a banking stress test, examining the resilience of the banks it should supervise. Again, this stress test can cut both ways. If done properly, it would result in many European banks judged as unstable, thus further eroding confidence. But if the ECB were to ignore the banks’ weaknesses, those shall strike later and put the credibility of the ECB in question.

In addition, it is important to consider who will be the subjects of the new methods of regulation.

Should global investment banks be subject to different regulation than, for example, Deutsche Bank or Barclays? Since involvement in SSM and SRM implies paying into the crisis fund and other obligations, smaller banks are fiercely trying to remain exempt. However, financial instability in Europe was largely spread by risky loans held by smaller and even state-owned institutions.

Thus, the committee faces the following three big questions: Should the EU or Member States attain the main decision-making authority, and which institution should finally be put in charge? What further instruments need to be developed or refined to avoid financial repercussions similar to 2008?

Faced with the choice of either stability amongst financial institutions or high lending activity to support economic growth, what should the EU prioritise?

Keywords: Banking regulation; Basel III (BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision); Banking union (Single Supervision Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism, Common Deposit Protection); European Central Bank; SIFIs (Systematically Important Financial Institutions); Banking Stress Test.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Useful material Platform explaining financial terminology - http://www.investopedia.com Explanation of the development, aims and challenges of the EU’s banking union Current news, updates and comments on the banking union Video introduction to the banking union Interview and comment on the banking union plans Report on banking regulation in Europe EU Commission press release on the state of the banking union J.P. Morgan Jargon Buster Movies to watch • HBO: Too big to fail trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-g2gdYhjlsM • Lions Gate Entertainment: Margin Call trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2DqFRsPrns • Sony Pictures: Inside Job trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzrBurlJUNk • BBC: The last days of Lehman Brothers full movie: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLWIPyQXcRE • BBC: The Fall of Lehman Brothers full movie: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqOBnULi124

Chair: Kati Pärn (EE)

EMPL I “Internships are crucial to facilitate the transition from education to the labor market. With the current high levels of youth unemployment in the EU, it is essential to ensure that interns receive excellent training, the experience needed to get a job, and that they are not exploited.” –Laszlo Andor, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Internships: opportunity or exploitation? How can the EU effectively support its youth in making a smooth transition from education to employment?

Internships have become a crucial stepping-stone for young graduates gaining hands-on experience and entering the job market. Thus, the debate about internship exploitation and employers often using trainees for cheap or free labour has become increasingly relevant. the Europe 2020 Strategy names increasing the access of young people to the labour market as one of its key goals. Yet, currently most Member States do not uphold the practice of defining internships through formalised contracts which means they are not regulated to the same extent as regular employment. The lack of regulation leaves the issue in a grey zone, and calls for action in clarifying the mechanisms of equality, transparency and accountability between the employer and the trainee/intern.

Young people who enter the job market often face the demand for experience even in entry-level roles, and often have to take on several internships to enhance their employability before securing a long-term job. This raises equality questions, where those able to afford financing themselves through unpaid or low-paid work experience gain a substantial advantage in the job market. How can the EU contribute to making internships accessible for all society groups?

The unwritten obligation to gain work experience before securing employment also comes with notable economic consequences. It creates obstacles for young adults to go into employment early on, thus hampering their ability to build up savings, become self-sufficient and subsequently invest back into the economy. Taking on their first job at a later stage also delays their career development.

From the perspective of the employer, taking on trainees can be time-consuming and resource-demanding. Employers often argue that internships are an excellent opportunity to gain work-related experience and a boost to one’s employability, thus the lower pay is justified. A number of Member States legally oblige employers to pay National Minimum Wage to interns who work regular hours and make a contribution through their work, thus making many unpaid internships illegal. However, this is not a unified practice across the EU. Moreover, many countries tolerate the practice of not paying interns even though the law instructs otherwise.

This leads to a serious concern about intern abuse and using trainees for entry-level jobs, or even placing trainees in roles that should normally be taken by paid full-time employees. The number of cases reporting an unhealthy workload put on interns is rising rapidly, with more and more interns reporting circumstances where incentivised with the hope of potential employment interns find no other option but to go over the limit of a healthy workload. In August 2013, the media widely reported the death of an intern at a German bank in London, who had allegedly worked for 72 hours without sleep to stand out and be ahead of his peers and potentially secure a job with the bank after the internship.

Today, many internship roles severely lack an element of mentorship and guidance, as well as experience that would provide real insight into the relevant sector or specific company’ work. The terms of internships are rarely clearly agreed upon in advance, and are not monitored by a third party.

The situation across the EU becomes difficult to assess due to lack of comprehensive data and com-

parable statistics. The fact that currently the EU has no policy on regulating traineeships increases the potential for exploitation, and allows the employers to act as they please. However, the majority of Member States have received Corporate Social Responsibility action agendas on youth employment issues within the European Semester process, which is a cycle of fiscal and economical policy coordination in the EU. Providing guidance on how to address existing problems in traineeships is in line with the logic of the European Semester and supports attainment of commitments made by Member States for Europe 2020.

The European Commission has provided an outline of the situation in 2012 in a report “Study on a comprehensive overview on traineeships arrangements in Member States”, where the lack of or low compensation for one’s work is brought out as the main drawback of traineeships – despite many funding opportunities, such as EU funding (e.g. European Social Fund), national and regional funds, and university grants. Furthermore, the report emphasised the absence of providing social security and health insurance for the intern and not taking the responsibility to ensure the intern’s well-being.

In 2012, the European Commission started an initiative “Towards a Quality Framework on Traineeships”, which aim is to facilitate education-to-work transitions and promote mobility by increasing the quality of traineeships in the EU and thereby contribute to a reduction of youth unemployment and to sustainable job creation in EU labour markets. The initiative also refers to youth movement and promotes learning mobility. It proposes several solutions, such as creating an informative website or forming a Quality Framework for Traineeships, which could be implemented in the national legal system.

Keeping aforementioned in mind, to what extent should the EU regulate the provision of healthy working conditions and reasonable pay for trainees who are still developing their skills? In what way can the transition from education to employment be balanced and beneficial for both the trainee and employer?

Keywords: Unpaid internships, apprenticeship, internship exploitation, learning mobility, Quality Framework for Traineeships.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background material A Guidebook about Apprenticeship and Traineeship Schemes in EU27 EU measures to tackle youth unemployment McKinsey study on education and work EU’s Working Time Directive German bank intern dies due to a stressful traineeship. BBC News Measures already in place Executive summary of an analysis “Towards a Quality Framework on Traineeships” National campaign in the UK against unpaid internships European Alliance of Apprenticeships Issue analysis A study on a comprehensive overview on traineeship arrangements in Member States, pp 82-93 Youth Employment policies and activities by the European Commission A roadmap of Commission recommendation on principles for high quality traineeships HMRC targets unpaid intern employers Interns fight back after unpaid work experience http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8565629.stm Opinions Internships: the scandal of Britain’s unpaid army An opinion about intern exploitation by employers Protests about Brussels ‘intern culture’

Chair: Marie Dromey (IE)

EMPL II “The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and re-learn.� – Alvin Toffler

The age of ageing: As Europe faces the challenge of an ageing labour force, how can the EU act now in order to maintain competitiveness and sustain robust economic growth in the future?

Social and economic developments, as well as advancements in science and technology have resulted in unprecedented increases in life expectancy. This, coupled with ever-decreasing birth rates, means that in less than four decades, more than one third of the population of Europe will be over 60, and one quarter will be over the age of 65. An ageing population raises many challenges for our societies and economies, culturally, organisationally and also from an economic perspective. Ultimately, an ageing population results in the decline in the size of the work force, while simultaneously increasing demands on support mechanisms, such as retirement benefits and public healthcare.

This demographic change is expected to increase the overall economic burden in every country with an ageing society. Furthermore, this challenge varies significantly across Europe, considering the different demographic outlooks and labour market performances of Member States. Age-related government expenditure in the EU-27, including spending on pensions, healthcare, unemployment benefits, long-term care and education, is predicted to grow from 23.1% in 2007 to 25.8% in 2035 and 27.8% in 2060 . It is also worth noting the vast inconsistencies between Member States regarding retirement age, healthcare, and long-term care systems as well as various other age-related services , and the implications of these on older workers. Policy makers need to act now to ensure sustainability in the long term.

Previously the Lisbon employment objectives attempted to offset this issue by setting a 50% employment target rate in 55-64 year olds to be achieved by 2010 . In addition to this objective was not being generally achieved, there was significant variation in results between Member States, with some exceeding the objective but others not reaching it at all. By 2007, 12 Member States had already achieved the 50% target. These Member States were spread across the EU and included Finland, Denmark, and Sweden but also Portugal, Estonia, and Latvia. However, ten Member States including Poland, Italy, and Austria did not reach past 40% employment rate for older workers. As evident from these statistics many countries did not achieve the 50% employment rate for older workers but most did see a significant increase for employment rates for older workers since 2001, which is a positive sign overall.

The European Commission has set a 2020 objective of increasing the employment rate of the population aged between 20 and 64 from the existing rate of 69% up to 75%. Many Member States have already taken action to prevent the economic hardship associated with an ageing population and these range from raising the age of eligibility for a full pension, bringing retirement ages for women into line with those for men, and tightening eligibility to early retirement schemes. For instance, retirement age in Germany was increased from 65 to 67 in 2007. However, this is not a blanket solution as it may result in a situation where there are increased incidences of early retirement and claims for disability pension.

Member States need to achieve greater participation of older workers within the workforce. Simultaneously, there is also the need to develop a multifaceted approach to the issues directly created by an aging population as well as ensuring the modernisation of the labour market and the long-

term employability of workers. Policy makers need to consider how best to create robust economic environments in which the ageing population can prosper. The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs II need to identify how best the EU can act in order to ensure that the inevitable ageing population does not hinder economic sustainability and growth.

Statistics • The number of people aged 65-74 will expand substantially in the next decade, up from 46 million in 2010 to almost 55 million by 2020, thereby increasing their relative importance in the population.

• Demographic developments will continue to have a profound effect on the EU population profile between 2010 and 2020 with the peak of the age distribution rising from around 32-35 years in 2000, to 42-45 years in 2010, and 52-55 in 2020.

• Eurostat’s figures show the proportion of the population in the EU27 aged 55 and over rose from 25% in 1990 to 30% in 2010, and the number is estimated to reach around 40% by 2060.

• According to the European Commission 2009 Ageing Report, public spending on pensions is expected to increase from 10.1% of GDP in 2007 to 12.5% of GDP in 2060.

• Eurostat data: in 1960 there were on average about three youngsters (aged 0-14 years) for every elderly person (aged 65 or over), by 2060 there may be more than two elderly people for each youngster.

Keywords: Ageing workforce, ageing society, pension reform, retirement, 2020 employment objectives.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background material Employment Trends and Policies for Older Workers in a Recession The EU 11 in an Aging Europe Older workers Longer Working Life through Pension Reforms Measures already in place It’s time to manage age Issue analysis Pension projections in the EU 27 Working away at the cost of ageing 2009 Ageing Report Opinions The Ageing Demographic: Nothing to Fear but Fear itself Sweden considers raising retirement age to 75 Life-long learning can transform EU labour market

Chair: Giada Benfatto (FR)

ENVI “Modern technology, owes ecology, an apology.” – Alan M. Eddison

With around 6 million tonnes of e-waste generated in Europe annually, and continued dumping of this waste in developing countries: How can Member States act to ensure responsible management of e-waste?

E-waste is spinning out of control. The 21st century has witnessed an unparalleled increase in technology consumption. The development of these technologies is also happening faster and faster – tablets and smartphones see a new model breaking the market every year, while the average lifespan of a computer has dropped from five years in 1997 to two years in 2005. The result is that there is no incentive to repair these products, and they are quickly discarded: the fastest growing market is also turning into the fastest growing waste stream, with an expected global increase of 8% per year.

The EU alone produces around 10 million tonnes per year, a number that is expected to increase to 12.3 million by 2020, according to a United Nations University (UNU) report. However, much of the planet’s e-waste is left unaccounted for, so a precise quantification is hard. Even more worrying is that only a small part of the total amount of produced waste is recycled – a much larger quantity is dumped into developing countries, mostly West Africa, but also Pakistan, India and poorer regions of China.

While exporting waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is illegal, the study “Where are the WEEE in Africa” by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) showed that an estimated 220,000 tonnes were shipped from the EU to West Africa in 2009. It appears that typically, the illicit waste is hidden in containers carrying legitimate cargo to thwart customs inspections. However, there is also a grey zone between used electrical and electronic equipment (UEEE) and e-waste, as exportation of the former as second-hand products is permitted. Yet, the same UN study showed that in Ghana alone, 30% of imports of allegedly second-hand products were useless.

To counter these trends on the long term, a recast the EU Directive on WEEE was adopted in 2012, aiming at a separate collection of 85% of WEEE generated from 2019 onwards and including measures to make illegal exports more difficult. Member States were given until 14th of February 2014 to adopt the directive into national law. The EU legislation restricting the use of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS Directive) was also recast in 2011 to increase the level of legal clarity and develop better regulation conditions.

While this may be a solution for future prevention, it does not solve the problem of the trash already present in countries that do not have the means to process e-waste on such a large scale. Very little of the e-goods are properly recycled. While formal recycling facilities exist, the bulk of the work – collection of e-waste and extraction of raw goods, is done through informal recycling: waste-pickers that find an easy source of income in the largely toxic scrap.

Indeed, the hazards of e-waste are not few: electronic components contain lead, mercury, cadmium, barium and many other toxic elements that affect the kidneys, brain and nervous system. Furthermore, the burning of PVC – a common practice in the disposal and extraction of valuable raw material – releases dioxins, some of the most hazardous carcinogens known. It is estimated that 3-5% of the dioxins produced actually reach Europe.

In 2012, a Pan-African Forum on E-waste took place as a project of the E-Waste Africa Project (20082012) of the Basel convention. The topic is also a matter of discussion of the UNEP, with several initiatives dedicate to it, such as the UN partnership initiative StEP and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative GeSI. While the results of the new WEEE directive are yet to be seen, the current situation still demands for effective measures. The informal sector cannot be overlooked when looking for solutions, due to its strong role in societal structure and being a source of income for many. The situation thus requires for creative and innovative solutions to this new problem of the modern world.

Keywords: e-waste, Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), informal e-waste management, leaking, dumping, re-use, used electrical and electronic equipment (UEEE), toxic material.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Definitions Glossary of EU Terms Summary of EU Legislations – Glossary Official Sources Recast of the WEEE directive RoHS in EEE Disposal of Spent Batteries and Accumulators WEEE Forum Basel Convention GeSI and StEP e-Waste Academy eWASA Informative Material E-waste: National Geographic GeoPedia (very extensive and a lot of useful links) StEP e-waste world map Where are the WEEE in Africa? (must read) WEEE Report Recycling: From E-Waste to Resources Distinction between UEEE and e-waste Basel Convention: E-Waste Africa Project – Publications Case Study: Inside Italy’s E-Waste Problem (Report Annexed) Case Study: UNU Study documents Dutch e-waste flow (Report linked) Country Study: Ethiopia Media coverage/Debates Visualising the World’s E-Waste Problem West-African Nations pay a price for EU waste Pan-African Forum on E-Waste Britain’s e-waste leaking illegally into West-Africa Europe breaking electronic waste export ban E-waste: Annual Gold, Silver “Deposits” in New High-Tech Goods Worth $21 Billion+; Less Than 15% Recovered Video material E-Waste Hell E-Waste from Antwerp to Ghana

ITRE

Chair: Alex Proctor (FI)

“We must avoid 28 Member States with 28 different agendas doing bilateral deals, each seeking national interests to the detriment of its neighbours. We need solidarity; seeing that, as one, Europe is far better equipped to compete, and win, in today’s tough energy world.” –Gunther Oettinger, Commissioner for Energy

With the South Stream bilateral agreements declared “in breach of EU law” by the European Commission: How can the EU work towards achieving energy security whilst underlining the need for adherence to its energy and environmental legislation?

Control over key energy resources, coal in particular, was at the heart of integration when Europe began to rise from the ashes of the Second World War and formed the Coal and Steel Community.

Energy has been fought over; held unions together; and now it is said it has upheld a prominent part in maintaining European peace. In the 21st century, the European Union sees moving towards a common energy policy as the key to addressing various European challenges, such as climate change, energy security and dependence on external parties, particularly regarding gas.

The Energy Community, an assembly of countries with the EU at its core, was formed in 2006 to bring Europe stability, development and security regarding energy – thus taking a major step in unifying Europe’s energy front. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU competence over energy supply and changes to energy policy within the EU, also placing the Energy Community under EU energy law. In 2009, the Third Energy Package (TEP) came into force, aiming to diversify the energy supply market by making it more competitive, secure and sustainable.

The EU consumes one fifth of all the energy in the world; with the energy demand only said to grow.

The scarcity of internal resources and limited infrastructure for transmitting, distributing, and trading energy currently leave European energy security greatly deficient. The EU is still left extremely dependent on imported gas, despite efforts to ensure a competitive energy market and the 2020 targets: to enhance energy efficiency and raise the role of renewables.

The uniform development in the field of energy has led to comprehensive legislation and jointly approved targets regarding energy policy. However, on December 4, 2013, the European Commission found the bilateral agreements regarding South Stream pipeline between Russia and Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, and Serbia, “in breach of EU law” with regard to competition rules, ownership unbundling policies and the Gas Directive. All states are parties to the Energy Community; all operate under European energy policy; and all are aware of European legislation. What led seven countries to consciously “breach EU law” and where does that leave the common European goals towards reaching an energy-secure Europe?

Russia has always played a dominant part in European energy politics. Over half of the EU-27’s gross inland energy consumption is dependent on external sources (54, 1% in 2010) and Russia is Europe’s largest supplier in all fossil fuels. Russia’s recent actions reveal the country’s intentions in upholding and growing Europe’s dependency. South Stream pipeline was intended to compete with and possibly oust the planned alternative energy supply routes: the Nabucco pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, which would have challenged Gazprom’s near-monopoly as Europe’s main gas supplier.

Russia sees European energy integration as a threat and has sought intergovernmental relations with Member States individually throughout the 21st century, thus actively trying to neglect European energy policy. North Stream agreements already withheld an exemption from EU competition law. The fact that Russia did not even seek such an exemption for South Stream agreements, but rather resorted to international trade law, displays the country’s stand regarding the EU’s goal in reaching a unified energy front.

The gas crisis in 2009 scared European countries and led to Member States taking matters into their own hands, thus threatening common European energy goals. As the “greenest” fossil fuel, the role of gas will likely only grow while the EU seeks to reach its environmental targets. The EU is in a situation in which it needs to ensure that the growing demand on gas is met while reducing Russia’s overwhelming political power in Eastern Europe. How can the EU diversify its energy resources and internal energy market while Russia sees the process as a threat? How can the EU work towards achieving energy security whilst underlining the need for adherence to its energy and environmental legislation?

Keywords: Third Energy Package, Competition Law, ownership unbundling, South Stream, Gazprom, liquified natural gas, EU 2030, European smart grids.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background material South Stream declared ‘”in breach of EU law” EU taking on the South Stream ‘mess’ Setting up a task force to review the South Stream agreements The EU explained: Energy Energy security and solidarity action plan Single market for gas and electricity, TEP Internal market for natural gas EU-Russia energy relations Eurostat: energy dependency rate 2000–2010 Energy production and imports Measures already in place Energy Community The Energy Community’s legal framework (mainly pages 147–246) European energy policy Gas Directive Energy security and solidarity action plan Task Force for Smart Grids, gas related Smart grid projects in Europe EU 2030 targets Issue analysis South Stream ‘mess’ Opinions Is South Stream too hard to handle for Gazprom?

Carnegie Europe: Eastern Europe its own worst enemy regarding energy security?

Standart news: South Stream quarrels – a competition to TAP? Reuters: are the 2030 targets ambitious enough?

Videos https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROmrzPg1GRM – TEP explained https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j3xiLXiOiDQ – South Stream as a competitor https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5--NKzMvwM – EU 2030 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK0BkKHAZ8Y – Energy security in Europe

Chair: Beatrice Reichel (SE)

LIBE I “The European Union cannot accept that thousands of people die at its borders. The challenges that Lampedusa and Italy are facing are European challenges.” – José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission

With continuing tragedies at Lampedusa and the growing strain of illegal immigration: How can the EU support its Member States in managing the increasing flow of asylum seekers through its Mediterranean borders whilst ensuring their humane treatment?

Although the European Union receives 35% of all the asylum applications made worldwide, the distribution of these applications is not always even among Member States. In 2011, 90% of asylum applications were dealt with by only 10 countries in the EU. Of these, the Mediterranean countries have been the most affected by the increasing migration flows from Northern Africa and the Middle East. As countries like Italy, Greece and Malta fall short of their humanitarian obligations, there is a clear need to increase burden-sharing between Member States.

Since the Tampere European Council of 1999, the EU has sought a harmonisation of asylum policy across Member States. With Dublin III Regulation entering into force on 19 July 2013, a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) now exists, fulfilling this goal. The common principle behind Dublin III and its preceding versions is that an asylum application should be lodged in the first Member State a migrant arrives in. With Dublin II being severely criticised by various human rights agencies for violating migrants’ fundamental rights, the revised regulation clarifies when exceptions can be made to this rule. It makes special provisions for family reunification, the protection of minors, unaccompanied children and persons with special needs. The regulation is backed by the Reception Conditions Directive, which lays out minimum living standards in reception centres across Europe.

Irregular immigration is tackled on many fronts – including joint European action along the maritime border. Frontex is the EU’s external border management agency and coordinates the activities of borders authorities from various Member States. Historically, these activities have focused on deterring and preventing irregular immigration as opposed to carrying out search-and-rescue operations. In April 2013, the Commission put forward a proposal to clarify the organisation’s humanitarian obligation to rescue those in peril at sea. However, Mediterranean Member States such as France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta are reluctant to extend the obligations or powers of Frontex.

Meanwhile, Frontex relies on Member States to provide vessels and personnel as it has few resources of its own. All these organisational short-fallings ultimately contribute to the loss of life at sea.

The CEAS has also increased information-sharing between Member States. The fingerprints of all irregular migrants are gathered in a data system known as Eurodac. This helps the authorities track whether individuals have previously applied for asylum in the EU. Meanwhile, the CEAS has also led to the development of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). Having become operational as recently as December 2013, this system will pool the resources of national border patrols and Frontex in order to track and rescue irregular migrants in distress along the maritime borders.

The issue at hand is framed by Member States’ obligations under international law. The right to asylum is enshrined in several human rights treaties. Regionally, it is covered in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. The 1951 Geneva

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees makes it a global obligation. In addition to these, the principle of non-refoulement states that countries are obliged not to return asylum-seekers to a territory where their fundamental rights may be violated.

It is important to note that prohibition of refoulement includes European countries. All transfers of asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation have been suspended after a ruling of the European Court of Justice, as it is feared they may suffer ‘inhumane or degrading treatment’ in Greek detention centres. In the case of Hirsii vs. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Italy was guilty of collective expulsion and therefore in violation of fundamental human rights. Powerful legal precedents lay a foundation to this debate, bringing into question the extent to which sovereign states can be induced to enforce a humanitarian migration policy under international law.

Crucially, migration is portrayed as a security issue for Europe. Informal migration flows are increasingly being criminalised, making it difficult for genuine asylum-seekers to reach the protection Europe can offer. In this context, it remains to see whether the EU can hold up its humanitarian obligations and simultaneously control migration flows from abroad.

Keywords: Common European Asylum System, Dublin Regulation, Frontex, non-refoulement, irregular migration, Reception Conditions Directive, securitisation of migration.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background Material Key terms defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IMO) The European Commission’s overview of migration and asylum policies in the EU. The European Court of Justice rules against Greece for mistreating asylum seekers.

Mediterranean States oppose measures to increase Frontex’s humanitarian responsibilities.

The European Court of Human Rights finds Italy guilt of fundamental rights violation.

Measures already in place Overview of current changes to detention policy in the context of the Dublin III regulation European Commission press release on actions taken to save lives at sea.

An overview of the Reception Conditions Directive.

MEP Cecilia Wikström explains the Dublin III Regulation.

A summary of the legal content of the Receptions Conditions Directive.

The European Commission’s infographic explaining EUROSUR. Issue Analysis ISPI Policy Brief on Mediterranean Border Management and Frontex.

European Council on Refugees and Exiles responds to Dublin III entering into force.

Summary of Jesuit Refugees Service’s report on the problems with the Dublin Regulation.

Huysman’s seminal work on the securitisation of Europe Opinion Human Rights Watch discusses Frontex’s humanitarian obligation at sea Smythies and Ramazzoti deliver their view on changes made to the Dublin Regulation.

Human Rights Watch criticise lack of EU cohesion and humanitarian action.

Major of Lampedusa on the troubles the island faces.

LIBE II

Chair: Laura Hibberd (UK)

“I have given thought to the idea that in the initial moment, between the referendum and the proclamation of independence, we could remain outside of Europe…This would be a shame because we want to remain in the EU” – Artur Mas, President of Catalonia

With continuing tensions between the Spanish government and the region of Catalonia, as well as the upcoming referendum on Scotland’s future: How should the EU react to regions seeking independence within its territory?

In September 2014, people in Scotland will take a historical decision – whether to stay in the UK, or become a new, separate and independent state. In Catalonia, there are calls for the same, but the government in Madrid seems unlikely to follow Westminster’s suit. Yet the tensions this is creating within Spain is of chief concern to the EU as an organisation founded on peace, democracy and the rule of law.

Perhaps the most pressing consequence of a region declaring its independence is the EU membership of the “breakaway state”. European Commission President Barroso has made it clear that if a region becomes independent it has to apply for EU membership according to EU law. This sentiment was echoed by President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, when discussing Catalonia in 2013 .

There is no precedent or clear legal basis for how ‘internal enlargement’ can take place in the EU. It is necessary to examine the full accession procedure to decide which Treaty basis would apply.

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) deals with EU membership: states need to apply for membership, obtain unanimous support of the European Council for this request and have their membership approved through an Accession Treaty, ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirement of each Member State. This process gives the potential for the ‘mother state’ to block EU Membership, creating significant political consequences. If resistance became outright refusal, the states of the EU could be accused of ignoring the democratically and peacefully expressed views of European citizens, touching upon Article 2 TEU. Meanwhile, the Scottish Government argues its legal basis for joining the EU is the ‘ordinary revision procedure’ (ORP) in Article 48 TEU. The ORP is the mechanism by which the Treaties can be amended and has never been used to expand the membership of the EU. Aside from the mechanism of how a breakaway state would join the EU, in the case of Scotland the issue of opt-outs and joining the Euro and Schengen area also stands. The Scottish Government has stated it would wish to secure opt-outs from joining the Euro or the Schengen area, yet all new Member States since 1999 have had to join both. Scotland may have an uphill struggle securing such opt-outs.

The points above reflect the complexity of a region’s prospective EU membership. Beyond legal technicalities are the political implications which must be considered before taking a definitive stance.

Whatever decision is taken will set a precedent and a legal basis for future regions, thus Catalonia, Flanders and Padania, for example, have a keen interest in the outcome.

The tension within the EU’s borders is another side-effect of secessionist movements, one which needs to be considered in this topic. According to Artur Mas, Catalan President, public surveys and opinion polls show over 80% of the population in Catalonia want a referendum, reflected by the 1.5 million citizens who participated in a demonstration in September 2013 . Traditionally, the EU has regarded the Catalan issue as an “internal affair”. However, Mr Mas has asked the EU for help in

holding a referendum in Catalonia in 2014, and there is the prospect this cannot be resolved peacefully internally. Thus the EU may not be able to ignore secessionist movements any longer – but what should its position be?

This topic necessitates analysis of not only the EU’s legal position regarding “internal enlargement” but also of the political and economic consequences any position will have. Answering this question will create the framework for all secessionist movements across the EU and their calls for independence. With the deadline of the Scottish referendum approaching, this discussion has never been so significant.

Keywords: General terms (all accompanied by ‘EU’): Membership procedure, regional breakaway, national/ regional independence, secession.

Specific secession demands: Lega Nord, Scotland, Flanders-Wallonia, Catalonia.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Background material Article discussing regional breakaways as ‘opening Pandora’s box’, September 2012.

Article discussing the declaration for a referendum in Catalonia and the government’s response President Mas’ call for the EU to help Catalan in holding a referendum, January 2014 Video discussing Brussels statement that an independent Catalonia would need to leave EU Measures already in place Treaty on European Union, see Articles 48 and 49 Video from Scottish Committee discussing how Scotland could become and EU member and the consequences of joining, such as vote allocation in EU bodies and opt-outs.

Issue analysis News report on the committee in Holyrood’s questioning of 4 legal figures on the Scottish government’s EU proposals, January 2014.

News report claiming Scotland could gain a special deal on EU membership, January 2014 Pages 49 - 52, analysis of Scotland’s prospective EU membership and explanation of accession process, February 2013 Blog analysing and discussing the Scottish government’s position on EU membership and future negotiations Article discussing a French study which supports Catalonia and Scotland not having to go through accession process, January 2014 Opinions Table stating EU Member States’ views an independent Scotland’s membership of the EU One author’s opinion on the stance the EU should take on breakaway regions, January 2013.

Blog arguing that any decision about Catalonia’s independence should also involve citizens in the rest of Spain and discusses Spain’s constitutional laws, October 2013.

Article concisely identifying 5 arguments surrounding Catalonia’s EU membership should it become independent, September 2013.

Chair: Monica Moisin (RO)

LIBE III “...Not to depend on decisions made elsewhere, but to decide ourselves how we want to protect the personal data of our citizens” — Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission

Protecting our personal data online: With the limited effect of the Data Protection Directive in practice, what steps should the EU take in implementing legislation in order to ensure an effective protection of its citizens online? “[…] would enable us Europeans to exercise our right of digital self-determination. Not to depend on decisions made elsewhere, but to decide ourselves how we want to protect the personal data of our citizens; while keeping our internal market open and competitive.” (Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner, Brussels, 28 January 2014) What exactly will “enable us Europeans to exercise our right of digital self-determination”? A Data Protection Compact? A Data Protection Regulation? A reformed Data Protection Directive?

Some actors still see data protection as an obstacle rather than as a solution, and privacy rights as compliance costs and not as an asset. Yet data protection is inherent to our existence. It is about making sure your smartphone operator doesn’t know more about you than your family does, about your insurance policy not going up every time you type the name of an illness into a search engine, and ultimately, about your teenage Facebook profile not being available online forever. In light of the technological development brought by the “digital era” on the one hand, and the scandal generated government mass surveillance systems that dominated the news over the past months on the other, the EU must take appropriate legislative measures to ensure the protection of its citizens.

Understanding the facts The need for adequate legislation on data protection emerges from two sources: data collection by companies and surveillance by governments. These issues are closely connected, as concerns about government surveillance drive consumers away from digital service. 92% of Europeans are concerned about web applications collecting their personal data without their consent. 89% say they want to know when the data on their smartphone or tablet is being shared with a third party. The citizens know that the companies use their data in ways they cannot control or influence, but what can one do when he or she has no power to act? For example, web applications tend to follow the rule “take it or leave it”. Upon agreement to pay for an application, the user is asked to enable location settings and share personal information with the service provider. If the user does not agree with these terms, they simply cannot use the application they are willing to pay for. This lack of choice is one reason why citizens feel forced to compromise their privacy, and a cause for mistrust towards businesses whose services we use on daily basis.

The current state of data protection in the EU Due to differences in national legislations, Member States cannot resolve the existing data protection concerns alone. Thus, there is a specific need to establish a harmonised and coherent framework allowing for a smooth transfer of personal data across borders within the EU while ensuring effective protection for all individuals across the EU and outside its borders. The Regulation–Directive duo may be an effective solution.

The proposed new legal framework consists of two legislative proposals. The first is a proposal for

a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing and free movement of personal data (General Data Protection Regulation).

The second is a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing and free movement of personal data by competent authorities for protection purposes.

The Proposal for a New Data Protection Directive was voted, with an overwhelming vote in favour, by the LIBE Committee on 21 October 2013. In substance, this reform contains important elements for ensuring the individual is in control of their right to privacy, namely the right to be forgotten, explicit consent for use of personal data, the right to data portability and the right to be informed of personal data breaches, and provides for serious sanctions in cases of violation.

At present, the main focus of the European legislator is to restore the citizens’ trust in data processing by both companies and governments. We are facing a double mission. First, the protection of personal data whilst guaranteeing a high level of public safety. Second, ensuring effective exchange of personal data between competent authorities for protective purposes. Furthermore, to be effective, rules must be implemented in parallel for both companies and government data processing.

Possible instruments and course of action Whilst the solution to achieve this aim is the production of strong data protection rules, the means to achieve such protection are multiple and can be applied cumulatively. Given that in theory, we have everything it takes to “to exercise our right of digital self-determination”, how do we ensure it in practice?

Simultaneously, whilst there is need for internal EU legislation for data protection, it is equally important that European concerns are also addressed by the U.S. given the recent surveillance scandals.

But how feasible is an EU-U.S. action plan, and what are our negotiation tools with “the Big Brother”?

Without answering these questions first, we cannot cast a vote in favour or against this new legislative proposal. Without understanding the data security policy we want to apply, we cannot enforce it.

Keywords: Data Protection Compact, General Data Protection Regulation, Data Protection Directive reform, criticism on data protection proposed legislation, Safe Harbour, Umbrella Agreement with the U.S.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Official Sources The official EU Commission Data Protection dedicated section on the Data Protection Reform The text of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation The full text of the Commission proposal for a New Data Protection Directive Analysis of the New Data Protection Directive by the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament Academic Sources Out-Law.com by Pinsent Masons – Delay in adopting the New Data Protection Directive Additional material EU Advertising Video for the pro- New Data Protection Directive campaign U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance program PRISM U.S. - EU data protection “Umbrella Agreement” U.S. – EU Safe Harbour EU perspective U.S. perspective

Chair: Oleg Shimanskyy (UA)

INTA “What seems sometimes to be altruism, in relation to Africa, or in relation to developing countries, is more than that. It is enlightened self-interest.”

– Gordon Brown

The future of the EU-Africa trade relationship: With China’s growing influence in the continent and the EU’s preferential trade agreements with African states expiring in October, how can the EU position itself to maintain solid trade links with African states?

While China is actively expanding its trade with Africa year by year, the EU and the African states seem to have reached a stalemate in their negotiations over the free trade deals. Should the negotiations not conclude before October 1, 2014, whole industries in African states could face a noticeable increase of import duties when trading with the EU. Let’s take the example of the roses from Kenya that constitute up to 63% of all rose imports to the EU. What would be an effect of a duty rise of 24% to an industry, accounting of up to 70% of all Kenyan plant exports?

Since 1975, the EU has regulated its trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa based on the Lomé Convention that allowed the African states duty-free access to the EU markets without reciprocity. That provided African states with a great opportunity to sell their products on EU markets and at the same time be shielded from competition from EU companies exporting to Africa.

However, this accord contradicted the WTO rule of the most-favoured nation (MFN), whereby the Member State should treat other WTO members just as favourably as any other country. Two derogations from this principle are possible: a country being subject to a special scheme for developing nations (e.g. Everything But Arms initiative of the EU) or a free trade agreement. Under pressure from the WTO partners, the EU came up with the Cotonou agreement in 2000 to transform non-reciprocal trade relations with Africa into equal-footing relations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). African states were to negotiate these free trade agreements by 2007 or to fall back to a variety of more restrictive trade regimes under the Generalised System of Preferences. The latter deadline was extended until October 1, 2014. In addition to the equal footing in trade, the new arrangement under the Cotonou agreement would provide the development help and political cooperation as equally important pillars of cooperation.

China’s approach to Africa is profoundly different. After a booming growth of Chinese economy in the 90’s, its government adopted the “Going Global” strategy that prioritises investment into other countries. Thus, Chinese companies actively expand and invest into African states by creating new businesses, building infrastructure and providing development help. The Chinese approach is sometimes regarded as “neo-colonial”, as it maintains links with countries despite their questionable political regimes, and extracts natural resources in exchange of infrastructural projects. China is often criticized for not contributing to Africa’s development, as the companies typically employ Chinese workers and sell their products overseas.

However, such an active investment policy results in an incredible growth of trade, going from US$9.5 billion in 2000, to US$79.8 billion in 2009. Furthermore, after the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 2000, the amount of infrastructure contracting projects has raised significantly, making Africa China’s second largest engineering contract market.

China and the EU exhibit two divergent approaches to Africa. The former employs the “non-interference” approach, maintaining strictly business relations and additionally offering development help.

The critics of this approach state that Africa’s growth interests are not properly embedded.

The EU attempts at establishing an equal-footing trade regime to foster the development of trade and local economies in Africa. However, the agreements appeared to be difficult to conclude, since they lack the account or regional integration in Africa.

How should the EU act to foster the agreements be concluded in due time? What could we learn from China’s approach? What policy needs to be established for the EU to become a more appealing trade and development partner for Africa?

Keywords: China, China-Africa Cooperation Forum, GSP, EBA, Cotonou Agreement, Most Favoured Nation, Lomé Convention, JAES, African, Caribbean and Pacific Cooperation.

LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Dropbox folder with articles Official sources EU-Africa Cooperation Joint Africa-EU Strategy explained About Cotonou agreement Economic partnership agreements in a nutshell Economic Partnership Agreements - State of play Benefits of EPAs, why EPAs are better than GSP (EBA for LDCs) EPA testimonials Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Opinions Economic Partnership Agreements: Will Europe and Africa Avoid a Diplomatic Tragedy?

EU pressures seven African countries to complete trade agreements Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements EU Economic Partnership Agreements in Sub-Saharan Africa