Polish cryptologists reveal they have cracked the Enigma code

to an end, and the Presidency to Giscard d’Estaing; in Argentina, the veteran President Juan Peron was succeeded by his second wife, Isabel; in West Germany, the resignation of Willy Brandt over a spy scandal made Helmut Schmidt the new Chancellor; and in Ethiopia, riots and student protests so undermined Emperor Haile Selassie that he was deposed in September. Other departures were temporary: President Makarios of Cyprus, ousted in a Greek coup in July, was to return to office in December; in Spain, the ailing dictator General Franco handed over power to Prince Juan Carlos - but only for a few months; and in Libya, the erratic Colonel Qadafi was relieved of day-to-day duties by the Revolution Command Council in order to concentrate on the ‘ideological direction’ of the Libyan people - but remained head of state.

Shocking contrast

Against this context, Nixon’s resignation may seem just one more shifting pattern in the kaleidoscope. But 40 years later, the contrast still seems shocking between the President’s experience, abilities and undoubted flair for international affairs, and the depth of his disgrace. Nixon was wracked by insecurity and believed that the only way to succeed in politics was to get your retaliation in first: at some point, he lost the ability to distinguish between threat and reality, executive power and contempt for the law. For Jonathan Schell, there was a direct causal connection between the Vietnam war and Watergate: one of Nixon’s first acts as President was to order a secret bombing campaign against neutral Cambodia. For Richard E. Neustadt, Nixon, like his predecessor Lyndon Johnson, was ‘a driving man and driven, tending to excess, compulsive in seeking control, taking frustration hard’. But we should give the last word to Henry Kissinger, who knew him better than most: ‘It was impossible to talk to Nixon without wondering afterward what other game he might be engaged in at the moment. Of one thing you could be sure. No single conversation with Nixon ever encapsulated the totality of his purpose.’

Suggestions for reading

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III: Vol. IV, The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis 1972-74; Vol V, The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-76 (London: Routledge, both 2006). Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (London: Macmillan, revised edn 1980) Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995) Jonathan Schell, ‘Reflexions on the Nixon Years’, 6 articles in the New Yorker, 1975; cited here, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1975/06/30/the-time-of-illusion-v-thescript-and-the-players