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Foreign & Commonwealth
Office
THE CICERO
PAPERS
Further releases concerning the security breach Ankara, HM Embassy, in Second World the at
War, 1943-73
FCO Historians March 2005
CICERO and
`Snatch'
his Valet and the Security Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara Embassy, British the at
October
Between
1943 and March
Allied
in World cause
Embassy in Ankara
1944, the British
information leakage of source of a serious
Breach
was the
for disastrous have the that could proved
War Two. Ilyas Bazna, the valet to Sir Hughe Knatchbull-
Hugessen (aka `Snatch'), HM Ambassador to Turkey, was able, through poor security arrangements,
to photograph
documents, and secret
important of
large a number
German Germans Bazna he Embassy. The the to the then cover name gave sold which Papers released to The National
CICERO.
the end of the war that the Security
not until identity
CICERO of
authorities
were able to establish the
involved Germans of several
the case officer, Maria Molkenteller,
Moyzisch,
in 2003 show that it was
(TNA)
This full M15 to the was affair. and give a account of was able
interrogation from the obtained Ludwig
Archives
CICERO with
Amt VI Headquarters
(SD), the Security Police of the SS, and Walter
Sicherdienst
Amt VI. Further information, Ostuf Schuddekopf,
Schellenberg,
this did not apply to Knatchbull-Hugessen's valuable
since
Schuddekopf`s by Moyzisch,
Head of
Section of Amt VI. The latter felt most of the
documents provided by CICERO were very dated and of historical
dealt
of the
though of a somewhat negative character, came from SS
Head of the British
they
including
with
the
interest only. But,
personal notes, which were considered problem
of
British-Turkish
relations.
is probably nearer the truth than the exaggerated claims made analysis fictionalised in book his he and elaborated which
' it. Newly
Foreign released
authorities
including lengths trap the to to spy, elaborate went
Cabinet paper, without
Office
the Foreign
TNA to papers
Secretary's
in the film based on
British the that reveal
knowledge,
planting
security
forged War a
in the Embassy in late
the new papers also indicate that he spent
January 1944. For Knatchbull-Hugessen,
CICERO fallout from his his the the to trying the of clear name career much of rest of revelations.
2
The Consequences of CICERO's The potential
damage that CICERO
could
Activities
have inflicted
in being decisions Moscow, taken were and strategic
political
Major
was enormous.
Cairo and Tehran. A
in Cairo documents have the produced could planning number of proved fatal had they leaked. Fortunately,
one of them was ever in Knatchbull-Hugessen's
only
Although The others were never at risk. possession.
the code-name OVERLORD
was
date location in documents the to and of the operation were not passed over, referred compromised
by
Another
CICERO.
that the CICERO
possibility
potential
information
area of
damage
concerned
enabled Franz von Papen, the German
Ambassador to Turkey, to bring pressure to bear on the Turkish delayed a declaration of war by Turkey on the Allied
Government
which
side. The British desire to have
in September increased Italy 1943. British surrendered when on side
Turkey
the
forces
had then taken over a number of the Dodecanese Islands from their Italian garrison, Leros and Cos, and an attack on Rhodes, operation
including
contemplated. November
ACCOLADE,
was
But the Germans tightened their grip on the area and re-took Leros in
1943. To mount an attack on Rhodes, Turkish
airfields were now needed
to provide bases for fighter protection.
At the Cairo Conference, between 3 and 7 December 1943, Churchill minute
on operation
Turkey
to enable the `fly-in'
ACCOLADE
for the preparation a plan
SATURN,
British of
operation. Mention
fighter
squadrons
together with his Foreign Minister SATURN minute on
Knatchbull-Hugessen.
minute
in
cover the British of President,
arrived in Cairo, copies
handed were over to the Turkish
President and
took notes to this end, which formed the basis, together
memorandum,
for a further CICERO for Turkey's
`Establishment term accepted
of Allied
haul. However,
Churchill's
entry into the War' Forces in Turkey
Both terms are misleading and the limited nature of Churchill's
ACCOLADE
that would
1943, the Turkish
Knatchbull-Hugessen, and
`Preparations was not a paper on
more generally
airfields
The latter was instructed to draft the minutes of the talks. No
doubt Knatchbull-Hugessen SATURN the with
of British
was also made of a possible infiltration
4 December into When, Black Sea. the on submarines
Churchill's of
produced a long
nor the in 1943.
minute must be noted.
25 December 1943, on was cancelled not for lack of air cover but
because of the decision to launch the assault on Anzio. Negotiations with the Turks 3
foundered talks also continued -
throughout
unreality. On 4 February 1944, all military military official
negotiating
January 1944 but took on an air of
supplies to Turkey were cut off and the
team returned to Cairo. Knatchbull-Hugessen
was told to avoid leakage had been
contact to the best of his ability. By that time the CICERO
effectively
plugged.
approached
Moyzisch
the results
Knatchbull-Hugessen's
Molkenteller and in
achieved
confirmed It
December.
that they never
seems likely
that
some
have been Germans; but to the passed on may well
they could have been of little more than academic interest. It was known Foreign
of
Office Foreign to the on the state of the negotiations reports
with the Turkish Foreign Ministry
Turkish
again
Minister
himself was
keeping
informed on the progress of negotiations
a number of diplomatic
that the missions
and there was no reason to suppose that he
did not discuss the matter equally freely with von Papen.
Two
other possible
consequences
of CICERO's
activities
have been suggested.
Moyzisch had argued that the documents enabled the German cryptographers
to break
important but investigated British found this to be untrue. The story an was cipher and leakage, the Germans became aware that there was no that, through this other was genuine threat of an Allied
into the Balkans. If this particular move
(and it rests on an entry in General Alfred CICERO Papen) then von perhaps Molkenteller technique manuscript
Jodl's diary and less direct statements by
earned all the money the Germans paid him.
disposes also of the myth the photostats, -
of CICERO's
mastery
she says, showed many duplicates
notes were largely
is true statement
indecipherable.
It is possible
of photographic and some of the
that CICERO
had a
confidant in the Embassy since, according to Moyzisch and Schellenberg, two fingers or thumbs which
did not look like the agent's own were visible
in several of the
photographs. In his own account, Bazna tells of having two female accomplices. first of these whom he names was completely -
The
innocent of the actions he attributed
to her. There is little reason to suppose that the second woman was not also a figment 2 his imagination. But this small mystery remains. of
Reactions in Berlin
In Berlin, CICERO's documents received a mixed reception. The German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was still smarting after being duped by operation MINCEMEAT
Allied an -
ruse which
pointed to an attack on the Balkans
in the
1943.3 Ribbentrop summer of had his own brother-in-law,
the ambassador.
At Hitler's
Ribbentrop court
in February Adana at
1943.
surprised to receive von Papen's telegram
of 27
President InĂśnĂź's meeting with Churchill
Thus Ribbentrop
was somewhat
October informing
him of CICERO's
for the scheme. Photographed
his approval gave
he offer although cautiously
tendencies of the Nazi elite were in evidence.
by CICERO contacted
but had passed him on to Moyzisch.
deal Moyzisch would only with
In turn, Schellenberg
but
documents were in German hands by 1 November
fratricidal the very soon
the kudos for this intelligence
relentlessly
in Ribbentrop's
against von Papen and the Turks - the latter compromised
eyes following
in Ankara
Albert Jenke, promoted to the post of Minister
in August 1943 to monitor intrigued
feud with von Papen and
also cultivated a long-standing
Jenke had been
factor that riled Ribbentrop,
alone -a
he knew that as
Walter Schellenberg to coup would accrue
had little time for Ribbentrop
CICERO
Thereafter,
SD. the and
CICERO to and attempted use
to
discredit the Foreign Minister.
On his return to Berlin Ribbentrop Berlin
and thoroughly
When
grilled
November, the end of until dried up and flowed
information
details
of the Cairo
finally
Ribbentrop
was ordered to the Foreign Ministry
to report, Moyzisch
but as CICERO
Instead the Foreign Minister
misinformation. lines in the Allied
coalition,
more reasoned viewpoint
would
conferences
the conclusion
interpretation an
in told to was stay
Moyzisch
deal with him only, the
Moyzisch again only when
Tehran and to
came
11 November. on
by
returned
were provided
that the material
was
thought the documents
to Ankara. by CICERO British
not
fault showed
Schellenberg's which countered
rather
that the documents pointed, however vaguely, to a massive
4 'Allied invasion of Europe and the destruction of Germany.
As already discussed some debate exists about the impact British-Turkish
relations.
that CICERO
There is no doubt that von Papen made full use of the
in in he had its his attempting value, possession, whatever material After neutral. British
Cairo, he warned the Turkish
requests for Turkish
reprisals'
had on
Foreign Minister
into the war would entry
to keep Turkey
that compliance
`inevitably
lead to German
destruction' `least be the consequences would whose complete
and Izmir. Von Papen was gratified
with
of Istanbul
to find out a few days later from CICERO that the
Turkish note to the British on 12 December was non-committal.
5
With the departure of
the British
in
delegation
military
February
early
1944,
von
Papen
informed
Ribbentrop that `this round in the campaign for Turkey has been won by us a ... 5 Balkan offensive could not now take place. ' Sir John Dashwood 's Investigation
forged the and
War Cabinet paper
On 17 January 1944, when the British authorities learned that von Papen had obtained intense have from documents British that this and aroused a source, secret must come in London.
high level very concern Franklin
D. Roosevelt,
liaison security investigation.
Churchill
in informed he turn told, and was the Foreign
the US President. Sir John Dashwood,
left for Ankara at the end of January 1944 to carry out an
officer,
investigation,
As part of Dashwood's
document a
might
Government Although
be expected that
to provoke betray
would
their
forged
-a
in Cabinet paper Embassy, the the contents of which, was planted Berlin,
Office's
War
if they reached
some reaction
German the the on part of
knowledge
the document
of
in
question.
the trap was laid for several days, there was no result and Dashwood by Victor forged Cabinet The paper, composed unsolved.
returned with the problem Cavendish-Bentinck,
the chairman of the Joint Intelligence
The War Cabinet remained War Cabinet
Committee,
was unique.
in it; there the archives of the was no copy unaware of
its and existence
known was only
to handful
of officials.
It was a
Cabinet by Office Foreign the printer, with a genuine perfectly genuine paper, printed and authentic required
but its contents were entirely
number
a considerable
fictitious.
deceit by all concerned. amount of
The whole
process
In particular,
Pierson
Dixon, the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, forged Anthony
Eden's initials
to indicate that the paper had been approved by the Foreign Secretary, when the latter had in fact never seen it, and was completely
its Without to oblivious, existence.
lie the printer would never have accepted the paper.
Knatchbull-Hugessen
this
6
himself was determined that any leakage had occurred not from
his own house but on a train journey,
from Cairo the the to either on way or meeting.
The papers known to be in the Germans' possession corresponded closely to the briefs he had carried in a brown travelling box he had left unattended, However,
after
accumulating
Dashwood was unconvinced
box, in the special train to and from Cairo. This
in his carriage while evidence
for
what
he was in the restaurant he called
the
`train
car.
theory',
that this was where the theft took place and fell back on
6
the assumption
place
Knatchbull-Hugessen's members of
reviewing security
that the theft took
in Knatchbull-Hugessen's
7 house. In
in Ankara, the British personal staff
had nothing on their records against his domestics. The butler
authorities
but known little English the to be able to none of other servants were could speak a indications being `all do English them the to are against able and read so'. However, footman butler, in habit that the the valet and were all noted of entering
Dashwood
day before time the they went to bed any of at and also study
Knatchbull-Hugessen's
his bedroom had to suite: access at night and equally In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the Brown box is house and that the Black box has
in Excellency's kept His always
it is difficult there all night, often remained
to avoid the conviction
that any of these persons may have had opportunities have duplicate boxes and may well with -these
for tampering
keys to the boxes
keys his his Excellency His set of on carries person. since What emerged therefore was that Knatchbull-Hugessen black box in his bedroom overnight together 'with' a key to a red circulation
kept his working
in a papers
and carried on his person the key to this box, box in which such papers were transported to
is key Chancery, from described key the which sometimes the to another and and as his safe and sometimes as the key to his brown travelling that Knatchbull-Hugessen rather than returning CICERO
box. There is little doubt
fault for leaving box the was at unattended in the Residence
it to the Chancery at night, and in leaving the key to it where
it. Knatchbull-Hugessen hold did, of get could, and
was warned not to do
this in 1942, long before CICERO came on the scene but he persisted in doing so. The Security
Guard's
log for the period
from
1 September to 11 October
1943, for
days Ambassador 25 that the the that of spent in Ankara during this example, shows in 20 his kept box Residence he the on of the nights, and returned it to the period, Chancery on only five. It was no surprise that Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary
Office, Knatchbull-Hugessen Foreign the asked at
to do his work in
8 the Chancery in future.
Efforts to Clear Knatchbull-Hugessen 's Name 11 Knatchbull-Hugessen Ambassador
in newly
was transferred liberated
from Ankara
in September
Brussels. At that time
7
1944 to become
his responsibility
for the
it was suspected, especially
leakage at Ankara was not known for certain although
factor.
been have his Dashwood that the a contributory negligence might after report, When the British Government
found out the true story in 1945, Cadogan confided in but I
his diary on 14 August, that `Snatch ought, of course, to be court-martialled, 9 Knatchbull-Hugessen later Cadogan Two think this'. sent over must weeks
formal a
full The in but letter dated August 1945 28 this was never made public. reprimand a story of CICERO became public only in 1950 when Moyzisch of it in his book Operation
his account published
Cicero. In response to a Parliamentary
Question (PQ) by
W. S. Shepherd MP on 18 October 1950, the Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin, told the House of Commons that: The Ambassador's
in valet succeeded photographing
a number of
highly secret documents in the Embassy and selling the films to the Germans. He would not have been able to do this if the Ambassador had conformed
to the regulations
governing
the custody of secret
lo documents. On the minuting
draft PQ, Sir Andrew the to the of reply
Noble, the Under Secretary
Security Department, said `I do not know what we say if asked why Sir the overseeing H's punishment
was not something more than a severe reprimand.
It has always
"' far he lightly. too got off seemed to me that
The day after the PQ, Knatchbull-Hugessen then PUS, Sir William
into the Foreign Office and saw the came
Strang. Knatchbull-Hugessen
complained
that the Foreign
Office might have warned him that the PQ was coming up and perhaps given him the to discuss the wording of the reply. Knatchbull-Hugessen
opportunity
correspondence instruction
would
in fact infringe he did that not show
also argued that
any particular
security
he had been box from that the to given understand and which the papers
for him informed having The PUS taken of were apologised not was absolutely safe. the PQ, though he did not think that the Foreign Office substantially.
draft have the could altered
After reading the whole file, the PUS said that he had been left with the
impression that with such highly secret documents it was scarcely in conformity general security instructions
with
for him to have left the box or possibly his key to it,
anywhere within reach of foreign servants.
8
That same day, 19 October
1950, Shepherd wrote to the Secretary of State again Secretary The Ankara. have been to should sent
details OVERLORD asking why of
"details" that certain
be State `I that think of replied, we can absolutely OVERLORD
were
never
sent to
12 On Ambassador '.
the
of operation
15 October
1964,
in Secretary had Third Sir Edward Peck, to served as who wrote
Knatchbull-Hugessen
Ankara during the war, stressing that he did not want to go down in posterity having given away the date and details of OVERLORD.
as
Since Knatchbull-Hugessen
himself was not in a position to deny this in public he was anxious his obituary should do so. The Office
obituary on Knatchbull-Hugessen,
On 3 November which
in April The Times 12 on printed
covering the memorandum,
CICERO the of
affair
Knatchbull-Hugessen
1971.13
its aftermath. and
commented
The Foreign
that he was not sure about `our agreeing
`when all is said and done, he was responsible This view prevailed
at the time. After
1971, Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe,
former
Knatchbull-Hugessen's
the former Ambassador,
Knatchbullof writing
obituary
the contention
that there was no safe in
residence at the time of CICERO.
7 November on
There is no indication
1945 that Knatchbull-Hugessen's
original
him. But, Cadogan continued,
did in is be, harsh fact the that the succeed obtaining enemy may
documents entrusted to your charge '' .a
9
on
Cadogan
safe had been
be in Chancery 1943, January that this to the and should modified removedletter to Sir Hughe reprimanding
to Sir
in and
far enough went
the files at the time that the FCO agreed to the accusation being modified. did acknowledge
and
death on 22 March
MP and a good friend
did not feel that Peck's to make public
discussion
1971 and the Secretary of State on 14 April
the then PUS, on 2 April
he wanted
to any
for a serious leakage to the enemy'.
Knatchbull-Hugessen's
Hugessen, took up the cause of vindicating
1971. Mott-Radclyffe
Head of
Office's
Sir H's did He version of paper'. not want to stimulate any further
particular
In the letter
It is intended for the FO to look at and I hope agree to as background
Department
Denis Greenhill,
in
intended is `The not paper stated,
in the event of any of the false reports appearing'. Security
supplementary
Peck to a memorandum also sent
1964 Knatchbull-Hugessen
he give his version
for publication.
led to Sir Edward Peck's
agreed to this, which
in his
`however that access to vital
Conclusion CICERO British
bring in bad to through the off a major espionage coup security was able
Embassy in Ankara and this must largely be ascribed to the carelessness by
Knatchbull-Hugessen the British
himself,
the leakage did not last for very long. CICERO
Fortunately, staff.
Knatchbull-Hugessen's
as the Dashwood enquiry cleared all other elements of
in service mid-July
entered
1943 but did not contact the Germans
in in late in October. his He January 1944 third the week and until gave about notice left at the end of February.
After
November/December months with
influenced was seriously
his material deteriorated,
1943, when his activities
events of great moment
important probably not very
Christmas
in the Middle
but the two
were at their peak, coincided
East. Although
it is, for example, unlikely -
the damage done was
that Turkish foreign policy
danger the enormous. was potential -
Christopher Baxter Historian, Foreign & Commonwealth
10
Office
I L. C. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero (London, 1969). 2 The above is taken from investigations into leakage of information to the German Intelligence Service from British Embassy Ankara (CICERO case). The file documents MI5's efforts after the event to piece together facts relating to a it became Allied leakage from involving interrogation the secrets which, of apparent the case espionage wartime serious from Dated 1944. 1945 Jan in 1943 01 in Turkey 1952 Dec 31, had KV German 6/8, The and occurred prisoners, of National Archives (TNA). 3 On 30 April 1943 a corpse draped in a British Army officer's uniform was washed up on a Spanish beach. Attached Allied Balkans. The Spaniards full the briefcase body attack an on suggested plans which of to the was a passed these in in Madrid Embassy German mid-May. papers to the 4 Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London, 2003), pp. 423-25. Pap Franz The Life Apprenticr: The Sorrerrr's W Rolfs, vom en (Lanham, Maryland, 1996), pp. 406-08. Richard of 6 Clutton, minute for Strang, 4 January 1950, FO 370/2930. 7 The Chancery was cleared of complicity by the fortuitous fact that Mrs Stemdale Bennett, the wife of HM Minister at Ankara, had typed four copies of a document which Knatchbull-Hugessen was due to take to the conference in Cairo, in but Ambassador's the the had one the not three copies possession. This was the copy of corrected a misprint on and See Edward Peck, Rmvllections Germans. Edward have Pak: discovered the 1915 to retirement to of reached which was Library), 39. FCO from p. (Unpublished the 1975 manuscript available aA copy of Dashwood's report, entitled `Leakages in Turkey. 1943/44', 7 March 1944, can be found in FO 850/128, TNA. 9 Diary entry for 14 August 1945 in David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogaa, O.M. 1938-1945 (London, 1971), p. 761. Everett note, 25 October 1973, FCO 1O`Background to the CICERO Affair and Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen', 12/161, TNA "" ibid. 12ibid. The Times, 12 April 1971. 13`Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen', 14 Background 12/161,
to the CICERO
Affair
and Sir Hughe
Knatchbull-Hugessen',
TNA.
11
Everett
note,
25 October
1973,
FCO