Russia: Tsarism to Stalinism

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FCO HISTORICAL OCCASIONAL

BRANCH PAPERS

No. 6 Russia: Tsarism to Stalinism

Office Foreignand Commonwealth

Alay 1993

FOREWORD

Branch, in conjunction During the autumn of 1992 the FCO's Historical Training Department, lectures From organised a of series six entitled with Empire to Commonwealth: Russia and its neighbours. The lectures, which were for new entrants to the Diplomatic Service, concentrated intended primarily imperial Russia, the territorial economic growth and upon expansion of and Soviet Four the emergence, the and collapse of consolidation system. of them, those dealing with the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, Occasional in issue Papers. this are published of Each of these essays deals with a significant in development the of stage Russia.

David Gillard surveys the steady extension of Russia's land modern frontiers during the last century, and Maureen Perrie considers the pace of Russia's industrialisation its influence Russian and upon society and the leading 1917.

Economic factors figure large to the revolution events of also in Stephen White's Bolshevik diplomacy examination of early and the Soviet triumph of state interest over revolutionary in Russia's ardour pursuit its Finally, Jonathan of recognition and accommodations with neighbours.

Haslam Stalin's initial delegation to the way in which points of flowed from in responsibilities and sustained an ambivalence the making and conduct of pre-war Soviet foreign policy.

Historical Branch is grateful to all those who participated in this useful and timely lecture series and I would like to thank contributors for making their for available papers publication.

Keith Hamilton Historical Branch Library and Records Department May 1993

Office

Foreign & Commonwealth

BRANCH

HISTORICAL Occasional

Papers

May 1993

No. 6 CONTENTS

Lectures in the series From Empire to Commonwealth.Russia and its Neighboursdelivered at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, October December 1992 page Empire Nationalities: and Century Russia Dr David Guard The Economics 1860-1917 Russia,

of

The

Empire:

Expansion

The

19th of

Industrialisation

1-10

of

11-24

Soviet the of

25-33

Maureen Perrie, MA Revolution, Civil War and the Emergence Union, 1917-1924 Professor Stephen White Communism, Stalinism Dr Jonathan Haslam

West, the and

1924-1953

Note on Contributors DBPO: Volumes

34-38

39

published

in and preparation

Copies of this pamphlet will be deposited with the National libraries FCO Historical Branch, Library and Records Department,

Clive House, Petty France, London SW1H 9HD Crown ISBN

0

Copyright 903359

44

8

40

EMPIRE

AND NATIONALITIES: 19TH CENTURY

THE EXPANSION RUSSIA

OF

David Gillard

If the new freedom of access to Russian archives lasts, it will be possible to Russian empiretest more rigorously the various provisional explanations of building, which have so far been put forward on the basis of material much As `imperialism' interpreting limited for than that available elsewhere. more have initially knowledge doubtless the effect of complicating usual, new will be Russia it issues, but in some the case of may rather than simplifying the is before Reinterpreting the time these complexities 2oth century emerge. likely to seem the more urgent task, especially among native scholars. It has Congress been reported by Dr Robert McKean that at the 19go Harrogate for Soviet and East European Studies, where almost a thousand papers I, Nicholas I Alexander were presented, none related to the reigns of and Moreover, II. half Alexander dealt and only one and a papers with that of Soviet Union former hundred from delegates the none of the nearly three presented a paper on any aspect of the period 1801-1917 or even attended devoted for it.

This is, the to any of sessions suspending of course, no reason the business of interpreting the very considerable body of knowledge that we have.

It is historians already that sometimes proceed said cannot because hypotheses by be their scientifically tested about the past cannot in found Yet be do, in fact, prediction and experiment. we predict what will be basis know, to the examined archives still on of what we already and at least pretend to hope that we will be proved excitingly wrong.

Here is one provisional explanation as to why Russians extended their frontiers of territory and influence to control so many non-Russian peoples during the i 9th century. It can be presented in terms of the usual three basic historical questions: What happened? Why did it happen? What does it I (The third matter? question should, suppose, read `does it matter? ', but, be I to that since a negative answer professionally would prefer unthinkable, to leave it in its more tendentious form. ) First, what happened? Russian expansion in the 19th century continued a had been for Russians had begun that process going on many centuries. building their great land empire in Europe and Asia at much the same time Spaniards, Portuguese, British Dutch, French had begun building the as and their great overseas empires. Most of that Russian empire, which suffered its first disintegration in the second decade of the Both century and which has broken had brought into been being before the igth now up once more, began.

The century 19th-century additions nevertheless substantially changed the character of the empire by bringing far more peoples of quite different languages and culture under tsarist rule.

frontiers European Russia's Asia. in The additions were almost entirely been had There in had been in indeed, 1815. the 1914 as they same were, been had but intervening in temporary nature they of a the years, changes Russian Bessarabia. delta Danube armies and southern the to confined and had but in Ottoman Empire by defeating delta Danube the 1829, the won Crimean War, in defeat it the along with the to return after their own in Russia had Bessarabia districts 1812. annexed which of three southern Bessarabia Russia, however, as part of the general regained southern in its following 1878. territorial settlement victory over the sultan's armies Russia's more durable territorial gains in these years were in Transcaucasia, Russia Georgia in its With Asia.

Asia i8oi annexation of and east central barrier, and by had advanced decisively across the Caucasus mountain defeating the shah's forces in 1828 had created its present frontier with Persia. Control over the eastern shores of the Black Sea was consolidated Ottoman in by the sultan 1829 and 1878. victories over and extended in the Conquest of the whole Caucasus region had involved incorporation Christian Georgians like the peoples, some and empire of numerous Armenians, some Muslim like the Chechens and the Circassians, some a Reaction Russian both like Abkhazians. but the to rule varied, mixture of Daghestan Chechens the the peoples of and were among those who offered during fierce and protracted resistance much of the 19th century.

Nevertheless, Transcaucasia base from constituted a great military which Russia might expand its power in various directions.

The area most Caspian Sea into Asia, to the across such expansion was vulnerable central to the north of which Russian forces had been slowly advancing ever since Mongol power had declined and disintegrated. During the first half of the finally Russia had brought Kazakh the century nomadic peoples of the steppe region under their control, making possible the establishment of from bases Uzbek khanates to threaten the predominantly military which of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva, which ruled the sedentary populations of central Asia. Their conquest was completed between 1864 and 1876, and between that of the Turkmen peoples of the region 1881 and 1885. This brought Russia's frontier east of the Caspian as far as areas claimed by the Afghanistan, by British Persia buffer the rulers of and seen as states to their Indian empire. For that reason, in 1885 a war with Britain was only Through Russia now annexation narrowly averted. or protectorates Muslims controlled most of the of central Asia, whether Turkic like those Persian like already mentioned or the Tadzhiks. Extensive colonisation by Russian settlers followed.

Russia made comparably swift and dramatic between Asia in advances east 86o.

After an early push to the Pacific in the j 6th and 17th 1850 and i centuries, Russia's relations with the Chinese Empire had been defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1688, and until the middle of the 19th century tsarist power in that part of the world remained too slight to force any improvement In its intruded terms. on the 185o an energetic man on spot

2

Nikolaevsk China by Nerchinsk as a and set up reserved to onto territory be That base near the Amur this was move would exploited estuary.

Kamchatka incident by the on coast of a minor and unspectacular ensured War and by the war against China by Britain during the Crimean and from France between 1856 and i86o. Skilful diplomacy a stricken won in 86o, Treaty Peking China the substantial territorial i of accessions of the base Vladivostock. by of the establishment of the great naval crowned led Subsequent work between 1861 and 1866 by boundary to commissions disputes which are still unresolved. Russia was also able to exploit Japan's Russian In expedition was sent to 1853 a sense of vulnerability at this time.

Sakhalin where there were already Japanese settlers. In 1855 an agreement This Kuriles.

Sakhalin Japan the was to share and was reached with Russia by by St. in Treaty Petersburg got the the 1875 which amended of later Russia's Sakhalin Kuriles.

Japan expansion whole of and all of the China's in leases through the medium of railway rights and territorial its Manchurian between attempts to province 1896 and 1898 together with its Korea in by Japan however, largely control war against were, reversed Russia in 1904-05, after which Russia lost half of Sakhalin as well.

These were substantial acquisitions of people and territory, but the 19th century also saw a scaling-down of Russian power in two areas, the Mediterranean and North America.

During the turbulent both Russia, for years around 18oo once of as an ally Ottoman Empire Britain, had briefly become a Mediterranean the and Russian A had fought power. squadron the French there and occupied the Ionian Islands and the Adriatic France Cattaro, by port of recently taken from Venice and Austria respectively.

They also tried to get control of Malta when, after its occupation by France in 1798, the Knights of St. John invited Tsar Paul to be their Grand Master, but the British forestalled them Malta in in By Treaty however, Tilsit, themselves took and the 18oo. of Russia handed back the Ionian Islands and Cattaro to France, and did 1807 Vienna them the not regain at settlement.

Russian control of territory in North America had originated in discoveries

by Bering, a Danish navigator in Russian service, in the middle of the 18th finding His century. of the strait that still bears his name and of the Aleutian, Diomede Komandorski islands was followed

by Russian and islands, in Russian-American the conquest and settlement of the while 1799 Company set out to extend Russian territory and trade As the on continent.

Alaska islands, well as occupying and the a colony was established between California. in Company, The however, deteriorated 1812 and 1841 footholds became increasingly by the commercially and to vulnerable attack Britain and the United States. The California base was sold in 1841, while Alaska and many of the islands were sold to the USA in 1867.

3

in the rgth Such was the shape of Russian expansion and contraction fact The form. it is the that The that took why second question century. principalities and the empires weak the of expense at aggrandisement was local lost had Russia in Asia areas where was of while the contraction it was a matter of military advantage to major powers may suggest that did Foreign that to arguing close come often observers simple opportunism.

Russian expansion had been so persistent over so many centuries that they force habit wherever there was an of continued to expand simply through been has, That do said of every other to of course, also so. opportunity does it because is It not explain rarely an adequate explanation empire. in because `need' to expand the any why there was aggrandisement at all; dispute direction among policy-makers; was normally a matter of particular in because any case, spasmodic rather than continuous. expansion was, and Russian leaders did not always seize an opportunity to expand their in did leaders imperial Neither the 19th the territory. powers of the other century.

In considering why certain opportunities were exploited there is no need to debate about the make more than a passing reference to the persistent I discussion between `imperialism'. term mediaeval once attended a historians about `feudalism' and found that their controversy had developed how lines.

In to a each case common consent as along remarkably similar familiar word should be used is no longer possible so that disputes about the historical interpretation be of new evidence can more clearly conducted it.

Neither `expansion' `empire' the the without word nor even present word I I here that such problem. need taking the view that any merely say am in loose the empire sense of stronger political units seeking to absorb or in for has been least control some way weaker political units going on at five thousand years and is still going on. Studying particular examples like Russia may someday help to answer the extremely difficult question as to be this so. should why There are at least two ways of analysing any state's expansion. First, there German is what historische researchers quite reasonably call Sozialwissenschaft, though it is a method also used by British historians who feel being historical might at classed as uneasy social scientists. This is historical It to primarily a circumstantial approach explanation. assumes that frontiers less formal frontiers territorial the expansion or of of of predominance can be explained by social, economic and political conditions both in the expanding state and in its victim. An advanced capitalist society in because it is will expand a predictable way an advanced capitalist society, regardless of which individuals happen to control it or of what opinions they hold as to how their power should be exercised. There is nothing surprising, headed by Gladstone have been therefore, that a government should for Egypt.

The trouble with this approach is responsible seizing control of historical investigation that detailed of particular episodes tends to its Dietrich Geyer, is broadly in undermine many of assumptions. who

4

in has, his interaction the shown study of the approach, of sympathy with Russian domestic and foreign policy between 186o and 1914, that policyfact, did in decision-makers not, make their policies or take makers and by the theory.

For example, their decisions for the reasons predicted Russian behaviour at the top in 1904 or 1914 cannot be explained simply in internal hostility diverting terms of `social imperialism', to an external of in future it insists He but the that accepts should take a enemy. approach less simplistic and dogmatic form.

An alternative approach is to look at the problem the other way round.

Most diplomatic and international historians have tended to concentrate on the relatively small number of individuals involved in the making and execution of policy abroad, examining the various ways in which they interpreted the circumstances and how one interpretation would make a particular course of action psychologically more obvious than others which were, physically speaking, available. This is the approach I prefer, doubtless for personal reasons of disliking the idea that we are all prisoners of An Russian in circumstances. explanation of these terms would expansion concentrate not on some present consensus among historians as to what were the political, social and economic realities of Russia at the time, but on which of the many ways, then current, of construing the international situation were preferred by Russian policy-makers when discussing the further advisability of expansion.

This

is facilitated

in the case of Russia by the dominant position approach of the emperor in matters of foreign policy, at least until the 18gos. Not only foreign by was policy essentially made the emperor personally along with a few advisers, but the total number of people involved for the whole century There five between was very small. were emperors 18oi and the end of the field in century, while only three ministers acted as principal this advisers between 1812 and 1895, namely Nesselrode, Gorchakov Giers.

Finance and and war ministers also tended to serve for long periods. There was, not inevitably but not surprisingly, a good deal of continuity in the interpretation international including of politics, questions of expansion, and, as I see it, only two major changes of viewpoint, around 1855 and around 18go, took between place 1815 and 1914.

The essence of foreign policy for Alexander I after 1815 for I Nicholas and throughout his reign was preserving the stability of regimes and of frontiers in Europe so as to avert or control revolutionary Their outbreaks. predecessors in the 18th century had construed Russian interests very differently, involving themselves frequently in European in the wars and, Catherine II, in case of the destruction of Poland's regime and participating frontiers. The new Russian policy arose from the ways in Alexander which i Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic Foreign Policy, 1860-1914 and (Leamington Spa, 1987).

5

Wars dangers interpret Nicholas arising confronted. each the to came and had led to the invasion of Russia and the from the French Revolution had France from ideas in Moscow 1812, while revolutionary capture of intellectuals the nobility, most among to many proved acceptable I Nicholas dangerously among army officers who came near to overthrowing favour Both in his tsars came to 1825. accession to the throne at the time of in fellow and resolving anticipating sovereigns close co-operation with their international disputes, which might otherwise weaken a united monarchical front against social and political disorder. being With European stability and monarchical given the co-operation highest priority, expansion in Asia and the Near East took second place, but in Expansion in Asia it did the and especially this slackened. not mean that Near East had for centuries been taken for granted as a desirable course of Mongol The Russians. by Russian by all other rulers and probably all action Mongol Moscow, the the and the retreat of power, of rise conquest, had Mongols Russian control over the areas to which the extension of incomplete long historical been had process of which a and still retreated Russians generally were deeply conscious. There was likewise general it become displacing the the goal, should ever realisable, of agreement as to Straits.

Russia's Ottoman sultans from Constantinople manifest and the destiny in Asia and the Near East was assumed by all, though there were different views as to how far it must be left to diplomacy to cope with China indigenous like intruders Persia, states, and and powerful substantial like the British. Neither tsar could have been easily persuaded that a policy in Asia Near East incompatible the and of expansion with a policy of was Rather in Europe. it Russian by stability was assumed policy-makers that a for European facilitate concern stability a spirit of common would for deals be favourable Russian to and a readiness compromise which could Ottoman in, Empire. the say, aspirations This assumption about the world of international initially politics seemed to Disputes its European Greece, the reality. among square with powers over Egypt and the whole future of the Ottoman Empire were resolved down to diplomacy, by involving Austria, and i85o a mixture of war co-operation with deals with the British and the isolation of France. Expansion continued, European in Caucasus the challenge, without at the expense of the Ottoman Persia, in and the lands of the Kazakhs whose empire and by When foreign the middle of the century. conquest was completed dangerously interpreted in reaction was as the cases of the strong, as Russian threat to Constantinople in 1829, of the defensive alliance arranged Porte in for Persia's bid to capture Herat in the and with 1833, of support Russian For forty Russian 1838, quietly were plans modified. nearly years leaders saw no reason to reconstrue the basic international situation.

A fundamental international follows review of affairs often bewildering events not anticipated by the prevailing constructs,

6

a series of especially if

this coincides with the emergence of new leaders ready to seize on any interpretation alternative of events which seems to make more sense of Russian in them. This happened in the i 85os and inaugurated a new phase expansion.

A crisis over the Ottoman Empire, initiated by Napoleon III in 1852, was by diplomatic during accompanied 1853 on the part of all the miscalculations involved its in the successful exploitation powers and reached climax of Ottoman by Empire's leaders. They rejected a diplomatic these errors the Russia by declared the powers and solution worked out war on under in French British the and governments circumstances which over-committed Russia's defeat in them. the subsequent war could could scarcely abandon be reasonably pictured as a temporary setback by diplomatic St. in advisers Petersburg and by historians in retrospect, but to Alexander II, who had in it humiliation throne to the come 1855, was a which made nonsense of The impact be traditionally the tsar's thinking policies pursued. on may by features imaginary British defeat considering an understood with similar to those of the Crimean War. It would have involved enemy forces landing on the south coast, the siege and capture of Plymouth, and the imposition of denied Britain bases its treaty the to a peace which right naval on southern fleet in Channel.

The future Salisbury, Lord to the coast or a at that time MP, had for in Commons a young the that the valid grounds arguing demilitarisation Black Sea be intolerable Great Power the of to a would so like Russia that it would be unsustainable in the long run.

Apart

from

by Alexander II his a massive reform programme which and Russia be better equipped for to tried government thereby, modernise and, future conflict, Russian leaders came to see international in politics a way long by its belligerent to that closer urged some of more officials and Britain Russia's dangerous soldiers. now seen was as most enemy, presenting both threat to the empire's security in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, a in and to its prospects of expanded trade, influence territory the and Ottoman Empire, Persia, Central Asia and the Far East. Disputes in Europe were no longer seen primarily as undermining monarchical solidarity in face of the kind of general revolutionary threat which had resurfaced in had been 1848-49, especially since help to the Habsburgs that time at by War. The foreign their hostility to Russia during the Crimean repaid from policy which emerged this overall reconstruing of international politics took three principal forms. First, conflicts within Europe were exploited in isolate such a way as to try to restore Russia's diplomatic to position, Britain and eventually to get rid of those clauses of the Treaty of Paris had demilitarised which the Black Sea. Secondly, expansion in Central Asia first was accelerated, at tentatively by diplomatic means, then with growing confidence by war, so as to forestall British penetration there and to be in a position to threaten India in any future crisis over the Near East. Thirdly, invasions China prompt advantage was taken of the Franco-British of

7

between 1856 and i86o to consolidate East.

Russian in Far the power and extend

in terms of this revised viewpoint proved successful enough to its leaders.

As Russian in its territorial the minds of well as reinforce validity Sea Black Russia Central East Asia, in to the end was able and expansion Austria-Hungary by Germany itself the early and with restrictions and to ally Ottoman Empire international When arose out of a crisis over the i87os. an Russia in in Bosnia-Herzegovina was this time able to go to 1875-76, revolt it by imposing The diplomatic from tsar then overdid position. a strong war Britain drastic that treaty the sultan on was able to secure the a peace so Germany in bringing Russia's Austria-Hungary, and allies, co-operation of Russia in Nevertheless, had its made substantial gains 1878. about revision Germany Austria-Hungary and was revived with and the alliance with in detailed discomfiture Britain's in 1881. commitments clearer and more Central Asia continued as Russian forces at last reached the Afghan border in 1885. When Russian and Afghan troops clashed, the British prepared for local inferiority lack their their military and of war, uneasily aware of of for They formula in Europe. diplomatic to settle were glad a allies and Russians frontier delimitation, the as continued the consolidation of their new empire through a network of strategic railways which, the British feared, might one day be the means of extending it still farther.

Acting

Yet events in Europe between 1885 and i8go made it increasingly difficult for the foreign minister Giers to defend the prevailing viewpoint against different interpretation Further in those who placed a them. upon upheaval the Balkans, this time in Bulgaria, brought about yet another breakdown in Austria-Hungary, British the relations with which gave again an opportunity in Near East. The ambivalent to mobilise an anti-Russian the grouping by Bismarck attitude of some as grounds for abandoning reliance was seen Central links Powers the altogether on with and opting either for a free hand, in the manner of the British themselves, or for an alliance with France. Giers was able to sustain his policy by a separate alliance with Germany in 188-, but, after Bismarck's fall from power in 18go, the German it to government refused renew while at the same time making a dramatic British.

The the colonial settlement with current tsar, Alexander III, agreed Germany those with as now the main threat to Russia. During the who saw 8gos be the overall international in early i situation came to reconstrued had implications for Russian in Asia ways which major expansion as well as for the question of Russian security in Europe.

The

into took new viewpoint account the awkward fact that, despite the Crimean defeat, Russia military and other reforms undertaken the since fight This explained could still not two major powers simultaneously.

Russia's need to back down in 1878 and between 1885 and 1887- Yet Britain and Austria-Hungary both implacable were seen as opponents of Russia, and likely to act together in the Near East, in last the while resort

8

The Russia. back Austria-Hungary Germany rather than would always had from interpretation international this policy which gradually emerged Minister Finance First, features. the three main under the guidance of for basis Witte, there was a drive for rapid industrialisation economic as a Germany Britain. that to and of counter power on a scale and military Secondly, this was to be facilitated by a policy of informal empire in Asia into China least Korea bring Persia, substantial parts of and at which would it disagreement There Russian to was as whether the was economic orbit.

France Thirdly, during this process. an alliance with essential to avoid war Germany between i8gi and 1894 which served to contain was negotiated in its finance Russia's industrialisation both economic empire and and to Asia. international Once more, a revision of Russian thinking politics about be had brought impressive to gains, though once more some of them in humiliatingly disgorged when Russian leaders overreached themselves, in dealing with Japan, by diplomatic of those reminiscent miscalculations by followed however, Defeat in a 1853 and 1878. were and revolution 1905, basic The in by tactics rather than radical change new strategic thinking. industrialisation, informal in Asia policy of and the alliance with empire France remained, Japan but deals with former enemies Britain to and least the secure exclusive zones of predominance temporarily, replaced, at belligerence This unsuccessful of the recent past. seemed to work well, at for Russia, over the next few years, but the most important any rate test of interpretation in it the any was whether made sufficient sense of events Near East to show how Russian control might be extended No there. had passed this test in the long run, and it was essentially a reconstruing failure in this region which had led to both the major revisions. sense of Developments between 19o8 and 1914 suggested that Nicholas II and his had been even less successful than their predecessors in discerning advisers realities there. Their failure involved them in catastrophic events, including disintegration in Asia, had the temporary the empire of whose expansion been the most remarkable achievement of tsarist international in the policy 19th century.

The

Russian direction in the 19th century pace, timing and of expansion determined by therefore, the personal constructs through were, arguably interpreted international tsars their the which particular chosen advisers and found That in like they themselves. the empire's setting setting was, which its the conditions own current social and economic and state of armed forces, always open to numerous interpretations degrees of of varying interests indeed, European the the tsar's earlier view of validity; requiring front for stability and a common against revolution was perhaps more valid the later 19th century, when the revolutionary movement was so much for Alexander I Nicholas I. Different the than stronger, reigns of and in have in light, in which command that seen matters might personalities Russian have expansion probably case would proceeded more slowly and

9

in other countries, cautiously, and, even assuming the same policy-makers for both drastic less conquerors and conquered. consequences with probably have Alternatively, bolder precipitated earlier and men with visions might greater conflicts.

What does Russian expansion in the form it did take in the 19th century for being, disintegrated? has, least time the at matter now that the empire There is as yet no very satisfactory answer. It matters to the historian as important one example of that seemingly universal tendency to aggression It touchy. and arrogance about which we are all so understandably mattered, and still matters, to those conquered peoples who were exposed to the notoriously destabilising effects of rapid change, in the case of Russia, less than with the empires of Western states, the kind of change known no The in both as modernisation. the tsarist and soviet spread, unintentional ideas, if liberalism, democracy, the periods, of nothing more, of nationalism, to mainly Islamic peoples, along with socialism and scientific enquiry forms technology, manifestly superior weaponry and of organisation are still having consequences which it is much too early to predict or assess.

10

OF EMPIRE: OF RUSSIA, 1860-1917

THE ECONOMICS THE INDUSTRIALISATION Maureen

Perrie

been Russia has late industrialisation Discussion of the tsarist always of the causes of the inseparable from broader historical questions concerning development, by-product Was of economic a revolution 1917. of revolution its including the industrialisation political, origins primarily process or were in but domestic Russian in the based not only also the situation development Russian Had in led international to war 1914? system that between in the of war outbreak and the the revolution 1905 years stabilised itself the of overthrow of cause the the that principal war was in 1914, so late in tsarism so profound tsarism 1917 or were the structural problems of highly that renewed revolutionary probably even without war? unrest was This essay, while focussing on Russian industrialisation, will attempt to place it in the context of these broader debates. The literature that I shall review few last in but British historiography; American the comprises mainly and in Russia, in issues have been discussed the these where, years also widely from the transition context of current state socialism towards a market industrial economy, the question of the viability of capitalism under tsarism has acquired a new topicality and relevance. late The starting point for any discussion of the industrialisation tsarist of Russia has to be the work of Alexander Gerschenkron, the American have in historian the set the economic ig6os, whose studies, published led ' has for More however, agenda recent research, all subsequent analyses.

I Here to some modifications and revisions of Gerschenkron's propose views. firstly to summarise Gerschenkron's interpretation, indicate the then to and in been his have According to to areas subject criticism. which views Gerschenkron, institution barrier to the the chief of serfdom constituted industrialisation in Russia in the first half of the 19th century. Defeat in the Crimean War highlighted Russia's economic backwardness in general, and I A. Gerschenkron. `Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic Development' in C. E. Black (cd), The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change since 1861 (Cambridge, Mass., cg6o), pp. 42-72. This important article has been reprinted in M. Cherniavsky (ed), The Structureof Russian History: InterpretiveEssays(New York, 1970), pp. 282308 (page references in the present article are to this collection). A version entitled `Russia: Patterns of Ecor "nic Development, 1861- i 958' appears in A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardnessin Historical Perspective:a Book of Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 119-51.

See also A. Gerschenkron, `Agrarian Policies and Industrialization, Russia 1861-1917' in The CambridgeEconomicHistory of Europe,Vol. VI, Part II (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 7o6-8oo.

11

Nevertheless, in deficiencies particular. the of the system of transportation Gerschenkron's in in Serfs Emancipation view, 1861 was not, the of the desire by on the part of the government to promote a primarily motivated features And indeed there were a number industrialisation. of the of The industrial hamper Emancipation growth. settlement that served to inadequacy of the allotments received by the peasants, together with the for land, high redemption their payments that they were required to pay limited their purchasing power. The economic inefficiency of the commune land, its to peasant of also contributed regular redistribution system, with for domestic development impeded the of a consumer market poverty and industrial goods. In addition, the retention of the peasant commune, with for taxes and redemption payments, served to collective responsibility from features These labour countryside to towns. of restrict the mobility of Gerschenkron's in Emancipation the assessment, were the main settlement, Russia industrial in in there spurt of growth was no significant reason why 2 first the thirty years after the abolition of serfdom. development occurred, however, in the i 8gos, largely as a in The tsarist government, government policy. result of a change which best indifferent been industrial had towards at earlier growth, now positively favoured it. Considerations of national defence played a major part in this Congress Berlin, After focus Russian foreign the the of new policy. of policy from Balkans Far East, but implications to the the the shifted military of developments in Central Europe dictated the need for economic and The industrial funded growth. particularly government railway-building on a large scale, and channelled investment into the production of iron and steel, Russia import to the most advanced Western was able and of machinery. for labour. Modern technology thereby to technology, and substitute capital in its turn favoured the large-scale enterprises that came to characterise 3 The industrialisation industry. largely these sectors of programme was financed by the taxation of the peasantry: peasant consumption of industrial industrial development took place largely at the goods was curtailed; and All the of this meant, expense of rural population. according to Gerschenkron, budgetary that `the government's policy was effectively for deficiency internal { the an substituted of market'.

Rapid

industrial

The spurt of the i8gos, when the annual rate of industrial growth averaged 8%, came to an end with the depression of igoo. A number of factors contributed to the onset of the depression, which has been variously 2 Gerschenkron, `Problems and Patterau', pp. 282-6,; Gcrsc} 706-633 Gerschenkron, `Problems and Patterns', pp. 228-94 Ibid., p. 287.

12 ,

kroยบn, `Agrarian Pa"n',

pp.

interpreted

financial the consequence of of a a crisis crash, In international to or a response overproduction, circumstances. however, Gerschenkron's `the view, exhaustion of the tax-paying powers of followed, Sporadic the rural population' played a major part. peasant unrest beginning full-scale into the the of century, rural and expanded at a in background broke the of 1905, when revolution rebellion out against 5 Russia's Japan. war with as

unsuccessful

Rapid industrial growth resumed after 1905, although the rate of increase, at 6% per annum, was somewhat below that of the i 8gos. In Gerschenkron's however, difference between there the growth period was a significant view, State investment less that the of 18gos. of 1906-i4 and of a played much Stolypin's But the effects of expenditure role, as government was cut. industrial to of 19o6 made a major agrarian reforms contribution These reforms, which encouraged development. the peasants to leave the holdings into land, their commune and consolidate a single enclosed plot of designed industrialisation, but had to they were not primarily promote a Some the process. positive effect on peasants took advantage of the reforms to sell their land and move to the towns, thereby enhancing the mobility of labour. Others set up independent farms that were more productive than holdings, improved in thus to an communal the and contributed prosperity These developments, Gerschenkron formed countryside. a contended, Russian `westernisation' in last the the significant part of the of economy feature Another pre-war years. of this process was the increased role played by the banks in the financing of industrialisation.

They took over from the for internal state as substitutes an autonomous market, and their new found in prominence marked a change in the pattern of substitution, that to less backward countries such as Germany.

And at the same time as the domestic mode of substitution was changing, a market was gradually 6 in this period. emerging Russia

on the eve of the war was still, in Gerschenkron's a estimation, backward The relatively country. overall industrial structure remained similar to that of the 18gos: iron, steel and machinery were expanding most large-scale feature. rapidly, and enterprises were still a characteristic Compared with Germany, the relative weight of the agrarian sector of the larger in Russia, and per capita output But lower. economy was was much Russia's degree of backwardness diminishing, institutional was and no

5 Ibid.,

p. 291.

6 Ibid., pp. 292-5.

13

barriers remained development.?

to

the

further

westernisation

of

her

economic

distinct into divides three subthe period 186o-i9l4 therefore, 86o-go The its slow i witnessed years characteristics. own periods, each with features by impeded industrialisation of the retarding with economic growth, industrial decade The of the 18gos saw rapid settlement. the Emancipation by followed but by largely sponsored development, an this was the state, in depression the the of over-taxation which revolution and a economic in Finally, important the the of igo6-14 weakening part. an peasantry played in intervention the economy the of state reduction and peasant commune led to further industrial growth in the context of a general westernisation of the economy.

Gerschenkron,

has however, Subsequent the of questioned validity research, The interpretations Gerschenkron's most of each of these sub-periods.

British has been by Gerschenkron's the provided views effective critique of 8 Olga Crisp.

Russian history, economic specialist on pre-revolutionary In contrast to Gerschenkron's emphasis on the `inducing' role that the state Great, Peter had played in Russian industrialisation the since the reign of forces Crisp draws attention to the role of `autonomous' - private forces Russian in to market responding economic entrepreneurship Crisp, from the i 8th century According development to onwards. degree in `autonomous' Gerschenkron the the of growth underestimated Russian economy in general, and in industry in particular, both before and Serfs.

Emancipation Serfdom in immediately the the of practice after institutional barrier less industrial to than of an growth constituted in the second quarter of the 19th century, for implied: Gerschenkron industry developed industry both the the cotton and sugar example, Gerschenkron the environment of serfdom. also within successfully Emancipation to the the extent which provisions of the exaggerated institutional to provide continued constraints on economic settlement did The impede labour the of commune retention not significantly growth.

There is factory labour: on the evidence of a shortage of no mobility. hidden in Nor there contrary, widespread was the towns. unemployment dues burdensome depress so were redemption as to peasant purchasing degree.

The Emancipation did stimulate economic to power any significant did if industry growth; and not grow more rapidly before i 8go, this was a backwardness Russian its the reflection of the general of economy, with ' Ibid., pp. 295-6.

8 0. Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation of Economy before 1914 (London, 1976), PP. 5-54

in Russia, 1700-1914' in her Studies in the Russian

14

Railwayfinancial infrastructure. network and weak poor communications Emancipation building, in Crisp's view, played a more important than role both The development. in encouraging a railways stimulated economic domestic and an external market for grain, and created a demand for iron, 9 steel and coal. importance Gerschenkron's the economic of government views concerning 8gos industrialisation for the the rapid are generally accepted, and of i policy Ministers by Finance detailed have the policies pursued many scholars (1887-92) and Witte (1892-1903). High tariffs protected the Vyshnegradskii including industries; Russian the the of stabilisation policy, monetary nascent foreign (in 1897) attracted rouble and the adoption of the gold standard investment; and government support for major projects such as the building iron Trans-Siberian the and expansion of coal, railway stimulated of the 10 steel production. importance But although Gerschenkron's the of the role of the views on 8gos industrialisation in the are generally accepted, some of the i state Olga Crisp his insist to overall picture. on modifications scholars would Vyshnegradskii Witte far how the and a constituted policies of questions for development, economic and she argues plan coherent and premeditated have industrialisation been to some extent that the promotion may of designed fiscal by-product to achieve narrower of policies and merely a financial goals. I l Arcadius Kahan, by contrast, while accepting that the main in industrialisation, has this to period was promote aim of government policy intervention have been beneficial. that suggested may not state entirely Some policies, such as tariff policy, he argues, were counter-productive, and budget the much of state was spent on unproductive areas such as the bureaucracy and the military. 12 More significantly for Gerschenkron's however, Olga Crisp has thesis, overall financing burden industrialisation the questioned of whether was borne From by increased 88os the the overwhelmingly peasantry. i an budget from indirect taxation, the proportion of government's revenue came 9 Ibid., On the supply of peasant labour to industry, see also 0. Crisp, `Labour and pp. 12-22.

Industrialization in Russia', in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. VII, Part 2 (Cambridge, 1978),pp. 3o8-4i510 T. H. Von Laue, Sergei Wine Industrialization the and of Russia (New York, 1963); M. E. Falkus, The Industrialisation of Russia, 1700-1914 (London, 1972), pp. 61-74; Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation', of pp. 22-32.

11 Ibid., pp. 22-3212 A. Kahan, `Government Policies Industrialization Russia', in Russian his the and of EconomicHistory: tlu Nvutunlh Century (Chicago, 1989) PP. 91-107.

15

levied on commodities such as sugar, kerosene, matches, tobacco and vodka.

Such commodities, Crisp argues, were consumed only sporadically by the for the urban population. of necessity they articles were peasants, whereas heavier borne have The townspeople, a proportionately therefore, may 13 More did burden generally, recent the peasants. than share of the tax in have standards were questioned whether peasant consumption scholars fact depressed at the end of the 19th century. Paul Gregory has shown that increased between 1883 and IgoI agricultural at an annual rate of output by force increased labour only I. 10/o, and 2.55%, while the agricultural is `little 14 Gregory by that there concludes i . 45%. output per worker Russian [Gerschenkron's] peasant assertion that the evidence to support '' depressed living It in for industrialization terms of a standard'. paid heavy follows, therefore, that Gerschenkron's taxation of the argument that in industrialisation finance in the 18gos was a major order to peasantry but depression industrial of igoo also of the peasant cause not only of the has it been be indeed sustained: and unrest of 1902-3 and 1905-7 cannot 16 follows, historians.

It by too, that the commune some explicitly rejected impact have had on peasant output as such a retarding system may not forward has been by Gerschenkron this too, put argument, assumed: and 17 recent scholars. he difference between that the the assert overstates Crisp the that t8gos and of of 1go6-14. concedes that the years after 1905 witnessed a coalescence of the streams of `autonomous' But development. hand, `induced' the on one as she notes, autonomous and (i. e. market-led) industrial growth had been significant even in the 18gos, and food-processing largest late industries in textiles the and as were still as 1914 18 force. labour On the terms of the value of their output and share of the in hand, the the the economy remained strong after 1905. state other role of State Crisp draws attention Bank in to the investment the of the 19 in Gatrell Peter 1911; construction of grain elevators and notes that in 1908-13 played a major part in the government expenditure on armaments

Gerschenkron's critics industrial development

13 Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation', of pp. 27-8.

14 P.R. Gregory, RussianNational Income, 1885-1913(Cambridge, 1982) pp. 130-36,148-9,19315 Ibid., S. See G. Wheatcroft, `Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in p. 148. also Late Imperial Russia' in E. Kingston-Mann and T. Mixter (eds), PeasantEconomy,Culture, and Politics of EuropeanRussia, 18oo-1921(Princeton, igg1), pp. 128-7216 Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation', of p. 32; Wheatcroft, `Crises', pp. 166-72.

17 R. Bideleux, `Agricultural Advance under the Russian Village Commune System' in R. Bartlett (ed), Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia (London, i 9go) pp. 196-218.

18 Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation', of pp. 34-5.

19 Ibid., p. 34.

16

20 Crisp Gerschenkron's industrial assertion also questions revival. pre-war in banks in financing industrialisation increased the that an role of the of diminution the the of 18gos was a sympton of 19o6-i4 compared with backwardness in the latter period. After 1905, Crisp argues, the banks acted `more as a channel for government inducement than an independent agent' 21 fact in had in to they the the 18gos. one similar was played which role -a from Russian industrialisation has that the picture of recent emerged in Gerschenkron by is the rather more complex than that painted studies Gerschenkron it In the role of oversimplified seems that particular, ig6os. development development `induced' `autonomous' co-existed with the state: did the the throughout after 1905 and state not withdraw period i86o-igi4, Gerschenkron implied. that to the extent

Thus

Russia is general agreement with Gerschenkron's assessment that War. backward First In World the 1861, on the eve of was still relatively United fifth in largest Russian the world, after the the economy was the had Russia France.

By States, Germany, the United Kingdom and 1913, Russia fourth But basis, France, to occupy place. on a per capita overtaken lagged far behind the major European countries, with national income per in 1913 about 40% that of France, head of population 30% that of Germany, United Kingdom United the 20% that of and i o% that of the States. In all cases this marked a deterioration from the situation in 1861, the gap having widened most noticeably in the comparisons with Germany 22 States United In (Table the terms of the overall structure of the and 1). dominant the remained economy, agriculture sector, constituting 51% of income in industry, In national 1909-13.23 consumer goods such as textiles food industries, and processing still predominated, although capital goods such as mining, metallurgy and metal-working, were expanding most rapidly 24 increasing But is their relative and there share. although a general Russian backward in immature that the consensus economy was still and in it its development that, terms 1914, seems of structural change, pattern of from dissimilar industrialising As in too that the was not of other countries.

There

20 P. Gatrell,

`Industrial Expansion in Tsarist Russia, 1908-14', in Economic History Review, 2nd series, Vol. 35, No. i, Feb. 1982, pp. 99-110.

21 Crisp, `The Pattern in the of Industrialisation', p. 34. See also her `Banking Industrialisation of Tsarist Russia, 1860-1914' in her Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914, pp. 111-58-

22 Gregory, RussianNational Income, pp. i }.-8,19423 Ibid., pp. 132-3-

24 Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation', of pp. 34-6.

17

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industries goods consumer that earlier, economies 25 income Per first, developed then metals and machine construction. capita in but it industrial in lower rapidly rising than societies, was other much was in the period immediately both the towns and the countryside preceding Russian in important Foreign 1.26 War World capital was undoubtedly by financed from investment industrial development abroad was of 40% in it Gregory but role greater a significantly played whether questions ig13 Russia than it did elsewhere. 27 had

industrialised

industry Russian been has that Doubt cast on traditional assertions even had Gerschenkron large-scale in highly enterprises. concentrated was bigness of characteristic enterprise was that and plant of claimed in conditions of backwardness, since the borrowing industrialisation of 28 Soviet large-scale favoured from plant. abroad advanced technology feature, drew historians the this to of too evidence as attention economic industrial Russian organisation, characteristic supposedly advanced nature of for `monopoly the ground prepared capitalism' which the of phase of Russian however, Crisp has Olga As the structure of noted, socialism. industry in terms of labour force per enterprise was very heterogeneous.

Alongside large modern plants there were millions of small-scale kustar industrial by producers - and urban artisan rural enterprises - workshops run industries. Russia did have a relatively high number of `giant' enterprises Crisp large but 1,000 the that the of contends size workers; over with labour force in such enterprises was frequently an indication of the low Russian Large Russian labour. enterprises were often of productivity diverse rather than concentrated specialist conglomerates, sprawling immature industrial concentration was a symtom of an concerns; and by than of advanced monopoly capitalism, as claimed economy, rather Soviet scholars. 29 Recent Western work on Russian economic history has cast doubt on many but Gerschenkron's interpretation, implication the overall of the aspects of from dissimilar Gerschenkron's is too own not research revisionists' backward, tsarist that the economy, although still relatively conclusion: was There the the eve of war. were no essentially stable and prosperous on

25 Ibid.,

p. 36.

26 Gregory, RussianNational Income, pp. 148-9,176-7,192-4 27 Ibid., On importance foreign investment, seeJ. P. Mckay, the pp. 137,148,173-4,177,193-4. of Pioneersfor Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurshipand Russian Industrialization, 1885-1913 (Chicago, 1970} 28 Gerschenkron, `Problems and Patterns', p. -289.

29 Crisp, `The Pattern Industrialisation', of pp. 36-44,448-52.

19

in inherent structural the economy problems further growth. Olga Crisp comments that:

that

might

have impeded

By 1914 Russia had a significant industrial sector which was not an in underdeveloped `enclave' contemporary sectors as modern the but be, the of rest with connected closely countries tend to There fiscal on were the system the and market economy through ... in `rigidities' few the rural sector impeding the whole sociological development contemporary of economists about which economic 30 despondent. are so underdevelopment historians who take a more negative view of the tsarist economy in industry deficiencies `evidence and regional and that of structural concede in incipient in itself does crisis' the that economy was show not agriculture 31 on the eve of the war.

Even

How do these findings fit into the broader `optimists' versus `pessimists' debate about the direction in which Russia was developing before August Russia's 32 Gerschenkron that economic not only was argued 14?

1g development becoming `westernised' on the eve of the war, but also that, in in the early years of the century, the economic contrast to the situation instability. leading development to social and political of igo6-14 was not led in the condition The improvements to a the of peasantry after 1905 in in too, the the towns, the tension and rising countryside; of relaxation labour industrial living that the movement workers meant of the standard of An increasingly becoming extension reformist rather than revolutionary. was have Duma, `which democracy through the probably would of political likely later', to accentuate the reformist tendency of was occurred sooner or 33 labour the movement.

As we have seen, there is now general agreement among historians that Russia in Moreover, the the on there was no economic crisis eve of war.

Gerschenkron's has assessment that generally confirmed revisionist research living standards were rising. There was undeniably widespread unrest among in industrial but `pessimists' the urban 1912-14, workers even the who 30 Ibid.,

p. 52.

31 R. W. Davies, `Introduction' in R. W. Davies (ed), From Tsarism to the Neu Economic Policy (London, tggo), p. 2o.

32 For the terms `optimist' and `pessimist', and a useful review of the early stages of the debate, see A. Mendel, `On Interpreting the Fate of Imperial Russia' in T. C. Stavrou (ed), Russia under the Last Tsar (Minneapolis, Russia 1969), pp. 13-41. Optimists that argue was democratic evolving a capitalist economy and a political system by 1914; pessimists contend that a Bolshevik-type revolution was likely even without war.

33 Gerschenkron, `Problems and Patterns', pp. 297-8.

20

interpret

the strike movement of these years as revolutionary rather than in its labour the to the repressive character attribute militancy of reformist deprivation than to rather any economic among the political environment 34 More generally, `pessimist' for inevitability the the of case workers. its late the tsarist system now places underlying causes within revolution and instability in 1912-14 than on any greater emphasis on social and political Even in form, fundamental this the pessimist position, economic weaknesses. is excessively determinist heavily in the view of the present writer, and influenced by hindsight. Of course we cannot entirely exclude the possibility have in Gerschenkron that revolution occurred even might peacetime: himself allows that `A new outbreak of revolutionary violence at some point 35 improbable'.

But it being far from altogether was only the advent of was war that made revolution a real probability. is it to view the First World War as an extraneous factor legitimate Russia from `optimists' impinged do? inclined to that on outside, as are himself raised the question `whether war and revolution Gerschenkron interpreted be industrial development'. the as result of preceding cannot Some Soviet historians, he noted, had suggested that the responsibility for Russian bourgeoisie, lay in the the the outbreak of war with pursuit of their Gerschenkron interests.

But find could economic no evidence that the decision of the tsar and his government to go to war in August 1914 was in any way by the interests of the industrialists. 36 Subsequent influenced has Dominic Lieven tended this to confirm view. research concludes that interests had little influence on the Foreign Ministry's Russian economic 37 Germany. few And scholars would now support the old policy towards First World Leninist War from imperialist that the argument resulted in interests Russian the the great powers, among rivalries which of 38 Those their played part. capitalism pessimists who still believe that the be seen as a purely extraneous phenomenon war cannot now argue, at a level, foreign Russia in the that much more general that policy the pursued 39 the the summer of 1914 somehow reflected tsarist regime. nature of

How

Gerschenkron himself does not discuss developments in 1914-17, but it is from his he that clear overall analysis regards neither the war nor the industrialisation: `from the point of view the revolution as result of pre-1914 34 E. Acton, RithinkbV the Russian Revolution(London, iggo) pp. 62-70.

35 Gerschenkron, `Problems and Patterns', p. 298.

36 I

bid,

P. 297 37 D. C. B. Lieven, Russia Origins First World War (London, 1983) PP- 134-5the the and of 38 Acton, Rethinking the Russian Revolution, pp. 8o-8i.

39 Ibid.,

80-82; Davies, From Tsar端m to theNew EconomicPolicy,pp. 20-21. pp.

21

industrial development of the country, war, revolution, or the threat of the 40 As be we shall thereof may reasonably seen as extraneous phenomena'. far from have however, historians creating argued that the war, some see, in difficulties highlighted the pre-1914 existing simply new problems, economy.

Russian war economy since studies of the Carnegie Endowment for by the the multi-volume series published Peace in the 1920S and 30s. The contributors International to this series liberals disagreed of various complexions among most of whom were emigre by themselves about the extent to which the revolution the was caused Russia Struve during Peter difficulties the that experienced war. economic important less argued that the country's wartime economic problems were forces in but `catastrophe' Michael to the than political contributing of 1917, importance factors.

Florinsky While to economic greater attributed Russia `[w]hat from that recognising was suffering was not the exhaustion of her resources but the inability to make full and complete use of them', Florinsky asserted that during the war Russian industry proved `completely 41 unequal to the task'.

There

have been few Western

More recently, the British historian Norman Stone has discussed the Russian war economy, in the context of a more general study of the fighting front.

Stone on the eastern concluded that the economic chaos that Russia in be her backwardness.

1917 could not simply experienced to attributed The crisis was not the crisis of a backward economy collapsing under the it strain of war; rather, was a crisis of wartime growth. All sectors of the Russian economy during the war, with armaments-related expanded industries such as coal, petroleum, engineering and chemical production This growing particularly rapidly. growth was financed by the government, through increasing its foreign debt and printing paper money. The result was inflation, with a four-fold increase in prices between 1914 and the beginning Inflation in its deterred turn of 1917. the peasants from marketing their grain, as the prices of manufactured goods rose so rapidly in relation to into subsistence.

Food agricultural prices that the peasantry retreated in the towns resulted: bread riots in Petrograd sparked off the shortages 42 in February revolution 1917.

40 Gerschenkron, `Problems Patterns', and p. 298.

41 P. B. Struve (cd), Food Supply in Russia during the World War (New Haven, 1ggo), p. xx; M. T. Florinsky, The End of the Russian Empire (New York, ig6i), Florinsky's book, first p. 53. published in 1931, was the final volume in the Carnegie series.

42 N. Stone, The EasternFrone, 1914-1917(London, 1975),pp. 14,208-10,284-97.

22

Stone himself draws `pessimistic' conclusions from his analysis of Russian developments.

The that the economy problems wartime economic during he distortion the experienced war, argues, were not so much a of pre`hectic to a wartime of peculiar situation, as versions' war patterns, Russia have had face in The to problems which would even peacetime. war forced Russia to expand her industry that had previously sectors of depended on imports from Germany; but in the loth century any country, foreign Russia, trade relied on exports of primary products, whose such as have later had import to or sooner pursue policies of would substitution development. industrial And the problems of food-supply in through rapid derived from `the greatest long-term Russian economic the winter of 1916-17 fit how for to all: that an agriculture of problem was not structured industrial to the of surpluses needs of a modern production economy with fed'. be Thus Russia in 1911-17 was not facing a to millions of urban workers unique wartime problem: rather, Norman

[b]ehind

the confusion and dislocation of wartime, Russia was encountering ... problems that she had to face, war or no war; the nature of the economy is to be seen, not in speculations as to how the economy would have gone had there been no war, but in its reaction to the demands of war. 43 be in his analysis of the effects of the may correct war on the in his judgment Russia's and that economy, wartime economic problems but her longer-term a version of were structural problems (although he fails the degree to which these structural had to recognise been problems by But it is 1914). overcome possible to draw different conclusions from Stone's interpretation.

On the basis of his assertion that the wartime difficulties `hectic `optimists' were versions' of peacetime problems, are it dictated by the to the entitled that conclude surely was pace of change wartime context, rather than the pattern of change itself, that created the crisis of 1917.

Stone

As `revisionist' work on the economic history of pre-war Russia has shown, tsarism had succeeded by 1914 in combining steady industrial growth and farimproved living standards for both the urban reaching agrarian reform with Within and rural population. the period reviewed in this essay, it was only in the exceptional conditions of the First World War that rapid state-sponsored heavy industry took place at the expense of the living standards expansion of To that extent, the causes of the February of the urban population. revolution of 1917 must be viewed as primarily economic; but the economic problems that Russia experienced in the winter of 1916/17 were exceptional 43 Ibid.,

p. 286.

23

be They from taken cannot as the situation. wartime ones, resulting unique in fundamental the pre-r9i4 economy structural weakness evidence of any Russian in development further have capitalism of that would prevented the the absence of war.

24

REVOLUTION, OF THE

CIVIL WAR AND THE EMERGENCE SOVIET UNION, 1917-1924 Stephen

White

The year 1917 marked as great a break in Russian foreign relations as it did in domestic politics. At home, the years that followed October 1917 were increasingly by the establishment of an centralised and authoritarian marked Socialist Revolutionaries) (like the regime, with trials of political opponents and the expulsion of scholars and writers who were unable to share the Nikolai Berdyaev departure (the of and others on the regime's assumptions `philosophers' ship' in 1922 is the best known example). Although there was Communist Party, debate the a substantial private sector, and within still Soviet basic had been firmly the principles of rule even private publishing, itself had by the mid-ig2os and the regime survived a trial of established domestic in its the opponents civil war, which came to political with strength Crimea in Wrangel November defeat Baron in the 1920. of an end with the in the churches, in the trade unions, There was still domestic opposition, but Soviet in after the mid-1920S the government's areas; non-Russian and doubt. in immediately survival was not break in foreign The revolution patterns of relations. marked a similar from be Broadly the the 1917 until early 1920S might period speaking, The initial isolation, isolation `from to reintegration'. regime's thought of as from October a variety of circumstances not all of the 1917, stemmed after Bolsheviks' own making: but they certainly made a contribution through foreign debts, of property, repudiation of their nationalisation withdrawal in from alliance commitments the major and open advocacy of class war however, After there was a slow return to older about 1921, western powers. first of all through the exchange of prisoners of war, patterns of relations: and then through the resumption of postal and telegraphic communications, interaction, the revival of shipping and commercial and then through a series fuller discussions.

A in took and visits reintegration of exploratory place Soviet in `year de the the of recognition', which government was given 1924,

by Britain jure recognition and most other western states. The Soviet bodies like League Nations outside the government nonetheless remained of (until 1934), and it was closely identified throughout with a political basic between its USSR that assumed antagonism the a philosophy and capitalist counterparts.

The Soviet Union was not the only instance of a revolutionary state that had gradually reconstituted a working relationship with the outside world.

Lloyd George, during the immediate postwar years, was particularly impressed by the parallels with revolutionary France during the 1790s: this he it, saw another regime that was committed to a radical version of was, as democracy, it was stable (as in Russia) because land had been transferred to

25

Russia) in (as been it had it, again once sustained those who worked and during danger' in been had the revolutionary wars. because the `motherland however, impetus, statesmen The original was soon spent, practical the outside world with relationship themselves, and a working reasserted best Western advised began to be reconstructed; statesmen were accordingly `Pitt George Lloyd normal policy', conducting called a to pursue what I disapproved.

In domestic they policies of whose regimes even with relations have Islamic the raised states of times some with relations more recent but between involving difficulties, also governments relations only not similar internal bearing direct have believed the on to a theories of society that are in the relationship. affairs of other participants From

revolution

to reintegration

2 familiar is foreign Soviet The broad pattern of one. a reasonably relations from the war (in The revolution itself was followed by Russian withdrawal be had long the to and participant), an effective ceased since they which Brest-Litovsk in March Germans at signature of a punitive peace with the begun had intervention Allied originally in an attempt to prevent 1918. developed into German into hands, diverted being a and then supplies broader commitment to Russian forces that were prepared to oppose the Germans by force of arms. At least for some, such as Winston Churchill, `tyrannical further the the overthrow of there was a objective, which was 3 formal Commissars'; Jew agreement and there was a government of these down laid December in French, the respective spheres 1918, which with the 4 Soviet historians, For Allied intervention.

Allied an older generation of of intervention was directed against the Soviet regime because it was socialist; Allied intervention but even if this was part of the motivation, was still a Bolshevik the at the end of the war and minor operation relatively deviation from in the any case seen as a short-lived government was `No their conduct affairs. all societies must universal principles upon which I H. C. Debs., 5th ser., Vol. 154., 25 May 1992. On the wider question of revolutionary states David Revolution World Order.

Armstrong, international The the community see and and in international (Oxford, society 1993). revolutionary state

2 See for instance Louis Fischer, The Sovietsin World Affairs, 2 vols (London, i93o); Teddy, J. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology:the origins of Sovietforeign relations 1917-1930 (Beverly Hills, Richard K. Debo, by Survival: foreign Revolution the policy of Soviet two 1979); and volumes and Russia 1917-1918 (Liverpool, 1979) and Survival and Consolidation.theforeign policy of Soviet Russia1958-1921(Hamilton, Ont., 1992). Contemporary Russian scholarship on this period is Sovetskogo Nezhinsky, `Vneshnyaya L. N. in politika gosudarstva v 1917-1921godakh: reflected Kurs na "mirovuyu revollyutsiyu" ili na mirnoe sosushchestvovannnie?', Istoriya SSSR, 1991, No. 6, PP. 3-27.

3 Churchill to Curzon, 24 December 1921, Curzon Papers Fi 12/219, India Office Library, Churchill during intervention London. itself to call for `war upon the was prepared Bolshevists by every means in our power' (Cabinet minutes, WC 624 App. 2, Cab 23/1 2, Public Record Office, London).

4 See FO Office, Record Public London. /3086/243036, 371

26

live', the them to as much as a month commented give would man sane Daily Telegraph; the Cabinet itself was told, in January 1918, that the `final 5 be few days'.

Bolshevism' `within could expected a struggle with failure in White decisive, the the the end, was of armies to was from Russia Apart in Bolsheviks. this, the military service was overthrow being demobilised, in the any case were and costs were armies unpopular, difficult to sustain at a time of cuts in public spending. From about the end began to rea somewhat older pattern of relations of 1919, accordingly, began, Negotiations in May between British itself. the 192o, establish Russian delegation.

The Bolsheviks trading themselves and a government in 1919 began to establish a network of treaty relations, with Afghanistan Finland Baltic in The idea three the republics and 1920. of and then with Trotsky, first itself; the people's reasserted state to state relations foreign had few for `issued a relations, revolutionary commissar 6 to the people and then shut up shop', and some of the proclamations Finnish the that treaties short-lived socialist with earliest - such as forward in looked to the establishment 1918 - explicitly of the government Georgii Cicherin, basis.?

Under international commissar soviet system on an from 1918 onwards and formerly an official in the tsarist foreign ministry, a began be degree to of emphasis placed upon more orthodox greater 8 relations with the outside capitalist world.

What

dispelling ignorance both An important the this part of of process was - on Russian had been Early the revolution certainly views of alarmist. sides.

According to the `Collection of Reports on Bolshevism', issued by the British free in love' `commissariats had been in 1919, of set up government flogged for `respectable towns, and women refusing to yield'. revolutionary The Bolsheviks were reported to be employing `gangs of Chinese' to shoot deserters; heavy loss life in there and was a of prisons, though officers and because `during its full extent was not appreciated the executions a band lively More tunes'. plays generally, there were clear signs regimental Oligarchy [was] `Terrorist Allied be `would tottering' the that that the and 9 The American welcomed with open arms everywhere'. press was no more York New to according a careful and contemporary the calculation, reliable; Times reported the end of the regime no fewer than 91 times between November 1917 and November igig, and several times that Lenin had been 5 Daily Tekgraph,5 January Cabinet Paper GT CAB tgi8; 3432, 24/40, Public Record Office, London.

6 Leon Trotsky, Mein Leben(Berlin, 1930) p. 3277 Yu. V. Klyuchnikov and A. Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaya politika noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh,notakh i ddclaratsiyakh,3 parts (Moscow, 1926-9), Part 2, p. 120 (it is in included not the standard Soviet treaty series Dokwnentyvneshneipolitiki SSSR, Vol. 1- (Moscow, 1957- ).

8 For E. O'Connor, a recent biography see Timothy Soviet foreign Iowa, (Ames, and affairs 1918-193o 1988).

9 Cmd. 8,1919.

27

Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Cicherin

killed or imprisoned. 10 Lenin was himself no better informed, believing - in Poland Action formation Councils to oppose a war with of 1920 - that the of Russia in February and a step on the path revolution was equivalent to the Il British Bolshevik towards the revolution. dispelled, be in began This fog of misunderstanding to and misinformation first One Western by the of was the 1919 and 1920, visitors. a series of British left-wing MP George Lansbury, who concluded that the Bolsheviks George Lloyd Lord's Christians `doing call the work' and urged were what `crown [his] career by coming out in a telegram from the Soviet capital to 12 honourable both democracies.

Another in to and making a peace visitor, G. H. Wells: hostile Marxism itself, he the to 1920, was writer was Bolsheviks `as that the nonetheless persuaded were securely established as 13 important More in Europe'. than either of these was a any government British Labour and trade union delegation that visited Petrograd, Moscow Russia in The delegation's the and parts of southern summer of 1920. aim information, judgements, but it had no to to collect not make political was difficulty in concluding that the excesses that had taken place were largely due to Allied pressure, and it called for the full and unconditional 14 Visitors be Pankhurst, (Sylvia the recognition of new regime. could wrong for instance, reported that the Russian people had `almost forgotten the 15 be And they very existence of alcohol'), and could misled. yet whatever their background and experiences there was generally little dissent from the Soviet likely be that the government to view was an enduring one, and that a closer relationship with the country over which it ruled would make a to the revival of trade and the reduction considerable contribution of in Britain itself. unemployment Influenced

by these various circumstances, the British government, in March de facto 1921, concluded a trade agreement the represented which Bolshevik recognition of rule, and a basis on which goods could be imported from Russia without being seized on behalf of British creditors whose been had property nationalised or whose debts had not been repaid. The British agreement, as Krasin had expected, served in turn as a `signal for the majority of states of Europe'; 16 and by the end of the year the Soviet 10 Charles Merz Walter Lippmann, and Republic,4 August ig2o, p. io.

`A test of the news', Supplement

to The New

11V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sochinenii, sobranie 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-65),Vol. 41, Pp. 327,283.

12 George Lansbury, What I Saw in Russia(London, ig2o), p. xv; Lansbury to Lloyd George, ii February ig2o, Lloyd George Papers F95/2/9, House Record Lords Office, London. of 13 H. G. Wells, Russiain the Shadows(London, 1920), p. 64-

14 British Labour Delegation to Russia Report (London, For a fuller 1920), pp. 6,27,29. discussion see Stephen White, `British Labour in Soviet Russia, 1920', English Historical Review (forthcoming).

15 E. Sylvia Pankhurst, SovietRussia I Saw It (London, as 1921),p. 184..

16 L. B. Krasin, Voprory torgooli(Moscow, 1970), pp. 253,255" vneslznei

28

had trade agreements of a similar character concluded with authorities Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy.

Austria Norway, Germany, and had been Iran in February Diplomatic established 1921, a relations with in March Turkey in (later friendship the year a treaty with was signed Soviet by in Caucasus), the the republics and similar treaty was signed following November. friendly relations with Mongolia the established were by this stage, had been at least conditionally The Soviet government, from international it had into the community so which reintegrated October leave in its demonstratively taken 1917.

From

conditional

to diplomatic

recognition

from limited the there was a steady move and about 1921 until 1924 for been had trading that accorded purposes to a recognition conditional The discussions through which this took place fully normalised relationship. debts, issues the that and property other concerned with were naturally in Moscow, had been and which generally arose out of the change of regime deferred by the trading and other agreements. A broadly conceived attempt issues, and at the same time to revive the to resolve these outstanding European economy and deal with German reparations, was attempted at 7 following ' in April-May it Hague.

Genoa 1922, and at the conference the The attempt to make a simultaneous settlement over the whole range of issues that had been left after the end of the war was not successful, Maynard Keynes, including who thought at the although there were many, different have been it could achieved with and more appropriate time that debts Keynes For for to the extract attempt and compensation policies. had been `miserable a property repetition of reparations and nationalised debt', and he was in favour in later inter-Allied years - of a public - as loan Russia if in initiative to necessary a substantial and order to restore levels and prosperity throughout of employment trade and raise the 18 continent.

From

fact in by labour trading supported arguments, organised was and industry less by banks, the so that played the although manufacturing Soviet encouraging part in resumption of a relations greatest with the formal The and eventually a settlement. argument government was put in various forms. Russia, it was first of all suggested, was an forward its huge population and great needs; this was at a enormous market, with in the West, in part because of the collapse of time of rising unemployment Eastern Europe.

This labour trade with that an was argument and social democratic parties found particularly persuasive: and it was parties of this in Britain and in France in 1924 But it was kind that were in government

It

17 On the conference dipiornacy of the early 1920s see Carole Fink, The Genoa Conference European diphmacy ryzr-J92i (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984) and Stephen White, The Origins of Dete*Le:The Genoa conferenceaid Soviet-Westernrelations, rg2j-. tg? z (Cambridgt, 1986).

18 ManchesterGuardian, 18 Apra' 1922, and ManchesterGordian Comas June ciao 15 1922.

29

insensitive, business and there was a more to an argument was not which A by behind left be second and related others. general concern not to foodstuffs Russia and vital source of argument was that was a potentially Russia had imports.

Before it supplied 70% the war, other was pointed out, large flax, Britain's half of the proportion the country's timber, and a of it if 19 here butter that was argued and elsewhere country's wheat, and eggs; Russia could only return to the domestic market supplies would improve and fall. be bound to prices would There was a third and related argument, which appealed particularly to Lloyd George and a wide spectrum of liberal and commercial opinion. This be belief the that trade the resumption of more effective than was would founded in that a system upon principles military action was undermining New Economic the they all regarded as unworkable. The introduction of Policy in the spring of 1921, with its relaxation of state ownership and introduction of currency and budgetary reforms, was seen as an admission of the failure of these theories by the Bolsheviks themselves. There was a Commons Lloyd George House in from March told the the of change, 1921, Communism `wild extravagant There is a of a year or two years ago... [that] is impossible All that recognition system one'. the time, the prime an insisted, `converting' they the Bolsheviks through minister were simply a `gentlemanly process of instruction'.

An opponent of the trade agreement find Lenin `man his heart he if has only a that soon would was a of own little patience, if he does a little business with him, a little trading, a little The begin exchange of commodities. to realise they cannot moment they have brought run their country except upon the same principles which begin to they prosperity to realise that the only way to other countries, will bring prosperity to Russia is to put an end to their wild schemes'. 20 The prime minister appears to have been directly influenced by the testimony of Simon Eisenstein, manager of the Marconi company in Russia since 1916, had just installed Interviewed in a wireless station in the Kremlin. who in Eisenstein Lenin had himself been largely secret that early 1922, reported for the adoption responsible of the recent economic legislation, which the abandonment effectively represented of the main principles of George (Lloyd communism marked this passage and drew upon it directly in his speeches). 21 Influenced by such considerations, relations between Soviet Russia and the Western major governments steadily converged during the early Ig2os.

Individual manufacturers and chambers of commerce took up the call for a loser relationship during 1923; and several important business visits were made at this time, among them a visit by Becos Traders, a group of firms including Nobel and Ferranti. The delegation included engineering 19 H. C. Diebs., 5th ser., Vol. 135,29 November ig2o.

20 Ibid., Vol. March 139,22 1921.

21 Notes of interview, 23 February 192-2,Lloyd George Papers F149/2/ 13.

30

Conservative its issued F. L. Baldwin, the prime minister; report, of Soviet November in government was widely supported 1923, argued that the 22 Sir for Britain `extremely trade were the with good'. that prospects and Federation, Employers' Engineering Smith, Allen was also concerned of the in his dealings with government to press upon them the importance of 23 fact City, Izvesiya Russia.

In had `long the reported, reviving trade with 24 and by the time of the December Russia'; Soviet 1923 ago recognised Soviet full British elections, government of the recognition was common Labour Party.

Formal Liberals between the took and recognition ground just before Mussolini February to 1924, was able undertake the i on place Italians.

France, Austria, Sweden, behalf Norway, the of same step on Denmark, Greece, Mexico and China also extended formal recognition to during itself became known `year Soviet 1924, the government which as the of recognition'. brother

Some

contentious

issues

issues saw post revolutionary years agreement on a number of early Bolshevik had the arisen out of that victory and the rupture of more orthodox relations with the outside world, among them prisoners of war and But issues there were several other that were not resolved, communications.

Soviet-Western to the affect continued course of and which relations.

Perhaps the most important The Soviet of these was propaganda. from had been ideology the outset, that to committed government, an defined relations with the outside world in terms of social class rather than It was itself a 'workers' diplomacy. and peasants' government', not the Russia.

There `workers' Red Army', and of a was and government peasants' Navy'.

The Soviet `workers' peasants' and constitution a of 1918 gave the of other countries their whatever vote to proletarians nationality or looked forward the 1924 and constitution explicitly citizenship, to the `unification of the workers of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Early Soviet diplomatic Republic'. by the same token, communications, brigades' `red were often addressed to peoples rather than governments, and formed direct 25 to make a military to their contribution were struggle.

The

The Soviet government also enjoyed a close relationship with the Communist International, established in March igig and headed by Grigorii Zinoviev, a more senior Bolshevik than Chicherin and one of Lenin's A network of communist parties was established especially close confidants.

22 Mmuhesler Guardia,,

= November 1923.

23 See for instance Smith to Baldwin, July and 3 August 1923, Prem 1130, Public Record 24 Office, London.

24 Ilya, ii November 192325 For for instance Klyuchnikov Sabanin, Mehdunarodnaya this a proclamation of see and politrka, Part 2, p. too (not included in Dokumcnty vneshneipolitiki); on the `red brigades' see Saobodnaya mys4 1921, No. 15, p. 27.

31

financial the support of the world, many of them enjoying throughout Moscow. And there was a developing network of relations with colonial or Soviet involved in Asia, developing nations, particularly the which also Britain interests in to the and of actions that were prejudicial authorities `Moscow The gold' could of communication the other metropolitan powers.

Francis during its have these years: the publisher comic opera aspect Meynell, for instance, recalled in his memoirs how he had posted Bolshevik inside a box of chocolates, jewels back to London to Cyril Joad the immediately he (the recall). could only person whose address philosopher liking for chocolates.

There was only one problem: Joad's well-developed Maynell arrived only just in time to intercept his precious cargo. 26 But Soviet financial support could be on a more substantial scale, as when a in Herald, Daily in to the or 1922 when reports ig2o subsidy was paid Communist Party indicated that the Labour Research Department the and 27 funded in being the same way. were Propaganda, admittedly, could be conducted by both sides. The Bolsheviks forged Pravda in the themselves early recipients when a was produced were kind. had before this the trade agreement outlawed all activities of 1921, The forged paper was reproduced in the Herald on, 28 February, beside an Special Branch for be the the paper to accusation that was arranging distributed Russia. in The Home Secretary the produced and admitted but its Commons in House the truth of the charge, regretted occurrence, of Foreign March Office British files indicate that the 1921. on 3 Riga had in forged hundreds' `some received representative of copies of the diplomatic bag in November.

It had the the paper previous contained a Britain had about that number of statements a transparently political information few Communists the that there to purpose, such as were very But the paper was `well printed on good paper' and Mr be encountered.

Tallents, the representative, did not think the `most ignorant Russian would have supposed it to be genuine' when able to compare it with the bad Bolsheviks' He the thought the paper on which own papers were printed. `entire Rex Leeper, who commented on the waste of money'. exercise an Foreign Ofice, Basil Thomson, the that communication within suggested head of the Special Branch, might be able to throw some light on the in the origins of question, and recommended papers the abandonment of Thomson replied that the paper had been paid for from White such efforts.

Russian funds. But how then, asked a Foreign Office minute, had it come to be in the official diplomatic bag? 28 26 Francis Meynell, My lives (London, 1971), pp, 120-1.

27 On Papers the latter see Churchill to Austen Chamberlain, i8 March 1922, Chamberlain AC 23/6/17, Birmingham University Library. Soviet party archives have now made it of foundation Communist Party of Great Britain was facilitated by a that the the clear of grant of 55,000 from Russian sources: see Moskovskie novosk, 14 March 1993, p. 5A-

28 See FO 371/5446/N25o7 London.

and N3136, i6 and 25 November

32

1920, Public Record Office,

between the Soviet government its Western A political accommodation and for kinds difficult but in these to accomplish, of reasons; was counterparts Soviet interests forced to choose, state were generally given the end, when had but they all entirely eclipsed the original and eventually priority foreign The issues to revolutionary policy. that a economic commitment including the the revolutionary early years, of nationalisation of out arose February debts, (in the 1918) repudiation of were rather more property and It was clear that trade could resume without broader intractable. a but far debts less foreign investors that and property, on clear agreement be Indeed, for full to their the risk capital. willing reintegration would again into Russia the world economy, many other changes were needed, of including currency, adequate a convertible communications, and financial and legal institutions.

The interests of the West, in independent Government debts in and conflicting. varied mattered more any case, were but debts Britain, like important in private were more countries countries like France. The property that had originally belonged to Western nationals And there were extensive had often been destroyed or reconstructed. including a demand for compensation Russian counterclaims, arising out of White in had been 29 from the the civil war which supported abroad. issues kind during this of of was no resolution the early post have been in they years; nor satisfactorily revolutionary resolved more despite a greater willingness on the part of the post-communist recent times, its fact In to the accept obligations of predecessors. government another, lesson from different Soviet danger the emerges early rather that years: the West, from the bodies through like economic consortia pressure the or World Bank, will provoke a counterreaction at the popular level which will difficult for Russian it more any government to accept the conditions make is During before any assistance offered. the which upon months the Genoa Western the powers coordinated their plans, Russian emigres conference, as Soviet the to support of a government were rallying that did at least disagreements be defending independence their to appear whatever the integrity lands historically Russian.

And there territorial that of were and within the country itself, to any terms that was strong public opposition, of the gains that had been achieved by would amount to the confiscation 30 More than seventy the the people over years since ordinary revolution. it is later, kinds help these that to explain the difficulties of attitudes years been have Russia's in that experienced gradual return to the international community.

There

29 See for instance Dokummty Vol. politiki, vneshnei 30 See White, Origins Detente, of pp. 109-17.

33

5, note 8o, p. 739-

COMMUNISM,

AND

STALINISM

THE

WEST,

1924-1953

Haslam

Jonathan

Although in popular literature it has been customary to date Stalin's rule in Russia from the death of Lenin in 1924, this is inaccurate, since the period between Lenin's for successors: power 1924 to 1929 saw an acute struggle Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky and Stalin. During dispute, in key West issue element that time the was a of relations with the One Socialism in debate on the necessity of since the outcome of the Country (quite apart from its feasibility) pivoted upon the prospects for Stalin's With was victory, the priority of world revolution world revolution. decisively subordinated to that of raison d'etai. Up to 1929, however, Soviet foreign policy remained the uneasy product of an amalgam of views and This Stalin's foreign be per term should, strictly se. policy considered cannot from be to the the onset of the personal period applied exclusively speaking, dictatorship in 1929 to the dictator's death in 1953Stalin's it foreign the term policy conceals as much as use of Soviet history Union imperial Most the the of against work on as reveals.

Russia by traditionally than written political scientists rather was in A major weakness in political historians. (and science social science is in history things tendency to the see a static terms; strength of general) dynamic lies in its appreciation historical the the of nature of process.

Instead of asking such questions as to what extent was Stalin interested in foreign policy in 1929? Was Stalin's interest constant or variable? What Stalin's foreign intellectual there to consistency was policy over a twentyit is grandly assumed that Stalin set out like a kind of four year period?

Richard Nixon or Adolf Hitler with fixed ideas and some kind of overall for international This is the conduct of strategy approach relations. as diehard in the evident anti-Stalinists as Robert Tuckers as it is in work of the work of more moderate political scientists like Adam Ulam. 2 Either is Stalin knew he doing but that the assumption way, not only what was he do.

In to what was about my view this assumption has to be tested, not faith, for accepted as an article of the pre-war period; the post-war certainly is, in era my opinion, another matter entirely.

However,

From

Stalin fact in 1929 obsessively concerned with two issues: his was personal supremacy, and the restoration of Russia to the status of a Great 1 R. C. Tucker,

Stalin in Power:

The Revolution

From Above 1928-1941

I990).

2 A. B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man His Era (London, and 1974).

34

(New

York

and

London,

latter The better). (or Power meant the re-industrialisation of the country to in degree that the could guarantee autarchy self-sufficiency of a ensure in Foreign distraction instruments this affairs were of war. sense a modern from the main tasks; but they were a distraction which proved impossible to Manchuria Japan in looked the occupied 1930s.

1931 and avoid through 3 in Soviet Maritime Province Far East.

While in the jealously the upon Europe Hitler came to power and immediately embarked upon an antiSoviet foreign policy. 4 Stalin dealt with these threats to Soviet security by delegating the operational side of policy to others, adopting strategies put forward by others and intervening only at decisive points when the urgency He delegated Commissariat dictated. the the running of of of events Comintern Dimitrov Foreign Affairs to Litvinov, the to and the chairing of foreign affairs committees in government and party to Zhdanov and Molotov The delegation (necessarily of responsibility the entailing respectively. delegation of associated power and influence) was managed in such a way as did his the supremacy: own ultimate recipients not get along at all to ensure discreetly fed by these and personal rivalries animosities and were well, Stalin himself. Only by this means could the delegation of power mean the diffusion rather than the concentration of power into other hands. Even from Stalin launching the terror of great 1936 regarded the threat after the but never sufficient means of preventing the of execution as a necessary by In Stalin's power of potential rivals. my this to view aspect accumulation is much neglected. rule Delegation

both

flowed

from

of responsibility and sustained a certain in Molotov, policy. who was chairman of the council of people's ambivalence for foreign in Politburo Litvinov and responsible the affairs commissars while deeply distrusted any notion of alliance with capitalist ran the commissariat, but temporary collusion, perhaps, standing alliances, never. This was states: in part ideological and in part also no doubt a product of xenophobia.

The he Moscow line that advocated was was wrong to distrust Germany policy faith in to place so much potential so much and and actual arrangements French.

Germany Whereas British the and with was seen as the country in (fascism concealed this, so he and Europe most ripe for revolution others just believed), Britain was widely regarded

by Molotov but also by and not Stalin as the most powerful capitalist Power in Europe. If Moscow was to in imperialist international it the the contradictions play with system, should, balance believed, he with the weaker against the stronger. The fact that so Britain and France were democracies was a matter of utter indifference.

3 See Haslam,

Soviet Foreign Policy 193 33:

Impact of the Depression (London,

The the Eost, i933-4, r (London,

1983); and

The Soviet Union and the Threatfrom 1992).

4 See Haslam, The Soviet Union Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39 the and (London, 1984).

35.

Fascism and democracy were, in this fundamentalist vision, merely the forms in its And the essence all capitalist states of capitalist state, not essence. were warlike. for whom the This vision was a world apart from that of Litvinov, fundamentalist distinction was essentially an irrelevance to the conduct of international for fascism relations; rather than capitalism meant war; whom for interests dictated for democracies Moscow's the and support whom German fascism.

And Litvinov's threat to against a common all vision was by Dimitrov, from fascism that paralleled of as equally who saw the threat fearful for both democracy and revolution. 5 Given

Stalin's own deeply rooted distrust of all and given his subsequent is it Litvinov Dimitrov him into that talked record, remarkable and ever strategies that, through the greater part of the 1930s, were designed to German fascism.

The failure of both strategies was, the contain expansion of however, signally evident by the time of the notorious Munich settlement in September 1938 and it proved only a matter of time before Stalin turned to Molotov and Zhdanov for advice on the direction the country should now take. That direction led directly to the Nazi-Soviet pact and expansion into Eastern Europe: a recombination Tsarist of reconquest and the spread of Soviet-style communism, almost exactly what Lord Curzon had predicted before. twenty some years The illusion

Soviet Union it The that the was could go alone. assumption Moscow had breathing-space the that after pact was won a substantial of four before it might have to face German power, if three perhaps or years Everything that took place thereafter proved unexpected: the speedy at all.

Stalin Poland before collapse of was really ready; the stubborn and heroic Finland imposition Russian to the resistance of territorial of claims; the dramatic sweep of Hitler's armies into Scandinavia and the Low Countries; the catastrophic fall of France; and, last but by no means least, the invasion Russia itself.

The of situation was not aided by the fact that Stalin tended Churchill.

This was in part of product to trust Hitler than more of experience - `Perfidious Albion' was not a concept that had captured merely French minds; Churchill had spearheaded the war of intervention against Bolshevism in Ig18-ig; and mistrust of the British had been exacerbated by in 1938-39. But it was the behaviour of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain do balance to partly also with the chronic misestimation of the of power British the overestimation of the power of the capitalism and German (fascist) power.

German Although underestimation of power seemingly encompassed Europe and British arms had been pushed back to 5 For the Popular Front strategy, see E. H. Carr, Turilighi of Comintern,,930 -

36

(London, 1982).

fascist Stalin Molotov islands home structure saw the the and and empire, for British from flawed social averting the capacity whereas within; as Other factors legendary. let also were was revolutions, alone unrest, involved: in Mein Kampf Hitler had castigated the Kaiser for fighting on two fronts, and the British were not yet beaten. Second, the Germans ran a Sealion Operation disinformation campaign suggesting that very effective fact June Britain.

It be that 1941 early relaunched against was also a would foreign in Moscow (including the the embassies the consensus among all British) was that Hitler would not launch all-out war against Russia; the Hitler's Thus bluff be and renegotiation. expected was most that could 6 Churchill's believed; warnings were not. reassurances were hand With the Germans moving East, Prime Minister Churchill offered the Stalin's Thus Moscow.

Russia friendship to entered the allied camp of its its his And time own and at a through no choice of not of own choosing. facts. bitter The the throughout those war reflected alliance was a conduct his Stalin formed had By necessary adjustment of a temporary nature. now foreign Russia fitted in best his that policy, one own own mentality. with democracies him in far democracies the would work with so allowed as the freedom Soviet influence to the of action expand power and at will to the he but beyond thought necessary; extent that he would not go. Litvinov was brought out of the cupboard reluctantly to work to as ambassador later deputy Washington for foreign He and as commissar affairs. was retained through the war as a symbol of a willingness to co-operate, but as a After he in the more. nothing war to was allowed symbol, survive Stalin in just had further him case need of retirement, were renewed coWest `a Stalin's the to prove necessary with stone' up operation sleeve.

In the meantime Stalin planned on the basis of a likely third world war involving Germany and Japan. He took the territory required to ensure that , he could nip any future aggression in the bud unilaterally.

Splendid isolation isolation became impoverished hall Soviet foreign the rather, mark of or, Despite in huge losses post-war the those early years. policy entailed in the his Stalin optimistic: armies were apparently was unbeatable war, and based into Central Europe and on the Japanese northern forward most leaving Europe for islands. The Americans the second time. The were Continental British empire was overextended.

Europe its western was on knees economically and drifting politically to the extreme left. Granted, the Americans had the atomic bomb and Stalin's spies were mobilised to supply for Soviet bomb, not successfully tested the secrets the manufacture the of

6j.

Haslam, `Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-41: Isolation and Expansion', Sai 1que,18, Nos. 1-3 (1991),PP. 103-2I.

37

Soviet Union/Union

did Americans But August the not stockpile these until the end of 1949.7 involving bombs, President Truman planning refused to sanction military Eisenhower Churchill Stalin like their use until 1948, and anyway and tended to regard the bomb as merely one means of warfare among others.

Only the occupation Russian territory only a could secure victory; of Soviet diplomacy back to threat away. convincing of occupation could cause And Stalin, though ever cautious and ever calculating, though ever mindful US technological supremacy, always made the mistake of underestimating of American resolve. And it was this fundamental Russia that cost error so dear for the next half century. The tragedy was that when Stalin had finally foreign forged he to come grips with policy and a consistent policy could call his own, that policy proved inimical interests of the to the immediate democracies indeed, Russians long-term interests to the the and, of themselves. Whether all this can be laid at the door of Stalin's personality Soviet ideology is doubtful.

Other factors or played their part, too: the failure of the democracies to respond positively to Litvinov when the time Stalin's was ripe, and the role of circle, not least Molotov and Zhdanov, in influencing the new directions eventually chosen. Thus while still placing Stalin centre stage, we should not blind ourselves to the real complexity of events and the parts that others played, including ourselves, in the tragedy that unfolded.

7 Forthcoming is a history of the Soviet atomic and hydrogen bomb projects by David Holloway of Stanford University.

38

NOTE

Dr

David

Gillard

Maureen

Perrie,

Professor

Stephen

Dr Jonathan

ON CONTRIBUTORS

formerly

MA

Centre

in Modern History Glasgow University

for Russian & East European Studies Birmingham University

White

Haslam

Senior Lecturer

Glasgow

University

King's College, Cambridge University

39

DOCUMENTS

ON BRITISH

POLICY

OVERSEAS

This collection from Foreign documents the the archives of and of Commonwealth Her Office is published by authorisation Majesty's of Government. The Editors have been accorded the customary freedom in the selection and arrangement of documents.

SERIES I (1945-1950) Published Volume

I

The Conference at Potsdam, July-August

Volume

II

Conferences and Conversations Moscow. and

Volume

III

Britain and America: Negotiation 1945. loan, August-December

Volume IV

1945.

1945: London, Washington States United of the

Britain and America: Atomic Energy, Bases and Food,

December 1945-July

1946.

Volume V

Germany

August Europe, Western and

Volume VI

Eastern Europe, August 1945-April

December 1945.

1946.

In preparation Volume

VII

The United

Nations,

1946-7.

SERIES II (1950-1955) Published Volume

I

The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western 1952.

European Integration, May 1950-December

Volume

II

The London Conferences, JanuaryJune

Volume

III

German

Volume IV

Rearmament,

Korea, June 1950-April

1950.

September-December

1950.

1951.

In preparation Volume V

Germany and European Security, 1952-1954.

Volume VI

The Middle

East, 1951-1953.

Free lists of Titles (state subject/s) are available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, HMSO Books, 51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5DR.

40

FCO HISTORICAL

BRANCH

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

Valid Evidence

No-2 Meeting

Editors of

Germany

Diplomatic of

rejoins

Documents

the Club

No. 4 Eastern Europe

Foreign and Commonwealth Office