Operation Hullabaloo: Britain’s role in Kissinger’s nuclear diplomacy 1972-73 by FCDO Historians

Operation Hullabaloo Britain's role in Kissinger's nuclear diplomacy 1972-1973 ~

OPERATION HULLABALO.O Britain's role in Kissinger's nuclear diplomacy

A selection of documents reproduced from

The Year of Europe America, Europe and the Energy Crisis 1972-1974 Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume IV

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Historians

PREFACE

Few diplomats of recent times have left a greater impression upon their contemporaries than Henry Kissinger. One recurrent theme of the correspondence and other papers published on CD-Rom in The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74, the latest volume of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), is the fascination of British ministers and officials with his manner and methods, first as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon and then, from August 1973, as US Secretary of State. Kissinger's grasp of strategy and mastery of negotiating tactics were rarely questioned. His powers of analysis were much admired. Yet British diplomats were perplexed by his distrust of the Washington 'bureaucracy' and his passion for secrecy, particularly his insistence on observance of the 'Kissinger rules', by which he sought to confine the discussion of specific topics, along with information thereby confided, to a chosen few. They were likewise irritated by his resort to what amounted to a selective, and sometimes highly manipulative, bilateralism in his dealings with America's partners in NATO. Intellectually arrogant and excessively sensitive to criticism, Kissinger could be sour and tetchy when he failed to have his way and scornful of others when they dared challenge the practicality of his theoretical constructs. The new Mettemich seemed all too easily to mutate into the old Bismarck when it came to balancing antagonisms within the Atlantic alliance. 'Operation Hullabaloo'

Senior British officials were, nonetheless, to be active participants' in one of the more occult of Kissinger's diplomatic endeavours, notably the drafting of what emerged in June 1973 as the US/Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. The following selection of formerly 'Top Secret' documents; drawn largely from the papers of Sir Thomas Brimelow and here reproduced from the new electronic volume of DBPO, reveal the essence of what those in the know in Whitehall code-named 'Operation Hullabaloo' . The British first learned that the Soviet Union had proposed an agreement with the United States on the prevention of nuclear war when on 28 July 1972 Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, visited Washington for an exchange of 'general views on the world situation' with Kissinger. Trend had for some time been engaged in intermittent bilateral talks with White House staff, knowledge of which was restricted to a very small circle in London and, as a result of an understanding between Nixon and the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, these had been extended to cover

US/European relations. It was therefore hardly surprising that Kissinger should have chosen to infonn Trend that, following Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972, the Soviet leadership had resorted to an old ploy and suggested that the US and Soviet Governments conclude an agreement not to use nuclear weapons against each other. The British had serious misgivings about the project which, by removing the main nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, could clear the decks for Soviet action by conventional forces against China, severely weaken NATO, and create a political climate in which it would be difficult for Britain to develop further its own nuclear deterrent. Drafting for Dr K

On IO August Sir Thomas Brimelow, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, conveyed these doubts personally to Kissinger. Anxious, however, not to rebuff the Soviet initiative and risk the future of detente, and wishing to respond with a counter-proposal consistent with Western security requirements, Kissinger invited Brimelow to assist in drafting a revised text. Moreover, although the resulting draft was rejected by the Russians as insufficient, Nixon argued strongly in favour of holding open the prospect of such a deal in order 'to keep the Soviet Union in play and at the same time to fend off, month by month, Congressional pressure for United States troop reductions in Europe'. There were in any case hints from Moscow that without an accord to sign, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, might have to cancel his planned visit to Washington in the spring of 1973. The matter had to be handled with the greatest secrecy. The original Soviet proposal had, as Brimelow recalled, been incompatible with both the 'current foundations of ATO defence doctrine' and the 'security of China', and any leak or disclosure of America's readiness to negotiate on such a basis could undermine confidence within the Western alliance. In Washington no one outside the White House was initially informed of the proceedings and, following the Soviet rejection of the US counterdraft, Trend was asked by Kissinger whether the British 'could suggest some means of putting the ball back into Brezhnev's court without compromising the position so far adopted by the United States government'? British involvement in the subsequent drafting of the agreement was, however, to border on the bizarre. Brimelow was in effect to become Kissinger's desk officer for the Soviet Union, amending and putting into treaty fonn a bilateral US/Soviet arrangement for which neither he, nor his colleagues, had any genuine sympathy. Lord Cromer, the British Ambassador in Washington, summarised the situation pithily when, after a visit from Brimelow for discussions with Kissinger on 5 March 1973, he noted how he was 'struck by the astonishing anomaly of the most powerful nation in the world invoking the aid of a foreign government to do its drafting for it, while totally excluding its own Ministry for Foreign Affairs'. Of course, this had the advantage of allowing Brimelow and his colleagues the opportunity to influence the outcome of the US/Soviet dialogue, and

their drafting skills helped ensure that the agreement left America's commitment to its NATO allies largely unimpaired. Emphasis in the agreement was thus shifted away from the non-use of nuclear weapons and towards the creation of 'conditions in which the recourse to nuclear weapons [would] not be justified'. Yet, as Cromer reminded Brimelow, there were dangers in these proceedings, particularly given 'the highly devious nature of Kissinger's intellectual make-up'. Although Kissinger indicated that Bonn and Paris had been told of the Soviet approach, neither was apparently fully aware of the American response, and Britain would be vulnerable to criticism from its new European partners if they were ever to learn of Brimelow's part in the affair.

Britain between America and Europe The British were engaged in a difficult balancing act. Britain had only just become a fully-fledged member of the European Community in January 1973, and Heath, whilst eager to maintain close ties with Washington, was determined to demonstrate his Government's commitment to building a European union from whose counsels the Americans would be excluded. It was important to prove, particularly to sceptical Gaullist opinion in France, that Britain was not an American 'Trojan Horse' within the Community. Yet, had 'Operation Hullabaloo' not been kept under top secret wraps, it could easily have been interpreted by the French and others as evidence of British complicity in rei.tiforcing a US/Soviet condominium in Europe. That was all the more reason why, four days before the signing of the agreement by Nixon and Brezhnev, on 22 June, Sir Edward Peck, Britain's Permanent Representative to NATO, was instructed to 'welcome the agreement' when the Americans explained it to allied representatives, 'without however revealing knowledge of prior White House consultation with us'. Peck appears to have done his job too well in feigning British ignorance, for his rather bland remark during the North Atlantic Council meeting on 22 June, to the effect he could 'well understand the fears about public euphoria and about "decoupling'" of the United States from Western Europe, seems to have been taken amiss or misreported by Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Permanent Representative in Brussels. In any event, on the next day Kissinger telephoned Cromer from San Clemente in 'high dudgeon' to complain that Peck had had the temerity to attack the agreement in NATO. Cromer was quick to remind him of the embarrassment that might result from Kissinger's own reference in a recent press briefing to previous 'close consultation with a number of the US' allies' on the text of the agreement. 'I do not', Cromer wrote in a letter to Trend, 'think we need pay any more attention to the episode. There have been similar occasions in the past when Henry has chosen to play the prima donna only to find that he is singing from the wrong score.' As, however, is apparent from other documents contained in the new DBPO volume, this was far from being the only occasion on which Cromer would have to defend his fellow British diplomats

against a National Security Adviser who was otherwise ever ready to seek their assistance and exploit their multiple talents.

Keith Hamilton Foreign and Commonwealth Office Historians September 2006

A NOTE ON THE DOCUMENTS With one exception, the following documents are reproduced from Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series ill, Volume IV, The Year ofEurope: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74. They are numbered in accordance with their appearance in that volume. The exception is the [mal, unnumbered document, the text of the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 22 June 1973, which is taken from the website of the US State Department. The image on the back cover is a reproduction in colour of the first page of Document No. 32, a minute from Sir Thomas Brimelow to Sir Denis Greenhill of 23 February 1973, with annotations (in red) by the Secretary of State, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. -

CONTENTS Document No.

Name

Date

Main subject

Minute: Brimelow to Greenhill Brimelow papers

22 Jan 1973

Covers draft brief on Operation Hullabaloo

Minute: Brimelow to Greenhill Brimelow papers

25 Jan 1973

Obj ects to Soviet draft on nonuse of nuclear weapons

Record of discussion between Heath and Nixon AMU3/548/8

2 Feb 1973

Operation Hullabaloo

Minute: Brimelow to Greenhill Brimelow papers

23 Feb 1973

Reports on progress with Operation Hullabaloo and its potential for ~plomatic embarrassment

Letter: Cromer to Greenhill (extract) Brimelow papers

7 Mar 1973

Covers record of Brimelow' s conversation with Kissinger in Washington: Hullabaloo and the transatlantic relationship

Washington tel 1223 Brimelow papers

5 Apr 1973

Informs Brimelow on Hullabaloo

Washington tel 1224 Brimelow papers

5 Apr 1973

Conveys memo by Kissinger on Hullabaloo

Washington tel 1225 Brimelow papers

5 Apr 1973

Transmits latest American draft of US/Soviet agreement

Brief for Heath Brimelow papers

16 May Update on Hullabaloo: covers latest draft of Agreement on the 1973 Prevention of uclearWar

140

UKDEL NATO tel 460 Brimelow papers

22 June 1973

United States/Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War US State Department

22 June 1973

Reports AC debate on the US/S.oviet agreement

DPBO, Series III, Volume IV

Minute: Brimelow to Greenhill .,

. ~ ......

Brimelow papers

.: .....----~---~~~~~~

O~ION lltJLI,AJWA)O

I submit a draft brief, covering Dr. lissi!lg~r' s requeSt that we ~eat sOlle lleaDS ot putti.D8 the ball back into the

Soviet court vithout COlIPro.ia1Dg the obviou princi»lel at

stake. 2.

This request "aa

tr~tted ~ugh Sir

minute recordiDg it is attached at ~lag !..

22 January 1973

!rQP EmCllNr ECLIPSE

lIJI,t,A.lLOO

Ti-enQ, whose

hU.L.LA.BALOO

3 COPIES

TIfiS DOCUf1ENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC

MAJESTY I S GOVERNMENT PA~

NO 1

5 PAGES

HmI(73) .•.••

Copy No •••••

SOVIET UNION sovrmPROPOSALS FOR

A~OVIET-US

AGREEMENT NOT T(

USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGi'INSl' EACH OTHER Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ;.

After President Nixon's visit to Mosco\-}

1972, the Soviet Government suggested that

they and the United States Government should conclude an agreement that neither Government should use nuclear weapons against the other . When the United States Government point ed out

the obvious objections, not least the interest s of their allies, the Soviet Government showed themselves ready to modify their propos al in a

~~ ~ c.(.Lo...,.,.r 4)

:~e ey~sting

way which wod ,i

the two principals .

-JZ:

.... o

The two Soviet outl i n e (,1 k-~~>

h >r~M~

that we hav_e these draft~mus t be

attached as Annexes I and I I

l~~

all'

moat carefully protected). 2.

These Soviet drafts were discuss ed by u s

with Dr Kissinger and an agre ed counter-dra f t is attached as Annex III .

This was communica-

ted by the White House to ihe Soviet Amb 8ssador l

in Washington.

The Soviet Government, a s

expected, found it disappointing.

Aa part of the preparations for t ~e pro-

posed visit

0, Mr Brezhnev to Washington ,

th e

Soviet Government have reverted to the idea that the visit be marked by the announcement of .(

~.;

. :

an agreement on the iines propos ed by' t~ ..m. I

They have even suggested that it might

Fot

possible for M.r Brezhnev to· come · to Was~inp;t on I

unless there was something to show for it At t he ~~

end;.I andywnat better outcome could th er e b e then /t be prr.)"1 ~ f):-:t"': '1 . , . .

OOpy NO)-

TO.tl SECR.cLr

.tiU LLAl:SA.LUU

3 COPIES

PAGE NO 2 OF 5路 PAGES

the proposed

declarationt~

~issinger

has

asked Sir B Trend whether we could suggest some means of putting the ball back into Mr Breihnev's court without compromising the position so far adopted by the United States Government. 4.

There is little or no

advantage in merely putting this ball back int Mr

There is a long history

Breihnev's court.

of Soviet proposals for agreement by all

-a:z ":E

nuclear powers on "no use" and "no first use"

of nuclear weapons.

!!! J:

proposals and air them in public vJhenever it

1- .

They dust off these

The novelty . of their

suits them to do so.

-Z

'"1=

United

St~tes

exposed,

their second propo-

C-f bAlV

sal leftLChina exposed, to the possibility of

Soviet nuclear attack.

ICJ

the

:-r: Z

States Governments have maintained

silence about their 1972 exchanges;

I-

Unite~

Both the Soviet and

but the

Soviet Government could break this silence at any time;

and the more proposals and count -r-

proposals there have been, the deeper might be the impression created by an eventual dis-

closure or leak

t~t

the United Stat s

Government had been seriously interested in c""v; , proposal which, in its original fo seem d incompatible with the current foundations of . borL NATO defence doctrine, and in . " 52 J for~ I

". -, :f~' . .

with the security .of.' China. . .

From the' " point I

of view of the United Kingdom (and, ,we I

believe, of the EuropeM m"embers of r~ l~ATO and I ~

China), the best course is to keep on offer the text we agreed with Dr Kissinger and to

Copy No;L OF

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HULLABALOO

3 COPIES

PAGE NO 3 of 5 PAGES: 路

leave it at that.

It is for Mr Breihnev to

produce a reasonable counter J;>roposal;

and \\1 e

d.,c...r ~ U.J ~~.:.,:, V-'Af~ c,rI't/ I'h~r~ ~ "e' ,I Ai.. W!!' pr:ference fortbfwn

.Cal"

latest proposal unlessLSoviet alternative "'~ ~

proves on examination to suit

interests

better - which seems unlikely.

This, of course, is of little help to the

Soviet and United States Governments in their effort to find something more appealing to the

Russians than the text at Annex IlIon 'Which

"La= 芦

President Nixon and Mr Breihnev might agree. But we have only been asked to suggest a means

of putting the ball back into Mr Brezhnev IS

J: tZ

court without compromising our position .

Our

~ suggestion is that the Sovi et Forei~n

Minist~be asked to agree to the publication,

a: ~

as a document resulting from

visit to Washington, of

...0

textl

disappointment or object, they should be told

that we see potential importance in the

phrases "to bring about the conditions in

-.... Z

\.. c.r ~ 1IZ :J

the

Brezhnev ' s

8@;P8sJ

WiSil

UAll

If the Soviet Foreign Ministry express

the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war

'vJhi .h wouJd

be reduced and ultimately eliminated II and lito create conditions in which recourse to nucl e~r

1tJeapon.s will not be justified 1\ ;

and that I

Soviet agreement to take part in co4fidential and unpublicised Soviet-US studies of how

progress might b~ made towards thes~ ends

-路----r

would be a possibly yaluable 9upple~ ent to ~ theL't' diplomacy a sociated

with the CSCE and the various aspects of arms

limitatiQn.

Mr Brezhnev would not llike such

a proposal.

The Communist Party of the Sovi 0t

Union has never been willing to allow any Soviet representative to enrza~e in s("~::, .; "~ ' ~ '. ~: .- - - - - - - - - ....... _ - .. , ....... - ... 1" "

.... - - .

HULLAl3ALOO

Copy no Soi :5 copies Page No 4 -'

of 5

pag~8

objective discussion of the tensions arising from the concept of peaceful

coe~stence

as a

struggle, in every field except the military ;'.

one, to change the balance of power in the

.\.. - ~

world;

but it is one which can be batted .

about with less r~s.K: tna.n.L"no use u or "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

Mr Brezhnev

said to President Pompidou that he did not

know to what God to pray in order to convince the West that he wanted peace.

As a good

Communist, he might be spared the embarrassmem

a:: -( J: !l

of prayer if he were willing to

allo~

his

officials to begin a confidential and-

l: t-

businessl1ke discussion of how the tensions

and suspicions which threaten peace might

Z w

I:;:

best be reduced.

= .0..

ments against the acceptance of the two

that may be made by the Russians in connexion

-...

existing Soviet drafts or 'of new proposals

. with Mr Brezhnev· s visit to Washington.

0 Z

We have not been asked to provide argu-

,..

the question is raised, we might suggest, as

a possible reply to the Russians, that pro-

posals which lead to destabilisation are illadvised;

and both of their original proposals

would have this effect, ~hereaB the ' count erdraft proposed by Dr Kissinger would not have I

this effect.

7 • . Given the suspicions of the Soyiet-United I

were exprt- s.sed in

States relationship

". NATO la.st year, the del 'c:acy of thisI whole .

subject c~ot be too strongly emphasised. .

One day there wil'l be .a disclosure c>y the

Russians or a leak.

It is essential that the

loutcome. TOP 8 ECRm

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HULLABh ... (1)

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O~ ;t,.'

"3 COPIES

PAGE NO 5 OF 5 PAGES

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outcome should not bring into question the correctness of the line taken by the Governmen of the United States.

The French and the

Federal German Governments have been informed in general terms of developments last

summer~

and will no doubt be on the alert for further

news.

Z l: t-

O Z

....

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'.!.'(),t-ISELkET

'. First Soviet Version

TREATY (AGREEMENT)

between the USS~ and the U. S.A. on the non-use of nuclear .weapons

Guided by the aim. of atrengthening world 'peace and international .ecurity, Strivina to reduce and w.tima.tely to completely eliminate the danger of an outbreak: of :h~clear war with it. devastatmg 'consequences for all

mankind, Proceedini from the desire to facilitate the creation of conditions excluding the use of nuclear weapons both among the nucl.ea.r power 8 themselves an~ by anyone of them again~t countriea not possessing s\lch weapons, The Union of Soviet Socialist Rep\lbUcs

and the

United States of

.America have reached agreement (have agreed) on tb:e following: Article I

The Soviet Union and the United States undertake the obligation not to \l.e nuclear weapon. againat each other.

Article II

The Soviet Union and the United Statel .hall prevent such a situation when, . a.

re.ult of a.ction. by third States, they wO\lld find themselves

involvec:l in a coW.ion with the ule of nuclear w.eapona.

•

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Article f

ni,

Both .Parties, in case of Inilitary conflict between other States,

,/"t..... ,;

~pply

.hall

all efforts

prevent a nuclear war from being unleashed. Article IV

Noth~g

contained in this Treaty (Agreement) shall affect the obligations

of the Parties undertaken by thezn under appropriate .T rea.ties and Agreeznents concl';lded with third States, and under the Charter of the United Na.tions.

~. .

·. . .

. .. -

Article V

This Treaty (Agreement) is of unlimited duration.

Article VI This Treaty (Agreement) is done in two copies, each in the Russian .

and the English languages, which are equally authentic.

Done at the city of Moscow, this •••• day of • '•••••••• one thou s an d

nine bundred and .eventy .. two.

For the United States of Am.erica

For the Union Soviet SociaUat Repu.blic

TOP SECRET

. '

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Second Soviet Version

--"

TREATY between the USSR and the USA on the nOD-use of nuclear weapons

Guided by the aim.s of strengthening world peace and international security, Being aware that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Pro~eeding from. the desire to create condit1ons 'in w'lUch the danger

of an outbrake ..,..... of nu.clear war w~uld be redu.ced' and . ultima.tely eliminated, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of ADlerica have agreed •• follow., Article 1 The Soviet Union and the . United Statel of America undertake not

to ule

nuclea~. weapo~s

against each other.

Accordingly the $oviet U.n ion and the United States will build their relation •• 0 that they Iho~ld not contradict the obligation ~s8umed' by the .ides unde~ this Article. Article

The Soviet Union and the United Statel lhall prevent luch a situation when, a ... r •• ult of actions by third ltatel, they would find themeelvel inv~lv.d

in a colli.ion with 't he use of nuclear weapon ••

I' 1

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In ease of military conflict involving states ... not parties to this

Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States shall apply all efforts to prevent an outbrake of nuclea.r war. Article III Nothing contained in this Treaty shall affect the obligations under-

taken by the sides before other states, or any obligations under the United Nations Charter.

The Treaty shall not affect the right of individual

or collective self-defense. ';I .

• •

,. .

--'•

•

Article IV Thi. Trea.ty i. of unlinrlted duration.

Article V The Treaty is subject to ratification in conformity with the con-

stitutional procedures of each of the sides, and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. The Treaty shall be registered in conformity with Article 102 of the United N3ticns Charter. Done at the city of •••••• '•••••

...... .

1972, in two copies, each!

in the RUlsian and the English languages, which are equally authentic.

For the United States

For the Union of Soviet Socialilt Republica

of America

TOP SECRET

( c..v ©

c.-

M.l.

2.-.

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COPY NO ~~

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( "'-., ""

REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED SOVIET-US DECLARATION.

PAGE NO 1 OF 2 PAGES

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security: Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences for mankind: Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear

war would be reduced and ultimately eliminated:

-z (!)

Proceeding from the basic principles of relations

between the United States of America and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics signed in MOscow on May 29,

1972:

I-

-ZZ

Proceeding from 'their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenanc

~ ;:

of peace, refraining from the threat or use of forc e ,

and the avoidance of war, and in conformity wit h the

various agreements to which either has subscribed:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the

e)" Z J:

United States of America

have agreed the following:

I-

that in their international relations they will make

The United States and the Soviet Union declare

.. it their goal to create conditions in which recourse to nuclear weapons will not be justified. II.

The two parties agree that the

conditio~ns

referre

to in the preceding paragraph presuppose the. effective ;

elimination of the threat or use of force

one

party against the other, by one party agains,t the

allies of the other, and by either party

~inst

third

countries, in circumstances which may encan~er international peace and security.

III. The two parties agree to develop their utual

TOP

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BEC~

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relations in a way consistent with the above purposes •

It at any time

re~tions

between states not parties

to this declaration appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, the t~o parties, acting in accordanc with the terms of this declaration, will make every effort to avert this risk. IV •

Nothing in this declaration shall affect the

obligations undertaken by the parties towards third

countries, nor shall it impair the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

In particular, nothing in this oeclaration

shall affect the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

t'0

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O Z

' .-. . ~. ..":./ ' - 1 ~

rown copyright 2 05

.,.

DPBO, Series III, Volume IV

Brimelow papers

Minute: Brimelow to Greenhill

sa~e~d

. 2. ', It

NAT,o?n

may : have been" so

~ drafted t~~ text.

~~,~'ed. ~j

the "' So~et . ~'f4:i,~i~s

"wh~ "

The ~e~i~an:s had pointed out that -the first

s~vi~t draf~. did ~ot , a~~qtia:telY pro.t ·e et the 'mtere~s o?:r.;their ' a11~es " and the second Soyiet draft purported to be an effort to" ", '. , ,~

.'"

meet. . this . . . . - criticism. ... ' .. '

t think howeve~ that Axticl~

woUld n~t ,in fact safeguB.l:-d NATO. " ".lrticle

"Nothing contained

~ this Treaty

shail

III

state~:- ,

aif~t -the

obligatio~s ~~rtaken by t~e sides before other States,

8IJY

obligatio~ under the ,Uul-ted Nations, Charter.

Tre~ty ,shall not "affect ~he righ~s of individUal o:r I

•

self-defence."

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~ . ~..:

COPY Nb ' 1 of 3 COPIES

mo:re' o..f them in Europe or North America shall be c{)ns'idered. an attack agt¢.n.st them ~~;.

and consequently they agr~e .1 ;hat,

if such an armed attack occurs, ' each of th'em, in exercise of the right o.f individual or collective self-defence re~ogmsed by Article 51 of the 0:harter of the United Nati.o~, will aSsist

the party

parties ' so attacked ' by taking forthwith, individually s~ch

and in concert' with the other parties,

action as it

dee~s

necessary, including the use o~ armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the

~orth Atlao.t~c

area. If

Nothing in thes€ Articles obliges the United States

Government to resort to the use of nuclear 'Weapons

i:n

a casus

foederis but the United States Government has no ~eaty obligation towards the USSR "Whi·ch might oblig.e it not to have such ' resort.

If, however, a treaty on the lines of the second Soviet· draft were to be signed, the United States Government would have to take' account of its first Article,. which reads as follows:"Article I The Soviet Union and the United States of America undertake

not to use nuclear weapons against each other. Accordingly the Soviet Union and the United States will build their relations so that they should not contradict the obligation assumed by the sides under this Article."

In my . o!,inion, this Article would set in t:rain the process

of undermj ni ng the credibility of ,the over

NATO;

~eriean

and it is for this re~son that I think t~t Art~cle III'

\ of the second Soviet proposal would not

sf:l.f~guard

25 January 1973 2 - , ~OP

nuclear umbrella

SECRET

ECLIPSE

HUI.LABAI.()O

NATO_.

DPBO, Series III, Volume IV

IJeathlNixon discussion

AMU3154818

E. PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ( THIS DOCUMENT IS THE , COpy NO Record of a Discussion a.t CaInP David on FRIDAY 2 FEBRUARY 1973 at 4. 00 pm

PRESENT The Rt Hon Edward Heath MP Prime Minister

President Richard M Nixqn

The Rt Hon Sir Burke Trend

The Hon Dr H A Kissinger

OPERATION HULLABALOO During the discussion of East-West relations in general there was a reference to this subject - in the context of the speculation about the Soviet enthusiasm for the CSCE. Why were they so concerned that this conference should take place? What did they expect to gain from it? And, equally. what did they expect to gain from Operation Hullabaloo? PRESIDENT NIXON sa.id that the Soviet Government continued to press the United States Government to conclude the proposed "treaty", in the form of an agreement which would be not merely a general statement of intention by the two Governments to avoid the use of nuclear weapons but would constitute a binding obligation on both of them to this effect. Ambas8ador Dobrynin had recently revived the subject once again and had p'ressed for the conclusion of the agreement on the basis on which it had been left when the United States had broken off the discussions on the ground that they, could not deal with the subject until they had reached a settlement on Vietnam - ie a basis which would allow exceptions to the undertaking in favour of the allies of both parties and in circumstan ces in which either party judged that its supreme national interests were involved but would not safeguard the position of third parties, notably China. It was clear that the Soviet Government still attached great importance to i!ÂŁui'tfig Cnned States endorsement of an undertaking of this kind 1f they ~uld induce them to give it. Indeed, there was some reason to think that Mr Brezhnev's personal prestige was now at stake on this issue. It might be expedient, therefore. to meet the So~iet Government on the point, if ,we could. Could we not find some means of further m.odifying the existing draft in such a way that it would ,purport to go som~ way towards meeting the Soviet Government wit:hout really meaning anything very much at all ? The Soviet Government had not really done very well out of their advocacy of a policy of detente. SALT I had been a 8uccess for the United States rather than for the Soviet Union, since it had prevented the latter {rom carrying forward their programme of nuclear development at several points without really damaging the United States in this resp~ct at all - if only because Congress would never in any event have approved the additional programmes of mia.ilea and ABM'. which the agreemeJit now prevented. In fact. the United State. had uaed the general prea.ure for detente to some

E effect against the Soviet Union. Partly as a result the Soviet Government were now none too sure of themselves; and perhaps we should not overestimate the extent to which they were a united, monolithic body. They might now be beginning to realise that, if they wanted to deal WJ.~ the Chinese, they could not afford to play fast and loose with the United States tne more so since the United States Government had let Peking understand that they would not allow the Soviet Government to tljump" the Chinese. It was against this sort of ba.c kground that one had to consider the proposed " treaty" renouncing the use of nuclear weapons. It would leave the Middle East and China unprotected; and it might also have significant implications for the domestic policies of those countries (? possibly including the United Kingdom) whose public opinion would be teInpted, if the "treaty" were concluded, to ask why they need trouble to maintain their own programmes of n.uclear weapons. On the other hand it might always provided that we could make it harmless in effect - be a IneC!-ns of gaining time in which to do what now had to be done. "You can be sure practicall sure - that we will eta in Euro e 80 Ion as I am here". evertheless, United States domestic opinion now needed a year or so i n which to recover from the psychological trauma of the Vietnam war. It was tempting to envisage the nuclear "treaty" a ,s a kind of carrot with whi ch to draw the Soviet Union along, stage by stage through the year, in the hope that all the other issues - MBFRs, SALT II, CSCE, the Middle East, and so forth - could similarly be played along with minimum damage and the proposed United States/Soviet surn.m.it could be deferred at least until the autumn. T~whole pojnt of the operation would be to hold the prospe ct o sd'm.e further .deal with the Soviet Union continuousl dangling just ahead in- order to eep the Soviet Government in play and at the satne time to fend off, month by month, Congressional pressure for United States troop reductions in Europe. THE PRIME MINISTER said that we had considered the proposed "tr eaty " very carefully. As we saw it, it was simply an updated version of a very old Soviet story. In its original version, it had clearly been aimed at depriving NATO of the protection of the United States nuclear deterrent. It had now been reshaped in such a way as to purport to exclude this ri sk; but was this really credible? DR KISSINGER replied that one need not worry unduly on that score .. .. The real dan e r lay in the fact that the exi sting draft did not provide • or China.

......

-------

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was open to the additional objection that it would also generate pressure on the United States to reduce their nuclear forces: and this, too, would be unwelcome from 'tlJe European point of view. Europe could not afford to rely on a wholly conventional defence. DR KISSINGER, reverting to China, said that it was not realistic to suppose that the United States could invoke the "supreme national interest" clause to cover China. Public opinion in the United States would not accept this; nor would it be credible in the eyes of the Chinese themselves. THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in that case the wisest course was surely to rest on the form of document which we had given the Soviet Union in the previous autumn. But we might at the same time offer them the prospect of private discussions about the means of creating the kind of conditions which would discourage recourse to nuclear weapons, on the lines indicated in our draft • . He had been giving some thought to a POB sible formulation for this purpose. At this point the Prime Minister gave the President a copy of the document entitled "Soviet Proposals for a Soviet-United States Agreement Not to Use Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other: Brief by the Foreign and

'rr);.' ) . ~~. ~ .

Commonwealth Office", the original of which was enclosed with Mr. Acland's letter of 24 January, 1973, to Sir Burke Trend.

DR KISSINGER said that he thought that something might be made of this suggestion. The United States Government would have to give the Soviet Government some Bort of response by about 10 March; and he would be glad to discuss our proposal further with us soon after he returned from his visit to Hanoi and Peking, ie about the end of February or the beginning of March. It would be helpful ii, in i;4.e meantilne, the United Kingdom Government would consider how their suggestion might be incorporated in the text of the draft itself.

Cabinet Office 5 February 1973

DPBO, Series Ill, Volume IV

,v.e ry muCh

at ' a,li,

'tJould'~,~~o~~ '" to , $0 $ome 'way towards

meeting the curr€nt' Sovi~t' desid~rat~~

The latest Soviet 'de~id;e~ata' known:

trari.sl.atio~

'whiem. 'may

to- us

'a re set out

'Cui

le~ve somet~g t ,o be " des~ed), in th~ ,

paper at ' Annex II.,

-The Scviet and United Bta~'e~ s:~~ are hard to :reconcile:.

hav~ ~_ Tre_a.~~':, o~ :"the p.on:-us,e , ot ~uc~ear

The, Soviet ,w ish i :s t?

':~ea~ona bJ'" the Sov~e~: Union ~d 'the- ,U nited ','~at'es ~g~~ ~ac~ 'longer, f~r~~eeab~e ,

'T heir hcpe i~' tl:lat , this ~reaty ,' "wculd' be~om~ the ' lna~'or

Onl! fO;

~vent- cf \.;orl~ , pcliti~s not '

eve~tn.,

cth~rn •

pe~iQd'

of 'time"-

1973" but ai~c :for a f,~ '

It"IQ~ ,b e ,that' flo!! njajor

(;ather, tru¢ "tlle , majcr ,'ev,~nttl) :wculd I

, , a-ccurate trans,l ation; , ..

•

)

~ut

•

~e ,an ~gU:~lY '" ..

" .

however ·thB.t may be, the ~c~anc~

" ,

•

that', ,the, .S~vi~t '~eade:rs a~,t~h to ~liis 9.oc~ent is ' ~anifes~;. " ' , ':

' To 'judge' from the. reccrd'-" of ...

'the ' discussi'on. in

Washingto.n'~ , "

'the- 'Nhite HOl;se is , c~nSc~cus 6f t~e' d~~r$ _ iDheren~'. ~ t~e

sovi~t prOPO~al,

but· 't~ -that

,'I.

" :~;o~ided" we, ~O~~ 'make, ~t

,f..

.. ..

harmless iIi effeet'l ', it eculd 1be· e, means ,c f g~ing t~e to dc ' l

•

It:"would"be ... ~

•

TOP SEGREf

HULLAEALOO

- ....

..., . .. ..

COPY NO 1

ECLIPSE

States Soviet Summit could be delayed at least until the autumn . The whole point of the operation would be to hold the proSJ.)ect of some further deal

~ith

the Soviet Union

cont~uousl~

for United States troop reductions in Europe . lI -

dangling

Dr Kissinger

thinks that

1'W.e

need not worry undulyll about the Soviet aim of

depriving NATO of the protection of the TIni ted states nuclear deterrent .

He sees the real danger in the fact that the existing

draft · (by. which he presumably means the latest Soviet draft, .~

attached as Annex III and not the, draft we agreed with him, which is the text at Annex 1) does not provide protection for China.

The United States wish to give the Soviet leaders some kind of reply' by 10 March. g~stion

They would like us to cOD:sider ho1'J the sug~

we mad'e in the orie£ Ior the Prime Minister's discussion

li~s

subject during his recent

VlSlt

to lJashingtoR mj ght be _

incorporated in the draft of a Treaty . ~- ~

suggestion in that brief was that the Soviet Foreign

Ministry be asked to agree to the publication, as a document resulting from Mr Brezhnev's visit to Washington, of the text at Annex

suggestton

If the Soviet Foreign Ministry objected, our second ~as

that they should be told by the White House that

the United States saw

.J?otent~al

importance in the phrases "to

¥-

bring ~bout the conditions in which the danger of an outbreak

nuclear war '\tioul:d be reduced and ultimately eliminated H and "to create conditions in which recourse. ~o nuclear weap0nB will not ~ " --------------------~--~~------~--~-------------be justified It, and that in the o!,inion of the White House Soviet agreement to take part in confidential and unpublicised 'Soviet-US - 2 -

TOP

SEC~

HULLABALOO

/studies • • • • ECLIPSE

ECL.:IP~E

TOP SECRET .. :aDLLA:BALOO . '- .........: :.:-'

COPY NO ' 1

studies of how p~ogress _might be made to~ards these ends would be a possibly valuable supplement to the public diplomacy associated with the CSeE and the various aspe-ct:s of- arm.s limitation.

The essence of our suggestion '-was_ that it shouln be or~~ and .... confiden.tial and that the studies proposed in . it shou.+d ·be con-

....

No such confidentialit~ could attend

fidential and unpublicised.

any talks or studies propos-ed in the- text of a. published Treaty.

The interest of the -wo.r ld pre~s and tele,?-sion would be aroused;

and the talks !night, and probably would, become an ~xerci-se in ~t th~

political manoeuvre and propaganda.

Americans have now

proposed to us means doing something diff.erent from what we ourselves had in mind.-

None the less , it is not an unreasonabl.e proposition and the

pro't e.c tion of our own interests requires us to remain in the game . I therefore attach, as Annex IV, a redra,f t of Annex I, in 1tJhich

additions I have made, ..the request, are Underlined.

in an effort to me·e t the latest US The note to each addition explains the

........

purpose it is intenaed to serve. 8.

.When the text of Annex IV has been approved, I suggest that

it be discussed with the iNhite House as soon as possible . Washington telegram No 734 of 22 February suggests that Sir Burke Trend and/or I go to Washin~on as soon as possible after -l March

for this purpose • .

The

dr~t

at Ann-ex,

.ry

is open to the criticism

t~at

it is too

long and that it is repet.i .tive in that the more general provisiOns

in it

~ould

be held to cover the narrower. bilateral provisions.

But the Russians want a. bilateral . treaty, while the need to . . . -_...... ~

...

~r.eaSSlll'e NATO and phi.n.A.r~q~i!,:'i~!l, general language. .

-" 3- - '

I think

we can

,'.-

/l_eave •• '••

TOP SECRET: ~O .."'''' . .

ECtIPEE

COPY NO 1 -

t .

leave it to the Russ ians <;md -the Americans to do the pruning. What Dr Kissinger YJants in the first place is a draft Treaty that

might help to keep the Russians in play .

I think that the present

draft gives scope for prolonged -discussion . 10.

The role of the United Kingdom in this exercise is a matter

of increasing delicacy.

If ever the draft Treaty sees the light

of day , it may increas-e European anxieties about Super-Power

If our own part in the exercise becomes known, we

bilateralism .

may be criticised for keeping the other members of NATO, and the Nine in particular, in the dark .

I f our own part does not

become known, and the rest of the Nine are critical, we may be expect,ed to join in public criticism of - a text 'to which we have contributed .

further source of possible embarrassment is that

we do not know exactly what the Americans have said to the French or the Germans about the Soviet proposal .

We ought to agree with

the Americans 'What we say to the French or the Germans if- they approach us .

THOr'lA.S BRIMELOW

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DPBO, Series III, Volume IV

'--_44 _ _L_e_tt_er_:_C_r_o_m_er_to_B_"_·_m_e_lo_w_.....IIL.. __B_"_·m_e_l_ow_p_a_p_er_s____ Copy No 10f 2

TOP SECRET &. ECLIPSE

~CTLY

BRITISH EMBASSY. WASHINGTON, D.C.

PERSONAL

7 March 1973

Sir Thomas Brimelow GeE OBE FCO London

.,.- . t.G.A

(~,

I enclose the records of the discussions which we on 5 March with Henry Kissinger, on Hullabaloo, DFRs, and the future of NATO. You will see that they largely follow the text of the record you did yourself before leaving here but that we have added one or two glosses, and expanded your own. contributions. • had

2. You suggested to Richard Sykes that it might be useful if we let you have general tmpressions of Kissinger and the current attitudes. I think that there are in fact three principal reactions which we had.

: : ..

","

3. OUr fir.st impression is that although Kissinger . . spoke as always, both lucidly and confidently, there appeared to be an underlying element of strai~ and • perhaps emotion beneath his outwardly calm exterior; this has been emerging progressively • . I do not know quite what to attribute this to, other than the fact that he seems to be taking an ever-widening interest in all issues of US policy ·and this must un~oubtedly increase the strain upon him. Moreove~, some of the issues which concern the Administration now are not such as to fall easily within his own intellectUal scheme of coping with . problems, since they cannot easily be broken down into relatively simple issues. In addition, he must undoubtedly be up against a certain amount of opposition on one front or another, and he may be finding life more frustr'a ting than usual. Be that $S it may, I think there is an . increased danger that with so many balls in the air, one or other of them ma coine own as. ou Kissinger was becoming more involved in international economic affaire. If the US finds its international political ~ostur~ constrained by monetary or economic limitations (as we have . ourselves found) this could engende~ a very difficult mood • ., '

. : - .,

•

•.

'..

¥o

4 • Secondly, hi~' a~t~ilishl.ng int~lle'~~al" ~rrogance', . . though masked by a. . ~aim mannez: and nq . exaggerated words, . . showed through most promiriently. It was noticeable that the only two bodies who escaped his ' strictures we!e the. . UK (and I always have an uneasy feeling that we ~ay 90~1t . so~e error which will bring down the . ~eadmaster.t~ . ,censure, f

...... 1

/because " :-

TOP SECRET & ECLlfSE

because that is the nature of international affairs) and the Chinese. All the rest came in ·for the stick at some point or another, whether it was the (inevitable) bureaucracy, the State Department, the Department of Defence, the Europeans, the economists and so on. It must be maddening not to be able to control such bodies as the Department of Defence as directly as he would wish but it is just not possible, even for Henry Kissinger. I found his ~eneral scorn for "the Europeans" (perhaps ~s rl l from re ressed feel~ng of gul~t that he lias deserted his intellectu erl age. par lcularly disturbing. At one time I thought this might be a reflexion of his master's voice. Now I am not so sure.

Thirdly, as always, we were struck by the astonishing anomaly of the most powerful nation in the world invoking the aid of a foreign government to do its drafting for it, while totally excluding its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is ludicrous, and sooner or later it must change. The question is, of course, when? Meanwhile, given the fact that the Administration work in this most extraordinary way, we must be thankful that at least" it gives us the opportunity of making our views known and perhaps influencing their courses of action. But it is a dangerous and complicated path that we tread and I am always aware of the pitfalls that lurk on either side.

s f-interest and not necessarl to ours. gOlng too far 0 sugges that we are to e used as cats' paws. I do not think we are. But we should remember that this very close and confidential relationship, which is so closely guarded , and 80 little known to the government machine in both this country and the UK, carries with it, in addition to its undoubted advantages, some major potential dangers. It is obviously sensible to make hay while the gun shines but one has to remember that clouds are around and could cover the sun.

I .'

Record + 1 copy I

•

ro\vn copyright 2 5

..,

_I'

•• '

" '. ':. ·.·. . .:.·1 !. : ;.,. '-'. : ' •

Record of Conversation at the British :Embassy, Washington, on 5 March 1973 Present: Dr, H'A Kissinger Mr H Sonnenfeld l4r Rodman

11M Ambassador

Sir Thomas Brimelow Mr R A Sykes HITLLABALOO 1. ,

Sir Thomas Brtmelow gave to Dr Kissinger and

Mr Sonnenfeld folders

contribution to this

2B and 20 containing the latest UX s~dy.

He gave folder

to Mr Sykes.

He explained that these papers had been seen and approved by the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Sir Burke Trend

, had discussed his copy with the Prime Minister, who had

questioned how much had been told to the French and the Germans. 2.

Dr 'K issinger said that no d'Qcuments

to the

h~d

been shown

but the Germans had been told of the

Ge~ans;

, Soviet approach.

Rather more had been told to the French,

who had been shown the original Soviet text, gnd subsequently \

he had read them the Soviet explanatory note (which Dr Kissinger said he still found an incomprehensible ' document).

But no copy had been

giv~n

to the French.

, There had been an exchange of views with the Chinese. Dr Kissinger, having read rapidly through the UK draft of a possible Treaty and its accompanying ,

~~tes,

: ."

remarked with

a 'slight air of Burprise that 'we had given treaty for.m

•

the proposed document.

-e-

, '. '

,-...,

/Sir Thomas Brimelow -

.TOP SECRET

Sir Thomas Brimelow said that this was what we had

been asked to do.

We should have preferred no document

at all.

Dr Kissinger said we had first to consider what the

Soviets were aiming at.

The US Administration would not

be unwilling to cancel the whole exercise if 'it were judged iffiprudent.

That was admittedly not their usual tactic

in discussion with the Soviets; do anything foolish.

but they did not wish to

Before getting down to the discussion

of our ideas, he ought to bring us up to date on what had happened in the last ten days.

The Russians had produced

a new draft Declaration (not a Treaty), of which he gave us the English translation (attached at Annex I), adding that all the English been those prepared

tran~lations

we had been given had

the Soviet Embassy.

recently been a new factor.

Since Dr Kissinger's visit

to China, the Soviet Ambassador in to play games .

W~shington

He had been saying that

to come to Washington,

... '

There had

had begun

Brezhnev wished -but only if a successful outcome ~

---'-----.

of his visit were guaranteed.

One aspect of this success

.....

would be the Declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapoEs. It::

In addition Mr Dobrynin had been playing games with dates.

The US had suggested that Mr Brezhnev come to Washington in November .

Dr Kissinger commented that in the US . ~

there was no domestic need at all to have a summit .,..-

with Mr Brezhnev.

It had

bee~

his (Dr Kissinger's)

me~ting

,..

intention to spin out negotiation on all outstanding issues '/until 2

TOP SECRET

ÂŠ

TOP SECRET

until June.

But last week Mr Dobrynin had said that a

visit by Mr Brezhnev in May would not be possible, and that his authorities would be prepared to fix a date in June. Dr Kissinger described this as a trick, since the US had not offered the possibility of a visit by Mr Brezhnev i~

May.

were not.

Chinese tricks were intelligent;

Soviet tricks

The message from Mr Dobrynin had made no

mention of November. need for a swmmit;

The US Administration had no domestic and the later it could be, the greater

guarantee there was of Soviet good behaviour.

But the

US Administration could not say that a June visit would be unacceptable. \

They would therefore arrange for the visit

take place a: late--:-possible in June.

The Russians

had suggested. a big agenda . - the Middle East t SALT,. and a whole lot of garbage about the environment, transportation,

agriculture and. the like.

Dr Kissinger said he would let

Lord Cromer have a copy of their message.

The effect

of their message was to reduce somewhat the urgency of

the proposed Declaration or Treaty on the 路non-use of nuclear weapons, in

tha~

the Russians could no

lon~

refuse to come to Washington, even if they were to get

the ' question of

satisfaction on this issue.

T~is

development had put

the Treaty in a somewhat different perspective.

But how did the UK see this Treaty in the general context of Soviet political strategy?

Sir Thomas Brimelow said that when the Soviet Union and

the other members of the Warsaw Pact had launched the /proposal 3

TOP SECRET

proposal for a European Security Conference in 1969, they seemed to be principally interested in obtaining confirmation of the existing frontiers in Europe.

They

had gained acceptance of these frontiers through Herr Brandt's Ostpolitik.

Now they had a new objective.

By creating the appearance of detente they ~oped to bring

--------------------------------------

~ about a political climate which would simultaneously make .

it easier for the US Administration to reduce the US --------------------------------------------------~~ military presence in Europe, while at the same time making ..... it more difficult for European Governments to make good this reduction from their own resources.

In consequence . . .... ---

the future balance of power would tend to move in favour -of ~---------------------------------------~---the Soviet Union.

Sir Thomas Brimelow considered that in his view the

basic ~principle of Soviet policy was to achieve world-

wide change in the balance of power in their favour. , Detente was an important factor in this thinking. Recent I

Soviet policies supported this view.

They were once more

making references to a World Disarmament Conference.

Mr Brezhnev had talked of a possible visit to Helsinki. We, were in for a major Soviet propaganda campaign in \ favour of detente. British Ministers were forthright in their cons~ant :efer~nces to. the continuing strength of the Soviet Union, and this was the primary reason for the consistent Soviet attacks on HMG's policy. o~

The expulsion

the spies still rankled but it was Ministerial ' statements "

about the strength of the Soviet forces which was the principal target of

t~eir

hostility.

4 TOP SECRET

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.. .. -.- . "..

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-------'.

...

TOP SECRE!I ·

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Sir Thomas Brimelow said that there was a paradox

at the present time about llBFRs.

ill models we have

produced so far seemed advantageous to the Soviet Union. Why, therefore, were they so uninterested?

In Sir Thomas

Brimelow's view, it was probably because they were anxious about the possibility of adverse poli t~c'al repercussions in Eastern Europe.

If they could achieve the political

domination of East Europe, and the Eastern Europeans could be brought to accept this,

e.g.

as a result of the

OSeE Confer'e nce, then we might expect much greater Soviet interest in MBFRs.

If by the conclusion of any Treaty about the non-use '--~--------------------~--~~-------------------of nuclear forces, .or if the US umbrella were removed, the .... 'Soviet Union could expect a major increase of political control of Eastern Europe.

Sir Thomas

Br~elow

also said that 'in his view the

Soviet Union was not contemplating military operations

\ anywhere in the world at the present time;

but : .they

.: ~ __w_a...:y:....s_B_o_u..:g:....h_t_a_f_a;_':V_o_u_r_a_b_l_e_m_i_l_i_t_a.ry __b_al_·~ah __·_c_e_t,--S_1_·n_c_e__u_s_e_ful __ political' consequences could flow from it • .....

10.

Dr KiSSinger said that the US Government would never

agree to an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons. .c

explained that the current Soviet draft left China and Third Party areas wide open.

' . ,. . . C"

......

.. .

They had therefore removed

the clause about the use of nuclear weapons, and their \

'Own

draft was aimed at

continu~.

the dialogue. /Dr ,K issinger

' .'

5' TO:P SECRET I.

' .,

••

il.

Dr Kissinger confirmed that his own assessment tended

to agree with what Sir Thomas Brimelow had said and 'with the Chinese assessment of Soviet policy. (.

He commented

wryly that the UK and the Chinese seemed to be the soundest

members of NATO .

The Soviets were trying to use the

Declaration or Treaty as an instrument of detente and of Great Power bilateralism.

They could hint that it gave

them a free hand elsewhere, and even if this were untrue, it was something they could still use for political exploitation while pushing their own military development in an eerie way.

At present the Soviets probably

regarded detente as part of a political offensive .

did not know what Mr Brezhnev 's arriere pensees were; he might be thinking of genuine detente in the longer term. But if,at present , he were to come .under attack in the Politburo , it would have to be admitted that he had secured few advances for the USSR .

fire in North Vietnam.

He had had to accept the cease-

He had also had to accept tit"

~;xpulSion of the Soviet fo~es from Egypt. ~

the

The Security

Conference had in part been made irrelevant by Herr Brandt's Ostpolitik.

The Soviet Government had been forced to take

part in an MBFR discussion which they did not really want.

It was a matter of concern that in Moscow a point

might be reached when Mr Brezhnev's colleagues might be induced", through frustration , to turn to other

polici~s.

It was for this reason that the United States Administration would like to give Mr Brezhnev 路something.

Hitherto the US /tactics

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漏

fOwn

copyrigl t 2005

TOP

S'ECRE!l!

tactics had been to involve the Russians in endless discussions on matters which the US did not wish to settle. None of the quid pro quos which the Russians had been ~

expecting had in fact been

It could however ,. ff be said that the Russians had gained a few "pluses in ~elivered.

~ ,~~ ,~o~ of attitudes ' of mind in Western Europe, largely, brought about by Federal German policies. 12.

Dr Kissinger said he was

r~luctant

to become involved

wi th the Russiane in a bilateral. deal over the Middle East. What the Russians had tabled with the Americans was their

1969-70 plan virtually unchanged. plan could not be brought about

on Israel.

The acceptance of this

excep~

by brutal pressure

The Russians had more means' of exercising

pressure than the US had.

In Vietnam the US were abLe to

bomb one side and threaten the other to cut off aid. Even so it had taken two-and-a-half years to achieve a settlement.

He had some sense of what might happen in a

situation where the only pressure that the US might be able to exert might be the withholding of aid in a volatile internal political situation in the US.

The inability of

the US to exercise adequate pressure ,might lead to a new war or to a new Soviet intervention, ostensibly on behalf It was clear from what Hafiz lamael had said in Washington that the of a joint Soviet-American position. .

. .'

' (

;": ~ :;. ,

Egyptians wouid no't negotiate a set't lement. ' Their vi~~ ,---

was that any', -peace settlement ,would have to be made by the Palestinians - the very groU:p ,which had the least incentive

Ito 1

TOP, SECRET .... ;

TOP SECBJ4',.!r- "

to recognise Israel.

.An imposed settlement in the Middle

1East would have precisely the opposite effect from the ~ settlement

which had been imposed in Vietnam.

settlement would get the Americans out. in the Middle East would get the

The Vietnamese

An imposed settlement

c' American~

involved.

The Americans must not get themselves linked to the Soviet ~

Union in the Middle East.

Their strategy was to use

Egyptians to squeeze the Russians out.

the

From the point of

view of the Soviet Union , that would add another element ' of frustration .

The attitude of the United States Adminis-

tration was that they did not want to discuss the Middle East or MBFR with the Russians; discuss SALT.

whereas they did wish to

On the Middle East, the Russians had no

incentive to take a line softer than that of the Arabs. They did not want Sadat to be too successful .

They did

not want the onus of a settlement to fallon the USSR. They wanted it to fallon those Arabs who agreed to a settlement.

13 .

Dr Kissinger said that the Russians wanted bilateral

discussions with the US about certain European issues which the US did not wish to discuss with the Russians. be dangerous.

It could

Hence the reason for the present draft.

But was it right to proceed in this way?

Should the US

Aruninistration tell the Russians to go to hell? ~

,:.

14.

Sir Thomas Brimelow said he thought that the US

Administration should' not tell the Russians to go to hetl â&#x20AC;˘

...

. ~':::' ~~ ! '. :': t\i t

was po ssi bl e that the Sovi et Union might be genuinely

8 TOP SECRET

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----

/interested

TOE.. SECBET

interested in real (a~ opposed to bogus) detente. so, this was desirable. t~is

of judging whether

Unfortunately there were no means was so and, if so, when it would

But in any case it would be better to get on les6

grow.

competitive terms. useful to talk. East?" •

The UK's view was that it was always

Dr Kissinger said, "Even about

th~

Middle

Sir Thomas Brimelow said that the US Government

could not .avoid talking about the Middle East, to which

Dr Kissinger asked whether they should talk of concrete details or general principles.

Sir Thomas Brimelow said

that they should talk on principles, explaining that these were very difficult problems, and that. the important question to establish was what was the political will of the participants concerned.

There was no need to go beyond

this.

15.

Dr Kissinger said that he was worried.

He feared

that the Russians would give the US a tough paper. could be difficult

to alter it in

si~ce,

This

acceptable

way would place the onus (a difficult one) on the Arabs or the US.

There was also the problem of a second round

over Palestine.

Once the US gave a paper, there would be

immediate trouble with both the Arabs and Israelis.

16.

Sir Thomas Brimelow said that Articles 6 and 7

provided for long-term studies. .~

'I.~

• •

In the Middle East the

object should be not to produce papers, but to consult together quietly, so as to help matters evolve.

This would

take a long time.

/17. 9 TOP SECRET \ ."

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coming ~'to" Washi ngton .•

was making ·a 'mistake ·in 1"

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had mor.e room 'f oi-

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m~~i~tie. in "()~to~er") ~~~~rO~~kO •

would see

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saw through the Soviet draft~ . The- RuSS~8. had· .:'tI~ed .'

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sell . their ' draft t-o- the .Am.erj, cana on the. grounds that it meant ,; •

no~~. . .

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•. "'~)~:

J'" ,I,

• •

·.a~k~~ ~~eth~r. t~e E~~o~S~~..:~r.~.a!~,. when '·, . publishe-d;, would: make ' tll.e west Europeans think that the. . . ... . . . .. .' Mr Sykes

, .

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were two

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~~----~----~~~~.' '. -----~----~~--~~~~~--~

TOP SECRE!I!..:

~ ~J

to Prince Philip to visit an equestrian event in Kiev would be acceptable they were t 'o ld that it would be if . presented formally.

Before the invitation had arrived,

they arranged for Victor Louis to write in the Evening , Standard that not only would Prince Philip visit Kiev, but also Mo scow and. Leningrad; . and that EM The Queen might be visiting the Soviet Union in the near future. Sir Thomas Brimelow continued that there was some danger of a feeling of euphoria.

Detente would carry on anyhow.

Was it not better to have some form of arrangement which would enable the Americans to put real claws into the problem? 19. .Would the US want a firm commitment to talk?

was p~ss1ble that the talks could lead into deep waters: did the US Government really want this? Dr Kissinger said that any treaty would give the

20.

Soviet Union the advantage of the appearance of a kind of super-power condominium;

but in fact any undertaking to

discuss was not new but was indee~ inevitable. Dr Kissinger continued in flattering terms that he liked the

UK draft. It was longer, more comprehensive, more

vague, gave the impression of conveying more but in fact meant a great deal less than their own effort.

He thought

it unlikely that the Americans could have achieved anything

so good.

21.

Sonnenfeld said that Article IV appeared to leave

a gap so far as relations between the parties themselves

Iwere 11

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET \ )

~.;

":~>~:;

were concerned , and it was agreed to add the phrase " each other or with" between the words " contracting parties with" and " a state or states" in line 2 of Article IV . 22 .

Dr Kissinger said that if the Russians decided they

did not like the draft Treaty, the Americans could continue with the discussion of SALT II . 路

The UK draft

of the Treaty would be studied in the White

Ho~se t

they would let the :&nbassy have their comments . was to be back in Washington on 10 March ; Dr Kissinger was

and

Mr Dobrynin

but

no hurry to give him a draft text .

He would wait for another ten days or so after that . They wished to keep the Russians

23 .

unde~

time pressure .

Sir Thomas Brimelow then raised the question of how

the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance should be informed .

They would not wish to be taken by surprise .

But the history of MBFR showed that everything leaked very quickly .

The UK would study the Public Relations aspect

of the matter.

Dr Kissinger commented that if there were

leaks , the reaction of Presid~nt 'ixo~ would be such that the Europeans would paY 'a price out of all proportion. Sir Thomas Brimelow said that the UK might have a problem with the Nine .

They had been asked to join on Christmas

Eve in a complaint about the bombing .

. ;: . -;

was lucky the UK had not agreed .

Dr Kissinger said it

Sir Thomas Brimelow said

there was no question of luck in that instance . Dr Kissinger admitted this

an~

said that perhaps it might

be possible for consultation to take place in the Ministerial /Meeting 12 TOP SECRET

漏

rown copyright 2

'0 Meeting of NATO in June, but this would not be easy. But he himself would no doubt have to go to Moscow before Mr Brezhnev came to

Washing~on.

He could probably stop

aff in Bonn and France on his return.

The Germans and

the French would ..thus be put into the picture, and he

\ would warn them not to leak. 24. Mr

Dr Kissinger said that he would

~ropose

that

Brezhnev's visit take place as late as possible in

June. v~ew

The later the

d~te,

the better from the point of

of the discussion of SALT, on which every day would

be needed.

The eSeE might be pushed into July.

Summing

up, he said that the White House would work on draft, not on the US draft. passed to Mr Sykes.

~eir

~he

comments would be

Subsequent progress could be made

either in correspondence, or, if necessary, by personal contact.

If the Russians rejected the revised draft,

the Americans would suggest that it be left in abeyance, and that SALT and MBFR be dealt with instead.

In no

circumstances would the US accept any obligation not to, use nucl ear weapons. ;:.

25.

Finally, after the discussion on MBFRs and the

f~ture of NATO, Sir Thomas Brimelow asked what attitude

: ' ..w~ shC?u1d adopt if the French or Germans asked

whether

.we., had heard anythin& abou.t the propos~~. treaty. Dr Kissinger路 ~aid that: h~ thought the ' best reply woul~ be

in . to admit, . '

g~neral

.. . terms, . .

t~t

we had heard about it,. .in .. . .

the same way as the French and Germans had. heard about: it /1>ut

13 TOP SECRET

but that we understood it now to be in abeyance.

If it

were to be raised again, then presumably the Americans would discuss it with all three of us as they had previously. 26.

If the Russians did not accept the treaty then there .

would be no further need of discussion.

If they did" accept,

then the US approach would be to discuss it with the French and Germans in a general way, suggesting that they would be consulted as before. 27.

Dr Kissinger thought it most unlikely that the Chinese

would raise the issue with us.

If they were to do so then

he suggested that our reply should be similar to that made in response to any French or German enquiry.

: I

. "( .

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- '- .,,"

14 TOP SECRET '.

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....

DPBO, Series ill, Volume IV

~____5_9___~_a_sh_t_en_~_o_n_t_e_l_12_2_3____~II~

___

B_"_em_e_w_w __p_ap_e_r_s___

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CYPHER/CAT A -PS 100

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TOP SECRET UK tV FS ALPHA

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1223 OF 5 APWIL. 1973. PERSONAL FOR BR I ~ELOW YOUR TELNO 804: HULLABALOO I PASSED THE COMMENTS IN YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE TO KISSINGER ON 30 MABCH. 2. MY FIRST 1FT CO~TAINS THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM WHtCH KISS INGER HAS NO\路/ SENT ME. TH IS EXPLA INS THAT THE US HAVE NO~~ GIVEH THE SOY fET S IDE A NE\~ DRAFT AGREEMENT, IjH ICH T~KES INTO ACCOUNT YOUR COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET DRAFT. 3. MY SECOND 1FT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE HEW AMERfCAN DR~FT . 4. I AM SURE THAT YOUR FUQTHER COMMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME CROt路1 ER NO DISTRI~UT ION

}& PS/puS

SIR T BRlMElOW

COFIES TO SIR BURKE TREND CABINET 0 FFI CE lORD BRIDGES NO 10 DOHNING STREET

rlR 'WIGGIN MR ROSE .

TOP SECRET

DPBO, Series

Washington tel 1224

60 n~mDIATE

TOP SECRET

CYPH f. f~/CAT A \

m, Volume IV

Brimelow papers COpy NO

·Lr

.........

FM WASHINGTON 06012~Z

DEDIP . TOP SECRET . UK EYES

~LFA.

TO I~MEDIATE F·C 0 TELNO 1224 OF 5 APRIL. 1973 PERSONAL FOR BRI~ELOW. M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMGPANDUM . ~E HAVE STUDIED SIR THOMAS BR1MfLOW'S VERY HELPFUL COMMENTS. A NEW DRAFT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO DCBRY~IN IN RESPONSE TO THE t'!OST RECENT SOV JET DRAFT.

IN TH IS NE\·! DRAFT, ~,I E INCORPO,RATED

THE POINTS MA~E BY SIR THO~AS, AS INDICATED BELOW. 2. YOU WilL NOTE THAT OUR ·DRAFT RFSTORES TO THE PREAMBLE THE LAUGUAGE VIH ICH THE SOy tF.TS HAD R.a'lOVED AND ON \4H ICH SIR THOMAS COMMENTED IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF HIS MEMORANDUM . WE HAVE ALSO ADDED A FURTHER PREA ~'BlJLAR PAP,AC·RAPH , DRAWN FROM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES, REGARD ING.,THE INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. 'THIS IS '. INTENDED TO f':EET THE S9V I ET DES IRE FOR smlE SUCH LANGUAGE, AS REFLECTED IN THE IR A.RT IClE III, BUT DOES SO WITHOUT THE PITFALLS WHICH SIR THOMAS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF HIS MEMORANDUM. ' 3. OUR COUNTfRDRAFT OF' ART lelE I TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE CO,~CERNS EXPRESSED BY SIR THO~AS (PARAGRAPH 4 OF HIS MEMORA~DUM), WHICH WE OF 'COURSE SHARE, IN SEVERAL WAYS, \1H ILE - ALSO BE ING RESPONS IVE TO THE SOV lET DES IRE FOR MORE EXPL IC IT Fom~ULAT IONS ON NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE NOW SAY ·THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS THE "EFFECTIVE REMOVAL" OF THE DANGER, ETC. THIS SETS A STRICTER STANDARD THAN THE 5uV fET VERS,ION AND LEADS MORE lOG ICALlY INTO ART ICLE ii, AS WE REWORDE~ IT. FURTH~R~ORE, WE HAVE RESTORED THE CLAUSE THAT ~EFERS TO "CREATING CON?'TtONS, I' ETC., AND WE HAVE REWORD~D THE SOVIET QUOTATION FROM THE PRINCIPLES IN A MORE BINDING fORM. WE TH H'K WE HAVE THU'S ~A INTA 'NED THE BREADTH OF SCOPE- 'IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH SIR THOMAS REFERS, WHILE ALSO GIVING TH~ SCV lETS SOt~E LAt~GUAGE, IN REV ISED FORM, TO WH ICH· THEY ArtACH IMPORTANCE.

4. OUR REDRAFT OF ARTICLE II REVERTS TO FORMUlATIO~S WE HAD , USED EARLIER A~n SEEMS ·TO US TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE P01NTS ' IN SIR THOMAS' PARAGRAPH 'S, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE CHANGES IN ARTICLE I, FROM ':HltCH ARTICLE II FLOWS, CORRECT THE DEFICIENCIES ' ~'HrCH HAD CONCERNED SIR THOMAS. TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET ' "

RE TURNS TO THE S~CRT VERS IO:~ Cf Eft, ~ L JER CRA FTS. THE " PURPOSES " REFERRED TO ARE OF COURSE THOSE IN OUR TWO PREVIOUS

5. , A~T ICLE III ARTICLES .

A.RrICLE V, THE PROV IS ION CO~ CERf' INC JOII~T STUDIES AND CO N SUL TATIO ~S SINCE IT ts A LO GICAL AND SENS IBL E ONE 11" THE LIGHT OF OUR REDf{AFTS OF ART JCLES I AND II AS WE LL AS OF ARTICLE I II. SIR T HO~AS WAS OF eCURSE CORRECT IN NOTING (PARAGRAPH 8) THAT TH E SOV IET VfRSlor HAn CUT THE GROUND FROM ., UNDER THIS ARTICLE . FCq OPTICAL RE ASONS, ~ E INSE RTED THE A~T ICLE ON URGENT CO~SUlTATIONS ~HEAD OF THE ONE ON JOINT STUD IES. 6 . \vE HAVE RESTOREG , AS

I!~ ARTrCLE VI I, SUBPARAGRAPH (A), \'IE

HAVE LET STAND THE

REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER BECAUSE WE FEE L ON BALANC~ THAT IT MAY REA~SURE THE CHINESE TO SOME EXTENT TO HAVE SOV'ET R fGHTS OF SE LP- uE"FJ:NS'E CIRCUMSCR InED IN 'TH IS Id AY. ~I[ DO, HOWt=VER, IN SUBPARAGRAPH (c) ELl f'li 1 ~IATE TH E C.OV fET REFERENCE TO " APPROPR IATE TREATIES AND AGREE .AENTS " ; \~ E JUDGED , AS DID SIR T H Or~ A. S (PARAGD;\PH 11 OF H I S t~n路~crL~ 1 DlH) TI-L~T TH E SOV l ET I NTEN T ~!AS

TO CIRCU~SCRlnE O~R RIGHT TO ASSIST ALLies AND THIRD COU f TRIES. 8. ~E HAVE ALSO PICKED UP Ir~ TH IS DRA FT THE EARL f ER SR IT ISH SUGGEST ION S CONCERN IN G THE LISE OF 'COUNTR I ES ' RATHER THAN I

~IPA q TIF.~ ,"

It/HERF THIS IS PERTI IEN T.

CROt4ER

NO DISTRIBUTION

COPIES TO

SIR BURKE TREND CABINET OFFICE LORD BRIDGES NO 10' lX)\.JNn~G ST~ET

PS/PUS SIR T BRIMEWW

r-m

WIGGIN

I'm ROSE

-2TOP SECRET

漏

fOwn

DPBO, Serie III, Volume IV

6_1___~_a_s_ht_路n_~_o_n_~_e_~_12_2_5____~II~

L -____

II'~',!;lJIA'rE

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~ CteRER/CAT A

:-".GPS Ft~

___B_n_路m_e_l_ow__p_a_p_~_s___ COPY NO

?r:fJ ., ..

060100Z

\>lASHINGroN

DEDI? TOP SECRET

UK EY ES ALPHA TO l~ii'iEDIATE F~O TEUIO 1"25 OF

AP ~ IL.

1973 -

FOR BRIHELOW

PERSOH~L ~1Y ~

IPT '

FOLLOWiNG

AGREENEf4T 2ET / EEN

~~1 F.RICA

DRAFT A ~ REE ~ ENT. THE fGOVERN !\~ ENT OF TH ~ u~~ ITED

TEXT OF

AHOfrHE GCVEl{tWElJT OF

TH ~ UNION

STATES OF

OF C.OVlfT SOCIALIST

THE PREVfNT ION OF PlJCLE'AR ~ AR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION () GU JDED BY TH[ OBJECTIVES OF STREHGTHEN ING \:WRL D PEACE AND liiTERNATIONAL SECUR lTV I WCO~SCIOUS THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES REPUBL ICS o r~

FOR MANKIND;

~) PRO':EED ING EQUAlLY .FROt-A THE DES IRE TO BRIHG ABOUT CONI; IT IOf SIN WHICH THE ~A~GER OF AN OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR ANYWHERE IN THE

RE DUCCP AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATEDI (0 PROCEEDING FROM THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED . ~ NATIONS REGAPDING THE 'MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, REFRAINING FROM T~E THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF W AR, AND I~ CONFORMITY WITH THE VARIOUS AG~EEMfNTS TO WHICH EITHER HAS susseR IBEDz , : @PROCEEDING FROM THE BASIC pRINCIPLES O~ RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF ,AMER ICA/f AND THE UN ,ION OF SOy lET SOC IAL 1ST REPUEL ICS SIGNED IN MOSCO\~ ON' 29 ~1AY, 19721 I~ REAFF IRM lUG THAT THE DEVELOP~1ENT 'OF U~-SOV lET RELAT to: S IS t!OT DIRECTED AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES AND THEIR INTERESTS" HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: ARTICLE I '. THE UN ITED STATES AND THE SOV lET UN ION SOLEMtJLY AGREE THAT THE OBJECT IVE 'OF THE IR pOL IcY IS TO ACH IEVE THE EFFECT IVE 'REMOVAL OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR AND OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR W~APONS. ACCORDINGLY, THEY AGREE THAT THEY WILL, IN THE COHDUCT OF THEJR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DO TH~IR UTMOST TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH RECOU~SE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE JUSTIFIED, TO PREVENT THE DEVELOP!4ENT OF SlrUAT IONS CAPABLE OF CAUS ING A DANGEROUS EXACERBATION OF THEIR RELATIONS, AND TO AVOID MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS. ;.. ,I/ORlD ~'!OULD BE

TOP SECRET

/ARfICLE II 路 '

TOP SECRET

AR TICLE I I THE TltlO PAR TIEc, ~GR[ E THAT

THE

ACH I [V[tI. ENT OF THE O BJECT~ V ES

AND

CONu lJIONS RE FERR fD TO I ~ ~RTICLE I P RE ~ UP POSES THE EFF ECTIVE F LIMI ~ ATIO ~ OF THE THREAT OR USE OF" FORCr BY ONE PARTY AGAI NST THE "OT4 Ef< , gv O!"£ PA RTY AGAt NST THE A .LLIES OF THE OTHER "AtD BY EI THE R PAR TY ~ G A J NS T TH IRD CO U~i TR IES 1 H~ CIRCU !4 ST I\ :~CES ~; H ICH (\ hY END AG[R I N T ~R!~ :\ T IO;"I Al P £~CE !dH) SEC U~ ITY. TH€ Tt. O PART IES E G L E M ~ LY AGREE T~A T THEY !~ ILL BE GU10ED BY THESE CO ~ SIDERATIO~S IN THE F OR r"'~ U LA T ION OF T;:EIR FOREIG N POL ICV "I..ND IN THE IR ACT 10 'S IN THE FI ELD OF INTE RN ATIO NA L ~E LATIONS. i

AR T lel£ III

THE

T~O

OTH!: H

PAR TI ES U ~E R T AKf TO DEV FLOP THEIR RE LATIO NS

AI~ D

v,' ITH TH IRD CCU : TR I ES IN A ,.fAY CCIJS lSTE T

\~:

~ ITH

EACH

ITH THE

ABOVE PURPOSE S. ART ICLE " IV

IF AT ANY TI ME THE REL ATIONS OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE PA RTIES TO THIS A~q EE MENT VII TH EACH OTHER OR ~ ITH TH IRD COUNTR IES APPEA~ TO INVOLV E THE RISK OF A N U~ L E AR CONF LICT, OR IF RELATio ns BET ~ EEN vTATE c ~O T PART IES TO THE A GRE E ~ E N T AP PEAR TO INVOLVE SUCH A RISK, TH E IJ t~ I TED STAT ES At 0 THE SO V 1ET UN lO~, ACT I G It ACCOR DANCE .J ITH THf PROVI SIGN S OF THIS AGRE E,iE NT, WILL H1ME i) IATELY EI~TE R INTO URGEtlT CONSULTATIONS vi lTH FACH OTHE~ A~ D '1 IIKE EVE RY EFFORT TO AVERT TH IS RISK,

AR TICLE V

TH '=

E TO EfTABllSH A JO INT GHOUP TO STUDY AtH) CONSULT CO ~JCE R N It G THE I E At~ S 't.'HERE hY THE OB JFCT IVES, PURPOSES AND UNDf.RTAKl fi GS SET FORTH I ,J ARTICLES "'. II AND lit CAN BE EFFECTIVELY REALIZE D AND TO MAKE R ~ C04MfNDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE . PARTIE S CON~ ER NING THE I~PL[ME ITATION OF TH E TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. ART ICLE V I EACH PARTY SHALL BE FREE TO I. 'FORH THE SECUR ITY COUNC Il, . TH£ SE CRETARY GENE RAL OF THE U'lITED NATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALLIED OR THIRD PARTIES OF THE PROGRESS AND OUTCOME OF CONSULTATIONS if IT IATED IN ACCORDA CE vJ ITH ART ICLES IV AND V OF TH IS AGREEMENT, r 'J O PART

IES

AGq

AR T I elE v II

-2TOP SECRET

r wn c pyright 2

/NOTHING

•t

TOP SECRET

NOT~ING

JM THIS

~GREE~E~T

SHill AFFECT OR

t M ~AIR

(A) THE HHtERENT RIGHT CF I NDIVI DUA L OR COLLECTIVE S~LF-DEFENSfl l-ft"'C"'i Jvo,..I .J v.

~ ROVIOED FO~} BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

(8) THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OR RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECUR lTV:

NO DISTRIBUTION

COPIES TO

SIR BURKE TREND CABINET OFFICE LOl\D BRIDGES no 10 DC\ll~ING STREET

PS/FU'S

SIR T BRlMElOY

MR WIGGIN MR BOSE

-3TOF SECRET

DPBO, Series III, Volume IV

Brieffor Heath

Brimelow papers

PMVP(73) ZO

16 May 1973 TALKS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE ON 21 AND 22 MAY 1973 HULLABALOO

Brief by the Foreign a.nd Commonwealth Office

BACKGROUND 1. The latest version of the text (given to Sir Burke Trend by Dr Kissinger on 10 May) is attached. As a ~xt it is now agreed between the Americans a.nd the R.ussians. But, a.s of 10 Ma.y, the Am~ican8 were not yet committed to signing. Brezhnevevidently attaches great impo~tance to this Agreement acd the Americana evidently want to extract some quid pro Cf.lO in return.

2. . As the Prime Minister knows, we have been extensively involved with Dr Kis singer in this exercise, not wholly of O\\r own volition. (Being unwilling to trust his own bureaucracy Dr Kissinger has tended to use Sir Thomas Brimelow as his desk officer!) It is essential that the extent of our involvement should not be revealed to the French, nor to anybody else. 3. The latest version of the text takes account of some of our comments on the last version. But there are still features which, ideally. we would have liked to see improved. . In particular:a. in the title, "Measures to remove the ~nger of nuclear war" should be preferable to liThe prevention of nuclear warttj b. in Article I lido thoir utmost" would be preferable to "act in such a manner &8 11 â&#x20AC;˘ Generally speaking, we wo~ have wished for a more cautious form~tlon of Article 1. The Agreement may well give rise to anxiety about II decouplingtl in lome other NA TO countries when it lee. the light of day. But it would not be practicable for us to seek further amendments at this stage. 1

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4. According to Dr Kissinger, President Nixon intends to send a letter to Brezhnev at the time of signature making clear "that the Agreement does n..:>t constitute renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; the purpose of such a letter would of course be political, and designed to reassure the Allies, and others; 16gally, the text comes nowhera near constituting renunciation of first use, let alone of any use. 5. At the time of Dr Kissinger's visit here the Americans bad read the text to Dr Bahr and had discus sed the question with the French in general terms, and aleo with the Chinese. Dr Kissinger intends to go ever the text in more detail with Iv1 Jobert while in Paris this week. He aims to let us know what transpires (through Sir Edward Tomkins) Lefore the Prime Minister sees President Pompidou. 6. Sir Denis Greenhill emphasised to Dr Kissinger the importance of warning the Alliance as a whole about this Agreement before it saw the light of day. He sugge8~6d ~t the Americans might inform the NA TO Council a.bout a week before the announcement was due. and should siInultaneously take carefully considered diplomatic action in capitals to explain what the Agreement was about. Sir Denis added that it would help to reassure the Allies if the text of President Nixonls letter were made known to thurn, whether or not the intention was to publish the letter wl'.en the Agreement was published. Dr Kis singer did not commit himself to any p"lrticular course of action but ex~reseed the hope that whez:. the time came we would be pI epared to help. LINE TO TAKE 7. It is likely that thi3 s\4l)ject will t;ome up when the Prime Minister s ees President Pompidou. In the circumstances the precise line the Prime Minis ter might take will have to be decided very shortly before the event. Provisionally, the Prime Minister might make. the following points: -

a. We understand that the Americans have been diBcus~ing this Agreement with the French recently, as they have with US; we believe the Germans and the Chinese also know about it. b. We believe that the text takes sufficient account of the interests of the Allies. Certainly it does not constitute renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless it may cause anxieties within the Alliance. We have urged on the Americans the importance of t.heir making a major diplomatic effort to explain the Agreement to the Allies as a whole before it sees the light of day and to reassure them that it does not mean "decoupUns", nor the abandonment of Europe.

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c. While we do not take a. elaiat.:r ~ew of the Agreement, it is part of a trend which reinforce. our belief in the importance of Europe's addres sing herself much more actively than hitherto to the problems of European defence. It will also be important that. in explaining the Agr«feme.nt to the Allies the Americans should forestall any teooeucy that might appea.r in some of them to regard it, unjustifiably, as a significant acceleration of dete·n te.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 May 1973

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, ·.' AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ., •

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STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE I

UNION OF SOVIET

~OCIALIST

REPUBLICS

ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR. WAR. The United State. aDd the Soviet Union

Guided by the objective. 01

8tren~enini

'World peace and inter-

national aecurity; Conscious that nuclear war cCNld have devaatating conaequencc fl

lor mankind; Proceeding lrom the deaire to bring about conditions in which tho

danger of an outbreak of nuclear

wu anywhere

in the world 'would bo

reduced and ultimately eliminated: Proceeding from their obligation. under the Charter 01 the Unit ·.. l Nation. regarding the maintenance ot peace. ret'raining t'rom the

tlll.' (, :"I t

or u •• of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with

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menta to which either ba. lubacribed. Proceeding from the ba.ic principles of

rela~on8

between

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Unit.d State. of America and the Urdon of Soviet Socialist Republic B .iped in Moacow on 29 May 197Z; Reaffirming that the de,v elopment of U. S. -Soviet relatione i8 not

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ARTICLE I The United Stat~a and the Soviet Union solemnly agree that an objective of their policy i. to r~oye the dansu of nuclear war and of tb. use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly. they agree that they will act in 'a uch a manne~ a8 to prevent the development of .ituation. capable of causing a dangerous exac~rbatioD

of their relationa, .s to avoid mili~y comronta~on8 and

•• to exdude the outbreak of nuclear war 'b.tw..en tllemaelve. and

between either party ancl third countrie •• ARnCLE

The two putie. agree. in accordaDce with Article I and to r o~li;'o

ita objective, to proceed from the premi.e that they will refrain from the tmeat

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ua. of force by, one party agaiDat the other. by one P'lJ.·ty

againat the Allie. of th. other aDd byeitbei' party against third countri o. in ~lrcumat~ce. which may endanger interDatioDal peace

and security.

T,h e two partie. aolemDly aptee that they win be i\lided by these, conoi .. deration. in the formulation of tl,leir foreip policy and in their nctionn in the fialel of tnterMUODalre1ationa •

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The two partie. undertake to develop their tela.tione with ea.ch other and with thUd

count~i••

in .. way ,con.i.tent with the ..bove

ARTICLE IV II at any tim. rela.tion. between the Partie. or between either party and third countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclea.r

conflict, or if relations between .tate. not parties to the Agreement a.ppear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union or between either of them and third countries, the United Sta.te. and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provision. 01 thi. Agreement, will immediately enter into ur ge nt con.wtationa with ••ell other and make every .uort to avert this ri Bl~.

ARTICLE V

Each party ah&ll b. free to inform the ~curity Council, th e Secretazty Goner,a l ~l the United Nation. and tho Governrnttnte of nI H <1

or third parti •• 01 the progre •• and outcome of conlu1tations initi ntccl in accordance with Articlea IV ol~. Agreement.

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N othina in tbi.

Agre~ent

.hall allect or impair

<a) the inherent right of individual or c:olleetive •• If.defaDse; , provide~ for QY Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nationll:

(b) the proviaiona of the Charter oftha United Nation. relating to the maintenance or reltoration of international peace and .ec~rity; (c) , the obligation. undertaken by the United State II and the

Soviet Union toward. their aUi.a or other c:ountrle.,in ~eatle.,

ARTIC~~

[Tb1. Agreement ,hall b. ~f Unlimited duration. •

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Don. at the City of WaahingtoD; D. C. on _____, 1973 in t wo

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equally ,a uthentic.

the United State. of America . ' .' For the Union of Soviet SociC\li f:' t

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TOP SEC RET '7; TO F LAS H F C O· TEL ~!O 463 OF 22 JUNEjlr:FO -Htut..\ED-1A~E l~ASHI~lGTON , PP.10RITY BOH!~, PARts, ROME, · THE

~AGUE

At"D SAVING BRUSSELS A~JD · UK REP EEC~

AGREEFiE!tT BET\lJEEN THE US AND THE U S S R ON PREVENTI0r; OF ~'UCLEAR WAR .

1. ·Rur·iSFELD (US) CALLED A SPECIAL AND VERY RESTRICTED HEETI!~G OF THE COUHCIL LATE 'rH I S HOR~UNG: HE READ RAP I DL Y THE DRAFT OF TIU S AGREEMENT w'H I CH I S TO BE SIGNED BY NI XOM AJJD BREZHt,tEV AT 1533 H.OURS ·WASHINGTON TI~1E TODAY .. HE THEN READ A COt~r4ENTARY ON WE DRAFT AND FINALLY RESpONDED TO QUEST'OI~S AND COt-U'iEHTS~ '" •• 2~ RUHSFELD SA·, D THE DRAFT \JAS SUBJEd TO LAST MI ,JUTE CHANGES~

·FOR THIS REASON AND BECAUSE OF ITS PECULIAR SENS1TIVITY HE DID NOT CI RCULATE EITHER THE DRAFT OR THE TEXT OF' THE COf·iMENTARY~ HE SAID DR~ KtSSlttGER WOULD . INFORM NAT 0 Af~B"ASSADORS IN . \tlASHiNGTON DURING THl!" COURSE OF THE

t·10RN·H~G ~JASHINGTON TIME~

(I ASSU ME THE DEFIHfTtVE TEXT OF THE AGREE:~ ENT \:IiLL BE TRA,I S;{!TTED TO YOU BY H. H. EliBASSY AT \l.'ASHii·1GTON.)THE 'S IGNATURE \~OULD BE FQLLO\1ED BY A PRESS BRIEFIPG. KISSI NGER'S REr~Ar<~~s ON THESE OCCASJONS ~.IOULD BE AUTHORITATIVE \'f~EREAS RUMSFELD'S ·OWN COMMENTS ~iUST BE TAKEN AS PERSONAL: .

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. . 3. AT THE SUGGESTION OF DE S~AERCKE (BElG lur·1) IT VJAS AGREED TH~T . IF ruE NAT 0 SPOKESMAN SAID ANYTH lt~G AFT::R THE AGREEI-1Et·JT H, D BEEN PUBLISHED HE ~JOULD AVOtD SUGGESTING THAT THE COUNCIL HAD QUOTE, .DISCUSSED -UNQUOTE THE AGREEME~~T BUT ~IOUL.D. ADM I T 'THAT : THEY HAD BEEN QUOTE 1NFORt·1ED UUQUOTE~ . ~~; Rur~sFELD'S COf!;NENTARY hi'n eH LAr{GEL Y REPEATED THE TEXT OF THE AGREEHEUT CONTA' NED THE FOLLO~IfNG PO I NTSI (A) THIS QUOTE SIGNIFtCANT U~IQ~OTE AGREEMENT ~IAS B'~ATERAL BUT ITS OBLIGATIONS WERE MULTILATERAL IN )HE SENSE THAT IT COVER~D CONTINGENCtES INVOLVING THIRD PARTIES • . (B) IT WAS PREDtCATED ON THE ABSENCE OF THE THREAT OR USE

OF FORCEs TOP SECRET

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IT DID NOT (LAST

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(C) IT oD'D NOT (LAST ~ RD .UI~DE RLIrED) BA,~ THE USE OF IJUCLEAR \tEAP01~ S AND IT PRESERVED THE RIGHT OF THE US TO USE SUCH \'JEAPONS: ( u) us uc;L1GATtO:JS TO THE I RALLIES \'I£RE Ut t ~PA IRED so DETERP.~, C£

'OT AFFECTED :

tF FORCE 'W AS USED It' VIOLAT10 ;1 OF ARTICLE 2- THE US ~10U LD BE

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F;-;EED CF ALL O..,l JGAT JOi:S U,\DER THE .... GPEEj· EhT. (F) THE T 't~_ PA : \TIES ACCE.?TED (. RELAT ION TO ,..lL TH i RD P!RTtE~ 111 E CC 1.! STR;;; ~~T" -I:-i i CH TH"'Y 1'0''; ACCEP TEH AS EET ~~EN THEHSEL YES s (G) T~E REFE , E: 1 CE ti' A~i:CL€ 6 TO QUOTE APF:'CP~IATE DO CJ i'~ EiTS Uf: (!UOTE H' CLU ED PRES I l)E: Tl L PRO f·uU . CEi·iE':rS AND Ul\D~' STjJ"DL~GS ~~ {TH or 'ER cnu JTR t ES ~ 5. T;E co~ !C IL AT O i ~C~ "'ECOC; ISED THAT F1J~~ D~,l E.~TAL

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A"Rf.:Er ,Err WAS OF

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tlCE A. D AGREED TO DISCUSS iT IN tJ.1D-JULY THE BAS IS OF HSTRUCTIOi'S. DR KISSIfGER HAS AGREED TO A

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t ~ SAN CLE ·-: EUTE o:~ SATURD y 30 JU t' E \ ITH THOSE t~Et'BER S

OF THE CO .,C IL MiO ARE GO I G C~ THE SACLANT J,U r T~ lU(4 S COULD

EE PRESEt T IF THIS IS SilFTED TO 29 JU ~E, EUT AS YOU Kt· OW~

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HAS TO LEAVE FOR Lot DOi . 6; DE STAERCKE, DE ROSE (F RA CE), SPIERENBURG ( NETHERLANDS); KRAPF (FRG )

'JD CATAL

~ (ITALY) ALL EXPRESSED DISQUIET AND IT ~JAS

PLAIN THAT LUNS SH-ARED TH~IR VIEW: ERALP (TURKEY) SAID HIS FI RST PE Cl JOl l t·, S .. ! T !~ [ ~~ FJ 'CU R ~;LE S tilCE THE AonE E-1EdT S=.Er~ ED TO HAVE UO EFFECT 0 'I THE t UCLE! R DETEr RE T.

user! ( i;CR ~';A Y) BELIEVED I I S t'.UTHO I T 1E ~'lOUlD \~ELCG f~E THE QUOTE HTEIJTIO~S UoQUOTE OF iH E AGREErH.':NT. t~ARSH ALL (CAnADA ) EXP RESSED NO VI E\·J BU T AS KED BY I iPL ICATI O, \~1ETHER THE PROVfSION FOR CON SU LTATION BET ~ EEN T IE PARTIES MI GHT OPEN THE W Y TO U DE IRABLE I.JTERF ER E;CE BY THE OVt ET UN I Otl I THE AFFAIRS OF A·1ER JCA'S

A!-L J ES . 1 SPOK E AS REPORTED If PARA 9 BELOW. OTHER DELEGAT I Ot~S DI D 0 T. co r·~ ! EdT. . 7. THE ' r \!O t·1AiH POUt TS ~1 ICH \~ERE ESPECf LLY HAltJ1ERED HOME °

BY DE ST AcRCKE ~1D DE ROSE ,ERE ; ( A) TH - GREEtlS;' ~'OULD BE ~J I DELY Ur DERSTOOD (THOUGH NO DOUBT vlRONGL Y) AS QUOTE DECOU? Lit G UflQUOTE NU CLEAR A D cor~vt:NT rONAL

DEFEPCE ~ SPIERE:.!BURG THOUGH T THERE ~/OULD BE SEVERAL LEADE RS IN THE PRESEt T fIETHERLA DS GOVT ~JHO \'OULD BE GLAD TO INTERPRET IT AS A QUOTE NO -FIRST USE U! QUOTE AG~EEMEdT. (B) THE GPEEt~Erl T SET UP A QUO TE PR IVILEGED U IQUOTE RELATION SH IP BETWEEI THE T.O SUPER POWERS~ DE -ROSE SAID \lJE SHOULD BE HAPPY

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iABOUT THE STABILISATION

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-ABOUT THE STASiLIS!\TIO:{ ?F SUCH A RELATIONSHIP BUT ASKED ,ER EUROP E \'.iOULD PARTfclPATE OR WOULD SECONE ~ QUOTE MARS INAL AREA Ui~ QUOTE.

OTHER POI'!TS i~ ADt: \i/ERE; (A) THE. AGREE~·~Et~T Hill E!4 COURAGE THOSE

~lHO BELIEVE Hi A

8JRO? EAN t~UClEAR FORCE (NETHERLAnDS): (B) THE AGR£E~·II ENT ~t~ULD BETTER HAVE BEEt~ ENi tTLED QUOTE TO P ~ EVE~~T \/AR Ui ORDER TO FREVEf'~T t'UCLEAR \t:!AR ut~QUOTE {FRG} I

(G) TI'E EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY RUf·1SFElD h~ULD NOT BE EASY

TO PUT ACROSS TO PUBL leo? t NION AND TH ERE WOULD' BE A . PSYCHOLOG 'CAL PROEl £1-\ {SEVER,\L p ERr~ANENT REP RESEt{TAT t VES} -

9. t SAID TI1AT t COULD ~!ELL UNDERSTAND THE FEARS . ABOUT PUBLIC E\JPHORIA AND .ABOUT QUOTE DECOUPLING UNQUOTE Bt)T : '. , •• TIlE TEXT ,OF THE AGREEMENT Dl D rOT SEE~1 TO I NVOL VE A,~Y RENUt~CI AT.ION OF NUCLEAR WEAPOr·ss OR. OF THEIR FIRST USE. I HOPED THAT Hi . HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY KISSINGER WOULD r~AKE TH1S PLAIH AND THAT FOLlQ\I/l NG HIS STATEMENT ON SALT (~JASH I 'GTON TEL NO 1948) HE WOULD AGAIN STRESS THAT TH~ SECURITY Ii,TERESTS OF THE u~s; ANn THE I R ALL I ES \'!ERE 1NSEPERABLE'~ J SA I D ( AND SEVERAL. OTHER PE ~ ;'~A \IE ii T REP~ESE.~TATIVES ECHOED TH IS) THAT ~!E HAD, CO,!.FIDEHCE THAT THE U. S. WOULD PROTECT ALL I ED I NiERESTSo ' '

10. I N RESPONSE TO COMf ENTS RU~1SFELD STRESSED THAT:

. (A) THE AGREEt"iENT WAS NOT A ~EPARATE DEAL BET\\tEEN 2

PARTIES: IT CONTR1BUTED TO QUOTE SYSTEM OF CONSTRAINTS UNQUOTE

INTERNATIONAL

(B) THE . US COi-'ir'lfTH,ENT TO THEIR ALLIES REf."6.IUED UNIMPAIREPI (C) QUO!E' THE AGREEt·1ENT 1S NOT AN AGREEt~ENT NOT TO GO TO WAR UNQUOTE

(D) IT IS NOT A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT AND DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE USE OF

r~UCLEAR ~JEAPONS.

11. RATtiER TO MY SURPR I SE, COUNC I L ~s A WtlOLE SEEMED LESS ' COtlCERHED ABOUT LACK OF COf~SULTATION THAN AT THE EUPHORIC

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· Agreement .b etween the ,Uni ted Sta't es' of Anierica and ' ~he ' Union of' Sovie~ Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War Signed at Washington Jupe 22, 1973. Entered into force June 22, 1973 .

The United States of America and the U:qion ' of S.oviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred · to as the Parties , Guided by the obj ec't lves of strengthening world peace and international security, Conscious · that nuclear war would have ' devastating consequences for mankind, Proceeding from the desire t .o bring about conditions in which the ·d anger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the wO'r ld would be reduced and ultimately eliminat.e d, Proceeding fr0rt:\ their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and 't he avoidance of war, and in conformi ty with the agre.e ments to which either Party has s~bscribed, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and ' the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in MosGow on May 29, 1972, Reaffirming th~t the development of relations between the Soviet · United States of America and the Union of other Socialist Republics is . not directed against countries and their interests, Have agreed as follows: Article I The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an. obj ecti ve of their politie.s is to remov.e the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Parties agree that ' they ·will act in ·such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military' confrontations, and .p.s to exclude the outbreak of ' n\lclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries. Article II The Parties agree ,. in accordance wi th Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will ' · refrain from· the threat or use of force ag'a inst the ot.her . Party, against

the allies of ' the other Party ' and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security . The ' Parties agree that they will be guided by these consi?erations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in . their actions in the field of international relations. Article III The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent w~th the purposes of this Agreement . Article IV . If at any' time relations between the Parties or between ei ther Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or : if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the Uni ted States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or between either Party and other countries , the United States and Âˇ the Soviet Union,. acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk. Article V Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations , the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and Qutcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement. Article VI Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair : (a) the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense as ' envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of . the United Nations , * (b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations , including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and (c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or other countries in trea~ies, agreements, and other appropriate documents ., Article VII This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration . Article VIII This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

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Washington on June 22, 1973, in t~o copies, each English and Russian languages, ' both texts , being authentic '. . UNITEP STATES OF AMERICA: NIXON President of the United States of ArneriGa FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST- REPUBLICS: ' L.I. BREZHNEV

DONE at in the equally FOR THE RICHARD

General Secretary of the Central Committee, ' CPSU

OPERATIO

(a) be given Treaty form (b) be modified in a lIanner which, without meaning very II

ch at all

ould purport to go sOlie way towards

tiDg the current Soviet desiderata.

latest Sovi t de iderata

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paper at Ann

own to us are set out (in a

ethiDg to be desired) in the

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auld be an equally