Academic Preparation Kit Barcelona 76th International Session of the EYP by International Office of the European Youth Parliament

Barcelona 2014: Prep kit

Contents Page Page 2 – Presidential Welcome Page 3 – The Committee on Constitutional Affairs Page 9 – The Committee on Foreign Affairs Page 15– The Committee on Culture and Education Page 21 – The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs I Page 28 – The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs II Page 34 – The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs Page 40 – The Committee on the Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety I Page 47 – The Committee on the Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety II Page 52 – The Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality I Page 58 – The Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality II Page 64 – The Committee on International Trade Page 70 – The Committee on Industry, Research, and Energy Page 76 – The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Page 81 – The Committee on Security and Defence Page 87 – The Committee on Transport and Tourism

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Presidential Welcome Welcome, dear delegates, to the Academic Prep Kit of the 76th International Session of the European Youth Parliament. In less than two months we will meet together under the sun in the great city of Barcelona, for what I am sure will be a fantastic 10 days of intercultural dialogue and an open exchange of ideas. I know that many of you will have attended International Sessions before; but can I take this moment to impress upon you how important it is that you adequately prepare yourself for your own good, and for the good of those in your committees. Whilst we all know how enjoyable International Sessions can be, let us not lose sight of how educationally rewarding they can be, no more so than when we are invested and knowledgeable in out topics. The Chairs team has put together this document to help you start your own research in your topics, so you can have fruitful and enjoyable debates in the beautiful Sant Pau Committee Work venue – I hope that you appreciate our work. Each committee Chair has written a dedicated overview to your own particular topics – this is an introduction to the topic, which outlines its relevancy, key conflicts surrounding the topic, and facts, figures, and questions to help you grasp the topic’s fundamentals. It is now your responsibility to use this prep kit as the starting point to your own research, so you can better understand what the most important aspects of your topics are, and what more you want to know. Every delegate will be required to fill out the survey that can be found here: http://polls.eyp.org/academicprep-barcelona - which needs you to research some facts, as well as write your position on one or two quick questions. The Head Office of EYP International will be collecting and chasing your responses, before giving them to your respective committee Chairs who will then build upon this base research with particular research tasks for your own committee. The deadline for responses is Monday 30th June. We all know that there is more to a successful EYP Session than merely academic preparation, but I think we would all agree that sessions are considerably more enjoyable when you are adequately intellectually prepared to engage in meaningful debate – so please, I guarantee that the effort that you put in now will pay dividends come the session! I hope that this finds you all well, and that you’re as excited about the session as I am. The session’s Media Team, led by Gustaf Danielsson and Saki Shinoda, was recently confirmed, capping off a truly exceptional officials team. Working within the structures so fantastically created by the Head Organisers, Sandra, Oriol, and Albert, we look forward to working with you to create a memorable session. I look forward to meeting you all in person, and as ever if there’s anything I can do for any of you, please don’t hesitate to get in contact. All the best, and good luck with your preparations! Chris Hall – Session President

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THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (AFCO) WITH THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS’ INITIATIVE (ECI) BEING THE MOST AMBITIOUS LINK BETWEEN THE ELECTORATE AND POLICY CREATION AT A PAN-EUROPEAN LEVEL, HOW CAN THE EU STRENGTHEN THE ECI AS A TOOL FOR ACTIVE DEMOCRACY, AND WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE TO BRING CITIZENS CLOSER TO EU POLICY MAKING? Chairperson: Célia Poncelin - France Before reading the overview, you can have a look at this PowerPoint which clarifies how the EU works and different theories that are essential for understanding the topic: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/3v2mcrh7592y0oa/AADsADaitu5O1wyrPET0rVKha

Explanation and relevance of the Topic: The result of the elections of the European Parliament in May 2014 shows a growing popularity of the extreme right and euroscepticism1. Citizens grow more and more disillusioned with the EU, and the political sphere as a whole. As a result, one could argue that the EU does not appear legitimate anymore due to the disconnection between citizens and policy makers, that the belief in the ability of representative democracy to speak for all citizens is damaged and that there is a request for more participation of civil society and European citizens. While the EU claims to foster a union of people and thus directly regulate for the people, tools for more direct democracy were only created in the 2000s, when criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit2 arose against the “technocratic” EU. However, the introduction of the European Citizens Initiative in 2012 as the first real tool of direct democracy raises the question of the political nature of the EU. Indeed, the European institutions still have not been able to initiate such a change in the institutional framework to move towards more direct democracy. Thus, the first question that needs to be tackled is what is at stake and why was there never any institutional change? What needs to be considered as well is whether the EU should aim to introduce more direct democracy or not? If you think so, which tools should the EU implement? Does the institutional set-up allow EU to be a (direct) democracy? Is democracy in the core of the EU? Links: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/20/eu-democratic-deficit The article questions the democratic deficit. You should pay special attention to the paper for the think tank Policy Network. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/10/how-to-reduce-eu-democratic-deficit Charles Grant’s point of view to reduce the EU democratic deficit based on the institutional framework. http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ulrike-guerot-robert-menasse/europe’s-unfinisheddemocracy Ulrike Guérot and Robert Menasse tackle the European democracy with a broad point of view. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9VERBPU6_c

1 2

Eurosceptic 'earthquake' rocks EU elections, 26th of May 2014, BBC.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm

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A video about representative democracy, which explains ways citizens can participate in society.

Key Terms: 

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Democracy: according to the work of Robert Dahl3 democracy is defined by two basic concepts: political equality and popular participation in decision-making. According to him, essential elements are required to achieve this: on the one hand, vertical mechanisms, such as elections, and on the other hand, horizontal mechanisms, such as the separation and balance of powers.4 Representative democracy: citizens of each country elect their representatives in European, national and/or regional parliaments. Direct democracy: aims to let citizens directly decide on policy initiatives, i.e. a direct involvement of the citizens in the legislative procedure as well as the use of the methods to bring the citizens closer to politics.5 Active democracy: more active democracy corresponds to the fact that there is a will to introduce more participatory democracy in a representative democracy system. Democratic deficit: describes the fact that citizens are less interested in politics, and thus less willing to be involved. An example is the decreasing turnout to the elections and the general disillusion towards politics.6 Policymaking: describes the process from the birth of a policy to the implementation of the law, including the vote of the bill.7 European Governance: the Governance of the EU is multi-level: local, national and European. This means that the decisions and actions can be taken in different levels.

Key questions  o o  o o  o o  o o  o o

Is the European Citizens’ Initiative a good tool for direct democracy? What is the result so far of the ECI? How could it be improved? Representative democracy vs. direct democracy: which direction should the EU take? Is it the role of the EU to introduce more direct democracy? Should the EU use direct democracy tools at all? How could we make the EU an effective democracy? What is “European democracy”? Is the EU a democracy? How could we bring the EU closer to the citizens? Is the EU only a “government of technocrats”? What are the concrete tools to bring EU closer to the citizens? How could the voices of the citizens and the civil society be heard? By which means can the EU and the society dialogue? How can citizens be involved?

Key facts and figures 

According to a survey published by the European Commission on May the 12th of 2014, 59% of the Europeans do not have trust in the EU. 32% have faith in the EU, while 9% do not express any opinion.8

Robert Dahl is a political scientist. A lecture at Standford University on what democracy is http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm Pay a special attention to http://www.polipedia.eu/tiki-index.php?page=Ancient+and+Contemporary+Ideals+of+Democracy which is a very complete article on democracy (highly recommended). 5 An explanation of the differents systems of democracy http://www.democracy-building.info/systems-democracy.html 6 An in-depth analysis of what the democratic deficit is http://www.academia.edu/1508020/A_Democratic_Deficit_in_the_EU_The_reality_behind_the_myth 7 A really good video that explains the policy making in the European Union : http://europa.eu/eu-law/decisionmaking/procedures/index_en.htm 4

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In September 2012, the Eurobarometer found for the first time that more European citizens considered the EU to be undemocratic than democratic.9 So far, 8 European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) are on-going and 13 ECIs have been closed. Another 17 ECIs have been refused and 7 have been withdrawn.10 The turnout of the European Parliament elections in May 2014 was 43.09%11. A study showed that people do not vote because they don’t believe it will change anything (64%), that they are not sufficiently informed (61%), that the European Parliament does not deal with their everyday problems (56%), that they are not interest in politics and elections (54%)12.

Key conflicts 

Improving the European Citizens’ Initiative Even if it is too early to draw conclusions on the long-term effect of the European Citizens’ Initiative, some contradictions already appear. First of all, it seems that the more negative feelings an individual has for the EU, the less intention that person has to use the ECI13. Thus, the ECI does not tackle the problem of euro scepticism and unwillingness to get involved in its root. The ECI is reserved to a certain group of the population; the one that has access to the information. As such, it does not necessarily bring more direct democracy because it makes the citizens unequal in front of such tool. As Pierre Rosanvallon said ‘we thought democracy is about participation but actually it is about equality’. Emily O'Reilly14 is currently working on a feedback of the European Citizens’ Initiative that will be submitted to the European Commission. See more: http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/53306/html.bookmark The press release of the work of Emily O’Reilly http://www.more-democracy-ineurope.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/eci_support_centre_response_to_the_european_ombudsm an_own_inquiry_into_the_functioning_of_the_european_citizens_initiative.pdf Position Paper of the ECI to respond to Emily O’Reilly, that makes an assessment so far of the ECI (highly recommended). http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/europe/23brussels.html?pagewanted=all&action=click&modul e=Search&region=searchResults&mabReward=relbias%3Aw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fquery.nytimes.com%2Fs earch%2Fsitesearch%2F%3Faction%3Dclick%26region%3DMasthead%26pgtype%3DHomepage%26modul e%3DSearchSubmit%26contentCollection%3DHomepage%26t%3Dqry789%23%2FEuropean+Citizens+Initi ative&_r=0 The article describes the limits of the ECI, based on one concrete example. http://www.democracy-international.org/eu-citizens-initiative This article details how the ECI works and proposes a reform of the ECI.

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_data_en.pdf http://www.policy-network.net/publications_detail.aspx?ID=4399 10 For an overview of all the ECIs : http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/?page_id=955 11 http://dalje.com/en-world/ep-vote-turnout-across-eu-up-4-countries-worse-than-croatia/510133 12 http://ec.europa.eu/youth/library/reports/flash375_en.pdf 13 Cigdem Kentmen-Cin, “Explaining willingness to use the European Citizens’ Initiative: Political cynicism, anti-EU attitudes and voting weight of member states”, Department of International Relations and the EU, Izmir University of Economics, Sakarya Cad. No. 156. Balcova, Izmir, 35330, Turkey. 14 Emily O'Reilly is since 2013 the European Ombudsman 9

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Is the EU a democracy? It seems that to answer the question “why citizens fail to use the tools they have”, we have to turn ourselves towards the lack of salience.15 Indeed, the EU does not have the power of initiative in every field of the decision-making16. Due to the reluctances to give more powers to the EU from Member States, the EU might not be capable to foster a real political participation. Furthermore, historically, the EU was never supposed to become a democracy, but rather a tool to better cooperates between a few countries on an economy level. In this perspective, we can wonder whether it is really necessary to bring the EU closer to the citizens because it is not its first task. Indeed, the EU might not be capable to live up to the expectations: there is a lack of political life in the EU (and lack of mediatisation of such a life), policy makers are not being elected except for the European Parliament, which is rather seen as a ‘second order national contest’17 and for whom election is strongly depending on the national performance of the government. According to Moravcsik, “Legislative and regulatory activity is inversely correlated with the salience of issues in the minds of European voters, so any effort to expand participation is unlikely to overcome apathy”. As a matter of fact, it appears that any move towards more participation - referendums, elections - based on EU issues might encourage the impoverishment of the EU. There is as well a risk that by allowing more participation, the quality of the law would decrease and the policy making process will be less efficient. A solution might be to give individuals a reason to care about EU politics - it appears necessary to give them a stake in it - such as the feeling of a united European people, that the EU wants to build but still fails at doing. Whereas it is for the ECI or for any further tool that wants to bring the EU closer to the citizens, what should be the first question is why is there such a democratic deficit? Links: http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/anya-topolski/from-idea-of-europe-to-europe-of-ideas Anya Topolski argues for a political community in Europe. http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20thcentury-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do Worth to read from the 11th paragraph of the section “the return of history” (under the picture of the demonstration against austerity in Greece) until the end.

Stakeholders:  

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The European Commission has the legislative power and the right of initiative of bills. The European Commission is composed of 28 members. Every Member States appoint one person. The European Parliament and the 751 Members of the European Parliament (MEP). The election of the European Parliament takes place every 5 years. The European Parliament has the co-decision power with the European Commission, however it does not have the right of initiative. The elections do not lead to the creation of a government and there is no “European” campaign for the elections as they take place nationally. The 500 millions citizens of the European Union, which can submit a European Citizens’ Initiative and vote to the elections.

ANDREW MORAVCSIK, In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union*, JCMS 2002 Volume 40. Number 4. pp. 603–24, Harvard University 16 You can find the explanations of the right of initiative and the shared competences in the powerpoint. 17 Follesdal / Hix: “not in fact about Europe, but are ‘second-order national contests’ () –> they are fought by national parties on the performance of national governements, with lower turnout than national elections, and hence won by opposition and protest parties”

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The civil society “plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people's needs’” according to the White Paper on the European Governance.”18 The European Ombudsman is an organ from the EU that serves as an intermediary between the EU and the citizens. Any European citizen can address a complaint to the European Ombudsman.

Links:

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/time-citizen-oriented-eu-301962 An interview with Birgitta Ohlsson, Minister for EU Affairs of Sweden, who tells us about her vision for a more citizens-oriented EU and the governance of the EU. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-608_en.htm?locale=en A press release about the answer that the European Commission gave to the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘One of us’ on the 28th of May.

Existing measures: 

The EU European Citizenship (article 20 TFUE19) allows every citizen to vote and to be elected to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage since 197620. Since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, every citizen has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in the local and regional elections. In 2000, the White Book on the Reform of the EU governance21 decided to orientate the democratic issue towards citizens and civil society by:

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Taking into account the reinforced participation of the “civil society”; Set up the objective to make the decision-making process more open and transparent; The definition of “civil society” became more inclusive, including not only NGOs but also “trade unions and employers’ organizations (“social partners”); . . . professional organizations; charities; grass-roots organizations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities”22 The Treaty of Lisbon, in effect from 2009, is a reference moment towards more direct democracy. The article 10.3 TEU23 stipulates, “every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union”, while:

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The article 11 TEU details the involvement and dialogue with civil society in EU decision-making Articles 15 and 16 set dialogue and public debates (cf p. 7 doc EUDOreport) Articles 20.2, 24, 227 and 228 TFEU explains the citizens’ democratic rights The European Citizens’ Initiative24, that took effect on April 1, allows the citizens to be “co-authors of the law”: if a measure gathers up to one million signatures coming from at least 7 out of the 28 Member States, it will be addressed to the European Commission. However, such initiatives can only be taken into the secondary EU legislation, i.e. not the treaties of the EU25.

18 ECOSOC Opinion, The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe (OJ C329, 17.11.99); ECOSOC Opinion, Organised Civil Society and European Governance: the Committee's contribution to the drafting of the White Paper (OJ C193, 10.7.2001), page 14 19 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF 20 Decision and Act on European elections 21 http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/white-paper-european-governance-linksdossier-188216 and http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l10109_en.htm 22 http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live?article=78#organisation 23 Article 10 par. 3 of TEU 24 Regulation (EU) No.211/16th February 2011, Lisbon Treaty 25 According to Article 48 of the TUE, the institutions initiate the revision procedures only. This website explains the sources of the European Union law http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14534_en.htm

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http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/guide?lg=en The guide of the European Citizens Initiative http://www.citizens-initiative.eu The website of the European Citizens Initiative An infographic that explains the ECI: http://www.debatingeurope.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/European-Citizens-Initiative02.png 

Member-States The Member States can decide to hold a referendum on EU issues. However, expressing its view is limited to a pro or cons opinion.

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Civil Society In 2006, the European Movement France launched a petition that aimed to gather one million signatures in order to create a European Civil Service, which would allow every young European to engage in a project of solidarity in another Member state of the EU. The European Civil Service is today one tool to bring the EU closer to its citizens. Moreover, there are a few initiatives. For example, the network Democracy International introduced a paper “More democracy in Europe” in 2005, calling for more direct democracy. They called for a new EU convention where big decisions would be taken in an open debate between politicians, civil society and citizens26. Furthermore, obligatory referenda would take place in case of a transfer of sovereignty and treaty amendments. Heidrun Abromeit27 proposed mandatory referenda in case of new treaties and amendments, as well as direct-democratic instruments such as veto rights. Finally, Michael Nentwich28 proposes a European indirect popular initiative – similar to what exists in Switzerland. 3-4% of the electoral in at least five Member States could submit a proposal to the Council and the Parliament. If they refuse to enact the law, a European-wide referendum will take place. We can as well consider the Internet and social media as platform for discussions, as we have seen the impact that it can have to a certain extend during the Arab Spring. It appears necessary to as well keep in mind the involvement of lobbying and interest groups in the process of policy making on a European level. Those measures are just examples among many, and you are welcome to do any further research. Links: http://www.democracy-international.org/join-campaign-calling-democratic-europe Democracy International is an international network that promotes direct democracy. In this article, they are explaining their call for a new EU Convention, and you can see a case of petitions as a tool to raise the citizens’ voice. http://www.developmentprogress.org/sites/developmentprogress.org/files/j1862_odi_political_voice_infog raphics_260314-01.jpg A very good infographic that sums up the possibilities for citizens to express their voice.

http://www.democracy-international.org/sites/default/files/PDF/EU%20Convention/DI_strategy_EN-short_AK.pdf German political scientist 28 Austrian lawyer and political scientist 27

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THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ENLARGEMENT

POLICY AS THE

EU’S

STRONGEST FOREIGN POLICY TOOL? IN LIGHT OF

OPPRESSION OF POPULAR OPPOSITION, HOW CAN THE

TURKEY’S

ONGOING

BEST USE THE COUNTRY’S ACCESSION TALKS TO

ENCOURAGE SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESSES AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?

Chairperson: Saga Erikson - Finland Explanation and relevance of the Topic: The prospect of joining the EU has been used as an incentive structure for less developed European countries to democratise and stabilise the region in order to gain entrance to the single market. In 1993 this structure was specified through the creation of the Copenhagen Criteria29, which set out the political, economic and legislative conditions for a country wishing to accede to the EU. We can see the success of enlargement policy particularly in the cases of Balkan countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, who have recently become members after reforms to their democratic institutions30. Through this the EU has managed to create neighbouring countries with similar values of freedom and democracy, and has extended its sphere of influence by inviting these countries into the Union. This has expanded the EU’s influence as an international player, with the hope of also legitimising it as a voice for the entirety of Europe. However, the procedure of enlargement and negotiating accession have not been easy and with many countries has taken decades with little progress being made. The most pertinent example of this is Turkey. Turkey’s road to EU membership has its roots in its application to join the European Economic Community in 1987, which eventually in 1995 led to a customs union between Turkey and what had then become the EU31. In 1999 at the Helsinki Summit Turkey’s status as a candidate country32 to join the EU was recognised. However due to the slow pace of Turkish reforms, and from the EU side the difficulty in ratifying financial aid to Turkey as well as the European Commission’s failure to meet commitments to secure the free movement of workers, meant that formal accession negotiations were only started in 2005. This came after the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) party in Turkey who pushed forward with more reforms in the early 2000’s33. Since then, however, only 13 chapters out of 35 of the community acquis have been opened and one provisionally closed. Several chapters remain blocked by countries such as Cyprus and France34 due to their unwillingness to let Turkey join the EU. The issue of Turkish occupation of the Northern part of Cyprus means the EU is also blocking the opening of 8 chapters because of trade restrictions on Cyprus from Turkey. The case of Turkey is an example of how accession talks have not yet been used to their full potential, as the EU response to violent repression of the Gezi park protests was slow and made little difference. Enlargement policy offers needed leverage to make change in Europe’s neighbouring countries but how can it be used more effectively when dealing with democratic deterioration in cases such as Turkey? Links: Copenhagen Criteria: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm Accession negotiations: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_negotiations_en.htm Pre-Accession strategy: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/preaccession_strategy_en.htm Progress in negotiations:

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat “Democratic Transformation in the Balkans” http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1363_the_democratic_transformation_of_the_balkans.pdf 31 Kenan Aksu “Turkey-EU Relations: Power, Politics and the Future” (Cambridge Scholras Publishing 2012) 32 Kenan Aksu “Turkey-EU Relations: Power, Politics and the Future” (Cambridge Scholras Publishing 2012) 33 Kenan Aksu “Turkey-EU Relations: Power, Politics and the Future” (Cambridge Scholras Publishing 2012) 34 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/us-germany-turkey-eu-idUSBRE91O10L20130225 30

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http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa EU leverage in Turkey: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/european-union-leverage-i_b_4435754.html Articles: “The European Union’s Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foregn Policy Perspective” http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1197295.files/MuftulerBac.%20The%20European%20Unions%20A ccession%20Negotiations%20with%20Turkey.pdf Kivanç Ulusoy “The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in Turkey” Internatrionl Political Science Review Vol. 30, No.4 (September 2009) Kenan Aksu “Turkey-EU Relations: Power, Politics and the Future” (Cambridge Scholras Publishing 2012)

Key Terms:    

Democratisation: The introduction of a democratic governing system through implementing reforms to the political structure of a country Enlargement: Policy seeking to admit new members to the EU and thus extend the influence of the EU to neighbouring countries Accession: The term for when a new country joins the EU. The accession procedure consists of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, formulating a pre-accession strategy and screening the country to assess to what extent they already comply with EU legislation. Community acquis: A body of common rights and obligations that all Member States must comply to and are bound by. It consists of legislation, declarations, resolutions, treaties and international agreements adopted by the Union, and measures relating to foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. Applicant countries must accept the acquis before they can join the Union. It consists of 35 chapters to do with different policy areas. Links: Community acquis: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm

Key questions:       

How has the EU enlargement policy been used in the past to achieve foreign policy goals? Is there political will in Turkey to move forward with accession negotiations? How can accession be used as a credible threat to pressure Turkey to make democratic reforms? What political demands should the EU set for Turkey as a condition in order to move negotiations forward? How should the EU deal with individual Member States’ personal agenda’s in blocking further progress of negotiation talks even if Turkey meets present criteria? Should the EU work towards a more coherent stance in making a definitive promise that Turkey will be awarded membership if it fulfils all criteria? Is it better to reward Turkey with further opening of chapters of the acquis prior to progress in order to encourage it or to threaten to stop negotiations if progress within a certain timeframe is not seen?

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Key facts and figures:   

38% of Turkey’s total trade is with the EU and almost 71% of foreign direct investment in Turkey – with a strong high-technology component – comes from the EU.35 Turkey was only ranked 61st in the 2013 Democracy ranking, the lowest of all prospective EU countries.36 Between 2001 and 2005 Turkey’s score on the Human Development Index (HDI) rose from 0.735 to 0.775.37

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63% of Turks think it is not likely that Turkey will join the EU, including 34% saying it is not likely at all.38

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Only 34% of people in all Member States support Turkey’s membership to the EU. 39 Links: Trade: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013.pdf Democracy: http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?page_id=738 Public opinion: http://blog.gmfus.org/2010/09/17/10-statistics-that-show-turkey-drifting-away-from-thewest/ HDI: http://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/soziologie/arbeitsbereiche/makrosoziologie/mitarbeiter/lehrstuhlinhaber/dateien/Why_not_Turke y.pdf

Key conflicts: In order to effectively use accession talks as a tool to foster more support for democratic reform in Turkey, there must first be a uniform stance on where the EU stands on the possibilities of accession after Turkey has fulfilled criteria to join. Several Member States have expressed that even if all chapters of discussion of Turkish accession were closed they would still oppose Turkish membership40 to the EU. This affects how much political will there is within the Turkish government to carry out reforms if what is promised at the end may never be materialised. This also puts a strain on the credibility of using accession talks as tool as it diminishes the value of accession for Turkey if they believe the chance of it is minimal. Further, if the general attitude towards Turkey within Member States is hostile and Turkey is not seen as a part of Europe, this will also affect in what light Turkey will see its own chances of accession and the role it can play in the EU. These are all conflicts that weaken the only tool the EU has to use to pressure Turkey for more democracy and respect for human rights. However, Turkish political will is not only influenced by the EU’s stance on its accession, but also by domestic players who may be pro- or anti-EU depending on how they perceive their gains. The Turkish political party in power, the AKP, may be unwilling to carry out democratic reforms that would diminish their ability to stay in power.41 Democratic reforms open up the political sphere to groups who can now demand for more change, and could through that help with demanding further reforms. Lastly, we must also examine how moral it is for the EU to threaten to halt negotiations with Turkey over domestic unrest, when the EU itself has been inconsistent with its approach to Turkey and in some cases has yet to communicate to Turkey the benchmark criteria for opening chapters. This is the case especially with chapters 23 and 24 to do with Judiciary & Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom &

35 36

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013.pdf http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?page_id=738

http://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/soziologie/arbeitsbereiche/makrosoziologie/mitarbeiter/lehrstuhlinhaber/dateien/Why_not_Turkey.pdf 38 http://blog.gmfus.org/2010/09/17/10-statistics-that-show-turkey-drifting-away-from-the-west/ 39 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013.pdf 40 Ziya Önis “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans (2009) 41 The European Impact on State–Religion Relations in Turkey: Political Islam, Alevis and Non-Muslim Minorities

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Security.42 If the options are to open chapters as an incentive for more change in Turkey, continue to freeze negotiations further, or threaten with the possibility of abandoning negotiations altogether, which of these is likely to produce the most desirable result? Links: Turkey’s accession process: http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/2_turkiye_ab_iliskileri/2_2_adaylik_sureci/2_2_8_diger/crs_eu_enlarge ment_tr_2013.pdf EU inconsistent approaches: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10096781.asp Europeanisation: http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/10/europeanization-analyzing-the-domestic-change-in-turkey/ Commission Progress Report 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013.pdf Turkish public opinion: http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/OzgehanSenyuva.pdf Articles: Susannah Verney “National identity and political change on Turkey's road to EU membership” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans (2009) Ziya Önis “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans (2009)

Stakeholders: There are a multitude of key stakeholders to do with this topic, one of the most obvious being the Turkish government who has been keen to join the EU, and especially in the early 2000’s the government carried out a multitude of reforms to further align with EU policy. In the last few years there have also been several rounds of judicial reforms and a new democracy package in 201343. In Turkey, the civil society and large businesses have an interest in joining the EU for more profits through free trade and have been able to gain more say in the political sphere through reforms. Individual Member States in the EU such as France and Cyprus have an interest in not allowing Turkey to join the EU. France is sceptical of the influx of immigrants and the consequences of a country with a majority Muslim population entering the EU44. Cyprus is in a conflict with Turkey over the territory in Northern Cyprus and before this dispute is resolved would like to use the prospect of accession to the EU to pressure Turkey into a solution. The entities within the EU who can affect Turkey’s accession are mainly the Commission and within in it the Directorate General and Commissioner for Enlargement who have an interest in smooth negotiations and moving forward the process. They also manage the information and communication policy45 to do with enlargement and through that can affect public opinion. Citizens in Member States, and the weight they carry together through public opinion, are also stakeholders as in order for a country to accede to the EU all Member States

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-adopts-democracy-package-goes-torecess.aspx?PageID=238&NID=63091&NewsCatID=338 44 https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=13739 45 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/about/directorate-general/index_en.htm 43

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must agree in accession and in some countries such as France this is decided through a referenda. Links: Directorate General Enlargement: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/about/directorate-general/index_en.htm Cyprus and Turkey: http://www.economist.com/node/15065921 France and Turkey: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703440004575547751406126316 Turkish Industry and Business Association: http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/history/ Turkish government: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa EU Member States: http://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/soziologie/arbeitsbereiche/makrosoziologie/mitarbeiter/lehrstuhlinhaber/da teien/Why_not_Turkey.pdf

Existing Measures: Apart from the structure of how a country can accede the EU the measures already in place that are important to highlight here are to do with reforms made in Turkey and efforts from the EU to move along negotiations. This is important in order to understand the context of what policy improvements can be used as leverage, whether it is economic, political or legislative. One of the most important reforms made recently in Turkey is the aforementioned democracy package passed in March 2013. The main features included in the package were legalising the publishing of Kurdish materials, political parties that receive more than 3% of the vote were know eligible for treasury funding, and there was new legislation on the freedom of expression. 46 One of the key negotiating points between the EU and Turkey is to do with visa free access of Turkish citizens to the EU. Usually when a country becomes a candidate for accession visa restrictions are lifted however in the case of Turkey this was not done. A roadmap towards a visa free regime with Turkey has recently been established with a 3-year timeline throughout which the Commission will present reports to the European Council and Parliament on Turkish progress. Once all criteria have been fulfilled the Commission will present a proposal to the Council and Parliament on the amendment of EC Regulation 593/200147 lifting visa requirements. Even though many of the chapters of the community acquis remain blocked preventing further negotiations taking place, the Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Füle has established the Positive Agenda with Turkey. Under the Agenda a broad range of issues such as political reforms, migration, trade and further support to alignment with the acquis are to be discussed. Working groups have been established for unopened chapters such as Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services (3), Company Law (6) and Information Society and Media (10). In order for countries to meet to conditions for accession they often need financial and technical assistance: the Instrument for PreAccession Assistance (IPA) is the program through which the EU provides this assistance. The second edition of the program, IPA II is for the period from 2014-2020 and has a budget of 11.7 billion euros.48 This can also be used to pressure countries by suspending the assistance provided through this.

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-adopts-democracy-package-goes-torecess.aspx?PageID=238&NID=63091&NewsCatID=338 47 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visafree_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf 48 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm

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Links: On democracy package: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-adopts-democracy-package-goes-torecess.aspx?PageID=238&NID=63091&NewsCatID=338 Visa free regime: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visafree_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf IPA II: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm Positive Agenda: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-359_en.htm?locale=en

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THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (CULT) DESPITE THE FINANCIAL LITERACY INITIATIVES OF THE OECD, WORLD BANK, EU AND NATIONAL ENTITIES, OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC FINANCIAL CONCEPTS AND CONSUMER RIGHTS STILL PREVAIL. HOW CAN THE FINANCIAL EDUCATION OF EU CITIZENS’ BE IMPROVED? Vice President: Luca Olumets - Estonia Explanation and relevance of the Topic: Financial education improves individuals’ understanding of financial products and concepts, and empowers them by investing in the development of the necessary skills to improve their financial literacy. Financial literacy emphasises individuals’ awareness of money management, income, savings, financial risks and opportunities. The abovementioned elements of financial literacy are aimed at (1) empowering consumers to make the best decisions given their financial circumstances, (2) protecting individuals’ consumer rights, and (3) being in charge of one’s finances. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) started emphasising the role of financial education in combating low levels of financial literacy in the early 2000s and since then, incremental steps have been taken to improve financial literacy globally. However, the negative effects of limited understanding of financial concepts did not reveal individuals’ weaknesses to financial turbulence until the 2008 financial crisis and the following economic recession which exposed many households to careless financial decision-making, resulting in an accumulation of consumer debt across the EU. Such high levels of consumer debt have raised additional concerns about the possibility of rolling over debt, or accessing new sources of borrowing to cover existing loans. An over-indebted household has insufficient funds to meet its financial commitments; over-indebted households face difficulties in escaping a vicious cycle of accumulating debt to meet their financial commitments. The question of whether extensive or sufficient prior financial knowledge would have prevented many households from ending up in such a state arises. In order to actively combat lack of financial knowledge, many international organisations, and EU Member States have conducted surveys which have resulted in the undertaking of initiatives and projects aimed at increasing citizens’ understanding of the financial environment and its key concepts. The OECD has developed a survey instrument to address people from different backgrounds and various countries, in which it emphasises three aspects of peoples’ comprehension of financial literacy: financial knowledge, financial behaviour, and attitude49, and how they are interlinked. The European Commission has explained the benefits of financial education for an individual, the society and the economy50. On an individual level, financial education may develop young peoples’ skills thus allowing them to lead an independent life, and make better financial decisions in accordance with their needs. Benefits for society include encouraging citizens, even those with low incomes to engage in financial planning and saving; two elements that diminish the potential of financial exclusion. Should individuals become financially literate, they are more likely to save and challenge financial service providers to develop products that correspond to their needs, having a positive effect on the economy on both investment levels and economic growth. However, the active role of international organisations yields little results as education falls under the exclusive competences of the Member States. Thus international and supranational organisations have limited powers in formulating education policy51. Since 2007, limited progress in the provision of financial education and Member States’ inadequate response to decreasing levels of individuals’ financial understanding allowed for a negative spillover effect of the financial crisis on the microeconomic level, as consumers’ financial decisions were not optimal.

Atkinson, A. and Messy, F. (2012). “Measuring Financial Literacy: Results of the OECD / International Network on Financial Education (INFE) Pilot Study”, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 15, OECD Publishing 50 European Commission. (2007). Communication from the Commission. Financial Education. Commission of the European Communities. COM(2007)808 Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

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Figure 1: Risks deriving from financial illiteracy.

Links: EBF: Financial literacy – empowering consumers to make the right choices: http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/EBF_Financial_Education_-_rev7-26-9_webversion2009-00831-01-E1.pdf Communication from the Commission: Financial Education: http://www.parliament.bg/pub/ECD/71166COM_2007_808_EN_ACTE_f.pdf OECD: Financial Education, Savings and Investment: http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k94gxrw760v.pdf?expires=1402169872&id=id&accname=guest&checksu m=549D61E963BA730697350823892773BD OECD: Measuring Financial Literacy: http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k9csfs90fr4.pdf?expires=1402169205&id=id&accname=guest&checksum =F263B945BA7D06DB8FC39F84603F690C Over-indebtedness: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6708&langId=en Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): http://www.eudemocrats.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/D-Reader_friendly_latest%20version.pdf World Bank: Financial literacy around the world: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6107

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Key terms:      

Consumer rights – laws designed to ensure the rights of consumers as well as fair trade, competition and accurate information in the marketplace. Financial literacy – the achievement of skills necessary to make informed and effective decisions regarding earning, spending, and the management of money. Financial literacy is a person’s ability to understand and make use of financial concepts52. Financial behaviour – they way in which a person acts/reacts within a financial literacy measure. Financial attitude – an individual’s attitude towards a financial phenomenon, and how the attitude influences the financial behaviour. Over-indebtedness – households or individuals are in arrears on a structural basis, or at a significant risk of getting into arrears in a structural basis. Outstanding debts – the sum of overdrawn bank accounts, outstanding credit card balances and arrears on other credits and on housing and other bills.

Key questions:      

Is financial literacy a determinant of individual financial behaviour? Is financial education the antidote to the increasing level of over-indebtedness? How relevant is formal or informal education in shaping the understanding of consumer rights and basic financial concepts? What should the role of the EU be in integrating financial literacy initiatives into national educational structures? Are there considerable differences among Member States’ financial education initiatives? Should financial literacy initiatives include sectorial stakeholders (i.e banking institutions, financial organisations etc.) or should those initiatives be carried out solely by Member States?

Key facts and figures:    

A survey carried out in Hungary found that consumers were not aware of basic financial terms; 70% of respondents were not aware of the meaning of inflation53. A UK survey found that at all income levels many people do not plan ahead, and that 70% had no provision to cover an unexpected drop in income54 A UK survey found that 33% of people, who hold no more complex products than general insurance, bought their policy without comparing it to even one other product55. According to a study of Lietuvos Bankas carried out in 2009, around 30% of disposable income, on average, was used for debt servicing by those households which had outstanding debt56.

Links: Case study on young Hungarians and their level of financial knowledge: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/capability/conference/otto-gecser_en.pdf Financial Capability in the UK:

Servon, L, J. and Kaestner, R. (2008). Consumer financial literacy and the impact of online banking on the financial behaviour of lowerbank customers. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 42, 2. p.271(35). Retrieved June 7, 2014 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2008.00108.x/asset/j.17456606.2008.00108.x.pdf?v=1&t=hw5a6owr&s=2392b80ba6997eeb2587465a01c4ec10b6487bff 53 Gecser, O. (2007). 8 steps to teach young Hungarians to use their money in a smart way. The work of the Foundation of Financial SelfReliance. Retrieved June 8, 2014 from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/capability/conference/ottogecser_en.pdf 54 Financial Services Authority. (2006). Financial Capability in the UK: Establishing a Baseline. Financial Services Authority. Retrieved on June 7, 2014 from http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fincap_baseline.pdf 55 (ibid). 56 Bank of Lithuania. (2009)Financial Stability Review. Retrieved June 8, 2014 from http://www.lb.lt/fsr_2009_1

income

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http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fincap_baseline.pdf Assessment on Financial Literacy: http://www.moneyms.eu/uploads/1/6/2/1/16214540/moneyms_assessment_on_financial_literacy.pdf Business Insider: ‘Teach kids financial literacy to spark entrepreneurship’: http://www.businessinsider.com/r-buffett-teach-kids-financial-literacy-to-spark-entrepreneurship-2014-19

Key conflicts: There are three main conflicts associated with this topic. First, in economies that are recovering from the recent recession, information is power and knowledge is key. Financial knowledge helps people and businesses in making smart and profitable decisions regarding their investments, spending and lending, and helps guarantee that individuals’ consumer rights are fully upheld. However, there seems to be a negative relationship between the growing need for understanding financial concepts, and the actual knowledge thereof. The current financial literacy initiatives in Member States are not sufficient enough and the levels of individual’s financial literacy remain low. Therefore, the conflict between the lack of knowledge and the rising need for understanding financial concepts needs to be corrected for with higher effectiveness. Second, households with low incomes, young adults, people with lower levels of education, and single parents are more likely to fall into a vicious cycle of over-indebtedness57. Financial education has been announced in the European Commission’s report58 for 21st Century Europe as an essential component of its efforts to ensure that the Single Market can bring direct benefits to Europe’s citizens. Keeping the aforementioned aim as an over-reaching goal, many Member States59 have taken measures that involve enforcing certain financial courses into a primary and secondary school curricula e.g. money basics. Even though financial education from an early age is likely to yield the anticipated results for the levels of financial literacy, it is questionable whether such education should be compulsory or voluntary. Third, education falls under the exclusive competences of the Member States where the EU has the power to merely assist. The task of enabling financial understanding through literacy initiatives is mainly up to the Member States. Even though many Member States have taken considerable actions in order to raise the level of financial literacy, a number of Member States have made little progress in initiating measures regarding financial knowledge. If the aim is the same for all Member States, to tackle low levels of financial literacy, then how to do deal with such discrepancies among the Member States as early on as possible? Links: European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA): Report on Financial Literacy and Education Initiatives by Competent Authorities: https://eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/publications/reports/Report_on_Financial_Literacy_and_Ed ucation__EIOPA-CCPFI-11-018_.pdf TIME: ‘Financial Education is All the Rage but Does it Work?’ http://business.time.com/2013/10/25/financial-education-is-all-the-rage-but-does-it-work/ The Wall Street Journal (WSJ): ‘Teaching Financial Literacy, Starting with Teens’: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304640104579487533888321814

European Commission. (2010). Over-indebtedness. New evidence from the EU-SILC module. Retrieved June 8, 2014 from ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6708&langId=en 58 European Commission. (2007). Initiatives In The Area of Retail Financial Services. Commission of the European Communities. Retrieved June 8, 2014 from http://ec.europa.eu/citizens_agenda/docs/sec_2007_1520_en.pdf 59 In Czech Republic, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and Sweden such education has been made compulsory.

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The Economist: ‘Getting it right on the money’: http://www.economist.com/node/10958702 The Economist: An economist descends into the trenches: http://www.economist.com/node/12675257

Stakeholders: Citizens, and their capacity to comprehend the complexity of financial concepts, are the target audience of financial literacy initiatives. Member States’ governments have employed different initiatives and strategies to increase citizens’ understanding of financial concepts and elements of sound financial decisionmaking so as to minimise the potential of social exclusion and risk of poverty resulting from increasing levels of household over-indebtedness. The highly integrated financial environment of the EU and the provision of mobility and market activity within the EU, however, require coordinated action and inclusive strategies aimed at increasing the financial literacy of individuals. Hence, EU institutions and the resulting initiatives at the EU level are vessels of added value in the efforts of both national and supranational actors to enhance citizens’ awareness of financial concepts. National organisations that are active in the financial sector may also provide governments with the necessary expertise in formulating and implementing financial literacy initiatives. Such organisations like central banks, financial associations, consumer advocacy organisations and decentralised government agencies are stakeholders that add relevant and appropriate input to initiatives aimed at empowering individuals’ understanding of the complex concepts and structures that govern financial decision-making. Additionally, international organisations like the OECD and the World Bank should act as channels for international reporting and benchmarking of best practices. This would be in the hope that financial literacy initiatives that have yielded significant results are shared among members of the international community allowing financial regulators, market stakeholders and educational agencies to create inclusive financial literacy initiatives that are relevant, appropriate and have the capacity to develop the financial planning and decision-making skills of citizens. Links: The World Bank: Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Good_Practices_for_Financial_CP.pdf European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA): Report on Financial Literacy and Education Initiatives by Competent Authorities: https://eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/publications/reports/Report_on_Financial_Literacy_and_Ed ucation__EIOPA-CCPFI-11-018_.pdf EBF: Initiatives taken by the Member States, p. 13-56: http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/EBF_Financial_Education_-_rev7-26-9_webversion2009-00831-01-E1.pdf WSJ: Video about the challenges facing financial literacy: http://live.wsj.com/video/the-challenges-facing-financial-literacy/C0AEAD7E-2948-4434-AF99AB2C2192EF52.html#!C0AEAD7E-2948-4434-AF99-AB2C2192EF52

Existing Measures: The importance of good financial education has been acknowledged at both the international and EU levels.

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In the EU, initiatives such as the White Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010)60, the May 2007 Green Paper on Retail Financial Services61, and the European Parliament resolution on financial services policy62, adopted in July 2007, emphasised the EU’s active attitude towards increasing citizens’ understanding of the financial environment. The European Commission has already taken some initial steps to address financial education. It has set up a website, Dolceta1763, offering consumer education to adults. One of the modules on this site is dedicated to financial services, with subjects including budgeting, consumer credit and home loans, means of payment and investments. Another initiative is the ‘Europa Diary’, a booklet distributed to second-level students to inform them of their rights as consumers. It includes a section on money, and gives early warning about the dangers of excessive borrowing. In 2009, the European Database for Financial Education (EDFE) was launched, which is an ‘electronic library’ of existing financial education schemes. In 2008 the Commission Expert Group on Financial Education was created with an aim to promote the exchange of ideas, experiences and best practices. The Group’s three year mandate came to an end in 2011, noting that the European Commission will focus on consumer protection and continue to monitor the many activities of the OECD. The OECD and the World Bank have both conducted surveys and published reports in order to best depict the current status of financial knowledge in the world. Their extensive reporting has given rise to many initiatives taken by the EU, but has mostly benefitted the Member States, who have created projects starting from ‘debt-free through life’ in Austria to ‘Portal del Cliente Bancario’ (Financial Watchdog) website in Spain.

Links: OECD: Current Status of National Strategies for Financial Education: http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k9bcwct7xmn.pdf?expires=1402169097&id=id&accname=guest&checksu m=37FA79C25D86BB817A918341B95239CB Survey of Financial Literacy Schemes in the EU27; Responses in the Member States p.13-20: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/capability/report_survey_en.pdf Consumer Classroom – What is it? http://www.consumerclassroom.eu/about/teacher-resources ‘Europa Diary’: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/europadiary/index_en.htm EBF: Initiatives taken by the Member States, p. 13-56: http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/EBF_Financial_Education_-_rev7-26-9_webversion2009-00831-01-E1.pdf

COM(2005) 629. COM(2007) 226. 62 P6_TA-PROV(2007)0338/A6-0248/2007. 63 Consumer Classroom: http://www.consumerclassroom.eu/?referer=dolceta.eu 61

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS I (ECON I) SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES) AS THE BACKBONE OF EUROPE'S ECONOMY: GIVEN THAT EUROPEAN PROGRAMMES FOR SME FINANCE HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A MAJOR PAN-EUROPEAN BREAKTHROUGH, WHAT TARGETED INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE SME FINANCING CONDITIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY DISTORTING CAPITAL? Chairperson: Maria Pashi - Cyprus Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: It’s a commonly held belief that small and medium-sized enterprises are a centrepiece of Europe’s economy.64 There are 20 million SMEs in the EU, which make up 99% of all European businesses and provide two out of three of the private sector jobs65. Thus, SMEs are crucial to the European employment and economic growth rates. Moreover, they are responsible for innovation, research and development and the creation of new products and markets. ‘They are a nursery for the larger firms of the future.’66 As a SME grows in size more employees are hired, the product range expands and economic growth increases. Additionally, startup companies drive innovation in technology, create new products and markets, therefore, it is vital for the economy that they have adequate finance in order to develop their innovation. Since SMEs take up so much of the European economy, because of their great potential to grow, and also innovate and invest in research and development, their support towards growth is essential. A requirement for an SME’s growth, however, is having the financial support. Small businesses have only a small amount of finance to invest either due to inadequate profits or low starting capital. Unfortunately, many constraints and barriers exist that make it difficult for an SME to find the finance it needs to grow and invest. Financing an SME generally depends on its sector of activity and its growth cycle.67 In order to grow, a firm needs to be able to rely on equity and debt. Depending on the company’s age, industry, country and operations, the type of finance a SMEs seek vary. At the beginning of its growth cycle SMEs will use finance to start their business, from personal/family savings while more established SMEs use retained profits. As firms grow, external finance is needed and financial institutions, banks and investors are the primary source of finance. However, there are a number of structural market failures that restrict a viable SME with great growth and innovation potential, from accessing finance. The Rowlands Review estimates up to 3,000 viable SMEs each year with characteristics suitable for growth capital may be unable to raise any of the finance required for growth.68 A key barrier is that of asymmetric information between SMEs and finance providers, which creates a funding gap for SMEs with no performance track record or collateral. With the limited data that investors have about the track record of the company, investors cannot fully assess an SME’s potential returns or distinguish between low and high risk businesses. As a result, investors are hesitant to invest and become risk adverse and higher interests are set for SMEs or lenders decide to invest in larger businesses instead. Ultimately, even with the EU’s support the structural market failures have not been rectified. Since the financial crisis of 2008, SME lending has not fully recovered, with tighter banking regulations combined with

Ayad, R. (2009). Financing SMEs in Europe. http://imap.suerf.org/download/studies/study20093.pdf. EurActiv | EU News & policy debates, across languages, (2014). SMEs need to embrace technology to boost growth. [online] Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/smes-need-embrace-technology-boo-analysis-532024 [Accessed 7 Jun. 2014]. 66 Palma, Gabriel (2005) “Four Sources of De-industrialization and a New Concept of the ‘Dutch Disease’” in Jose Antonio Ocampo (editor) Beyond Reform: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 65

Oecdobserver.org, (2014). Financing SMEs - OECD Observer. [online] Available at: http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/3102/Financing_SMEs.html [Accessed 7 Jun. 2014]. 68 SME Access to External Finance. (2014). BIS ECONOMICS PAPER, (16).

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the lack of reliable economic recovery making banks hesitant to lend to SMEs.69 With the financial crisis, SMEs’ challenges to access finance had worsen. With SMEs being highly vulnerable to economic downturns and with lending market paralysing, SMEs’ were hit the most by the financial crisis. Additionally, since then, new banking regulations were introduced in order to safeguard banks and the economy from future financial crisis through setting higher standards and regulations for banks to follow. Basel III agreement aims to strengthen the resilience of the EU banking sector in times of economic shocks while banks continue to finance economic activity and growth. Under Basel III banks need to have much higher capital requirements - which is challenging especially after the financial crisis. The new more restrictive capital requirements do not however apply to loans granted to SMES up to the amount of 1,500 00 euros thus does not restrict SME financing.70 For any bigger amounts however, it may mean that banks require personal guarantees from SMEs or even switch away from lending to SME’s altogether. National governments recognise the finance gap that SMEs face, thus intervene to fix this market failure and support SME though national initiatives. Examples include the Funding-f0r Lending (FLS) Scheme and Startup Loans in the the UK, the KfW Entrepreneur Loan in Germany and the Contrat de Développement Innovation (CDI) in France. The EU recognises the importance of SMEs in the European economy and the financing issues that they have, thus tries supports them by providing grants, loans, guarantees, venture capital and other equity financing. Support is available either directly or through programmes managed on a national level. Additionally, innovative ways of finance, such as crowdfunding, are enabling more innovative SMEs to secure finance. Thus, viable SMEs, with great potential, lack the financial support they need in order to grow, innovate or even begin setting up their business. The result is great loss of potential in increasing economic grow, decreasing unemployment and driving innovation. Links: Why should SMEs embrace innovation and seek to expand. http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/smes-need-embrace-technology-boo-analysis-532024 Why SMEs need financing http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/3102/Financing_SMEs.html SME Performance Review http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-review/index_en.htm Is Crowdfuding a solution? http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-blog/2013/jan/31/crowdfunding-smefinance-kickstarter-funding

Key Terms: SME: Within the European Union, SMEs are defined as firms with a small market share, less than 250 employees and a turnover of less than €50 million annually. There are 3 types of SMEs: - Micro-enterprises have fewer than 10 employees - Small enterprises have between 10-49 employees

www.centralbanking.com, (2014). Post-crisis central bank policies are crowding out ABS, ECB and BoE say. [online] Available at: http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking/news/2347580/post-crisis-central-bank-policies-are-crowding-out-abs-ecb-and-boesay [Accessed 10 Jun. 2014] 70 Ec.europa.eu, (2014). Basel III adapts to SMEs' needs. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/tajani/headlines/news/2013/04/20130416_en.htm [Accessed 10 Jun. 2014].

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Medium-sized enterprises have between 50 and 249 employees

(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/) Financial institutions: An establishment which provides financial services to its clients and members. Conventionally, financial institutions are composed of organisations such as banks, trust companies, insurance companies and investment dealers. Most financial institutions are regulated by the government. Line of Credit: An arrangement between a financial institution, usually a bank, and a customer that establishes a maximum loan balance that the bank will permit the borrower to maintain. The borrower can draw down on the line of credit at any time, as long as he or she does not exceed the maximum set in the agreement. Funding Gap: The amount of money needed to fund the ongoing operations or future development of a business or project that is not currently provided by cash, equity or debt. Financial intermediaries: An entity that acts as the middleman between two parties in a financial transaction. This category includes financial institutions such as investment banks, insurance companies and commercial banks. Financial intermediaries offer a number of benefits to the average consumer including safety, liquidity and economies of scale. Business angel: A high net worth individual who provides financing to small businesses in exchange for an equity stake in the business. Business angels are often thought of as a bridge between loans from family and friends and venture capital. Credit scoring techniques: This involves the use of statistical models by lenders to approve loans to SMEs by predicting the probability of default. Information on financial ratios (such as profitability, leverage and liquidity) and information on credit histories/ financial delinquency are used to predict the probability of default Venture Capital: Money invested in early-stage businesses with expected long-term potential growth. It typical means a high-risk for the investor but expects high-returns in the long-run. Most venture capitalists are groups of wealthy investors, investment banks and other financial institutions. The investor in return gets a portion of the equity and usually a say in the decisions concerning the company. Grants: An amount of money given by governments, foundations, corporations, for a specific purpose. The person/business that receives the grant does not need to repay it. Loans: Giving money (or otherwise, providing debt), to a business or individual in exchange for future repayment plus interest rate. Usually individuals, financial institutions and governments give loans which are paid back in regular instalments plus interest rates - which is considered the lender’s profit. There are legal regulations as to how high the interest rate can be and the length of time before repayment is needed. Guarantee: A safeguard that the lender will be repaid In the case that a borrower is unable to repay the loan back. The guarantee takes the debt obligation if the borrower defaults. The loan can be guaranteed by a third-party like another individual or the government. Government guaranteed loans aim to assist people/business who have low creditworthiness. Additionally, in the case of mortgages, the property is the guarantor in case the borrower defaults.

Key Questions:    

What types of finance can an SME seek? What are the different barriers SMEs face when seeking different types of finance? What can SMEs do to bridge the financing gap? What can financial institutions do to bridge the gap? o What are the alternatives from bank financing for SMEs?

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

Should national governments and the EU institutions devise separate national or EU-wide policy actions for SMEs?

Key Facts and Figures: Access to finance was the second most pressing problem mentioned by 15% of EU SME managers, only locating customers was a greater problem. When rated on a 10 point scale, the severity of the problem of getting access to finance was most pressing in Slovakia (42% of SMEs rating it as 10 out of 10, i.e. extremely pressing), followed by Greece (28%) and Cyprus (26%). It was least likely to be judged as extremely pressing in Estonia (only 3%), Finland (5%) and the Czech Republic (5%) - http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/files/2013-safe-analytical-report_en.pdf The percentages of SMEs reporting rejections of loan applications, loan applications for which only a limited amount was granted, and loan applications which were rejected by the SME because of too high borrowing costs, as well as the percentage of SMEs which did not apply for a loan for fear of rejection, gives a share of 12% (unchanged from the previous survey round) of euro area SMEs having reported that their loan applications were not successful in the period from October 2013 to March 2014.

Key Conflicts: A key implication that restricts SMEs’ finance greatly is lack of information. One barrier to finance is that the lack of information, deems the lender unable to distinguish between high and low risk investment and evaluate the true potential of growth that an SME can have. To avoid costs associated with gathering this information, lenders ask business to provide a financial track record and/or collateral as security for the finance.71 Since 2008, times of uncertain economic conditions, the banking market is more cautious about assessing risk. Unfortunately, since a lot of SMEs are small and young, although they be viable business propositions, with the lack of a track record or collateral, they are unable to secure funding. SMEs do not have audited financial statements that can be shared with any provider of outside finance. Some familyowned businesses, for example, are very reluctant to report strategic information such as business structure, growth opportunities, strategic orientation and even ownership structure. As a result, small firms are often unable to convey their status in a credible way, and have more difficulty building a reputation to signal their high quality as a borrower.72 Even in the occasion that the lender decides to assess the quality of an SME proposal, the costs of doing so are transferred to the SME as transaction costs, thus, increasing their burden when securing funding. Therefore, from the lender’s perspective, an investment in a larger, lower-risk business is wiser. Unfortunately, this leaves potentially viable businesses with growth potential not being able to obtain equity finance. The general lack of equity in the firm, the high risk, the lack of adequate collateral and poor information about the business restrict lenders from investing in SMEs. Although investing in SMEs in its early stage can bring about innovation and a number of positive spillover effects to the economy, investors do not take this under consideration when making their investment decisions. Their incentive is to make the most profit through the safest and risk-averse investments. There is also a great lack of information from the SMEs’ side. For instance, entrepreneurs and SMEs may not fully understand the potential growth and benefits of their business had they raised. Moreover, many SMEs are simply lacking the information on how equity finance works and where to obtain such finance from. Small businesses find it challenging to comply with European standards and find the procedure too complex. SMEs may also lack the managerial skills and can make poor business plans. This means that a lot of them fail

71 72

SME Access to External Finance. (2014). BIS ECONOMICS PAPER, (16). Ayad, R. (2009). Financing SMEs in Europe. http://imap.suerf.org/download/studies/study20093.pdf.

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to present themselves as a good investment even though their business might have the capacity to do so. There is gap between financial institutions and SMEs hindered even further by the lack of communication. Communication should not be limited to the reasons for not granting bank loans or withdrawing existing credit lines – it should be built upon mutual trust between banks and SMEs. SMEs are unaware of risk assessments and the factors leading to downgrading. They are many times unaware of the data needed to determine the rating, the factors affecting the credit decision and the possible ways to improve the rating. The assessment criteria of whether to invest or not, vary between Members States and between different institutions. Having said that, SMEs fail to seek finance from abroad, but rather remain nationally or locally. The European internal market represents 500 million consumers, but too many of our SMEs fail to look beyond the limits of their own national borders. Links: Financing SMEs in Europe – an analysis of market failure between lenders and SMEs imap.suerf.org/download/studies/study20093.pdf http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16148/EBA-SME-Report.pdf Bank finance – the gap finance http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/804540/7/__homes.surrey.ac.uk_home_.System_Desktop_SME.pdf Good Practises in SME policies http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/best-practices/index_en.htm Microfinancing http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=836

Stakeholders: Entrepreneurs and SMEs seek for external finance in order to establish their business, expand it or invest in research and development. They seek this finance through private investors or financial institutions such as banks. They seek to make a profit through either buying part of the company they’re investing in and profiting through the business’s profits or by giving a loan and receiving interest rates for it. Either way, lenders want to maximise their profit in the least risky way. So, they seek for investments in business, which are not risky and have the smallest possibility to fail, and also the best potential for the company to grow greatly and quickly. Due to the fact that SMEs are usually young in age and lack the history to prove that they are not risky, it becomes very difficult for them to acquire the external funding. The EU recognises this market failure and recognises how important SMEs’ growth and development is for the Europe’s technological innovation, the shrinking of unemployment and the increase of the European economic growth. Thus, the European Commission (EC) develops and implements a range policies assisting SMEs to develop and thrive as well as to receive finance through grants, loans and work towards finding out what are the market failures and how they can be overcome. The EC constantly works with Member States to manage this funding and also gather information about current market failings and how they can be resolved in an innovative way.

Existing Measures: In 2008, the European Commission launched the Small Business Act (SBA), which is a policy framework, including legislative proposals, which aim to facilitate SME’s access to funding and assist them in thriving as a business. The European Commission’s activities based on SBA has been the SME Finance Forum, providing them with flexible financial instruments such as Eurobean Investment Bank (EIB) loans and an Action Plan in order to improve access to finacne for SMEs. This Action Plan includes the Horizon 2020 which combines all

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research and innovation funding, and the programme for Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME). The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group provides an additional €60bn in lending in order to support Europe’s economic recover. It finances SMEs through local partner banks, in favourable terms. The European Investment Fund (EIF) manages a range of EU financial instruments and is a provider of risk finance aiming support Europe's SMEs by helping them to access finance. The EIF does not lend nor grant subsidies to SMEs, rather it works through financial intermediaries in order assist SMEs with lending. For instance, can provide venture capital for small businesses and it can provide guarantees to financial institutions to cover their loans to SMEs. It uses either its own funds or those entrusted to it by the EIB or the European Union.

The programme for Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME) will facilitate and improve access to finance for SMEs through two different financial instruments, available from 2014: The Loan Guarantee Facility (SMEG) The COSME budget will fund guarantees and counter-guarantees for financial intermediaries to help them provide more loan and lease finance to SMEs. This loan guarantees encourages banks to make more debt finance available to SMEs, including microcredit and mezzanine finance, by reducing the banks' exposure to risk. SMEG provides co-, counter- and direct guarantees to financial intermediaries providing SMEs with loans, mezzanine finance and equity. The Equity Facility for Growth The COSME budget will also be invested in funds that provide venture capital and mezzanine finance to expansion and growth-stage SMEs in particular those operating across borders. Horizon 2020 is the EC's latest programme for research and innovation and aims at improving Europe's global competitiveness. One of its objectives is to strengthen innovation. This includes major investment in key technologies and greater access to capital and support for SMEs. The Specific Fields of Action, singles out specific aims that Horizon 2020 should strive for. This includes making sure that “the adequate participation of, and innovation impact on, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in Horizon 2020”.Thus the dedicated SME instrument, which takes up 7% of the total budge for Horizon 202, aims to fill gaps in funding for early-stage, high-risk, research and innovation by SMEs and also stimulate innovation.The new instrument will integrate the specific SME support that the EU Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) and the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) had, in one comprehensive, simple and easily accessible scheme.

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Â Links: Small Business Act in Europe http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/small-business-act/index_en.htm European Investment Banks http://www.eib.org/index.htm European Investment Fund http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/eif/index_en.htm COSME http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/cosme/access-to-finance-smes/index_en.htm Horizon 2020 Fact Sheet http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/pdf/press/fact_sheet_on_sme_measures_in_horizon_2020.pdf EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assistance for access to finance http://europa.eu/youreurope/business/funding-grants/access-to-finance/index_en.htm Fighting late payments http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/fighting-late-payments/index_en.htm

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COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS II WITH THE EU’S STANCE ON STATE AID GROWING STRONGER IN THE PAST THREE DECADES, AND TAX POLICIES SUCH AS THE UK’S ‘PATENT BOX’ BEING QUESTIONED BY THE COMMISSION, HOW SHOULD THE EU ADJUST ACCEPTABLE STATE AID ACTIONS TO PROTECT NECESSARY CAUSES AND COMPETITION, WITHOUT DAMAGING MEMBER STATES’ RIGHTS TO REMAIN FINANCIALLY ATTRACTIVE? Chairperson: Harm van Leeuwen – The Netherlands Explanation and relevancy of the Topic:

“[Without trade restrictions] the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man… is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way.... The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty [for which] no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society.” – Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter IX, p. 687, § 51 The single market is one of the most important pillars of the EU as a whole. It is underpinned by the belief that free trade and competitive markets provide the best basis for prosperity, through employment and economic growth. Free trade is established through the four fundamental freedoms of the EU: goods, services, capital and persons can generally move freely between member states. However, more is needed to guarantee the success of the single market. Thus, the EU was charged with establishing competition law: rules to guarantee a well-functioning, competitive market73. There is a fairly wide consensus over the importance of free trade to the economy in general, and the internal market to European economies in particular. Even political parties that advocate leaving the Euro or the EU often argue that their country should continue to have access to it74. In fact, several non-EU members are essentially part of the internal market through the European Economic Area and have agreed to apply many EU rules as a result. The existence of a customs union is thus not in itself controversial. Which competition rules should govern the single market, however, all the more so. Because the EU is an international organisation with independent member states, its competition rules need to ensure that neither firms nor governments engage in anti-competitive behaviour. Therefore, in addition to rules to guarantee free and fair competition aimed at companies, the EU also regulates aid given by its member states to individual companies. The general rationale behind regulating state aid is that it distorts competition by giving these companies an unfair and inefficient advantage over competitors.75 This is even more relevant for the EU, because member states can use state aid to give unfair preferential treatment to their own companies over those from others (a form of protectionism). In case a measure falls under the EU’s definition of state aid, the authorities handing out the assistance normally have to notify the European Commission beforehand. The commission then decides whether the proposed aid is legitimate or not. However, most state-aid measures are not subject to notification through the general block exemption regulation. This is an estimated two-thirds under the latest regulation (see ‘measures in place’). State aid rules apply regardless of the form in which the assistance is given—this could be anything from cash handouts to tax breaks to preferential treatment for government contracts. However, there is a large grey area of measures for which it is not immediately clear whether they classify as state aid or not, let alone whether they should be permitted if this were to be the case. One such case is Britain’s new patent box, which allows companies to pay a lower (10%) corporate-tax rate on profits earned from patented inventions. Last year, Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble called for the patent box and similar schemes in

eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN euspeak.eu/where-to-place-new-german-euroscepticism 75 europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/state_aid/index_en.htm 74

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other countries to be banned by the EU.76 The problem is that the scheme, rather than motivating companies already located in Britain to innovate, is designed to encourage them to re-locate there from other countries. For this reason, the European Commission declared Britain’s patent-box scheme harmful tax competition.77 Tax competition in itself is unrelated to state-aid rules, but now the commission has started collecting information to determine whether patent boxes in various member states can be classified as state aid or not.78 The central aim of the topic is thus to deal with cases like this: to decide which types of state aid should be allowed and which should be forbidden. A successful solution to this problem should not only find a balance between the key conflicts central to the topic (see ‘stakeholders’ and ‘key conflicts’), but also complement the European Commission’s existing drive to modernise and simplify state-aid rules (see ‘measures in place’). Links: • European Commission state-aid portal ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html • British government’s page on state aid https://www.gov.uk/state-aid • Commission page on state-aid procedures ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/state_aid_procedures_en.html • Academic introduction: Economic principles of state-aid control, by J Haucap & U Schwalbe, 2011 dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/Discussion_Pape r/017_Haucap_Schwalbe.pdf • News article: European Commission defends ‘patent box’ probe, World Intellectual Property Review, 26/3/2014 worldipreview.com/news/european-commission-defends-patent-box-probe-6429

Key terms: • State Aid: aid given by a government to selected companies at its own discretion. According to the EU legal definition, assistance must meet four conditions to be classified as state aid: (1) it is directly or indirectly granted by the state or from state resources; (2) it gives an advantage to one or more companies over others; (3) it (potentially) distorts competition, e.g. by providing some companies with an advantage over others; and (4) it affects trade between member states. • Single market/internal market: the EU’s free-trade area with free movement of goods, services, capital and persons (‘four freedoms’) as well as common product standards and competition policy. • Competition: rivalry among producers to satisfy the needs of consumers, such that no producers or consumers have enough power to individually control the market. Different degrees of competition exist in economic theory, from hypothetical perfect competition to monopoly (a complete lack of competition). In modern economies, fair competition is thought to be essential for efficiency and low prices for consumers. • Notification: Under EU law, member states have to notify the European Commission of proposed state aid, so that the commission can decide on the legality of the proposed assistance. Many forms of state aid are exempt from notification through general block exemptions, for example because the amount of assistance given is relatively low. • Patent box: tax break for companies over the profits that they earn from patented inventions. This measure was recently introduced in Britain and the name is now also used to refer to similar schemes in other EU countries. This is not currently considered a form of state aid, but the European Commission is considering whether it might be. • Harmful tax competition: tax regimes that are specifically aimed at getting businesses to relocate the place where they are registered for tax purposes, for example by providing tax breaks only for offshore companies. All EU finance ministers agreed not to introduce such measures anymore and phase out existing ones in the EU’s code of conduct for business taxation. Harmful tax competition is unrelated to state-aid control.

uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/uk-europe-taxes-idUKBRE9680KY20130709 ifs.org.uk/publications/6899 78 worldipreview.com/news/european-commission-defends-patent-box-probe-6429 77

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Interesting links: • The latest general block exemption regulation europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-369_en.htm • Examples of what is considered state aid by the European Commission http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/State-Aid/About/Examples • For those into law: the legal definition of state aid in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, articles 107–109 eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN Key questions:

• How widely should the term state aid be interpreted? Which types of assistance should be included in the definition, and which types of assistance, given on what basis, should not be considered state aid?

• In general, is state aid a fair way for EU member states to promote business in their country or an inefficient measure that undermines the EU’s single market?

• What is legitimate state aid? That is, for which purposes specifically is state aid an instrument that member states should be free to use and why? How well do the current exemptions regulations correspond to these needs? Key facts and figures:

• From September 2008 to December 2010, EU member states spent €1240bn, or 10% of EU GDP, in state aid to the financial sector, aiming to restore stability. This was possible because the European Commission adopted temporary rules regulating this type of aid because of the financial crisis. The Member States pledged even more aid, but most of it was not used by banks and other financial institutions.79

• In total, in 2012, more than €67bn non-crisis state aid was handed out by EU member states. This is about half a percent of the EU GDP.80 Of the total, only €8.2 had to be notified to the commission. The rest was awarded under general schemes (which only have to be notified once, not for each individual case) and block exemptions.

• Of block-exempted aid, the biggest shares went to regional development and environmental protection (including energy saving). Training, employment, small and medium enterprises, and research, development and innovation received much smaller amounts.81

• In 2013, only in 7 out of 269 cases did the European Commission decide to claw back state aid that was unlawfully given.82 A common reason for ordering organisations to pay back aid is because they got more than needed to achieve the goal that the aid was for, as happened to the German and Belgian post and a Dutch public broadcaster.8384 Links: • European Commission page with statistics on state aid in general, clawed back aid (‘recovery’) and more ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/studies_reports.html • State-aid scoreboard with aid measures broken down by country ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/non_crisis_en.html

ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/temporary_stateaid_rules_en.html epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm_comp/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=comp_ncr_xrl_01 81 ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/horizontal_objectives_en.html 82 ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/statistics/statistics_en.html 83 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-822_en.htm 84 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-38_en.htm 80

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Key conflicts: There are two types of key conflict when it comes to state aid. The first is between the interests of individual Member States and the interest of the EU or world economy. The second is a conflict between theory and practice: in economic theory, state aid is generally thought to be a bad thing, but in practice it can be a useful tool for governments to influence the economy. The dry matter of competition policy rarely leads to passionate confrontations between politicians. Yet in January, the French industry minister Arnaud Montebourg attacked the European competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia for his strict application of state aid rules.85 Mr Montebourg stressed that European companies’ competitors in America, China and Japan are already receiving billions of euros in state subsidies. He argued that in order for European companies to survive among their global rivals, EU member states should be allowed to respond in kind by selectively supporting businesses. In Mr Montebourg’s view, state aid is a suitable way of compensating European industries for unfair competition from non-EU states. Mr Almunia responded that, “Europe will not find its place in globalisation by launching a subsidy race with the rest of the world.” In his view, state aid does not offer a long-term solution for unfair competition from abroad. Rather, it would discourage European firms from innovating to become more competitive, and would potentially keep inefficient companies alive with taxpayers’ funds while causing more efficient ones to fail. It is helpful to look at the conflict of interest between individual countries and the EU as a prisoner’s dilemma, a theoretical way of thinking about co-operation. This way of thinking goes as follows. It would probably be better for the global economy if all countries agreed not to give unfair state aid to their companies: the most efficient firms would prevail while wasteful ones would shut down. However, it is tempting for one country to give its own firms an edge over others by handing out subsidies anyway. This would damage firms in other countries, so that these would now be better off handing out subsidies as well, rather than let their companies perish because of the unfair competition. In the end, consumers in all countries end up paying high taxes to support inefficient firms, so every country is worse off than they would be if no state aid was given by anyone. This is illustrated in the table below with Europe and America as hypothetical examples—to understand how the table works, have a look at the video under ‘interesting links’ below! Europe

No state aid

Give state aid

No state aid

Europe: 10 China: 10

Europe: 15 China: 0

Give state aid

Europe: 0 China: 15

Europe: 5 China: 5

m e r i c a

The second key conflict is that between the economic theory of state aid and concrete cases. As stated, state aid is considered inefficient by most economists, as it is seen as bad value for money, discouraging innovation and distorting competition. Yet in practice, member states would often like to use state aid to reach specific goals in their economies. These goals could be as varied as creating or safeguarding jobs, investment in socially desirable projects, or encouraging specialised business clusters. Many, but not all of these are allowed as exemptions under EU state-aid rules.

ft.com/cms/s/0/99515d88-8367-11e3-86c9-00144feab7de.html

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The question is thus how to balance these interests. Can state aid be a legitimate way of attracting business and/or a sensible response to other countries handing out subsidies? Do state-aid rules deprive member states of tools to influence their own economy? Or is state aid infeasible as a long-term strategy to deal with globalisation? Links: • Explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma: http://youtu.be/IotsMu1J8fA

• ‘War is declared’ between Montebourg and Almunia, EurActiv, 27/1/2014 euractiv.com/trade/war-french-minister-eu-competiti-news-533012 • Examples in news articles of how state aid affects the economy: • State aid for Ryanair and small airports economist.com/node/21588076 • State aid through loan guarantees for small companies economist.com/node/13611707 • Dispute between the EU and America about state aid to Boeing and Airbus reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-trade-aircraft-subsidies-exclusive-idUSBREA4I03W20140519 Stakeholders: The European Commission, the EU’s civil service, is the main actor in regulating state aid at a European level. It decides by itself on exemptions, procedures, guidelines and other issues in regulations that are binding for all member states. These decisions are made on the basis of extensive consultation with the other stakeholders. Some measures, however, have to be approved by the Council, the meeting of national ministers, in a regulation of its own—for example when the commission wants to include entire new categories in its list of exemptions. The European Parliament only has an advisory role. All public bodies in member states, including national and local authorities, agencies, government-owned companies and more, have to abide by EU state aid rules. Companies receiving state aid will also want to make sure that the state aid they are receiving is legitimate: if the aid is later found to be illegal by the European Commission, it has to be paid back. The final authority on this is the European Court of Justice, however cases normally don’t reach this last resort. Competitors and other ‘interested parties’ are essential in enforcing state aid rules: when they think another company is receiving illegal state aid, and they are thus being put at a disadvantage, they can complain to the European Commission, which will then investigate. Finally, all consumers are stakeholders because when state aid distorts competition, they are the ones that end up paying for it. Measures in place: EU state aid regulation is currently in the process of undergoing major reform under the European Commission’s State-Aid modernisation programme.86 The commission has defined three major objectives: fostering economic growth, focusing enforcement on cases with the biggest impact, and streamlining rules and decision-making processes. The entire regulation system around state aid is being reformed so that it encourages member states to use targeted state aid towards specific growth-promoting objectives and controls state aid that significantly affects the single market by distorting competition. In addition to existing categories, the commission now exempts certain aid in its new general block exemption regulation (GBER) in the categories innovation, culture, natural disasters, sport, broadband infrastructure, other infrastructure, transport to remote regions and certain agriculture, forestry and fisheries issues.87 These categories were previously not part of the block exemption and always had to be notified, creating a high administrative burden. In addition, the commission is in the progress of publishing new guidelines for these categories to instruct public authorities on how to use state aid. Some of these have been finished, some are still in the consultation process and some still need to be started.88 The commission has also adopted a new de minimis regulation, exempting all state aid below €200 000 (this amount is

eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0209&qid=1402133842298&from=EN europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-728_en.htm 88 ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html 87

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higher than before). Finally, it has started the process of better defining the notion of state aid through a consultation round in which public bodies and private companies are asked to give their opinion.89 Links: • European Commission overview of its state-aid modernisation programme: ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html • State-aid modernisation on the EU law portal: http://eurlex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1402133842298&text=%22state%20aid%20modernisation%22&scope=EUR LEX&type=quick&lang=en&page=1 • Examples of how the GBER has implications for specific sectors: • Handouts to big greenhouse-gas emitters as an unintended side consequence euractiv.com/sections/energy/report-new-state-aid-rules-offer-big-emitters-eu2-billion-windfall-301296 • Implications for energy policy in general euractiv.com/sections/energy/new-eu-state-aid-law-huge-mess-say-lawyers-301805 • Implications for small airports euractiv.com/transport/eu-state-aid-rules-lead-closure-news-532105

ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/index_en.html

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THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (EMPL) WITH THE CONFEDERATION OF FAMILY ORGANISATIONS IN THE EU (COFACE) NAMING 2014 AS THE YEAR FOR 'RECONCILING WORK AND FAMILY LIFE', WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN SINGLE PARENTS' POSITION IN THE LABOUR MARKET, AND TO ENSURE THAT NEITHER GENDER IS FINANCIALLY PUNISHED FOR HAVING CHILDREN?

Chairperson: Dorothea Weber - Germany Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: The high unemployment rates in Europe has been a prominent topic for many years90. 2014, the Year for ‘Reconciling Work and Family Life’, brings a pressing matter to the table: single parents’ position in the labour market. They are “one of the two groups with the highest risk of poverty, with the percentage at risk of poverty ranging from 28% in the Nordic countries to 34% in the North-Western countries”91. This raises the question of responsibility; especially whether it should be the governments’ task to come to their rescue. The most recent data shows that 10.4% of households92 with children are run by single parents. Of these, only 1.2% are single-father homes and 9.1% are single-mother homes. Some would argue that these discrepancies result from factors such as the gender pay gap, gender roles, legislation and the access to contraception and abortion. Figure 1: Proportion of children by living arrangements based on parental status – LFS 201093

Studies show that mothers with partners are much more likely to be employed than single mothers94. This indicates that single mothers have to choose between taking care of their children and taking up a job.

Jolly, David (2014): Unemployment in Europe Stays High Amid Signs of Recovery – The New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/09/business/international/unemployment-in-euro-zone.html?_r=0 91 Iacovou, Maria (2013). Household composition, poverty and hardship across Europe. Retrieved from: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-TC-13-008/EN/KS-TC-13-008-EN.PDF 92 Labour Force Survey 2010 93 Ruggeri, Kai and Bird, Chloe E. (2014): Single parents and employment in Europe. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/documents/140502_gender_equality_workforce_ssr3_en.pdf 94 There is a severe lack of data about single fathers.

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However, a job and the income connected to it are necessary for single parents to be able to afford services such as childcare or after-school care. Without a steady income they are dependent on state aid such as paid paternity and maternity leave or child benefits. In order to balance their children’s needs as well as their finances, many single parents take up part-time jobs. The issue of social exclusion is part of the topic employment and social policy, which is a shared competence between the EU and its Member States. Most policies are currently implemented on a national level while the EU has a complementing function. In order to tackle this issue, the first question that needs to be answered is whether a welfare state system with social benefits is a way forward or whether the responsibility lies with the single parents themselves. In other words: is it the Member States’, EU’s or any governments’ task to protect the groups at risk of poverty? What might the effects of state interference in the labour market be? Links: 2014 Year of Reconciling Work and Family Life – Official Homepage with a short explanation: http://eyf2014.wordpress.com/european-year-2014/ 7 Days: Euro crisis, single parents – introductory information about the life of single parents in the EU: http://youtu.be/Z9TslzjMII4?t=11m44s Maternity and paternity leave across the EU – The Independent – Article summarising the different policies (2010): http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/maternity-and-paternity-leave-across-the-eu2112229.html “I am prouder of my years as a single mother than of any other part of my life” – an article by J K Rowling about her life as a single mother: http://www.gingerbread.org.uk/content/1901/J-K-Rowling Who will speak up for the universal welfare state now? – an article from The Guardian about the welfare system in the UK: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/21/welfare-state-universal-benefits

Key Terms:       

Single parent: A person bringing up a child or children without a partner.95 Lone parent: Synonym for ‘single parent’, sometimes used to mean a parent who raises the child entirely by themselves and receives no help from the other parent. European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS): The largest European household sample survey, providing quarterly and annual data on labour participation of people aged 15 and over and on persons outside the labour force.96 Childcare: The care of children, especially by a crèche, nursery, or child-minder while parents are working.97 After-school care: Childcare facilities where children can go in the time after school and before their parents come home from work. Social policy: Social policy forms part of the shared competences between the EU and Member States. At the moment, social policies are implemented at Member State level rather than on a European level.98 Barcelona Objectives99: Aim at developing childcare facilities for young children in Europe with a view to sustainable and inclusive growth.

Definition by the Oxford Dictionary: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/single-parent Further short description and explanation of the LFS: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/introduction 97 Definition by the Oxford Dictionary: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/childcare 98 Further short explanation of the social policy and EU competences in the matter: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0023_en.htm 96

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Links: European Union Labour Force Survey 2010 (LFS 2010) – contains the most recent data collected on the topic: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-030/EN/KS-SF-11-030-EN.PDF Definitions by the International Labour Organisation – used in the LFS 2010: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/EU_labour_force_survey_-_methodology A description of the project ‘Maisons Relais’ in Luxembourg – a day center for children: https://europa.eu/youth/vp/vol_organisation/48000206977_en ‘Europe’s other Crisis’ – The Economist – Article about the demographic crisis in the EU: http://www.economist.com/node/21557774

Key Questions:   



What exactly are the difficulties single parents face when trying to (re)enter the labour market? Considering its competencies, what concrete measures can Member States take regarding social policy? What do the different approaches in the Member States look like?  How much do the measures vary?  What consequences does this have in terms of the single parents’ position in the labour market?  What is the situation in your country? In times of high unemployment rates throughout the EU, especially amongst young people, what effects does the strengthening of one specific group in the labour market have?

Links: Eurozone unemployment remains at 12% - EuropeanVoice: An article about the high unemployment rates throughout the EU: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/eurozone-unemployment-remains-at-12/ Your rights country by country – You can click through various countries and have a look at the legislation concerning single parents: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=858&langId=en FAQ on the EU competences and the European Commission powers – short answers to all you questions about competences: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq?lg=en#q3

Key Facts and Figures: These figures are taken from the Short Statistical Report No. 3, “Single parents and employment in Europe” by Kai Ruggeri and Chloe E. Bird from 2014. It features only the countries included in the LFS database.100  

41% of households have children under the age of 15 (lowest: 29% Germany; highest: 58.6% Malta) 10.4% are single-parent households (lowest: 3.5% Romania; highest: 20.4% UK)

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/130531_barcelona_en.pdf

100 Due to missing information on children not all Member States are included in the study. Denmark, Sweden and Finland are not listed. Likewise the non-EU countries Croatia (study from 2010), Norway and Sweden are not included because of the same reason.

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    

9.1% are single-mother households (lowest: 2.9% Romania; highest: 18.5% UK) 1.2% are single-father households (lowest: no reported cases in Malta; highest: 2.4% France) 16% of children come from single-mother homes (lowest: 5.3% Greece; highest: 28.1% UK) 2.1% of children come from single-father homes (lowest: 0.7% Cyprus; 15.1% Belgium) 90.5% of women with children and partner are employed (55.4% full-time), only 84.1% of single mothers are employed (47.9% full-time)101

Figure 3: Differences in part-time and full-time employment between single young women with and without children – LFS 2010102

Key Conflicts: The question that is essential to this topic is whether social benefits are something the EU and/or Member States should provide or whether single parents and other groups should be responsible for their own employment and therefore learn to cope without state aid. What it comes down to is the two opposing theories of free market economy103 versus social market economy104. An aspect, which needs to be acknowledged, is the legislative situation. The EU has the competence to complement and support the Member States’ actions. The reason for this is the subsidiarity principle105, which ensures that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. Considering the great variety in the 28 Member States in terms of the composition of single-parent households, this does seem like a sensible concept. Nonetheless, there are possibilities for the EU to act. The European Parliament can ensure that more data is collected on the matter so as to understand the situation better in order to provide legislation tailored to the

101

People who are not seeking work (inactive) are excluded from the data. Ruggeri, Kai and Bird, Chloe E. (2014): Single parents and employment in Europe. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/documents/140502_gender_equality_workforce_ssr3_en.pdf 103 A free market economy is an economy in which the allocation for resources is determined only by their supply and the demand for them. It does not include the aspect of social exclusion. http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/free_market_e.htm 104 Definition by the Oxford Dictionary: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/social-market-economy 105 Treaty on the European Union (TEU), p. 4: http://www.eurotreaties.com/lisbontext.pdf 102

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situation. Another helpful tool is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)106, which brings together Member States in order to work towards common objectives while the Commission takes on a surveillance role. Additionally, the European labour market is a complex system. It is not easily predictable what the support of one group might mean for another. Considering the amount of people in desperate need of employment, the question arises whether it would really be fair to support single parents rather than for instance youngsters in search for a job. Should the decision be made, however, to aid the single parents, then the question remains which measures might be appropriate? Many complain about a lack of flexible work opportunities107, which would be ideal for people taking care of a child. Single parents could be given the chance to work part-time and be given the option of taking time off during school holidays. Other possible measures would be paid maternity and paternity leave as well as the further establishment of child-care and after-school care. This would give single parents more time and flexibility to (re)enter the labour market. Links: Flexible child care for single parent families – Mom’artre; a video and a summary about the project: http://inno-serv.eu/content/flexible-child-care-single-parent-families-–-mom’artr Gingerbread – an organisation providing advice and practical support for single parents in the UK: http://www.gingerbread.org.uk/content/428/About-us Principle of Subsidiarity – a short and comprehensive explanation: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0017_en.htm A factsheet on flexible working from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development: http://www.cipd.co.uk/hr-resources/factsheets/flexible-working.aspx Country profiles – a platform where you can find out more about the successful policies in each Member State: http://europa.eu/epic/countries/index_en.htm Denmark: Combining work and family life successfully – a country profile: http://europa.eu/epic/countries/denmark/index_en.htm

Stakeholders: 

  

European Commission – Directorate General on Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and Commissioner László Andor: Organises regular EU Stakeholder Dialogue meetings with NGOs, social partners, businesses and social economy actors, academics, foundations, think tanks and international organisations to ensure that they are involved in developing and implementing policy initiatives to combat poverty and social exclusion; has the right of initiative concerning EU legislation European Parliament – Committee on Employment and Social Affairs: In charge of all forms of discrimination at the workplace and in the labour market except those based on sex; mainly conducts studies and makes amendments to the Commission’s proposals Council of the European Union – The Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO): The EPSCO Council brings together ministers responsible for employment, social affairs, health and consumer policy from all EU Member States Confederation of Family Organisations in the EU (COFACE): The Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Union (COFACE) is a pluralistic organisation, at the heart of civil society, which aims at promoting family policy, solidarity between generations and the interests of children within the EU

106 107

A short explanation of the OMC: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm A video and written explanation oft he principle of flexicurity: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=102

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  

Member States Governments: Are in charge of policy making in this field. They establish different benefits for single parents and have different viewpoints about state aid depending on the current government. Single parents: They are clearly most interested in the matter. More support, be it financial or otherwise, is what they demand. They are also in need of more flexible job offers in order to manage both work and family life.108 Employers: In times of high unemployment rates, employers have to choose amongst applicants for a job. They tend to perceive single parents as unreliable and prefer other applicants to them109.

Links: The Official Website of the Directorate General of Employment and Social Affairs: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=751&langId=en Official Website of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/empl/home.html

Official Website of the EPSCO: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/councilconfigurations?lang=en#epsco The Official Website of COFACE and an explanation of what it is and does can be found here: http://www.coface-eu.org/en/About/What-is-COFACE/

Existing Measures:      

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 153 – The EU supports and complements the Member States when it comes to social exclusion and social security.110 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 – Coordination of Social Security Systems in the EU: this regulation concerns maternity and paternity leave as well as family benefits. It clearly states who has a right to social benefits and who does not, ensuring the free movement of persons in the EU.111 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 577/98 of 9 March 1998: This Regulation established the Labour Force Survex which is conducted in 28 Member States of the European Union and 2 candidate countries as well as 3 countries of the European Free Trade Association112 European Platform for Investing in Children (EPIC)113: a platform for sharing the best of policymaking for children and their families, and foster cooperation and mutual learning in the field through thematic seminars and workshops. Commission Recommendation: ‘Investing in children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage’ (2013/112/EU)114: proposes a long-term social strategy to help overcome the current crisis and to strengthen the capacity of individuals. The Social Investment Package (SIP)115: an integrated policy framework, which takes account of the social, economic and budgetary differences between Member States.

108

Press release by the European Network of Single Parent Families: https://www.vamv.de/uploads/media/PM_ENoS_European_Elections_2014.pdf 109 „...and being viewed as potentially less employable by prospective employers (who may see single parents as an employment liability or risk if hired)“ Ruggeri, Kai and Bird, Chloe E. (2014): Single parents and employment in Europe, p. 11. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/140502_gender_equality_workforce_ssr3_en.pdf 110 Full text version of the TFEU: http://www.eudemocrats.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/DReader_friendly_latest%20version.pdf 111 A comprehensive summary of the regulation: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_protection/c10521_en.htm 112 Full text of the regulation: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1401525557015&uri=CELEX:01998R0577-20090807 113

Official Homepage of EPIC: http://europa.eu/epic/about/index_en.htm Full text of the Recommendation: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/;jsessionid=54XpTSvT1Cbp2v361DV252vmmQXZYGdJTGlKfhcd7DJKlJhGGG23!5737444?uri=CELEX:32013H0112 114

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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY I (ENVI I) EMPTY RHETORIC OR MAKING A REAL DIFFERENCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE? WITH THE EU’S 2030 AND 2050 GOALS BEING CRITICISED BY ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS FOR A LACK OF AMBITION, WHAT SHOULD THE EU’S PRIORITIES FOR COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE BE? Vice-President: Irem Tümer - Turkey Explanation and Relevancy of the Problem: In the last few decades, the average global temperature has significantly risen as a result of the increased use of greenhouse gases in human activities. These temperatures are having, and will continue to have, significant consequences around the world. Abnormal weather conditions that are brought about as a result of climate change, such as rising sea levels, flooding and droughts, are having an increasing impact on economies and environment, as well as the health and daily lives of individuals. The EU has always been at the forefront of the fight against climate change, and has often been praised for the ambitious regional policies it pioneers. Climate change is a top priority for the EU. The EU’s Heads of State or Government have endorsed the proposal to spend at least 20% of the 2014-20 European budget on climate-related measures. Climate change priorities are also mainstreamed into relevant European policies such as regional development, agriculture, fisheries and energy. All of these are shaped to take into account the goals of climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the aftermath of the economic crisis, the ‘green economy’ is a promising field for job creation, and it also strengthens the EU’s energy security and decreases dependency on imported oil and gas. The European Commission proposed the EU’s policy framework for 2030 in January 2014. (For more on the content of the proposal, refer to the Measures in Place section.) There have been mixes views on the proposal. While Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, argued that ‘We have set ourselves ambitious and yet feasible and affordable targets.’; other MEPs did not agree with this statement. ‘The modest 2030 targets are not in line with what the science tells use is needed to limit global warming to below 2 C.’ said Rebecca Harms, for the Green Group in the European Parliament.116 The proposal has been vigorously criticised for the renewable energy target it sets, and the absence of an energy efficiency target has also been pinpointed. The package must still be approved by the European Parliament and by Member States governments. EU leaders agreed in March 2014 to decide on the framework in October 2014 at the latest. With the negotiations on a new international agreement on climate change scheduled to take place in early 2015, the formation of the EU climate change policy for the short and long-term is of utmost importance. The exact nature of the 2030 and 2050 goals will be the main indicators of the EU’s continued commitment to tackling climate change. Links:   

To read more on climate change and EU’s policies on tackling climate change, refer to http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/climate_action_en.pdf The climate action section of Europa portal also gives an excellent overview of different sub-topics and relevant policies: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm For a comprehensive compilation of public reactions to the 2030 policy, check out http://treealerts.org/region/europe/2014/01/round-up-eu-told-to-strengthen-2030-package-amidst-waveof-criticism/

115

More information on the SIP: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes The quotes have been taken from the Nature News article titled ‘Modest EU climate targets criticized’ from 22 January 2014. Full text can be accessed at http://www.nature.com/news/modest-eu-climate-targets-criticized-1.14573

116

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Key Terms: 

       

   

Climate change is a pattern of change affecting global or regional climate, as measured by yardsticks such as average temperature and rainfall, or an alteration in frequency of extreme weather conditions. Both natural processes and human activity may cause this variation. Global warming is one aspect of climate change. Adaptation refers to any kind of action that helps cope with the effects of climate change - for example construction of barriers to protect against rising sea levels, or conversion to crops capable of surviving high temperatures and drought. Mitigation refers to any kind of action that will reduce man-made climate change. This includes action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or absorb greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Tipping point is a threshold for change, which, when reached, results in a process that is difficult to reverse. Scientists say it is urgent that policy makers halve global carbon dioxide emissions over the next 50 years or risk triggering changes that could be irreversible. Greenhouse effect is the insulating effect of certain gases in the atmosphere, which allow solar radiation to warm the earth and then prevent some of the heat from escaping. See also Natural greenhouse effect. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are natural and industrial gases that trap heat from the Earth and warm the surface. The Kyoto Protocol restricts emissions of six greenhouse gases: natural (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane) and industrial (perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride). Fossil fuels are natural resources, such as coal, oil and natural gas, containing hydrocarbons. These fuels are formed in the Earth over millions of years and produce carbon dioxide when burnt. Renewable energy is energy created from sources that can be replenished in a short period of time. The five renewable sources used most often are: biomass (such as wood and biogas), the movement of water, geothermal (heat from within the earth), wind, and solar. Cap and trade is an emission-trading scheme whereby businesses or countries can buy or sell allowances to emit greenhouse gases via an exchange. The volume of allowances issued adds up to the limit, or cap, imposed by the authorities. The EU ETS (more in the section Measures in Place) is a cap-and-trade scheme as well. Carbon capture and storage is the collection and transport of concentrated carbon dioxide gas from large emission sources, such as power plants. The gases are then injected into deep underground reservoirs. Carbon capture is sometimes referred to as geological sequestration. Carbon offsetting is a way of compensating for emissions of CO2 by participating in, or funding, efforts to take CO2 out of the atmosphere. Offsetting often involves paying another party, somewhere else, to save emissions equivalent to those produced by your activity. Green economy is defined as an economy that results in reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities, and that aims for sustainable development without degrading the environment. Low-carbon economy (LCE) is an economy that has a minimal output of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the environment biosphere, but specifically refers to the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. Links:

 

For a comprehensive glossary of terms related to climate change refer to: http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-11833685 or http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html#B To read more on mitigation measures and the terms used to refer to them: http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-26980837 Key Questions:

  

Building on the experience gained from the implementation of the 2020 framework, what are the most important concerns when designing policies for 2030 and 2050? What should be the type, nature and level of targets and how should they interact? Should the targets be at EU, national or sectoral level and be legally binding? Have there been incoherencies between the targets or measures in the existing framework, if so, how can the coherence of further targets be ensured?

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 

Which elements of the climate change policy should be highlighted to better promote job creation, growth and competitiveness? How can the climate change policy encourage cooperation and fair effort sharing between Member States while ensuring cost- effective delivery of set objectives? Links: For further discussion points, please refer to the Green Paper that was published by the European Commission on 27.3.2013 which can be reached at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0169&from=EN

Key Facts and Figures:        

The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, is now at its highest level for at least 800.000 years. The first 11 years of the 21st century were among the 13 warmest since recording began in 1880. The average temperature has risen by almost 0.8 C since 1850 globally but Europe’s land area has warmed more, by 1.3 C. Scientific evidence indicates that irreversible and catastrophic changes in the global environment could occur if average warming exceeds 2C above the temperature in pre-industrial times (or around 1.2 C above today’s level.) Preventing global warming from exceeding the 2C threshold is technologically and economically possible. The cost of taking action is estimated at 1% of global GDP whereas failing to act could have a price of 5% to 20% of global GDP. The EU has successfully reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by over 18% since 1990. In doing so, it has proven that economic growth and decrease in emissions are not necessarily mutually exclusive scenarios, as the EU’s economy has grown by more than 40% over the same period. The renewable energy industry in Europe has increased its work from 230 000 to 550 000 between 2008 and 2013. Meeting the 2020 target of obtaining 20% of EU’s energy from renewables could create an extra 410,000 jobs across the EU in related sectors. The EU is responsible for 11% of world greenhouse gas emissions. More than 80% of European emissions come from the production and use of energy, including transport. The graph below shows the sectoral distribution of greenhouse gas emissions in 27 EU Member States as of 2011:

Total GHG Emissions by Sector Fugitives (emission leakage) , 2%

Industrial Processes, 7%

Residential/Comm ercial Properties , 14%

Agriculture Agriculture, 10% Waste, 3%

Energy Industries, 31%

Waste Energy Industries Manufacturing/Construction

Transport , 21%

Transport Manufacturing/Con struction, 12%

Residential/Commercial Properties

(Data has been taken from the European Commission Fact Sheet on Climate Change)

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Links: Some facts on climate change in general are presented in http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence For more facts that are specific to Europe, refer to http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_climate_change_en.pdf

Key Conflicts: EU’s policy on climate change on one hand should be sufficiently ambitious to ensure that the EU is on track to meet longer-term climate objectives. On the other hand, it should also be realistic, taking into account the consequences of the economic crisis, in particular budgetary problems faced by Member States and businesses. Affordability of energy has been a common concern for households, and businesses, especially because of competitiveness. According to the Green Paper on the 2030 Framework, the proposed policy ‘must identify how best to maximise synergies and deal with trade-offs between the objectives of competitiveness, security of energy supply and sustainability’. Another important conflict exists between different policy instruments. A balance should be struck between concrete implementing measures at EU level and measures that allow for flexibility at the Member State level. In order to balance all these concerns, the climate change framework adopted by the EU should set clear priorities and choose policies that are best tailored to achieve the identified goals. While ambitious targets do provide political momentum, some stakeholders argue that setting numerous targets is not necessarily coherent or cost- efficient. That is why the framework should make a sound choice on the types of targets, while recognising technological developments and promote research and innovation. As Europe is struggling with the challenges set out by the economic crisis, ambitious climate-change related goals might seem unimportant. However, stepping up the transition to a environmentally- friendly, lowcarbon economy potentially might help the EU overcome weak economic growth and unemployment.

Stakeholders: The European Commission plays a central role in shaping and implementing the EU’s policies on climate change. Connie Hedegaard is the current commissioner who is in charge of the climate action portfolio. Functions of the Commission include: -

developing and implementing EU climate action policies and strategies, representing the EU in international climate negotiations together with the Presidency of the Council of the EU, implementing the ETS, monitoring the EU countries’ implementation of emission reduction targets in sectors outside the ETS, promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy based on clean technologies, managing the EU budget, 20% of which is allocated to support climate action.

The Directorate- General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), which was established in 2010, develops and implements international and domestic climate action policies and strategies. It is the main vehicle through which the adore-mentioned functions of the Commission are carried out. The European Environment Agency (EEA) is an EU agency that is aimed at providing information on environment related issues. It acts as an information source for the general public, and is also beneficial for policy makers. Currently, the EEA has 33 member countries. of the European Union. National governments also take specific national action on climate change. In relation with the European Climate Change Programme, each of the Member States have put in place domestic actions that build up on existing measures. Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) sets the

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principle of minimum harmonisation of the EU environmental policy and legislation, which means that Member States can keep the EU goals or adopt more stringent measures as long as they respect the Treaty. Links: For the website of Commissioner Hedegaard, visit http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/hedegaard/index_en.htm More information on DG CLIMA can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/about-us/mission/index_en.htm Official website of the European Environment Agency can be found at http://www.eea.europa.eu/about-us

Existing Measures: The European Union puts into place a series of policy measures to tackle climate change, and many of these are done through the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) the first of which was launched in 2000. The ECCP II, which is ongoing today, consists of has several working groups and a set of specific actions that have been identified. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the ‘cornerstone of the EU’s climate strategy’. It covers around 45% of emissions from over 12.000 installations in the power generating industry and other energy intensive sectors. The system works by putting a limit on overall emissions from high-emitting industry sectors, and letting the companies buy and sell emission allowances as needed. The NER300 programme, which is financed from the proceeds from the sale of ETS allowances, is one of the world’s largest programmes to support the development of innovative low-carbon technologies. The EU also has policies targeted at reducing emissions from flights and road transport. Other efforts include preventing deforestation and capturing industrial emissions. The EU has also launched a pan- European communication campaign that aims to raise awareness on climate change and the transition to a lowcarbon economy.

EU’s legislative framework has been shaped by mandatory goals that have been put forward with certain deadlines. Let’s take a closer look at the 2020, 2030 and 2050 goals set by the EU: The 2020 Strategy has been the first regionally binding legislation setting targets that must be achieved. The 2020 Strategy (also known as 20-20-20) sets three goals for the EU to reach until 2020: o o -

EU greenhouse emissions are to be cut by 20% below 1990 levels. This is, on one hand, being achieved through the ETS. For the sectors that are not covered by the ETS117, (this amounts to around 55% of total emissions), Member States have agreed to the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) that sets national binding targets. 20% of EU’s energy is to come from renewables. Energy efficiency is to be improved by 20%. As a part of this strategy, the first two targets were implemented through a ‘climate action and energy package’ that became binding law in June 2009. The legislation sets compulsory national targets on emissions and renewable energy for all Member States. Legislation setting non-binding national targets for improving energy efficiency was adopted in 2012.118 The 2030 policy framework, which has been proposed by the European Commission in January 2014, is to be finalised until October 2014. Below are the main targets that are to be achieved by 2030 according to the proposed policy:

117

Some examples of sectors that are not covered by the ETS are transport, buildings, waste and agriculture. The Energy Efficiency Directive establishes a common framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency within the Union in order to ensure the achievement of the Union’s 2020 20 % headline target on energy efficiency and to pave the way for further energy efficiency improvements beyond that date.

118

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o o -

EU greenhouse gas emissions are to be cut by 40% below the 1990 levels. The sectors covered by the ETS would have to reduce the emissions by 43% compared to 2005. Emissions from non- ETS sectors would need to be cut by 30% below the 2005 level. The share of renewable energies in EU’s energy consumption would be raised to 27%. The role of energy efficiency in the framework will be discussed in late 2014, as part of the review of the Energy Efficiency Directive. In addition to this, the long-term perspective of the EU has been set by the 2050 Roadmap in 2011. Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, reflects the EU’s target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% below 1990 levels. The Roadmap foresees sector- specific reduction targets to reach this target. To reach this goal, intermediate cuts by 25% by 2020, 40% by 2030 and 60% by 2040 would be needed. 2020 Framework •Reduction of GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels. •Increasing the share of renewable energy to 20%. •Improving energy efficiency by 20%.

2030 Framework (Proposal) • Reduction of GHG emissions by 40% below 1990 levels. •Increasing the share of renewable energy to 27% at the EU level. •Nothing concrete on energy efficiency.

2050 Roadmap •Reduction of emissions by 80‐ 95% below 1990 levels.

Links: For more information on the ECCP, visit http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/index_en.htm For a simple and well-written overview of the ETS please refer to http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf More information on the 2020 Framework can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm More information on the 2030 Framework can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/2030_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm More information on the 2050 Roadmap can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/roadmap/index_en.htm

Legal Framework: EU’s competence on environmental issues is a shared competence119. This means that both the EU and the Member States would have the power to legislate on the issue; however, Member States would exercise this power to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. 120 The Articles 191 to 193 of the TFUE are environmental provisions, setting out the objectives that are to be achieved by the EU. With the Lisbon Treaty, a specific reference to climate change has been added to the definition of policy’s objectives.

119 120

Article 4/II/e of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) Article 2 of the TFUE

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Regarding the decision-making procedures, the ordinary legislative procedure is the main rule for the adoption of environmental legislation, including the adoption of the legally binding acts setting out the priority objectives of the EU environmental policy. The Lisbon Treaty significantly modifies the enforcement procedure of legally binding acts. The EU’s capacity to impose sanctions in an area of Union policy is also recognised.121 This means that a Directive that establishes minimum rules for the definition of sanction on environmental issues can be created. Links: This article provides a comprehensive review of the impacts of the Lisbon Treaty on environmental law in the EU, please refer to the relevant sections of the article for in-depth explanations: http://www.clientearth.org/reports/clientearth-briefing-lisbon-treaty-march-2010.pdf

121

Article 83/II TFUE

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THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND FOOD SAFETY II (ENVI II) WITH

MARINE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE PRESENTING A BLEAK OUTLOOK FOR EUROPEAN WATERS AND COASTLINES, WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE TO LESSEN THE DAMAGING HUMAN IMPACT OF OVER- FISHING, LITTERING, AND CLIMATE CHANGE ON EUROPE'S SEAS? THE REPORTING STAGE OF THE

Chairperson: Sophie Hall – Switzerland Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: Europe’s seas are indispensable. Beyond their traditional value for transport, fishing and tourism, they are now also a source of minerals, oil, gas, wind farms, and communication cables. On a more elemental level, the seas and their diverse ecosystems are vital in keeping not just Europe, but the world’s climate stable. Mankind’s impact on the environment is increasing, not least in the marine environment. Agriculture, fishery, industry, shipping, urbanisation, space demand, tourism, energy production and mineral extraction all have serious consequences for Europe’s seas. Protection of Europe’s marine environments is more than an end in itself; it is also crucial to protect the economic benefits from trade, fishing, tourism and mineral supplies. With only 5 of 27 Member States without a coastline and the maritime area under the jurisdiction of Member States being larger than the European Union’s (EU) total land area, marine problems are truly common ones: both the causes and consequences of damage are shared between Member States, making cooperation essential. The complexity and interdependence of the marine environment make a comprehensive approach necessary; it is difficult to address any one issue individually. However, this committee is asked to address three areas in particular: overfishing, littering, and climate change. Overfishing can have a devastating effect, both environmental (as the size of the fish community sinks, so does diversity and the ability to adapt to environmental change) and economic (stock depletion can eventually lead to the collapse of the industry). The change in the fish population furthermore modifies the structure of the ecosystem. Littering both from land-based sources and ships is a growing problem in European waters. Beyond the visible pollution of beaches, it poses a serious threat to ecosystems, with litter degrading under water or plastics being eaten by birds or fish. Marine litter, especially from plastics, is increasing rapidly, yet there is a complete lack of national legislation to control marine letter122. Though climate change is not included in the descriptors which make up “Good Environmental Status”, it will probably increase the impact of other existing pressures in the future. Even small changes in water temperature can alter the distribution of species and the acidification of the sea water from CO2 could affect both marine species and global CO2 level. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive of 2008 requires each Member State to develop its own Marine protection strategy to achieve Good Environmental Status (GES) by 2020. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive takes an “adaptive” approach, meaning that the goals must be reviewed every six years. With the Directive now in its sixth year, these reviews are looming and a first assessment of whether the overall goals and the strategies set by Member States are suitable and sufficient, and whether the strategies developed by Member States are appropriate. Links: The Marine Strategy Framework Directive http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/marine-strategy-frameworkdirective/index_en.htm An overview of the importance of Europe’s seas http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/pdf/seas-forlife.pdf

122

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_ar_2010.pdf

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Overfishing and its impact on Good Environmental Status http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/goodenvironmental-status/descriptor-3/index_en.htm Marine Litter and its impact on Good Environmental Status http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/goodenvironmental-status/descriptor-10/index_en.htm “The waste dump of our planet - a look at Marine Litter” (a video from the EEA) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOO0-Bnwn0A&list=UUII_6TPyf8QHiEZzm8ruStQ Types of Marine Litter: http://www.rpaltd.co.uk/documents/J767_DGEnvMarineLittering_Annexes_Publ_001.pdf “Ten things everyone should know about Europe’s productive seas - From the EEA. http://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/ten-things-everyone-should-know Key Terms :        

Good Environmental Status: “The environmental status of marine waters where these provide ecologically diverse and dynamic oceans and seas which are clean, healthy and productive” Article 3, Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Marine Protected Area (MPA): Areas reserved, usually by legislation, to receive a higher level of protection, for example because they house endangered species or ecosystems. Overfishing: When fish and other marine species are caught at a rate higher than they can reproduce, causing stock depletion. Marine Littering: when human-created waste is left in bodies of water or coastal areas, in particular nondegradable substances. Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY): the maximum annual catch which can be taken without reducing the productivity of the fish stock. Climate Change: The long-term statistical change in the climate, particularly nowadays an increase in atmospheric temperature due to man-made factors. Ecosystem approach: An approach to environmental protection which involves consideration of all components of the ecosystem, recognising humans as a part of it, as opposed to a series of separate problems with a simple cause and effect. Directive: A legal act of the EU which sets a result (e.g. achieving GES by 2020) but not how Member States shall achieve it. Each Member State then must implement the directive within a set time period (usually two years), which almost always means adjusting the national legal framework to fit with the Directive. Key Questions :

    

Which are the critical areas in implementing the Marine Strategy Framework Directive? Which Member States are lagging behind in implementation? What should the EU do to address overfishing and marine littering? What would be the consequences of failing to meet the goals of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive for society as a whole? Who bears responsibility for taking action on the environment; EU actors, national governments, the private sector or consumers? Key Facts and Figures :

 

23 out of 28 EU Member States have a coastline123 41%of the population (206 million people) live in the EU’s 378 coastal regions124

123

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0049

124

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0049

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    

39% of NE Atlantic fish stocks and 88% in the Mediterranean & Black Seas are overfished.125 The Mediterranean is the region which receives most tourists in the world126. Almost 90% of EU foreign trade is seaborne.127 63% of EU stocks are being fished beyond MSY, and 30% of these are at a high risk of depletion128. Approximately 80% of marine litter is land-based and 250.000kg of waste is removed from the North Sea yearly.129

Key Conflicts : At a glance, the area of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive seems very uncontroversial: the achievement of Good Environmental Status by 2020 is eminently desirable. But how realistic is it? As many other areas of environmental protection, the EU’s policy on its seas faces several conflicts in achieving its goals. Firstly, the common clash between commercial and environmental interests, with industries from fisheries to transportation and tourism hesitant to accept regulations which would damage their profitability. Environmentalists argue that if nothing is done, for example, to reduce overfishing, then the fishing industry itself may eventually collapse. This is true, but also highlights a key problem in such regulations: their successful implementation. Even though a comprehensive legal framework and strategy have been established on a European level, it is still individual actors, often smaller companies, or Member States, who must follow through those changes. Furthermore, there is a lack of a common understanding over the term ‘Good Environmental Status’ – how can Europe achieve a shared goal, if there’s no consensus on what this goal is? Successful environmental protection requires cooperation and sacrifices from all stakeholders. Despite the common good, such behaviour is extremely difficult to ensure because those who do not contribute to the benefits cannot be excluded. This is also true of Member States sharing regional waters, where one country which invests more cannot exclude those who offer less from the shared sea. The economic theory behind this understanding of overexploitation is called the “tragedy of the commons”. Links: A video explaining the tragedy of the commons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLirNeu-A8I “Ending Overfishing” – a brief video on Overfishing https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6nwZUkBeas “Solutions to marine litter in the EU” – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZz17nYsjZ0

video

the

problem

marine

litter

Stakeholders : The first stakeholders are public authorities in both the EU and on a national level. Within the EU, the Environment Directorate General proposes policies and legislation for environmental protection and is responsible for making sure Member States correctly apply EU environmental law, ie. evaluating policies which have been implemented. The Commission uses target-setting to shape national strategies, which Member States have to develop themselves. It is the Member States who actually fund and implement marine protection measures in the strategies they have developed. Whilst the Commission sets the goals in the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, there is room for manoeuvre, which potentially could cause conflicts as Member States implement the goals differently and with varying success. As with all environmental issues, industry and commercial actors have a large stake in marine policy: the fishing industry is limited by quotas (derived from a total allowable catch or TAC), and its many, many

125

European Commission 2013. Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning a consultation on Fishing Opportunities for 2014. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=728986:EN:NOT 126 World Tourism Organisation: http://www2.unwto.org/en/event/6th-international-conference-destination-management 127 European Commission 2014 - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:168:0050:0056:EN:PDF 128 European Commission 2014 - http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/good-environmental-status/descriptor-3/index_en.htm 129 Greenpeace - http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/marinelitter/publications/docs/plastic_ocean_report.pdf

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producers whose plastic packaging end up in the sea. This also raises the question of consumer power, since it is consumer demand for these things which fuel commercial actors. Calls are often made for consumers to change their habits to be more environmentally friendly. Beyond policy-makers, international bodies also work to increase knowledge and understanding of the marine environment. The European Environment Agency (EEA), an agency of the EU, is a key information source on environmental issues for policy-makers and the public. The EEA advises both Member States and European Union institutions on environmental policy. On a global level, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), a network of scientists working for enhanced ocean sustainability, does research to offer to policy-makers, industry, and the public. The Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) does the same, but as an independent not-for-profit institute. Links: A factsheet on the Environment Directorate-General: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/factsheets/dg_environment.pdf “Who we are”: The EEA http://www.eea.europa.eu/about-us “Who we are”: ICES http://www.ices.dk/explore-us/who-we-are/Pages/Who-we-are.aspx A report from the IEEP on how to improve EU Legislation: http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1258/IEEP_2013_How_to_improve_EU_legislation_to_tackle_marine_litter.pdf

Existing Measures: In June 2008, the European Commission adopted legislation on the EU’s marine waters in the form of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, which sets the goal of reaching ‘Good Environmental Status’ (GES) by the year 2020. It is meant as a comprehensive piece of legislation to set goals for Member States to individually achieve within the four marine regions it establishes: the Baltic Sea, the North-east Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. The Marine Directive also requires Member States to use the existing regional cooperation structures: the Regional Sea Conventions. These are the OSPAR Convention for the North-East Atlantic, the Helsinki Convention for the Baltic Sea, the Barcelona Convention for the Mediterranean and the Bucharest Convention for the Black Sea. Where “practical and appropriate”, the Marine Directive states that the RSCs should ensure coordination. Next to the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is crucial. Under the Lisbon Treaty, fisheries conservation policy is an exclusive competence of the EU, reflecting both the importance of conservation and the need for European cooperation130. General fisheries remains a “shared competence” of the EU and Member States, so decisions are made mainly by the Council of the European Union. The CFP regulates many aspects of fisheries, including setting quotas in the form of a TAC for each country, fixed by the Council of the European Union. There are a number of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in European waters, which protect biodiversity and allow for the recovery of depleted populations, set up under several international conventions. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive specifies that a coherent and representative network of MPAs must be created by 2016. Links: An overview of the Regional Sea Conventions: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/international-cooperation/regional-seaconventions/index_en.htm

130

Article 3(d)

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Â Report on the needs of the Regional Sea Conventions: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/international-cooperation/regional-seaconventions/Regional%20Sea%20Convention%20Needs.zip TACs and quotas in the Common Fisheries Policy explained: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm An article suggesting that overfishing can easily be solved with TAC http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/17/overfishing-environmental-challenge-europeancommission An overview of Marine Protected Areas in Europe http://www.marbef.org/wiki/Marine_Protected_Areas_in_Europe

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COMMITTEE ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY I (FEMM I) WITH

THE APPALLING RESULTS OF THE

AGAINST WOMEN, HOW CAN THE

EU’S

AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS’ STUDY INTO VIOLENCE

ENCOURAGE MEMBER STATES TO MAKE A MARKED REDUCTION IN

PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN?

Chairperosn: Erdem Topcu - Turkey Explanation and relevancy of the Topic:

“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” - Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Any form of violence against people is a behaviour that should by no means be tolerated nor accepted under any conditions. However, many women keep on living under the shadow of aggression and abuse. These women, whose substantive rights such as freedom, honour, and safety are being violated, are exposed to domestic violence, sexual abuse, human trafficking, forced prostitution, oppression and physical abuse. Through extensive cooperation with national police and intelligence forces, the EU has taken many measures towards violence against women and women trafficking. Victims of women trafficking are eligible for financial assistance from certain EU funds in order to reintegrate into society through education, training and employment.131 Moreover, a number of projects tackling trafficking are also funded under the DAPHNE Financial programme to support NGOs helping victims, awareness campaigns, and law enforcement cooperation.132 Even though there are programmes that fund women’s refuges and health facilities, as well as efforts to change attitudes, little progress has been made in trying to tackle a matter of such importance as this. Moreover, it has been noted that there is a linkage between domestic violence and poverty in developing countries. For example, if a household is already exposed to a certain level of poverty, in case of domestic violence, a woman is more likely to stay with her spouse rather than leave, fearing that the chances of her supporting herself are slim. Additionally, those women who decide to leave their homes are also face difficult access to the labour market.133 Many would suggest that fighting to lower the level of poverty that exists in certain European States will aide women in successfully evading and exciting violent situations. In 2014, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) published its EU-wide survey on violence against women which was based on interviews with 42,000 women across the 28 Member States of the EU. The survey further affirms that violence against women is a widespread human rights abuse that the EU cannot afford to overlook. Results of the survey indicate that lives of a huge number of women have been affected by abuse, and more importantly that a majority of those incidents were never reported to the authorities.134 Should this not be a wake-up call for European decision-makers? This topic aims question what the EU can do to encourage Member States to make decisions leading to a marked reduction in physical, mental, and sexual abuse of women. Links:  

Mind map of the committee topic: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bwnivnx6LZfsN0xUOWNRVkZLMzA/edit?usp=sharing European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014). Violence against women: an EU-wide survey:

131

Directorate-General for Communication of European Commission (2009). Europe for Women. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/publications/booklets/others/80/en.pdf 132 European Commission DG Justice, freedom and security. The EU policy to fight and prevent trafficking in human beings. Retrieved from: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/trafficking/docs/Dakar_Protection_Gert_Bogers.pdf 133 Women Against Violence Europe. Retrieved from: http://www.wave-network.org/content/genderworks-links-between-poverty-andviolence-against-women 134 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014). Violence against women: an EU-wide survey. Retrieved from: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-vaw-survey-main-results_en.pdf

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

http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-vaw-survey-main-results_en.pdf The Directorate-General for Justice page on gender equality legislations: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/law/index_en.htm

Key Terms: Violence against women: Violence against women is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women. Including all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic suffering for women, incorporating threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, in both public or private life.135 Physical Violence: The term physical violence refers to a bodily harm suffered as a result of the application of immediate and unlawful physical force. It also encompasses violence resulting in the death of the victim.136 Psychological Abuse: Psychological abuse, also referred to as emotional abuse or mental abuse, is a form of abuse characterised by a person subjecting or exposing another to behaviour that may result in psychological trauma, including anxiety, chronic depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder. 137 Sexual Abuse: Sexual abuse is unwanted sexual activity, with perpetrators using force, making threats or taking advantage of victims not able to give consent.138 Domestic Violence: Domestic violence shall mean all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or have shared the same residence with the victim.139 Victim: A person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss, which was directly caused by a criminal offence.140 Perpetrator: A person who commits violent acts against women. Boyfriends and intimate partners are the most common perpetrators of violence against women. Acquaintances, such as friends and co-workers of the victim, are the second most common perpetrator of violence against women. 141 Links: Violence Against Women – Association for Nonviolent Communication: http://www.drustvo-dnk.si/about-violence.html Perpetrator Risk Factors for Violence against Women - Future Without Violence: http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Perpetrator%20Risk%20Factors%20Fact%20Sheet%20 2013.pdf List of Violent Acts Against Women – Association for Nonviolent http://www.drustvo-dnk.si/about-violence/violence-against-women/237.html

Communication:

135 Council of Europe (2011). Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). Retrieved from: http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=52143 136 Council of Europe (2011). Explanatory Report of the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). Retrieved from: http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=52144 137 Maiuro, Roland D.; O'Leary, K. Daniel (2000). Psychological Abuse in Violent Domestic Relations. New York:Springer Publishing Company. p. 197. 138 Kazdin, Alan E. (2000), Encyclopedia of Psychology, Oxford University Press 139 Council of Europe (2011). Op. Cit. 140 Directive 2012/29/EU of 25/10/2012 “Directive on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision” 141 Future Without Violence (2013). Perpetrator Risk Factors for Violence against Women. Retrieved from: http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Perpetrator%20Risk%20Factors%20Fact%20Sheet%202013.pdf

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Key Questions: 

What are the impacts of violence against women on the society as whole?



What legal instruments does the EU already have in place to cope with violence against women? Are the existing legal provisions not enough?



What are the possible reasons for under-reporting such incident to the authorities?



What is or should be a man’s role and responsibility in achieving a reduction in violence against women?



How can the EU encourage Member States’ policy-making to further tackle violence against women?

Key Facts and Figures: 

Nearly eight in 10 women (78 %) in the EU think that violence against women is very common or fairly common in their country.142



One in 10 women in EU has experienced some form of sexual violence since the age of 15, and one in 20 has been raped.143



One third of victims of partner violence (33 %) and one quarter of victims of non-partner violence (26 %) contacted either the police or some other organisation.144



On average, every second woman in the EU is aware of existing legislation concerning protection and prevention with regard to domestic violence.145



Every second woman in the EU, on average, has recently seen or heard campaigns addressing violence against women. 146



In most cases of sexual harassment faced by women since the age of 15, the perpetrator is an unknown person (68 %).147



Almost a third (30 %) of women who have experienced physical violence indicate a relative or a family member (other than a partner) as the perpetrator, and one in four women who have experienced physical violence (25 %) say that this involved somebody whom they did not know beforehand.148

Key Conflicts: Various EU-bodies have called for concrete data on violence against women, and criticised existing discrepancies in data collection. There is an absence of comprehensive data on the extent and the nature of specific types of reported abuse. For this reason, justice systems are having difficulties when they serve the rights and needs of the victims. One of the main conflicts which FEMM I is facing is the requirement for concrete and comparable data across all European states. The committee will also need to consider whether there’ll realistically be much that the EU can do considering the competencies that it has, or does not have, in terms of social policy.

142

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014). Op. Cit. Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 143

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Until recently, in most Member States, violence against women was considered a private matter in which the state played a limited role. Only from 1990s onwards has violence as such against women emerged as a fundamental rights’ concern. Despite the measures already taken by EU-bodies, there are significant differences between national cultures and traditions that result in differing attitudes towards the matter at hand. While taking EU-wide legal actions on this topic, national and religious differences should be definitely taken into account

Links: Unreported cases of domestic violence against women: towards an epidemiology of social silence, tolerance, and inhibition http://jech.bmj.com/content/58/7/536.full

Stakeholders: Within the European Commission, the Directorate General for Justice (JUST) has provided significant funding through the Daphne programme to address violence against women. In the Council of the European Union, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) is responsible for most of the gender equality decisions. In the European Parliament, the parallel body is Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). EPSCO and the European Parliament established a European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) in 2014. This body collects comparable data for the Gender Equality Index. The index measures gender equality between men and women in different fields, including a ‘satellite domain’ on violence against women that “remains empty due to the lack of data”.149 Regarding the NGOs, European Women’s Lobby (EWL) is the largest umbrella organisation of women’s associations in the EU. They do significant work to promote reducing violence against women and leading campaigns across the continent. The EWL is the largest umbrella organisation of women’s associations in the EU, representing a total of more than 2000 organisations. 150 National police and intelligence forces play a key role in this matter. The EU is fighting against women trafficking and cooperating with national security and intelligence forces in order to make a marked reduction in such incidents. The EU is combating this matter by strengthening cooperation and coordination between the police and judicial authorities of the Member States.151

Links: Gender Equality page of the European Commission Directorate General for Justice: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/index_en.htm European Parliament - Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/femm/home.html European Women’s Lobby (EWL): http://www.womenlobby.org Fact sheet from the Council of Europe on its role in promoting Gender Equality: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/02factsheets/Gender%20Equality%20Fact%20Sheet%2 0FINAL%2021%209%202012%20hyperlinks.pdf

149

Gender Equality Index. Retrieved from: http://eige.europa. eu/content/gender-equality-index. European Women’s Lobby. Retrieved from: http://www.womenlobby.org/ 151 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_trafficking_in_human_beings/index_en.htm 150

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EU Rules on Gender Equality: How are they transposed into national law? http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/your_rights/eurulesongenderequalitytranspositionfinal2009_en.pdf

Existing Measures: The most recent and the most all-encompassing regional instrument to address violence against women is the Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, Istanbul Convention, which was adopted in April 2011. 152 All parties of the convention are obliged to criminalise physical and psychological abuse and sexual harassment, including rape.153 23 states have signed and 11 states have ratified the Convention.154 Although EU law is in place to address certain forms of violence against women – such as Directive 2006/54/EC155 (Equal Treatment Directive) which encompasses ‘sexual harassment’, many forms of violence against women are not explicitly addressed through EU law. Almost all EU Member States that have legislation in place in the area of intimate partner violence also have some forms of protection measures in place for victims156, including European Protection Order (EPO) which is in force since 10th January 2012157 and the European Victims’ Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime was adopted on 25 October 2012.158 European Women’s Lobby (EWL) has criticised the European Commission for not taking enough steps to reduce violence against women. Currently the European Women’s Lobby and its 2000 member organisations in 31 European countries are campaigning to establish 2016 as EU Year to End Violence against Women and Girls. It should also be acknowledged that since 2000 the Commission’s Daphne Programme has provided significant funding for civil society, local authorities and researchers to address violence against women in the EU. Its specific objective is to contribute to the prevention of, and the fight against all forms of violence occurring in the public or the private domain, including sexual exploitation and human trafficking. It aims to take preventive measures and provide support and protection for victims.159 Links: Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=52143 Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (Equal Treatment Directive) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:204:0023:0036:en:PDF European Protection Order (EPO) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32011L0099&from=EN European Victims’ Directive http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0057:0073:EN:PDF

152

Council of Europe (2011). Op. Cit. Ibid. 154 As at 28 May 2014, for the full list of signatories, see http:// conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=210&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG. 155 Directive 2006/54/EC of 05/07/2006 “Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation” 156 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014). Op. Cit. 157 Women Against Violence Europe. Retrieved from: http://www.wave-network.org/content/european-protection-order-epo 158 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/victims/index_en.htm 159 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/daphne/index_en.htm 153

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European Women’s Lobby: 2016 as EU Year to End Violence against Women and Girls! http://www.womenlobby.org/get-involved/take-action-today/article/share-and-sign-the-europeanwomen?lang=en Daphne III Funding Programme of the European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/daphne/index_en.htm A basic information booklet for the members of the FEMM committee of the European Parliament – totally useful to understand how it is working http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200907/20090728ATT59207/20090728ATT59207 EN.pdf Summaries of the European legislation on equality between man and women – there are couple of links regarding to violence against women http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/equality_between_men_and_wo men/index_en.htm

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COMMITTEE ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY II (FEMM II)

A RECENT COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE STATED THAT ‘WOMEN STILL WORK ON AVERAGE 59 DAYS ‘FOR FREE’ EVERY YEAR COMPARED TO THEIR MALE COUNTERPARTS’. CONSIDERING SUCH STATEMENTS, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO ADDRESS THE EUROPEAN GENDER PAY GAP? Chairperson: Anna Borrell Mauri - Spain Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: In Europe, the unadjusted gender pay gap stands at a level of about 16.4%, according to data for 2012 from the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat)160. The list of factors used to explain the gender pay gap is long and relationships between them complex. Some encouraging recent trends include the increased number of women on the labour market and their progress in securing better education and training. However, gender gaps remain in many areas and in the labour market women are still overrepresented in lower paid sectors and under-represented in decisionmaking positions. Parenthood keeps female employment rates down, and women continue to work more unpaid hours than men at home.161 Equality is a key factor in meeting the economic, social and demographic challenges the EU faces, and is essential in ensuring sustainable growth and the development of a fair society. Inequalities between women and men violate fundamental rights, and they also impose a heavy toll on the economy and result in underutilisation of talent. The principle of equal pay for men and women for work of equal value is enshrined in the EU Treaties. The Treaty of Rome 1957 and the Equal Pay Directive of 1975 established the principle of equal pay for women and men for work of equal value. Despite these regulations, a gender pay gap remains and the goal of equal pay for equal work is still far from being achieved in Europe.162 However, the root causes of the gender pay gap extend well beyond the question of equal pay for equal work. There is a gap between women's educational attainment and professional development, thus special attention should be paid to the transition between education and the labour market. The causes of the pay gap also derive from segregation in the labour market as women and men still tend to work in different sectors. On the one hand, women and men are often over-represented in certain sectors, with ‘female’ jobs (mostly in health care, education and public administration) being in general less valued than typically male professions. On the other hand, within the same sector or company the jobs done by women tend to be of lower value and less well paid. When it comes to the statistics, several things need to be taken into account. Firstly, the unadjusted measure of the gender pay gap used in European statistics captures the overall gap in men and women’s hourly wages. Some of this gap can be explained by observable characteristics of male and female employees, which include differences in education, labour market experience, type of job and company characteristics. Adjustment for these observable characteristics reduces the gender pay gap but does not eliminate it and large differences remain. Furthermore many of these observable characteristics are also sources of disadvantage and indirect discrimination. Secondly, an area where interpretation of the gender pay gap needs some care relates to methodological issues of making comparisons across countries. One of the challenges in addressing the extent of the gender pay gap in the EU has been the lack of suitable comparable data. And finally, one of the problems of modern pay systems is that the growth of individualisation has disguised potential inequalities. Ensuring pay transparency requires businesses to take a detailed evaluation of their

160 161 162

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=TSDSC340 http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5776&langId=en http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=11660&Lang=EN

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pay systems and compare the pay earned by men and women. It then requires employers to make sure they can justify any discrepancy in pay. Economic and business benefits can be gained from enhancing gender equality. In order to achieve the objectives of Europe 2020, namely smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, the potential and the talent pool of women need to be used more extensively and more efficiently. This is why many efforts remain necessary to close the gender pay gap in both the private and public sectors, and concrete objectives are required, both at European level and at national levels.163

Gender Pay Gap in unadjusted form across Europe, %, 2012. Source: Eurostat164

Links: “Tackling the Gender Pay Gap in the European Union” brochure from the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/gpg_brochure_2013_final_en.pdf “Strategy for equality between women and men 2010 - 2015”: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/equality_between_men_and_wo men/em0037_en.htm http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/strategy_equality_women_men_en.pdf Report on Progress on equality between women and men in 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/documents/141404_annual__report_en.pdf European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) videos: https://www.youtube.com/user/eurogender/videos

Key Terms:

Gender: Identifies the social relations between men and women. It refers to the relationship between men and women, boys and girls, and how this is socially constructed. Gender roles are dynamic and change over time. 165

163

http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=11660&Lang=EN

164

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=TSDSC340

165

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/glossary/index_en.htm

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Gender equality: result of the absence of discrimination on the basis of a person's sex in opportunities and the allocation of resources or benefits or in access to services.166 Unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. All employees working in firms with ten or more employees, without restrictions for age and hours worked, are included. Gender Mainstreaming: Integration of the gender perspective into all policies with a view to promoting equality between women and men. 167 Glass ceiling: Invisible but real barrier through which the next stage or level of advancement can be seen, but can not be reached by a section of qualified and deserving employees. Such barriers exist due to implicit prejudice on the basis of age, ethnicity, political or religious affiliation and/or sex168. Social partners: is a term generally used in Europe to refer to representatives of management and labour (employers’ organisations and trade unions). The term ‘European social partners’ specifically refers to those organisations at EU level which are engaged in the European social dialogue, as provided for under Article 154 and 155 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU).169 Parental leave: is defined as an individual right to leave for men and women workers on the grounds of birth or adoption of a child to enable them to take care of that child, for at least three months, until a given age up to eight years, to be determined by Member States and/or social partners. 170 Additional Links: Glossary on Gender Equality: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/glossary/index_en.htm

Key Questions: Are the already implemented equal pay legislation and equal opportunities policies, effective and adequate? If not, why have they not succeeded yet? Have affordable, accessible and high-quality care for dependants and people with additional support needs, and women-sensitive leave arrangements been intrinsic components of the effort to close the pay gap? What can the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Member States and European Social Partners do in order to eradicate the gender pay gap in Europe? How can the European Institutions ensure that the right to equal pay for work of equal value is enshrined in the domestic legislation? How can more innovative ways be implemented to ensure that women receive equal pay for work of equal value? What mechanisms should be used to cope with the institutional heterogeneity171 against the gender pay gap across EU Member States?

166

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/glossary/index_en.htm

167

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/glossary/index_en.htm

168

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/glass-ceiling.html

169

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/europeansocialpartners.htm

170

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/parentalleave.htm

171

As the gender pay gap varies considerably depending on the Member State, each country has a different approach to it. This leads to different specific legislation, the creation of multiple monitoring bodies across Europe, and varied measures to tackle the issue.

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Key Facts and Figures:

In 2010, only five countries had an adjusted gender pay gap of less than 10%: Denmark (4%–6%), Sweden (5%), Germany (6%–14%), Ireland (8%) and Italy (10%–15%).172 In 2012, across Member States the gender pay gap varied by 27.5 percentage points, ranging from 2.5% in Slovenia to 30% in Estonia. 173 In 2012, in the EU the gender pay gap for part-time workers varied by a factor of 39 percentage points, from the lowest recorded in Ireland (-6.9%) and Malta (-5.1%) to the highest in Spain (31.8%), Portugal (26.1%) and Slovakia (24.4%). 174 In general, the pay gaps are slightly narrowing: from 17.6% in 2007 to 16.4% in 2012, in Europe.

The unadjusted gender pay gap by working profile, %, 2012. Source: Eurostat175

The unadjusted gender pay gap by age category, %, 2012. Source: Eurostat176

172

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ef1018.htm

173

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics

174

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics

175

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics

176

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics

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Links: Gender pay gap statistics: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics

Key Conflicts:

In the context of the EU, the issue of the gender pay gap attracts additional interest, given that its various integration policies involve convergence not only across Member States but also within each MS. This is why strong EU leadership is required in coordinating policies and promoting good practice, combined with the active engagement of Social Partners and Non-Governmental Organisations. The current economic conditions mean that more needs to be made of existing resources and mechanisms to address pay inequalities. This is why the challenge for those wishing to address the gender pay gap is to mobilise available resources, mechanisms and institutions to address the underlying processes that explain the persistence of the gender pay gap. A key role for the EU in the continued fight against the gender pay gap is to bring together the variety of initiatives and multiple actors. Across the EU there are already examples of good practice that could combine with a pressure at the European level as part of the Commission’s initiatives. In addition, comprehensive approach to the gender pay gap is required, with actions at multiple levels. Such an approach recognises the complex web of factors acting to maintain the gender pay gap and also the variety of actors at different levels that are involved in pay determination, labour market regulation and shaping women’s and men’s experience of work. But what remains as the crucial conflict is how to achieve the balance between the overall goal of gender equality with the existing realities of the economy and work life. This means that if any efficient solutions are to be found, they also need to be applicable to businesses, and at the same time be ambitious enough to tackle the problematic gender pay gap. There may be viable solutions to the issues which are considered positive discrimination, or unrealistic for certain economies or industries to implement, no matter how effective they might be. Links: Resolution 1715 (2010) of the Council of Europe. “The wage gap between women and men”: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1715.htm Communication from the EC for “Strategy for equality between women and men”: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5776&langId=en

Stakeholders:

Closing the gender pay gap requires mobilisation of all key actors, mainly the EU countries, the European Parliament and the European social partners to tackle the multiple causes of the gender pay gap. However, finding a solution to the gender pay gap is mainly in the hands of national governments and the social partners. The EU can help, but solutions should be developed at national level. Public opinion in Member States has an important role to play. Within the European Commission, the Directorate General for Justice (JUST) is responsible for implementing the Commission’s Strategy for Gender Equality 2010-2015. The Council of Europe Transversal Programme on Gender Equality launched in 2012 aims to increase the impact and visibility of gender

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equality standards, supporting their implementation in member States through a variety of measures, including gender mainstreaming and action in a number of priority areas.177 In the Council, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) works to increase employment levels and improve living and working conditions, so it is the Institution responsible for most of the gender equality decisions.178 Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) is the equivalent body in the European Parliament.179 Together they created the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), a EU agency which supports the EU and its Member States in their efforts to promote gender equality, to fight discrimination based on sex and to raise awareness about gender equality issues. 180

Measures in Place:

Generally, reducing the gender pay gap is an important topic on the European political agenda. Since 1999 it has been part of the European employment strategy. In 2001, the Treaty of Nice requested Member States to act for ‘equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work’. The European Commission’s 2007 Communication on the gender pay gap proposed a series of actions to tackle the gender pay gap. These included the better application of existing legislation, fighting the gender pay gap in employment policies, promoting equal pay among employers and through social partnership, and supporting the exchange of good practices across the EU. Closing the gender pay gap through legislative and non-legislative measures is a core objective of the European Commission’s ‘Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015)’. The Strategy sets out actions in five areas: the economy and labour market, equal pay, equality in senior positions, tackling gender violence, and promoting equality beyond the EU. In the Directive on Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value (Directive 2006/54/EC) the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value is also incorporated. One of the Commission’s priorities for the coming years will be to monitor the correct application and enforcement of the equal pay provisions of the Directive 2006/54/EC and to support employees, Member States and other stakeholders by providing guidance on the proper enforcement and application of the existing rules. Gender equality and making better use of women’s talents and skills are central to closing the gender pay gap and to achieving the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the EU’s growth strategy for the coming decade. The Strategy aims to create more and better jobs, to achieve a higher employment rate for women as part of the overall employment target of 75% for all 20-64 year-olds, and to ensure that there are 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2020. Links: Basic legislation already in place (Directives, Communications, Recommendations, Reports and Council Conclusions): http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/law/index_en.htm.

177

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/02factsheets/FactSheetGenderEqualityWEB_en.pdf

178

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/council-configurations

179

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/femm/home.html

180

http://eige.europa.eu

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THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (INTA) OPPOSITION

TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE

TRANSATLANTIC TRADE

AND INVESTMENT

PARTNERSHIP (TTIP)

CONTINUES TO RISE, HIGHLIGHTING CONCERNS AND SLOWING WHAT WAS INITIALLY CONSIDERED INEVITABLE ACCEPTANCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE

ATLANTIC. WHAT POSITION SHOULD THE EU TAKE TOWARDS THE TTIP

NEGOTIATIONS?

Chair - Aida Grishaj - Albania Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: In July 2013, the EU and the United States of America (USA) started negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between them, which is set to create the largest free trade zone in the world: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The negotiating parties are aiming to eliminate trade barriers, such as tariffs, regulations and quality standards regarding the production of goods.181 By opening new markets and increasing the exchange of goods and services, the EU and the US are hoping to boost trade, employment and give new impulses to their struggling economies. The existing customs tariffs are low, however, removing them completely will generate profits of billions of Euros for both, the EU and the US. The negotiations are focusing on making markets more accessible, dismantling unnecessary regulatory barriers and working on new international standards182. When the project was launched, it was greeted on both sides of the Atlantic. Different parties pushed for the agreement to be signed without any delays, so that the fragile economies would be able to benefit straight away183. Nevertheless, as the negotiations proceed, there is an increasing opposition towards the TTIP. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, environmentalists, and social justice organisations have expressed concerns that this agreement, by harmonising regulations, will undermine and lower Europe’s high standards regarding consumer, environmental and worker’s protection, food or technology safety and public services.184 They claim that the negotiations lack transparency and that the EU is willing to sacrifice these standards in favour of commercial benefits and lobbying groups. The European Commission (EC) on the other hand has continuously reassured that environment, health and safety, protection of privacy as well as workers' and consumer rights are non negotiable.185 The relevance of this topic is not only limited to the parties signing it. There are several FTAs being negotiated between other players, like the one between the US and several Asian countries. These FTAs will also aim to harmonise standards and the standards set by TTIP have the potential to turn into a point of reference for them, making this agreement have larger global impacts than simply increase trade between the US and the EU. So the question revolves around what position the EU should take in these negotiations; whether to lean towards sacrificing European standards for greater economic openness, or whether our regulations and standards are too important to be lowered for the potential financial gains. Links: An article on the role TTIP can play for other international agreements: http://www.euractiv.com/trade/ttipforefront-international-trade-analysis-534062 A summary on the regulatory aspects being discussed by the negotiators: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151605.pdf

181

European Commission, 2014, Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/ European Commission, 2014, Retrieved from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf 183 The Economist, Come on TTIP, 2013, Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571890-good-idea-state-unionaddress-business-should-rush-support-come-ttip 184 Emily Sherwin, Tripping over TTIP, Deutsche Welle, 2014, Retrieved from: http://www.dw.de/tripping-over-ttip-obstaclesovershadow-eu-us-trade-pact/a-17426907 185 James Crisp, De Gucht, NGOs, trade accusations after anti-TTIP protestors 'kettled' by police, EurActiv, 2014, Retrieved from: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/de-gucht-ngos-trade-accusations-after-anti-ttip-protestors-kettled 182

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A good explanation of what TTIP is and what its main aims are: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf An article on the main concerns raised against TTIP: http://www.dw.de/tripping-over-ttip-obstaclesovershadow-eu-us-trade-pact/a-17426907 An article pointing out the main facts and issues regarding TTIP: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/08/talks-over-a-huge-u-s-europe-tradedeal-start-this-week-heres-what-you-need-to-know/

Key terms:    

 

Free trade zone: A free trade zone is composed of countries which have signed a free trade agreement (FTA) between them, according to which they impose a few or no tariffs or import quotas and preferences on most (or all) goods and services traded between them.186 Free Trade Agreement: Countries signing a free trade agreement (FTA) agree upon eliminating tariffs and other barriers on goods and/or services traded between them and create this way a free trade zone. Trade barriers: Trade barriers are measures introduced by governments or other public authorities, which aim making imported goods or services less competitive than goods and services produced in the country.187 These barriers pose restrictions on international trade and can be either tariffs or non-tariff barriers to trade. Customs duty/tariff: It is a tax levied on imports (and, sometimes, on exports) by the customs authorities of a country to raise state revenue, and/or to protect domestic industries from more efficient or competitive companies from abroad188. Many of the existing transatlantic tariffs are quite low, with the textile industry and financial services being the main exceptions. Non-tariff barriers: Non-tariff barriers are an alternative to tariffs as means for one country to control the amount of trade that it conducts with another economy.189 The most common form of non-tariff barriers includes quotas, embargoes, sanctions and other restrictions. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): It is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) the EU and the US are planning to finalise by 2015 the latest. Links: Simple explanation of what trade barriers are: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6xBo0_WCYU A brief explanation of TTIP: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41snQ9AEQOUv Explanation of the benefits coming from the FTAs for the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countriesand-regions/agreements/

Key Questions:   o o o o o o

What will be the impacts of the TTIP and why is it important for the agreement to be finalised without delays? What are the main differences between European and American standards in production of goods and provision of services, especially in the following areas: health (food safety) consumer protection environment worker’s rights education the financial sector?

186

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/free_trade_area.asp http://um.dk/en/tradecouncil/barriers/what-is/ 188 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/customs-duty.html 189 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nontariff-barrier.asp 187

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    

Which groups have opposed to the TTIP so far and what are their main arguments? How far should the harmonisation of standards go? Should standards on food safety audiovisual industry, textile sector, aviation and public procurement or labour rights be fully or only partly harmonised? Are the economic benefits worth negotiating standards or should standards (on consumer protection, food safety, labour rights, environment) be out of the discussion table? To what extent should the negotiators consider the TTIP as a blueprint for other FTAs? Links: Q&A from the European Commission on TTIP: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/questions-andanswers/#why-now Why leaders are interested in finalising the negotiations fast: http://www.euractiv.com/trade/hollandeobama-agree-ttip-fast-news-533441 What is hindering the negotiations? http://www.euractiv.com/trade/ttip-hurdles-overcome-analysis533627

Key facts and figures:    

The EU economy could grow by €119 billion per year190. The total investment between the US and the EU amounts nearly $4 trillion.191 The EU is the biggest investor in the US topping €1.6 trillion of investments.192 Removing the existing tariffs could raise Europe’s GDP by around 0,4% and America’s by 1%.193 Links: A stakeholder’s survey on the TTIP: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-4C33D1683FA15517/bst/xcms_bst_dms_37655_37656_2.pdf

Key Conflicts: There are two main conflicts regarding the TTIP negotiations: the disputes between the parties themselves and the conflicts with different interest groups. The conflicts start with what should be included in the treaty. The US and the EU have notable differences in agricultural policies194, financial sector regulations195 and data privacy. The US has insisted that the financial sector will not be part of the negotiations, whereas the EU insists on making it part of the agreement as it would make TTIP more consistent. The negotiating parties have to face opposition coming from NGOs, trade unions, environmentalist groups and the major dispute regarding standards.196 Opposition groups claim that harmonising regulations can only mean that the EU lowers its degree of protection. Otherwise, what would be the interest of American

190

European Commission, 2014, Retrieved from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf The Economist, Come on TTIP, 2013, Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571890-good-idea-state-unionaddress-business-should-rush-support-come-ttip 192 European Commission, 2014, Retrieved from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf 193 The Economist, Come on TTIP, 2013, Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571890-good-idea-state-unionaddress-business-should-rush-support-come-ttip 194 Institute for Agriculture and trade policy, Promises and Perils of the TTIP: Negotiating a Transatlantic Agricultural Market, 2013, Retrieved from: http://www.iatp.org/documents/promises-and-perils-of-the-ttip-negotiating-a-transatlantic-agricultural-market 195 James Crisp, EU-US clash over financial services in TTIP, EurActiv, 2014, Retrieved from: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europeanbusiness-summit-2014/eu-us-clash-over-financial-services-ttip-302173 196 Shawn Donnan, Green and consumer groups voice fears over EU-US trade agreement: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1b2942a0-328f11e3-b3a7-00144feab7de,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F1b2942a0-328f11e3-b3a7-00144feab7de.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&siteedition=uk&_i_referer=#axzz336Azd4eU 191

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companies in the agreement? There have been concerns regarding GMOs and hormone treated food, which is allowed in the US but banned in the EU. Fracking practices and lower American requirements for environmental protection have also been in the centre of strong opposition. The EC has pointed out several times, that these standards are not in the table of the negotiations and that TTIP is only supporting them.197 The European Commission has been accused of lacking transparency on the negotiations and failing to clarify these concerns raised. Another point that has generated heated debates is the Investor - State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).198 Many groups fear that it will undermine some important democratic principles, as foreign companies might potentially have the right to intervene in and change national legislation by using the TTIP as a legal base in process disputes. Parties claim that this system needs reform and that European firms, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will benefit from it, without infringing democracy in any form. The NSA scandal also risked to damage the negotiations, as many European leaders threatened to stop the negotiations because of it. However, the negotiations still continue and were not slowed by the political tensions. Links: An article on the growing opposition against TTIP: http://www.wdm.org.uk/trade/opposition-eu-us-trade-deal-growing-negotiations-start-brussels An article on why environmental groups oppose to TTIP: http://www.euractiv.com/trade/ttip-challenged-environmental-cr-news-533794 An article highlighting the assumed lack of transparency on the TTIP negotiations: http://www.euractiv.com/trade/campaigners-call-transparent-tti-news-534166 The EC’s position on ISDS : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf An article on the dispute over financial services: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/european-business-summit-2014/eu-us-clash-over-financial-servicesttip-302173 Why won’t ISDS harm legislative sovereignty of different Countries? The EC prospective: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1008

Stakeholders: The EU is one of the parties negotiating the treaty with the US. The EU is represented by the European Commission in the negotiations. Other institutions playing a role are the European Parliament and the European Council. The Commission has to report to these two institutions on the progress of the

197 Frédéric Simon, France draws red lines for EU-US free trade negotiations, EurActiv 2014, Retrieved from: http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/france-draws-red-lines-eu-us-fre-news-518616 198 Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is a provision often found in the text of trade and investment agreements. It allows investors to bring legal proceedings against foreign governments that are party to the agreement, typically if they believe they have been subject to expropriation or discriminatory treatment in that country. This has raised concerns that the TTIP will undermine the power of national governments to act in the interest of their citizens. (http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefingpapers/SN06777/investorstate-dispute-settlement-isds-and-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip)

Simon Mckeagney, ISDS one of many risks that could sink TTIP deal, 2014, Retrieved from: http://www.ttip2014.eu/blogdetail/blog/ISDS%20One%20of%20Many%20Risks.html

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Â negotiations. The other negotiating party is the government of the United States of America. Both the US and the EU are expecting large economic benefits from this agreement, so their objective is to reach an agreement on more than twenty sectors by the end of 2015. Apart from the negotiating parties, NGOs, environmentalists and civil society in both the US and the EU will have a say, especially when it comes to safeguarding the standards in environmental, social and health issues. After being accused of lack of transparency, the EC launched several meetings with interest groups to receive feedback on what is being negotiated. The lobbying groups, mostly businesses and corporates will also have a say in speeding up the negotiations and reaching a final agreement by the end of next year and by doing so, having free access to the markets without barriers or unnecessary regulations hindering trade. Finally one would be remiss to consider the question without some appreciation of the American point of view. The American Government, including the House and Congress (which would have to ratify any agreement) are major stakeholders in such an agreement. Understanding their aims, and the aims of big business in America, will help the Committee get to the bottom to the vast amount of conflicting information and opinion that surrounds the topic. Links: The American perspective, what the US expects from these negotiations: http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-Detailed-View The European point of view: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf A summary of some of the main concerns raised by environmentalist groups: http://ttip2014.eu/blogdetail/blog/id-30-reasons-why-greens-oppose-ttip.html Costs and benefits of the TTIP from a British perspective: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260380/bis-13-1284-costsand-benefits-of-an-eu-usa-investment-protection-treaty.pdf

Existing Measures: When it comes to the TTIP itself, the negotiations are in full swing with the 5th round being concluded in May. Both parties are aiming to reach an agreement by 2015. The chapters of the negotiations have already been decided and are the following: agricultural and investment goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, SMEs, dispute settlement, competition, customs facilitation and state owned enterprises. After five rounds of negotiations, there have been advances in achieving an agreement in regards to technical barriers to trade, competition, SMEs, sustainable development, labour, environment, energy and raw materials. For the first four a common text is expected soon. The EC has already had large consulting meetings with various interest groups, in an attempt to make the negotiations more transparent. The main initiatives to stop or oppose to TTIP have been several demonstrations and petitions from opposing groups. However, they did not slow or have a meaningful impact on the negotiations. Additional links A summary of the first round of negotiations: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941 A summary of the second round of negotiations: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=988 A summary of the third round of negotiations: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1007

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Â A summary of the fourth round of negotiations: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1041 A summary of the fifth round of negotiations: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/infocus/ttip/resources/#videos

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THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH, AND ENERGY (ITRE)

WITH THE RECENT EVENTS IN UKRAINE HIGHLIGHTING THE DANGERS OF OVER-DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED ENERGY, WHAT STEPS CAN THE EU TAKE TO LIMIT RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL ENERGY SOURCES AND TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM PRICE SHOCKS? Vice-President: Zahra Runderkamp – The Netherlands Explanation and relevancy of the topic: Energy is a key variable for growth and competitiveness199. As of today, the EU is far from being able to produce the energy it needs to cover its own demand. Furthermore, the EU’s dependence on other countries for energy is increasing year by year200. The EU is for a large part dependent on imported energy. Russia remains to be one of the biggest exporters to the EU. With that, energy has become more and more of a political tool, as most natural resources for energy production are getting scarcer every day. This also means that European economies have been exposed to energy price increases affecting consumers and industries directly201. Therefore, political events have a direct influence on energy prices, leaving the consumer in a state of uncertainty. Over the past few years, we have witnessed several instances of EU’s energy safety being threatened by disruptions in Russia’s oil supply, particularly in 2006 and 2009. But there is also more historic examples: going back to 1973, the European economy suffered from an oil shock caused by the OPEC’s decision to radically increase oil prices202. With its large economy and limited access to fossil fuel resources on its own territory, the EU is constantly in need of ensuring a stable and reliable supply of energy and raw materials. To achieve this goal, the EU continues to establish partnerships with producing countries, such as Russia203. In 2011, the EU imported 60% of its total gas consumption and over 80% of its oil consumption. 36% and 31% of these imports came from Russia respectively204. What these imports are made up of, can be seen in this graph made by Eurostat:

199

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf For an overview of all Member States. European Commission, “European economy. Member States’ energy dependance”, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf 201 Eurostat data show that between 2005 and 2008 EU energy prices have increased on average by 7.14% compared to an overall inflation rate of 2.34% 202 Read the full story on the “Historical Evolution of Energy Dependency in the EU” here: http://www.cria-online.org/11_5.html 203 It should be noted that the depencency Russia/EU also goes the other way around 204 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_en.htm 200

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And how has the importing of energy been growing? The European Commission shows it in this graph:

These graphs raise the question of what the EU could, and should, do to become more independent as far as its energy supply is concerned. With this question, the committee will also be asked to answer a more philosophical question: What do we want the future of our energy to look like on an EU level – what place do alternatives, such as nuclear or renewable, energy have? Bearing in mind that the topic of energy security is already a priority on EU’s agenda, especially after changes made in the Lisbon Treaty, the topic of energy is an interesting one within the EU context; after all, it is a so-called shared competence205: Member States have a right to frame their national energy policies, yet in responding to common concerns, such as ensuring a well-functioning internal market in energy and security of supply, along with implementing the priority European infrastructure projects, the EU needs coordinated action and interests, between Member States and the EU as a whole, overlap constantly. Furthermore, energy is at the very core of the European project: the original design of the European integration project was based on cooperation in the area of energy with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and was quickly followed by the Euratom treaty206. Links: For a first overview on energy security: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK0BkKHAZ8Y Must-read about the history of the EU’s energy (in)dependence: http://www.cria-online.org/11_5.html Europe’s Energy Security: Options and http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf

Challenges

Natural

Gas

Supply

Diversification

European Energy Security Governance: Key Challenges in EU-Russia Energy Relations

205

For an overview of the division of competences within the EU: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0020_en.htm 206 Consolidated version of the treaty establishing the european atomic energy community: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:084:0001:0112:EN:PDF

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http://unu.edu/publications/policy-briefs/european-energy-security-governance.html

Key terms:

      

Security of supply/energy supply security: ensuring a reliable and uninterrupted supply of energy Over-dependence: the state of being too dependent on something Price shocks: an unexpected event that changes the supply of a product or commodity, resulting in a sudden change in its price Supply diversification: Ensuring that you have multiple sources of supply for a particular product, commodity, or service. Energy efficiency Governance: The combination of legislative frameworks and funding mechanisms, institutional arrangements, and co-ordination mechanisms, which work together to support the implementation of energy efficiency strategies, policies and programmes207. Energy Mix The distribution of different energy sources used for the energy consumption of a territory Energy (in)dependence: The ability of a country or region to meet all its own energy needs. A country which has achieved energy independence can produce, transform and transport the energy that it consumes by itself. An energy dependent country, meanwhile, is a country that has to import energy to meet its energy needs208. Links: Energy security; video, infographics and documents http://ec.europa.eu/energy/fpis_en.htm Do price shocks matter? A paper on price shocks http://ideas.repec.org/p/aee/wpaper/0102.html

Key Questions:

     



What are the biggest threats to the EU’s energy security? How can the EU produce more of its own energy demand? What role should the EU play in (binding) legislation on the EU level or should it be left largely to the discretion of national governments? How should the EU deal with energy as a shared competence? What measures should the EU take to ensure that consumers are protected from price shocks? How could further competition on the energy market aid both consumers and energy security?

Key facts and figures The energy mix in Europe is on average made up of 35% oil, 24% gas, 17% solid fuels such as coal, 14% nuclear power, 10% renewable sources such as hydropower or wind energy. Please note that this mix varies widely across Member States.

207 208

http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/eeg.pdf http://www.planete-energies.com/en/glossary-200053.html&Letter=E

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  

Today, the EU imports 53% of the energy it consumes. Energy import dependency especially arises from the use of crude oil (almost 90%), natural gas (66%), and to a lesser extent solid fuels (42%) as well as nuclear fuel (40%). Energy supply and security concerns every Member State, even if some are more vulnerable than others. This is valid in particular for less integrated and connected regions such as the Baltic and Eastern Europe. The most pressing security of supply issue is the strong dependence from a single external supplier For instance, six Member States depend from Russia as single external supplier for their entire gas imports and three of them use natural gas for more than a quarter of their total energy needs. In 2013 energy supplies from Russia accounted for 39% of EU natural gas imports or 27% of EU gas consumption; Russia exported 71% of its gas to Europe Links: Read more about the key facts and figures in this communication from the Commission to the European parliament and Council of Ministers: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf

Key conflicts: As mentioned, energy security lies at the intersection of policies on energy as well as foreign affairs. The question that remains is therefore how Members States can work together effectively tackle the multiple challenges energy security poses. Moreover, we should ask ourselves to what extent the EU should legislate on energy issues - is the EU a more coherent actor in this instance as one voice than as Member States? Another conflict is that under the shared competence, Member States work together “in the spirit of solidarity”, but the choices amongst different energy sources and general structure of energy supply are made on the EU level, choices for the conditions of exploiting their energy resources on the other hand are in the hands of Member States. All in all, we can say that the topic of energy, and especially of energy security, is fragmented. Another key conflict lies with the side of the energy supply. Clearly, big energy firms such as Gazprom have a big role in the energy security of the EU. Though at the same time this means that the price of energy is not very competitive and big energy firms can dictate what they want. Examples have shown us that the consumer is in fact not safe from price shocks. Price shocks are less likely when the market is in fact competitive, and there are various methods of doing so209,210,211.

209

How to make the energy market more competitive? https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/64012/267-factsheet-112liquidity.pdf

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Additional links: Regulation No. 994/2010/EU on the security of gas supply: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:295:0001:0022:EN:PDF Gas security: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/external_dimension_enlargement/en0026_en.htm



   



Stakeholders: Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER)212 of the European Commission: the external dimension of energy falls under the mandate of Commissioner Günther Oettinger, in cooperation on some topics with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who can promote certain European preferences in energy, but DG ENER takes final decision. European Council213: identifies strategic interests and objectives of the EU, on external action and also energy. European Parliament & Committees ITRE214 and AFET215: Even though energy is a shared competence, under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, the Parliament has to give its consent, for instance in international agreements made on the topic of energy. Member States: decide until a certain extent on their national energy policies and energy mixes. Member States have different energy ‘deals’ and import regulation. Energy companies such as the Russian Gazprom216: being the world’s largest exporter of gas, Gazprom plays an enormous role in the question of Europe’s energy dependence on Russia

Existing Measures: Art. 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)217 sets out the four main aims of the EU’s energy policy. These four aims are: to ensure the functioning of the energy market; to ensure security of energy supply in the Union; to promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and to promote the interconnection of energy networks. The relevance of this topic lies with all four aims. Regulation on the security of gas supply in Art. 194 (2) TFEU218. This regulation notes some major problems: “With decreasing domestic production, gas imports have increased even more rapidly, thus creating a higher import dependence and the need to address security of gas supply aspects” as well as possible solutions and aims: “In order to reduce the impact of potential crises triggered by the disruption of gas supplies, Member States should facilitate the diversification of energy sources and gas delivery routes and supply sources”. The 20-20-20 targets219 set out, amongst others, the aim to raise the share of renewables (on European grounds) by 2020

210

What place is there for renewable energy? http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/only-renewables-can-create-integratedcompetitive-eu-energy-market-301456 211 What role is there for shale gas? Read about America here: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Shale-Revolution-willCreate-More-Competitive-Energy-Markets.html 212 More on DG ENER: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy/index_en.htm 213 Energy policy and the European Council: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/leaders-discuss-euenergy-policy-priorities 214 More on the Parliamentary committee ITRE: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/itre/home.html 215 More on the Parliamentary committee AFET: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/home.html 216 More about Gazprom on their website: http://www.gazprom.com/ 217 Read the full text here: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-andcomments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-actions/title-xxi-energy/485-article-194.html 218 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:L:2010:295:TOC 219 An overview of the 20-20-20 targets: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm

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

Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy220: this roadmap gives direction to the future of Europe’s energy market, therewith setting the bigger picture in which this committee will have to look for solutions (especially in terms of the energy mix). An overview of legislation on the topic http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/external_dimension_enlargement/index_en.htm and http://www.managenergy.net/eu_legislation_policies.html

220

http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/roadmap/index_en.htm

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THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS (LIBE) CATALONIA

AND

SCOTLAND’S

STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY CONTINUES TO KEEP THE QUESTIONS OF SELF-

DETERMINATION AND AUTONOMY RELEVANT.

WHAT WITHIN ITS BORDERS WHO SEEK INDEPENDENCE BE?

SHOULD THE

EU’S

STANCE TOWARDS POPULATIONS

Chairperson: Dan Brown – United Kingdom Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: There are a number of regions in Europe whose population wish to seek independence. In Scotland, the symbolic, economic and geopolitical vision of the pro-independence camp is grounds enough to support a split from the union221, whereas in Catalonia, its prosperous regional economy and unique identity222 encourage independence. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, sets out a procedure for a voluntary withdrawal from the EU according to a State’s “own constitutional requirements.223 This means that it is legal for every Member State, providing that a referendum is held and the people of the region get a say, for a separation to occur. Although Scotland and Catalonia are the most advanced examples, they are not alone. Populations in Flanders seek independence from Belgium whilst those in Corsica seek autonomy from France. There are a variety of arguments for and against independence but this topic is not an assessment of whether or not individual campaigns are justified but rather, what the EU’s position should be if independence follows a referendum. If, for instance, Scotland became independent, would it automatically remain a Member State of the EU – or would it have to go through the whole accession process for new Member States, either alone or alongside the rest of the UK? This is a major question in the independence debate, and one to which there are no clear answers. There is no precedent for a devolved part of a Member State becoming independent and having to determine its membership of the EU as a separate entity, and the question has given rise to widely different views. There are at least three different possibilities under international law for a newly-independent state224. The first is that there is a process of both continuation and secession. For example, in Scotland’s case, the UK would retain its treaty obligations and membership of international organisations but Scotland, as the breakaway region, would not. Another possibility is dual separation. That would mean both entities, be it the UK and Scotland or Catalonia and Spain, would retain and continue with its previous arrangements. Alternatively and thirdly, a complete dissolution would occur. Both Scotland and the UK, for example, would not retain any of their previous arrangements with the EU. Whatever the position under general international law, a decision on Scotland and Catalonia’s status within the EU is likely to be a political one225. On the other hand, Member States with their own domestic concerns about separatist movements might argue that Scotland should lose its membership on independence. For instance, why would Spain agree to separation in the UK if they knew that by doing so they were setting a precedent that ultimately would work against them if Catalonia voted to be independent? This was referred to when Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, stated that his government believed an independent Scotland could only apply to join the EU from outside the organisation as a new state and there are long-held suspicions that the Madrid

221

The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/01/economist-explains-9#sthash.vg7AxDPU.dpuf The Journal, http://www.jhubc.it/bcjournal/articles/desquens.cfm 223 K Mason, “Greenland – withdrawal from the EEC”, Georgia journal of International and Comparative Law, 13 (193) 865-76 at 874 224 DP O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, 1967,vol.II, pp184-5 retrieved from http://f3.tiera.ru/1/genesis/580-584/580000/0a5cf36eb0833eba67d32ce1c22fcd11 225 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 5th edition, 2003, p881 222

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government will resist the Scottish government's plans because of its rejection of Catalonian independence.226 As such, a key question is how would the EU respond in light of this political pressure? Would it make exception to certain political states or would it risk further destabilisation of the EU by not accepting breakaway states? Links: A good overview of how the EU would react should Scotland vote for independence: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-27670533 The impact of independence to the EU: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-27696769 An excellent and detailed introduction explaining the Referendum process as well as how potential negotiations could work: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/51.pdf How MEPS view the impact of independence and how potentially the Parliament would respond: http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/top-stories/scottish-independence-eu-would-want-scotland-13270786

Key Terms:

 

  

Article 48 – Allows the Treaties of the European Union – the EU rulebook – to be amended by existing members of the European Union, the European Parliament or the European Commission Article 49 – A more specific provision about the accession to the European Union of new member states. The applicant country must agree to the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union. These are: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law227 Negotiations – By voting to be independent, the breakaway region would have to renegotiate the terms of their existence both with their former State and the EU. A variety of issues would need to be negotiated, in particular budgets and acceptance of the monetary union228 Breakaway region – areas that have voted through a referendum to split away from the State to which they previously belonged. Copenhagen Criteria – rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union. Should a region vote to be independent they could be treated in the same was as a separate country wishing to join.

Key Questions:

    

What are the options open to a breakaway region after successful separation? What are the political and economic consequences for a region that votes to leave the EU both for the EU as a whole, and the Member State? What political options are available to a region that votes to be independent yet fails in its attempts to be accepted into the EU? Should regions that vote to be independent automatically become part of the EU or should they go through the accession process? What is the accession process and how does it work?

226

The Guardian, November 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/27/scottish-independence-spain-alex-salmond-eu Would Scotland be in the EU after a yes vote? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26173004 228 Excellent article on Scotland joining the Eurozone: http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/andrewlilico/100026646/an-independentscotland-would-have-to-join-the-euro-heres-why-and-what-it-means/ 227

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Key Facts and Figures: The EU Treaties feature no provision on the membership of an EU territory after secession If Scotland were to be independent and accepted it would have vast consequences upon the number of seats in Parliament. At the moment the UK (population 60 million) has 29 votes in the Council and 73 seats in the European Parliament. Both Denmark (5 million) and Finland (5 million) have proportionately much larger representation: 7 votes and 13 seats each. Scotland’s population is also about 5 million.229 This is just one of the significant facts to consider as negotiations that would follow independence would need a clear stance from the EU that would satisfy all Members. Recent polling revealed only 4% of Scots want an independent Scotland to join the Euro.230 Estimated impacts of select EU-related costs for an independent Scotland: Issue

Ongoing annual costs (€m)

Output effect (€m)

Foregone jobs

Rebate

409

736

6,680

Euro

562

1,011

9,637

Schengen

92.5-125.7

46.8

433

1,063.5 – 1,097.7

1,794

16,750

Total Identified Costs Fig 1231

Key conflicts: The very notion of separation brings conflict. As is clear in both the Scottish and Catalonian cases, there is friction between those who wish to remain unified and those that wish to separate. Few topics evoke much emotion and passion from its supporters. Yet, whilst it may be a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for those engaging in referendums in the countries themselves, the case is far from clear for the rest of the EU. Each Member State will inevitably ask themselves, ‘what does this separation mean for me?’ As such, there are a number of potential conflicts. To begin with, article 49 of the Treaty232 on EU provides that the accession of any new Member State must be ratified by all others. This potentially provides the United Kingdom and Spain with veto power on the accession of the new states, which could be used not only against their former region, but also against each other.233 The key conflict is whatever the position under general international law, it is by no means clear whether or not Scotland, Catalonia or any other region would retain membership of the EU automatically if it gained independence. Nothing in the EU Treaties sets out what would happen in the event of part of a Member State becoming independent. Articles 4.2 and 5.3 of the consolidated EU Treaty incorporating the Lisbon Treaty specifically mention local and regional government for the first time, but do not concern succession or EU membership.

229

JE Murkens, P Jones and M Keating, Scottish Independence – A Practical Guide, 2002, p119 Tim Oliver, If Scotland leaves the UK, will England leave the EU?, witllhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/41686 231 New Direction report, http://newdirectionfoundation.org/content/scotland-could-lose-%C2%A31-billion-year-independence-europe 232 Would Scotland be in the EU after a yes vote? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26173004 233 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/external_dimension_enlargement/index_en.htm 230

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A number of complex issues would need to be resolved through negotiations with other Member States. These would include a new relationship with the Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries Policies, revised trade rules with Member States and with third parties, and changes to the arrangements for the free movement of workers throughout the EU and EEA areas, to name but a few. Links: The conflict between the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigners in Scotland and their view on the EU: http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2012/01/euro-scotland-join-osborne A could overview of the conflict in Catalonia: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20644877 The European Commission view on independence: http://www.euractiv.com/video/commission-ratesjudiciary-independence-eu-member-states-48399

Stakeholders:

 

Member States – will inevitably decide whether or not accept the new region as a part of the EU. There has to be a unanimous vote amongst all Member States, European Commission – will be essential is conducting the negotiations should an independent region breakaway as it would be the Commission who would have oversight of the process. European Parliament – will be directly affected as the numbers of MEPs would be potentially affected as more States would in effect be joining. International Court of Justice - If there were a dispute during the negotiation process, the International Court of Justice could be called upon to give an opinion or a judgment. National Parliaments – Independence would have vast and striking consequences for the National Parliament losing a region. Politically, socially and economically its future would still be entwined with that of the breakaway region.

Existing Measures: There is no clear case study by which to judge or assess how the Members States, the Commission or the EU as a whole would react. Those who wish to demonstrate that a newly independent Scotland and Catalonia would not automatically find itself outside the EU have sometimes cited the example of Greenland, the only country to have left the EC. For them, the fact that Greenland’s exit from the EC required protracted negotiations implies that Scotland and others could not be automatically ejected. Greenland secured autonomy from Denmark in 1979 and voted to withdraw from the EU in 1982. But it was not until February 1985, after difficult and protracted negotiations, that Greenland formally left the EU and re-associated itself with the EU through the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) formula. Furthermore, the EU has in the past enlarged without accession. This happened when the former East Germany became part of the European Community. There was no formal application process but a process of absorption. Several agreements were quickly ratified by the Member States to allow for the increased membership and transitional provisions for the East German lands. Institutional and other necessary provisions relating to the enlargement were later adopted and incorporated as Treaty amendments. However, in the case of East Germany there was no increase in the number of Member States.234

234 Andrew Hughes Hallet, “Optimal monetary arrangements for Scotland: adopt which money and why?”, in Professor Sir Donald Mackay (ed), Scotland's Economic Future, 2011 retrieved http://reformscotland.com/public/publications/scotlandseconomicfuture.pdf

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Â As such, although both Greenland and Germany can act as an indicator, there is no direct precedent to which the EU would follow and as such this committee has the opportunity and focus to detail what it would like to see happen should a region vote to be separate. It is essential to understand that the primary focus of this committee is not to judge whether it is correct that Scotland, Catalonia or any other region in the EU is justified in seeking independence, but rather how should the EU respond both legally and politically.

Additional Links A comprehensive overview of what each Member Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21601242

view

independence:

A useful article on the similarities between the Scottish and Catalan campaign and the EU response: http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/top-stories/catalan-eu-claim-may-impact-on-scots-independence1-3096498 The impact upon the European Parliament of independence: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euelections-2014/catalonian-independence-creates-eu-election-issue-301921

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THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (SEDE) IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CLOSE TO THE EU’S BORDERS, MEMBER STATES ARE RETHINKING CUTS TO MILITARY SPENDING AND THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP). HOW FAR SHOULD THE EU GO IN BECOMING A 'HARD POWER' ACTOR, AND DEVELOP CAPABILITIES AKIN TO THOSE DEPLOYED BY NATO, WHILST CONSIDERING THE NECESSITY OF DUPLICATING THESE STRUCTURES? Chairperson - Hugo Dürr – Sweden Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: Up until 1945, Europe had not known peace. For millennia, Europe had been at war, somewhere, somehow. This came to an end, with the World War I and World War II, and since then, members of the EU have known peace, now for nearly 70 years. As a result, the democratic peace evokes a sense of security and stability, and for the sake of coping with austerity after the 2008 economic crisis, many Member States took measures to limit military spending and armament development. However, with the worryingly escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as growing tensions within Turkey and the unyielding civil war in Syria, Member States are reconsidering the decisions made to cut back on military spending. In addition, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has come under critique recently due to its lack of legislative weight and incentive for Member States to utilise the policy. The absence of joint action since its formation and the promises and pledges that have not been acted upon fuel the criticism235. Many worry about the instability in neighbouring regions, and suggest that Member States are at the moment “defenceless”236. This pertains not only to the EU Member States; allies to the west, the United States237, as well as NATO238, who are concerned over the lack of hard EU security, as security in the EU means security for NATO. However, there are those that discuss whether the EU should react to the political events in neighbouring regions, if there a need for Europe to respond to conflict which arises outside the Union? To question further, how likely is it that there will be the need for European hard power capabilities? Is there even a threat worthy to defend against? Today, the Berlin Plus Agreement (see section 7. Measures in Place) outlines the cooperation, responsibilities and boundaries between the EU and NATO. Albeit a promising framework, the Berlin Plus has been criticised for its lack of influence and political weight, with it having failed to ensure continuous strategic cooperation between NATO and the EU239. This raises the question if the EU should focus on developing its own structures, such as the CSDP, or if improving the existing NATO framework is the wiser option? Are the two alternatives mutually exclusive? What is clear at least, is that security and safety of its members are essential to both organisations; so how best to accommodate this? Despite many arguments that highlight the importance of developing hard powers, soft power has always been a key element of leadership, especially in the case of the EU. Skilful leaders have always understood the attractiveness that stems from credibility and legitimacy through, for example, diplomacy, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction; as the EU has advocated since its establishment. Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun; even the most brutal dictators have relied on attraction as well as fear. The core of the European project was, from the beginning, peace, human rights and diplomacy, and this represented the identity of the EU. This raises the debate of whether the identity of the EU is ideologically incoherent with developing hard power military capacities. The options that lay ahead in this issue are not as clear as they may seem; the ideological standpoint of opting for hard or soft power is not an absolute, there is considerable middle-ground. Opting to develop hard power does not directly signify increasing a military presence or even indicate an increase in spending, but rather a reallocation of funds, or development of already existing structures and measures. Nor does

235

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Between internal constraints and external challenges. P 55-56 October 2013. 236 The Economist. Defenceless? December 21 2013. 237

Reuters, America, tightening belt, warns Europe over its defence spending. February 26 2014.

238

The Economist. Defenceless? December 21 2013.

239

Network of the European Union Centres of Excellence (EUCE). Policy Area: EU-NATO Relations.

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developing soft power entail that the EU simply continues as it is today, but rather could require a greater focus on diplomatic strength. There are several possible routes to explore. Last but not least, an important question that must be raised is who will ultimately answer for how Europe develops its armament: the EU or the Member States? Would it be possible to coordinate between the differing foreign policies of Member States, bearing in mind the varying mentalities, the impact of history, and the culture of military in Member States? There are several aspects to consider; but must it be either the EU or Member States who answer? The decision to follow whichever course of action need not be taken at a pan-European level; there is the possibility of certain Member States or regions to work in one way and others in another: more concretely, some Members States might be encouraged to enlarge the defence budget, and others not. There is no YES or NO answer to this issue; the discussion is primarily a fundamental ideological one, on the identity of the EU, and thereafter the determination of “at which level” resolutions would be implemented. Links: 

French defence minister warns against further spending cuts: http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/137113/french-defence-minister-warns-against-further-spending-cuts



Does NATO still have a role? http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/03/04/j-l-granatstein-the-end-of-nato/

Key Terms:     

Collective security: the concept that aggression against a state should be defeated collectively because aggression against one state means aggression against all. Sovereignty: the authority of the state, based on recognition by other states and by non-state actors, to govern matters within its own borders that affect its people, economy, security, and form of government. Democratic peace theory: supported by empirical evidence that democratic states do not wage wars against each other, but to fight wars against authoritarian states. Hard power: a coercive approach to international political relations, especially one that involves the use of economic and/or military power. Soft power: ability to change a target’s behaviour based on the legitimacy of one’s ideas or policies, rather than on material power e.g. economic or military.

Key questions: • • o

o • o

What are the issues with the EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s security and defence today? Are there any? Which course of action should the EU follow: development of hard power capabilities, or soft power capacities? If the favoured option is the development of hard powers, should it be on the initiative of the EU to develop hard power security and defence capacities in Member States? How would a hard military power fit into the legislative framework of the EU? How would the EU create a common policy encompassing all Member States’ policies in an effective manner? If soft power is the preferred option, in which way could the EU increase the safety of its members with a common policy encompassing all Member States’ policies in an effective manner? With regard to the already existing frameworks, for example those of NATO, is it necessary for the EU to develop its own structures? Should the EU look to improve its own structures, such as the CSDP and the Military Headline Goals, before focussing other frameworks, such as the Berlin Plus Agreement? Links:



Where does the CSDP fit into EU foreign policy?

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http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/csdpeuforeignpolicy-witney-ne-jdi-feb13.pdf?pdf=ok 

“That cross-Channel gap is becoming too wide to bridge”, an example of finding a consensus among Member States: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/cross-channel-gap-analysis

Key Facts and Figures:       

Not a single EU Member State doubled their military spending between 2004 and 2013, while many states to the east of the EU did; Russia, Iraq, China, Afghanistan, to name a few240. Between 2012 and 2013, Central and Western Europe decreased military expenditure by more than 2%241. Eastern European states - pertaining to the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Albania, Hungary Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Latvia – were spending 14% less on their militaries in 2012 than in 2000. Poland is an outlier in this case, increasing military spending by 50% during the period 2000-2012242. In 2010, Russia launched a ten-year weapons-modernisation programme, costing $720 billion, with the goal of turning the current 10% “modern” weapon kits to 70% by 2020243. Since 2007, Russia has almost doubled military spending, and during 2014 alone it will rise 18.4%244. 22 Member States of the EU are also members of NATO. NATO has agreed that member countries should spend 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence and should cooperate more to reduce expensive overlaps. In 2013, over all, European NATO members spent 1.6%245.

Key Conflicts: The key underlying conflicts to this topic are of a highly ideological nature, and with regard to security and defence in Europe the conflict is threefold: firstly, and central to the topic, as the advocate for peace and democracy that the EU is; should the EU become a hard power in the international arena, or should it stick to the role of the moral actor in global affairs, believing in soft power, through diplomacy, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction? Secondly, is it the place of the EU to legislate on European defence, or if this is to be left to the Member States themselves? Does the European project extent thus far so to integrate Member States on a military level? How far should integration go, and is collective security part of the European vision? Thirdly, what is most affective in today’s international arena; soft or hard power? Links: 

Why should Europe care what happens between Ukraine and Russia? http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2014/05/02/ukraine-russia/#.U49I2fl_svk



Combining Hard and Soft Power: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart

Stakeholders: Working top-down, the EU institution concerned most by this topic is the European External Action Service (EEAS), is equivalent to the foreign office of the EU. The EEAS manages the diplomatic relations of the EU with non-member countries. It aims to make the foreign policy of the EU consistent and more

240

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Recent trends in military expenditure.

241

Ibid.

242

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Expenditure by Country.

243

The Economist. Putin’s new model army, p.25. May 24 2014.

244

Ibid.

245

The New York Times. Europe Begins to Rethink Cuts to Military Spending. March 26 2014.

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efficient, thereby increasing Europe's influence in the world. Furthermore, the EEAS facilitates the CSDP through a number of committees and agencies where the CSDP is discussed and practiced246. NATO, the intergovernmental military alliance signed on 4 April 1949. NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. As already mentioned, 22 EU Member States are also members of NATO. Thus, the safety of the EU is of great interest to NATO, and vice versa. The EU-NATO partnership is today defined by the Berlin Plus Agreement247, outlining how EU-led operations work, the level of transparency and mutually reinforcing capability, to name a few. With this agreement already in place, the extent to which NATO should be included in this debate pertains to whether the EU should develop the already existing partnership, or rather develop an EU-oriented defence project? It goes without saying that the EU Member States are also key stakeholders in this matter. It is of great importance that the Union is on board with the pursued actions and remains united. This is incredibly difficult, when 28 sovereign states with individual national and foreign policies, all with national interest as a priority: safety and prosperity. Currently, a Member State is itself in command of how to manage its national military; the EU has no standing “European Army”, nor the power to create one. But with the European vision, where no member should stand alone, are Member States truly only in charge of its own security? It can be contemplated whether the EU evokes the concept of collective security, in the pursuit of national security even if Member States are by right sovereign. Bearing in mind the greatly varying views on military and historical identity of Member States, is it plausible that there can be consensus on a pan-European defence policy? Must this policy even come at a pan-European level, or should Member States decide for themselves? Links: 

A report on the implications of military spending cuts for NATO's largest members: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/07/military-spending-nato-odonnell



An article on the falling defence budgets and excess capacity of Europe’s military-equipment: http://www.economist.com/news/business/21572826-falling-defence-budgets-and-excess-capacity-haveput-europes-military-equipment-makers

Existing Measures: EU’s Common Defence and Security Policy & the Treaty of Lisbon As declared in Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) “shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy” and provide “an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets”, which the EU can then use for crisis-management missions248. The aim of the CSDP is to give the EU a politico-military capability for European-led operations and “shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy”, for peacekeeping and other military and security tasks, without undermining the importance of NATO as the provider of territorial defence for most Member States. There are many who look to criticise the CSPD, with relation to the phrasing of “common security and defence”. The Treaty of Lisbon, with aim to foster a closer cooperation whilst giving more power to Member States, did not change the manner in which policy formulation occurred for the CSDP; policy decisions are still by and large taken generally by the EU Member States themselves. Despite the call for a more collective and collaborated initiatives in the absence of structured coordination of national policies, the European armaments market remains fragmented along national lines.

246

For example The Political and Security Committee (PSC), The Politico-Military Group (PMG), The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). European External Action Service. Structure, Instruments and Agencies. 247 European External Action Service. About CSDP - The Berlin Plus Agreement 248 The Lisbon Treaty: Sect. 2, PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY. Art. 42

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Lisbon’s legal limitations are illustrative of the lack of political will to create concrete cooperative initiatives that will initiate a transition from “defence policy” to actual “defence”. Whilst Lisbon has facilitated the practises of “softer” aspects of security, such as the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters249, is has not created a relative platform for the implication of hard power. Ergo, the effectiveness of CSDP as a successful component of the EU’s response to global threats and a means of facilitating cross-national coordination of defence policy remains a “diamond in the rough”250. This empirical analysis could also suggest that Neorealism – that emphasises the restrictive impact of the anarchic international system on the scope and depth of cooperation251 – has the strongest analytical leverage in understanding the CSDP. The Berlin Plus Agreement The Berlin Plus Agreement refers to a comprehensive package of arrangements between the EU and the NATO. It allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis-management operations. The CSDP reinforced the need to establish a formal agreement between the EU and NATO, as with overlapping memberships of the two organisations and thus the concerns over duplications of assets, capabilities and structures, required both partners to agree on procedures for crisis management operations. The formal elements252 of the Berlin Plus Agreement outlines the framework of cooperation and clarifies the specifics of the EU-NATO partnership. Treaty of Amsterdam The Treaty of Amsterdam indicated the possibility of developing a future common defence policy for the EU. The inclusion of what became the CSDP was designed to enable the EU to adopt a coherent approach when addressing security challenges. The treaty subsequently states: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy […] which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide”253. Petersburg Tasks & Military Headline Goals In addition, the Treaty of Amsterdam also defined the range of military tasks which the EU could undertake, namely the Petersburg tasks. Originally, this outlined three purposes for which military units could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks and; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42) then further expanded these tasks to include: joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks and; post-conflict stabilisation tasks254. To facilitate the availability of the Petersburg tasks, following the Cologne agreement that the EU should possess an autonomous military capacity to respond to crises, the Military Headline Goals were established. The purposes of these goals are to make it possible for Member States to deploy forces up to corps level, and to ensure that the EU possesses the military capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions encompassed by the Petersburg tasks. In 2004, the European Council set a new target for capability improvement of the EU’s militaries, the Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010), which recognised strategic scenarios whereby the EU should be able to respond with a “fully coherent approach” to crisismanagement operations, as outlined in the Petersburg Tasks. The deadline for the completion of the HLG 2010 came and passed without the goals being met. Since then, no news Headline Goals have been set. The European Defence Agency (EDA) & the Pooling and Sharing Initiative The EDA is the Union’s agency facilitating defence cooperation among its Member States, and works to assist Member States in their efforts to improve European defence capabilities in support of the CSDP. The aim of the EDA is "to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities […] and to sustain the CSDP as it stands now and develops in the future”255. The Agency

249

European Parliament. Fact Sheets on the European Union; Judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

250

T. Dyson and T. Konstadinides Understanding the Limitations of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Sep 26 2013.

251

Mingst, Karen and Arreguín-Toft, Ivan M. 2007. Essentials of International Relations. 5th Ed. p.227.

252

EU-NATO Declaration on CSDP Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Art. 17. 254 Treaty of Lisbon. Art. 42. 255 European Defence Agency, Mission. 253

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is funded by its members in proportion to their GNP, and gathers the defence ministers of the Member States. In 2010, based on The Ghent Initiative256, the EDA in conjunction with the Member States developed the Pooling and Sharing Initiative, where the concept refers to initiatives and projects to pool and share more military capabilities among EU Member States on a national and voluntary basis, in line with defence policies of Member States257. In December 2013 the European Council made a clear case for increased defence cooperation and welcomed the progress achieved by the EDA on Pooling & Sharing. Links: 

This report considers in detail the current situation in the field of EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and identifies significant efficiency losses and potential economies of scale: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/494466/IPOLJOIN_ET(2013)494466_EN.pdf



NATO still has vital role, says NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/25/ nato-anders-fogh-rasmussen/2870679/

256 257

A Swedish-German paper on intensifying European military cooperation. European Defence Agency, Pooling & Sharing.

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THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURSISM (TRAN) BUILDING ON THE URBAN MOBILITY PACKAGE: WITH APPROXIMATELY 70% OF THE EUROPEAN POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES, HOW CAN THE EU PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT WHILST EMBRACING TECHNOLOGY AND EFFICIENCY, TO IMPROVE SUSTAINABLE URBAN TRANSPORT? Chairperson: Teresa Stadler - Austria Explanation and relevancy of the Topic: The world’s population is increasingly city-based and the existing mobility systems are close to breakdown. By 2050 the average time an urban dweller spends in traffic jams will be 106 hours per year, three times more than today258. European citizens and economic actors need a transport infrastructure which provides them with seamless, high-quality door-to-door mobility. At the same time, many argue that the adverse effects of transport on the climate, the environment and human health need to be reduced. Urban areas account for some 23% of all CO2 emissions from transport and cities need to make more efforts in order to achieve the 60% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions set out in the European Commission’s (EC) White Paper “Roadmap to a single European Transport Area”. EU legislation on air quality and increasingly stringent emission standards for road vehicles seek to protect citizens from harmful exposure to airborne pollutants and particulate matter - but cities in virtually all Member States are still struggling to comply with the legal requirements. The Urban Mobility Package was introduced in November 2013 as a guideline for Member States to better manage congestion, reduce road fatalities, co-ordinate different modes of transport and introduce greener technologies. The EC clearly states that implementation of its suggestions should be realised at the national, regional and local level to ensure that the actions taken match the specific circumstances. In order to facilitate this process, the EC runs several platforms for national authorities to share best practice examples such as the Urban Mobility Portal and recently allocated funds for the period 2014 – 2020 to be invested in urban transport projects. Furthermore, problems associated with urban mobility seem to have very obvious solutions at a first glance and many claim that the technology needed to make this sector more sustainable and environmentally friendly has long been available. However, numerous stakeholder interests, changing political landscapes at a national level as well as difficulties in securing the necessary funding to implement long-term Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs) make modernising transport in urban areas a complex endeavour and the evaluation and modification of existing measures imperative to guaranteeing results in the near future. Links: EC Mobility and Transport. Includes a list of related documents, legislation and press releases http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/urban_mobility/action_plan_en.htm EC Document: Urban Mobility Package, central communication http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/doc/ump/com(2013)913_en.pdf Overview of actions proposed in the Urban Mobility Package and actors in charge http://www.ecf.com/wp-content/uploads/ECF_Urban-Mobility-Package-Dec-2013_Overview-of-Actions.pdf White Paper (EC 2011) Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system – a summary http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/transport/bodies_objectives/tr0054_en.htm

258

Little, Arthur D. (2014): Towards networked, multimodal cities of 2050. Retrieved from: http://www.adlittle.com/multimodal-cities-of2050.html

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Key Terms 

Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan - A set of interrelated measures designed by national actors with the help of an EC guideline. A SUMP aims to satisfy the mobility needs of people and businesses. It addresses all modes and forms of transport in a city and its surrounding areas and builds on existing planning activities.259

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Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) – Systems in which information and communication technologies are applied in the field of road transport, including infrastructure, vehicles and users, and in traffic management and mobility management, as well as for interfaces with other modes of transport.

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Urban logistics/City logistics – The transportation of goods in urban areas which refers to three types of movement: (1) to industrial and commercial establishments, to tertiary sector or service industries (2) by individuals for shopping (3) other flows designated as “supplementary” flows generated by other activities such as transport of waste, the internal needs of public service, relocations, home delivery, postal service and hospitals260.

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Urban access regulations – Are measures to regulate vehicular access to urban infrastructure which can apply to specific places, types of vehicles and time periods.

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Transit privatisation – The process of shifting responsibility concerning the provision of public transport or services from the public to the private sector.

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Public Private Partnerships - A business relationship between a private-sector company and a government agency for the purpose of completing a project that will serve the public. Public-private partnerships can be used to finance, build and operate projects such as public transportation networks.261

Links: An explanation of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) by the World Bank (includes a video) http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-partnerships A call for smarter urban vehicle access regulations; EC communication http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/doc/ump/swd(2013)526-communication.pdf An interactive page on urban access regulations across Europe http://www.lowemissionzones.eu/ City Logistic: Urban freight distribution in Gothenburg; a best practice example http://www.bestfact.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CL1_QuickInfo_Gothenburg-21jan2014.pdf

Key questions 

With urban mobility calling for long-term commitments often restricted by typically short-term policy making on a national basis, how can long-term solutions and wider use of green technologies be achieved as well as the necessary funding be secured?

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Keeping in mind price, service quality and safety, is transit privatisation a desirable/ necessary option in achieving the goals set out in the Urban Mobility Package? Which other feasible option are there to better finance infrastructure modernisation?

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Many experts claim that new, green technology is already widely available. Why it not being implemented coherently and what can be done to achieve wider use?

259

European Commission (2014), online platform: http://www.mobilityplans.eu/ Commission of European Communities (2007): www.civitas.eu 261 Investopedia (2014). Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/ 260

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With all policies in the areas of transport, environment and technological development being shared competencies between the EU and the Member States and few legally binding documents on environmental regulations in this sector, how can already existing and new measures to better manage urban transport be implemented effectively? Links: European Parliament Think Tank suggesting an integrated approach to urban development http://epthinktank.eu/2014/02/19/sustainable-urban-development/ A paper by Detlef Sprinz in which he discusses the nature of long-term policy challenges (section 1) and ways in which they might be tackled (section 4) http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/sprinz/doc/Sprinz.LoPo.Overview.pdf Transport and greenhouse gas emissions – a project group aiming to analyse and decrease CO2 emissions in the transport sector http://www.eutransportghg2050.eu/cms/about-the-project/ United Nations Habitat site on Transport and Mobility http://unhabitat.org/urban-themes-2/mobility/

Key facts and figures: 

Member States will have to spend at least 5% of their European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)262 budget on integrated sustainable urban development. Under the new rules, Member States have to prepare a Partnership Agreement (or contract) explaining how they intend to use the five main EU funds in a coordinated way to achieve the 11 thematic objectives linked to the Europe 2020 strategy263. This should include their proposals for the implementation of integrated sustainable urban development.264

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Significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from transport are required if the EU is to achieve its long-term goals. Therefore, the Commission carried out a study to investigate the sorts of policies and technologies that are needed to achieve substantial emission reductions by 2050.265 Links: Attitudes of Europeans towards Urban Mobility, a Euro barometer survey http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/urban/doc/ump/flash-eurobarometer-ump-2013.pdf EC Press Release on the ERDF in the period 2014-2020 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1096_en.htm City Population – check past and current population density in your city (and many others) http://www.citypopulation.de/Europe.html

Key Conflicts: One core issue is the competition for space between car users, public transport vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians. With many cities failing to implement coherent traffic management which also connects different modes of transport, efficiency has not improved significantly over the past years. It needs to be understood that re-allocating limited city space is a tedious process which involves several stakeholders. This lengthy commitment is one that many governments are not willing to take on so that it never gets much needed attention.

262

European Commission Regional Policy (2014): http://ec.europea.eu Europe 2020 is the EU's growth strategy for the coming decade. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm 264 Enemark, Anette/ Kneeshaw, Sally (2013): How Cities Can Motivate Mobility Mindsets. Saint-Denis: URBACT 265 European Commission (2014): Climate Action. http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/index_en.htm 263

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Moreover, the lack of funding raises the question of transit privatisation which would substantially lower public expenditure and bears great potential in raising standards. With the profit motive at its core a private business has a greater incentive to invest in new technologies which would contribute to the EU’s environmental goals as well as positively impact efficiency and usage of public transport. Opponents of privatisation argue that governments should be responsible for providing basic services to prevent private monopolies and guarantee fair access for all consumer groups. Furthermore, privatised transport organisations are likely to ignore negative externalities related to transport since they are only concerned with one sector. Conflicting stakeholder objectives which determine whether they aim to maximise profit, performance or safety further impact private businesses’ actions. Debates on the topic often circle around the topic of how to best address urban mobility short-comings. Many of the proposed technological innovations are yet untested while smart, forward-looking solutions are needed now to better connect the ever increasing urban population. Delegates will have to evaluate the Urban Mobility Package as well as identify ways in which environmentally friendly systems can be made available to more users. Links: Alex Steffen – The shareable future of cities (a TED talk) on sustainable urban planning http://www.ted.com/talks/alex_steffen#t-349024 Arthur D. Little – The future of Urban Mobility 2.0 (this is the full report and not limited to European countries but includes many useful visuals) http://www.adlittle.com/downloads/tx_adlreports/2014_ADL_UITP_Future_of_Urban_Mobility_2_0_Full_st udy.pdf Björn Hasselgren for The Guardian; Europe’s transport infrastructure: A road to privatisation. http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2013/oct/30/europes-transport-innovations-private

Stakeholders: Please note that the policy areas this issue touches upon all fall under ‘shared competencies’ between the EU and the Member States. The principle of subsidiarity, meaning that measures are taken at the lowest possible level of governance, should be kept in mind at all times when dealing with urban mobility.     

The European Commission as the responsible EU institution which needs to be addressed with suggestions concerning the modification of the Urban Mobility Package. The Committee of the Regions266 (COTER), is a main actor in pushing for innovative solutions, mostly in the area of territorial cohesion. In May it discussed the Urban Mobility Package and expressed its opinion to the EC. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as private businesses play a key role in lobbying for their specific interests and can significantly impact the course of national action taken on this matter since neither action plans nor guidelines are legally binding documents. Member States, as the Urban Mobility Package is addressed at authorities at national, regional and local level, which means that several layers of governance will be affected. European citizens play an important role in this matter since transportation should be tailored to their specific needs and their active participation in shaping new solutions is core to any project’s realisation. Links: COTER calling for a White Paper on the urban agenda after their meeting on May 5th 2014 http://web.cor.europa.eu/ea/News/Pages/COTER-call-for-a-white-paper-for-urban-agenda-and-urban-ruralbalance.aspx

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COTER Homegae (2014): http://cor.europa.eu/en/Pages/home.aspx

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Eurocities is a political platform that cooperates with the three main EU institutions and organises working groups to better address problems of climate and inclusion on a local level http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/activities Polis Homepage –European Cities and Regions Network for innovative transport solutions http://www.polis-online.org/

Existing Measures:      

The Urban Mobility Package as the core document and its annexes which further elaborate on the implementation on proposed measures. The EC’s 2011 White Paper “Roadmap to a single European Transport Area”267; Eltis the Urban Mobility Portal268 which is an online sharing platform where Member States can publish best practice examples of urban mobility projects they have implemented. Eco Mobility Shift269 which is a quality management system which helps cities to measure the performance of their urban transportation and detect room for improvement. URBACT270, an exchange and learning programme aimed at cities which is part of the European cohesion policy is an important tool to foster urban development across the EU. CIVITAS271, an initiative co-financed by the EU tries to make transport in cities environmentally friendly and more efficient.

267

EC White Paper (2011): Roadmap to a single European Transport Area. A summary: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/transport/bodies_objectives/tr0054_en.htm 268 Eltis Homepage (2014): http://eltis.org/index.php?ID1=4&id=4 269 Eco mobility-shift Homepage (2014): http://www.ecomobility-shift.org/en/ 270 URBACT II (2014): http://urbact.eu/fileadmin/general_library/19765_Urbact_WS5_MOBILITY_low_FINAL.pdf -special attention should be paid to chapter 2 271 CIVITAS Homepage (2014): http://www.civitas.eu/

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