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FCO HISTORICAL OCCASIONAL

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No. 4 Eastern

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Europe

April 1992

Foreign & Commonwealth

HISTORICAL Occasional

Office

BRANCH Papers April

No. 4

1992

CONTENTS Papers presented at the Seminar held by the Editors of Documentson British Policy Overseasin the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 1992 on Page The Quest for a Modus Vivendi: The Danubian Relations in Anglo-Soviet 1945-6 Satellites Dr Keith Hamilton

3-20

Response to Dr Hamilton's Sir Edward Tomkins

21-25

1945-6: Europe Eastern in Bulgaria Malcolm Mackintosh British Gillian

The

Personalities Dr Ann Lane

Allied

Control

Commissions 26-28

Europe

in the global

the DBPO

Eastern on

Policy in Eastern Bennett

Disaster-Management: Professor Norman Stone

paper

in Diplomacy:

Eastern

Europe

context Europe

1945-6

29-32 33-35

36-45

46

Note on Contributors DBPO:

Volumes

published

Copies of this pamphlet will be deposited with the National FCO Historical Branch, Library and Records Department, Clive House, Petty France, London SW! H 9HD Crown

47

in and preparation

Copyright

Libraries

FOREWORD

On 8 January 1992 a seminar was held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to mark the publication of the two latest volumes in the Documentson British Policy Overseasseries. devoted to a volume on Korea 1950-1 and are afternoon sessions were in issue Occasional Papers.

(No. 5) this a separate of published series of This issue contains the proceedings of the morning sessions which were Eastern Europe 1945-6. the concerned with volume on The

The two main papers, by Keith Hamilton, Editor Eastern Joint the of followed European volume, and Sir Edward Tomkins, by by were comments Gillian Bennett, Assistant Editor of this volume, and Mackintosh, Malcolm Stone. Ann Lane has contributed Professor Norman an additional piece on British statesmen and diplomats featured in the volume.

I should like to thank the outside participants, in took the seminar. part other officials who

the FCO's

Historians

Richard Bone Library and Records Department April 1992

and

THE QUEST FOR A MODUS VIVENDI: THE DANUBIAN SATELLITES IN ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1945-6 Keith A Hamilton

Thirty

Professsor WN Medlicott, distinguished historian the ago years and Documents the editor of one-time on British Foreign Policy, challenged diplomacy.

British In the conventional on wisdom principles underlying a in Britain Europe he the the and nineteenth paper on century questioned Crowe's Eyre it had `become that of oft-cited assertion almost an validity historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of Medlicott [the balance of power]'. in Crowe's instance that this argued dialectic was flawed and that history revealed that a more constant wish of had been to achieve a modus vivendi with their European British governments far in Britain's them they only opposing so as seriously menaced neighbours, Lansdowne Grey interests. 1 The successful endeavours in the early of and France Russia, Britain's to this two secure century accords with years of and in Africa imperial Asia, rivals and principal offered obvious examples of such Professor And, Medlicott later demonstrate in to as conduct. was a 1930s in the on appeasement, essay the pioneering provided yet another 2 for Britain's Germany.

Only it search an understanding shape of with when had become plain that it was impossible to reconcile Britain's interests with Hitler's methods and objectives had the British quest for a modus vivendi with Germany designed to to deter and ultimately policies explicitly given way in Europe.

Nazi The Second tradition the aggression counter survived War and the emergence World of a victorious, expansive and potentially In May Russia.

1944 inter-departmental Post-Hostilities the threatening, Planning Sub-Committee that Britain should not `oppose any recommended U. S. S. R. demands do the they of where not conflict with our reasonable 3 Moreover, interests'. documents in latest the the published vital strategic Eastern Europe4 DBPO lend to to the view on seem credence volume of Ernest Bevin his the that in the immediate aftermath of war and officials

1WN

`La Grande-Bretagne Medlicott, et 1'Europe' in L'Europe du XIXe et du XXe Siecle (1870-1914), vol. I, eds. M Beloff, P Renouvin, F Schnabel and F Valsecchi (Milan, 1962), pp. 574-5.

2WN Britain and Germany: the Searchfor Agreement, 1930-37 (London, 1969).

Medlicott, 3H Thomas, Armed Truce. The Beginnrings the Cold War, 1945-46 (London, 1987), of p. 209.

4 Documents British Overseas Policy (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series I, Volume VI, Eastern on Europe, 1945-1946 (HMSO, 1991). The other volumes in Series I cited in this paper are Volume I, The Conference at Potsdam, 1945 (HMSO, 1984); Volume II, Conferences and Conversations, 1945. " London, Washington and Moscow (HMSO, 1985); Volume III, Britain and America: Negotiation of the the United States Loan, 1945 (HMSO, 1986).

Q

tended

to

containment

before put conciliation and co-operation in their approach to the Soviet Union.

confrontation

and

'Ehe perpetuation Big-Three had of co-operation obvious advantages from the British point of view. It would, as Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy UnderSecretary, in his VI: `Stocktaking memorandum, argued after -Day', give in difficult it find Britain the to a position might otherwise world which its interests being likelihood be less there of and would assert and maintain, ignored by the Soviet Union and the United States. 5 This seemed evident, dealings in Allied defeated Germany, but in handling the also of not only Romania.

Hungary Bulgaria, former and enemy satellites, with three of the had figured in the so-called percentage Each of these countries agreement Soviet Eden had Churchill their counterparts that negotiated with at and 1944. The British had thereby reserved to themselves a Moscow in October Hungary in Bulgaria 10% in 20% share of influence a and share and Romania. 6 Quite what these percentages might mean in practice was never informal Nevertheless, this and essentially verbal accord clearly specified. in Soviet Danubian Britain implied the that while preeminence accepted basin, it was not prepared to disinterest itself in the region. Domination was in interpreted this sense, the and, when not equated with exclusivity kind did the of three-power conflict with not necessarily arrangement in London, Soviet had Ambassador Ivan Maisky, the collaboration which into division distinct in 1943 the to greatof world a alternative posed as a Red Army 1945 by Yet influence.? the the was spring of power spheres of Soviet Eastern Europe in authorities and the already of most of occupation States United deny Britain determined to anything more seemed and the Danubian in the than a nominal the satellites. of administration voice Sofia, Soviet-sponsored in Bucharest had been and and established regimes in Budapest existed only on Soviet sufferance. Admittedly, the government interests in few first had Britain have practical at sight, would appear to South-Eastern Europe. The only substantial British investment there was in impose Romanian Soviet British their to endeavours oil, and alarm over from the presumed resulted more economic system upon the satellites being financial, their than the commercial of consequences political, and 5 DBPO, Series I, Volume I, No. 102.

6 Albert Resis, `The Churchill-Stalin Agreement on the Balkans, secret "Percentages" Moscow, October 1944' in American Historical Review, vol. 83 (1978), pp. 368-387; KGM Ross, `The Moscow Conference of October 1944 (Tolstoy)' in British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944, eds. W Deakin, E Barker, J Chadwick Holdich, `A Policy of Percentages? British Policy in the (London, 1988), pp. 67-77; PGH Balkans after the Moscow Conference of October 1944' in International History Review, vol. 9 (1987), pp. 28-47.

7E Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London, 1976), p.

135.

4

drawn

into the Soviet orbit. British however, be incomprehensible would, interests strategic and power-political

Axis lesser the policy Britain's to reference without in their future development. towards

powers moral,

It is hardly in Horrors'

Gladstone's `Bulgarian the to necessary recall outrage over demonstrate British to the that to order were accustomed high Balkan issues.

Attlee Bevin moral stance on and assuming a may not have had to pay as much attention to the non-conformist conscience as their but they could not afford to neglect the predecessors, nineteenth-century Americans John Balfour, British liberal predilections the the of and what 8 faith in Washington, `the large Minister termed their at magic of words'.

Europe, Liberated had The Yalta Declaration the on which committed free Allies holding the to of elections and the establishment of principal 9 in in London. the satellites, was taken seriously governments representative have doubted British diplomats the capacity of the peoples may sometimes institutions democratic have involved to sustain and questioned whether free Yalta elections were a practical aspiration. genuinely remained, however, both a liberal yardstick with which to measure their achievements justify behind American their to and a ends, cause and and which rally In Commonwealth Britain had obvious strategic interests support. addition, in the southern Balkans. True, the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee had not listed Eastern Europe amongst Britain's vital strategic interests. But included had Middle its list Eastern the the protection of oil, 10 Mediterranean Hence the British desire for and vital sea communications.

Greece in Soviet to and position opposition aspirations with a preponderant Turkish Hence Britain's to the straits. also regard concern over the political fate of Bulgaria.

Eden had been reluctant to accede to any accord which I l Soviet dominant Union And in Sargent, leave July 1945 the there. might for Britain have that the to abandon moment conceding might while its beyond Bulgaria Romania Hungary reach, placed as amongst the six and Central European Britain East `must take a stand countries on which and in the immediate future'. 12 Sargent was anxious to ensure that the new situation in Europe should not be allowed to crystallise, leaving Stalin with an `ideological Lebensraum' from which the Soviet Union might extend its influence towards the south Britain, he argued, have `to in and west. take the would offensive 8 DBPO, Series I, Volume III, No. 3.

9 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British ForeignPolicy in the SecondWorld War (Abridged edition, HMSO, 1962), pp. 491-2.

10 Thomas, op. cit.

11 Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 143.

12 DBPO, Series I, Volume I, No. 102.

in Eastern the of penetration challenging communist as many of countries far But Sargent was concerned Europe as possible'. more than the with Soviet British Union to the the threat that security of might pose military Britain's in large interests. His memorandum part an examination of was Potsdam international in the time the of at politics role and status European Britain's it Conference, great power that status as a and was Soviet `exclusive by any recognition Sargent feared would be injured of `appear in the interests' in certain parts of Europe. It would, he contended, the whose nations small of the cynical abandonment a as world eyes of interests we are pledged to defend; and for ourselves it would represent the be Great Power the of to whole with concerned as a right of our abdication interest'. have in in Europe, and not merely a special those parts which we be European to Ironically, states system was about at a moment when the lose `great in by term the power' would very which a global one superseded definition Sargent its this of great classical gave meaning, original much of in Britain the could not acquiesce as a reason why power responsibilities in Eastern Europe. influence Soviet sphere of of an exclusive establishment in his Allied future Britain's was eyes collaboration of status and the fallen had from lands its dependent already under which non-exclusion on 13 Britain had in Soviet control and no military presence. which Potsdam Russians, Sargent's prescription to the and at was plain-speaking it delegations American both the British clear that abundantly made and Prior Axis lesser to the the powers. to abandon they were not prepared favoured had Office the conclusion Foreign Conference, of proposing the Russians the to compelling of the a treaties as way satellites peace with have Russians The then to say would objectives. reveal their ultimate it intended and was their occupation, to military they continue whether been had diplomatic established relations that normal presumed once its in better be Britain and commercial to advance position a would treaties American But interests. to peace concluding objections economic forego British led this Soviet-backed to course. the governments with puppet full for in States Instead, they supported United participation the pressing (ACCs), Commissions Control in the Allied to the bodies established imposition terms, and their procedures were the of the armistice supervise interests in the of all take and responsibilities account of revised order to it 14 July, Soviet 12 A Allies. though referred note of which, three major for ACCs basis' `as Potsdam Hungary, a to was taken at specifically Commissions things, that should meet at elsewhere, proposed, among other be directives `questions intervals should on of principle' and that regular

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., No. 224.

6

issued

`only

English American the after and agreement... with 15 Soviet The Government have these representatives'. regarded may formality.

Russians been The had, than as concessions no more a after all, from its in Italy the excluded effectively administration of after capitulation Sofia Commissioners in Bucharest 1943.16 Nevertheless, the British and Soviet instructed Russian to to the their that were explain note colleagues 17 implied `genuinely tripartite clearly control'.

American With this end in view the British supported proposals, which included for American British the provision appointment and of vicethe representation chairmen, of all three powers on the staff and all Commissions, sections of the of sections component and the establishment liaise local Bevin to administrations. also assumed that the specifically with Commissions be He functions that there extended. admitted could of the in draw be little trying to their competence value within would probably formation Moscow the of new governments since major questions such as its discretion.

But he representatives so much reckoned would never allow that they might be able to bring such matters as public security, control of demonstrations ACCs. This the the and censorship within mandate of in Bulgaria the appropriate seemed particularly case of where communist holding the threatened to the thwart police and militia penetration of of free Bevin it In thought truly any event elections. necessary that all three fully informed The keep of each other's actions. posts each other Commissioner then serve as a precedent could of one achievements 18 elsewhere.

September some progress was made towards placing the and footing, British Commissioners and reported on a new on the Soviet Russians displayed The by their counterparts. goodwill remained, General Vinogradov, however, very firmly in command. the deputy chairman insisted Potsdam ACC Bucharest, that the accords only obliged at of the him to seek the opinions of his British and American colleagues, rather than directive issuing important Romanian before to the their agreement, an he `we `after continued, were three soldiers together and all', authorities: Soviet Union Marshal instruction by being of our given an we would on During ACCs

August

15 Ibid., No. 518.

16 E Barker, `British Policy towards Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, 1944-1946' in (London, 1977), pp. 201-3; A Communist Power in Europe 1944-49, ed. M McCauley Arcidiacono, `The Dress Rehearsal: the Foreign Office and the Control of Italy, 1943-44' in Historical journal, vol. 29 (1985).

17 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 11.

18 Ibid.

7

' On another accordingly salute and comply in good Red Army fashion'.

General Oxley, British Commissioner in Bulgaria, occasion, the when to tour the south-western attempted part of' the country he was, despite his Soviet having informed High Command his intentions, the of summarily from Soviet by As Soviet the region ejected soldiers. one general put it. `Bulgaria was occupied by Russian troops and there were too many British 2' ROAMING American And by December officers and ahout'. although in Sofia, felt William Houstoun-Boswall, the British Political Representative C freedom AC, to that as a result of meetings matters such a of' report able had the the strength of missions and greatly clearance of aircraft movement, improved, he had to admit that the Russians still controlled the country. issued directives They framed their ever consulting and without policy British colleagues on the Commission. 2' British and United States efforts to broaden the basis of Allied control may none the less have encouraged the in Bulgaria, but in Russians to press for earlier elections not only also Hungary.

This at least, was the opinion of Dr Bela Zsedenyi, the President On August Assembly.

18 National he Hungarian told of the provisional in Representative Budapest, Political British Alvary Gascoigne, that if the `elections were held now with Russian troops in the country and with the it he impossible in Anglo-Saxon lack would control participation present of 22 from being to prevent them rigged'. least had a semblance -of at which efforts to establish administrations British be to and as a response regarded popular support may also did from American which not threats to withhold governments recognition been it had At Potsdam agreed that each of the satisfy their requirements.

Big Three would examine separately `in the near future, in the light of the diplomatic relations' then prevailing, the establishment with of conditions `to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of ex-satellite governments had Ministers (CFM) Foreign Council The peace treaties' of with them. been asked to prepare such treaties, and it was stipulated that after their Allies democratic `recognised the would conclusion with governments' 23 Nations.

United for their support of the application membership insist Moreover, in the aftermath Conference Bevin to continued of the full diplomatic that Britain with any of the could not resume relations former `as it them to the governments consider of satellites as was unable Potsdam democratic the the meaning of representative or within Soviet

19 Ibid., 20 Ibid.,

ii. iii.

21 II id.

22. Ibid., No. 7, note 3.

23 Woodward, pp. 558-9.

8

Government decisions'. 24 As he told the Commons 20 August, British the on [was] being replaced by had the impression that `one kind of totalitarianism 25 another'.

Non-recognition Bulgaria, where

however,

debatable From a weapon value. was, of for August, 26 elections and where a were scheduled in law bound to electoral seemed a substantial victory patently unfair result for the left-orientated Fatherland Front, Houstoun-Boswall questioned Britain be by anything achieved refusing to recognise the whether could Soviet decided Union The had to re-establish already resulting government. feared Anglo-Saxon he full diplomatic henceforth the that and relations, Sofia lower before.

In than an even position at powers would occupy Front local the and supporters waging a were already addition militia Houstoun-Boswall their terrorist opponents, and warned against campaign Sir Alexander Under-Secretary, `it is idle to Cadogan, the Permanent incapacity history Bulgarian that, the political and congenital suppose given democratic institutions Bulgarians to the a of make genuinely work, for be in democratic this genuinely structure can maintained any country length of time. They are a people of violence and so likely to remain. ' He Bulgarians the their that about were sensitive nevertheless admitted relations with the outside world, that they tended to attach an exaggerated British importance that to appearances, a and refusal to maintain anything Sofia d'affaires `a them than at would give well-merited more a charge doubts Whatever Cadogan had the about adopting such a course. shock'. it be, he bound thought that to alter after the might was current situation legation that then treaty a properly staffed and of a peace would conclusion Bulgarians demonstrate that Britain to the `more sensible and respectable' had not lost interest in them, and could be `a channel through which a He ideas it Western `foregone knowledge thought could percolate'. a of Sofia Russian have to that the representative at would continue conclusion' but he by `pre-eminent this there, considered situation position' no means a 26 Britain. to

unprecedented

and one acceptable

The only alternatives to exerting direct pressure upon the Bulgarians were States to work through the ACC at Sofia, or to for Britain and the United Government Soviet the postponement to support to the of the appeal in ACC Soviet in hands But the and remained effective power elections.

Bevin was reluctant to risk being snubbed by the Russians, who might claim It was, he to the Bulgarians. that the Allies had no locus standi for dictating

24 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 5.

25 Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, House 26 DBPO, Series I, Volume

VI, No. 5. iii.

Commons, 291-3.

413, cols. vol. of

insisted,

important `particularly that we should choose our ground very before Soviet Government fundamental the challenging carefully the on faced 27 Balkan He throughout the problem with which we are countries'. in his dealing Romania, King Michael was equally circumspect with where leaders and opposition were seeking the overthrow of the Soviet-hacked 28 Petru Groza.

Dr. Obnoxious Groza's though of government regime Bevin for to assume the responsibility was, was not prepared undoubtedly individuals in from Britain to engage actions advising whose consequences Far less by State them. the protect caution not exhibited could was in August its Department, the early part of and political and military Michael for hing Bucharest Groza's to press encouraged at representatives hing Groza Allies When to the to the appealed resign, refused resignation.

Potsdam Yalta for their help as defined the the and agreement under Government firmly Russians behind But the they the stood communique. had foisted on Romania, and the net effect of the episode was simply to 29 States United Meanwhile King. further the authority diminish the of the in Bucharest from Sofia their counterparts took their cue at representatives for British a special meeting colleagues, called and, with the support of their it Nevertheless, Bulgarian discuss ACC was only on the to elections. of the Moscow been it had 24th, that there to made clear t`he evening of the after States United Britain be recognising a and the of no question would impending Bulgarian based the elections, that on the results of government 30 Bulgarians, Soviet the advice, agreed to their postponement. on diplomats This success in Sofia encouraged British to hope for greater 31 in Bulgaria But Allied co-operation ACCs. the and recent events within United Romania had also highlighted both the failure of Britain the and desirability States to co-ordinate Balkans, in the the their policies of and 32 been had British kind The Anglo-Soviet not privy some of understanding. little intentions Bevin in Romania, than to American a was more and follow its irritated failed State having Department, through to the when 33 intervention decide indicated Britain the next move. there, that should No less worrying from the Foreign Office's point of view was the way in United States to the which seemed ready to adopt a softer approach irregularities Bulgaria.

Bevin wanted to ensure that Bulgarian electoral

27 Ibid., No. 9, note 8.

28 Ibid., No. 6.

29 Ibid., i, ii.

30 Ibid., No. 9.

31 Ibid., No. 17.

32 DBPO, Series I, Volume II, Nos. 9 and 26; DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 9. i.

33 Ibid., No. 6. ii.

10

be `more

he should not simply effectively resented such camouflaged', and `gushing in States United James Byrnes, that the messages' as which State, Secretary Government Bulgarian `a the of congratulated on democratic the traditions act constructive worthy of self-respecting of the He Bulgarian likewise American decision the to people'. was critical of 34 Bulgarian in Washington.

Meanwhile, receive an unofficial representative he inclined towards the opinion of Houstoun-Boswall that until Britain and Russia had discussed openly their aims and intentions in the region there 35 hope `little be lasting harmonious of any genuine, and co-operation'. could Anxious Byrnes, to discuss the fate of the Danubian states with who was first for London C in FM he to the the coming meeting of mid-September, telegraphed to Balfour on 23 August that the time had come when Britain States face have United to and the would up to the question of whether or in Eastern Europe they to the acquiesce greater part of not were prepared in the Russian sphere of influence'. definitely He thought it `remaining decide far how they to they would wanted and necessary what go to he it. `to inducements, `We added, achieve ought also', consider what look West these to we can offer economic and cultural, countries rather than East. Having thus cleared our minds we should then be in a position to have frank discussions with the Russians. '36 issues Further in Foreign these to was given consideration an unsigned September, Office memorandum 2 draft an of earlier of which was prepared Southern Department.

Hayter It

by William Yalta the the that of argued declaration Soviet interference to that succeed, even was unlikely without form in Danubian the or oligarchy almost of autocracy was certain some influence was ready on the spot to lands, and that Russian and communist dictatorships in interests local `Soviet the these of exploit expansionist And

in

loss half Europe Western to avert of order of policy'. have `incalculable democracy, an outcome which would effects on the in Europe', its Great Britain British that the proposed author of position `to Government promote a self-denying ordinance prohibiting should seek in the Danubian in Great Power interference area' return for a withdrawal 37 Greece from Italy.

Few in Office forces Foreign British the thought and of It have leaving the that such an arrangement would work. meant would from in far likely field open to Soviet subversion, it that and any case was Brimelow, from Army be Thomas Red the the region. withdrawn would Russians in Northern Department, the thought that the then were who was to

the

34 Ibid., No. 9. i; Foreign Relations IV, States Europe, United (FRUS) 1945, 312the pp. vol. of 3.

35 FO 371/48130, R 149225/21/7, Sofia No. 253,25 Aug. 1945.

36 DBPO, Series I, Volume II, No. 9.

37 Ibid., No. 19.

Europe and that they determined their hold on South-Eastern to maintain British interference in brook `sphere their they considered no what of' would lie feared that if Britain were to pursue an active In addition influence'.

Eastern in it have Soviet its Europe, to reckon with own would policy of in its own sphere of interest, and that this was a game that intervention for suppressing trouble makers Britain would lose. `The Russian organisation in the Danube countries is', he observed, `more ruthless than ours, and our disciplined is for not as well organised and making trouble as organisation Indeed, lie in Greece Italy. ' Parties & Communist thought the only the in for the to acquiescing present situation was alternative satisfactory Britain

to withhold to continue of the governments of the exrecognition If treaties them. to to peace conclude with refuse and enemy satellites Britain were to have any hope of changing the situation in Eastern Europe, Russians it in lay in Brimelow's to withdraw, the then persuading opinion 38 followed by `cautious

propaganda'.

have had, Anglo-Soviet Whatever ordinance may self-denying an attraction its grip it was hardly practical politics when the Soviet Union was tightening Office Foreign briefing `In European its general', a neighbours. weaker upon independent `we states, and we wish them to emerge as paper stated, because "Allied" Allied means control existing seek to abolish should '39 Bevin was only reflecting "Russian". the scepticism of his officials when he told Byrnes, `we must be prepared to exchange one set of crooks for dig in heels determined his Byrnes 40 his For to part, was evidently another'.

Molotov's Romania, Bulgaria refusal to yield to and this and and over bickering for demands American the which so much of was responsible Molotov's for CFM. Moreover, London request meeting of the marred the British in Tripolitania Soviet to trusteeship suspicions reinforce served a Eastern beyond designs Soviet the confines of that might extend well Britain's in determined Europe. Molotov to predominance contest appeared 41 Foreign Mediterranean, the this to reinvigorate the and the effect of was from Bulgaria, in those countries, interest Offce's the which such as Russians

might

launch

such a challenge.

Russians, Others the though that still thought present at the conference in Eastern Europe, interference determined to resist any with themselves 42 Roberts, British Minister Frank the three-power unity. wanted to preserve 38 Ibid., No. 14.

39 Ibid., No. 39.

40 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1985), p. 134.

41 Piers Dixon, Double Diploma. The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon (London, 1975), pp. 189 and 193.

42 DBPFO, Series I, Volume II, No. 164.

12

Moscow, at Big Three

likewise

`to stressed preach the virtues of to collaboration'. made every effort Soviet that and explain understand suspicions of the West, also maintained Russians determined `to the take advantage were of the present world [their] interests incidentally to safeguard to pocket situation vital and be before the general world may going whatever situation crystallises'.

Moreover, he Bevin importance the whilst urged upon of achieving an Russia based Soviet British with understanding on a clarification of and interests, he insisted that such an accord would involve a `recognition of Soviet vital interests, more especially in the Balkans'. 43 This, however, was for although Roberts did not advocate Britain the root of the problem he thought that there was approving or condoning procedures, undemocratic British being improve than the thereby to their no more a chance of able in Eastern Europe.

An Anglo-Soviet it position modus vivendi would, seemed, have to be based upon Britain's Russian in acceptance of pre-eminence an influence in That implicit in the too exclusive sphere of east. was a report Intelligence October joint (JIC) 18 in the sub-Committee of of which, deterioration between Soviet Union to the the seeking of relations explain first its Allies, listed Western `Russian insistence, face in the the and of British American Eastern Europe treating opposition, on and as their influence interests Allies. ' The the their regardless of exclusive sphere of of JIC, like Roberts, if British Government that the assumed showed clearly limits it its forebearance, it that there to were where stood, and might hope for Anglo-Soviet 44 Sir Yet, to create a more `solid foundation' relations. as Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador Moscow, in the at noted Soviet Government following the to be still wanted collaboration month, its British terms, that the and meant own resumed on exclusion of and interests from Eastern Europe. 45 American that But

they continued Roberts, who

There were, of course, instances during the autumn of 1945 when the British Government was given cause to hope that the Soviet stance on the October In in Hungary municipal elections satellites was weakening.

Smallholders for left in Party the moderate and resulted a striking victory Bevin under the impression that the forthcoming general elections would be held under similarly fair conditions. 46 Gascoigne was less optimistic. He learned that the Russians were demanding that all parties should join in he list, if the that a common electoral presenting and predicted Smallholders refused the Russians would `tighten the screw economically', 43 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 30.

44 Ibid., No. 41.

45 Ibid., No. 49, note 7.

46 Ibid., Nos. 7.iii and 42.

13

that they might `possibly arrange for further widespread outbreaks of unrest', He therefore try to that the might communists stage an armed coup. and Hungarian Bevin in representative against accepting an unoflicial cautioned before London as `it might be unwise to count our democratic they chickens November held 4 In hatched'. the to appeared event, elections on are Smallholders democratic 57째"o the won principles, of the votes conform with 47 Hungarian But Bevin to agreed representative. receive a and polled, Soviet Gascoigne that the authorities were seeking to use was convinced Hungary, impose Party Communist to their the political will upon especially determined do to all they could to secure control of the as they appeared They of their military seemed equally set upon taking advantage police. in the pre-eminence country order to ensure their economic of occupation Soviet-Hungarian A in Eastern Europe. there as elsewhere economic August 1945, one already concluded with which mirrored of agreement in for Russian Romania, almost every sphere of the participation provided British Hungarian the against wish to treat all the and militated economy first Yet Bevin Danubian was at as a single economic unit. countries implications Gascoigne's the to accept either gloomy assessment of reluctant States Britain United his the that should and advice or of the agreement, Russians. direct by its pressure upon the putting ratification seek to prevent its he Whilst Bevin insisted that Britain rights, argued that must maintain And in be helpful `must British the and no pinpricks'. a minute of attitude Gascoigne `not he questioned 10 October too prejudiced and was whether looking all the time for the nigger in the wood pile which [was] probably 48 not there'.

Soviet-Hungarian that accord revealed of analysis In from far the words of an exaggerated. apprehension was be Hungarian Southern Department, the economy would of the official R. be S. S. U. benefit `for there the the exclusive and would of made to work [was] not which volume of trade with any western country no substantial itself drawn into the Russian orbit'. 40 But the Russians refused to discuss in Bevin Budapest, in ACC to the no position the agreement was and at form in for it, Hungarians the trade of or the whether substitute a offer Soviet demands in Hungarians The to resist any case unlikely were credit. "`gut" backed by threat to to one account, a one were according which, finally in December in Hungary', factories the treaty and was third of all 50 insisting Council.

Yet Bevin National Supreme by the was still ratified A detailed Gascoigne's

the

47 Ibid., Nos. 42. i 51. and 48 Ibid., No. 44, note 1; cf. DB. PO, Series I, Volume II, No. 27.

49 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 44.

50 Ibid., notes 1,2 and 3.

14

Government `must guard against Hungarian that the to attempts 51 Russians'.

Romania, British Even in the play us off against where interests directly suffered petroleum as the result of the price-fixing policies 52 Groza Government, he do be the that to of might anything was reluctant Russians He keen the that to as an anti-Soviet construed move. assure was had no wish to see the restoration Britain type of there of a pre-war 53 Russia.

The the to or establishment government of one unfriendly Romanian by demonstrators in taken troops measures repressive against 8 November Bucharest 12 but Bevin British and on occasioned protests, done lest British have the secret service should was still perturbed anything 54 disturbances. to provoke the British

for less kind the that the the was none aware prospects achieving of Office Foreign had that the three-power envisaged co-operation originally `Instead he in receding. of world noted a co-operation', were rapidly drifting into 8 November, `we are rapidly spheres of of memorandum be better described influence Monroes. ' He three as or what can great `a vast area under Russian thought the Russians to be set upon creating from Lubeck Port Arthur', to to control and that they were attempting incorporate into the `whole life of the communities the there.. concerned .

Russian complete He had, however, economy'. no new solution to offer to for from United Organisation, Nations the the this situation support apart Commonwealth British `on the the the same of security of maintenance frank discussions theirs', the terms as other countries are maintaining and Russians British Americans diplomats had that the and statesmen and with `The prospect at the moment', long recommended. he wrote, `is not healthy I believe and cannot we shall make any real progress and not encouraging bluntly three the of us and unequivocally ask each other to put on the until is table clearly and straightforwardly what our real policy and which road follow.

In Foreign Office '55 intend the the to meantime was preparing we Evidently Soviet fresh the to pursue a new course. possibility with of a in interests Mediterranean in British Sargent the to eastern mind, challenge 26 November: `We limit Houstoun-Boswall informed trying to on are put a in fact in Middle build kind East Russian the to and of expansion up a on in its ' This did Britain "Monroe" that area. not mean system could wash On hands of the Danubian the contrary, the creation satellites. of a in Middle East implied interest in British Monroe the system a revival of Bevin

51 Ibid., iii.

52 Ibid., No. 56.

53 Ibid., No. 37.

54 Ibid., No. 56.

55 DBPO, Series I, Volume III, No. 99.

15

Bulgaria,

in his letter

Sargent echoed his own to Houstoun-Boswall and earlier ruminations on the strategic significance of that country. `If Bulgaria Russian he contended, `it will always be in the power remains a satellite', Soviet Government in order to keep Turkey the to use Bulgaria of and Greece perpetually it be impossible for tenterhooks, on and will us to in Greece ' Turkey these two restore confidence countries. and might then into leaving the British orbit and moving into the Soviet one be frightened disastrous Britain's in Mediterranean. the eastern effects upon position with be `an importance' Bulgaria It was therefore `vital that should of her independent buffer State' and that Britain position should recover 56 there.

Similar conclusions with regard to the dangers inherent in Soviet policies in American Mark by Balkans the the press proprietor, arrived at were fact-finding Byrnes' behest, Ethridge, a personal mission who, at undertook Romania.

He Bulgaria that the strong to the position and reported for themselves in these two countries Russians were establishing would `doubtless bear on Greece, Turkey and the Straits, and could be converted for in into Eastern the a springboard aggression great effort without 57 far from how It however, Mediterranean this process obvious region'. was, Office Foreign Sargent be halted. the thought that and others within might interests to sign a peace treaty with Bulgaria or, at it would be in Britain's Sofia.

They diplomatic relations with were also any rate, establish normal fraudulent in in blatantly took the to place elections which ready acquiesce Front in Fatherland Bulgaria on 18 November the receiving which resulted is justified', 75.7% of the votes polled. 58 `To send a country to Coventry Sargent observed, `only if it forces the country in question to behave itself heart better in future. If on the other hand it merely hardens the country's defeats its friends drives it then the policy own to seek and elsewhere is Bulgaria far Great Britain are concerned and purpose, and as as he ' Britain, definitely interests.

British harmful long term argued, should to Bulgaria, but dominate Russian to the challenge claim possible whenever 59 This Russian into do in drive Bulgaria arms. was not so a way that would December, Houstoun-Boswall but, 5 nothing that all very well, as replied on in Bulgarians far British done drive had had the this the tended to so Government direction.

To make peace with the `present "stooge" would', he concluded, `not only profoundly discourage the vast mass of the into inevitably but Bulgarians the arms of throw the population would

56 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 63.

57 Ibid., No. 36. ii; FRUS V, 1945, cf. pp. 633-37. vol.

58 Ibid., No. 63. i.

59 Ibid., No. 63.

16

Russia

Turkey Greece the that result with and 60 be latter's entirely at the generations mercy'.

would

for

several

forcible it did Office but Foreign to a was rejoinder, alter nothing After all, the policy of non-recognition had so far achieved little in thinking. `Only British Ambassador the Danubian the satellites. a year ago', wrote at Ankara, `we had hopes of retaining some influence in the Balkans, indicated by varying in different to percentages which were assigned our control Today is (except in percentage countries.... of control retain which we Greece) precisely Clearly '61 Britain's nil. a reassessment of position was impending Moscow Conference Foreign Ministers led the to a required, and A briefing 12 December by tactics. thus that review of paper of argued Britain United States the to the existing governments refusing recognise and Soviet harming Union their the relations with and achieving were simply fact' little else. The alternative `inescapable the to that there accept was Bulgarian Romanian the of and was no chance of a material reorganisation in for the to the gradual present and governments circumstances work long later that period of conditions creation over a might make possible the first The of representative government. eventual reemergence of these Soviet be the troops, and that could be more must of conditions withdrawal had been treaties negotiated easily achieved once peace and when the onus Government Soviet be to show why their occupation on the would should 62 continue.

This

line He later Cabinet this tell the to of argument. agreed with was doubted had he for it be time that to whether past some would practicable United States had first the the attitude maintain uncompromising which Potsdam.

The in `more he this at matter adopted practical policy', develop be `would by to those the our contacts with observed, countries Consuls, the establishment of air services and the opening of appointment 63 Agreement Moscow however, at relations'. was, up of commercial Byrnes from former dependent the to the readiness of retreat on ultimately facesaving formula.

American As it and accept a a result was position British diplomatic follow American the that settled and recognition would in Sofia include Bucharest to the reconstitution governments and of so as despatch the representatives of opposition parties, of a tripartite advisory 64 Romania But holding these the there. to commission and of elections diminish Soviet democracy little did to measures promote or either Bevin

60 Ibid., note 9.

61 DBPO, Series I, Volume 62 Ibid., No. 281.

63 Ibid., No. 361.64

II, No. 278.

Ibid., No. 356.

17

influence in the satellites. After securing Western recognition in February 1940 Groza proceeded to terrorise and split the opposition parties so that in the elections in November their gaining no more than 1O /O of resulted Likewise in Bulgaria, where the opposition the seats in parliament. refused in Government, to be bullied into accepting unconditional the participation first the their gave communists majority, elections which clear parliamentary by intimidation, Western trickery, obstruction and and were again marred in delayed February the treaties until conclusion of peace recognition was in in Hungary 1947. Representative the meanwhile government was by local the tactics communists and the salami of eroded progressively demands of' the Soviet authorities. 65 in large Anglo-Soviet had figure Danubian the to satellites ceased Red Army in Other issues, the the northern such as presence of relations. diplomats, Iran and Soviet claims upon Turkey, to were more worrying as to whether, when and where soldiers and statesmen who were uncertain A JI(: Soviet Union the might embark on another expansive phase. report , Russians March 1946 1 that the argued were set upon creating and of frontiers "belt" `a their of satellite states with round consolidating `all Governments to their weapons, short policy', and would use subservient frustrate `belt' both this to to any attempts undermine and of a major war' 66 dominate'. it believed `strategically it to areas they to extend necessary to Then in April the Chiefs of Staff, who had long taken a pessimistic view of developments `it Anglo-Soviet that recent made appear relations, concluded dangerous far Russia is than more that enemy, our most probable potential 67 Soviet Given Germany'. strength and such assessments of a revived British 1946 in intentions it was hardly the spring that of surprising Soviet balancing diplomats and containing with were as much concerned Europe.

South-Eastern power as with achieving a new accord embracing By then

it had long since become apparent that if a modus vivendi were to be achieved with the Soviet Union it would have to include the acceptance despatches in last In Soviet influence. three the of of an exclusive sphere of Roberts Soviet 18 he \Vest wrote on which analysed policies towards the be March 1946 that Anglo-Soviet `could most solidly probably relations left in basis influence the the established on of zones of which we each 68 free from interference other or criticism within specified areas'.

Moreover,

it is difficult In retrospect how to imagine have been revived on any other basis. The

Big Three collaboration could in Soviet military preeminence

65 Stephen Kertesz, Between Russia Peacemaking Illusions it'est: Hungary the the and of and 1945-1947 (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1986), pp. 32-27.

66 DBP(), Series I, Volume VI, No 78.

67 Ibid., No. 90.68

Ibid., No. 83.

18

East-Central

Europe,

the ideological the emerging gulf that separated from Western the regimes of capitalism region and social communist States United democracy, Britain to admit and the reluctance of and the Greece, Russia to a say in the administration Italy seemed to or of either if it be based be European there that to a must on were settlement ensure into influence. division the continent of of spheres a well-defined Bevin and his officials had been reluctant Nevertheless, to acquiesce in from Eastern On November, Europe.

8 Britain's the any part of exclusion he drafted his Monroes' Bevin day `Three memorandum, on which same that he `would not tolerate the prevention told the Polish Foreign Minister 69 Russia'. iron down by by drawn Poland an curtain of our association with developments how later Sargent was still speculating A fortnight recent on into be in Bulgaria turned the a country might reversed and effectively despite Foreign Moreover, buffer the the emphasis which state. neutral Russians, Secretary and British diplomats the to placed upon plain speaking Nations, it is far from clear how world cooperation through the United have been Bevin's alternative to the `three great Monroes', applied might He to accept the notion of to the Danubian satellites. was quite prepared for Big Three be the each of areas which responsible security would Moscow, he had he to too that assure ready no wish was only policing, and Europe Eastern in that might be unfriendly to the to see governments At the same time the British Government Soviet Union. had continued to in Yalta insist on the application the their principles of enunciated at and, States, United the these and maintain goodwill of the effort to uphold had found diplomats British themselves the individual supporting and initiatives American ill-considered their of colleagues. sometimes British The that the to the truth matter of was were responding Europe with which they were ill-equipped in South-Eastern developments to for Potsdam Had the early conclusion they pressed at of peace cope.

Axis have been lesser the the situation treaties with powers might clarified: it been have that to seem suggest not would events would subsequent Commissions Control But while the revised machinery improved. of the British few facade Allied it left the of unity, with opportunities preserved a the excesses of governments to do more than moderate which were either Bevin had beholden to oppose, local Soviet commanders. to, or reluctant influence in be its Britain to that might eventually able expand anticipated increased This, however, trade. through the satellites and was a publicity forlorn hope at a time when press freedoms were being curtailed and when Soviet Romania into be Hungary Bulgaria, to transformed and were about Coulson Economic John There dependencies. the of was, as economic

69 Ibid., No. 52.70

Ibid., Appendix

19

1, pp. 363-78.

Relations

Department

in March 12 `no 1946, remarked paper a of' striking be Europe.

Eastern Russians The panacea' to which could applied were too near and the memory too recent. of their overwhelming strength Governments be the of area could not expected to take any step that might displease Moscow, British it this and counteraction made essential that any best do', be unobtrusive `The we can and of a rather generalised character. he concluded, `is to hold the door openor to hold enough doors open--for to catch frequent glimpses of a more attractive and the Eastern Europeans in West be the when the occasion offers, and encouraged, prosperous world being, For '70 the time to pass through. as the pursuit of a modus vivendi had British War, for Cold to the reconcile preparation merged with Eastern Europe in Danubian to the themselves satellites and much else falling within what amounted to an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence.

20

RESPONSE TO DR HAMILTON'S

PAPER

Sir Edward Tomkins

Dr Hamilton's difficulties the paper gives a graphic picture of which the American British Control Commissions Allied in the representatives and on in Eastern Europe Soviet having the liberated their countries with were opposite numbers.

He suggests that HMG deal Soviet to the wanted make a with Government and the documents lend some support to this theory. Certainly it would have been a useful way of defending our interests in Eastern Europe. But judged against the background of the much wider picture of Soviet attitudes and behaviour in the rest of the world and as seen from the in Moscow, it doubtful British Embassy seems angle of the whether such an arrangement

was ever a practical proposition.

For some time before the end of the war, at Yalta and even earlier, the solot Big Three had been to the question of the of thought giving a called The the the organisation war. of world after most urgent problem was the future of Germany, but there was also the question Peace Italian the of Colonies, Treaty, Peace Treaties the fate of the Italian the exwith Germany Poland Austria. the problems of and of satellites and

Even more important was the question of how to prevent the outbreak of had been discussion there considerable another world war and about the Nations by League body the of a capable of ensuring the replacement of in By the the time the war ended world. maintenance of peace and security had been body, be known the to on reached setting up of such a agreement Organisation, Nations by United the the the and provisions of charter as included Security These Council be it to governed. a with which was international disputes to and to powers to recommend peaceful solutions impose them, by coercive measures including the use of force, if necessary, in the event of such disputes becoming a threat to international peace and Committee Military Security To this security. end a was set up which was to be responsible for the planning and execution of any military action decided by the Security Council.

In the lengthy discussions leading to the establishment of the UNO, the had insisted that all decisions of substance, i. e.

Soviet representatives Security Council by decisions of a non-procedural the taken nature, This the the members. unanimous agreement of permanent required

21

Stalin by the principle reflected enunciated on various occasions, and notably when the voting procedures of the Security Council were approved by him at the Potsdam Conference, that if the Big Three were agreed, if they disagreed, nothing could be achieved. anything was possible, whereas At the end of the war all thinking dominated by determination the to was Germany the prevent the resurgence of an aggressive and therefore for three-power maintenance of unity posed no problems us---it was a major it indispensable British be for to the aim of policy and appeared guarantee Public opinion was sympathetic to the Soviet the future control of Germany.

Union and there was widespread hope that that country would play a full in But in the organisation of a new world. part post-war reconstruction and Soviet Union difference in between the there was a major view of course Big-Three For Allies its Western to the the as meaning of unity. and for Great directorate; Western Russians it meant Power the a sort of in Charter it the trouble, as envisaged against powers was a guarantee of the United Nations Organisation. dilemma for for it became Western Powers the soon apparent posed a Soviet intentions in but that parts of the world were anything various Great Power interest They in to the started showing conducive unity.

Dardanelles, in former in Italian the the control of colonies, warm water islands.

Far East, in in Japanese They the the and ports some of adopted in Azerbaijan disquieting Persian in to regard and attitudes parts of Russia.

Tsarist Poland had belonged Turkey Northern to once which and island Bornholm in States Baltic the the the of were question marks as was Baltic. The question was how far was it reasonable for the Western Powers Soviet Great for Power To the to the to go everything agree unity. sake of but to resist could Union wanted would be to let it get away with murder, blocs. lead to a world divided into exclusive and antagonistic power This

because difficult it but to resolve of was was clear enough; differing America interests Britain the and of and national did instance, for Americans, Soviet intentions.

The not share assessments of Churchill's fears about Soviet policy and actions in Europe. They did not foresee, at the time, the problems which arose in 1947 and 1948 and they be imagined in Europe be that they that the situation such would would Their in home to their troops two main aim was to get able get years or so. the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and they were anxious not to On they many cause antagonism on matters regarded as secondary.

Germany in Councils in Allied Control they the questions adopted positions, and also in Eastern Europe, which differed from our own and this had the Soviet intransigence. effect of encouraging The

dilemma diverging

22

In this scenario Eastern Europe did not figure prominently.

Soviet policy in Soviet Germany.

For Soviet this area was a function towards the of policy Union German the prime aim was the elimination the of any renewal of threat. For them, as for us, the unity of the Great Powers was a guarantee. denazification, But they pursued drastic in addition total a policy of demilitarization for in demands reparations which would and massive effect destroy the industrial Underlying base of the country. this policy was the intention the German to eliminate ruling classes and the creation of an favour left economic social unrest and wing political climate which would Allied to this was the creation of a glacis of states in Eastern orientations.

Central Soviet friendly Europe, Union to the and which would make impossible a repetition 1939-45. the experiences of of

Beyond these aims (and the documents assembled in Series I, Volume VI do not show this, since they only cover the period 1945-6) lay the ultimate Soviet objective in Germany, which was the take-over of East Germany and from there the establishment in West Germany of a regime favourable to the Soviet Union-perhaps not necessarily a Communist regime, at least at first, but definitely a neutral and disarmed Germany. documents do show, however, in the shape of a series of the despatches from Moscow, Anglo-Soviet and that telegrams was relations began to deteriorate very soon after the end of the war and got steadily by.

The Soviet became the months went as press and propaganda worse in denunciations British their strident more more and of the machinations of in Europe.

At Soviet the time particularly same policy, policy towards Iran, Turkey Greece and especially took an increasingly turn. The anti-British began to take an unwanted Soviet Government interest in the Eastern Near East generally, Mediterranean in a manner which had negative and for our imperial lines of communication implications for and our oil supplies.

What

Soviet

anti-colonial attitudes and the in dependent Liberation movements

towards

the weakening

of our position

National active encouragement of directed territories were clearly in the Far East and in Africa.

It was difficult Britain, at the time to see what lay behind this onslaught.

Western the alone among powers, seemed to be singled out as the target of Soviet attacks. There were no corresponding US the attacks on at that later. But with hindsight it seems clear that time, though they developed that the main obstacle to the real cause of this hostility was the realization fact in Soviet Europe Britain herself the attainment and the aims was of diametrically Soviet British that opposed. policy were and

23

fruits the Russians wanted to the to was secure of their victory, disorganisation Europe before the exploit of order was restored, so as to bring To Russians the the about a radical political realignment. have favourable to such a change; the war had circumstances must seemed left Europe devastated Politically, it was economically and materially. deeply divided.

Food was scarce; morale was low, neutralism and pacifism flourished, feeling.

Soviet Union The to allied anti-German was popular imitated.

Soviet for be In to and many the system was regarded as a model France and in Italy the Communists political party, were the strongest dominant in the trade unions. role which exercised a What

Seen in this perspective, Great Britain must have been regarded as the be if Soviet Her be to to attained. ends were prestige overcome adversary leader home the the the of western world, moral of was great, she was democracy, the cradle of capitalism. She had a Labour government which in for Europe progressive opinion represented a pole of attraction and therefore a counter to communism. for Europe, the restoration political and economic of stood and the democratic Her help France to to order. policy was of re-establishment in Germany Europe; bring back, her to traditional place eventually, regain federal decentralised into the community of nations, with a structure and a in German democratic to the the and meantime restore government; Allied it that to the rebuilding control, contribute could, under economy so Europe. of Britain

All this was totally contrary to Soviet ideas and intentions. They saw in it a balance to traditional the policy of of power, and as an attempt to reversion American German industry, bloc, based enjoying on create a western Soviet In Soviet Union. eyes such a support and aligned against the in Western Europe development implied the reinforcement of capitalism but, form barrier according to a against communism which would not only internal because inevitably Marxist the the of analysis, would result, Soviet in the contradictions a renewed attack on of the capitalist system, Union.

Great

be Britain to therefore, appeared, not only as an adversary As by but things turned undermined all possible means as a potential threat. it ideological but be the time the to out at reasoning proved unfounded determined Soviet policy of which one of the first priorities was to Soviet Eastern Europe. the strengthen grip on

24

In these circumstances there was very little hope of concessions on Eastern Europe from the Soviet side. We had very little leverage and our difficulties differences in interpretation by increased language the the of the of were in fact fundamental Stalin, disagreements. treaties, which concealed more is not fascist, it is for instance, claimed at Potsdam that `if a Government `responsible democratic! ' and so all discussion of what constituted and by fruitless.

It democratic the treaties, government' as prescribed soon was liberated Europe became clear that the Yalta declaration on meant nothing to the Soviet side. financial

Our

situation was was weak; our economic and own position We had in the ahead extreme. an enormous task of reconstruction parlous We had a new government on a policy of which was embarking of us.

Secretary, We Foreign had scope. with of unprecedented a new reform into job.

Empire We little experience a of the were trying to convert the independent of very of nations, posed a number which commonwealth deprived India had The independence difficult to grant of us of questions.

Army Indian had been the the use of which one of the mainstays of the And we insurgency.

We had problems in Malaya with communist Empire. fact in links US the to that the preserve our vital spite of with were trying interest did not always coincide. and priorities our respective national

All in all, one must conclude, that a deal on Eastern Europe could only be And it is then, that to even pay. we were not prepared achieved at a price far from certain that such a deal was even on the cards.

25

THE ALLIED

EASTERN CONTROL

EUROPE 1945-6: COMNESSION IN BULGARIA

Malcolm

Mackintosh

Control Commissions direct to the affairs of the ex-enemy set up had Allied Powers in the final year of to the countries surrendered which War came into existence following decisions made at the Second World between Allied leaders, Winston Churchill, Franklin the meetings wartime Roosevelt Stalin, Josef initially Teheran Conference in 1943. the and at Commissions The composition depended largely the and chairmanships of location how by the the geographical on of country concerned and and it had been during liberated Thus, Romania the occupied or war. whom Soviet Bulgaria, by Army in August-September the and which were occupied dominated Commissions Control 1944, found by themselves the under Soviet Union, and chaired by Soviet Marshals or Generals, assisted by small States. from United Britain the military and political missions and The

Allied

factors dominated it benefit hindsight, is two that the major of clear Soviet Union Commissions: determination the the work of these the to of Romania Communist Bulgaria became that states obedient and ensure Soviet for lack the total to requirements, of precedents either solely and Allied in Inter-Allied in the together. military camp coside working had liaison been during between the operation minimal war, and political difficult.

The first had been our governments unproductive and extremely Control Commission in Soviet Bulgaria in (in the the of priority authorities from Red November I liaison Army 1944 the served as a officer with which demands of the Soviet 1946) was to accede to the military to September Army. This included Army in Thirty-Seventh, Bulgaria: that the sealing off With

Colonel-General SS from Biryuzov, commanded members of the Western missions, and issuing orders to these missions on movements and flights to and from Italy, in for example, little a very notice and with Control Politically, Soviet the the peremptory style. element of Commission-also General Biryuzov-was by the guided command under of interpretation between `percentage their the so-called agreement' of Churchill Stalin had (to United States the and which government never division in the the ex-enemy countries acceded) on of authority and power Balkan Greece, Yugoslavia Yalta the the of peninsula as well as and of and February 1945, in to they the most rigid way agreement of which clung throughout the existence of the Allied Commission. by

26

Western imposed the on movement of personnel at an were installation Commission in Control formal the the of early stage after Mission, 1944. In December, November the head of the British Military WH Oxley, Mission Major-General the and other members were of Soviet by be troops, travel that and orders were given would arrested journeys Sofia, limited to Commission-approved the outside and capital, `military pass' and a precise route and timetable then only with a agreed Soviet in in Well Europe before the authorities. end of the war with the in 1945, the Soviet May government set about establishing a regime by the Bulgarian Communist Party, to whose leadership Bulgaria dominated Secretary-General former Comintern figure the the and central of returned in Fire Trial' in Berlin in 1934, Georgi Dirnitrov, in the Nazi `Reichstag Party to power began in 1945. The process of bringing the Communist 1945 leader January in the to the attempt with arrest pro-Western earnest Party Georgi Agrarian (also known Dimitrov, Bulgarian called usually of the distinguish `GEMETO' in Bulgarian, by his initials of `G M Dimitrov' to or He escaped from house arrest one him from his Communist namesake). in in Sofia, billet Sunday in January and sought refuge my and was taken by Ambassador head Maynard Barnes, American the protection of under Mission, United Political American the to and subsequently the emigrated 1945, the Bulgarian On 1/2 February States. tried and authorities including 103 the those who members of wartime government, executed all had voted against joining the Axis in 1941 and against declaring war on States The Bulgarian United Allied Britain, the and other powers.

Soviet Control Commission, by in the the element supported authorities, intimidation, opponents tactics arrest and murder against political of used latter Many this the throughout period. of resisted with great and rivals for Agrarian Nikola Petkov, it lives. like their the and paid with courage, Restrictions

Control Commission British Allied in Bulgaria During the the the years of Missions protested vigorously Military American tactics these of against and Soviet intention the to single-minded set up a against and repression in Their best however, had Communist that country. efforts, government little success, and in the last resort, the Russians acted as if the Western from diplomatic hardly to the adhering existed, apart niceties of missions Commission functions.

On formality the and at only one at meetings of Russians to the taken personal my recollections, were according occasion, intervention-in Stalin By by himself. by this case, an unexpected aback bringing Bulgarian Communist Party 1945, the to the of process mid-August General had Biryuzov in the the reached stage at which country power hold one-Party Party's `request' to throughout the to elections agreed The heads of the Western missions protested at meetings of the Bulgaria. hours Commission the to small of the morning right up of the elections

27

Stalin

from Moscow telephoned and ordered their success-until without immediate Biryuzov his and colleagues were shaken to the cancellation. fainted.

Stalin's had But taken the orders call actually core: one officer who jubilant Bulgarians that the took to the streets convinced were obeyed, and Western powers had forced the Soviets to give in. Opposition newspapers in began to appear, and non-Communist to engage politicians were allowed for into But 1946. later, activity some months-and a year open political these political leaders began to disappear, the press was silenced, and a fullCommunist Agrarian Democratic Party purge of and members was scale October In 1946, held: one-Party resumed. elections most were with behind bars-or leaders No opposition worse. one can explain precisely the for Stalin's decision in it is 1945: by unexpected said some analysts reason American, did Soviet the that Western, particularly pressure persuade his But it is leader tactics. that the to relent or change undeniable Communist Bulgarian Party-and Soviet intervening the their year gave identify backers-an the potential to opportunity strength of the opposition its leaders, before Party to them the effectively and silence officially and People's Republic Bulgaria. the the as government of of assumed power for the Bulgarian for West, People's Fortunately the the people, as well as forty-four later it its Republic had a time-limit existence: on came to years Bulgaria the were able to embark on a new course people of an end, and in deciding their own fate and their position in the Councils of Europe and the world.

28

BRITISH

POLICY

IN EASTERN EUROPE CONTEXT Gillian

IN THE GLOBAL

Bennett

Pelly, and I began work in selecting documents When the Editor, Margaret had four for this volume, the recently we edited other volumes covering in Volume 1945-6: II, Council Foreign Ministers, the period on of same in November Attlee's visit to Washington 1945 and the Moscow Conference Volume III, 1945; US in December loan the the the on negotiation of of Volume IV, Anglo-American 1945; 1945-6; of on aspects of relations autumn Germany V, Western in Europe half Volume the on and second of and in 1945. We were therefore the acutely conscious of global context which Soviet Union Eastern We Europe knew the and were set. with relations foundations Volume VI been for in had laid the that, of already a sense, us.

Volume III we had learned that the successful negotiation US the of foreign policy in the last quarter British in 1945 loan dominated of and 1946 until the loan finally got through Congress in July. There was not an by the awareness that the Americans had to be issue which was untouched forthcoming. be US humoured to make sure that the money would James Byrnes State his few let Secretary of and officials equally for On leverage. from their topics using ranging pass relations opportunities Ernest Bevin his Argentina to route air concessions and colleagues with followed it informed they that a certain course of action unless would were `the American lend be very difficult to to persuade people' money to From

Britain. backdrop be to the the loan negotiations must regarded as a constant issue it be Eastern European the that must also remembered scene, which in Eastern Europe but Anglo-Soviet dominated this period was not relations The determination to industrial, to reduce Germany the future of Germany.

Soviet impotence the central plank of policy at and economic was military in the Control for Germany Council this time, and it was the negotiations focus Great dialogue. forum British Power In the the this of which were found disadvantage: American team themselves the often at a negotiators Russian in French frequently the took the part an argument, and were issue implied form on any which any of centralised obstructive Germans in Germany.

While Bevin determined the that administration was for British War, he be `pay the the to the price' made and should German industry destruction Government that the total also realised of disastrous for Europe be They be hard as a whole. on the could would While

29

German

but

them to starvation they could not condemn and people, feed in The British to them. the no position equally, were anarchy: Germans had to be left in a state which them to survive: the enabled definitely division of Germany this regarded as temporary. was at stage Soviet British divergence between Despite the this and of policy Germany Governments, Bevin was always conscious in the negotiations on duty be fair it both to that scrupulously a political was necessity and a for Russians.

Even the towards their most outrageous reparation claims despite depredation treated their the seriously, complete evidence of were At Zone. determined US Government their this the own of stage was also far keep Joe' `Uncle to try and the wartime as going as rapport with And despite differences lack some possible. of support of opinion and some from the American British linked negotiators, policy was still very closely to States. that of the United `special loan the the negotiations, sense of pressure of combined with in felt Government by British the the relationship' which was certainly defer War, US British to the that to tended of meant policy aftermath including Eastern looked in Europe.

Balkans, In the we every arena, wishes Soviet for joint Americans to the action against the more outrageous Romania, disappointed; but the where were usually encroachments, case of Communist-dominated demand for the resignation King Michael's the of directly inspired by US Groza government the who then representative was backed off and declined to join in British support for the King, was fairly States Bevin Danubian is It and to true to say that typical. regarded the Soviet Balkans `influence' the was to some as areas where some extent American legitimised in a strong without any case unstoppable and extent The

lead.

Bevin's own interest in Central and Eastern Europe was much more closely focused on two other areas: Poland and Greece. The records show that had Secretary Foreign in July State Secretary becoming the of since issues.

He foreign policy acquired a masterly grasp of the whole spectrum of `line had in interested to take', a strong and always everything was The do dominated by a firm intention records to right. what was morally This his Poland however, that sympathies. particular attracted also show, Churchill had from War: hangover the made explicit promises was partly a left be Mikolajczyk that they to alone at the mercy of and others would not forces Polish Soviet policy, and that pledges to repatriate the armed under Bevin be British command met. clearly regarded these promises as would binding on him.

30

he was also clearly determined to try to make the new Polish fulfil Potsdam the government pledges made at communist-dominated about free press and free political free elections, In to association. addition diplomatic Ambassador, British through the strong pressure new exerting Bevin kept up a barrage of minutes regarding forging Cavendish-Bentinck, links Poland, bringing British trade and with and views to the new cultural for example, English language Polish people through, the publications of in Poland. newspapers However,

in half by frustration 1945 Anglo-Polish the relations second of were marked both The in disappointment British Ambassador that on sides. reported and Soviet dominance in the post-war and political geographical situation Bierut Government determined Poland was inevitable, that the to and was force Ambassador if On British in by basis, that the necessary. power, stay Communists. the to establish a working relationship with sought Government, Polish Unable to exercise any decisive influence the over Bevin found that in the areas where he felt he should be able to accomplish in Polish the as repatriating, under satisfactory conditions, something--such had British forces served under who command---he was equally armed by impotence Polish the to obstructionism on side and to some reduced British.

Despite discussion high-level by the tape on months of red extent Anglo-Polish issues further little by most advanced were and correspondence had been hostilities.

1945 than they the at end of the end of Greece frustrating, for different Relations were equally reasons. with from the rest of Central and Eastern Europe in Greece was quite different British by "percentage it the troops, that and under was occupied in Stalin leave Greece Churchill 1944 had to agreed with agreement" in British interest. half In 1945 being the the sphere of second of alone as Greece was in an almost permanent state of political crisis, government Regent hold following the the ring and trying to with vainly government fulminating delays Hellenes in in George England King the of against holding a plebiscite he was sure would restore him to the throne.

Greece, in hilarious) (sometimes towards as expressed policy Ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper, the with was ambivalent correspondence On his the one as ambassador contradictory, pointed out. and sometimes in interfering hand Bevin informed the Regent that he had no intention of Greek politics and that the Greeks must choose their own government and On he Greek Government it. the to other, expected any new get on with his legal economic, and wishes regarding electoral, constitutional respect His instructions Leeper between to alternated and threats ultimata reform.

Greeks his hands Against background the this to wash of altogether. was the Bevin's

31

directly fear but Soviet Union, through the that the not perhaps constant Greece's intermediary Yugoslavia Bulgaria, on encroach might of or borders.

The documents Bevin's ambivalence, and also reflect northern humorous light gloom of represent some relief against the almost unrelieved for in Eastern Europe: the the the picture example, rest of conjuring up, Regent's Hector interesting McNeil the picture of villa at midnight going to him in Bevin's name to withdraw his resignation, to implore and of the Regent's sobbing acquiescence. in Volume The documents VI present a picture of the slow but seemingly inevitable drawing down of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. It might for Bevin lost trend the that to to take seem or opportunities were reverse in firmer did line.

It the those countries to some of people a certainly seem by the West and their wartime hopes that they were being abandoned flawed, betrayed.

Potsdam, however But the agreements reached at were Government by by British the the still regarded as rules which they must Soviet They Union's in the the abide. great sacrifices were conscious of United War, and of the need to maintain the a good relationship with States above all. Britain had been left bankrupt by War, the and exhausted Government Labour and the new on an ambitious were embarking Against domestic dominated this their programme reform which of counsels.

Ernest Bevin and the British Government background, could only choose forward. then-and the now-as only realistic way what appeared

32

DISASTER-MANAGEMENT:

THE DBPO ON EASTERN Norman

EUROPE

Stone

disaster-management-none better.

In 1945, are very good at disaster.

True, they had won a world war, but they were quite close to bankrupted They depended American had help them. almost upon victory boy: (I remember that, of my own portion as a very small chocolate-drops) it Their that there certainty no would continue. empire, onewas and land because the the surface, of world's apart, was splitting quarter in had, By 1945, it a mysterious way, gone. consensus of rulers and ruled Palestine, India because in the elements and only which on, carried for in fact, they succession could not agree; close to civil were, contended Great Britain, in July 1945, Inside there was a social revolution; a war. into land-swept it Party Labour power, and was promised an end to radical in former Resources into have times, the the old ways. which, gone would had into former housing to go and welfare; a of empire now maintenance Bevin, Ernest Palmerston's Foreign boss, the trade union occupied chair at Palace to In 1945, as the crowds gathered Office. outside Buckingham in)E(urope) for V(ictory day, Churchill there was a moment when cheer for instance George Orwell, imagined that even very wise commentators, being That did for last a world power. moment the country could go on not long; soon, the problems were coming in, thick and fast, so much so that you Cold War War Succession'. `the British the of could almost call The

British

far

British do to exceeded power and continued responsibilities so Truman Doctrine', `the Americans March 1947, in last the with at until, burdens.

The is the take whole problem over some of very wellagreed to It concerns by this present volume of Foreign Office documents. illustrated April Eastern and Central Europe, from the end of the European war until British

1946, when the Cold War was getting under way. The volume consists of Office instructions Foreign diplomatic to ambassadors, assessments, reports, documents is language The these of considerations. and economic military the prize goes elegant and shrewd: with severe competition, often extremely Roberts, from The has been Moscow.

Frank to reporting editing work kind this may sometimes appear to well: volumes of carried out superlatively I read in the same way as I This one, however, be dryasdust scholarship.

Count Montecristo in late The teens: without stopping, over nearly of my read impartial hours.

I have be therefore, to twenty-four critic. no claim, an Eastern Europe Stalinist had most of control, passed under followed for Was these there anything period countries. a nightmare By 1947-8,

33

and that

Should Americans have done British the they to stop this? the and might from the Ruhr and a have tried to appease Stalin, giving him reparations future Germany have in Japan, they the or should of western or real say later In 1945-6 they these clear-cut as alternatives resisted? were not as At had be.

Yalta, Allies in 1945, to the presented a united appeared early for front.

Inter-Allied had been a sharing arrangements made of Councils in Control liberated There Allied be all responsibilities. would free In theory, this the countries. arrangement and of meant co-operation The Yalta Again, in Declaration for latter these. the elections. provided Resistance the stages of war, coalition of the anti-Fascist were governments forms So in the this and that ministry. set up with non-Communists of postdemocracy, Allied war with supervision, were present.

Warsaw in Bucharest, Budapest, Belgrade the observers on and spot inter-Allied could therefore talk to non-Communist politicians, and sit upon in There In they most commissions. practice, was, were nearly powerless.

Red Army lifting quite capable simply of countries, garrison which was a Siberia in The the to anti-Fascism. secret police was name of opponents off British

in Communist the distribution

hands,

the ordinary and so was the censorship, Commissions Control land. The Allied

police, and Soviet had of On had the the calling of meetings. power over agendas and chairmen who isolated Central in Europe, and non-Communists were quite easily spot free in divided; the majorities of vote even when they won substantial ineffective.

In in November 1945, in Hungary they were elections, as Communists free (several Poland, the of there was not even a election, On Poland, Russian) but Polish, terror. the reports them not even spreading Portland, Cavendish-Bentinck, Duke later show the acuteness with of of It British through the was a very grubby whole process. observers saw which business. Warsaw was in ruins; Poles, British allies from beginning to end, little defrauded humiliated the that there and was very and were in in governments British could do to defend them. Non-Communists were paper to work position an almost ridiculous with piles of meaningless 1946 it March by Already from inadequate through, offices, and to no point. it Curtain', Soviet Union `Iron imposing and was an was was clear that the Missouri.

Fulton, in that month that Churchill famous his speech at made being

The volume ends in April 1946, with a clear assumption that Cold War was is There following. hot one curious way, with a war, possibly, under document, by the Foreign Office economic staff, in April 1946, assessing the likely future power of the USSR. It assumes (with only faint qualification) drawing level Soviet be brilliantly that the successful, planned economy will Such it by 1980. by American 1960, economy and overtaking were with the have With hindsight, the assumptions claimed that the people of the age.

34

Americans Communist done have the to the and should more resist in Central Europe.

Leszek Kolakowski take-over says that, at the very least, the West should not have conferred `legitimacy' upon the take-over, Both of these things may he by entering upon treaties, however well-meant. is deal However, inevitably, there to this a great story which, correct. have Moscow.

That to the access until we archives of remains mysterious delayed.

And be long fullythe to when, as result, we come a cannot, now, Cold War, the the editors of this magnificent volume of rounded account of deserve in documents list high British the a place will of up British

acknowledgements.

35

PERSONALITIES

IN DIPLOMACY: Ann

EASTERN

EUROPE

1945-6

Lane

Conference, Britain had been Potsdam in the the course of Election.

To the surprise of many it was the Labour throes of a General leader, Clement Attlee, and not Winston Churchill, Berlin to who returned for the final days of the Conference British Prime Minister.

Although the as Conservative differences between ideological there were significant and Labour politicians Attlee's views on foreign affairs, and those of his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, those of their consistent with were notably Both in had Coalition been the predecessors. ministers wartime Government foreign line in in the and current policy was one which they had acquiesced.

(1883-1967), Clement Attlee one official whom described difficult `an subsequently as outstanding manager of an often lacking `personal team', the trace a man even slightest of or vanity ' in disinterest in his having conceit', was unlike predecessor a relative foreign from He jaundiced Potsdam affairs. returned view of the with a 2 but tended Russians whom he dismissed as `ideological imperialists', to leave the making of foreign policy to his highly capable, but idiosyncratic Foreign Secretary.

During

the

British believed, that as a matter of principle, determined be ideological by policy should not or sympathies Rather, interests he it socialist solidarity. saw which as a matter of national he considered of the regardless unchanging of the political complexion Eden, Consequently, Anthony day. from the government of on taking over Bevin resisted pressure from the left wing of the Labour Party to alter in Office Diplomatic Foreign the the greatly personnel most senior and Service He few Shortly illusions. to after the posts. came office with Potsdam Conference he commented that the Russians, having carried out two five year plans and won the war, were returning to their `original Lenin face idea' and `any hope of a new style diplomacy "cards the table, on of 3 inconceivable"'. upwards, was Ernest foreign

Bevin

(1881-1951)

I John Colville, Fringes of Power, Downing Street Diaries, 1941 April 1955, vol. II (London, 1987), p. 262.

2JW Pickersgill and DF Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, vol. III, 1945-1946 (Toronto, 1970), p 71.

3 David Dilks (ed), The Diaries Cadogan, Sir Alexander 1938-1945 (London, 1971), p 785; H of Thomas, Armed Truce (London, 1988), pp. 295-96.

36

Bevin's determination for continuity by retention was underlined of the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Alexander (1884-1968), Cadogan who had been in office since 1938 and who in 1945, was expecting to retire after lengthy today tenure as the senior what would as an unusually appear described dry, official in the Foreign Office. Cadogan, as resourceful and Ihr known his dislike He had able, exuded confidence and was of planning. in Soviet Union United States but he the the served neither nor was very ideological by former in hast and Central the threat the conscious of' posed Europe and of the danger of leaving `the first open to the peculiar methods Soviet by Government'.

4 the employed of cultivation 1946, Cadogan In January Britain's first Permanent was appointed Representative Nations PUS by his to the United and was succeeded as Sargent deputy, Sir Orme (1884-1962). 5 Known to his contemporaries as described

by Lord Vansittart `holey' and as `a philosopher strayed into Whitehall', 6 Sargent spent the greater part of his career in the Foreign Office where he steadfastly In resisted all attempts to post him abroad.

1935 he had, as head of the Central Department, joined in advocating an Nazi Germany understanding with as a more constructive course to `the despair'-an alternatives of negation and argument remarkably similar to that used by proponents of an agreement with Soviet Russia in 1945.7 But following British the failure Hitler, Sargent to conciliate of attempts as an opponent emerged of subsequent attempts at `appeasement' and have Stalin in a similar frame of to the handling appears approached of In his `Stocktaking After 8 V-E Day', in July 1945, he paper mind. circulated `Britain in Communist that take the should argued offensive challenging in Eastern Europe'.

He this as necessary because to penetration... explained `would in do otherwise, the eyes of the world appear as a cynical interests the of small nations abandonment whose to we are pledged in his assessment of what Britain might defend. ' But he was not unrealistic hope to achieve in Eastern Europe: London Council Foreign the at of in September, he urged co-ordination Ministers Anglo-American in of policy

4 Documents on British Policy Overseas (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series I, Volume II, Conferencesand Conversations 1945: London, Washington and Moscow (HMSO, 1989) No. 19.

The other volumes in Series I cited in this essay are Volume I, The Potsdam Conference1945, (HMSO, 1984) and Volume VI, Eastern Europe 1915-46 (HMSO, 1991).

5 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-51 (London, 1983), 164. p.

6 Robert Vansittart, The Mist Procession(London, 1958), p. 399.

7WN Medlicott, `Britain and Germany: the search for agreement 1930-37' in David Dilks, (Ed. ), Retreat from Power. Studies in British Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, vol. I, 190639 (London, 1981), pp. 90-91.

8 DBPO, Series I, Volume I, No. 102.

37

implied, `promises, to the the region and the joint avoidance express or of found it be '9 be these areas which might could not carried out. peoples of for Bevin (1889-1982), MP Initially, Philip Noel-Baker appointed fervent A 1936, State.

Derbyshire his Minister since as and consistent of League Nations, Noel-Baker the supporter of of published a series of works in the 1920s which importance law in the the stressed of rule of 10 international Attlee's for he the relations. position, choice was well Labour during Bevin's Party.

However, his the tenure respected within as deputy at the Foreign Office, which came to an end in October 1946, he Il influence He by to the proved unable exert much on policy. was supported Parliamentary Under-Secretary State for Affairs, Clydesider, Foreign the of (1907-1955), journalist by had been Hector McNeil training a who elected MP for Greenock in 1941. McNeil Bevin knew to personally and was close his mind. In mid-November headed the British Mission 1945 McNeil to Greece where he displayed much pessimism about Greek politicians whom he considered have because `agree `no they to unlikely about anything' backing handling But his and are scared out of their wits'. stout of the Ambassador, difficulties British impressed him in Athens the confronting so Sir Rex Leeper, that the latter wrote to Bevin: `He was in a strange land His time. quick grasp of among very strange people at a very strange initiative his essentials, saved the position at a critical and resourcefulness but I himself He think you should things moment. will not tell you these know them'. 12

Private Secretary to Bevin was Pierson (Bob) Dixon (1904-1965) logical described having a popular official, mind combined as a clear and 13 friend He keen human was also a personal appreciation of with a values. for Anthony is Eden the the smooth credit of and as such owed much of transition between the two administrations.

Principal

Office Policy towards Eastern Europe was implemented Foreign the within departments, largely by the relevant certain consulting geographical issues dealing departments, those most notably specialist with economic Relations Bevin Department) (Economic placed some weight and refugees. be increase that trade of might used to secure a on the possibility an 9 Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton, New Jersey, 1974), p. 314.

10 Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala, Sir James Headlam-Morky.

A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference,1919 (London, 1972), p. 198.

11 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary(London, 1983), p. 78.

12 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 62, note 2.

13 Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life Sir Pierson Dixon (London, 1975), 20. p. of

38

Russian in the the restrictions on movement sphere. of many of relaxation diplomacy in The exploration this regard ,vas of economics as a weapon of by Economic (h.

1909), head Coulson John then primarily of conducted During Department.

1945 Relations 1946, the autumn of and spring of Coulson a series of thoughtful papers on the subject, which are produced for Britain in they the the emphasis place on constraints on notable forward in Eastern Europe, in both to terms of pursue a policy attempting its Soviet In and as a result of the own economic occupation weakness. in which he wrote: .March 1946, he summed up his views in a memorandum be faced

in is there present circumstances, must no he The Eastern Europe. to can applied which panacea striking Russians are too near. The memory of their overwhelming physical Governments is that the too recent and we cannot expect.. . strength displeasing have been is they to told will take any step which is at present no way of getting round There Moscow. this and it be it by that any counter-action must ourselves essential makes 14 and of a rather generalised character. unobtrusive

The

fact

that,

handling highly issues burden the the the of sensitive surrounding of Central Southern Europe, fell British in the occupied zones of and refugees Representative (1889-1979) UK Rendel George Sir the who was on to Commission Regional UNRRA15 European of as well as the the Secretary Refugee, Under Prisoners War Superintending the of of and His earlier postings included a spell as head Supply and Relief departments.

Ambassador Government-inYugoslav Department Eastern to the and of Sofia between 1938 and 1941 when he Exile as well as being Minister in in killed by bomb his being luggage a planted staff's at an escaped narrowly Istanbul hotel. 16 Much

Soviet in lead Department It was the Northern took the affairs, as which Poland Czechoslovakia; in to the ex-enemy those and pertaining well as Yugoslavia Greece together and with were the responsibility of satellites, In departments Department. both 1945, Southern the summer of the were Sir Orme Sargent. by superintended headed Department by (1895-1957) Christopher Warner Northern was Office Foreign in 1920.

His knowledge been had the to appointed of who Eastern languages had served him well in a succession of postings in Middle 14 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, Appendix I. 15 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

16 Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London, 1976), p. 61.

39

the Near East, but he had no personal April 1946, however, he had concluded

knowledge

Soviet the of

Union.

By

that:

Russian aggressiveness British interests all over the world. threatens intensive The Soviet Government to are carrying out an campaign depreciate in harry this and every possible way. weaken, country direct British threat to a herself must now address primarily, Perceiving

democracy social if not exclusively,

he argued that Britain 17 its defence. to own

(b. 1915), the official handling Russian affairs at this Thomas Brimelow He time, had returned in June 1945 from a three-year posting to Moscow.

Riga among his pre-war postings, was a Russian speaker-a numbered rarity in the Office in 1945 he and, even more unusually, possessed a grasp of Marxist-Leninist His view of Soviet foreign be theory. policy might by his it hard-hearted based `directly that characterised argument on a was interest balance forces' `ideological that of calculation and of arguments and [were] used chiefly to justify the taking of every opportunity of reaping 18 To London the the this thought advantage'. political convey eve of on Council of Foreign Ministers, he used the following nautical metaphor: When the boat leans over to the side of Great Britain, the Russians down heavily but is bulwark; their their sit aim and clumsily on own 19 it it. lean their way, not to overturn only to make

During the autumn of 1945 he argued strongly against the views of the Joint from American Intelligence Sub-Committee far by being that cowed Russians by bomb, their the the monopoly of were showing atomic increasing continued and obduracy that they were unconvinced that the West would use this weaponry in order to impose their will regarding the 20 postwar settlement. in (1882-1951) Until January Clark 1946, Sir Archibald Kerr remained Ever 1942. he had been Ambassador Moscow since optimistic where as just few days he before future Anglo-Soviet the a relations, wrote of about the opening of the London Council of Foreign Ministers that he considered `a certain Russia to be on the defensive in Europe and that he perceived

17 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 88.

181bid., No. 84, notes 4 and 10.

19 Ibid., No. 16.

20 Ibid., No. 49.

40

Soviet the grasp over east and central relaxation " Democratic influence'.

'Western advantage of in

Europe'

to the

b. 190T. Roberts had served at Clark Kerr's deputy was Frank Roberts Cairo Embassies before in He Paris London 1937. to returning the and was in Moscow 1945, in juncture Anglothereby arriving at a crucial posted to Soviet relations. Roberts was convinced that Soviet fears of Britain and the States were genuine like Clark Kerr, believed United that the and, Writing in Russians still sought, above all, to retain Big Three co-operation. be better 1945, he felt that it would `frankly September to reach Russians interests in Europe the than our respective upon with agreement `'`-' drift'. detailed In his let to assessment of the meýning to matters continue Soviet London implications transmitted to policies and propaganda, of and have `larch 1946 in a series of despatches been during which since George Kennan's `Long Telegram', he celebrated argued with compared Soviet Union's Britain indicated the attack on of a that the manner inherent Britain's fear Unlike Brii-nelow, he strength. of put profound ideology Soviet in foreign the the making of role of policy, emphasis on leading him to speculate whether it might is faced danger he the the not now world asked whether with of even 16th in the the of religious wars of equivalent century, a modern Western democracy Soviet will struggle with communism social which 23 for domination American version of capitalism of the world. and the East European frustrations to postings capitals were everywhere of first Ambassador Britain's Poland, However Victor to postwar manifest.

(1897-1990), known his Cavendish-Bentinck that made own view in Warsaw HMG war-torn was much more amusing and representing Sub-Committee joint for Intelligence he interesting the than chairing which 24 Cavendish-Bentinck for been had much of the war. was no responsible The

in having 1920s, his Poland there the to served and used private stranger `a he to that as peering machine' ensure not only was wellaeroplane in he had known but also to visit the estates of land-owners informed whom 25 He by (b.

Robert (Robin) Hankey there times. was preceded earlier Cabinet Secretary, Lord Hankey, formerly 1905), son of the former and Department.

Hankey, too, was a Polish speaker who had head of Northern been in Warsaw during the 1930s. His initial impressions to on returning 21 Ibid., No. 17.

22 Ibid., No. 30.

23 Ibid., No. 80.

24 Ibid., No. 4. iv.

25 Thomas, p. 347.

41

Anglo-Soviet `touchstone' the of relations, often considered were Department in his Northern `Russians that the to summed statement up days he had few the earlier conveyed control nearly everything'; a British the execution of atmosphere of oppression which would make policy deputy difficult Prime Minister, the moderate so about when writing Stanislaw in Mikolajczyk `in he his said spoke such a whisper who office 26 hardly hear he that Poland,

one can

what

says'.

Ambassador in Prague, British considered in terms of political to stand out from its neighbours 27 its links West.

His led him the to report at maturity and with optimism 1945 that despite the fact that a Soviet alliance the end of November Czechoslovak foreign it the remain would cornerstone of policy, was most Communists be `rethat the to the unlikely able prevent would democratic following establishment of a genuinely system' parliamentary be held in to the spring of 1946. elections Philip Nichols Czechoslovakia

(1894-1962),

Southern Department during half latter 1945 William the of of was (b. 1906) who had just returned from in Hayter a wartime posting Washington.

One of the Department's during this period principal concerns for During 1945, the treaties the was, of course, peace ex-enemy satellites.

Britain withheld recognition set up after the of the provisional governments liberation, holding However, the pending political of elections. representatives were posted to each of the capitals and Britain participated in the Allied Control Commissions.

Head

In Bulgaria, William (1892-1960) favoured a hard line Houstoun-Boswall in dealing with the Russians. Of the Bulgarian elections in November, he Government had `such that the created wrote an unwholesome atmosphere fear that they could quite afford to conform with all external rituals of of democracy'. He disagreed with Southern Department that Britain should the for an early conclusion of peace treaties with the ex-enemy work firm his Russians to that the conviction satellites, owing would eventually back-down in the face of renewed Anglo-American pressure. 28 by Similar in the representative arguments were advanced political (1894-1975). No stranger to East Central Bucharest, John Le Rougetel Europe, Le Rougetel had served in the Embassies in Vienna, Budapest and Bucharest before the war. By November 1945, he too had become firmly 26 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, Nos. 4 and 9.

27 Ibid., No. 65.

28 Ibid., No. 63.

42

Britain Soviet Russians blufff 'as that the the should call convinced are not 29 break in He his to the about with us regime'. prepared was outspoken ACC, he he the the to of' meetings of which condemnation considered not in Potsdam the to the minimum requirements even stipulated protocol. up Of his Soviet colleague, General Susaikov, he said that `he had two heads, Control Commission Allied in in Military High the the and one one drily adding Command', Soviet that this was `merely another point of 30 technique'. in Budapest (1893Britain's Alvary Gascoigne representative political was during 1970), whose experience of diplomacy thirty-five stretched over years list he Hungarian His to the a previous posting could capital. which ACCs his impression the the to that effectiveness of of was similar of Sofia: in Bucharest he `Russians', `formulate the and wrote, colleagues American British this to out any prior without reference carry or policy.. .and 31 representations'.

Southern

Department,

Yugoslav

by John affairs were handled Foreign Office in October (1915-1987) 1945 Colville to the who returned in RAF Treasury.

It the to the and service a secondment after wartime job his `compose in flowery later indignant he to wrote, part of prose was, in Belgrade instructing him to complain, in despatches to our Ambassador Government, Majesty's His behaviour.

As the tyrant's of the name of in they were enjoyable; they were composition as protests exercises 32 He had been preceded

by John Addis (1914-1983).

Before ineffective'.

Assistant leaving at the end of August 1945 to take up the appointment of `an informal Private Secretary to Attlee, Addis produced ephemeral minute' for his successor on what was to prove one of the thorniest legacies of this 33 Yugoslavs from British the of zones. period, the question of repatriation Within

(1895-1977), formerly Ambassador Stevenson Sir Ralph In Belgrade, Yugoslav Government-in-Exile Plenipotentiary in Extraordinaire the to and Provisional Government in had been accredited Cairo, to the United PPS during 1940, Stevenson had enjoyed a spell as 1945. Halifax's March before his posting to Cairo in August 1943. He Ambassador to Montevideo for Royalist displayed the excessive sympathy politicians and when the never 1945 Tito's November in confirmed of provisional government elections

29 Ibid., No. 66. i.

30 Ibid., No. 56. ii.

31 Ibid., No. 56.11i.

32 Colville,

p. 267.

33 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 26.

43

had firmly Yugoslavs he that the probably got the government argued power 34 the majority of the population wanted.

(Rex) Leeper (1888-1968), wartime Ambassador to the Sir Reginald following Athens had 1943, Greek Government-in-Exile to the gone since liberation in October 1944. An Australian by birth, he had held a series of disappointing East.

1945 in Europe Near Eastern was a and and the posts frustrations in Anglo-Greek in these trying year are reflected relations; Leeper's telegrams which reveal an understanding of and sympathy for the Greek people, but was less enthusiastic about their governments. Writing to Bevin at the end of the year he wearily commented that `it is difficult to find boring'.

Nevertheless, stability achieve anything stable with people who he contended that the Greeks as a nation were capable of producing far if Britain only could assist them now to get onto their more able politicians, feet. 35 in Soviet Union Eastern Europe the to the postings and exception, difficult diplomats British 1945 to work under very summer obliged of by in Establishing missions recently ravaged war, countries circumstances. from formed far governments welcoming, were sometimes and where newly Gascoigne had Alvary to take a problems. could present serious practical Government house in the country because the Hungarian would not provide October, in in Hayter 24 he letter him with town, to of and a one Hungarian Ministries that were comfortably complained while whole been in luxurious he had `for two months accommodation, ensconced 36 He for food to secure some permits and coal'. supplies struggling diplomats foreign in favours that the usual on showered recommended Hungarian from be London the recently appointed should withheld Britain. to representative Without

difficulties in transport and was also Robin Christopher Warner, background letter to a impossible in it Warsaw `virtually Hankey to get that explained was in five days `for tried vain to get on to the adding that we appointments' We Minister.

I Telegraph Posts Ministry the that could see so and of find the out what girl said she could not always got the wrong number or business In communications.

Diplomatic

hampered

by

information-gathering the number was! '37 Moreover, was severely restricted hazardous individuals discussion the to at regime was opposed with since

34 Ibid., No. 68.

35 Ibid., No. 72.

36 DBPO, Series I, Volume VI, No. 51, note 6.

37 Ibid., No. 4.

44

facilities

for

disseminating

information great, a were equally Foreign Office to the concern matter of particular relations since cultural if `one, as not the most powerful, of the means at our were regarded Russian influence in Czechoslovakia disposal for countering and the other At August, Orme Sargent `It Danubian the end countries'. of reflected now in looks as though the Communists take these will concerted measures Americans in direction, thwart those to the efforts this our and of countries '38 unless we act vigorously and promptly. best.

The

These problems diplomats were

the

information

greatly enhanced value of such as They to able glean. also encouraged conjecture and it Soviet intentions.

With to came assessing policies and when speculation few elites limited to to emerging political and with access opportunities only Britain's in Eastern Europe in in representatives negotiation, could engage imposition do little Soviet the than more monitor the -end of authority upon irrelevance the of the principles the region and reflect upon enunciated at Yalta and at Potsdam.

38 DBPO, Series I, Volume II, No. 19, note 5.

45

NOTE

Tomkins

Sir Edward

Malcolm

Professor

ON CONTRIBUTORS

HM Diplomatic

Allied Control 1944-46

Mackintosh

Norman

Stone

Professor University

Service 1939-75

Commission,

Modern of Oxford of

Richard

Bone

Head of Department,

Hr Keith

Hamilton

Editor, DBPO, FCO

Gillian

Dr

Ann

Bennett

Formerly FCO

Lane

Assistant

46

Library FCO

Assistant

Editor,

Bulgaria

History,

and

Records

Editor,

DBPO,

FCO

DBPO,

ON BRITISH

DOCUMENTS

POLICY

OVERSEAS

documents from This the archives of collection of the Foreign and Office is published by authorization Commonwealth Her Majesty's of The Editors have been accorded the customary freedom in Government. documents. the selection and arrangement of

SERIES

1 (1945--1950)

Published Conference

Volume

I

The

Volume

II

Conferences Conversations and Washington and Moscow.

Volume

III

Britain and America: Negotiation December 1945. loan, August

Volume

IV

Britain

and

December Volume

Germany

V

Potsdam, July at

America:

Atomic

1945 July

1945.

London,

1945:

United the of

Energy,

Bases and

States Food,

1946.

Western and

Europe,

August-December

Eastern Europe, August 1945-April

Volume VI

August

1945.

1946.

In preparation

Volume VII

The United

Nations,

SERIES

1946-1947.

II (1950-1955)

Published Volume

I

The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, May 1950-December 1952.

Volume

II

The London Conferences,

Volume

III

German

Rearmament,

Korea, June 1950

Volume IV

January June

1950.

September-December

April

1950.

1951.

In preparation Volume

V

Volume VI

Free lists Stationery

Germany

European and

The Middle

Security,

1952-1954.

East, 1951-1953.

Titles (state from Her Majesty's subject/s) of are available Office, HMSO Books, 51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5DR.

47

FCO HISTORICAL OCCASIONAL

BRANCH PAPERS

No. 1 Valid Evidence

No. 2 Meeting

Editors of

Diplomatic of

Documents

No. 3 Germany

rejoins

the Club

No. 4 Eastern Europe

No. 5 Korea

Foreign and Commonwealth

Office