Academic Preparation Kit Leipzig 80th International Session of the EYP

LEIPZIG 2015 80th International Session of the European Youth Parliament

From tearing down walls to setting new stones

ACADEMIC PREPARATION KIT

LEIPZIG 2015 Under the patronage of Tibor Navracsics

European Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport

Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Stanislaw Tillich

Minister-President of the Free State of Saxony

Burkhard Jung

Mayor of the city of Leipzig

CONTENT FOREWORD TOPICS & RATIONALES GOOD GOVERNANCE SOLIDARITY DIGNITY IDENTITY JUSTICE

LEIPZIG 2015

4 6 18 38 66 84 100

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LEIPZIG 2015

FOREWORD Dear participants of Leipzig 2015,

and across many domains and activities within and outside the EU, is central to the theme

The Chairs’ Team of the 80th International Ses-

of Leipzig 2015 and the mentality that the 80th

sion of the European Youth Parliament in Leip-

International Conference of the EYP is aiming

zig proudly presents you the Academic Prepa-

to communicate to its participants.

ration Kit. This document is comprised of the Topic Overviews that the Chairs have prepared

With Europe facing numerous challenges and

for the Committee Topics of Leipzig 2015. The

violations of human rights, within and outside

Topic Overviews will usher you into relevance,

of its borders, Leipzig 2015 will be an opportuni-

key terms, conflicts and stakeholders, measu-

ty for its participants to discuss topics that may

res in place, and future prospects of each to-

very well shape the future of the Union. Pro-

pic aiming to simplify the complexities that

tecting our Union from future crises, whether

comprise them. The links provided at the end

economic or environmental, is a key element

of every overview will hopefully facilitate your

of Leipzig 2015 as a solid, united and stronger

further research, but are by no means exhaus-

interior may allow the Union to harness its po-

tive. The Topic Overviews are supposed to pro-

tential as a promoter of global peace and order.

vide you with a holistic, objective summary of

While Leipzig 2015 will emphasise protection of

the Committee Topics and should only act as

human and civil rights at the macro level, it is

the point of departure for you own academic

important to highlight them at the micro level,

preparation.

too. Protecting those suffering from mental illness, mitigating risks of social exclusion and

Good governance, solidarity, dignity, identity

responding to the Great Migration crisis with

and justice – these are the five clusters that

effective, fair and humane policies are perti-

underpin the theme of the 80th International

nent topics on the political agenda of the EU.

Session of the EYP. With the year 2015 marking

Resolving issues like those requires a unified

the 26th anniversary since the Fall of the Ber-

front; a unified front that rests on the identity

lin Wall, and the 25th anniversary of the reuni-

of Europe founded on civility, respect to human

fication of Germany and Europe, Leipzig 2015

rights and social inclusion.

poses an opportunity to revisit the fundamental building blocks of the European Union. The

Europe is now faced with internal challenges as

protection of human rights, in various forms

much as it is with external ones; rebuilding our

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LEIPZIG 2015

PRESIDENT LUCA European identity and overcoming challenges

this experience, I invite you to plan and prepare

with respect to online activities and data pro-

for your own topic discussions. I would also like

tection, statelessness and access to effective

to encourage you to have a look at other over-

sexual education remain issues that you can

views and gain an insight into other issues that

discuss and aim to resolve in your effort to sha-

will be discussed and debated on in Leipzig.

pe the EU into a fair system of governance that

Most importantly, it is crucial that you familia-

respects and protects its people.

rise yourself well with the other two overviews in your topic cluster. We have prepared for you

Our rights as European citizens are engraved

an interesting and interactive Expert Hearing

in our justice system and should dominate the

concept, however, for you to make the most out

core of public policies, whether at the EU or na-

of it and benefit from those discussions, it is

tional levels. Respect to the freedoms of speech

important that you have a good understanding

and expression are pivotal for the establish-

of the other two overviews in your cluster.

ment of a free society. Respect should be omnipresent; from safeguarding detainees’ rights

I wish you the best with your preparations for

and their social rehabilitation to ensuring that

Leipzig 2015 and I invite you to use this oppor-

tax burdens are distributed equally by minimi-

tunity to embark upon a conceptual journey

sing the risks of market segregation that allows

and revisit the fundamentals of Europe.

for tax havens and off-shore activities to come to fruition.

My best, Luca Olumets

Leipzig 2015 will be an opportunity for you to

President of the 80th International Session of the EYP

discuss fundamental issues that have shaped our continent and our Union. At Leipzig, you will be given the opportunity to be critical of the past and draw your lines to the future of the EU ever so gracefully, with respect to the rights that have defined and will continue to define you and I - Europeans. We will all have a chance to contribute to the success of Leipzig 2015. However, in order for you to make the most out of

On behalf of the Chairs’ Team of Leipzig 2015 Andreia, Annmarie, Arnolds, Arriana, Benjamin, Conall, Felicia, Ia, Kati, Khalid, Laure, Lia, Lorenz, Lorenzo and Willem.

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LEIPZIG 2015

I. Good Governance AFET

SEDE

Armed conflicts as the greatest cause of fundamental rights’ violations worldwide: With many having criticised the European External Action Service for lacking ambition, how should the EU use its diplomatic power to contribute to global peace?

Unregulated Warfare: What stance should the EU take on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and which common principles should be accepted globally?

1. Committee on Foreign Affairs

2. Committee on Security and Defence

The usage of drones by the US is now reaching beyond surveillance on a regular basis, and is an alleged source

The current number of armed conflicts is the highest since the end of the Cold War. This poses a threat to world peace, a further potential for deepening the refugee crisis, and may cause instability at Europe’s borders. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was put into place as a diplomatic mission of the EU, aiming to improve relations and influence of a European perspective in world politics. The EEAS is represented by 139 delegations around the world, responsible for maintaining political dialogue, administering development aid, and building trade and cultural relations under the oversight of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, the EEAS has been criticised for exhausting many resources whilst making little impact on foreign policy, possibly also because of the EU’s limited decision-making capacity in this policy field. Actors that the EU could turn to externally are research institutes on peace studies and NGOs working on securing peace.

This topic poses the open question of what and how the EU can contribute to global conflict prevention. At the same time it opens the possibility to define the diplomatic corps in Europe, to uncover weaknesses and propose an effective distribution of tasks between actors within the European foreign and security policy.

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for countless civilian casualties in Pakistan, Iraq and Syria. While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are already an established weapon of war in the United States, after several failed attempts, the purchase of drones by European countries is still in a planning stage. Seven EU countries are planning to produce military drones from 2020 onwards.

The revolution in military affairs consists of new methods of warfare that change the way military action is being carried out, and redistribute risks and losses between those engaged in it asymmetrically. This poses an array of new moral considerations, as well as challenges to humanitarian and international law. The EU could consider finding a common approach to regulating the use of drones for investigative purposes and military maneuvers, as well as on the question of which areas should be the focus of future research and development. In addition, such a solution is most effective when supported globally.

This topic is about closing the legislation gap on drones to ensure already now that the EU’s military use of UAVs remains within the framework of Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. It aims at answering moral consideration and is ultimately aimed at finding a common solution together with allies such as the US.

LEIPZIG 2015

JURI I 3. Committee on Legal Affairs I

Rethinking public policies: How can the EU better contribute to the implementation of its good governance principles on local, national and European levels? Which steps should it take to combat corruption?

High-level corruption, corruption of elected officials, as well as petty corruption, corruption by civil servants, has different prevalence in the EU’s Member States. While high-level corruption is especially common in some Eastern European countries, hardly noticed and petty corruption occur on a daily basis in Western Europe. Corruption is proven to lead to a loss of economic potential, lack of innovation and a loss of potential social capital.

From straight-out bribe giving, over post employment arrangements of public officials, to ineffective or unfair decisions upon government contracts: Corruption is possible in many different fields of politics and via many different allies. While the European Commission and the Council of Europe (CoE) constantly assess and make recommendations for improving preventative mechanisms, the issue prevails in all European countries in different forms.

Beyond the issue of corruption, good governance can be further supported by principles laid down in European law.

These include democracy, transparency, accountability and an inclusive decision-making process. The reason this topic is framed around corruption is because a more active civil society, the inclusion of more viewpoints and power sharing as well as calling out those who misuse powers are important factors of forming an overall integer government. The topic thus asks for an evaluation of all of these areas on the national, as well as on the European level. It allows developing a comprehensive strategy to ensure good governance principles in law and practice, which invites analytical observations as well as creative approaches.

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LEIPZIG 2015

II. Solidarity INTA

4. Committee on International Trade

Fundamental rights in a globalised economy: After more than 10 years of prolonged free trade negotiations, how can the EU take a coordinated approach to facilitatating international trade while ensuring human rights and self-determination in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries?

Being the world’s largest economy, the EU is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries’ most important trading partner with the overall trade in goods amounting to 133bn euro in 2010. However, around 39 of the world’s 48 least-developed countries are ACP countries, in which political and social instability cause poor access to health, education and work. Precarious working conditions in those countries, for example in the field of textiles, have further caused both scandals and increasingly public debate on trade standards and conditions of industrial production. Although some efforts have been made towards raising awareness and updating trade agreements, there is no common practice for the protection of fundamental rights in a globalised economy. On one hand, this globalisation may substantiate a moral responsibility toward ensuring the protection of fundamental rights in the country of production, when on the other hand, economic competitiveness may outweigh such concerns. Accordingly, a coordinated EU approach would require a consensus on trade standards that balances such protection of rights and economic benefit when at the same time, respecting the country’s right to self-determination and its state sovereignty. In this regard, comprehensive solutions need to allow for the contracting country to raise their opinion and contribute to the trade negotiations in equal measure.

This topic opens up solutions for these conflicts arising from the lack of a common conception via the EU’s foreign trade policy and conditions for free trade agreements. This topics asks for a common ground of an European facilita-

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tion of international trade. On the one hand, the EU could set minimum standards for the production of imported products, on the other hand better standards could evolve naturally with a further economic development of third countries. The inherent conflict between paternalism and enforcing moral standards must be solved within this topic.

LEIPZIG 2015

ECON I

ENVI II

Preventing future crises: Learning from the European economic, financial and sovereign debt crises, how should the governance of the Eurozone be restructured to safeguard the European Economic Area against asymmetric shocks?

Towards an integrated European Energy Market: In the light of COP21, which innovative practices should the EU introduce to ensure affordable energy for consumers across the Member States whilst maintaining sustainability?

The economic and financial crisis has had serious con-

Since 2010, both gas and electricity prices have rapidly

sequences that still limit the access to basic rights such

increased, resulting in approximately 51 million Europeans

as health care or the right to housing in some EU Member

being incapable of paying their energy bills, consequently

States. In order to create the economic basis for a solid

not affording heating. In total, between 50 and 125 million

protection of fundamental rights, a stable common cur-

people are living in energy poverty in Europe, making af-

rency and functioning economy in the entire Euro Area

fordable energy one of the most in demand commodity.

is essential. The crisis has triggered a debate in politics,

Moreover, the restructuring of the energy market in Germa-

science and civil society about how the future of the euro,

ny and the current crisis in Ukraine have highlighted the im-

fiscal governance and monetary influence should be set up

portance of a sustainable energy supply for Europe.

5. Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs I

to ensure that a common monetary policy is in the best interest of all European economies.

6. Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety II

The world is at a critical juncture in its efforts to combat climate change, with momentum building towards the

Complaints prevail that solutions to the Euro crisis have

21st UN Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in De-

been short-term focused and that ambitions to increase

cember 2015. The scientific need to reach a meaningful

overall stability of the Eurozone set-up were abandoned for

global agreement on Climate Action is higher than ever.

political reasons. This topic aims to build upon the lessons

The expectations for the meeting even exceed those from

from the crisis to debate whether a governance reform

COP15 in Copenhagen (2009). Moreover, the energy sector

and/or further fiscal integration are necessary to build a

must play a critical role if efforts to reduce emissions are

common currency that is more resistant to shocks (such as

to succeed.

the former banking crisis) or that allows more harmonised decision-making. At the same time, the challenge of this topic is bringing forward a solution that is feasible for the currently very different economies in the Eurozone.

This topic requires a fundamental transformation to ensure a sustainable Europe by the middle of the 21st century. By switching from fossil fuel, greenhouse gas intensive sources of energy to renewable sources of energy, Europe is able to fully grasp its sustainable potential - in economic, ecologic and social terms. Today’s energy decisions will shape Europe’s supply system for at least the next 50 years, thereby determining the future level of greenhouse gas emissions, fossil fuel dependency and the competitiveness of European economies. The objectives for the years to come include diversifying suppliers, increasing energy efficiency and de-carbonising the economy.

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LEIPZIG 2015

III. Dignity ENVI I

7. Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety I

Mental health and the quality of human lives: With the rise in the number of Europeans suffering from mental health problems, how should the EU approach the insufficient treatment of patients suffering from mental illness?

According to a study from 2011, 38% of Europeans suffer from mental disorders while only a minority is undergoing treatment. The World Health Organization predicts that by 2020, depression will be the second leading contributor to the global burden of disease across all ages, which would negatively impact economic growth and burden health care systems. Researchers find that early prevention or treatment will remarkably improve how well individuals manage such diseases.

It is mostly lack of acceptance, lack of clearly observable symptoms and a lack of education and prevention that make it difficult for mental illnesses to be publicly accepted. Those suffering from mental illness may face obstacles in education, employment, family life and pursuing healthy social interactions. Thereby mental health remarkably impacts the lives of individuals and their families; while treatment gaps pose an additional challenge to living with mental illnesses in a dignified and inclusive manner.

All the while, neuroscientific research and investments into prevention tend to become lower in comparison to investment into short-term medical treatment.

This topic opens up the possibility of proposing solutions in the field of research and development, as well as the political and social recognition and management of mental illnesses.

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LEIPZIG 2015

DROI II

8. Committee on Human Rights II

Social equality and non-discrimination against minorities: With the Roma still being the most discriminated-against minority in Europe, how should the EU build on its Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies to guarantee social and economic rights, access to public services, and non-discrimination of Roma?

crimination of Roma in the future. On the ground of this call for inclusion and dignity of Roma, the EU must take seminal action.

Dignity and equality are fundamental rights established within Europe. Although the EU institutions and every individual Member State bear a common responsibility for ensuring that the EU citizen’s rights are respected, there is continuing discrimination against ethnic minority groups in this regard. According to estimations by the European Commission, 10-12 million Roma live in Europe of which almost half have EU citizenship, making Roma the biggest ethnic minority within the EU. Despite existing legislation on prohibition, the discrimination of Roma in employment, basic schooling, and the acceptance of civil society remain a problem in almost all Member States. The Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies is one of the recent approaches of conceptualisation for a sustainable inclusion in order to improve the situation of Roma across Europe. However, with Roma still being the most discriminated against minority in Europe, those strategies lack a sustainable implementation. The unfulfilling European policies on Roma inclusion in some Member States also show the shortcomings of political solutions, including an apparent lack of commitment by the Member States.

This topic raises the question of which new approaches to integration policy should be introduced, as well as how to ensure a better implementation of existing protection laws. The disparity of social and economic equality among EU citizens needs to be limited by considering new innovative approaches while taking into account already existing policies, such as the framework to guarantee social and economic equality, access to public services, and non-dis-

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LEIPZIG 2015

DROI III

9. Committee on Human Rights III

Europe’s external wall: How should the EU respond to the perils of illegal immigration and improve living conditions for asylum seekers whilst addressing fair burden-sharing amongst Member States?

2014 has seen the highest number of official conflicts worldwide since the beginning of the 90s, thus sending 90.000 refugees from Syria alone to the EU in the past three years. At the same time, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that the number of Syrian refugees in its neighbouring states amounts to 2,6 million. Because re-stabilising conflict regions is a long-term endeavor, the protection of the most fundamental rights of those fleeing from their countries requires an effective and fair short-term solution.

Mediterranean countries often find themselves unable to account for the large influx of refugees, which leads to a split view of EU Member States on the issue. The Dublin II regulation leaves room for doubts as to whether the number of refugees accepted per Member State can be distributed more fairly and effectively. While contemplating whether the EU should accept more refugees, conditions in refugee camps are often detrimental as the most basic human rights are violated; especially children and those suffering from an illness face inadequate living conditions.

With the past year counting over 3500 deaths at sea in the Mediterranean, the topic should also contemplate how the perils of fleeing can be alleviated and whether the EU should tackle increasing possibilities for legal immigration in cases of asylum. This topic aims to find practical solutions for a moral debate surrounding responsibility for human rights protection.

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IV. Identity

LEIPZIG 2015

IMCO

10. Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection

A right to digital identity: With EU institutions maintaining that data protection is a fundamental right, which principles should be integral in the management of customer data of companies online within, and beyond, the EU’s borders?

Europe’s data protection authorities have laid down their guiding principles for the use of European citizens’ personal data, in a joint statement where data protection is described as a fundamental right. In the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelation of the mass espionage carried out by the American National Security Agency (NSA), the issue of personal data protection has become a matter of great importance for European politicians. As more and more people use information and communications technologies (ICT) in their daily lives, safeguarding fundamental rights in today’s information society has become one of the key issues for the EU. The increase in the usage of ICT is also creating fundamental rights challenges, which may result in EU citizens’ rights to privacy, freedom of expression or freedom of association being violated.

There is a growing concern that companies and Internet service providers collect their customers’ data without their knowledge. The combination of digital apps like Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp adds to the risk of various data channels reaching the same provider, and our digital presence becoming an astonishingly accurate mirror of our lives. Under the current EU Data Protection Directive, dating back to 1995, each EU Member State autonomously decides on the sanctions for data protection violations, resulting in considerable differences throughout the EU. The recent cases of differing fines imposed on Google by Spain and France open up a question of to what extent should this matter be dealt with on an EU level, rather than Member State level alone? In the light of the new proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), this topic aims at finding an answer to where the limits of data collection for businesses lie, on which basis should data collection be permitted, and how can citizens be better informed about data security.

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LEIPZIG 2015

DROI I

11. Committee on Human Rights I

Fundamental rights and statelessness: With many people across Europe being stateless, how should European States work towards ensuring a nationality and a legal identity for every individual?

Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a stateless person as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’. Among an estimated 10 million of stateless people worldwide, it is estimated that around 600,000 live in Europe. With no nationality, fundamental rights and services such as health care, school and university enrolment, the right to vote and the ability to move within and outside countries are often out of reach for stateless people. Statelessness can occur for a number of reasons, including due to discrimination against certain groups like women or ethnic minorities; redrawing of State borders or State succession; and gaps in nationality laws.

While the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the most important legal instruments dedicated specifically to the protection of stateless persons and the prevention of statelessness, other international human rights instruments include provisions related to the right to a nationality and the enjoyment of rights by all persons, including stateless persons. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is the international organization within the UN family that has the mandate to work on issues of statelessness worldwide. On November 4, 2014 UNHCR launched its global 10-year Campaign to End Statelessness, which seeks greater political commitment to resolve protracted situations of statelessness and to prevent new situations of mass statelessness due to state succession or arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

In order to avoid stateless persons being pushed further into the margins of society where their situation is defined by constant frustration, depression and feeling of not belonging, this Committee will address the important

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question of how governments, civil society, international organisations and stateless persons could work together to ensure stateless persons enjoy their rights in Europe and towards their acquisition of a legal identity and a nationality.

LEIPZIG 2015

FEMM

12. Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

Health care and reproductive justice: After the failed resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the European Parliament, which strategy should the EU pursue to ensure that women have access to effective sexual education, and how should the EU ensure reproductive health standards?

tance vary greatly among the EU Member States.

This topic is about empowering women to exercise their health rights by providing them with information and outreach clinical services in family planning and contraceptive use. This topic seeks for tangible solutions to a worrisome issue while posing the question on which solutions are realistic, and which minimum standards the EU should guarantee.

The failed resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the European Parliament calling for access to safe and legal abortion, contraceptive services, and comprehensive sexuality education also included suggestions for improving work-life balance and the self-determined founding of a family for women especially. The resolution outlined a wider issue related to the health of women and mothers in Europe, and stated that all women are entitled health care, protection and support. In 2015 the European Parliament adopted the controversial Tarabella Report on gender equality, replacing the Estrela Report of 2013. The former has already been subject to criticism as it outlines abortion as a ‘fundamental right’ for women, while at the same time it still recalls that all matters relating to abortion and ‘sexual and reproductive health’ are in fact an exclusive competence of Member States, not of the EU. As a result, the report is not only not legally binding, but it pronounces an EP position on a matter for which the EP, in the very same documents, asserts to having no competence.

Reproductive health is a human right denied to many women and girls because of gender inequality, lack of information and their ability to make informed choices about themselves. Women and girls must be informed of and have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable health care services. However, when accessing health care and services, women are often not guaranteed privacy and confidentiality, nor do they always receive full information about reproductive health options and services. Moreover, all the aforementioned practices and their level of impor-

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LEIPZIG 2015

V. Justice LIBE

ECON II

A legal and practical fundamental rights safeguard for those deprived of freedom in prison facilities: Which common guidelines should the EU Member States agree on regarding detainees’ rights and freedoms, detention facilities, and social rehabilitation?

Protection of the national legal standards and the development towards a full common market: How should the EU deal with financial havens, offshore accounts and tax-avoidance regulations in its Member States?

13. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs

14. Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs II

The current scandal surrounding the numerous cases of The EU aims to facilitate the social rehabilitation of

tax evasion in Luxembourg has triggered a heated debate

convicted persons in various ways: by ensuring that they

across the EU. These cases of tax injustice emphasise the

serve their sentence in their home country, providing com-

thin line between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance

pensation for victims of inadequate care in custody and

practices. In order to reduce their tax liability, EU citizens

by making sure that prisoners are protected from attacks

and companies commit themselves to unduly tax planning

by other prisoners. However, with the dispute between the

or offshore deposits that cross the line from legality to il-

European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the United Kingdom

legality. Accordingly, several Member States are struggling

regarding prisoners’ right to vote, the question of wheth-

to comply with their economic and social responsibilities

er other basic rights and freedoms should be guaranteed

as a consequence of loss of revenue.

for detainees arises. Additionally, prisoners in a number of EU Member States suffer from inadequate health care and individual support, overcrowded dorms, and a lack of training opportunities. The recent case of Germany refusing to extradite Bulgarian nationals to serve out their sentence in Bulgaria due to poor prison conditions is only one of the latest alarming examples showcasing the importance of this topic. Such sub-human conditions of detention have been condemned numerous times, both nationally by associations involved in the defence of detainee’s rights, and internationally by the Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. The European Prison Rules (EPR) introduced by the Council of Europe (CoE) consist of a set of three recommendations defining the minimum rules applicable in prison facilities. However, all the reforms undertaken have difficulties improving significantly the conditions of detention.

With the state of prison facilities and the rights of prisoners varying greatly across the EU, this topic poses a question of which common guidelines should the EU Member States agree on and follow regarding the freedoms and rights of prisoners, detention facilities and social rehabilitation.

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The complexity of EU tax regulations has to be uncovered: this topic asks for the alignment of the Member State’s fiscal sovereignty and the individual’s right to financial privacy with the European discrepancies in tax regulations as well as the possibility of tax havens outside the EU’s reach.

On one hand the question remains of how the EU’s financial systems can operate on the basis of common standards when on the other hand, the EU has no competence in the regulation of tax systems. This topic further looks at how far the prevention of tax evasion in EU Member States as a common interest can be tackled on a European level, and how tax evasion can be avoided on a practical level.

LEIPZIG 2015

JURI II

15. Committee on Legal Affairs II

Preventing violations of fundamental rights by police forces: What common guidelines should the EU set to protect both the freedom of speech and public security?

Freedom of speech has been accompanied by violence in the past; what were meant to be a peaceful demonstrations eventually turned into violent street riots. The recent Blockupy protests in Frankfurt are only one in many of such escalating demonstrations in Europe. Similarly, the Taksim Square protests and the Euromaidan protests have displayed the extent of violent demonstrations and their impact on society and politics.

Such demonstrations often entail the damage to public property, violence against police forces and a public safety hazard. At the same time reports on violent reactions by police forces lead to tragic incidents such as in Greece or Turkey. Often the opposing parties both facilitate themselves by way of using subsidiary means such as rubber projectiles and tear gas. In light of this violence, the freedom of speech may be limited for security reasons and vice-versa. By reason of wrong conduct on both sides, it is difficult to distinguish fair and adequate judgement of such incidents. Consequently, violent demonstrations have led to increasing public scrutiny of legitimacy of public authorities in such situations. This topic asks for a common approach to ensure that the right to protest is upheld without harming public safety.

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I. • 18

GOOD GOVERN

LEIPZIG 2015

NANCE

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LEIPZIG 2015

Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) Armed conflicts as the greatest cause of fundamental rights’ violations worldwide: With many having criticised the European External Action Service for lacking ambition, how should the EU use its diplomatic power to contribute to global peace?

by Ia Tserodze (GE)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic With 180 000 fatalities, 42 active conflicts and 12 181 000 refugees1 worldwide in 2015, the light seems to be dim at the end of the tunnel. From Afghanistan to Syria, from Ukraine to Palestine, the current number of armed conflicts is the highest since the end of the Cold War. For the past years, the European Union (EU) has been looking for the right tools to tackle those high numbers of conflicts. As a means to tackle the issues at hand, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was drafted. Launched in 2011, the EEAS was created by the Treaty of Lisbon in order to“strengthen the European Union on the global stage, give it more profile, and enable it to project its interests and values more efficiently.”2 The positions of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and President of the European Council were introduced, with a view to enhancing the Union’s external representation capacities, and improving the coherence of its actions.

However, ever since its creation, the EEAS has been granted names such as“bureaucratic monster”,“Mexican Army” and“poisonous potion”; one can certainly realise the level of controversy that the EEAS has caused thus far. Nevertheless, many are left to believe that forming lasting alliances within the European Union through the means of the High Representative and the EEAS, is a stairway to power. They argue that joint actions are bound to give the Union more foreign policy influence, than if the Member States were to go alone or divided. In support of the argument, critics often bring up the EU’s recent cooperation strategy over the conflict of Ukraine. In 2014, the reasoning behind the failed ceasefire was thought to be the Union’s internal disagreement: with one Member State supplying Russia with warships, the other remaining as its faithful gas customer, and some merely calling each other hypocrites.3 EU’s foreign policy entitles the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP). It is responsible for maintaining relations with other Union institutions and bodies, international organisations and inter-parliamentary assemblies for matters falling under its responsibility. Furthermore, it focuses on the strengthening of political relations with third countries by means of assistance programmes, association and partnership agreements; and lastly, implements, monitors and if the need arises, alters the EEAS.4

IISS. (2015). Armed Conflict Database. Monitoring conflicts worldwide. Retrieved from https://acd.iiss.org/en

European Union External Action. (2015). The origins oft he EEAS. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/ origins-of-the-european-external-action-service/index_en.htm 3

Daley, J. (2014). An ‘EU Foreign Policy’ is a total nonsense. Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/eu/10991298/An-EU-foreign-policy-is-a-total-nonsense.html 4

European Parliament. (2015). Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.

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With these responsibilities in mind, the question at hand is how can the EU overcome its shortcomings of foreign policy, and efficiently tackle armed conflicts on an international scale? As the EU institutions play a pivotal role in the matter, one should not forget about the prominence of sovereign States. The matter requires close consideration of the obstacles that currently occur, and examination of possible improvements for the already existing measures.

Key terms Armed Conflict - International humanitarian law distinguishes two types of armed conflicts: international armed conflicts, opposing two or more States, and non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups, or between such groups only.5 Treaty of Lisbon – Signed in October 2007 and entered into force on December 1st 2009, the Lisbon Treaty amends and modifies two pre-existing treaties: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).“The Treaty of Lisbon gives greater coherence and visibility to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU therefore acquires legal personality, enabling it to negotiate and be a contracting party in international Treaties. In addition, the EU is henceforth represented globally by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). Furthermore, a section of the founding Treaties is now devoted to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The long-term objectives aim at establishing a Common European Defence.”6 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - The Member States have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union. The Foreign and Security Policy aims to strengthen the EU’s external ability to act, preserve peace, promote international cooperation, democracy and respect for human rights, through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – The EU does not have a standing army. Under the CSDP, it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by the EU countries for joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, and crisis management (e.g. peace making & post-conflict stabilisation).

European External Action Service (EEAS) - Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS is responsible for the running of about 140 EU Delegations and Offices operating around the world, representing the EU and its citizens globally.7 The EEAS is the European Union’s diplomatic service. It helps the HR/VP to carry out the CFSP.

eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=en&reference=RESP-AFET 5

International Committee on Red Cross. (2008). How is the ‘Armed Conflict’ Defined in International Humanitarian Law. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf 6

The Treaty of Lisbon: Introduction. (2007). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=URISERV:ai0033 7 (ibid)

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Key conflicts and stakeholders One of the inherent difficulties of the EU foreign policy is reaching a complete consensus among 28 Member States. In other words, forming and maintaining joint positions on a wide range of highly political issues is a process that is often slow, and can be seen as an subsistent condition of the EU. Evidently, the States differ in priorities and values among their own foreign policies; thus, having one, clear, attainable goal, that equally satisfies the needs of the 28, can become a close to impossible mission. It also brings back the question on what fundamental approach should be adopted as the way forward: sovereignty for the Member States, or more unison and coherence within the Union to strengthen its role in global politics.

Some also believe that having a new position – the High Representative – has enforced a wind of competition among the States rather than cooperation. The Representative is given the equivalent of two or three jobs, remaining a Vice-President of the Commission, with no deputy. The latter fact has caused ambiguity in the areas of responsibility of top EU officials. Essentially, the President of the European Council, the HR/VP and the President of the Commission are believed to have a degree of competence overlap in foreign policy.

The EEAS is also thought to have a lack of power and influence compared to the countries outside the European Union. Many observers believe that the EEAS has failed to fully integrate trade and energy policies, thus hampering strategic thinking on China and Russia. Those two countries, together with the Middle East and the United Sates, seem to be leading the global political arena, letting the EU fall behind. These countries are believed to be addressing the problems, or in fact, in some cases, creating them, while the EU is continually left to deal with the consequences, rather than possible prevention.

The EU Delegations are a significant mechanism, yet, because of their scale, might fail to adhere to time-sensitive cases. An EU delegation official working in the Democratic Republic of Congo has stated that his office waited two years for its human rights policy to be approved by Brussels, by which time“the situation had completely changed”.8 He said the EU interacts with all the key players in DR Congo; endless meetings, resulting in a failure to concentrate on the immediate problem.

One vivid example of the above-mentioned issues is the EU’s failed performance in the armed conflict of Darfur. Because of the long legislative processes and internal discrepancy, the EU did not declare the conflict to be genocide, as opposed to the stance of the United Nations. The news reports at that time bombarded the EU with articles on its indifference and silence in the face of the military conflict. Only a year later, did the EU decide that the situation had amounted to genocide. Yet, by that time, two main rebel groups had already rioted against the government, and vastly increasing the number of casualties among innocent civilians. Even after the EU started getting involved in the conflict, there was no close cooperation with regards to the provision of aid. The latter fact was due to the rivalry between several Member States as each wanted to be seen as a major mediator in peacekeeping. Therefore, according to the commander of the EU operations, the EU was able to improve security only in some regions.9

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Lewis, A. (2012). BBC News. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20522201 Karamalla-Gaiballa, N. (2015). World Association for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from http://www.

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The HR/VP - is in charge of coordinating and carrying out the CFSP and the CSDP.10 Some of the duties of the HR/VP include steering foreign policy on behalf of the EU, building consensus between the 28 EU countries and their respective priorities, attending regular meetings between leaders of EU countries in the European Council, and representing the EU at international fora, such as the United Nations.

The European Council – is not one of the EU’s legislative bodies. Instead its main role is to determine the EU’s general political direction and priorities - essentially setting the policy agenda for the EU.11 The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service is established by the decision of the Council. The Council acts on a proposal from the HR/VP after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission.

The Council of the European Union – defines and implements the CSFP on the basis of the guidelines set by the European Council. The Council provides the mandate to the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the EU agreements between the EU and non-EU countries and/or international organisations. At the end of negotiations, the Council decides on the signature and conclusion of the agreement, based on a proposal from the Commission. This also includes the EU’s development and humanitarian aid, defence and trade policies. Together with the HR/VP, the Council ensures the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s external action.

The European Parliament – gets a biannual update by the HR/VP on foreign policy activities to the Parliament, who also answers questions from Members of the European Parliament. The EEAS assists the High Representative with this task.

The EU Delegations - play a key role in implementing the EU’s foreign policies. They serve EU interests by presenting, explaining and implementing EU policy with the country, group of countries or organisation they are responsible for; analysing and reporting on the policies and developments of the host countries; and conducting negotiations in accordance with a given mandate.12 The EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) – promote the EU’s policies and interests in troubled regions and countries.“The EUSRs support the work of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), in the regions concerned. They provide the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a“voice” and“face” for the EU and its policies.”13 The EU currently has nine EUSRs in the following countries and/or regions: Central Asia, Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, Horn of Africa, Human Rights and the Sahel.

worldsustainable.org/index.php/component/docman/cat_view/4-international-journal-of-sudan-research/208-ijsr-v5-n12015?Itemid= 10

European Union External Action. (2015). The post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/high-representative/index_en.htm 11

European Council. (2015). Setting the EU’s political agenda. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ european-council/role-setting-eu-political-agenda/ 12

European Union External Action. (2015). EU Delegations’ Website. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ 13

European Union External Action. (2015). EU Special Representatives. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/background/ eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm

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Measures in place The ratification of the Lisbon treaty marked a turning point for the EU’s foreign policy in itself. Since changes of such scale have been implemented, it is highly unlikely for another substantial development to take place. The introduction of the High Representative granted the EU a new leading position to interact with various stakeholders worldwide. Additionally, the EEAS became the main tool for creating contacts and spreading European values, via delegations, around the globe. Annually, progress reports of the EEAS are drafted, which later on serve as development plans for the High Representative. Currently, the EU is focused on making the EEAS into a stronger body, by dwelling on its past challenges, rather than carrying out additional measures.

Outlook and key questions The situation at hand seems to be convoluted. While analysing the matter, it is pivotal to consider the different stances of various stakeholders. The imminent issues do not only involve the cooperation between the EU and external forces, but also encompass internal obstacles the Union happens to face. It is common knowledge that the EU should be present during armed conflicts, but the question is: how can its presence function in a beneficial way? Is the EEAS a viable solution? If not, what measures should be undertaken in order for it to become one? And how can the Member States put aside their differences to work together for a common cause?

Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: Official website of the EEAS. Provides concise information about its functions, structure, the High Representative and relations with other EU bodies. Retrieved from: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/index_en.htm [2]: The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, underlining future policy improvements. Retrieved from: http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/3.%20Resources/EU%20Documents/ EU_EU_Programme_for_the_Prevention_of_Violent_Conflicts.pdf [3]: The EEAS 2013 activity report, focusing both on the challenges that it faced and goals that it successfully reached. Retrieved from: http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/annual_activity_report_2013_en.pdf [4]: A short, informative video about the High Representative. Federica Mogherini talks about her position and the tasks that it entitles. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ih1cS6CAbwY

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Media coverage [5]: An article about the pros and cons of the EEAS, and the criticism it has received from various officials. Lewis, A. (2012). BBC News. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20522201 [6]: Criticism of the EEAS, and potential suggestions. Mungcal, I. (2012). Devex. Retrieved from: https://www.devex.com/news/as-eeas-turns-1-criticism-remains-77189 [7]: An article about the High Representative’s efforts to tackle the issue of migration. Lee, G. (2015).

BBC News. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32695483

Academic sources [8]: An in-depth analysis and case study of the EU’s foreign policy and its potential developments.

Provides an insight on the functioning of the EEAS. Dialer, D., Neisser H., & Opitz, A. (2014).“The EU’s External Action Service: Potentials for a One Voice Foreign Policy.” Innsbruck University Press.

Retrieved from: http://www.uibk.ac.at/iup/buch_pdfs/eeas_bd3.pdf [9]: Elmar Brok’s scholarly article about the EEAS. A must read in order to get an impartial view on the subject, and consider the service from the view of multiple stakeholders: the EU Institutions, Member States, citizens, etc.. Brok, E. (2011).“Prejudices, Challenges and Potential: an Impartial Analysis of the European External Action Service.” European Issue, (199). Retrieved from: http:// www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0199-prejudices-challenges-and-potential-an-impartial-analysis-of-the-european-external-action [10]: Derek Mix’s analysis of the EU’s foreign and security policy. Talks about internal challenges that the EU might face, as well as its relationship with partners such as NATO, UN and the United States. Mix, D. (2013).“The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy.” Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41959.pdf

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Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) Unregulated Warfare: What stance should the EU take on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and which common principles should be accepted globally?

by Felicia Dahlquist (SE)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic In light of rapid changes in international warfare and the development of new technologies, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) pose a set of complex legal, financial and ethical issues, not to mention security concerns across the globe. Amid fast developments of UAVs for civil, commercial and humanitarian purposes, their role in modern warfare is largely intertwined with wider technological and political processes. These developments have both generated and enhanced asymmetrical power relations between various global actors and UAV technology continues to be a delicate issue. As such the research and development, access and acquisition, and usage of UAVs in modern warfare are all points of contention.

In particular, UAV warfare operations remain controversial with regards to the clear standards of the various internationally agreed legal frameworks, such as International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. This involves debates regarding civilian casualties, state sovereignty, non-state actors and accountability for possible rights abuses. As not to undermine the importance of these conventions, such moral and legal inconsistencies must be resolved.

A 2014 State Watch report stated“at least 16 of the 27 EU Member States already own drones for military (combat and reconnaissance) or non-military (surveillance and detection) purposes”1. On an EU decision-making level, in December 2013 the European Council earmarked RPAS as one of four capability development priorities, managed by the European Defence Agency. The European Defence Agency has divided its work in this field in the following five areas: integration of military RPAS in non-segregated civilian airspace; certification of future military RPAS; development of cutting-edge technologies for future European RPAS; establishment of a community of military RPAS users in Europe; support to the development of a MALE RPAS to be operational by 20252.

Nevertheless, in terms of R&D and use of drones the EU is 10-15 years behind the United States of America (US) and Israel3 – the two global leaders in the field – and has so far frequently resolved to buy the vehicles and systems from its allies.

1

TransnationalInstitute. (2014). Eurodrones Inc. Retrieved from https://www.tni.org/files/download/011453_tni_ eurodrones_inc_br_3e.pdf 2

European Defence Agency. (2015). Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – RPAS. Retrieved from http://www.eda.europa.eu/ what-we-do/activities/activities-search/remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems---rpas 3

Hollinger, P. (2015). Europe plays catch-up with US in drone technology. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ d9209910-33b5-11e5-bdbb-35e55cbae175.html#axzz3mATMb092

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Key terms Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An aircraft without a human pilot on board, more commonly – but incorrectly – referred to as ‘drones’. UAVs can be autonomous or remotely piloted, in which case we talk about ‘remotely piloted vehicles’ (RPVs). In conjunction with their ground control stations (GCS), they can be called autonomous unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and remotely piloted aerial systems (RPAS). They can be categorised in terms of function or range/altitude. The most used ones in the security and defence field are, for their function, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) and, for their range/altitude, MALE (medium altitude, long endurance). UCAV are weaponised drones, whereas MALE are used in military operations for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes.

Targeted killings: This term has no definition under international law. According to a report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution,“the common element in all these contexts is that lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator. In a targeted killing, the specific goal of the operation is to use lethal force”4.

Irregular warfare (IW): There is no doctrinal definition of this concept. According to the US Department of Defence, we can distinguish two definitions of IW. It can be used as a synonym for ‘low-intensity conflict’; but it can also be intended as a form of warfare that encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism5.

Asymmetric warfare: Conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies6.

Non-state actor (NSA): This term has no definition under international law. A widely accepted one is ‘any organised group with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives. Such actors include ‘rebel groups’ and governments of entities which are not (or not widely) recognised as states’7.

Euro-drone: In May 2015, France, Germany and Italy signed a deal to start a two-year definition study of a MALE UAS. Airbus Defence and Space, Dassault Aviations and Finmeccanica will conduct the ‘Definition Phase’, that could be then followed by a ‘Development Phase’, allowing a European MALE UAS to be delivered by 20258. The project so far has cost the three governments 25 million euros on separate studies. Spain and Poland have expressed their interest in joining the project9.

4

United Nations. (2010). Report on the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston. Retrieved from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf 5

United States Army Combined Arms Center. (2013). Irregular Warfare. Retrieved from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/ AIWFC/Repository/IWGuidingDocsv30.pdf 6

Rand Corporation. (2015). Asymmetric Warfare. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html 7

DCAF Horizon. (2015). Armed Non-State Actors: current trends & future challenges. Retrieved from www.dcaf.ch/ content/download/53925/812465/file/ansa_final.pdf 8

Finmeccanica. (2015). European MALE drone development. Retrieved from http://www.finmeccanica.com/ documents/10437/47210913/FNM_18052015_MALE_eng.pdf?download_file 9

EurActiv. (2015). Italy, France, Germany sign European drone project. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/ transport/italy-france-germany-sign-european-drone-project-314675

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Research and development (R&D): According to the World Bank, it is the ‘creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development’10.

Key conflicts and stakeholders The use of UAVs in military efforts fundamentally comes down to a question of ethics, the interpretation and consideration of international law, and various approaches to security and defence issues at large.

When thinking about its role in the issue, we have to consider that the European Union has so far been a peace project. The EU does not have a common military force, and any military task carried out in a common setting would have to be of humanitarian and rescue, crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, disarmament, military advice and assistance or post-conflict stabilisation nature11; at the same time it has to ensure the security of its citizens. Drones are infamously known for their warfare applications, but they also have a potential in civilian fields and in (military) peace operations. An on-going debate revolves around the usage of UAVs in the anti-migrant smugglers operations to acquire information and targets.

But this and other UAV usage-related debates concern a wider topic, which is the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – and of the role of the EU in the global geopolitical scenario. The US, along with Israel, has been the leading actor in the development and use of UAVs as a military tool and a weapon of war; China and Russia have active drone programmes; the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia have a considerable fleet and are planning their own programmes. EU’s next moves on the chessboard have to be carefully considered.

The US’s use of targeted killings has been one of the principal points of contention in discussions surrounding UAVs for military purposes. Multiple international organisations such as the Human Rights Watch and The Bureau for Investigative Journalism have documented extensive casualties with UAV usage. In Pakistan alone there have been close to 1000 civilian casualties including approximately 200 children since 2004, and roughly 1,700 injured12. It also raises new concerns regarding international borders, national sovereignty and self-defence, as warfare is carried out by both state and non-state players in transnational spaces. The use of UCAV against the Islamic State (IS) is a prime example of this.

Additionally the question of accountability and transparency has come up as an issue relating to UCAVs as lines are blurred in terms of exactly who carries out a UAV strike and how they might be held accountable of human rights abuses if civilians were killed or injured. This is particularly

The World Bank. (2015). Research and Development Expenditure. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS 11

EurLex. (2015). Common Security and Defence Policy. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ HTML/?uri=URISERV:ai0026&from=EN 12

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2015). Get the Data: Drone wars. Retrieved from https://www. thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ 10

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sensitive with regards to recently technologically developed autonomous UCAVs. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has stated that“that the states [responsible for attacks were civilians were killed or injured] are under an obligation to indicate this publicly, and provide an explanation”13.

NATO is a key stakeholder in the field of security and defence. A majority of EU states are members of this intergovernmental military alliance, and article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) further highlights that NATO“remains the foundation of [the] collective defence and the forum for its implementation” for those states that are members of it14. NATO has extensively used UAVs in its last operations, and in June 2015 the first five NATO’s UAVs were produced; they will become operational in 2017 and 15 NATO allies, 12 of which are Member States, have already acquired the system15.

When it comes to the practical side of the issue, money has to be weighed up. The US have argued that the use of UAVs in targeting terrorist organisations abroad and carrying out direct attacks is a cost-efficient method that reduces any risk for the military personnel, decreases the number of civilian casualties, and uses less intrusive methods16. Depending on which directions the CSDP will take, the EU could have to evaluate the different ways it can set up an autonomous military force, and the costs related to this.

Lastly, an important stakeholder in the issue is the private sector, especially the aerospace and defence industries. It is hard to calculate the amount of money that would have to be invested in these two industries in order to fill the ‘technological gap’ EU is currently facing in terms of R&D of UAV, and the returns for these industries. At the same time, it is often the case that R&D operations conducted in the aerospace and defence industries then result into new technological innovations in other fields.

Measures in place The EU has still not taken a clear stance on the usage of UAVs. As previously stated, the EU’s tasks in the security and defence field are outlined in the CSDP and envisage war only for mutual defence.

Moreover, UAVs are not specifically mentioned in weapon treaties, or other legal instruments of international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the International Committee of the Red Cross prohibits weapons that have a field mortality of more than 25 per cent. Therefore, UAV with perfect targeting capabilities could easily violate this norm.

Lastly, the usage of UAV for target killings seems to contrast with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations:“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of collective or 13

RT. (2014). UN calls for maximum transparency in drone killing reports. Retrieved from http://www.rt.com/news/undrone-attacks-investigation-038/ 14

EurLex. (2015). Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN 15

NATO. (2015). Progress on AGS with completion of first NATO-owned air vehicle. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/news_120429.htm?selectedLocale=en 16

Byman, D. (2015). Why drones work. The case for Washington’s weapon of Choice. Retrieved from https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-work

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individual self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations”17. This means that outside of an armed conflict, where international human rights law applies – including in extraterritorial operations, where UAV are usually employed – states cannot carry on targeted killings, unless the target individuals pose an imminent threat to life; any use of force must be both necessary and proportionate18.

Outlook and key questions Key to grasping the entirety of this topic is to look at the various ways in which UAVs interrelate to wider processes of international power dynamics, changing warfare, human rights, international law, private interests, and research and development. There is a need to look beyond state borders, conventional warfare and the commonly held conceptions of human rights and international law.

The committee on Security and Defence will firstly have to decide what position the EU should take on the usage of UAVs in military warfare. This will then have implications on the future operation, acquisition, research and development of UAVs in Europe, which the EU may or may not have a common strategy for. Such a stance will also need to resolve conflicts relating to human rights, and the translation of such solutions in international law. Lastly, a decision concerning how the EU should relate their stance to global actors will tie the discussion into the larger processes at stake.

Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: European Parliament Policy Department Study on Human Rights Implications and the use of drones in warfare: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/410220/EXPO-DROI_ET%282013%29410220_EN.pdf [2]: 2013 Final Report by the High Representative/ Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf

Media coverage [3]: Article outlining the figures behind the world UAV trade: http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/16/numbers-behind-worldwide-trade-in-drones-uk-israel [4]: Council of Europe video on EU Defence Technology - UAVs: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtANZy-Bp4E [5]: Press coverage of an EP meeting regarding US use of UAV in Pakistan, raising issues regarding Human Rights law, national sovereignty and US power: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUQq-e_FDI8 [6]: Summary of EU Military drone deal between the UK, Germany and France: http://www.rt.com/ United Nations. (2015). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

Human Rights Watch. (2014). Joint Letter to the UN Human Rights Council on Targeted Killings and the Use of Armed Drones. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/18/joint-letter-un-human-rights-council-targeted-killings-and-use-armeddrones 17 18

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news/259633-eu-military-drones-deal/ [7]: Podcast on drone warfare in Yemen and civilian casualties by The Bureau Investigates: https:// www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/07/02/podcast-amid-fog-of-war-who-is-al-qaeda-yemen/ [8]: Article by The Bureau Investigates, on the involvement of private firms in drone warfare: https:// www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/07/30/reaping-the-rewards-how-private-sector-is-cashing-in-on-pentagons-insatiable-demand-for-drone-war-intelligence/ [9]: Documentary by Al Jazeera on the impact of drone warfare in Afghanistan: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/07/living-beneath-drones-150719090817219.html [10]: Article on DIY defence drones in Ukraine: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/ apr/24/crowdfunding-war-ukraines-diy-drone-makers [11]: Article on autonomous drones: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/22/uk-campaign-international-ban-autonomous-drones-ex-gchq-chief [12]: Drones are cheap, soldiers are not: a cost-benefit analysis of war: http://theconversation.com/ drones-are-cheap-soldiers-are-not-a-cost-benefit-analysis-of-war-27924 [13]: Former US military personnel urge drone pilots to walk away from controls: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/former-us-military-personnel-letter-us-drone-pilots?CMP=fb_gu

Academic and non-governmental sources [14]: Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law: Report and analysis of US drone practice in Pakistan: http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf [15]: A Human Rights Watch analysis of the US drone strikes in Yemen, including an examination of international law on the strikes: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [16]: An analysis of the future of weapons technology and UAVs: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/ assets/22_UAV_Munitions.pdf [17]: A summary of Amnesty International’s report on drone strikes in Pakistan: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/usa-must-be-held-account-drone-killings-pakistan/ [18]: US think-tank Stimson report and video on US drone policy and the benefits of UAV in security policy: http://www.stimson.org/programs/Drones-UnmannedAerialVehicles/; http://www. stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/recommendations_and_report_of_the_task_force_ on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf [19]:“The Security Impacts of Drones: Challenges and opportunities for the UK”, University of Birmingham. http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/research/policycommission/remote-warfare/final-report-october-2014.pdf [20]: Killing outside the bounds of law?: http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights/drones

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Committee on Legal Affairs I (JURI I) Rethinking public policies: How can the EU better contribute to the implementation of its good governance principles on local, national and European levels?

Which steps should it take to combat corruption?

by Lorenz Stree (DE)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic “The problem of corruption in Europe is not a problem merely of bribery and individual criminality, but it is a question of structural and political corruption driven by the lack of transparency and integrity”.

This statement from the core of Goran Klemenčič’s TEDx presentation links the committee topic with the very core of our democratic systems and their principles of good governance. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), or in the Treaties of the European Union (Treaty on the European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the European Union (EU) has expressed the importance of good governance in several pieces of legislation, such as the European Consensus on Development. In times of crisis in the EU, public trust in the political elite is more vulnerable than ever, and any obscure acts of bribery and corruption are likely to cause severe damage to the development of our democratic systems.

The EU Anti-Corruption Report (2014) [1] concludes from different Eurobarometer data that 76% of respondents think that corruption is widespread in their country, while 26% consider to be affected by corruption in their daily lives.

The aforementioned TEDx presentation, as well as scientific literature [11], present a meaningful dynamic between good governance and corruption: bribery and corruption are more likely to be performed in case of a significant gap between the power of elites (resources, discretion) and preventive or reactive mechanisms of good governance; or reduced to one of the main principles of good governance: Corruption = Power – Accountability.

It lies in the very nature of corruption to come at a certain price: on top of political and social costs, corruption causes overwhelming economic damage with estimates ranging between annual costs of €120-323bn within the EU [1] [11]. This figure alone provides more than enough reasons to dedicate resources towards more transparency, accountability and integrity for a clean exchange of knowledge between decision-makers and actors from the private sector and interest groups. This form of shared decision-making is often referred to as lobbyism in the public, and although lobbyism arguably is not the most popular term in public opinion, modern societies rely on this knowledge exchange to find political solutions to increasingly complex issues.

The harmonisation of EU national laws, as well as the protection of legal principles of the treaties of the EU fall under the competence of the Committee on Legal Affairs who will be entitled with the task to integrate countless anti-corruption efforts on all levels and in various sectors into a more

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coherent EU strategy. For the implementation of measures in areas, such as transparency or public procurement, cooperation with other committees is required.

Key terms Good governance concerns the process of decision-making and implementation. Good decision-making processes share several characteristics (principles) with a positive effect on various aspects of local government including consultation policies and practices. The EU is committed to five core principles of good governance: accountability, coherence, effectiveness, openness and participation 1. Other elements, such as the rule of law, a fair conduct of elections and ethical conduct have been stressed by the Council of Europe2.

Accountability ensures that representatives (agent) can be made responsible for their actions by the public (principle). Political science uses principle-agent models to analyse the interaction between i.e. voters and political representatives. Due to an information advantage, representatives are difficult to control by voters. In order to balance this asymmetry, the public needs comprehensible information about decision-making processes (transparency). Legislation on the freedom of information guarantees citizens the access to documents of decision-making processes.

Corruption is generally defined as the abuse of power, public office or an entrusted authority for private gain, and is considered a structural problem. Depending on the sector and size of illegal acts, corruption is classified as grand, petty or political. Grand corruption occurs at a high level of government and usually benefits a small number of elites at the expense of the public good.

Petty corruption includes the everyday abuse of power by lower level officials in the interaction with citizens (access to services, benefits or resources). Political corruption interferes with policies and rules of procedure with regards to the financing of decision-makers and political parties, who abuse their position for their own benefit.

Bribery is a form of an individual criminal act, in contrast to the structural problem of corruption.

Active bribery describes the act of promising or giving a bribe to someone, whereas passive bribery is the offence committed by the official receiving the bribe.

Shared decision-making refers to the interaction between legislators and actors from civil society (interest groups) or the private sector. Politicians benefit from the input of experts, whereas interest groups are given a way to influence public policy. In modern democracies, the most common forms of shared decision-making are pluralism and corporatism. Pluralism entails many different groups and organisations openly competing in different political arenas. Corporatism offers organised and formal channels of influence to the main economic groups so that they can jointly formulate their interests.

1

European Commission. (2001). White Paper on governance. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=URISERV:l10109 2

Council of Europe. (2007). Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level. Retrieved from http://www. coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Strategy_Innovation/Strategie2007_en.pdf

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Public procurement describes the act of public institutions, governments and public corporations buying goods and services from external sources. Public-private partnerships occur whenever the state or state-owned actors sign contracts with private companies over certain services (waste management, transportation, etc.).

Key conflicts and stakeholders The fight against corruption has developed into a large-scale legislation effort for good governance.

The ruling elite in the western world profits greatly from the pluralistic input from intermediary groups of different stakeholders (private sector, NGOs, interest groups) – a valuable and modern form of governance that needs to be protected from its own loopholes. It is thus at the core of this topic to maintain an active exchange of expertise and consolidate stakeholders’ participation in decision-making while preventing those elite groups from exerting their influence to an unfair advantage. As the topic claims, control of corruption can only be performed through a holistic approach towards a better implementation of good governance principles, securing integrity and accountability in public office.

Who should be made responsible for the implementation of good governance principles? Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) emphasises the need to”understand the limitations of international approaches to anticorruption” while Transparency International suggests that”corruption can’t be rooted out in one big sweep”3. Both these statements call for a multi-level multifaceted package of measures against corruption. In the context of this topic, this will require cooperation between supra- and international approaches of the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but also the efforts of national governments, as well as regional and local administration. Transparency International is an NGO active in more than 100 countries and one of the biggest actors in the fight against corruption.

What areas are most vulnerable for corruption and bribery? The EU Anti-Corruption Report (2014) identified several areas with an increased prevalence of illegal acts. In times of large administrative bodies and their power over public procurement, this sector offers too many loopholes for bribery in public-private partnerships, construction and maintenance services, and waste management. Furthermore, post- and pre-office employment arrangements for incumbents can often trigger conflicts of interest between personal gain and the integrity of office. Both these areas are excellent examples where the public society struggles to control those in office in light of a lack of transparency and freedom of information. The introductory TEDx talk even suggests that we live in an era where the individual consumer is more transparent than ever, while the elite groups have used their information advantage to build a wall of discretion.

3

Transparency International (2015). What is Corruption. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/what-iscorruption/#define

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Measures in place The importance of anti-corruption and good governance policies has long been widely acknowledged by decision-makers all around the world. Measures in place are thus already widely spread and numerous. One of the challenges in this topic will be a stronger cooperation between all these approaches and their multi-level implementation, monitoring and prosecution of violations.

The largest anti-corruption agreement is the United Nations Convention against Corruption4 (UNCAC), in force since 2005, and until now ratified by 173 states, including the EU. The Convention contains measures aimed at criminalising certain conduct, strengthening judicial cooperation and law enforcement, and involves a national self-assessment tool and reporting mechanisms. On the international level, the UN convention is complemented by the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention5 and regional agreements.

On the European level, the CoE established the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in 1999, currently consisting of 49 European members and the United States of America. GRECO initiates the exchange of good practices and the monitoring of compliance with anti-corruption standards through mutual evaluation in order to identify deficiencies.

The EU itself has worked in close cooperation with GRECO in particular, and pushed for more monitoring and implementation efforts in the last years, but still lacking a clearly binding policy framework. Targets have been set in the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector6 and in the Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU7, while the European Commission (EC) performs periodic assessments in the form of the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Additionally, the EU has recently updated the policy framework on public procurement with the Public Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU8 , established a transparency register for more transparent lobbying in the EU9 and implemented policy for a Freedom of Information (Art. 42 CFR, Art 15 TFEU, Regulation No. 1049/2001 and Directive 2003/98/EC). EU institutions are monitored by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

National approaches are even more numerous and distinct. Most Member States have various forms of anti-corruption legislations in place, supported by national anti-corruption agencies. The funding for political parties is strictly regulated in most Member States, according to the EU Anti-Corruption Report (p.9) and the criminal law in most Member States is in line with UNCAC standards and evaluated within GRECO. However, gaps between Member States persist in various areas which will be outlined in the following chapter.

United Nations. (2005). Convention against Corruption. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1997). Anti-Bribery Convention. Retrieved from http://www. oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm 6

Council of the European Union. (2003). Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA. Retrieved from http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32003F0568&from=EN 7

European Commission. (2011). Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ home-affairs/what-is-new/news/pdf/1_act_part1_v3-20110606_en.pdf 8

European Union. (2014). Directive 2014/24/EU. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN 9

European Union Transparency Register (2015). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage. do 4

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Outlook and key questions Stricter laws for the prosecution of violations alone cannot solve the fight against corruption. The committee should focus on corruption as a structural problem instead of an individual criminal act.

Yet, on the national, regional and local level, vast differences between law enforcement and prosecution still persist. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) identifies different risk groups for corruption where particularly Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Poland and Romania, but also Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain show weaker scores when it comes to constraining corruption.

At the core of the committee topic, the field of preventive measures still shows much potential.

Stimulating political accountability through transparency on all levels, preventive mechanisms promoting the integrity of the public sector, as well as external and internal control mechanisms can still be further developed on the national, regional and local level. While countless small anti-corruption measures already exist on different levels, the Committee will need to analyse those approaches and integrate successful models into a more coherent anti-corruption strategy. Some concepts will be able to be implemented on a EU level directly, whenever the EU has shared competences, whereas many approaches will have to be integrated into the already existing frameworks of GRECO or UNCAC or rely on the commitment of Member States. How should the EU support a better identification, exchange and implementation of best practices in all those preventive fields, in order to profit from the merits of shared decision-making, while ensuring that incumbents can still be held accountable for their actions? Can successful models be transferred to other countries despite large differences in political culture and democratic systems?

Combatting corruption can be expected to be an everlasting work in progress, constantly evolving with the development of our democratic systems. The control over modern democratic decision-making has quickly fallen into the hands of elites and the European community will need all possible tools of transparency to be able to perform direct and indirect control. Furthermore, the system itself will require a well-balanced set of checks and balances in a system of vertical and horizontal power division. How can the EU achieve more commitment of Member States and regional and local administrations considering the implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption measures?

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: European Commission. (2014): The EU Anti-Corruption Report: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/ acr_2014_en.pdf [2]: European Commission. (2011). Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/pdf/1_act_part1_v3-20110606_en.pdf [3]: Group of States against corruption, GRECO. (2015). Fighting corruption in Europe: regulating conflicts of interest of parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors must be a priority: http://www.coe. int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/news/News2015/News%2820150618%29ActRep2014_en.asp [4]: Group of States against corruption, GRECO. (2011). Fighting corruption: Political funding: https:// www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/DOUBLET_EN.pdf ^ [5]: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2005). United Nations Convention against Corruption: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/

Media coverage [6]: BBC News. (2014). Corruption across EU ‘breath taking’ – EU Commission: http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-26014387 [7]: EurActiv. (2014). Commission’s corruption report gets mixed reviews across EU: http://www. euractiv.com/justice/commission-corruption-report-get-news-533656 [8]: EU Observer. (2015). Bulgaria fails to adopt key anti-corruption law: https://euobserver.com/ beyond-brussels/130158 [9]: Transparency International. Anti-Corruption Glossary: https://www.transparency.org/glossary/ [10]: Transparency International. (2015). Incentivising Integrity in Banks: http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1921/12694/file/2015_WorkingPaper2_Incentivising_Integrity_ Banks_EN.pdf

Academic sources [11]: Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013). The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Controlling Corruption in the European Union: http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ANTICORRP-Policy-Paper-on-Lessons-Learnt-1_protected1.pdf [12]: Stoyanov, A. et al. (2014). Bulgarian Anti-Corruption Reforms: A Lost Decade? http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WP-42-Bulgarian-Country-Background-Report.pdf

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Committee on International Trade (INTA) Fundamental rights in a globalised economy: After more than 10 years of prolonged free trade negotiations, how can the EU take a coordinated approach to facilitating international trade while ensuring human rights and self-determination in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries?

by Kati Pärn (EE)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic As one of the most important actors in international and global trade, the European Union (EU) wields significant influence towards third countries. Trade, and more broadly commercial policies, have become tools through which the EU can effectively shape its environment, diffuse its political agenda, and extend its market preferences. This leverage is particularly prominent in the case of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, from which a majority are least developed countries.

This phenomenon is compounded by the historical ties, which often link former colonies of the EU Member States.

In acknowledgement of this, the EU has attempted to develop cooperation frameworks with these countries, which go beyond mere economic interests and include a political dimension intended to foster growth, partnership, and integration into the global economy.

The cooperation between the EU and ACP countries is managed with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which replaces the previous Yaounde Agreements I and II and the Lome Convention I-IV. The CPA came into force in 2000 and will expire in 2020, it features a deeper and wider interconnection holding three pillars of political dialogue, trade, and development cooperation.

The growing interest by the EU towards ACP countries can be illustrated by statistics: in the 1990s there was a significant shift in the world politics towards a general concern for the poorest countries and their well-being. The EU started to play an active role in development help once the focus moved to unbundling the colonial ties of the Member States (Young & Peterson, 2013). The European Commission (EC) has gradually increased the allocation of EU’s resources with regards to the developing countries; e.g. grants from the European Development Fund (EDF) started rising by an average of 11.5% annually for a decade since 1990s in comparison with 4.6% between 2000 and 20111.

Next to the economical side, the importance of human rights and fight for good governance has been integrated into the standing frameworks. Two important aspects to the new treaty can be outlined; the“rule of law“ was added to the“essential“ elements of the treaty, while“good governance“ became a“fundamental“ element. The introduction of good governance was accompanied by a new conditionality clause enabling the parties to call for consultations in serious cases of corruption (Article 97 in the CPA). There is a strong social dimension to this topic as exploitation of under-wa1

EC. (2015). European Union, Trade in goods with ACP Total. Retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ september/tradoc_113340.pdf

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ged workers and severe working conditions is a major issue. Still, helping developing countries to support their efforts to self-determination is highly important for the EU as well as to act as a role model in terms of promoting democracy.

Key terms One of the essential ideas of establishment of the Union is about promoting integration through trade. The EU has a vast amount of multilateral trade agreements, which set the common standards and rules for cooperation. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are direct economic tools for development issues of the EU. The nature of the EPAs, which provide a bridging solution to the ACP countries to access the European market for no quotas and duties on exports to the EU, furthermore (EC, 2015), they are tailor-made while helping to boost and build the economy of third countries.

The EPAs are asymmetrical, meaning that the EU opens its market more than the ACP countries.

There are many factors influencing the course of negotiation and implementation of EPAs. On the one hand, EPAs are considered as successful instruments for integration and for the EU as an international actor (EC, 2015.). Next to trade, development policy has been given the prominence on an institutional level by the creation of DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and therefore been prioritised more in recent history.

The EU profoundly reformed its trade as development policy and broadened its assistance from“supporting friends to assisting the poorest” while in the process of formulating the CPA. As a result, the EPAs were formed to ensure to“make (better) use of trade for development and bring the policy areas of trade and development closer together”2. EPAs are free trade agreements with multi-layered development components that are compatible with World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards.

Key conflicts and stakeholders The EU’s performance in securing EPAs with their ACP partners has proved quite disappointing.

Despite the EU’s superior leverage in many regards, the negotiations have stalled for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the“complexity of the EU multilevel structure seems to have hampered its ability” to be flexible and responsive in its capacity to address the diversity of ACP countries (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2009).

Also, internal frictions between the objectives of Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) and DG DEVCO, as well as the individual dealings of particular Member States, have often eroded the development considerations in the EU’s trade policy. For instance, nations such as France, Germany, or the UK contending for different conceptions as when the multi-level system comprising of Member States and EU institutions hampered coherence and the ultimate objective of“speaking with one voice”.

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. (2009). Linking EU Trade and Development Policies: Lessons from the ACP-EU trade negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements. Retrieved form http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ ISN/114022/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/af435845-2442-4383-b9e6-36ec921747fb/en/Study+50e.pdf 2

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Then, substantive and procedural criticisms was evoked by the ACP countries in the EPA talks. The rationale used by the EU“to introduce the EPAs - poor performance of the EC-ACP preferential trade regime, the need to comply with WTO rules, the pursuit of regional integration - was considered hypocritical and ill justified” (Carbone, 2011, p.8). Also, the EU’s overall bargaining stance faced harsh criticism. The EU and particularly DG Trade is tasked with negotiating these agreements, took a very traditional, hard-bargaining, market-access focused approach, which undermined its development-oriented rhetoric (ibid).

With limited enthusiasm from the EU to include explicit references to a development dimension in the agreements by insisting on full EPA schemes, the EU has been perceived as highlighting market interests and economic concerns rather than co-operation and development at the fore of its agenda. In general, the EU’s mediocre performance during the EPA negotiations can be ascribed to self-interest, a focus which arguably stems from the EU’s market power nature. Meaning that, the EU is criticised by scholars like Maurizio Carbone (2008) and Chad Damro (2012) in prioritising its trade agreement and being influential on a global level more than anything else.

Following the decision-making procedure on an institutional level, the role of the European Commission has not changed much, as it can propose legislation and elaborate on initial proposals on international trade negotiations coming from DG Trade. Next to other tasks, DG Trade holds regular plenary meetings with the WTO where politically sensitive issues are discussed. In the case of the ordinary legislative procedure, the international trade decisions are taken together with the European Parliament, which needs to give its consent to the ratification of trade agreements.

EPA’s are thus at the crossroads of trade and development policies because trade is an exclusive competence of the EU, while the ‘development’ is a shared competence with Member States. This in practice means that the EU has the right to form international cooperation agreements with third countries and execute their implementation, but when it comes to the development policies, the EU Member States play a decisive role in the policy as much of it is coordinated on a regional and national level. For example, DG DEVCO is responsible for ACP programmes and development issues, then DG Trade is involved with aid-trade nexus and the EPA negotiations, and lastly, DG for External Relations manages Asia, Latin America, Mediterranean, and political aspects of development. Considering the aforementioned, it can therefore be said that the EU has proven the success of EPAs in numbers, but there was still much criticism towards the scattered policy division and slightly aggressive negotiation tactics to enhance its market power.

The large group of 54 member countries in Africa make up the African Union (AU), which is an international organisation dealing with pan-African issues. As the main coordinator of internal and external affairs on the continent, the AU is responsible for EU-Africa relations and specifically monitoring the course of actions with the European External Action Service as well as the implementation of the CPA in the 49 African countries belonging to the ACP group. For instance, the actions of the Economic Community of West African States and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa are strongly coordinated by the AU.

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Measures in place The CPA from 2000 till 2020 being the most comprehensive agreement between developing countries and the EU assembles 79 states and is based on global equality of partners in tree pillars of development, political, and economic and trade relations. The latest version of the agreement was revised in 2010 adding concrete dimensions about regional integration, security, climate change, aid effectiveness and more. The CPA is the fundamental document to establish rules and guidelines between ACP countries and the EU Member States.

The EPAs contain ambitious measures, notably introducing reciprocity on market issues and pushing for greater liberalisation by for instance reducing tariff barriers. This has proved controversial for many countries, largely supported by NGO’s, who feel that this could have a detrimental impact on their economies and have argued for a long transitional period. Heated debates have thus arisen between and among EU institutions and ACP group concerning the implementation of reciprocal EPAs. Their main claim is that the EU as playing a coercive role in forcing the ACP countries to implement liberal reforms rather than focusing on the development objectives (Harding, EU-Cuba Relations on a Crossroads). Many of these confrontations from the Member States, who themselves pressure the EC for strict negotiation measures, are targeted to highlight the severe violation of human rights in the third countries.

A practical example can be brought by acknowledging that trade between ACP countries themselves is very low, for instance, Ghana sends less than 3% of its exports to neighbouring Benin compared with 49% to the EU.3 Therefore, the EPAs support cross-border infrastructures. Another example is the procedural implications, which takes much time in Rwanda, the import procedure takes 124 days on average in relation to an OECD average of 12 days (Harding, EU-Cuba Relations on a Crossroads). In conclusion, the EPAs support competition and reduce border delays.

When understanding the financing of the EPAs, then the European Development Fund (EDF) carries a vital role by being the main tool to sponsor the agreements and programmes. The Member States make their contribution to the EDF’s budget, which is coordinated by the EC and distributed to the regions accordingly.

Next to trade agreements, the question of securing good governance in the partner countries is a difficult task. Therefore the aforementioned Article 97 against corruption and the related Article 8, which sets the fundamental principles for respecting human rights, democratic governance and rule of law. Article 8 further stipulates, inter alia, that representatives of Civil Society Organisations shall be associated to this political dialogue between both parties (EP, 2014). The reasoning behind enabling these monitoring measures is to on the one hand grant EU the power to take action in occasions when human rights and good governance are being ignored and on the other hand to give more incentive for the ACP countries to act justly and transparently.

3

EC. (2015). DG Trade: Countries and regions. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/ regions/africa-caribbean-pacific/

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Outlook and key questions EPAs have emerged as the EU’s main tool to structure its trade and development relations with ACP countries under the Cotonou regime. The EU has been heavily criticised for its asymmetrical nature and an excessive range of difficult reforms, thus the EPAs have failed to generate enthusiasm among ACP partners. As the Cotonou agreement will expire in 2020, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) has been established; the task of the EPG is to explore the future options of the EU an ACP relations. The EPG will reflect upon necessary reforms and carried out consultations with the six ACP regions to, which have called upon cooperation on highest political level and for a stronger and more effective framework if there are common interests to keep the ACP group together.4 Having acknowledged that the working conditions are often hindered by the ACP countries as the cases of toxic death in mining industry5 or poor working conditions that health workers experience6 undermines the legitimacy of the ACP countries. These social factors play an important role in protecting human rights and fighting for lawful governance in countries, which are often lead by dictators and authoritarians.

Thus, the key challenges must be addressed in future agreements and the following questions stand: should the EU should continue clustering the ACP countries and implementing EPAs the way the system works at the moment? Taking into consideration the high difference in the political and economic development of ACP countries, how can the EU tailor its policies towards a balanced and healthy reciprocal trade relations? Examining the effectiveness of the human rights clauses by Article 8 and 96 in the CPA, how successful has the practice been and in what way can the EU increase its efficacy?

European Parliament. (2014). ACP-EU relations after 2020: State of play. Retrieved form http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/536423/EXPO_ATA(2014)536423_EN.pdf 5

European Parlimaent. (2012). ACP-EU joint Parliamentary Assembly Resolution. Retrieved form http://www.europarl. europa.eu/intcoop/acp/2012_horsens/pdf/ap_101.156f_pc_en.pdf 6

Wheeler, E. (2014). Strengthening human resources for health in ACP countries. Retrieved from http://www. commonwealthhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5-ACP-countries-Wheeler.pdf 4

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: More information on ACP-EU joint parliamentary assembly: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/10_01/default_en.htm [2]: ACP-EU relations beyond 2020, looking into the future: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/ BP_11.2013.pdf [3]: Potential future scenarios of ACP-EU cooperation: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491488/EXPO-DEVE_SP(2013)491488_EN.pdf [4]: Political dialogue and human rights in the framework of the Cotonou agreement: http://www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/381397/EXPO-AFET_ET(2007)381397_ EN.pdf [5]: Evolution of the relevant EU legislation and agreements with regards to ACP group: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/evaluation/market-and-income-reports/2014/epas/chap2_en.pdf [6]: EC Trade, ACP regional overview: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/africa-caribbean-pacific/ [7]: Political Dialogue on Human Rights under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/study_political_dialogue_/study_political_dialogue_en.pdf

Other sources [8]: EU-Cuba-ACP relations at a Crossroads: http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/ courier/courier182/en/en_026.pdf

Academic sources [9]: Selected literature by Carbone, Damro and Young& Peterson: https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0BwI_uuapiHecQ3l2WW1kVGEtUkk&usp=sharing

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Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs I (ECON I) Preventing future crises: Learning from the European economic, financial and sovereign debt crises, how should the governance of the Eurozone be restructured to safeguard the European Economic Area against asymmetric shocks?

by Willem Koelewijn (NL)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic The project that was once meant to be the crowning glory of European integration - the euro, a single European currency - has now, for several years, been causing European leaders major headaches.

Since late 2009, following the global financial crisis, the euro has been a source of uncertainty, to the point where some feared for the future of its existence. The European sovereign debt crisis and the measures taken in its response have left their traces. According to Eurostat, in July 2015, 17.5 million people across the Eurozone were unemployed in July 2015, equal to 10.9 per cent of the working population. In Spain, 48.6 per cent of people under 25 were neither in work nor in education. Greece, where youth unemployment is at 51.8 per cent, has lost approximately a third of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 200912. The events of the past years have rocked the euro on its very foundations, and have put pressure on the Eurozone and its leaders to come up with structural solutions to ensure a sustainable future for the common currency.

When considering the past, present and future of the single currency, it is important to distinguish between politics and economics. Many economists have used the Optimum Currency Area (OCA)3 theory to argue that the euro was, economically speaking, not a good idea4. However, it is important to consider the historical background of the euro5. The euro was mainly a political project6 within the larger process of European integration, and was meant to be a next step towards increased political union. As such, it was not solely designed with the aim of maximising economic efficiency, as the OCA theory states. Many of the structural design flaws that many economists point out, can, as so many European decisions, be explained as the result of highly sensitive political compromise. Whereas France was in favour of the common currency to ensure the commitment of Germany to the European project after its reunification, it did not wish to have strong European supervision over its 1

Eurostat. (2015). Unemployment statistics - Statistics Explained. Retrieved 2 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/unemployment_statistics 2

Tradingeconomics.com. (2015). Greece GDP | 1960-2015 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/gdp 3

The Optimum Currency Area theory describes the conditions under which a group of countries giving up their national currency in favour of a common one would be to their economic benefit, in which case they would form an Optimal Currency Area.

According to this theory, pioneered by Robert Mundell in 1961, the four main factors that determine whether a region could form an OCA are: labour mobility within the area, capital mobility, economic homogeneity, and the existence of an economic risk-sharing system that allows funds to be transferred to regions experiencing economic difficulties, often referred to as fiscal transfers.

4

Krugman, P. (2012). Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area. Retrieved from: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes. com/2012/06/24/revenge-of-the-optimum-currency-area/?_r=0 5

McNamara, K. (2015). This is what economists don’t understand about the euro crisis - or the U.S. dollar. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/21/this-is-what-economists-dont-understand-about-the-eurocrisis-or-the-u-s-dollar/ 6

Spolaore, E. (2013). What is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists. Retrieved from: http:// www.nber.org/papers/w19122

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budget. Germany, on the other hand, wanted to establish a strong, independent central bank that focused on price stability, which did not match the French views on monetary policy. After long negotiations, Germany got the central bank it wanted and France kept control of its own budget – a combination of factors that, according to some7, has brought the euro where it is today.

All seemed well in the years following the introduction of the euro in 1999, as shown by the low interest rates on government bonds in Europe. Interest rates tend to give a good reflection of the trust in a country’s economic situation and the sustainability of its debt, as investors demand higher interest rates for investments that carry a lot of risk. If interest rates on long-term government bonds are high, this indicates that investors may be uncertain about a country’s ability to meet its long-term financial commitments. As indicated by the graph below8, the countries that were in the 1990s derogatorily referred to as the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain), saw interest rates on their long-term debt drop from levels above 10 per cent to levels below five per cent after the introduction of the common currency. This allowed these countries to borrow money to finance their deficits at a much lower costs than before.

Table 1: Graph indicating the interest rates on 10-year government bonds for several Eurozone countries for the period 1995 - 2011. Source: The Atlantic (2011)

In the same period, numerous countries, mainly from North-Western Europe experienced strongly positive trade balances. Between 2002 and 2009, Germany, Finland and the Netherlands were running current account9 surpluses of 4.83, 4.53 and 6.51 per cent respectively, as indicated in the

Ash, T. G. (2014). The Crisis of Europe. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ europe/2012-08-16/crisis-europe 8

Thompson, D. (2011). The Most Important Graphs of 2011. The Atlantic. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http:// www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/the-most-important-graphs-of-2011/250240/ 7

The current account balance records the trade in goods and services of a country with the rest of the world. If a country has a current account surplus, this means more money coming into the country through exports than is going out of the country because of imports.

9

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table below. However, there is a very different part of the story that often remains untold. In 1999, an average 75 per cent of Eurozone countries exports was going to one of the other euro countries10.

This means that the trade surplus of one country was another one’s trade deficit. The countries that had large deficits managed to finance this deficit by borrowing at the low interest rates that were enabled by the introduction of the euro. Very generally speaking, the success of the core11 and the failure of the periphery12 are, in this sense, very much two sides of the same coin.

Table 2: Table indicating the budget surplus, current account position, annual inflation and change in unit labour costs of several Eurozone countries, between 2001 and 2009. Source: OECD Economic Outlook (2011)

Additionally, the current account deficits of many peripheral countries were largely financed by players form the core countries of the Eurozone. By the end of 2009, French and German banks had a combined total amount of assets loaned to residents of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain worth as much as $958 billion13.

These figures show the extent to which the core Eurozone countries enabled the peripheral countries to borrow excessively and overheat their economies, while making money in the process. At the same time, they show how interconnected the countries of the Eurozone, and more broadly speaking the whole European Union and European Economic Area (EEA), really are, and the extent to which the failure of some can affect all.

Key terms

10

European Central Bank. (2015). Retrieved from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/eaec/trade/html/index.en.html

A term used to refer to the countries at the geographical core of the Eurozone, such as Germany, France, Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, but also Finland.

11

A term used to refer to the countries at the geographical periphery of the Eurozone, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus.

13

Bank for International Settlements. (2015). Retrieved 15 September 2015, from: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1006. pdf 12

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The foundation of this topic lies in the way in which macroeconomic policy is made within the Eurozone. Traditionally, there are two key macroeconomic policy instruments that governments can use to influence the economy to reach their particular objectives, such as ensuring a steady level of economic growth, reducing unemployment or controlling inflation. The first one is monetary policy, which entails the use of the money stock by the responsible institution, most commonly a central bank, to affect interest rates, and consequently have an impact on economic activity and inflation.

Put simply, this is the way in which governments determine how much money is available on the market, and how much it costs. The other instrument is fiscal policy, which consists of a government’s policies regarding taxation and spending. By doing so, governments affect how much companies and consumers have left to spend, and how much money enters or“leaves” the economy.

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was formally established by the Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, and came into force in 1993. Its aim is to convergence the economies of all Member States of the European Union (EU). The EMU has three stages, the final stage of which is the adoption of the euro. Once a country enters this stage by meeting the convergence criteria14, it means that its legal tender is now the euro, and its monetary policy is administered by the European Central Bank (ECB). A country that has joined the third stage of EMU becomes a member of what is formally called the euro area, and is most commonly referred to as the Eurozone. It is important to note, however, that fiscal policies are still made at the national level.

An asymmetric shock occurs when a particular event of economic relevance affects a certain area more than another, either positively or negatively. For example, when oil prices fall dramatically, this will have a more negative impact on a country that has significant oil exports than a country that barely has any oil reserves. The extent to which the event will affect different countries, is therefore asymmetric. Asymmetric shocks are often the result of macroeconomic imbalances. This term refers to large economic differences between countries, for examples in terms of overall output, employment rates, inflation, competitiveness, household and government debt, etc.

The occurrence of asymmetric shocks is problematic within areas that share a single, or component of a single, macroeconomic policy. Historically, countries have often used currency depreciation to counter asymmetric shocks. By devaluating its currency, a country could make its goods and services cheaper, and make its export position more competitive. However, once a country enters a currency union with one or several other countries, it loses its ability to individually set its own monetary policy and depreciate its own currency if it is affected by an asymmetric shock. This is the case for the countries of the Eurozone, whose monetary policy is centrally determined by the ECB.

Key conflicts and stakeholders The one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the European Central Bank was a key objection many critics of the single currency had before its introduction. In practice, a single monetary policy for a group of vastly different economies is inevitably going to benefit some, and harm others. With France and 14

These convergence criteria set requirements regarding price stability, government finances, exchange rates, and long-term interest rates that must be met before a country can join the third stage of the EMU.

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Germany together making up approximately 47% of Eurozone GDP15, their monetary policy needs16 are crucial to determining the ECB’s policies. It has been widely argued that while the interest rates that the ECB has set since its establishment have matched France and Germany’s needs rather well, they have almost always been either too high or too low for the Eurozone’s peripheral countries17 18.

It is also important to note that the set-up of the ECB itself, as an independent central bank focused on keeping down inflation, was a German priority. Before the ECB was established, many, mainly Southern European countries, had traditionally had semi-independent central banks that were also tasked with promoting economic growth and employment. After negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called establishing monetary stability as the ECB’s prime objective his“main achievement”19. This has led to the criticism that the policies of the ECB have mainly been in line with Germany’s interest, while not paying as much attention to the need of weaker Eurozone economies.

With individual countries having lost the ability to shape their own monetary policy, they have been left with limited, only fiscal tools to improve their economic position and respond to asymmetric shocks. A country can attempt to improve its competitiveness by pursuing policies of internal devaluation, which are designed to bring wages down to match the level of productivity. This includes reducing public spending through austerity policies, lowering labour costs for companies, cutting benefits, and lowering wages in the public sector. However, these policies are generally unpopular with the public. After the introduction of the single currency and with borrowing costs going down for countries in the Eurozone, governments of countries with current account deficits turned to borrowing more in order to keep their economies running. As a result, wages in these countries rose more quickly than productivity, making their exports uncompetitive. In this sense, it could be argued that the set-up of the Eurozone encourages Member States to borrow more to avoid having to task difficult and unpopular measures.

Large macroeconomic imbalances within a currency area, such as high government debt and low competitiveness in some countries, make it incredibly difficult to apply a single monetary policy to the area in question, and will inevitably benefit some countries at the expense of others. Additionally, without monetary policy tools, responding to asymmetric shocks comes at a great cost for weaker economies, as the Euro crisis has shown. As suggested by the Optimum Currency Area theory, an area maximises the benefit of sharing a currency only by, amongst other factors, having sufficient labour mobility and fiscal transfers between regions. Consequently, it is often argued that

Eurostat. (2015). GDP at current market prices, 2003–04 and 2012–14 YB15 - Statistics Explained. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:GDP_at_current_market_ prices,_2003%E2%80%9304_and_2012%E2%80%9314_YB15.png

15

Economists tend to use the Taylor Rule to figure out how central banks should adjust their interest rates changes in inflation, growth and employment.

17

Wessel, D. (2015). Euro Zone Confronts Limits of 'One-Size-Fits-All' Policies. WSJ. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704396504576204531942846492 18

Darvas, Z., & Merler, S. (2015). -15% to +4%: Taylor-rule interest rates for euro area countries | Bruegel. Bruegel.org.

Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://bruegel.org/2014/08/15-to-4-taylor-rule-interest-rates-for-euro-area-countries/ 19

Speech by Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag. (1991). Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://www.cvce.eu/content/ publication/2002/2/22/12090399-dc71-42ee-8a3d-daf2420c0a9a/publishable_en.pdf 16

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the Economic and Monetary Union needs to be completed with fiscal union20. Under fiscal union, institutions that are shared between countries take decisions about fiscal policy. This would mean that the Eurozone countries would no longer collect taxes and spend at a national level, but would have a centralised budget. Additionally, rather than individual countries financing their own debts by issuing national government bonds, there would be one bond for the whole Eurozone, which is often referred to as the Eurobond. Such a system would allow for the transfer of funds from richer parts of the Eurozone to the poorer ones, with the aim of correcting macroeconomic imbalances and dealing with asymmetric shocks.

Although from an economic point of view the case for fiscal union seems strong21, there are many political objections to fiscal union. Collecting taxes and spending them is a core part of national sovereignty, and handing this over to a supranational authority is highly controversial. Consequently, many Member States strongly oppose this. Additionally, fiscal transfers to poorer areas within the Eurozone do not receive much support in the better-performing European economies, as became clear in the recent bailouts of, amongst others, Greece and Cyprus. Although Eurozone countries have already given up a degree of budgetary flexibility through the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact22, a move towards further federalisation is unpopular with many European citizens.

Some also argue that this system is too rigid and greatly limits Member States in making their own fiscal policies, while others praise it as a way to ensure fiscal discipline in the Eurozone and prevent future sovereign debt crises.

Measures in place The Maastricht Treaty established the EMU and its criteria for entering. Each Member State wanting to join the single currency must fulfil certain economic and legal criteria, as set up in Article 121(1) of the Treaty of Maastricht. These so-called convergence criteria are price stability, government finances, exchange rates, and long-term interest rates. They are often referred to as the Maastricht criteria, and state that the annual government deficit relative to GDP may not exceed 3 per cent, and that a country may not have a debt higher than 60 per cent of its GDP23.

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)24 was introduced at the same time as the single currency and contains a set of rules and regulations that aim to guarantee budgetary discipline. It was created to ensure the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union and coordinate fiscal policies within the Member States of the European Union. The SGP has been reinforced by the Six Pack (December 2011), the Two Pack (May 2013) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (January 2013). The Six Pack contained six separate pieces of legislation aimed at detecting potential macroeconomic imbalances at an early stage,

International Monetary Fund. (2015). IMF Survey: More Fiscal Integration to Boost Euro Area Resilience. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/CAR092513A.htm 21

International Monetary Fund. (2015). Retrieved 15 September 2015, from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ sdn/2013/sdn1309.pdf 22

Please see the”Measures in place” section for an explanation of this.

23

European Commission. (2015). Who can join and when? - European Commission. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm 24

European Commission. (2015). Stability and Growth Pact - European Commission. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm 20

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increased supervision of national budgets and the possibility to issue sanctions against countries that do not comply with the convergence criteria, most notably those on government deficit and debt. The system through which economic policies are monitored is called Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure25. The Two Pack26 was adopted later two further strengthen the implementation of the SGP. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)27 is a European Union agency created in 2012 that provides funding for struggling economies in the Eurozone and banks in difficulty, with a maximum lending capacity of €500 bn. It can lend funds directly to governments or buy their bonds, as well as supporting banks by providing funds in return for a shareholding. Lastly, the Banking Union refers to the framework in which banking-sector policy is controlled at a European level, and the process through which this is done, deviating from the previous situation in which banking-sector policy was national. The Banking Union stemmed from the critical decision that the ECB should take supervisory control over banks in the Eurozone in 2012. Even though this decision did not transfer all supervisory authority to the European level, the policies agreed upon in 2012 that are currently being implemented have changed the core of decision-making regarding banking-sector policy.

The supervision of the largest Eurozone banks now falls under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is managed by the ECB. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) ensures that banks that do fail will be efficiently resolved by a single European authority, and is funded by banks’ contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).

The EU budget is the closest Europe has to a fiscal transfer mechanism as is common in most currency areas. The EU budget expenditure2829 comes from the EU’s own resources30, that is, the EU’s revenue. The budget is subject to the limits established in the multiannual financial framework (MFF), which sets the maximum annual amounts the EU can spend in a certain policy area. Generally, the EU budget, which applies to all Member States, is not considered to be able to tackle asymmetric shocks due to its size and little flexibility in the context of the MFF. The EU’s annual budget amounts to €14531, which is approximately 1% of the EU’s GDP. Through mechanisms such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), fiscal transfers are in place to some extent. Some members are net contributors to the EU budget, meaning that they pay more into the budget than flows back into their countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Conversely, other countries are net beneficiaries, like Spain, Poland and Portugal32.

25

European Commission. (2015). Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure - European Commission. Retrieved 15 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/index_en.htm 26

European Commission. (2015). European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - ‘Two-Pack’ enters into force, completing budgetary surveillance cycle and further improving economic governance for the euro area. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-457_en.htm 27

BBC News. (2015). What is the European Stability Mechanism? - BBC News. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http:// www.bbc.com/news/business-19870747 28

European Commission. (2015). Interactive chart: EU expenditure and revenue - Budget 2014-2020. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm 29

European Union. (2015). EUROPA - How is the EU budget spent?. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http://europa.eu/ about-eu/basic-information/money/expenditure/index_en.htm 30

European Commission. (2015). Multiannual Financial Framework- European Commission. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/resources/index_en.cfm 31

European Union. (2015). EUROPA - Topics of the European Union - Budget. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http:// europa.eu/pol/financ/index_en.htm 32

European Commission. (2015). European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - EU's Financial Report 2012: EU budget increasingly an investment tool in the EU. Retrieved 16 September 2015, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-131163_en.htm

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Outlook and key questions Since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, many additional measures have been put in place to prevent future crisis. However, the view that the Eurozone is extremely vulnerable to new economic downturns is widely held. The question that remains is about what more can be done to protect the Eurozone against future asymmetric shocks? This topic is about considering the future of the euro in terms of what is economically sound and politically feasible. Should the Eurozone pursue further harmonisation of economic policy and if so, how? Or is the current composition of the Eurozone simply too diverse to share one currency? Should the Eurozone aim for fiscal union to complement the EMU? Would this solve the euro’s most pressing issues, and would this be a workable solution for a currently divided Eurozone? What are the alternatives?

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: How the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure works (European Commission publication): http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/mip_framework/index_en.htm [2]: Publication by the European Parliament discussing a potential fiscal capacity for the Eurozone:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130543/LDM_

BRI(2013)130543_REV1_EN.pdf [3]: Publication by the European Commission on the functioning of the Banking Union: http://ec. europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/fisma/item-detail.cfm?item_id=20758&newsletter_ id=166&lang=en [4]: 2012“Masterplan” by former President of the European Council on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2012/06/pdf/TOWARDS-A-GENUINE-ECONOMIC-AND-MONETARY-UNION---Report-by-President-of-the-European-Council-Herman-Van-Rompuy/ [5]: An IMF analysis of possible structural solutions for the Eurozone’s problems: http://www.imf. org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/CAR092513A.htm [6]: How the EU budget is set and how it is spent: http://europa.eu/pol/financ/index_en.htm

Media coverage [7]: An article from The Guardian analysing the relation between the Greek debt crisis and the Eurozone’s fiscal policy situation: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/01/greece-problems-eurozone-fiscal-policy-germany [8]: An article from The New York Times explaining the benefits of and obstacles for Eurozone fiscal union:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/11/upshot/the-problem-with-a-euro-fix-whats-in-it-for-

the-dutch.html [9]: Arguments for and against fiscal union: http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-fiscal-union/ [10]: Article from Foreign Policy outlining why a fiscal union would not work: http://foreignpolicy. com/2015/07/31/france-plan-eurozone-integration-is-a-bad-idea/ [11]: Article on the French proposal for a Eurozone economic government, budget and parliament: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11835614/French-economy-minister-calls-for-fullfiscal-union-in-eurozone.html

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Academic sources [12]: Blog by Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman on the relevance of the Optimum Currency Area to the Eurozone: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/revenge-of-the-optimum-currency-area/?_r=0 [13]: Article from the The Journal of Economic Analysis outlining the key problems of the Eurozone and identifying potential solutions: http://users.ntua.gr/jea/tua/journl/jea_volume1_issue1_ pp1_14.pdf [14]: A report by the Bank of Canada comparing the Eurozone and the US in terms of response to asymmetric shocks: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/wp94-1.pdf [15] Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Macroeconomic Economic Imbalance Procedure by economists at the National Bank of Austria: https://www.oenb.at/dms/oenb/Publikationen/Volkswirtschaft/Monetary-Policy-and-the-Economy/2011/Monetary-Policy-and-the-Economy-Q4-11/chapters/mop_2011_q4_in_focus6_tcm16-245362.pdf [16]: Article outlining four major possible scenarios for the future of the Eurozone: http://library.fes. de/pdf-files/id/ipa/09723.pdf [17]: Article from Foreign Affairs by Timothy Garton Ash on the origins of the EMU: https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2012-08-16/crisis-europe [18]: Analysis of the effects of the EU budget (executive summary only): http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR%20No%2086%20Effects%20of%20the%20EU%20Budget.pdf

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Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety II (ENVI II) Towards an integrated European Energy Market: In the light of COP21, which innovative practices should the EU introduce to ensure affordable energy for consumers across the Member States whilst maintaining sustainability?

by Laure Steinville (FR)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic “[The Energy Union] is the biggest energy project since the [European] Coal and Steel Community”1 – these are the words of Commissioner and Vice-President for Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič when he presented the Energy Union Strategy on February 25th, 2015. The Energy Union (EU)2 is a project launched by the European Commission (EC) with the aim to coordinate the transformation of European energy supply into a secure, affordable, competitive and sustainable energy.

Energy has become one of the most demanded commodities on the European continent due to Europe’s energy insecurity. Both gas3 and electricity4 prices have dramatically increased since 2008 rising by almost 25% with regards to the former and 50% for the latter. As a result, an estimated 51 million Europeans are deemed unable to pay their energy bills and between 50 and 125 million people can no longer access a decent amount of energy services, therefore, living in energy poverty in Europe5.

Not only do rising energy prices deteriorate life standards of millions of Europeans, but also jeopardise severely European businesses and their competitiveness on the global market. Yet, a transition to a more competitive and sustainable energy mix would have the potential to create millions of jobs and achieve Europe’s 2030 environmental targets6.

The on-going depletion of fossil fuels 7 has not only created a rise in prices but also raises severe concerns about the sustainability of global energy consumption. For many, the Energy Union is an incentive to discover or develop alternative sources of energy across Europe and worldwide.

As the recent Ukrainian crisis has highlighted, over-dependence on imported energy can be dange-

EurActiv. (2015). Will EU states play ball on Energy Union?. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/ will-eu-states-play-ball-energy-union-312419 2

EC. (2015). Energy Union Package: a framework strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-looking Climate Change Policy. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/FOR%20WEB%20energyunion_with%20_ annex_en.pdf 3

Eurostat. (2015). Gas prices by type of user in EUR per gigajoule. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table. do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=ten00118&plugin=1 4

Eurostat. (2015). Electricity prices by type of user in EUR per kWh. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table. do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=ten00117&plugin=1 5

EurActiv. (2013). Soaring energy costs make Europeans poor. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/energy/soaringenergy-costs-europeans-p-analysis-519884 6

EC. (2014). 2030 Energy Strategy: homepage. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/2030energy-strategy 7

Howard. E. (2015). Humans have already used up 2015’s supply of earth resources -analysis. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/12/humans-have-already-used-up-2015s-supply-of-earths-resourcesanalysis 1

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rous8. A potential cessation of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine would create a risk for gas transit to Europe. Therefore, the Energy Union does not only seek to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia’s imports, but as well from countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran9; keeping in mind that half of the EU’s energy is imported10.

The upcoming United Nations’ 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21)11 will have the aim of creating a new international climate agreement. With the status of the world’s largest GDP and the focus it has given to environmental issues in the past years as part of its Foreign and Security policy, the EU will play a critical role at the COP21. As a result, the EU must work closely with other countries, including its external suppliers.

Key terms The energy system of a given territory is the combination of its networks and methods of extraction, conversion, storage and distribution for the supply of energy, whereas the distribution of these energy sources used for the energy consumption is called an energy mix. The energy available for final consumption is called gross inland consumption. The energy mix of the EU is a combination of fossil fuels, which are non-renewable and include the EU’s biggest sources of energy (natural gas, oil and coal), and renewable energies, which are derived from natural processes that are replenished at a faster rate than they are consumed. Solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, and some forms of biomass are common sources of renewable energy and formed 11% of EU’s primary energy supply in 201212. Although the development of renewables is essential for the EU’s energy sustainability, managing and restraining the growth in energy consumption with the development of new technologies, or by adapting consumer behaviour through energy efficiency is at the heart the Energy Union’s framework. In order to develop its energy infrastructure, the EU is extensively relying on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). PPPs are arrangements, typically medium- to long-term, between the public and private sectors, whereby some of the services that fall under the responsibilities of the public sector, are provided by the private sector. There must be a clear agreement on shared objectives for delivery of public infrastructure and/or public services13.

On a geopolitical basis, the ideal situation for a territory would be to achieve energy independence, as it would be able to produce, transport and transform all the energy it consumes. If energy independence cannot be reached, diversification of energy supply ensures better energy supply security with multiple sources of supply for the market to deliver a reliable and uninterrupted supply

EurActiv. (2015). Ukraine faces ‘unprecedented’ energy crisis. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/ ukraine-faces-unprecedented-energy-crisis-313742 9

Traynor I. & Nelsen. A. (2015). Ambitious EU blueprint for Energy Union to loosen Russian grip on gas. The Guardian.

Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/24/eu-blueprint-energy-union-russian-gas-gazprom-maros-sefcovic 10

EC. (2014). EU energy in figures: statistical pocketbook 2014. p.24. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ files/documents/2014_pocketbook.pdf 11

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. (2015). What is COP21?. Retrieved from http://www. cop21.gouv.fr/en/cop21-cmp11/what-cop21-cmp11 12

EC. (2014). EU energy in figures: statistical pocketbook 2014. p.22. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ files/documents/2014_pocketbook.pdf 8

13

EC. (2006). Green paper on Public-private partnerships. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l22012

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of energy.

The Energy Union will try to overcome the aforementioned difficulties and will cut across a number of policy sectors including energy, transport, research and innovation, foreign policy, regional and neighbourhood policy, trade and agriculture. With the aim of creating a fully integrated internal energy market14, the EU would be using interconnectors which enable energy to flow freely across the Union - without any technical or regulatory barriers. Stronger energy competitiveness is indeed one of the key aims of the Energy Union, in which the energy market would have sufficiently low prices, or a high enough quality to be successful relative to other energy markets. The Green Paper on the 2030 framework for climate and energy15 includes the stimulation of investment in clean energy and energy efficiency as means to generate new jobs and support growth and competitiveness. In addition, the EU has tried to create a fairer energy market by tackling unbundling, which is the separation of energy supply and generation from the operation of transmission networks. If a single company operates a transmission network and generates or sells energy at the same time, it may have an incentive to obstruct competitors’ access to infrastructure. Under the 2007 Third Energy Package16, the EU advocates ownership unbundling, which intends to split generation from transmission to ensure the European energy market does not suffer from vertical integration17. A fairer energy market would partially help the EU to address energy poverty18, which is a situation where a household is unable to access a socially and materially necessitated level of energy services.

Key conflicts and stakeholders The institutional framework of energy policies The external dimension of energy falls under the mandate Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) of the EC19 under the guidance of Energy Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, and in cooperation with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini when it comes to interacting with third parties. Furthermore, under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, the European Parliament (EP), through the ENVI20, ITRE21 and AFET22 Committees, has to give its consent, for instance on international agreements. Yet, as energy is solely a shared EU competence, Member States (MS) also have the power to decide on their national energy policies and energy mixes. Import and export 14

EC. (2015). ‘A fully-integrated internal energy market: Homepage’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energyunion/fully-integrated-internal-energy-market/index_en.htm 15

EC. (2013). Green paper: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0169:FIN:EN:PDF 16

EC. (2010). Commission Staff Working Paper: The unbundling regime. p.4-5. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/ sites/ener/files/documents/2010_01_21_the_unbundling_regime.pdf 17

Art. 9-12 of directive 2009/72/EC. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0105 18

Bouzarovski. S. (2011). Energy poverty in the EU: a review of the evidence. School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham. p.1. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/conferences/ energy2011nov/doc/papers/bouzarovski_eu_energy_poverty_background%20paper.pdf 19

EC. (2015). About the Directorate-General for Energy. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/about-us 20

More on the Parliamentary Committee ENVI: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/envi/home.html 21

More on the Parliamentary Committee ITRE: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/itre/home.html 22

More on the Parliamentary Committee AFET: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/home.html

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regulations and partnerships with third countries are different for each MS, as a result disparities and interests between the 28 vary on energy matters.

Economic barriers are restricting further growth in the use of renewable sources in many MS. The development and implementation of energy sources is expensive on the market, and many MS still pay for fossil fuels rather than investing in renewable energies. For instance, France is still a heavy nuclear and imported fossil fuels consumer, but has banned shale-gas exploration whereas Germany has decided to abandon nuclear power to invest in wind and solar energy, while it is still relying on coal.

EU’s attempts to create a common energy market in the past decade and their impact The EC’s 2030 Climate and Energy Framework23 has set a greenhouse gas emissions reduction and renewable energy and energy savings targets for the next fifteen years. The European Council, which identifies strategic interests and objectives of the EU, on external action and energy, has endorsed these targets24, which is binding at EU level but not nationally. Therefore, although this target gives flexibility to Member States, it does not help them to achieve their common energy goals. In addition, even though Europe’s energy mix varies widely across Member States, the scenario estimated by the EC for average EU’s gross inland consumption in 203025 has been criticised by many observers for being unambitious with solely 18% of renewables by 203026.

In March, the European Council further agreed to outline the first steps of the Energy Union27, focusing on energy security, transparency in gas contracts, developing innovative strategies for a new generation of renewable energies and increase energy efficiency. One of the Energy Union’s key goals is to create an internal energy market in order to boost energy competitiveness, offer consumers a wider range of suppliers with more affordable prices, avoid the monopoly some energy companies have on European energy consumption. These energy companies effectively lobby against a supranational regulated market, such as the Russian state company Gazprom28, or European energy companies amongst them Shell29, Total30 or British Petroleum31. The Energy Union would ensure that smaller suppliers have access to the energy market, especially renewable energy suppliers. Yet, a European level energy policy would bring out very little flexibility for Member States in their national energy policies and the need to significantly invest in cross-border infrastructure and energy diversification. The EC has to clearly identify how the new energy market will be designed, taking into

EC. (2014). A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030 /* COM/2014/015 final */ .

Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015 24 European Council. (2014). Conclusions on 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework. Retrieved from http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145356.pdf 25

EC. (2011). Europe’s energy mix is changing. Retrieved from https://www.dropbox.com/s/nalkxbfu5h54n95/ Europe%27s%20energy%20mix.png?dl=0 26

Carbon Market Watch. (2014). Analysis of Europe’s 2030 Climate Ambition. Retrieved from http://carbonmarketwatch. org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2030-Council-Conclusions-Analysis_final.pdf 27

European Council. (2015). European Council Conclusions on the Energy Union (19 March 2015). Retrieved from http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/conclusions-energy-european-council-march-2015/ 28

More information on Gazprom website: http://www.gazprom.com/ 29

More information on Shell website: http://www.shell.com/ 30

More information on Total website: http://www.total.com/en/ 31

More information on British Petroleum website: https://www.bp.com/ 23

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consideration the aforementioned variables.

With the constant rise of electricity and gas prices, consumers are the ones most impacted by rising prices as their energy bills vary between 7 and 17% of household expenditure. Yet, energy poverty impacts EU citizens unevenly, with a strong regional imbalance persisting between Member States when it comes to energy costs; more than 30% of the Romanian or Lithuanian population is unable to pay their utility bills, whereas this only concerns less than 10% of the Dutch or Irish population32.

The need to enhance a greener energy mix Investment and subsidies from the EU are key variables in the energy transition. Around €1bn is spent every day to pay for Europe’s imported fossil fuels. Studies have shown that energy transition would be infinitely more cost-efficient than sustaining this spending in the long term. Whereas some efforts have been witnessed under the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI)33 , the money spent on creative work undertaken on a systematic basis to increase the stock of knowledge and the use of this knowledge to devise new applications, called Research and Development (R&D) expenditure 34, is still insufficient in renewable energies, with around 80% spent on nuclear energy and solely 10% on renewables35.

Additionally, Member States have a role to play as facilitators of networks of innovation actors, notably through PPPs. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 36 and eco-friendly enterprises, which represent more than 90% of the European green-technology market, are at the core of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) 37 has a strategy aiming to enhance PPPs38.

The external dimension of energy Lastly, the European Council has resolved to taking the next steps in EU energy diplomacy for less energy dependency and a successful COP2139. The central goal of the COP21 is to find a binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol, yet this target appears unreachable considering the failure of the Kyoto Protocol itself and the 2009 Copenhagen COP15 as well as the lack of cooperation from BRICS 40 countries. For the Paris conference to be successful, the EU must take a leadership role in climate diplomacy, since its credibility in the negotiations will also rest on its own capacity 32

Richard Anderson. (2013). Energy bills: who pays the most in Europe?. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/business-25200808 33

Under the EFSI, around EUR 75 million have been spent in Denmark to fund energy-related projects with a focus on offshore wind, biomass and transmission; and France has been allocated EUR 400 million to support energy efficient investments in housing. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/efsi/index_en.htm 34

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). (2011). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard: R&D Expenditure. Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-en/02/05/index.html?itemId=/ content/chapter/sti_scoreboard-2011-16-en 35

(2014). ‘Subsidies and costs of EU Energy: final report’. European Commission DG ENER. p.29. Retrieved from. https:// ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ECOFYS%202014%20Subsidies%20and%20costs%20of%20EU%20energy_11_Nov. pdf 36

SMEs employ fewer than 250 persons and have an annual turnover exceeding 50 million euro, and/or annual balance sheet total not exceeding 43 million euro.

37

More on the EIT: http://eit.europa.eu/eit-community/eit-glance/mission 38

EIT. (2014). ‘Europe needs more entrepreneurs’. Retrieved from http://eit.europa.eu/activities/entrepreneurship 39

European Council. (2015). ‘Council Conclusions on Energy Diplomacy’. Retrieved from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/ doc/document/ST-10995-2015-INIT/en/pdf 40

BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

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to develop an ambitious 2030 framework and to move towards a low-carbon and resource-efficient Europe in 2050.

Measures in place The Energy Community41 uphold the Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)42 by extending the internal energy market of the EU to neighbouring countries to ensure security of energy supply and interconnection of energy networks. This is achieved by the existence of a legally binding framework under which the members of the Energy Community must adopt EU legislation.

In order to achieve its energy targets, the EU has firstly implemented the Energy Efficiency Directive43 in 2012, which is legally biding at a European and national level. It includes a specific set of measures and strategies on energy saving for consumers and industries alike, as well as the need for Member States to draw up three-year action plans on their potential energy savings and annually report on their progresses. Secondly, through the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SETPlan)44 , the EU is supporting the innovation and R&D on low-carbon technologies, as well cost-efficient and pan-European energies. Thirdly, the EU is planning to introduce smart grids and energy meters to monitor energy flows, as it has been proved that such methods could decrease annual household consumption and reduce emissions in the Union by 9%.

The Third Energy Package is the latest legislation for completing the internal energy market with rules on unbundling, the independence of national energy regulators and further establishes the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 45 to help national regulators work together.

However, since the Package was not binding at a national level, some MS have not met the requirements set by the package. The EC therefore took more initiatives, such as the list 248 Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) 4647 drawn up under the Regulation No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council48. Moreover, under EU’s flagship Horizon202049 programme, through the Innovation Investment Package50 , further takes into account the need of PPPs by unlocking more than €6bn to launch eight contractual PPPs51, half of them being eco-energy orientated.

41

The Energy Community consists of the 28 EU Member States + Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR of Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine.

42

Article 194 of the TFEU (full text). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:12008E194:EN:HTML 43

EC. (2012). ‘Energy Efficiency Directive: Homepage’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energyefficiency/energy-efficiency-directive 44

EC. (2015). ‘Strategic Energy Technology Plan: Homepage’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/ technology-and-innovation/strategic-energy-technology-plan 45

Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). (2012). ‘ACER: Homepage’. Retrieved from http://www.acer. europa.eu/Pages/ACER.aspx 46

Interactive Map of Europe’s energy infrastructure and PCIs. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/ transparency_platform/map-viewer/ 47

These energy efficient projects may benefit from accelerated licensing procedures, improved regulatory conditions, and access to financial support totalling €5.35 billion from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2014 and 2020.

48

EP, Council of the EU. (2013). Regulation No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0347 49

EC. (2013). ‘What is Horizon 2020?’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020 50

EC. (2014). ‘Partnerships between Industries and Member States’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/ horizon2020/en/area/partnerships-industry-and-member-states 51

EC. (2013). ‘EU industrial leadership gets boost through eight new research partnerships’. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-13-1261_en.htm

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The Energy Union is further building on the 2030 Climate and Energy framework and the European Security Strategy52 53 to create a more Europeanised energy policy rather than a national one and ensure Europe’s security of supply, as issued in the 2013 European Commission’s publication54. The Commission’s Energy summer package 55 is the latest list of recommendations issued by the EC, further highlighting the need to adjust European climate and energy policies to set the example for the Paris Conference, notably on electricity market design, the retail market, energy labelling and the review of the Emissions Trading System.

In July this year, the EC launched a public consultation in order to receive direct input from the civil society stakeholders on what the design of the new energy market should look like56. Furthermore, the Commission is helping MS with exchanging their best energy practices via the Citizen’s Energy Forum57, set to issue recommendations to national governments on how to help vulnerable consumers through energy efficiency and other measures. Amongst the recommendations issued, it has been recommended that the Commission and MS should allocate a higher share of funds to renovation programmes for the energy-poor, low-income and more vulnerable groups of people. Moreover, the Think Tank Insight Energy has issued a list of 7 recommendations58 to the EC, amongst which it address the inexistence of a database outlining measures on consumer protection and how to tackle energy poverty. Following this citizen and consumer-oriented mind-set, the EC has also created a series of tips on energy saving59 60 for the average EU citizen to reduce his energy bill.

Outlook and key questions The implementation of the Energy Union falls under a new working method of the European Commission, which has been criticised over the years for its lack of transparency. Commissioner Šefčovič’ ‘Energy Union Tour ’61, has stated that the EU’s new energy policy must be“based on mutual understanding and trust”62, as this project will be tailored to be implemented at a European, regional 52

EC. (2014). ‘Energy Security Strategy: Homepage’. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/ energy-security-strategy 53

In the field of energy, the European Security Strategy aims to: (i) save energy; (ii) produce more local energies –especially renewable electricity-; (iii) make it easier to transport gas and electricity across Europe; (iv) find different ways and routes to import energy; (v) have common goals when negotiating with other countries.

54

EC. (2013). ‘Member States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment’. p.51. Retrieved from http://ec.europa. eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf 55

EC. (2015). ‘Transforming Europe’s Energy System: Commission’s energy summer package leads the way’. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5358_en.htm 56

EC. (2015). ‘Consultation on a new Energy Market Design’. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/ public-consultation-new-energy-market-design 57

EC. (2015). ‘Citizens’ Energy Forum in London: Homepage’. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/ citizens-energy-forum-london 58

Insight Energy. (2015). ‘Energy poverty and vulnerable consumers in the energy sector across the EU: analysis of policies and measures’. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/INSIGHT_E_Energy%20Poverty%20-%20 Main%20Report_FINAL.pdf 59

EC. (2015). ‘Consumers can now save up to 50 Euros per year on their energy bills thanks to new EU energy efficiency rules for cooking appliances’. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/consumers-can-now-save-50-euros-year-theirenergy-bills-thanks-new-eu-energy-efficiency-rules 60

EC. (2011). ‘Energy Efficiency: doing more with less’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player. cfm?sitelang=en&ref=I072677 61

The Energy Union Tour has been launched last May by Commissioner for Energy Šefčovič and aims at engaging a productive dialogue with relevant stakeholders to discuss the relevant strategies which shall be implemented in the Energy Union Strategy.

62

EC. (2015). ‘Vice President Šefčovič announces the launch of the Energy Union Tour’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/

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and national level. This initiative will feed into the first State of the Energy Union report, which the Commission will present to the European Parliament and Council in autumn of this year.

To ensure a sustainable Europe by the middle of the 21st Century, Europe needs a fundamental transformation of its energy practices, not only for the environment, but as well for its social and economic well-being. Alongside other leading global powers, the EU will be challenged next December during the COP21 to take the decisions, which will build Europe’s and the world’s climate and energy framework for years to come.

The set-up of a common energy market Should the EU create a ‘one-size-fits-all’ integrated energy market to ensure fair competition or should it prioritise renewable energies?

How can the EU best tackle energy poverty and address concerns of consumers on energy prices?

Moving towards a more sustainable energy mix Should the EU push towards more legally binding energy targets at Member States’ level?

How can the EU tackle the lack of public and private investment in renewable energies? How could the EU facilitate PPPs between the private sector - especially companies focused on the production of renewable energy- and public institutions in order to allow more scope for energy projects?

Enhancing EU’s energy independence Are the EU’s recent decisions on energy security sufficient to be energy independent? Are there more threats to Europe’s energy security, which have been ignored by decision-makers?

How can the EU increase its own energy production in the most energy efficient and sustainable way?

commission/2014-2019/sefcovic/announcements/vice-president-sefcovic-announces-launch-energy-union-tour_en

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: EU Energy in figures: Statistical pocketbook: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_pocketbook.pdf [2]: Former Commissioner Hedegaard on the 2030 Climate and Energy package: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIhSDPO6y8A [3]: The homepage of the Investment Plan website and a video introducing the project: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/index_en.htm [4]: The homepage of the Energy Union website and a video introducing the project: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/sefcovic/ blog/keep-calm-and-build-energy-union_en

Media coverage [5]: TED talk from Amory Lovins on energy efficiency in the US: http://www.ted.com/talks/amory_ lovins_a_50_year_plan_for_energy#t-156208 [6]: An interactive map providing a visual to understand better EU’s energy dependence network and a PREZI explaining the energy sources of the EU: http://www.barcelonaismedia.com/sourcing-our-energy-sources/ [7]: A compilation of news and opinion-based articles from EurActiv.com on the Energy Union since its creation: http://www.euractiv.com/topics/energy-union [8]: A compilation of articles on the reduction of energy consumption in the housing sector: http:// www.planete-energies.com/en/medias/feature-reports/housing-reducing-energy-consumption http://www.planete-energies.com/en/medias/feature-reports/housing-reducing-energy-consumption

Academic sources [9]: A publication by Sanam S. Haghighi focused on division of Competences between the EU and its Member States on Energy Security: https://www.dropbox.com/s/rwv4w8d3v5k1mmi/7%20 Haghighi%2C%20S.%20S.%20%282008%29%20Energy%20Security%20and%20the%20Division%20 of%20Competences%20between%20the%20European%20Community%20and%20its%20Member%20States.pdf?dl=0 [10]: A publication by Anna Herranz-Surralles comprehensively analysing the external dimension of EU’s energy policy: https://dl-web.dropbox.com/get/Background%20Material%20Leipzig%20 ENVI%20II/SAGE_Herranz-Surralles_2015.pdf?_subject_uid=132998830&w=AADGIwM-EpMCVsoh5475pH1il5buXcxEz3w_iVVoESI4gQ [11]: A website of the New Climate Institute, which provides an up-to-date assessment and rating of submitted Intended nationally determined contributions for the COP21, including the EU’s: http:// climateactiontracker.org/http://climateactiontracker.org/ • 64

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ITY

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Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety I (ENVI I) Mental health and the quality of human lives: With the rise in the number of Europeans suffering from mental health problems, how should the EU approach the insufficient treatment of patients suffering from mental illness?

by Conall O’Rourke (IE)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic Every 9 minutes a citizen of the European Union (EU) dies as a consequence of suicide (Wahlbeck et al., 2008). Europe is home to six out of the top 20 countries in the world with the highest rate of suicide (Saxena et al., 2013). It also ranks higher than road traffic accidents, homicide, and drowning as a cause of death in Europe. Despite this, the EU spends an average of 5.8% of its health budget on mental illness (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2008). The economic cost of mental illness is also significant, with the impact on the EU economy estimated to be equivalent to a reduction of 3-4% of total GDP (Mental Health Foundation, 2010). Taking France as an example, the cost of mental illness is estimated at €108bn, almost €28bn in direct costs (e.g. healthcare) and €85bn in indirect costs (e.g. loss of productivity due to inability to work). While there is a growing acceptance of the importance of mental health in government policy, evident by the fact that many countries have updated their policies in the past five years, more needs to be done. There are several key components to be addressed, and only by understanding these in the context of current policy, can solutions be found.

The most pressing issues can be explored under three themes; the use of funds, the application of evidence based practice, and the empowerment of people with mental illness.

Key terms Mental Health- A person’s condition with regard to their psychological and emotional well-being. It is influenced by several factors, including biological (e.g., genetics, gender), individual (e.g., personal experiences), family and social (e.g., social support) and economic and environmental (e.g., social status and living conditions).

Mental Illness- A wide range of mental health disorders that affect your mood, thinking, and behaviour e.g. schizophrenia, depression, anxiety disorders, eating disorders, addictive behaviours.

Institutionalisation- To be placed (possibly against your will) in the care of an institution or organisation. This is often for psychological/psychiatric treatment, or for the protection of the person or society.

Prevention and promotion of Mental Health- Prevention refers to strategies implemented at specific periods before the onset of the mental disorder in an attempt to reduce its negative effects. Promotion refers to strategies aimed at encouraging good mental health and providing coping strategies to help ameliorate the symptoms and deficits of disorders.

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Key conflicts and stakeholders The Use of Funds As mentioned earlier, the minimal expenditure on mental illness within Member States is a continuing issue. What little budget is available is largely spent on inpatient care, particularly long-stay hospitals, meaning the budget for development in other areas is highly limited. Malta, for example, spends 96.8% of its mental health budget on hospital care1. This is understandable given that mental health problems are often multiple, complex, and mostly chronic (Knapp et al., 2007). However, such high expenditure restricts the availability of funds for investment in community care programmes, prevention and promotion strategies.

Individual countries deal with mental illness in different ways, meaning the resources and type of professionals involved may vary. The lack of uniformity in approaches to treatment and the implementation of prevention and promotion strategies mean that the costs involved also differ widely. One major problem is that often government funded programmes will run parallel to those of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), resulting in the two groups competing against each other for funding e.g. in Lithuania occupational services, NGO’s, and the social care ministry are often funded by the same small grant programmes (Samele et al., 2013). An example of such a project would be“Feel well”, a mental health promotion programme in Austria, aimed at teaching employees strategies for coping with stress and anxiety. Another example would be the“SOS Detresse” in Luxembourg, which is an NGO run confidential helpline. With countries like Germany containing 40+ different mental health programmes there is little extra funding to allow for innovation and growth within these organisations.

This funding problem persists despite the substantial evidence in favour of greater mental health expenditure, justified on the basis of allowing individuals to return to work (Almond et al., 2003).

Beyond the direct healthcare costs of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment, the economic burden of mental health issues can be seen in the loss of productivity and high rates of absenteeism in the workplace. Depression alone costs the EU an estimated €54 billion a year through loss of work hours, early retirement, and sick leave (J. Olesen, et al., 2012).

Application of Evidence Based Practice Part of the reason for the slow change in mental health practices within Member States is the lack of robust scientific research in the area. There has been a noticeable lack of scientific advances in the area of mental illnesses in the past decade (Haro et al., 2014). Few new treatments have appeared and the search for biological markers which could aid in early detection and prevention has been inconsistent. There has also been a lack of communication between fields of study, resulting in fragmented research from different disciplines. The Roadmap for Mental Health Research in

Mental health systems in the European Union member states, status of mental health in populations and benefits to be expected from investments into mental health. Main report. Executive Agency for Health and Consumers Tender. Retrieved from: ec.europa.eu/health/mental_ health/docs/europopp_full_en. pdf 1

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Europe (ROAMER)2 attempts to address this by developing a plan for the promotion and integration of mental health research across Europe (Haro et al., 2014). They highlight the lack of coordinated research policies and integrated research networks in mental health as the cause of the low scientific output. Additionally, the report details the components required for effective research in this area, stressing the participation of European experts, service users, carers, professionals, and policy and funding institutions.

A report by the Mental Health Foundation (2010) echoed these findings, highlighting the lack of researchers in the area, inconsistency in research practices and aims, and limited available research funds as contributors to the problem. The report drew attention to the disproportionate allocation of research investment in mental health relative to other diseases. Mental illness accounts for over 15% of the disease burden in developed countries, more than that of all cancers (Prince et al., 2007).

While detailed information of mental health research spending by country is unavailable, funding by the EU into mental health research reported to be as low as 2% of its health research budget (Mental Health Foundation, 2010).

Empowerment of People with Mental Illness Further to these issues is the need for greater empowerment of people with mental illness. Deep-rooted stigma and widely practised discrimination greatly limit education and employment opportunities for mental health service users, often dragging them into poverty (Thornicroft, 2006). Chronic mental health problems often place people at greater risk of becoming homeless or having contact with the criminal justice system. For children, such problems may hamper their schooling and limit their future prospects, especially if left untreated. Published reports, including those of the WHO (2008) repeatedly stress the need for service user input and consideration when developing policy.

Many countries are starting to introduce campaigns and school programmes to destigmatise mental illness and help improve understanding of what mental health is. There are also many small charities and NGO’s dedicated to finding work for people with mental health difficulties, pushing for the implementation of approaches such as the Individual Placement and Supported Employment programme (IPSE)3. The number of schemes targeting mental health promotion and prevention varies by state, with Germany, for example, reporting forty individual programmes, while Romania reports having only two (Samele et al., 2013). Alongside this, there is very limited data exploring the amount of investment into such projects. Just under half of all programmes within Member States were targeted to school-aged children, with the second largest category being the general population or specific“at risk” groups. However, more must be done to tailor such approaches to other groups, such as the elderly.

2

ROAMER- A three year project, funded by the European Commission tasked with the promotion and integration of mental health and well-being research across Europe. Retrieved from: http://www.roamer-mh.org/index.php 3

IPSE; Employment teams working to support the transition of a client to a desired field of work through coaching, resume development, interview training, and on the job support. Source: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~ips/page29/page31/page31.html

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Measures in place On a Member State level, all EU countries have mental health policy in place (World Health Organisation, 2008). However, there is variance between states, with Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, for example, failing to include mental health promotion or prevention within their policy. Both Estonia and Sweden reported not having a standalone mental health policy, though reference to mental health is made in their other national policies. Likewise with legislation, all EU countries report having some form of law surrounding mental health, with the majority of these providing guidelines for admission to hospital. Some countries, notably Italy and Luxembourg have tailored their legislation to focus on psychiatric reform and the closure of mental institutions. This is representative of the push within EU Member States to move away from long-stay hospital care and towards community based care. This goal of de-institutionalisation is a vital step towards de-stigmatisation and social inclusion of people with mental health problems.

On an EU level, the first mental health strategy was released in 2005 in the form of the Green Paper“Improving the mental health of the population: Towards a strategy on mental health for the European Union” (European Commission, 2005) which outlined the current, and required policies and frameworks of the EU. It called for focus on: promoting the mental health of all, addressing mental illness through preventative action, improving the quality of life and protection of the rights of people with mental illness, and developing a mental health information, research, and knowledge system for the EU. The legal basis for the implementation of the Green Paper comes from the EU Public Health Programme 2014-20204 and The EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation5. The Public Health Program has pledged €446 million to programs aimed at improving health systems within Member States with focus on sustainability and innovation.

Further to this, the European pact for mental health and well-being (2008) called for action in five areas of priority; prevention of depression and suicide, mental health in youth and education, mental health in a workplace setting, mental health of older people, and combating stigma and social exclusion. Conferences on each priority area were convened, with the main conclusions combined in the document“European Pact for Mental Health and Well-being: Results and future action” (2011). This document called for exchange of information and communication of research between the European Commission, Member States, and international organisations.

As a result, the Joint Action for Mental Health and Well-being (JA MH-WB)6 was launched in 2013, involving 51 partners from 28 EU Member States. Its objective is to establish structured cooperation between Member States, the EU, and international organisations with the aim of developing a

Public Health Program; The third EU health program is a means of implementing the health strategy of the European Commission. It provides funding to projects which meet specific criteria thus incentivising states to adjust their own health policies.

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/health/programme/policy/2014-2020/index_en.htm 4

EU Framework Program; Part of the Horizon 2020 research and innovations fund, under the area“Social Sciences & Humanities” funding is made available for projects aimed at reforming public health systems. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/ programmes/horizon2020/en/area/social-sciences-humanities 6

JA MH-WB; Funded by the European Agency for Health and Consumers the aim of this program is to compile knowledge on the situation of mental health within Member States and develop a framework for improving the effectiveness of policies on an EU and Member State level. Source: http://www.mentalhealthandwellbeing.eu/the-joint-action 5

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framework for action in the five priority areas highlighted above.

On a wider scale, the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child7 and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)8 both contribute to the legal framework surrounding the treatment of people with mental illness. Protecting human rights in the context of mental health is a major challenge with some parts of Central and Eastern Europe highlighted as having substantial human rights abuses occur within psychiatric institutions, care homes, and mental health systems (Knapp et al., 2007).

Such international frameworks play a central role in guiding the policies and legislations of Member States.

Outlook and key questions With the Europe 2020 strategy pushing for a more sustainable Europe in the fields of education, employment, and social inclusion, mental health must be recognised as a vital prerequisite. When addressing this issue on an EU scale several questions must be asked. How can the EU ensure that adequate funding into evidence based mental health programs and policies occur within Member States? To what extent can a balance be struck between the need for both improved care facilities for people with mental illnesses and the implementation of prevention and promotion strategies within the EU? How can the EU aid in bridging the gap between policy and practice in the field of mental health?

Sources and additional links Official sources [1] European Commission (2005) Green Paper. Improving the mental health of the population: Towards a strategy on mental health for the European Union. Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/mental/ green_paper/mental_gp_en.pdf [2] The European Pact for Mental Health and Well-being: results and future action. (2011) Retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/122389.pdf [3] Samele, C., Frew, S., & Urquia, N. (2013). Mental health systems in the European Union member states, status of mental health in populations and benefits to be expected from investments into mental health. Main report. Executive Agency for Health and Consumers Tender. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/health/mental_health/docs/europopp_full_en.pdf [3] Wahlbeck, K., Braddick, F., Gabilondo, A., McDaid, D., Lang, G., & O’Sullivan, C. (2010). European Pact for Mental Health and Wellbeing. Die Psychiatrie, 7, 74-80.

Declaration of the Rights of the Child; Sets the ten principal rights that every child should have, including the right to special protection for the child’s physical, mental, and social development. Source: http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/1959-Declarationof-the-Rights-of-the-Child.pdf 8

ECHR; A treaty to protect the human rights and freedoms in Europe. Article 5 refers to a persons’ right to liberty and protects the competent patient, from having their freedom removed by medical professionals. Source: http://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 7

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[4] World Health Organization. Regional Office for Europe. (2008). European pact for mental health and well-being. In EU High level conference“Together for mental health and wellbeing”: Brussels.

Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/mental/docs/pact_en.pdf [5] World Health Organization. Regional Office for Europe. (2008). Policies and practices for mental health in Europe: meeting the challenges. WHO Regional Office Europe.

Academic sources [1] Almond, S., & Healey, A. (2003). Mental health and absence from work: New evidence from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Work, Employment and Society.

[2] Cyhlarova, E., (2010) Economic burden of mental illness cannot be tackled without research investment. Mental Health Foundation.

[3] Haro, J. M., Ayuso-Mateos, J. L., Bitter, I., Demotes-Mainard, J., Leboyer, M., Lewis, S. W.,... & Walker-Tilley, T. (2014). ROAMER: roadmap for mental health research in Europe. International journal of methods in psychiatric research, 23(S1), 1-14.

[4] Knapp, M., McDaid, D., Mossialos, E., & Thornicroft, G. (2007). Mental health policy and practice across Europe: an overview. Mental health policy and practice across Europe, 1.

[5] Olesen, J., Gustavsson, A., Svensson, M., Wittchen, H. U., & Jönsson, B. (2012). The economic cost of brain disorders in Europe. European Journal of Neurology, 19(1), 155-162.

[6] Prince, M., Patel, V., Saxena, S., Maj, M., Maselko, J., Phillips, M. R., & Rahman, A. (2007). No health without mental health. The lancet, 370(9590), 859-877.

[7] Saxena, S., Funk, M., Chisholm, D. (2013) World Health Assembly adopts Comprehensive Mental Health Action Plan 2013–2020. Lancet, 381(9882):1970–1.

[8] Thornicroft, G. (2006). Shunned: Discrimination against people with mental illness (Vol. 399).

Oxford.

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Committee on Human Rights II (DROI II) Social equality and non-discrimination against minorities: With the Roma still being the most discriminated-against minority in Europe, how should the EU build on its Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies to guarantee social and economic rights, access to public services, and non-discrimination of Roma?

by Lorenzo Parrulli (IT)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic Despite the fact that there are no clear statistics about it, Roma is considered to be one of the most vulnerable minorities in Europe. What is sure, though, is that it is the biggest minority in terms of population; approximately 10-12 million Roma live in Europe, of which six million live within EU borders. Due to the fact that they used to conduct a semi-nomad life, from the earliest days, Roma were regarded with fear, chased away or oppressed; Roma were enslaved in Hungary and Romania in the 15th century, and more than 200,000 Roma were exterminated during Nazism.

Roma people face a unique and daunted economic situation. According to the World Bank, 71% or more of Roma households live in deep poverty, and only 29% of the Roma have graduated secondary school1. In addition, less than 50% of Roma men and less than 25% of Roma women can find jobs2.

When comparing this data to the fact that up to 10-20% of new labour market entrants in these countries are young Roma3, it is clear how better integration for Roma would result in a positive economic outcome.

The on-going migrant crisis has exacerbated the situation in terms of discriminating acts, both from the state and from the citizens’ point of view. It has become politically easier for governments to remove makeshift camps – funded by the government themselves –, declaring Roma people to be illegal in their country. Besides, a growing part of Roma people chooses not to register their national identity because they fear possible repercussions, making it more difficult for the Member States to help them.

Key terms Minority: There is no internationally agreed definition as to which groups constitute minorities. The existence of a minority is a question of fact and that any definition must include both objective factors (such as the existence of a shared ethnicity, language or religion) and subjective factors (including that individuals must identify themselves as members of a minority4.

1

The World Bank. (2015). Europe and Central Asia - Brief on Roma. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/ eca/brief/roma 2

(ibid).

3

(ibid).

4

United Nations. (2015). Minorities under international law. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/ Pages/internationallaw.aspx

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Roma: An originally semi-nomadic population. Their presence in Europe is a result of the Roma diaspora, started around the 7th century; the Romani people reached the Balkans and then migrated throughout Europe. Roma identify themselves in different ethnic subgroups, based on the territorial, cultural and linguist differences; the main ethnic subgroups are Roma and Iberian Kale.

Nowadays 80% of Roma are estimated to be sedentary5.

Key conflicts and stakeholders “Any discrimination based on […] membership of a national minority […] shall be prohibited”. (Article 21, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) The major stakeholder in this issue is undoubtedly the Roma population, of which a disproportionately large number faces deep poverty and social exclusion.

The other major stakeholder is the EU. The biggest limit is that the Charter of Fundamental Rights also applies to Member States only when they implement EU law; the EU cannot intervene in fundamental rights issues in areas over which it has no competence. The EU can encourage and recommend, but cannot enforce any action itself.

The last major stakeholders are the Member States. The inactivity of certain Member States, or of their open violation of the common agreements, is due to the particular situation we are currently living, in terms of financial and migrant crisis. Nevertheless, for a number of Member States, addressing – and solving – the situation of Roma in terms of employment, poverty and education would contribute to progress towards Europe 2020 employment, social inclusion and education targets.

Another stakeholder is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). As the global guardian of human rights, the OHCHR has the duty to intervene when discriminative acts are carried out in any UN country6.

Measures in place Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: In Article 21, the Charter states that ‘any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’. As previously mentioned, all Member States should respect the Charter, but can intervene only in if an EU law is being implemented.

Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies: In 2011 the European Commission encouraged Member States to adopt plans for helping the Roma. These plans had to be aimed at the EU Roma integration goals – in proportion to the size of the Roma population in each country – on the areas of education (‘Ensure that all Roma children complete at least primary school’), employment

European Commission. (2010). Roma in Europe: The Implementation of European Union Instruments and Policies for Roma Inclusion – Progress Report 2008-2010. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/sec_2010_400.pdf 6

NewEurope. (2015). UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Hussein urged today governments of France, and Bulgaria, to halt Roma evictions. Retrieved from http://neurope.eu/article/ohchr-chief-urges-france-bulgaria-to-halt-forcedevictions-of-roma/ 5

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(‘Cut the employment gap between Roma and the rest of the population’), healthcare (‘Reduce the gap in health status between the Roma and the rest of the population’), and housing (‘Close the gap between the share of Roma with access to housing and to public utilities – such as water, electricity and gas – and that of the rest of the population’)7.

In 2012, the European Commission assessed the strategies and published its conclusions in the communication ‘National Roma Integration Strategies: a first step in the implementation of the EU Framework’. A year later, the European Commission adopted the communication ‘Steps forward in implementing the National Roma Integration Strategies’ focusing on structural pre-conditions that are necessary to achieve effective changes for Roma in the Member States.

About funding in this area, the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) have been used to support the implementation of national policies in these fields. The EU already co-finances projects for the Roma in sectors like education, employment, microfinance and equal opportunities (in particular equality between men and women).

Concrete amounts of EU funds specifically allocated to Roma are hard to quantify. However, according to an analysis of the European Social Fund (ESF) 2007-2013 Operational Programmes in 12 Member States (BG, CZ, ES, FI, GR, HU, IE, IT, PL, RO, SI, SK) target Roma (among other vulnerable groups). Overall, these countries have allocated a total budget of €17.5 billion (including €13.3 billion of ESF funds) to measures benefiting Roma and other vulnerable groups. This represents 27% of their total European Social Fund budget. In Hungary and Romania, Roma are potential beneficiaries in more than 50% of the planned ESF interventions, while in Ireland, travellers are a potential target of 99.5% of the planned ESF supported activities for 2007-2013.

Outlook and key questions Up to date, the EU has provided the largest amount of money available for Roma-targeted projects, yet the situation has just worsened. Do we need more investments or more efficacy in the implementation of these investments?

This topic does not allow the committee to decide whether or not to build on the Framework; the question is how to build on the Framework, and how to make sure that those steps to help secure a better treatment of the Roma will be taken by all Member States.

In fact, one of other key question is: are the Member States able to autonomously implement the national strategies they have outlined 4 years ago, and reach the 2020 targets?

Lastly, considering the critical situation the EU is currently facing, will the Member States be willing to implement these measures when they might affect other relevant fields of interests?

European Commission. (2011). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/ discrimination/docs/com_2011_173_en.pdf 7

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: Treaty on European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN [2]: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/ pdf/text_en.pdf [3]: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Council of Europe. Handbook on European non-discrimination law: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_non_discri_law_ENG_01. pdf [6] The World Bank. ‘Toward an equal start: closing the early learning gap for Roma children in Eastern Europe’: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTROMA/Resources/RomaECD_FinalReport. pdf [7] Open Society. ‘10 goals for improving access to education for Roma’: http://www.euromanet.eu/ upload/90/23/education_20090302.pdf [8] Council of Europe. ‘Human rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe’: https://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/prems79611_GBR_CouvHumanRightsOfRoma_WEB.pdf [9] European Commission. National Roma Integration Strategies: a first step in the implementation of the EU Framework: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/com2012_226_en.pdf [10] European Commission. Steps forward in implementing the National Roma Integration: Strategies. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/com_2013_454_en.pdf [11] European Commission. Report on the implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/roma_implement_strategies2014_en.pdf

Media coverage [12]: David Simpson. ‘The Roma: A thousand years of discrimination continues in Europe, advocates say’. CNN: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/21/world/europe/roma-discrimination/ [13]: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579459022620002030 [14]: ‘The Rubik’s Cube of Roma Rights. John Feffer, Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost. com/john-feffer/the-rubiks-cube-of-roma-r_b_8133824.html [15]: Police dismantle France’s oldest Roma slum. France 24: http://www.france24.com/ en/20150827-police-dismantle-france-oldest-slum-paris-outskirts-roma-courneuve-samaritain

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Committee on Human Rights III (DROI III) Europe’s external wall: How should the EU respond to the perils of illegal immigration and improve living conditions for asylum seekers whilst addressing fair burden-sharing amongst Member States?

by Annmarie Kiiskinen (FI)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic Over the past decade, immigration to the European continent has peaked due to conflicts in countries all around the world. Many immigrants make their way to Europe in order to apply for an asylum: in 2012 more than 400,000 applications were made within the European Union (EU), however, only 100,000 were accepted. Germany accepted the most applications (21%), followed by Sweden (15%) and the UK (14%).1 While the displacement of people is the cause of many challenges, it also creates opportunities that some are trying to exploit. As a person can apply for another state’s asylum only when physically in the state, the immigrants have to enter Europe before they can even begin the application process. For many crossing the European borders has proven to be extremely challenging and thousands of immigrants have already lost their lives during this dangerous journey.

Furthermore, a number of European border-states raised security measures to prevent the uncontrolled influx of immigrants who most commonly use the Mediterranean route through southern Italy or Greece to enter the continent. Still, the number of migrants reaching Europe by boat this year has more than doubled compared to 2014 and according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the migrant deaths at sea this year have already added up to 1,865 by June 2015, out of which 800 lost their lives in a shipwreck incident near the Italian island of Lampedusa on April 19, 2015.2 In light of this risky route, more immigrants are now trying to seek safety via Greek borders or through the Eastern border route and Balkan route, leading from Serbia to Hungary. Once they have entered the EU, the movement inside the union is rather free due to free movement laws established in the Schengen Agreement.3 Often, human traffickers are paid money to smuggle refugees into Europe.

The majority of immigrants seek to make their way to Germany or Sweden due to highly beneficial refugee laws, whereas other groups become stuck in the“Calais Jungle,”4 a refugee camp in France, right across the Eurotunnel from the United Kingdom.

Latest figures of Eurostat 2014 show a remarkable increase of almost 195,000 asylum applications in relation to 2013, out of which applications from Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Kosovo account for the biggest spikes. In 11 of the 28 EU Member States Syrians accounted for the highest number of 1

Eurostat. (2015). Asylum Statistics. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_ statistics 2

Peter, L. (2015).” Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?” Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-24583286 3

EUR-lex. (2015).”Schengen Agreement and cooperation”. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=uriserv:l33020 4

The Economist. (2015).”Learning from the Jungle”. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21660581camp-channels-edge-sideshow-europes-migrant-crisis-it-offers-important

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applicants, including 41 000 applicants in Germany, followed by 31 000 in Sweden.5 Settlement of displaced people in Member States lacks efficiency as much as refugee camps lack human rights: refugee screening centres are packed and tens of thousands of refugees are left outside the centres while waiting to become accommodated. Hence, in the face of this humanitarian emergency, serious contributions to improve the current situation are needed.

Key terms There are crucial differences between common terms such as illegal and economic migrant as well as refugee and asylum seeker. Whereas ‘migrant’ refers to a person leaving his/her home to seek a new life in another country, a ‘refugee’ is a person fleeing from danger such as violence or catastrophe. In legal terms refugees cannot return to their home countries due to fear of persecution and are therefore entitled to claim protection in another country.6 The individuals claiming this right are known as ‘asylum seekers’ and they have to go through a lengthy application process in order to receive asylum status and official permission to stay. ‘Illegal migrants’ are people who enter a country without meeting the legal requirements for entry.7 An ‘economic migrant’ on the other hand is a person traveling to another country to improve their standard of living, often fleeing from situations of severe economic hardship, and it is debatable if and when these types of migrants qualify for asylum.

The asylum seeking process causes challenges to the EU due to the Schengen area, a fundamental EU principle allowing free movement of people, goods and services, and which eliminated border controls among Member States. Thus, once immigrants manage to enter the EU, they can move relatively unrestrictedly within its territory. This policy can lead to problems such as asylum shopping,8 which entails seeking asylum from several states or seeking to apply to one particular Member State. According to the Dublin Regulation, an asylum seeker is to be returned to and processed in the country where he/she first entered the EU. The term ‘refugees in orbit’9 refers to asylum seekers unable to find a state willing to examine their application, causing these individuals to be left in limbo. Furthermore, the principle of family unity complicates the fair burden-sharing among Member States: it is a fundamental principle of international law establishing a right for family unity of every human being, despite their status in society.10 This is often used by incoming immigrants to bypass the Dublin Regulation and choose the country they prefer applying to.

5

Eurostat: Asylum Statistics. 2014. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_ statistics 6

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (2015).”Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”. Retrieved from: http:// www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx 7

Parliament of Australia: Parliament Library. (2011).”Asylum Seekers and Refugees: what are the facts?”. Retrieved from: http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bn/sp/asylumfacts.pdf p.3 8

European Council on Refugees and Exiles. (2015).”History of CEAS”. Retrieved from: http://www.ecre.org/component/ content/article/36-introduction/194-history-of-ceas.html 9

Library of the European Union. (2013).”Revised rules for asylum seekers”. Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130546/LDM_BRI(2013)130546_REV1_EN.pdf p. 2 10

UNHCR. (2015).”Principle of Family Unity”. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/3bd3d4a14.pdf

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Key conflicts and stakeholders As the reconstruction of international conflict regions and consequently the alleviation of entire populations’ urgent need to flee is a long-term endeavour, the primary priority is to ensure and establish the most fundamental rights for refugees. Unfortunately, with regards to immigration and asylum policies on EU and Member State level there are tensions between firstly immigration control and human rights and secondly national and EU powers.11 The treatment of asylum seekers varies largely among Member States due to divergent rules and practices. For instance, illegal entry and stay became a criminal offence in Italy in 2009 and without proof of legal entry immigrants have started to be detained.12 Despite the efforts of human rights organisations, violence, in some cases leading to death, frequently occurs in immigrant detention facilities. It is important to notice that due to a lack of resources in Member States, conditions are improved mainly for those who are applying for asylum, whereas illegal immigrants do not share the same privilege. This is because an asylum seeker has a legal right to stay in the country in which his/her application is being processed, whereas a migrant staying in the country without being recognised by the authorities is breaking the law.

However, the current EU policy makes it impossible to apply for an asylum before (illegally) entering the country. This has led to an increased usage of unseaworthy boats operated by smugglers, in order to transfer people to Europe. Correspondingly, the death toll of those trips has seen an alarming increase13 and survivors, having had to pay thousands of dollars, often report violence, abuse and robbery by traffickers.14 The establishment of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was intended to ease this challenge, yet the implementation of CEAS standards varies largely among Member States.

Under current EU law, mainly under the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers are to apply in the country they first enter, leading to overburdening influx in countries with external borders. Such countries, namely Italy and Greece, argue that this should not be the case solely based on their geographic location. On the other hand, immigrants often seek to apply for asylum in countries they prefer, due to family reasons, language, or better asylum conditions in general. Southern Member States demand fairer distribution of asylum seekers whereas many Northern and Eastern Member States are in favour of preserving the current situation. Member States’ substantial degree of autonomy in the treatment of refugees and processing of their asylum applications as well as free movement among Member States quickly gives rise to circulation of refugees who either go around looking for better conditions or are pressured by the overwhelmed authorities to leave the most pressured regions in Europe. These tensions are caused by a conflict between supranational integration and national prerogatives. Harmonisation of these processes is still on-going.15 Furthermore, many Members of the European Parliament agree that the Dublin Regulation is dysfunctional for the current situation.16 11

EU Law Analysis. (2014).”EU Free Movement, Immigration and Asylum Law: 2014 in review“. Retrieved from: http:// eulawanalysis.blogspot.se/2014/12/eu-free-movement-immigration-and-asylum.html 12

Council of Europe. (2010). Commissioner for Human Rights.”Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications”. Retrieved from: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1579605#P107_15080 13

Quarz. (2015).”Data show how manageable Europe’s refugee crisis could be.“ Retrieved from: http://qz.com/448228/datashow-how-manageable-europes-refugee-crisis-could-be/ 14

Open Society Foundations. (2015).”Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union”. Retrieved from: https:// www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylum-european-union 15

EurActiv. (2015).” Who is ultimately responsible for EU immigrants?” Retrieved from: http://www.euractiv.com/globaleurope/eu-ultimately-responsible-immigr-analysis-530931 16

Migration Policy Institute. (2015).”EU Dublin Asylum System Faces Uncertain Future After Ruling in Afghan Family’s

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Measures in place The Dublin III Regulation17 forms an umbrella framework for identifying the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, which usually is the country in which the applicant first entered the EU. Its main objective is to prevent an applicant from submitting applications in multiple Member States as well as to avoid the“orbiting” of asylum seekers. The EU’s existing asylum policy, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS),18 aims to ensure the protection of refugees’ rights under international law and to ensure access to asylum procedures. The system sets frameworks for processing and assessing asylum applications as well as the treatment of both asylum seekers and individuals with refugee status. Similarly, the Asylum Qualification Directive19 aims to harmonise the minimum standards for third country nationals to acquire refugee status through harmonising eligibility criteria and the scale of protection at EU level. The implementation of these standards, however, differs vastly among Member States. To alleviate the situation, the European Commission (EC) has introduced many Immigration Quota Proposals, including a fairer way to distribute asylum seekers within the EU through a binding quota system, to unburden countries which are most heavily hit by the immigrant influx, namely Italy and Greece. As it is up to Member States to decide upon their intake of asylum seekers, many of them do not agree on the proposed distribution plans, including the latest proposal unveiled by EC President Juncker in September.20 To ensure the access for housing, food, healthcare and employment, the Reception Conditions Directive21 sets common condition standards for asylum applicants. When dealing with border controls and tackling the issue of irregular immigrants, the EC suggested the establishment of a Smart Borders Package22 in order to stay informed about overstayers through an Entry/Exit System and a Registered Traveller Programme. The process was due to be fully in practice by 2014 but is still on-going due to technical, operational and high cost concerns. As an addition to the Dublin Regulation principles, an EU asylum fingerprint database, the EURODAC System,23 was launched to make it easier for the EU to determine responsibility for examining asylum applications. Finally, the EU agency Frontex24 works for border management and streamlining cooperation between national border authorities, in order to tackle illegal immigration and human trafficking. It has launched additional operations such as Triton, a replacement for the Italian equivalent operation Mare Nostrum, for the purpose of search and rescue efforts saving migrants using the risky Mediterranean route.25 Case”. Retrieved from: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-dublin-asylum-system-faces-uncertain-future-after-ruling-afghanfamily’s-case 17

EUR-lex. (2015).”Dublin Regulation III”. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33153 18

European Commission. (2015).”Common European Asylum System (CEAS).” Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm 19

European Commission. (2015).”Who qualifies for international protection?” Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/refugee-status/index_en.htm 20

Migrant Report. (2015).”Junker Unveils Distribution of 160,000 Refugees with Binding Quota”. Retrieved from: http:// migrantreport.org/junker-unveils-plans-to-distribute-160000-asylum-seekers-with-binding-quota/ 21

European Commission. (2015).”Reception Conditions Directive”. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/ what-we-do/policies/asylum/reception-conditions/index_en.htm 22

European Commission. (2015). Smart Borders. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/ policies/borders-and-visas/smart-borders/index_en.htm 23

European Commission. (2015).”Identification of Applicants (EURODAC)”. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants/index_en.htm 24

Frontex. (2015).”Missions and Tasks”. Retrieved from: http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/ 25

European Council on Refugees and Exiles. (2015).”Mare Nostrum to end”. Retrieved from: http://ecre.org/component/ content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-

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On the international level, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)26 is an UN agency mandating international actions to safeguard the well-being of refugees and promote their right for seeking asylum and finding safety and support in another state. Other important actors are the European Refugee Fund, a structural fund looking to ensure legal and social assistance for asylum seekers, and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), a civil society body operating under the EU, cooperating with international organisations in order to implement policies like the“International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families” (ICMRW).

Outlook and key questions While the EU currently lacks an immigrant quota system as well as a common asylum status and asylum granting process across Europe, solutions aiming at burden-sharing between Member States to improve the conditions for everyone seeking humane living conditions, need to be found. Thus, how can the incoherent legal framework be revised and how can Member States, with insufficient resources to tackle the issues at hand, best be supported, while keeping the supranational and national policy conflict challenge in mind? Should the EU move towards a common framework and harmonisation of immigration laws or help to adapt the already existing immigration policies separately in every Member State? What can be done to encourage Member States to take an impartial approach to the upcoming decisions and finding suitable solutions for all parties, taking into consideration the different economic, political and social resources of different Member States? Finally, how can the EU reduce the death tolls among immigrants desperately seeking safety through dangerous routes such as the Mediterranean and ensure humane conditions for the ones who make it to Europe?

Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: http:// www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx [2]: Asylum Statistics: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics [3]: Dublin III Regulation: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF [4]: Summary: Revised rules for treatment of asylum-seekers: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130546/LDM_BRI(2013)130546_REV1_EN.pdf [5]: European Council on Refugees and Exiles,“Mare Nostrum to end”: http://ecre.org/component/ content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.html

at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.html 26

The UN Refugee Agency, (2015).”About us”. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html

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Media coverage [6]:“Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?”: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286 [7]:“Europe’s Migration Crisis”: http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874 [8]: Migrant Report.“Junker’s new binding quota proposal”: http://migrantreport.org/junker-unveilsplans-to-distribute-160000-asylum-seekers-with-binding-quota/ [9]:“Who is ultimately responsible for EU immigrants?”: http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/ eu-ultimately-responsible-immigr-analysis-530931 [10]: EU Law Analysis touching upon the migration laws in the EU: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot. se/2015/06/eu-migration-policy-comments-on-results.html

Academic sources [11]: Understanding migration and asylum in the European Union: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylum-european-union [12]:“Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications”: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1579605#P107_15080 [13]: Working Paper on the future of the European Union and Refugees:“Towards More Restrictive Asylum Policies in the European Union?”: http://www.upf.edu/gritim/_pdf/WP8_Kaunert_leonard. pdf [14]: Conflicting moral aspects of the immigrant crisis: http://qz.com/496713/even-philosopherscant-agree-on-how-we-should-help-refugees-or-whether-we-should/ [15]:“How a tradable refugee-admission quota system could help solve the EU’s migration crisis”: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/06/22/how-a-tradable-refugee-admission-quota-system-could-help-solve-the-eus-migration-crisis/

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Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) A right to digital identity: With EU institutions maintaining that data protection is a fundamental right, which principles should be integral in the management of customer data of companies online within, and beyond, the EU’s borders?

by Lia Lisa Pachler (AT)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic Data protection laws exist to strike a balance between the rights of individuals to privacy and the ability of businesses to use data for the purpose of their business. Data protection also allows people to be aware of who processes their personal data and for what purpose. Yet, it is questionable how much customers really know about the processing of their personal data as many of them easily agree to a company’s privacy policy without actually having read it.

The protection of personal data is recognised as a fundamental right, as mentioned in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union1 (Charter), in the Council of Europe Convention 1082 (Convention), as well as in other international agreements and national constitutions.

The current EU-level legislation, meant to safeguard this fundamental right, the EU Data Protection Directive3 (Directive), was established in 1995. Since then the rapid pace of technological change, including the increased use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), and globalisation have profoundly transformed the scale and way personal data is collected, accessed, used and transferred. Also, back then the Internet was virtually unknown to most people. As of today, 250 million people use the Internet daily in Europe4 and concerns about privacy standards regarding data processing within and outside the EU have grown.

The EU has one of the highest standards for data protection worldwide and acts as a shining example for many other countries. However, there is room for improvement and better protection of customer data, especially when non-EU companies process data of EU citizens. Strengthening data protection rules is a high priority for EU institutions such as the European Commission (EC), which proposed a reform of the Directive in the form of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is still being discussed amongst various EU institutions. Although the general approach of updating the laws is welcomed, the new regulation already earned quite a lot of criticism. Nevertheless, the GDPR in its final form will be of utmost importance as it will largely determine the integral principles for EU customer data management.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union. (2012). Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 2

Council of Europe. (1981). Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/108.htm 3

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A31995L0046%3Aen%3AHTML 4

European Commission. (2012). Why we need new data protection rules now. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ data-protection/minisite/ 1

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Key terms Data protection is commonly defined as the laws designed to protect an individual’s personal information. According to the Directive and the Convention, data is considered personal data if it relates to an identified or identifiable natural person. A person is identifiable if additional information can be obtained without unreasonable effort, allowing for the identification of the data subject.

According to the EC“…personal data is any information relating to an individual, whether it relates to his or her private, professional or public life. It can be anything from a name, a photo, an email address, your bank details, your posts on social networking websites, your medical information, or your computer’s IP address.”5 If an individual’s data is being processed, this person is called the data subject. ICT refers to all the technology used to handle telecommunications, broadcast media, intelligent building management systems, audiovisual processing and transmission systems, and network-based control and monitoring functions. ICT has more recently been used to describe the convergence of several technologies and the use of common transmission lines carrying very diverse data and communication types and formats. The intentional or unintentional release of secure information to an untrusted environment is called data breach or data leak . Incidents range from hacker attacks with the backing of organised crime or national governments to careless disposal of used computer equipment or data storage media. A data controller, usually a company, is someone, who controls the use of personal data by determining the purposes and means of data processing. Data processing is about anything that is done with the data. This embraces gathering it, ordering it, storing it and making sure it is secure to transport or transmit. It also covers how data is being disposed of when not needed anymore. The data processor can be different from the data controller, for example if a company decides to outsource certain activities, which involve customers’ data. The activities a processor gets entrusted with may either be limited to a specific task or context or may be quite general and comprehensive.

Key conflicts and stakeholders The popularity of online activities, such as online shopping, social networks and cloud computing,6 has increased exponentially since 1995. While using these tools users leave traces that can be exploited, whether they are fully aware of it or not. However, as one of the Principles of European Data Protection is that“personal data may be processed only if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent” (Article 7 (a), Directive), European citizens should theoretically be aware of it. The aim is to make data processing more transparent to data subjects through providing more and better information. Yet, consumers feel that current mechanisms do not help them understand their rights or what will happen to their personal data. Why so? In many cases the privacy policies of companies collecting data, to which consumers give their consent to, are mainly trying to meet the applicable legal transparency requirements, rather than providing actual transparency. These poli European Commission. (2015). Why do we need an EU data protection reform? Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.pdf 6

Cloud computing is the practice of using a network of remote servers hosted on the Internet to store, manage, and process data, rather than a local server or a personal computer. Examples of cloud computing services are Dropbox or Google Drive.

5

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cies are often difficult to understand for data subjects due to their length, complexity and extensive use of legal terminology. In practice, customers often click a box saying that they agree to a company’s privacy policy having barely read it.7 Therefore, it can be questioned whether the Directive’s requirement of unambiguous consent is effective.

According to a recent Eurobarometer survey, 71% of Europeans think that disclosing personal data is increasingly part of modern life and accept that there is no alternative to providing it if they want to obtain certain products or services. At the same time, two-thirds of respondents are concerned about not having complete control over the information they provide online.8 Customers’ lack of trust in online services can easily harm businesses offering services or products online, which consequently holds back the growth of the Digital Single Market.9 Moreover, the relationship between data processor and data controller envisaged in the Directive does not adequately cover all the entities involved in the processing of personal data in a modern networked economy. There is uncertainty about when a processor becomes a controller or vice versa. Trends towards off-shoring, outsourcing and sub-processing have resulted in companies, as the main data controllers, having to arrange contractual clauses with each and every sub-contractor involved in processing, in order to avoid being in breach of legislative requirements. The bureaucracy involved in reviewing each of the contracts (which may have to be re-authorised whenever there is even the slightest change) is clearly a high burden for controllers.

Up until now, all the principles, which the Directive builds upon, as mentioned below, were incorporated into the national laws in each Member State (MS). As it is a directive rather than a regulation, to some extent it is up to the Member States how they implement those rules as long as they achieve the desired result. This means that a lot of specific rules differ from MS to MS, making it difficult for businesses to operate in different MS at the same time, as they have to comply with multiple laws for the same issue. In particular, each MS autonomously decides upon the sanctions for data protection violations. This is one of the reasons why the EC, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP) are currently establishing a new standardised legislation, the GDPR. As mentioned above and in detail below, a lot of concern has been raised regarding this new proposal. Therefore, one of the main issues to be discussed is the new regulation and its strength and weaknesses.

Measures in place As mentioned above, the EU Data Protection Directive is still in effect. In Article 6 it proclaims the key principles of European data protection law, which are also mentioned in the Convention. One of which affirms that personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully. Additionally, personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further pro-

7

RandEurope. (2009). Review of the European Data Protection Directive. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR710.pdf 8

European Commission. (2015). Data Protection Eurobarometer. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_eurobarometer_240615_en.pdf 9

Creating a Digital Single Market is one of the ten priorities from the EC’s current President Juncker. The Digital Single Market is a market, in which the free movement of persons, services and capital is ensured and where the individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.

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cessed in any manner incompatible with these purposes (purpose limitation). Thus, when data is collected, it has to be relevant to the purpose and context and not be excessive.

In order to ensure effective data protection, independent supervisory authorities must be established in every MS according to the Directive; these are the so-called National Data Protection Authorities (DPA). Their tasks are, amongst others, to monitor and promote data protection, to advise data subjects and controllers, to hear complaints and assist the data subject with alleged violations of data protection rights at the national level and to refer matters to court. They can also intervene, if necessary, by warning, admonishing or imposing fines on controllers and processors, by ordering data to be deleted or by imposing a ban on processing.

The Directive prohibits the transfer of personal data to non-EU countries that do not meet the EU’s“adequacy” standard for privacy protection. For U.S. companies, which process personal data of EU residents, the U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the EC developed a“safe harbour” framework to provide guidance for U.S. organisations on how to provide adequate protection for personal data from the EU in accordance with the directive, as the U.S. and the EU take a different approach to privacy. There are benefits to organisations that participate in the U.S.-EU Safe Harbour programme, but participation and self-certification to the list are voluntary. Once an entity elects to participate in the programme, it is legally required to comply with the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles.10 This arrangement, however, has been heavily criticised, even by the EC itself, as it is a voluntary and self-regulatory system, which is not adequately implemented and not sufficiently enforced.

In January 2012, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of data protection rules in the EU, the GDPR. The regulation builds on the current framework encapsulated in the Data Protection Directive of 1995 and the Convention but with a seemingly higher level of common protection, much less scope for divergent national approaches and considerably greater emphasis on trying to ensure effective enforcement of the rules. The twofold aim of the regulation is to enhance data protection rights of individuals and to improve business opportunities by facilitating the free flow of personal data in the Digital Single Market. In June 2015 the Council, in this case consisting of the MS’ justice ministers, approved of the regulation, but made numerous amendments.

To mention a few of the biggest changes the GDPR would bring: It is a regulation, not a directive, which means all rules become immediately enforceable as law in all MS simultaneously and don not have to be transposed into national law by the MS; The rules also apply to foreign companies processing data of EU residents; Higher penalties for companies for non-compliance with the rules; Many companies will be required to appoint at least one independent Data Protection Officer (DPO); Notification of data breaches must be disclosed to the supervisory authority within 24 hours of detection if feasible.

European Commission. (2013). Communication from the EC on the functioning of the Safe Harbour principles. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf 10

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Although the approach to adjust the data protection legislation has been welcomed by many parties, concern has been raised. There have been over 3000 amendments so far and particularly after the Council had presented its amendments last June it became evident that regulatory consistency and privacy protections have been significantly eroded;11 mainly because agreement among all 28 ministers was not easy to achieve, partially also due to substantial lobbying efforts. Consequently, it has been criticised that the Council’s text has carved out too many loopholes for MS, with some even claiming that the big amount of loopholes is not even consistent with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.12

Outlook and key questions Although the European standards for data protection are very high, there is room for improvement.

Particularly, after the Council published its amendments to the proposed Regulation13 in June 2015, customers’ rights run the risk of being watered down significantly. Since then, the EC, the EP and the Council have engaged in a series of closed-door trialogue negotiations to agree on the final text, which means that the proposal is not in its final stage yet. Although there is no clear deadline for the parties to come to a consensus on the final version, it is quite likely that this will be happening by the end of this year. Before the GDPR can be implemented, there is a transition period of 2 years planned in order to let all involved stakeholders prepare.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),14 which is still subject to negotiations, is likely to lower EU standards on privacy and data protection once it comes into effect.15 However, the EC points out that data protection standards are not part of TTIP negotiations and that TTIP will make sure that the EU’s data protection laws prevail over any commitments.16 Keeping in mind that the old Directive has been established in 1995, where most of the risks the Internet entails were not even fully known, is it acceptable that the EU’s data protection might be weaker after the implementation of the GDPR? Considering the fact that Internet users frequently disclose their personal data, unknowingly or against their will, in order to obtain certain services and products, how can customers be better informed about data protection, especially concerning their rights? What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the current measures in place and the proposed new regulation, and by which main principles should the new regulative framework be driven?

Amberhawk. (2015). Harmony? What harmony! Disharmony extends to one-third oft he Data Protection Regulation.

Retrieved from http://amberhawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/2015/06/harmony-what-harmony-disharmony-extends-to-one-third-ofthe-data-protection-regulation.html 12

MacDonald, R. (2015). As privacy regulation moves to trialogue, Access warns of dangerous loopholes in Council text.

Retrieved from https://accessnow.createsend.com/t/ViewEmail/d/7C297542B948EB95/C67FD2F38AC4859C/?previewAll=1 13

Council of the European Union. (2015). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation). Retrieved from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf 14

TTIP is a comprehensive trade agreement currently being negotiated between the EU and the US. 15

European Parliament. (2015). Civil society’s concerns about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2014/536404/EXPO_IDA(2014)536404_EN.pdf 16

European Commission. (2015). Services in TTIP. Retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/ tradoc_152999.2%20Services.pdf 11

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: A page from the EC about data protection: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_ en.htm [2]: Factsheet from the EC“Why do we need data protection reform?”: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.pdf [3]: A Eurobarometer on Data Protection: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_eurobarometer_240615_en.pdf

Media coverage [4]: The guardian on (the process of) the GDPR: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/ jun/15/eu-privacy-laws-data-regulations

Academic sources [1]: A paper providing an overview of some of the key issues and jargon surrounding data protection in the digital environment: https://edri.org/files/paper06_datap.pdf [5]: A review of the Directive, pages 22-39 about the main strengths & weaknesses of the Directive especially recommended: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/ RAND_TR710.pdf [6]: Key aspects of the proposed GDPR explained: https://edri.org/files/GDPR-key-issues-explained. pdf

Videos [7]: A short video explaining the key points about data protection and how it affects individuals and also its relevance to the workplace: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHvd6HaPq_s [8]: Anthony Merry presents the proposed changes in the new Regulation and what they mean for businesses around the globe: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TBh5hPynRzQ

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Committee on Human Rights I (DROI I) Fundamental rights and statelessness: With many people across Europe being stateless, how should European States work towards ensuring a nationality and a legal identity for every individual?

by Arnolds Eizenšmits (LV)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic “To be stripped of citizenship is to be stripped of worldliness; it is like returning to a wilderness as cavemen or savages […] A man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow man […] they could live and die without leaving any trace, without having contributed anything to the common world.” (Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951) In fact, at least 10 million people worldwide are currently stateless, and a baby is born stateless every 10 minutes.1 Furthermore, there are over 600.000 stateless individuals in Europe alone.2 It must be recognised, however, that the problem has multiple aspects and the causes of statelessness in Europe vary.

One of the main causes of statelessness in Europe was the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, which led to large-scale statelessness in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. It is worth mentioning that the nationality laws that were adopted in Latvia and Estonia did not automatically grant citizenship to all inhabitants and created an alternative status instead.3 Similarly, thousands of former USSR citizens remain stateless in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, in the countries that once made up Yugoslavia, new nationality laws also left many former citizens stateless. The problem in South Eastern Europe mainly affects members of minority groups, such as the Roma,4 who continue to face difficulties accessing the documents necessary to confirm nationality.

New cases of statelessness have emerged mainly among children and especially because the measures in place to prevent statelessness from being passed on from stateless parents are inadequate.5 Other than that, there are stateless persons who have migrated to Europe, but are now stranded.

The lack of accurate data on the number of stateless people per country, in part due to the fact that few European states have in place dedicated determination procedures to identify who is stateless

1

‘UNHCR. (2014). ‘UNHCR launches 10-year global campaign to end statelessness’. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr. org/545797f06.html 2

UN News Centre. (2105). ‘Ending statelessness in Europe is realistic goal by 2024, UN refugee agency says’. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51025#.Vff9_pe83Mu 3

European Network on Statelessness. (2015). ‘Who is stateless in Europe?’. Retrieved from http://www.statelessness.eu/ issues/who-stateless-europe 4

Council of Europe. (2011). As exemplified in the Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to Italy from 26 to 27 May 2011. Retrieved from https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1826921 5

European Network on Statelessness. (2015). ‘Preventing childhood statelessness in Europe - issues, gaps and good practices’, p. 3. Retrieved from http://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/Preventing%20 childhood%20statelessness%20in%20Europe%20-%20issues%2C%20gaps%20and%20good%20practices.pdf

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on their territories, further complicates attempts to address the issue.6 The Global Campaign to End Statelessness, launched by UNHCR in 2014,7 has recently given a new impetus to the problem. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if genuine political commitment can be found across Europe to eradicate statelessness.

Key terms First of all, a ‘stateless person’ is someone“who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”8 It is important to note, however, that whether a person is stateless is a distinct question from whether one is a refugee. In fact, most stateless people have never travelled abroad and are not under threat of persecution.9 Statelessness is closely linked to ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’. Nationality means the legal bond between a person and a state.10 In most cases, the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are used interchangeably and have the same meaning.11 Generally, nationality is established at birth by a person’s place of birth (jus soli) and/or bloodline (jus sanguinis).12 It can also be acquired through ‘naturalisation’, a process requiring an application to public authorities and a decision by these. There is a trend towards holding formal exams for applicants, usually testing language skills and civic knowledge.13

Key conflicts and stakeholders Nationality is a man-made concept, and thus eradicating statelessness is theoretically possible.

Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that a range of social, historic, political or even economic considerations have determined the policies which leave people stateless in certain countries.

This is the case regarding the biggest stateless populations within the EU – the unique situation of ‘non-citizens’ in Latvia and ‘persons of undetermined citizenship’ in Estonia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these countries adopted nationality laws that did not automatically grant citizenship to all inhabitants. They argued that persons who had immigrated during the period of Soviet occupation and who lost their USSR citizenship after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but who had never been citizens of the Republic of Latvia or Estonia, or their descendants, were not eligible for automatic acquisition of citizenship.14 Consequently, such stateless persons constituted 32% of 6

European Network on Statelessness. (2015). ‘Who is stateless in Europe?’ European Network on Statelessness. Retrieved from http://www.statelessness.eu/issues/who-stateless-europe 7

UNHCR. (2014).‘UNHCR launches 10-year global campaign to end statelessness’. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr. org/545797f06.html 8

Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr. org/3bbb25729.html 9

For more on stateless persons and refugees, see UNHCR, ‘Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons’, September 2010.

Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5941c9.html 10

Article 2(a) of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality of the Council of Europe. Retrieved from http:// conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/166.htm 11

European University Institute. (2015). ‘Citizenship or Nationality?’. EUDO CITIZENSHIP. Retrieved from http://eudocitizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-glossary/terminology 12

UNHCR. (2011). ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook’, p. 413. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf 13

European University Institute. (2015). (EUDO CITIZENSHIP. ‘Policy Brief no 2’, p. 1. Retrieved from http://eudocitizenship.eu/docs/policy-brief-naturalisation_revised.pdf 14

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. (2015). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia.

‘Basic facts about citizenship and language policy of Latvia and some sensitive history-related issues’. Retrieved from http:// www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-

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Estonia’s inhabitants in 1992 and 29% of Latvia’s in 1994.15 While many people in such a situation denounce severe discrimination, in fact they enjoy most benefits of citizenship. For example, differences between Latvian citizens and non-citizens are mainly the right to vote, to work in the civil service and occupy posts directly related to national security.16 As many respondents point out in a research paper on integration of non-citizens in Latvia, they have no need for Latvian citizenship because being a non-citizen does not prevent them from doing what they want to do17 and a pragmatic reason why some stateless people want to remain stateless is because, this way, it is easier for them to travel to the Russian Federation.18 Another key concern, especially looking at the problem in the long-run, is that children are still being born into statelessness across Europe today. For example, the report ‘Preventing childhood statelessness in Europe: Issues, gaps and good practices’ identified many problems in the continent’s nationality laws and the laws governing civil registration procedures, such as birth registration. It also points out that Albania, Cyprus, Norway and Romania have no safeguard in their nationality law to ensure that children born in their territory, who would otherwise be stateless, acquire a nationality.

Many other European countries, including Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Sweden and the Netherlands, have incomplete safeguards.19 As for key stakeholders regarding the topic, the UNHCR and the Council of Europe20 stand out as international organisations engaged with the issue. Direct EU involvement is limited as, for instance, the right to a nationality is not included in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, and the regulation of nationality is a competence of Member States.21 Nevertheless, the EU might take some measures regarding stateless persons in a migratory context.22 Otherwise, civil society organisations also have an essential role to play, especially when it comes to raising awareness on the issue. The European Network on Statelessness is the most prominent civil society alliance which has been committed to address statelessness in Europe since its establishment in 2012.

language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues 15

Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. (2014). ‘Analysis of Integration of Non-Citizens’, p. 5. Retrieved from http://www.biss. soc.lv/downloads/resources/nepilsoni/BISS_Noncitizens_2014.pdf 16

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. (2015). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. ‘Basic facts about citizenship and language policy of Latvia and some sensitive history-related issues’. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov. lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policyof-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues 17

Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. (2014). ‘Analysis of Integration of Non-Citizens’, p. 39. Retrieved from http://www. biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/nepilsoni/BISS_Noncitizens_2014.pdf 18

UNHCR. (2015). ‘Q&A: The realistic goal of ending statelessness in Europe by 2024’. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr. org/556c6a309.html 19

European Network on Statelessness. ‘Preventing childhood statelessness in Europe - issues, gaps and good practices’.

Retrieved from http://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/Preventing%20childhood%20 statelessness%20in%20Europe%20-%20issues%2C%20gaps%20and%20good%20practices.pdf 20

The Council of Europe is a human rights organisation which includes 47 member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union.

21

Policy Department DG External Policies. (2014). ‘Addressing The Human Rights Impact Of Statelessness In The EU’s External Action’, p. 5. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534983/IPOL_ STU%282014%29534983_EN.pdf 22

European Network on Statelessness. (2014). ‘European Network on Statelessness Submission to the European Commission Consultation on the future of Home Affairs policies: An open and safe Europe – what next?’, p.2. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2013/pdf/0027/organisations/ens-european-network-on-statelessness_en.pdf

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Measures in place In general, the most significant legal instruments related to the issue have been established by the United Nations. First and foremost, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights proclaims that“everyone has the right to a nationality”.23 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is one of the two milestone instruments on statelessness, providing the definition of a ‘stateless person’ and establishing the status of a stateless person under international law.

This instrument also seeks to improve the enjoyment of fundamental rights by stateless persons via, e.g., providing for the issuing of identity and travel documents to stateless persons.24 Another key instrument is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which establishes a set of concrete safeguards for states to incorporate within their nationality law in order to prevent and reduce statelessness.25 In 2014, the UNHCR launched a 10-year Campaign to End Statelessness, which aims at seeking greater political commitment to resolve situations of statelessness and promoting further accessions to the two Conventions. The impact of this campaign has been significant, and in 2012 the EU also declared that the Member States which have not yet done so pledge to ratify both Conventions.26 The UNHCR has also recently launched the #IBELONG awareness campaign and organised the First Global Forum on Statelessness.27 Other than that, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession 28 from 200629 established guidelines for future precedents, but has had no practical impact on the already existing problematic situations. The European Network on Statelessness (ENS), for its part, handed over its ‘Petition to protect stateless persons in Europe’ to the European Parliament in 2014,30 which has been signed by over 7.000 people and in 2014 the ENS launched its second region-wide campaign ‘None of Europe’s children should be stateless’.31 Nevertheless, as has been pointed out by Chris Nash, Coordinator of the European Network on Statelessness:“Despite the ratification of relevant international instruments aimed at addressing this problem by European states, little or nothing has been done to implement such obligations in practice.”32

United Nations. (2015). The United Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/

UNHCR. (2010). ‘Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons’. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5941c9.html 25

UNHCR. (2010). ‘Preventing and Reducing Statelessness’. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5941c9.html 26

European Union. (2012). Pledge made by the Delegation of the European Union at the High-level meeting on the rule of law at the national and international levels. Retrieved from http://www.unrol.org/files/Pledges%20by%20the%20European%20Union. pdf 27

Tilburg University. (2015). Global Forum on Statelessness. Retrieved from https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/ institutes-and-research-groups/statelessness/forum.htm 28

Succession occurs when one state ceases to exist or loses control over part of its territory, and another state comes into existence or assumes control over the territory lost by the first state.

29

Council of Europe. (2006). Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession. Retrieved from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/200.htm 30

European Network on Statelessness. (2014). ‘Over 50 Civil Society Organisations Call On EU Member States To Follow Through On Their Promise To Protect Stateless Persons Living In Europe’. Retrieved from http://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www. statelessness.eu/files/PRESS%20RELEASE_14%20October_1.pdf 31

European Network on Statelessness. (2015). ‘None of Europe's Children should be Stateless’. Retrieved from http://www. statelessness.eu/communications/campaigns/none-europes-children-should-be-stateless 32

Chris Nash. (2014). ‘Still stateless, still suffering: It’s time for European leaders to take action’. Retrieved from https:// www.opendemocracy.net/5050/chris-nash/still-stateless-still-suffering-it%E2%80%99s-time-for-european-leaders-to-take-action 23 24

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Outlook and key questions On the one hand, the number of non-citizens and persons of undetermined citizenship is likely to continue to decrease in Eastern Europe. For instance, in January 2015 non-citizens constituted 12% or 262.622 people of all Latvia’s population.33 This constitutes a significant decrease of more than 450.000 non-citizens since the non-citizen status was established in 1994. This is partly as a result of facilitating the process of naturalisation in Latvia, such as making the naturalisation exam easier. At the same time, only 141.618 non-citizens in Latvia have obtained citizenship by naturalisation since 1996, and most of the decrease can be attributed to demographic decline.34 The trend is similar in Estonia.35 In the Russian Federation, approximately 60.000 stateless persons have acquired Russian nationality since 2011, following amendments to the citizenship law.

On the other hand, however, the amount of stateless people in other parts of Europe may increase due to higher migration, unresolved situations of statelessness in these regions and political conflicts.

According to a report commissioned by the European Parliament, there is now growing scrutiny of the role of the EU in tackling issues of statelessness within Europe and increasing calls for the EU to strengthen its response.36 For instance, a recent Resolution by the European Parliament calls on Member States to implement the 1961 Convention and to“ratify, and give full effect to, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality”.37 This also implies that one could possibly expect more EU-level action in the future.

In relation to the topic, it is pertinent to consider the following questions: What are the social, political and economic effects of living without a nationality in Europe?

What criteria should determine the eligibility for citizenship? Should, e.g., language skills be a key criterion?

Should there be a case-by-case or a unified approach towards addressing the problem across the continent and ultimately ending statelessness in Europe?

What steps should European governments take to ensure that every individual, and especially children, living in Europe have a nationality and a legal identity?

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. (2015). ‘Basic facts about citizenship and language policy of Latvia and some sensitive history-related issues’. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenshipin-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-historyrelated-issues 34

Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. (2014). ‘Analysis of Integration of Non-Citizens’, p. 39. Retrieved from http://www. biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/nepilsoni/BISS_Noncitizens_2014.pdf 35

Estonia.eu. (2015). As of August 2015, Estonia has 83.542”residents of undetermined citizenship”. Retrieved from http:// estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html 36

Policy Department DG External Policies. (2014). ‘Addressing The Human Rights Impact Of Statelessness In The EU’s External Action’, p. 20. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534983/IPOL_ STU%282014%29534983_EN.pdf 37

European Parliament. (2015). ‘Situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2013-2014)’. Retrieved from http://www. europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-0286&format=XML&language=EN 33

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: ‘1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons’: http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729. html [2]: ‘1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness’: http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html [3]: Concept Note, A document outlining the goals and activities planned to be undertaken of the UNHCR within the Campaign to End Statelessness: http://www.unhcr.org/53174df39.html [4]:“Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years”, UNHCR Special report on Statelessness: http://www. unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=546217229&query=map%20 stateless%20europe [5]:“Access to nationality and the effective implementation of the European Convention on Nationality” – Resolution by the Council of Europe from April 2014 on how to tackle statelessness: http:// assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=20871&lang=en

Media coverage [6]:“Q&A: The realistic goal of ending statelessness in Europe by 2024”: http://www.unhcr.org/556c6a309.html [7]:“Nowhere to call home” – An article by The Economist that examines recent developments regarding the issue of statelessness: http://www.economist.com/news/international/21602251-changing-face-worlds-non-citizens-nowhere-call-home [8]:“Still stateless, still suffering: It’s time for European leaders to take action”, Chris Nash for Open Democracy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/chris-nash/still-stateless-still-sufferingit%E2%80%99s-time-for-european-leaders-to-take-action [9]:“How small Moldova ran one of Europe’s largest campaigns to prevent and address statelessness”, Roland Schönbauer for UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/55d1a4bd6.html [10]:“Mr. Nils Muižnieks, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, speaks exclusively to ENS” – In this interview Mr. Muižnieks talks about his commitment to address statelessness in Europe and the changes he would like to see: http://www.statelessness.eu/communications/ mr-nils-mui%C5%BEnieks-council-europes-commissioner-human-rights-speaks-exclusively-ens [11]:“Russian Latvians: target of discrimination?” – Deutsche Welle explores to what extent are non-citizens discriminated in Latvia and the opinions of different groups in the Latvian society: http://www.dw.com/en/russian-latvians-target-of-discrimination/a-17605939

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Academic sources [12]: ‘Preventing childhood statelessness in Europe - issues, gaps and good practices’, a Report by the European Network on Statelessness which focuses on children: http://www.statelessness.eu/ sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/Preventing%20childhood%20statelessness%20in%20Europe%20-%20issues%2C%20gaps%20and%20good%20practices.pdf [13]: ‘European Network on Statelessness Submission to the European Commission Consultation on the future of Home Affairs policies: An open and safe Europe – what next?’, a policy contribution by the European Network on Statelessness on how to tackle the issue: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2013/pdf/0027/organisations/ens-european-network-on-statelessness_en.pdf [14]: ‘Analysis Of Integration Of Latvian Non-Citizens’, A Research Project by the Baltic Institute of Social Science on the situation of non-citizens in Latvia. It includes a list of recommendations on how to tackle the issue. Especially pertinent between pages 5 and 7, 80 and 86: http://www.biss. soc.lv/downloads/resources/nepilsoni/BISS_Noncitizens_2014.pdf [15]:“Protection against Statelessness Data” – The Global Database on Protection Against Statelessness, developed by the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory in cooperation with UNHCR, includes information on the extent to which citizenship laws provide sufficient protection against statelessness, in light of the most important international standards: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/ protection-against-statelessness

Videos & visual materials [16]:“Why don’t these 10 million people belong?”- A comprehensive UNHCR video on what it means to be stateless: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNo6JiBFS9Q&index=3&list=PLtPw-Y91GlmVCipdhJgNZ4fTogqradSIj [17]:“Everyone has the right to a nationality!” – This video by the European Network on Statelessness (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1qGwoN61mw) outlines the story of a stateless person [18]:“For Russians In Latvia, Citizenship Is Tricky, But Sights Are Set On Europe” – A balanced view on the situation of non-citizens in Latvia (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rnae8LsXlrY) [19]:“Statelessness in Montenegro: Nusret’s Story” – The issue of statelessness in Montenegro, related to the collapse of Yugoslavia (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxjIxlxk_dw) [20]: A map of accessions to both Statelessness Conventions in Europe: http://maps.unhcr.org/en/ view?uuid=9e15fcda-6ebb-47e7-a48c-a5b78887f504

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Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) A legal and practical fundamental rights safeguard for those deprived of freedom in prison facilities: Which common guidelines should the EU Member States agree on regarding detainees’ rights and freedoms, detention facilities, and social rehabilitation?

by Arriana Yiallourides (CY)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic The European Union (EU) has consistently pronounced its commitment for the upkeep of fundamental rights and freedoms, most notably through the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights1. However, the poor conditions in certain prison systems across the Union and the numerous incidents of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, for instance through widespread prison overcrowding2 and inadequate health care provisions, call into question the lack of initiative in the area of penal policy.

Currently, the EU encompassed a heterogeneous landscape of penitentiary systems with each Member State managing its own prison system. The Union as a collective has no comprehensive guidelines in place with regards to detainees’ rights and freedoms determining the minimum standards of detention facilities. Additionally, the lack of EU competence in this policy area makes matters worse.

This was made evident, for example, when in March 2015 German courts declined to hand over inmates to Bulgaria as a result of concerns over poor prison conditions3. Even though there was a clear rights’ violation and the principle of mutual recognition mandated that prisoners had to serve their sentence in their home country, the EU lacked the capacity to deal with it, and the course of action was determined by German state authorities. It is easy to imagine, though, cases where this leads to impunity or lack of systemic change.

Notably, the only guidelines in place are the European Prison Rules (EPR) set by the Council of Europe. These rules are the main point of reference with regards to the correct management of deprivation of personal liberty in the EU. The rules have been adopted by all 47 contracting states of the Council of Europe, and require all persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for human dignity4. However, it is important to note that these are merely recommendations and are not legally binding. As a result, a lot of the reforms proposed are not implemented, since monitoring is controlled by each Member State.

In light of the reoccurrence of violations of fundamental rights in various prison systems in Member States, how could the EU establish common guidelines for EU prisoners?

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. (2012). Retrieved from EUR-LEX: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT 2

Background information for the LIBE delegation to Italy on the situation of prisons. (2014). Retrieved from: http://www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/493053/IPOL-LIBE_NT(2014)493053_EN.pdf 3

(2015). German courts refuse to extradite prisoners to Bulgaria. Retrieved from: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justicehome-affairs/german-courts-refuse-extradite-prisoners-bulgaria-313190 1

4

European Prison Observatory. (2013). Retrieved from: http://www.prisonobservatory.org/upload/ PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf

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Key terms Prison systems are places that serve to confine and punish persons convicted of crimes. The status of prisons varies across the Union, with problems such as overcrowding causing serious financial and systemic strains for countries such as Italy5. This phenomenon occurs when the demand for space in prisons in a jurisdiction exceeds the capacity for prisoners in the place6.

Additionally, as a result of the lack of common guidelines, the impact of such phenomena is exacerbated for vulnerable groups. According to the European Prison Observatory, women, detained children, infants, foreigners and minorities are in the vulnerable groups of detention facilities and deserve special attention.7 Another important term is social rehabilitation. This is defined as punishment intended to reform a convict so that she or he can lead a productive life and be reintegrated into society8. This is currently the main objective of a modern prison-related policy, which also serves to counter habitual offending, also known as criminal recidivism9. This is understood as a person’s relapse into criminal behaviour, adopting social rehabilitation practises.

Key conflicts and stakeholders If the EU seeks to adopt a penal policy in order to protect the rights of prisoners held in EU prisons, this would in turn require extensive coordination amongst the prison systems and the judicial organs of each Member State in order to ensure that domestic regulations and interpretive practices of the different EU countries comply with a set of common regulations aimed at safeguarding the rights and fundamental freedoms of prisoners. Also, this would be necessary so as to overcome the discrepancies in terms of infrastructure, resources and expertise, needed to align all EU prison systems. Lastly, through the principle of mutual recognition, it can be expected that certain Member States may need to assist other Member States with the common aim of protecting EU prisoners’ rights.

Based on Article 4 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)10, the EU has shared competence in the policy area of freedom, security and justice, in which prisoners’ fundamental rights and freedoms falls under. However, in terms of its control over administration such as that of prison systems, the EU only has a supporting competence 11. Bearing in mind the lack of European initiative in this policy area, a key conflict could arise between the EU institutions responsible 5

Robinson F. (2015). Overcrowding puts strains on Europe’s century old prisons, Retrieved from: http://www.wsj.com/ articles/overcrowding-puts-strains-on-europes-century-old-prisons-1422922763 6

European Prison Observatory. (2013). Detention Conditions in the European Union. Retrieved from: http://www. prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf 7

European Prison Observatory. (2013). Detention Conditions in the European Union. Retrieved from: http://www. prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf 8

Smith N. Encyclopedia of Criminal Justice. Retrieved from: http://pubpages.unh.edu/~nicks/pdf/Rehabilitation.pdf 9

Ovey C. (2013). Ensuring respect of the rights of prisoners under the European Convention on Human Rights as part of their reintegration process. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PRISONS/Conference_19_files/ COURT- Clare Ovey Helsinki.pdf 10

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT 11

European Commission. (2015). FAQ on the EU competences and the European Commission powers. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#q2

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for establishing the framework and the prison systems of each Member States, which would need to carry out the implementation of the guidelines. Thus the issue of compliance would need to be closely monitored.

Furthermore, it is worth noting, that the only guidelines currently in place are the European Prison Rules set by the Council of Europe which are not legally binding and still have faced grave opposition by states such as the UK which have ignored decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 12, which acts as the judicial organ of the Council of Europe.

The Council of Europe (CoE) 13, an intergovernmental organisation which comprises 47 countries of Europe and, unlike the European Union, cannot make binding laws. The CoE set up the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)14 to make recommendations for the improvement of penitentiary systems. This monitoring body, which assesses how persons deprived of their liberty are treated, makes recommendations to states in order to improve their prison systems in accordance to a set of standards15. A more stringent EU approach may face a lot of opposition by Member States who wish to retain their own standards for penitentiary systems. However it is important to note that common guidelines do not imply the establishment of an EU-wide legal framework, but rather a set of standards, which Member States would be encouraged to follow. The EU would provide the guidelines and the method of implementation would be up to the different Member States.

Finally, international organisations and civil society play an important role in prompting Member States to adhere to certain standards such as the EPR. Bodies such as the European Prison Observatory 16

carry out important research, which bring to the forefront the status of prison conditions. Addi-

tionally, organisations such as Europris 17 are key in increasing and improving co-operation among European Prison and Correctional Services, with the aim of improving the lives of prisoners and their families, enhancing public safety and security, reducing re-offending, and advancing professionalism in the corrections’ field.

Measures in place On a primary level, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 18, adopted in 2000, serves as the European Union text on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Most relevant with the establishment of potential EU prison guidelines is Article 4, which reads“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.19

12 13

The Council of Europe in brief. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused The Council of Europe in brief. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused

Council of Europe. The CPT in brief. Retrieved from: http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm

Council of Europe CPT Standards. Retrieved from: http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.pdf 16

European Prison Observatory. (2013). Detention Conditions in the European Union. Retrieved from: http://www. prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf 17

European Prison Observatory. (2013). Detention Conditions in the European Union. Retrieved from: http://www. prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf 18

Council of Europe. The CPT in brief. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused 19

EUR-LEX. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. (2012). Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT 14 15

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Additionally, the European Convention on Human Rights20 is an international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe signed by the 47 members of the Council of Europe.

Article 3 refers to the prohibition of torture particularly the inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Court of Human Rights oversees the implementation of the Convention21.

Currently, the only concrete guidelines in place are the European Prison Rules (EPR) 22, which aim to promote these principles in European prisons. The rules are based on the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners23. They were set up by the Council of Europe and serve as guidelines of good principles and practices in the treatment of detainees and the management of detention facilities. They have been applied to all of its 47 members and consist of a set of three recommendations defining the minimum rules applicable in prison facilities. The rules emphasise the need for treating all persons deprived of their liberty must be treated with respect for their human rights and that the conditions of imprisonment shall, as much as possible, approximate to the conditions of life in free society whilst promoting the detainees’ social rehabilitation.24 Finally, an important framework decision is the EU principle of mutual recognition of prison sentences and for the transfer of prisoners. The decision seeks to extend the application of the principle of mutual recognition, whereby EU countries agree to recognise one another’s laws or decisions, to judgments in criminal matters imposing prison sentences. This is important as it is the basis for the problem of moving prisoners to their home country, when prison conditions there would make them worse off than in the country of their conviction.

Outlook and key questions The EU currently lacks sufficient initiative in the area of penal policy and the need for its development is most evident due to the recurring violations of fundamental rights and freedoms across Member States. Should the prison systems maintain full control in the context of inexistent EU guidelines, the issue of violations of rights and freedoms could worsen. The lack of enforcement of EPR, which lack the institutional capabilities of enforcement and implementation in each Member State, could mean that the status of prisons in Europe remain stagnant.

Some questions to consider: Is the EU doing enough to safeguard the rights of those whose freedom is denied in prison systems?

Should the European Prison Rules (EPR) become legally binding?

European Court of Human Rights. European Convention on Human Rights. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ Convention_ENG.pdf 21

Council of Europe. The CPT in brief. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused 22 https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc. jsp?id=955747&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 23

United Nations. (1955). Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Retrieved from: http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ProfessionalInterest/treatmentprisoners.pdf 24

European Prison Observatory. (2013). Detention Conditions in the European Union. Retrieved from: http://www. prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf 20

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What rights and freedoms should be guaranteed for all detainees?

What stance should the EU take on social rehabilitation?

What standards should all detention facilities in the EU adhere to?

Should other rights and freedoms, besides the existing ones, be guaranteed to prisoners, if at all?

Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: Background information for LIBE Delegation to Italy on the situation of prisons: ht tp://w w w.europarl.europa.eu/RegData /etudes/note/join/2014/49305 3/IPOL- LIBE _ NT(2014)493053_EN.pdf [2]: Council of Europe - Prisons and Community Sanctions and Measures: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/prisons/default_en.asp [3]: 9 Key principles of European Prison Rules, 2006: http://www.epsu.org/a/6545 [4]: Prison Education and Training in Europe: http://ec.europa.eu/education/library/study/2013/prison_en.pdf [5]: EU Detention and Transfer of Prisoners: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-decision/prisoners/index_en.htm [6]: Ensuring respect of the rights of prisoners under the European Convention on Human Rights as part of their reintegration process https://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PRISONS/Conference_19_files/COURT-%20 Clare%20Ovey%20Helsinki.pdf [7]: European Court of Human Rights (Q&A): http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf [8]: EU system for mutual recognition of prison sentences and for the transfer of prisoners http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:jl0016

Media coverage [10]: UK Prisoners banned from voting not entitled to compensation: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/10/uk-prisoner-voting-ban-breached-human-rights-european-court-rules http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31356895

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[11]: The Norwegian Prison Model: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-treated-like-people

Academic sources [12]: Prison in Europe – Overview and Trends: http://www.prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisoninEuropeOverviewandtrends.pdf [13]: Compendium of conventions, recommendations and resolutions relating to penitentiary questions, European Council http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PRISONS/PCCP%20documents%202014/COMPENDIUM%20E%202014.pdf

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Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Health care and reproductive justice: After the failed resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the European Parliament, which strategy should the EU pursue to ensure that women have access to effective sexual education, and how should the EU ensure reproductive health standards?

by Benjamin Gradhand (DE)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic “On International Human Rights Day, when we should be celebrating how far we’ve come in protecting fundamental human rights, the European Parliament has failed to support women’s right to control their fertility and has turned a blind eye to the discrimination Europeans face based on their age, sexual orientation or gender identity.”

- Johanna Westeson, regional director for Europe at the Center for Reproductive Rights On December 10th, 2013, a day which is also celebrated as the International Human Rights Day, the European Parliament’s (EP) failure to adopt the resolution, which called for access to safe and legal abortion, non-discrimination, and the right to access healthcare and sexual education1, was seen as a controversial move. The so-called Estrela Report was shelved by a tight vote, which created frustration as the EP had just turned a blind eye towards the European Union’s (EU) founding principles of dignity, freedom, equality and non-discrimination. The discussions mainly circled around the principle of subsidiarity in connection to the formulation and implementation of policies on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), with education remaining an exclusive competence of the Member States and the EU only intervening to support, coordinate or complement their actions.

Next to the Estrela Report, the Tarabella Report2 was adopted in 2015, which includes the importance of equality and the right to decide, thus Tarabella is more lenient version of the initial discussion points on securing complete freedom for women to decide over their health and reproduction.

The EU is also seen as a global actor in upholding fundamental human rights and acting their vanguard on an international scale. Reproductive rights are a subset of human rights that deal with areas of sexual health, family planning and reproductive freedom. Even though their importance was first highlighted at the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968, there is still no consensus on what these rights entail, and how they should be guaranteed. The most widely agreed upon interpretation comes from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which published a programme of action in 1994 that referred to the “right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family 1

European Parliament. (2013). Motion for a European Parliament on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0426&language=EN#title2 2 European Parliament. (2015). Motion for a European Parliament on progress on equality between women and men in the European Union in 2013. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-20150015+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

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LEIPZIG 2015 planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant.”3

SRHR, including the right to maternal healthcare and family planning, contains both freedoms and entitlements linked to many of the already established civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights (EP, 2013). Despite the efforts to form a united front, the disparities of providing equal and fair health services in the Member States persist. The main conflict in question of the resolution of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the European Parliament was about the legal accessibility and safety of abortion. For instance, in countries like Poland and Ireland, abortion is legal in limited circumstances, such as when a woman’s life is in danger or in instances of rape or incest.

In both countries the access to reproductive services is insufficient and human rights activists fight for legal reforms to expand the access.4 Furthermore, Malta, as a controversial case among the Member States, has banned all sorts of procedures to perform abortion and punishes those involved with imprisonment up to three years.5 The importance of discussing the topic and understanding its complexity, it is vital to acknowledge the fundamental values of healthcare systems in Europe. These are universality, solidarity and equity,6 which relates to an access to prevention and treatment in health for all, financial support to ensure the access to healthcare, as well as healthcare based on need no matter the status.

The different aspects of the issue involve sensitive topics such as abortion, clinical services and family planning, access to information on health education and contraceptives, sexual education at schools, and non-discrimination of vulnerable societal groups. Access to reproductive and sexual health services in some the Member States is highly dependent on income and status, and solutions need to be found especially to include women and girls facing difficulties with accessing sexual education and preventative measures in particular. The Member States having the task to tackle these variations on their national level adds a dimension of complexity to the coordination of the EU health policy and fight for the justice of reproductive health standards.

3

International Conference on Population and Development (1994). Programme of Action. Retrieved from http://www. unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/ICPD%20PoA%20English.pdf (page 59) 4 Center for Reproductive Rights. (2013). EU Parliament Fails to Back Women’s Rights. Retieved from http://www. reproductiverights.org/press-room/EU-parliament-fails-to-back-women-rights 5 Abortion Clinics in Europe. (2015). Countries where abortion is illegal. Retrieved from http://www.abortion-clinics.eu/ abortion-europe/abortion-prohibited/ 6

Centre for Reproductive Rights. (2008). European Standards for Subsidizing Contraceptives. Retrieved from http://www. reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_fac_slovak_european%20standards_9%2008_WEB.pdf

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Key terms Family planning – includes both preventing unwanted pregnancy, and becoming pregnant when desired.7 Reproductive health – a state of physical, mental, and social well-being in all matters relating to the reproductive system at all stages of life.8 Reproductive health care – is considered to be the collection of techniques, methods, and services that contribute positively to reproductive health and well-being by preventing and solving reproductive health issues. Additionally, it includes sexual health; the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations, not just counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually transmitted infections.9 Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) – good sexual and reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being in all matters relating to the reproductive system.

It implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life, the capability to reproduce, and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so.10 Sexuality Education (SE) – is an age-appropriate, culturally relevant approach to teaching about sex and relationships by providing scientifically accurate, realistic, non-judgemental information.

Sexuality education provides opportunities to explore one’s own values, attitudes while being able to build decision-making, communication and risk-education skills about various aspects of a person’s sexuality. Its goals are to reduce the risk of unwanted pregnancies, among others.11 Moreover, an aspect of SE is Comprehensive Sexuality Education (CSE) in which the term ‘comprehensive’ means that such sexuality education needs to encompass the full range of information, skills, and values to allow for young people to exercise their sexual and reproductive rights, and to be able to make decision about their health and sexuality.12

Key conflicts and stakeholders The most prevalent stakeholders in this issue are women. The lack of sexual health standards and sexual education affects women, especially young women, more than any other group; there are about 250,000,000 women13 currently living in the 28 Member States.

World Health Organization. (2015). Family planning. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/topics/family_planning/en/

World Health Organization. (2015). Research on sexual and reproductive health throughout the world. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/about_us/hrp/en/ 9

European Commision. (2015). Reproductive health. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/health/population_groups/gender/ reproductive/index_en.htm#fragment0 10

United Nations Population Fund. (2015). Sexual and reproductive health. Retrieved from http://www.unfpa.org/sexualreproductive-health 11

Library of the European Parliament. (2012). Sexuality Education in the EU. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2012/120262/LDM_BRI(2012)120262_REV2_EN.pdf 12

UNESCO. (2015). Sexuality Education. Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/hiv-and-aids/our-priorities-in-hiv/ sexuality-education/ 13

Eurostat. (2015). The EU in the world 2015. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/6975194/ KS-EX-15-001-EN-N.pdf/d05075db-b5cf-4751-b62b-f49cc89f3fa2 7 8

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To better explain how rooted the debate on SRHR is, in May 2014 Mr. Borg, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy, replied to a Member of the European Parliament’s question of what does the EU’s common view look like, with the following: “the Commission is aware that no common view exists in the EU Member States regarding sexual and reproductive rights. In the recent United Nations Commission on Population and Development on 7-11 April, the EU was not in a position to present a united position on sexual and reproductive health and rights”.14 When it comes to sexual education, the stakeholders’ framework extends to schools and Ministries of Education as well. Whereas some Member States, such as Poland and Lithuania, have limited sexual education curricula and mainly focused on biology elements, the Dutch and the Swedish curricula are broader and even include elements of communication and negotiation skills.151617 On a EU institutional level the two key stakeholders are the European Commission’s Directorate Generals on Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) and the on eon Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA). DG SANTE is monitoring the health sector and proposing legislative actions; CHAFEA is managing operations and financial framework of the Health Programme.

On a global scale, the UNFPA and the World Health Organization (WHO) are the main sources of information and coordinators. The UNFPA thus describes itself as the “lead UN agency for delivering a world where every pregnancy is wanted, every birth safe and every young person’s potential fulfilled”. It has concentrated much of its work in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and determines that though improvements have been made since 1994, these countries are still far away from having even acceptable levels of reproductive rights. The WHO directs and coordinates international health policy within the United Nations’ system. It supports countries as they coordinate the efforts of multiple sectors of the government and partners to attain their health objectives and support their national health policies and strategies. The UNFPA and the WHO are the main data-collecting organisations as well as the main source of assessment and statistics on the issue.

The Centre for Reproductive Rights (CRR) is a global organisation that advocates for the right to abortion. It has helped numerous women present their cases to the European Court of Human Rights in past years, and was one of the first groups to frame preventable maternal death as a human rights violation. The CRR posits that abortion is a fundamental reproductive right, and as such many of its campaigns are focused on forcing countries that outlaw it to legalise the practice, and obliging countries with tight restrictions to loosen them.

14

European Parliament (2014). Parliamentary question: answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission. Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2014-004206&language=EN 15

Walls, A. (2015). In The Netherlands Sex Education Starts In Kindergarten: Here’s What They Tell Them & Why. Collective Evolution. Retrieved from: http://www.collective-evolution.com/2015/06/22/in-the-netherlands-sex-education-starts-in-kindergarten-heres-what-they-tell-themwhy/ 16

Weale, S. (2015). Swedish sex education has time for games and mature debate. The Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jun/05/swedish-sex-education-games-mature.

17

Directorate General For Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights And Constitutional Affairs, Gender Equality. (2013). Policies for Sexuality Education in the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/462515/IPOL-FEMM_NT(2013)462515_EN.pdf

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ASTRA is a network of activist organisations, operating mainly in Central and Eastern Europe. It aims to promote women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights in the region, and to ensure a prominent place for these issues on national and regional agendas.

Measures in place As the EU does not have an exclusive competence in the field of health, there are no actual EU measures in place. Nevertheless, the Parliament noted, in a 2013 resolution, that “the EU can contribute to the promotion of best practices among Member States”.18 The two fundamental pieces of EU legislation in the health field are Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). Art 168 of the TFEU states: “A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities”19; Article 36 of the CFR states “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices”.

Despite leaving a considerable freedom to Member States in shaping their health policies, the EU does have an influence in the field through funding. It is interesting to note, though, that in the thematic priorities of the Third Annual Health Programme 2014-2020 of the European Union, SHRH are not mentioned.20 With regards to the Council of Europe (CoE), in 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE passed the “European strategy for the promotion of sexual and reproductive health and rights”21, which mainly targets preventing sexually transmitted diseases, combating sexual violence, and decreasing mother and child equality, while measures to ensure women’s rights remain unspecific.

In terms of sexual education, the CFR does not explicitly mention it; however, Article 14 (1) guarantees the right to education, while Article 14(3) gives parents the right to ensure the education and teaching of their children is in conformity with “religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions”.

In terms of international health legislation, the most active body is the WHO22. In 2014, the Standing Committee of the Regional Committee for Europe (SCRC) of the WHO agreed to develop a new sexual and reproductive health strategy and action plan for the European Region to be finalised in 2016.

18

European Parliament. (2013). R resolution of 10 December 2013 on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.

2013/2040(INI). Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0548&language= EN&ring=A7-2013-0426 19

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Protocols – Annexes, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN 20

Regulation No 282/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on the establishment of a third Programme for the Union's action in the field of health (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 1350/2007/EC. Retrieved from: http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0282&from=EN 21

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. (2004). Resolution 1399 on European strategy for the promotion of sexual and reproductive health and rights. Retrieved from: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en. asp?fileid=17257&lang=en 22

WHO Regional Office for Europe, German Federal Centre of Health Education. (2010). Standards for Sexuality Education in Europe. Retrieved from http://www.bzga-whocc.de/pdf.php?id=061a863a0fdf28218e4fe9e1b3f463b3

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In 2010 the WHO Regional Office in Europe, along with the German Federal Centre of Health Education, developed a collection of sexual education guidelines “to help public health decision-makers develop appropriate curricula for sexuality education have been issued”.

Outlook and key questions In order to maintain one’s sexual and reproductive health, women and girls need to have access to accurate information, and the safe, effective, and affordable contraception method of their choice.

Moreover, it is crucial that women are informed and empowered to protect themselves from sexually transmitted infections, and in case of pregnancies, they must have access to services that help them have a fit pregnancy, safe delivery and a healthy baby.

Despite numerous international commitments, the existence of a disparity in the standard of sexual and reproductive health between and within Member States is more than apparent. The inequality of sexual and reproductive rights enjoyed by women in Europe, including but not limited to, terms of access to reproductive health services, contraception, and abortion, are all alarming signs of a situation that is in a desperate need of change and an intervention.

In order to respect every individual’s right to make their own choices about their sexual and reproductive health, current methods need to be strengthened or new ones need to be implemented.

Considering that this matter falls under the competence of the Member States, how can the EU support the Member State’s efforts to provide women and young girls with the right information and access to reproductive health services? To what extent, in what fields and where can it be ensured that women and girls learn about sexual health and reproduction? Should there be a ‘universal law’ among all Member States regarding rules and regulations on abortion or it is more important to make sure that in countries where abortion is legal, it is also safe? What are the alternatives in terms of access to safe abortion in EU countries where abortion is illegal? Considering that information is an important part of women being able to make the correct choices for themselves, which minimum standards should be guaranteed with regards to access to information about reproductive health?

Even though each Member State places a different level of emphasis on reproductive healthcare and sexual education, migrant, refugee and undocumented women who face insecure economic and social situations are even worse off as their need for sexual and reproductive health is often minimised or ignored among the Member States. If everyone should be equally guaranteed their basic rights, how can the aforementioned groups of women also be assured safe and accessible information and healthcare to be able to make their own choices regarding their sexual and reproductive health?

This topic is about empowering women to exercise their right of equal access to health services by providing them with information and outreach clinical services in family planning and contraception. This topic calls for tangible solutions to a worrisome issue while contesting how realistic those solutions may be and which minimum standards should be guaranteed by the EU.

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1] New Publications Support Women’s Reproductive Health: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/fiji/ press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150317_02_en.htm [2] Reproductive Health Indicators in the European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_projects/2001/monitoring/fp_monitoring_2001_a1_frep_02_en.pdf [3] Sexuality education in the EU: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2012/120262/LDM_BRI(2012)120262_REV2_EN.pdf [4] Policies for sexuality education in the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/note/join/2013/462515/IPOL-FEMM_NT(2013)462515_EN.pdf [5] Sexual And Reproductive Health and Rights: http://epthinktank.eu/2013/01/19/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights/ [6] Barometer of Women’s Access to Modern Contraceptive Choice in 10 EU Countries: http://www. ippfen.org/sites/default/files/Barometer_Apr2014.pdf [7] Actions on reproductive and sexual health and rights in the European Union. http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:r12517&from=EN [8] Regulation (EC) No 1567/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 on aid for policies and actions on reproductive and sexual health and rights in developing countries: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32003R1567

Media coverage [9] Migrant women face acute need for sexual and reproductive health care: http://www.ipas.org/en/ News/2013/April/Migrant-women-face-acute-need-for-sexual-and-reproductive-health-care.aspx [10] Millions of European Women Struggle to Access Contraception: http://www.reproductiverights. org/press-room/millions-of-european-women-struggle-to-access-contraception [11] Parliament fails to pass report on women’s reproductive rights: https://euobserver.com/social/122418 [12] EU aid for family planning sparks debate as budget cuts loom: http://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/2013/feb/06/eu-aid-family-planning-criticised

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Academic sources [13] Sexual and reproductive health of migrants: Does the EU care?: http://www.healthpolicyjrnl. com/article/S0168-8510(13)00288-1/pdf [14] Access to Contraceptives in the European Union: http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr. civicactions.net/files/documents/crr_eu_contraception_factsheet_v2.pdf [15] Are There Unmet Family Planning Needs in Europe?: http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3207400.html

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Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs II (ECON II) Protection of the national legal standards and the development towards a full common market: How should the EU deal with financial havens, offshore accounts and tax-avoidance regulations in its Member States?

by Khalid El Ghoul (NL)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic „Corporate taxation in the EU needs radical reform. In the interests of growth, competitiveness and fairness, Member States need to pull together and everyone must pay their fair share.“ as stated by Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs when announcing plans to tackle the practice of tax avoidance1. The European Commission (EC) estimates that tax evasion and tax avoidance might cost the governments of the Member States €1 trillion a year. This number became particularly offsetting when on November 5th, 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) published a number of documents containing tax rulings between the government of Luxembourg and numerous multinational companies, such as Amazon and Fiat. These tax rulings are so-called ‘letters of comfort’ between a country’s tax office and multinationals, which reassure them that their proposed tax schemes are approved by the national tax authorities. These schemes include complex financial structures allowing for as little taxation as possible, which in some cases means less than one per cent taxation on profits.

Revelations on similar tax rulings in the Netherlands and Ireland further fuelled the already growing public backlash against corporate tax avoidance schemes. In a time of economic uncertainty and a slow European Union (EU)-wide recovery from the financial crisis, many consider the tax rulings to be unethical, as the promotion of tax avoidance has deprived public budgets of crucial resources. This makes it increasingly difficult for Member States to raise funds, and undermines a fair-burden sharing between taxpayers, in particular between private citizens and small companies with limited resources, and multinational companies. In response to the revelations, the EC has launched an investigation into several tax rulings and received an endorsement by the European Council in December 2014 to put forward proposals on how to tackle the issue of tax avoidance.

On March 18th, 2015, the Commission presented its Tax Transparency Package, which includes several plans to increase tax transparency between Member States. Multinational companies rely on the complexity of tax rules and the lack of cooperation between Member States to minimise their taxes. Increasing transparency and cooperation between Member States is thus essential in the fight against aggressive tax planning. The proposals included in the package already received unanimous political support by the national ministers of finance at a meeting of the Council in April. An agreement on the technicalities is set to be reached by the end of this year. Following this first set of measures,

European Commission. (2015). Statement by Pierre Moscovici on Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation.

Retrieved from http://europa.eu/!nh49Ng 1

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the Commission presented a second Action Plan to combat corporate tax avoidance in June. The Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation includes five key areas of action as identified by the Commission. Legislative proposals based on the outlined strategy are set to follow in 2016.

Following the mounting public and political interest in tax ruling practices in Member States, the European Parliament decided on the 12th of February, 2015, to set up a Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (TAXE). This special committee looked into the compatibility of several tax rulings in different Member States for a period of six months and adopted a report on the 20th of July, which included recommendations on how to improve transparency and cooperation between Member States in the field of taxes. Further legislative proposal are set to follow.

Key terms Corporate tax avoidance is understood as a situation where certain companies use aggressive tax planning in order to minimise their tax bills. It often entails companies exploiting legal loopholes in tax systems and mismatches between national regulations, to artificially shift profits to jurisdictions with lower tax rates. As such, it goes against the principle that taxation should reflect where the economic activity occurs. Whereas tax avoidance is legal, tax evasion is not and represents a situation where companies report less profit than generated, either by reporting higher losses or lower revenues. These funds are then hidden in offshore accounts.

Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, also known as BEPS, refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. This undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems. Fifteen specific actions (‘Action Plan on BEPS’) have been developed in the context of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project to equip governments with domestic and international instruments needed to address this challenge.

The OECD is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which promotes policies that improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. The OECD provides a forum in which governments and various other stakeholders can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems on a wide range of matters, from agriculture and tax to the safety of chemicals.

Transfer pricing2 refers to the terms and conditions surrounding transactions between separate entities within a multinational company. It concerns the prices charged between controlled or related enterprises, established in different countries, for inter-company transactions, among which are the transfer of goods and use of patents. Since the prices are set by non-independent 2

Khan Academy. (2012). A video explaining the concept of profit shifting, including the practice of transfer pricing.

Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLSYwkWCIzA

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entities within the multinational company, the prices may not necessarily reflect an independent market price. This is a major concern for tax authorities who worry that multinational entities may set transfer prices on cross-border transactions to reduce taxable profits in their jurisdiction.

Tax base is the measure of taxation considering the value of assets that are subject to taxation, such as revenue and property. This determines the amount of tax that is due over a particular asset.

Key conflicts and stakeholders Reflecting the above-mentioned complexity of tax rules and lack of coordination, the key underlying conflict in this issue is one of a highly technical nature. The intricate relationships between the different stakeholders and their interests lie at the foundation of the issues that have arisen in the field of taxes. It is therefore essential to understand the position of each actor within the context of taxation and how this contributes to the issue at hand.

The single most important actors in this matter are the Member States as they form the connecting link between the different stakeholders and hold the legal competence within the field of taxes. With regards to the issues in this field, the conflict is threefold. First, the interaction between the Member States; the lack of coordination and communication between the Member States on tax rulings and tax regulations has allowed for multinational companies to exploit mismatches and loopholes in the different tax systems. Second, the interaction between Member States and the EU institutions; Member States are required to formally notify the European Commission in case tax-related aid is granted to multinationals. According to a report published by the TAXE Committee, Member States failed in many cases to disclose the aforementioned information to the European Commission, which is in direct violation of EU’s state aid rules outlined in Article 108 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)3. Finally, the interaction between Member States and multinational companies: whilst governments of Member States have vowed to fight tax avoidance, it is still they who make it possible for tax avoidance to occur by granting favourable tax rulings to multinational companies. Member States have a clear interest in attracting companies to their country and uphold tax competition4, especially as it contributes to the national budget through tax revenues and job opportunities. This practice, however, distorts competition on the internal market and undermines a fair burden-sharing. In this lies the fundamental conflict between the EU exclusive competence on competition on the internal market and the national competence on the regulation of tax systems.

As a counter balance to the actions of the Member States, the European Commission aims to facilitate a coordinated EU approach to battle tax avoidance. With the Tax Transparency Package and the Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation the Commission has 3

Norton Rose Fulbrich. (2014). Tax rulings on transfer pricing may violate EU state aid rules. Retrieved from http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8e1c8105-6020-4268-843e-e60f1b0825ec 4

Bowers, S. (2015). UK to reject EU plans to combat multinational tax avoidance. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/18/uk-reject-eu-plans-combat-multinational-tax-avoidance

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set itself an ambitious agenda for the upcoming year. However, the EU depends on the commitment of the Member States for approval and it remains uncertain whether these ambitions will be met with support from the Member States. Whilst the European Council endorsed the Commission’s actions, this is not always reflected in negotiations with the Council.

Finally, other key players are multinational corporations which employ big accounting firms to create complex legal structures with technically separate business entities in the different countries where they operate, so that profits can be shifted around through the practice of transfer pricing.

One specific case met with public outcry, is the case of Starbucks. The British subsidiary of the chain claimed a loss on turnover, so it was exempt from paying taxes on profits. This loss, however, was largely due to payments made to other companies in the Starbucks group for its coffee supplies, use of the Starbucks logo and shop format, and interest on loans within the group.

Measures in place As part of its ambitious agenda to tackle corporate tax avoidance and harmful tax competition in the EU, the European Commission presented several plans for the upcoming year. The Tax Transparency Package includes several measures to boost transparency and cooperation between Member States. As mentioned earlier, Member States share little information about their tax rulings with one another. Member States can decide for themselves whether a tax ruling might be relevant to another country or not. Subsequently, other Member States are not necessarily aware of cross-border tax rulings issued in another EU country, which may impact their own tax rates. Companies rely on the complexity of tax rules and the lack of cooperation between Member States in order to shift profits and minimise their taxes.

The European Commission aims to resolve this by introducing a system that requires Member States to automatically exchange information on their tax rulings. Every three months, national tax authorities would have to submit a report to all other Member States informing them of all cross-border tax rulings that have been issued. This is based on the principle that it is other Member States, which are best placed to assess the potential impact and relevance of such rulings, rather than the Member State giving the ruling. In case the disclosed information is not enough, a Member State can request more information from the respective country. This is one of the formal legislative proposals that are part of the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU5, which introduced the system of exchanging information, yet lacked a legally binding character. Therefore, a more systematic and binding approach to information exchange on tax rulings appears necessary within the EU. This approach should ensure that where one Member State issues an advanced tax ruling or transfer pricing arrangement, any other Member State affected is in a position to take any necessary corresponding action. The proposal has been submitted to the Council and now awaits formal approval, which is expected to come at the end of 2015.

5

Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/99/EEC. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:064:0001:0012:En:PDF

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Next to the Tax Transparency Package, the European Commission plans to submit several other proposals that are included in the Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation. This Action Plan sets out a series of measures that focus on areas where EU action would be the most effective way to address corporate tax challenges and to target particular types of abuse e.g. transfer pricing. Taken together, these measures offer a more coordinated corporate tax environment within the EU, leading to fairer taxation, more stable revenues and a better environment for businesses.

Among these measures is the re-launch of the CCCTB proposal6 and further regulations in line with the OECD BEPS Project, and the facilitation of Member States’ cooperation in the field of taxes by reforming the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 7and the Platform on Tax Good Governance 8.

Outlook and key questions It is clear that there are several measures on the way to combat tax avoidance and limit possibilities to exploit the tax system to a minimum. The first of these is the Tax Transparency Package, which is expected to be formally approved by the Council by the end of this year after unanimous informal support by the finance ministers in April. The question remains, however, whether the Council will follow through on its initially expressed support, in order for the measures to take effect by the 1st of January 2016? Next in line are the proposals scheduled for 2016, among which the re-formed CCCTB proposal. Whilst it may be an effective tool to combat tax avoidance, as the Commission advocates, the reformed CCCTB proposal is already facing some hurdles as the UK has already signalled that it will not support a system of common tax rules, rather insisting on tax competition. In addition to the work of the European Commission and the European Parliament, the OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to improve international tax co-operation between governments to counter international tax avoidance and evasion. A report including several measures is expected to be delivered to the G20 Finance Ministers in October 2015. This report will include several suggestions on how to battle tax avoidance and tax evasion. The European Commission indicated in its Action Plan that its proposal will be in line with the measures included in this report. The results of further meetings between the TAXE committee, Juncker and Moscovici as well as Vestager, will provide an impression of further steps to be taken.

The key to reforming corporate taxation in the EU, however, remains in the hands of the Member States and their rather lacklustre efforts to cooperate with the Committee on TAXE is illustrative and possibly suggestive of how matters will proceed in the nearby future. Ultimately, Member States would need to overcome their differences for the sake of fairness, competitiveness and efficiency.

Ryan, E, D. (2015). European Union re-launches formulary apportionment: key points about the CCCTB. Retrieved from http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=05482cef-1676-48bc-94a3-53e8057d04f1 7

European Commission. (2015). Harmful tax competition. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index_en.htm 8

European Commission. (2015). Platfrom for Tax Good Governance. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_ customs/taxation/gen_info/good_governance_matters/platform/index_en.htm 6

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In order to effectively address the issues posed by corporate tax avoidance and evasion, it is important to consider the role of each actor, the intricate relationship between the different actors and their interests. What concrete actions will the European Commission propose and what will be the focus of these proposals? Will the Member States be able to reach an agreement on these proposals and implement them accordingly? The European Commission and the Member States reiterated that neither have any intention of shifting competences in the regulation of tax systems to the EU. In the European Union where tax rulings interfere with competition on the internal market and cause public budgets to be deprived of resources, how much longer will it be possible to uphold such a division of competences? Is this a sustainable situation? Whilst there may be mismatches in national tax systems, this cannot necessarily be considered as an incentive to avoid tax through aggressive tax planning. What is the position of multinationals on tax avoidance and can they be prevented from engaging in such practices? If so, how?

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Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: European Commission Press release on the Tax Transparency Package: http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-15-4610_en.htm [2]: The Tax Transparency Package: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/ taxation/company_tax/transparency/com_2015_135_en.pdf [3]: European Commission summary of the Tax Transparency Package: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/transparency/index_en.htm [4]: European Commission summary of the Tax Transparency Package: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/transparency/index_en.htm [5]: European Commission press release on the Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation in the EU: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5188_en.htm [6]: The Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation in the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/ taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/fairer_corporate_taxation/ com_2015_302_en.pdf [7]: European Commission summary of the Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation in the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/fairer_corporate_taxation/ index_en.htm [8]: European Parliament resolution of 12 February 2015 on setting up a special committee on tax rulings (TAXE): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-0039&language=en [9]: Committee on TAXE website with a newsfeed on their progress: http://www.europarl.europa. eu/committees/en/taxe/home.html [10]: Draft report by the Committee on TAXE on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-564.938%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN [11]: The OECD web page on BEPS and their work on the package of measures scheduled for October 2015: http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-about.htm

Media coverage [12]: EUobserver, an article explaining the work of the Committee on TAXE and their recommendation in the: https://euobserver.com/news/129809 [13]: EUobserver, an article highlighting the lack of effort by Member States to provide the Committee on TAXE with the necessary documents: https://euobserver.com/justice/128667 [14]: Huffington Post, an analysis of the current tax situation, including thoughts by high profile economists: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/multinational-corporations- taxes_55d4baede4b055a6dab265d9

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Notes

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Committee on Legal Affairs II (JURI II) Preventing violations of fundamental rights by police forces: What common guidelines should the EU set to protect both the freedom of speech and public security?

by Andreia-Gemma Moraru (RO)

Relevance and contextualisation of the topic Throughout the history, public protests have proven to be a vital tool for the citizens to control the decisions of the executive or legislative powers in a country. The citizen’s right to protest peacefully is an essential component in any democratic state as it is one of the most effective ways in which the people can make their voice heard and influence the political decisions. Moreover, many demonstrations have taken place in the past few years in response to various government measures.

For example, several demonstrations took place in Greece1 and Spain2 in response to government austerity measures, and in Turkey (the Gezi Park protests)3, to protect freedom of speech and right to assembly. Even though they started as peaceful demonstrations, all these protests ended up having an alarmingly high number of casualties due to the unnecessary and excessive use of force by the police in case of a peaceful demonstration. The law enforcement officials often make use of“less-lethal weapons”4 to disperse peaceful protesters. For example, the demonstrations in Greece resulted in over 300 injuries and 5 deaths, the demonstrations in Spain resulted in over 1500 injuries, and the demonstrations in Turkey resulted in 8000 injuries and 22 deaths.

The right to protest as such is not guaranteed by any national constitution or international treaty; however it is a manifestation of the right to freedom of assembly and association and the right to freedom of speech. These rights are guaranteed by national constitutions, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)5and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

However, those rights are not absolute and can be subjected to restrictions if it is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. These restrictions are necessary to prevent the protesters to prevail themselves of these rights, while they are in fact not seeking to protest peacefully, but to instigate violence and pose a threat to public security. Law enforcement officials are the ones responsible for ensuring that the public safety and order are respected by the protesters. In order to do so, they have to evaluate in each situation if their intervention is necessary and proportionate. Therefore, under no circumstances should the police intervene and

The Guardian. (2011, July 1). Greek police face investigation after protest violence. Retrieved from http://www. theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/01/greek-police-investigation-protest-violence 2

BBC. (2011, May 28). Anger as Spanish police move on Barcelona protest camp. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-13582863 3

BBC. (2013, June 3). Protests ‘no Turkish Spring’, says PM Erdogan. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-22753418 4

Less-lethal weapon are weapons intended to be less likely to kill a living target than conventional weapons, such as pepper spray, tear gas, water cannons.

5

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (1950). Retrieved from http://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 1

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disperse a peaceful and legal demonstration or use violence on protesters who do not oppose resistance. They should intervene only if the protesters pose danger to the public safety and they should use only the necessary and proportionate measures to protect public safety. The European Court of Human Rights found violations of the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment in various cases against Turkey, Hungary and Russia. However, if the protesters become violent and put the life of other protesters or of the police officers in danger, or present a threat in any other way to the public security, then the police forces are expected to intervene.6 Even so, the European Union (EU) does not have a clear legislation on the policing of protests like the UN does (UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials). Given the high number of casualties during the recent peaceful protests, how should the EU define the role of the law enforcement officials during protests?

Key terms As previously stated, the right to protest is a manifestation of the right to freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. The right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11, ECHR) is defined as the freedom of peaceful assembly and the freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of interest. The right to freedom of expression (Art. 10, ECHR) is defined as the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. These rights are safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, several other international conventions and national constitutions. However, those are not absolute rights, which means that they may be subject to restrictions or penalties, which are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society or if such limitations are in the interest of national security, public safety, public morals and the rights of others. It is the role of police forces to intervene and impose such limitations if the public demonstrations pose threats to the public security but only if necessary and using proportionate measures to the situation they are facing. If the measure is neither necessary, nor proportionate, then the intervention is classified as an arbitrary use of excessive force, which is defined as use of excessive force by police that exceeds the legal limits. The fact that an intervention is arbitrary or excessive is described on a case-by-case basis. Though, as a general rule, law enforcement officials are not allowed to put the life of the protesters in danger (as it would represent a breach of their right to life, safeguarded by Art. 2 ECHR, or the right to not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment, safeguarded by Art. 3 ECHR). In order to avoid that, they use less-lethal weapons to disperse protesters. These types of weapons are intended to be less likely to kill a living target than conventional weapons and they are usually used by police forces in riot control or crowd control.

However, even less-lethal weapons can pose serious threats to the life and health of the protesters, which is shown in the high number of casualties at the aforementioned protests.7 6

ECHR decisions on demonstrations, riots and protests. (2014). Retrieved from https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ sites/default/files/case-digest-ECHR-protest-11212014.pdf 7

Amnesty International. (2012). Policing demonstrations in the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org. uk/sites/default/files/eu-police.pdf

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Key conflicts and stakeholders They key conflict in this matter is how to strike the balance between the right to freedom of association and freedom of speech of the protesters and the obligation of the authorities to protect the public safety and order.

On the one hand, the rights of the protesters are infringed whenever a legal and peaceful gathering is dispersed by the police authorities. Moreover, according to a report elaborated by Amnesty International,“in many cases criminal investigations against officers who are alleged to have committed violations are not thorough, impartial or effective; in other cases, no investigation is initiated at all”.

For example, in Greece, the alleged violations committed by police officers are first investigated by a disciplinary body from the police department.8 This procedure is not impartial because it is carried out by the colleagues of the accused police officers and the victims cannot contribute to the investigation. Also, it is hard to identify the police officers involved, as their identification number is often not visible.9 On the other hand, the role of the law enforcement officials is to protect public security and prevent public violence. Protesters do not always have a peaceful behaviour and it is the duty of the police officers to ensure that their behaviour does not pose a threat to either their own personal safety, or the public safety. The European Court of Human Rights stated in several decisions that the police intervention is justified if the protesters attack the police officers, instigate other protesters to violence, use firearms or pose a threat to the public security in any other way. Also, if an assembly risks to instigate violence, then the police officers should disperse it, to protect the democratic values of the society.

In the area of freedom, security and justice, the EU has shared competences with the Member States, as stated in Article 4 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The EU and Member States are authorised to adopt binding acts in these fields. However, Member States may exercise their competence only in so far as the EU has not exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence10. The protection of fundamental human rights, such as the right to freedom of speech and the right to freedom of assembly, falls under this competence, as well as the cooperation in criminal matters. The EU has already enacted legislation in the field of the respect of fundamental rights, for example, the Council Directive 2000/78/EC, which safeguards the right to equal treatment in employment and occupation. The EU also aims to be more active in the field of criminal justice, through the creation of EUROPOL11, EUROJUST12, CEPOL13. This means that the EU can adopt binding legislation and it can take measures to harmonise the national legislation in relation to the respect of human rights and the cooperation in criminal matters. Even so, the EU needs to respect the prin Amnesty International. (2012). Police violence in Greece. Not just ‘isolated incidents’. Retrieved from http://www.univie. ac.at/bimtor/dateien/greece_ai_2012_police_violence.pdf 9

Amnesty International. (2012). Police violence in Greece. Not just ‘isolated incidents’. Retrieved from http://www.univie. ac.at/bimtor/dateien/greece_ai_2012_police_violence.pdf 10

EurLex. (2010). Division of competences within the EU. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=uriserv:ai0020 11

EUROPOL. (2015). Retrieved from https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/about-us 12

EUROJUST. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/mission-tasks.aspx 13

CEPOL. (2015). Retrieved from https://www.cepol.europa.eu/who-we-are/european-police-college/about-us 8

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ciple of subsidiarity, which aims at determining the level of intervention that is most relevant. If an action has transnational aspects that cannot be resolved by Member States, if national action or inaction would be contrary to the EU aims and objectives, and an action at European level has clear advantages, then the EU should legislate in this field. Otherwise, the Member States are the ones who will continue to regulate that specific field.

However, in the field of administrative cooperation, which covers the actual conduct of the law enforcement officials, the EU has only supporting competences. This means that in this field, the states have the exclusive competence to adopt legislation. Therefore, with regards to internal rules, management and organisation of the police forces, the EU can only carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement Member States’ actions in this field. Such actions can include training or funding programs to improve certain aspects of the activity of police forces, but the EU cannot adopt binding legislation in this field or call for the harmonisation of the existing national legislations.

Measures in place International level The UN adopted two non-binding documents on this matter: the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials14 and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials15. Both state that the duty of the law enforcement officials is to protect the human rights of all persons and that the use of force should be exceptional, used only if it is reasonably necessary and be proportional to the legitimate objective to be achieved. The use of firearms is considered to be an extreme measure, for example when the offender offers armed resistance or they jeopardise the lives of others. Under no circumstances may a law enforcement official inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The governments should adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms against persons by law enforcement officials. Lastly, when policing assemblies, even if they are unlawful and violent, the police forces should use firearms only when less dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary. Otherwise, they should avoid using force and firearms.

European level (EU and the Council of Europe) The EU has established an agency, the European Police College, which aims to encourage cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime, maintenance of public security, law and order.16 Still, so far, the EU has not adopted any legislation related to the protection of the fundamental rights of the protesters and in the current legal framework, the EU cannot adopt legislation which regulates the conduct of the police forces. The European Court of Human Rights, which is a body of the Council of Europe, as mentioned before, has already condemned the practices of law enforcement officials

UN Code of conduct for law enforcement officials. (1979). Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ ProfessionalInterest/Pages/LawEnforcementOfficials.aspx 15

UN Basic principles of the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. (1990). Retrieved from http://www. ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx 16

Council Decision establishing a European Police College. (2000). Retrieved from https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/website/About_CEPOL/History/2000820jha.pdf 14

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during public protests in several decisions. These decisions are binding for all the Member States of the Council of Europe, which means that the countries need to adapt their legislation to the decisions of the Court.

National level Each Member State has a criminal code, criminal procedural code and codes of conduct for police forces, which criminalise the unlawful acts of the police forces. However, there are no measures of harmonisation in this field. The aforementioned decisions of the European Court of Human Rights show that not all criminal national legislations in this field offer the necessary protection to the human rights of the protesters during public demonstrations.

Outlook and key questions The high number of casualties in recent peaceful protests across Europe shows that some Member States fail to protect the right of the protesters effectively. Police officers abuse their powers while they are policing the protests, use excessive force and firearms when not necessary, severely breaching the fundamental human rights of the protesters, causing severe injuries or in the worst case, even casualties of protesters. However, in some circumstances, the intervention of the police is necessary as it is expected to prevent or end a violent protest, in order to protect public safety.

While the UN has adopted international standards that offer guidelines for the conduct of police officers during protests, in the current legal framework, the EU cannot adopt similar binding legal documents. However, the EU can enact binding legislation which protects the fundamental rights of its citizens. In this complex legal framework, what steps should the EU take to protect efficiently the rights of the protesters, but also the public security? Should the EU aim to adopt binding legislation or take some harmonisations measures in this field? Or are there other efficient measures it can take? Are the Member States better positioned to tackle this issue than the EU is?

Sources and additional links Official sources [1]: UN Basic Principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials: http://www. ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx [2]: UN Code of Conduct for law enforcement officials: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/LawEnforcementOfficials.aspx [3]: Council Decision 2000/820/JHA establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) https://www. cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/website/About_CEPOL/History/2000820jha.pdf [4]: European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: http://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

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Media coverage [5]:“What is the ‘right to protest’?”, FindLaw UK: http://findlaw.co.uk/law/government/civil_ rights/8648.html [6]:“Article 11 Right to protest and freedom of association”, National Council for Civil Liberties: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/ article-11-right-protest-and-freedom-association [7]:“Free speech and protest”, National Council for Civil Liberties: https://www.liberty-human-rights. org.uk/human-rights/free-speech-and-protest [8]:“Access for Rights Briefings. The right to protest”, Access Info: http://www.access-info.org/ wp-content/uploads/Freedom_of_Assembly_Briefing.pdf [9]:“ECHR decisions on demonstrations, riots and protests”, Open Society justice intiative: https:// www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/case-digest-ECHR-protest-11212014.pdf [10]:“Policing violence in Greece, not just ‘isolated incidents’”, Amnesty International: http://www. univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/greece_ai_2012_police_violence.pdf [11]:“Policing demonstrations in the European Union”, Amnesty International: http://www.amnesty. org.uk/sites/default/files/eu-police.pdf [12]:“Intervention – ‘Your freedom smells like teargas!’ Deconstructing Europe’s critique of Turkey’s policing of the 2013 protests”, Till F. Paasche: http://antipodefoundation.org/2013/10/31/your-freedom-smells-like-teargas/ [13]: Protesters and police intervention in Athens: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cISwiTfdWEo [14]: Protesters and police intervention in Madrid: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxNoQIWHJdo

Academic sources [15]:“The European Convention of Human Rights and policing”, Jim Murdoch, Ralph Roche, Council of Europe Publishing, 2013: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/capacitybuilding/source/documentation/europeanconventionhandbookforpolice.pdf [pages 22-42, 93-117] [16]:“Understanding policing. A resource for human rights activists”, Anneke Osse, Amnesty International Nederland, 2006: https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/book_1_0.pdf [pages 39125]

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LEIPZIG 2015 International Office of the EYP

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published by Europäisches Jugendparlament in Deutschland e.V. Sophienstraße 28-29 10178 Berlin, Germany Editorial Team Luca Olumets Lorenzo Parrulli Kati Pärn Benjamin Gradhand Andreia-Gemma Moraru Annmarie Kiiskinen Arnolds Eizenšmits Arriana Yiallourides Khalid El Ghoul Lia Pachler Conall O‘Rourke Laure Steinville Willem Koelewijn Lorenz Stree Felicia Dahlquist Ia Tserodze Layout Tom Wolfskämpf

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