Architecture, A Derivative Practice by Felipe Guerra

Architecture, a Derivative Practice

PREMISES FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE DISCUSSION OF COPY & DERIVATIVE WORKS

…the old styles or the modern style? […] The answer to that burning question however is that everything created in earlier times can be copied today provided it is still usable. For the form on new phenomena in our culture (railway carriages, telephones, typewriters etc.) solutions must be found that do not consciously echo a past style. Changing old objects to adapt them to modern need is not permissible. We must either copy or create something completely new. By that, however, I do not mean the new must be the opposite of what went before. — Adolf Loos, The New Style and the Bronze Industry, 1878

Thesis project 2013/2014 Felipe Guerra Advisor: Ido Avissar

THE BERLAGE The Berlage Center for Advanced Studies in Architecture and Urban Design. Tu Delft, Faculty of Architecture. January 30 2014

ABOUT THE TYPE The Relevant typeface has its name from the notion of relevance, the notion of measuring how much something influences reality, or how well a piece of information or a theory can convey knowledge about reality, regardless of the truth of this knowledge. The â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Relevantâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; typeface emerged from a typographic attempt to create a font family with a systematic structure, both in terms of development and design, and, at the same time, maintain optimum legibility and readability.

ABOUT THE PAPER The book is printed in antalis Bioset Cream White 120grs.

contents

INTRODUCTION ARCHITECTURE, A DERIVATIVE PRACTICE

IMITATION, MIMESIS AND COPY FROM MIMESIS & APPROPRIATION TO DERIVATION

NEORENAISSANCE NIHIL DICTUM QUIN PRIUS DICTUM: NOTHING CAN BE SAID WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SAID ALREADY

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB AUTHORSHIP & THE NEW

TYPE AND TYPOLOGY EXPANDED A TAXONOMY OF ARCHITECTURE

THOU SHALT NOT COVET COMMONS & LAWS

SELECTION ARCHITECTURAL PRECEDENTS

134

POSTSCRIPT PREMISES FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE DISCUSSION & PRACTICE OF COPY & DERIVATIVE WORKS

162

CONTRIBUTORS

166

Introduction Architecture, a Derivative Practice

1. Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air (USA: Penguin Books, 1988). Pg. 288

The fate of ‘all that is solid’ in modern life to ‘melt into air.’ The innate dynamism of the modern economy, and of the culture that grows from this economy, annihilates everything that it creates—physical environments, social institutions, metaphysical ideas, artistic visions, moral values—in order to create more, to go on endlessly creating the world anew. This drive draws all modern men and women into its orbit, and forces us all to grapple with the question of what is essential, what is meaningful, what is real in the maelstrom in which we move and live. 1 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, 1988

2. Peter Eisenman, “Terragni and the Idea of a Critical Text,” in Giuseppe Terragni: Transformations, Decompositions, Critiques (New York: Monacelli Press, 2003). Pg 299

The condition of an architectural language constitutes a series of unarticulated repressions, and the formal can be critical precisely because it operates on the borders of historical precedent. While all architecture engages formal components, the formal is potentially critical when it participates in the reinvention of disciplinary languages not simply for the sake of invention alone but as an analytical commentary on disciplinary precedents.2 Peter Eisenman, Terragni and the Idea of a Critical Text, 2003

Architecture is reified by repeating itself. This thesis investigates how architectural knowledge is appropriated and transformed, in order to resume the discussion of copy and derivative works. Architecture has developed through time as the transformation and reinterpretation of a body of knowledge, through processes of appropriation, repetition, iteration, seriality and difference, amongst others. The appropriated knowledge is presented in diverse forms; built, unbuilt and written. And varies from; a discourse, program, physical context, particular formal language, technical feature to a method. All these features lend themselves to being appropriated and thus being used for the production of architecture. Architecture has undergone a process of rejection to copying, derivative works, and a rejection of history as a form of knowledge. Such rejection has been mainly caused by; the semantic transformation the word copy went through, having a positive connotation from its Latin root copia—abundance, plenty, multitude—to the pejorative meaning of copy as a ‘degraded version of an original,’ the emergence of the romantic figure of the author as a genius creator during the renaissance, the establishment of intellectual property laws and the innovation imperative that started with modernity and its capitalistic economy. The reason for the continuous obsession for innovation has for the most part been driven by the creation of new forms. By putting forward the notion of architecture fundamentally as a derivative practice, the thesis criticizes the myth of originality, the unethical view against copying and derivative works, and frees from the innovation imperative surrounding the practice. The project argues that there is a potential for the production of architecture, by transforming our mimetic desire into an operative and projective tool for architectural production. By putting forward premises for the resumption of the discussion and practice of copying and derivative works into architecture. What makes architecture derivative is the constant reformulation and commentaries on ‘disciplinary precedents.’ Derive comes from English deriven, from the French deriver and the Latin derivare (‘to lead, turn, draw off’), from de (‘away’) + rivus (‘a stream’). Derive as a verb in

ARCHITECTURE, A DERIVATIVE PRACTICE

the widest sense is to create something by means of something else, or that stems from something else. Here derivative is understood as anything that is obtained by derivation or stemming from something or several things. Practice is used in order to broaden the discussion and consider both the discipline and the profession of architecture as one. Practice comes from the English practizen, a variation of practisen, from French pratiser, practiser, from Latin practico (‘to do, perform, execute, propose, practise, exercise.’), from prāctica (‘practical affairs’, ‘business’), from Greek πρακτική (prāktikē), from πρακτικός (praktikós, ‘practical’), from πράσσειν (prassein, ‘to do’). Here practice is understood as anything that an architect does, be it writing, drawing, etc. If all architectural knowledge is considered—all its forms, oral, written, drawn and built—as potentially being transformed, practice seizes all architectural actions into one. The project investigates six topics; i. Mimesis, Imitation, Copy & Appropriation, ii. Derivative practices, iii. Authorship, iv. The New, v. Type & Typology, vi. Intellectual property. The first text, ‘From Mimesis & Appropriation To Derivation,’ explores the relation between imitation, mimesis and copy, and traces the origin of the word copy, elaborating on the reasons on why we copy. What drives our mimetic desire and how could it be used for the production of architecture. The second text, ‘Neorenaissance,’ looks at the emergence of architecture as the discipline we know today, expanding on Leon Battista Alberti’s architectural method, particularly how he translated methods used in rhetoric to the production of architecture, what Anke Naujokat has compared to a collage technique. The third text, ‘What Difference Does It Make Who Is Speaking? The Lion Is Made Of Assimilated Lamb. Authorship & The New,’ explores the relation between the emergence of the figure of the author as creator and notions of originality, innovation and creativity, criticizing the figure of the architect genius. The text also argues that copy and derivative works, or repetition in a broadest sense, is in itself the production of the new, what Gilles Deleuze refers to as the production of a new difference, repetition but with difference. The text criticizes the innovation paradigm that emerged with modernity as a constant redefinition and recreation, what Rosalind Krauss has called the myth of originality. The fourth text, ‘Type & Typology Expanded. A Taxonomy,’ argues that the notion of type and working typologically

are architecture’s most derivative practices. The text puts forward an expanded taxonomy of architecture, such taxonomy could allow the coexistence of principle and single case, dialectic between type and model. Considering that architectural objects are assemblages of different types. The fifth text, ‘Thou Shalt Not Covet. Commons & Laws,’ looks at the relation of intellectual property and the notion of the commons in architecture, following the argument of the usage of type, as ideas or principles that cannot be copyrighted, therefore available for appropriation and transformation. The text explores the relation between the emergence of intellectual property and the figure of the author, and the relation between knowledge and cognitive capitalism. The text argues that, architecture should clearly establish what is of public domain and procure that architecture is treated as a common, a collective project. The texts are written investigations, they criticize notions of originality and innovation, and explore copying and repetition with the use of intertextual assemblages, meaning that the texts are composed primarily from fragments of existing texts. Shifting the task of the writer from the production of ‘original’ text to the compilation, classification, selection and assemblage of text. Even though architecture is fundamentally a derivative practice, not everything is produced intentionally with a derivative approach. This thesis is concerned with intentional and operative practices of appropriation, transformation and derivation, opposed to the sea of copycats and plagiarism cases surrounding architecture. Parallel to the texts, a selection of architectural projects that use a conscious derivative approach was redrawn as an act of appropriation in itself and an investigation on architectural precedents. In order not to speculate, all the projects that were selected stated somehow that they were repeating, appropriating or transforming a precedent. The postscript is meant to open up the discussion with a set of premises derived from the texts and the investigated topics. Finally the investigated topics, texts, projects and premises here presented, intend to provide a common ground on which to discuss, and resume copying and derivative works into architecture.

ARCHITECTURE, A DERIVATIVE PRACTICE

IMITATION, MIMESIS AND COPY From Mimesis & Appropriation to Derivation

1. Walter Benjamin, “Doctrine of the Similar,” New German Critique, no. 17 (1933). Pg. 69

The gift which we possess of seeing similarity is nothing but a weak rudiment of the formerly powerful compulsion to become similar and also to behave mimetically.1 Walter Benjamin – Doctrine of the Similar - 1933

2. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Duke University Press, 1991). Pg. 64

3. Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying (Harvard University Press, 2010). Pg. 82

4. Ibid. Pg. 18

5. Ibid. Pg. 18

With the collapse of the high-modernist ideology of style—what is as unique and unmistakable as your own fingerprints, as incomparable as your own body—the very source, for an early Roland Barthes, of stylistic invention and innovation—the producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a now global culture.2 Gabriel Tarde, in The Laws of Imitation (1890), sets out the three principles of universal imitation: a vibratory principle operating at the physical level; a reproductive principle working at the biological level; and imitation working at the social level. All phenomena result from repetition at these various levels, and from the interpenetration of repetitions, which give rise to variation.3 Plato’s writings on mimesis—a word usually translated as ‘imitation’ but also ‘copy,’ ‘representation,’ ‘reproduction,’ ‘similarity,’ or ‘resemblance’—play a key role. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates presents the argument that everything in this world is an imitation, because it is an echo or reproduction of an idea that exists beyond the realm of sensible forms.4 For Martin Heidegger, mimesis means copying, that is, presenting and producing something in a manner which is typical of something else. Copying is done in the realm of production, taking it in a very broad sense. Thus the first thing that occurs is that a manifold of produced items somehow comes into view, not as the dizzying confusion of an arbitrary multiplicity, but as the many-sided individual item which we name with one name.5 In architecture, forms are constructed and buildings designed on the basis of processes of correspondence,

similarity, and difference. The reference points here are extremely varied in character: the program of demands, the physical context, a typological series, a particular formal idiom, a historical connotation. All these elements lend themselves to being treated mimetically and thus to being translated in the design.6 The word copy comes from the Latin word ‘copia,’ meaning ‘abundance, plenty, multitude.’ Copia was also the Roman goddess associated with abundance.7 The word ‘copia’ was in common use, meaning ‘abundant power,’ ‘wealth,’ ‘riches,’ ‘abundance,’ ‘fullness,’ ‘multitude.’ It is derived from ‘cops’—’abundance’—, and ‘cops’ is derived from ‘ops’ and either ‘con’ or ‘co.’ This is a matter of some significance, since it links ‘copia’ to a rather more well-known goddess Ops, who was also a goddess of abundance, associated with the harvest, and with another harvest deity, Consus, who was the protector of grains and of the storehouses in which the harvest was kept.8 Although we no longer associate copying with abundance, but link it rather with the theft or deterioration of an original, and thus a decrease, the phenomena we label ‘copies’ and the activities we call ‘copying’ still manifest this abundance and this increase.9 The copy as an object that is inherently multiple, that is more than one, that is a copy of something, and thus part of an excess or abundance, of a more.10 Copia, according to a contemporary of Erasmus, meant the ‘faculty of varying the same expression or thought in many ways by means of different forms of speech and a variety of figures and argument.’ The three components of rhetoric, inventio—the selection of matter or elements—dispositio—the arrangement of those elements—and elocutio—the style of presentation—did not include imitation per se, but it was understood that the practice of imitation was fundamental to rhetoric. This was a matter of some concern—the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, for example, stressed that good rhetoric could not just be imitation. Thus, we can see a gap opening up between mimesis and copia, between copying understood as a crude act of thoughtless repetition—Quintilian’s main objection to a speech that is solely imitation is that it does not charm the listener—and copying as the many possibilities for variation within the act of repetition.11

FROM MIMESIS & APPROPRIATION TO DERIVATION

6. Hilde Heynen, Architecture and Modernity: A Critique (Mit Press, 2000). Pg. 193

7. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 41

8. Ibid. Pg. 44

9. Ibid. Pg. 42

10. Ibid. Pg. 45

11. Ibid. Pg. 47

12. Ibid. Pg. 48

13. Ibid. Pg. 41

14. Ibid. Pg. 91

15. Ibid. Pg. 27

16. Ibid. Pg. 226

17. Ibid. Pg. 29

18. Ibid. Pg. 79

Copy was used to denote a duplicate of a text as early as the fourteenth century; the more general meaning of ‘something made or formed, or regarded as made or formed, in imitation of something else’ did not emerge until the end of the sixteenth century. It was also around this time that ‘copia,’ which has an affirmative sense of resources, power, or plenty, started to take on a pejorative meaning: the copy as a degraded version of an original. The reasons for this shift are connected with the emergence of the printing press, the book, and other technologies of mass production.12 When we talk about copying today, when controversy around copying occurs, these meanings of ‘copia’—coming to us from before the age of print, the age of mechanical reproduction, or the age of the computer— reassert themselves.13 In every case that one can think of, copying involves repetition. Repetition—a copy repeats, is a repeat of something. But in this act of repetition, as Tarde and others have suggested, something else happens, difference manifests itself in repetition and marks a transformation that happens within repetition.14 Copying in its Platonic form would emerge out of the belief that there is an original object with an essence that could be copied; and this belief could be logically refuted. For if objects really did have essences, there could be no copying of them, since that which one would make the copy out of would continue to have its own essence, and could have only this essence, rather than that essence which is implied by the transformed outward appearance that would make it a copy. Similarly, if the essence of a thing were truly fixed, it could not be transported to the copy, and imitation, even as a degradation of the original, would not be possible.15 Copying cannot be understood without recognizing that the difference between original and copy is merely one of designation, and that both original and copy are ultimately nondual.16 Acts of designation, rather than guarantors of essence; as such, they are impermanent and they can themselves be copied. It is the emptiness of all phenomena, their lack of essence, which makes copying possible; but more important, this emptiness is what makes it possible for anything to appear at all.17 Copying, rather than being the production of a distorted, inferior version of an original, emerges from emptiness and from the impermanence, dependent origination, or lack of essence of all things.18

Copying requires the recognition of a similarity between two things; but without essences, how could there be such a similarity?19 Copying itself is neither good nor bad—it all depends on what it is used for, and what is intended with it.20 Copying can be split into two forms, one good and one bad, the bad one associated with deception, an act of deception. Something is presented in the guise of something else. This something is produced so that its outward appearance corresponds to something else, to something that it is not.21 But the ‘original’ itself is also necessarily an appropriation, translation, and imitation of other materials now presented, packaged, and marketed in ways that objectively constitute deception.22 Copying was an integral part of the visual arts until the eighteenth century, when the rise of originality and authenticity as aesthetic values, and the rise of various forms of intellectual-property law, retrospectively transformed the copier into a forger, and the multiplicity of similar and imitations into fakes. Where copying persisted, in name if not in fact, it was relegated to the applied arts or to folk arts, until the postmodern period, when the pervasiveness of copying in industrial societies was recognized.23 But why do we copy, suppose copying is what makes us human— what then? More than that, what if copying, rather than being an aberration or a mistake or a crime, is a fundamental condition or requirement for anything, human or not, to exist at all?24 Is there anything that does not involve ‘copying’? Indeed, many of the most vibrant aspects of contemporary culture indicate an obsession with the act of copying and the production of copies, and it seems that we find real insight into what human beings and the universe are like through thinking about how and what we copy.25 We live in a culture of downloads, filesharing, networks in which information, data, music, images can be exchanged almost instantaneously.26 Copying is a fundamental part of being human, we could not be human without copying, and we can and should celebrate this aspect of ourselves, in full awareness of our situation.27 Where does the desire of copying comes from, supposing copying is what makes us human, such desire might be caused by; an admiration for what has been done or an

FROM MIMESIS & APPROPRIATION TO DERIVATION

19. Ibid. Pg. 29

20. Ibid. Pg. 10

21. Ibid. Pg. 108

22. Ibid. Pg. 111

23. Ibid. Pg. 116

24. Ibid. Pg. 3

25. Ibid. Pg. 4

26. Ibid. Pg. 5

27. Ibid. Pg. 7

emulative desire, a desire for knowledge, acknowledging the fact that we learn by copying, vast resources at hand which can be appropriated, complete a task with ease or a disregard for innovation.

28. Ibid. Pg. 205 29. Benjamin Buchloh, Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975 (Mit Press, 2003). Pg. 380 30. Ibid. Pg. 385

31. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 205

32. Ibid. Pg. 144

33. Ibid. Pg. 155

All cultural practice appropriates alien or exotic, peripheral or obsolete elements of discourse into its changing idioms. Appropriation— the act of claiming the right to use, make, or own something that someone else claims in the same way. Thinking about appropriation enables us to ask: Who has the right to make a copy?28 The motivations and criteria of selection for appropriation are intricately connected with the momentary driving forces of each culture’s dynamics.29 Appropriation of historical models may be motivated by a desire to establish continuity and tradition and a fiction of identity, as well as originating from a wish to attain universal mastery of all codification systems.30 Most of what we call history is arguably the history of appropriation,31 appropriative practices have been carried out in all fields of human production, from the use of rhetoric, historicism, all the historical neo styles, to appropriation art at the beginning of the twentieth century with the emergence of the modern collage. What has changed respecting the current derivative practices such as collage, assemblage, remix, mash-up, cut-up, amongst others. The assemblage of a new artifact from fragments of preexisting objects or forms is one of the key practices of modernist aesthetics, and can be dated back as far as 1869 when Lautréamont proclaimed the beauty of ‘the chance meeting, on a dissecting table, of a sewing machine and an umbrella.’32 Historically, montage and collage as modernist aesthetic practices date to the early decades of the twentieth century. The scientific context for the ‘discovery’ of these practices includes the formalization of a number of scientific systems which consist of the permutation, by chance or otherwise, of various basic components: chemistry’s periodic table of the elements —Dmitri Mendeleev, 1869—, atomic physics—the electron, the nucleus, quantum physics, the isotope, 1897–1918—, genetics —Gregor Mendel, 1866—and set theory—Georg Cantor, 1874. Technologically, the advent of the camera —1826—, the telephone —1876—, the phonograph —1877—, and the movie camera —1889. 33

Theodor Adorno delivered the following damning critique of montage-based art: ‘But montage disposes over the elements that make up the reality of an unchallenged common sense, either to transform their intention or, at best, to awaken their latent language. It is powerless, however, insofar as it is unable to explode the individual elements. It is precisely montage that is to be criticized for possessing the remains of a complaisant irrationalism, for adaptation to material that is delivered ready-made from outside the work.’34

34. Ibid. Pg. 164

Nicolas Bourriaud has claimed that montage, and other practices of citation, repetition, and appropriation, constitute the core of a contemporary art practice, which he variously names ‘postproduction.’ Bourriaud situates this centrality of montage within the context of globalization, the culture of the DJ as curator, selector, and sequencer of a vast historical and geographical archive, and the Internet as a limitless virtual space of assemblages governed by the logic of the click and the hypertextual trace.35

35. Ibid. Pg. 143

What are the reasons for the contemporary interest and persistent usage of derivative practices, such as collage, assemblage, remix, mash-up, cut-up, etc. Is this just a different way to satisfy our desire to appropriate, imitate or copy? Or is there something more than a mere desire to appropriate? Some of the motives for this could be; acknowledgment or recognition of the potential of produced cultural production, access to material with the advent of digital technologies, a response to the modernist dictum of innovation and originality, and a reaction to cognitive capitalism, due to the way it has fetishized knowledge and the increase of intellectual property laws. One could argue that mainly the current interest and usage of derivative practices lays in two reasons, the compulsion to become similar and behave mimetically and a way to deal with all the knowledge at hand. One thing only seems to hold fairly constant in the vanguardist discourse and that is the theme of originality. Understanding originality here as more than just the kind of revolt against tradition that echoes in Ezra Pound’s ‘Make it new!’ or sounds in the futurists’ promise to destroy the museums that cover Italy as though ‘with countless cemeteries.’ More than a rejection or dissolution of the past, avant-

FROM MIMESIS & APPROPRIATION TO DERIVATION

36. Rosalind Krauss, “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,” The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (1986). Pg 157

37. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 10

38. Ibid. Pg. 21

39. Ibid. Pg. 22

garde originality is conceived as a literal origin, a beginning from ground zero, a birth.36 The Statute of Anne of 1709, the first copyright law, was in part a rearguard effort to protect the rights of the Stationers Company in the face of the effects of the English Revolution; copyright and patent law was inscribed in Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution —1787—, and in a law of 1793 in France; the Russian Revolution was accompanied by a variety of changes to copyright law —which had hitherto been in line with those of bourgeois European law—, including a 1923 decree nationalizing the works of authors such as Tolstoy, Gogol, and Chekhov.37 Intellectual-property law functions through Platonic concepts. Intellectual property law’s three constituent parts—copyright, trademark, and patent law—are each built around the paradox that you cannot protect an idea itself, but can protect only a fixed, material expression of an idea.38Since ideas do not or cannot receive legal protection, intellectual property law encourages those who produce commodities to exaggerate the inevitable distortion of the idea as manifest in the actual object. And the result of this is the kitsch version of originality, ‘thinking outside the box,’ that prevails in the marketplace today.39 Appropriation in architecture is nothing new, from the time of Alberti borrowing methods from rhetoric, the German discussion on style, to the postmodern pastiche, architecture has been appropriating. Postmodern appropriation could be characterised by, a pastiche approach and a ‘parodistic appropriation.’ Each act of appropriation seems to reaffirm precisely those contradictions it set out to eliminate. Parodistic appropriation reveals the divided situation of the individual in contemporary artistic practice. The individual must claim the constitution of the self in original primary utterances, while being painfully aware of the degree of determination necessary to inscribe the utterance into dominant conventions and rules of codification; reigning signifying practice must be subverted and its deconstruction must be placed in a distribution system—the market—, a circulation form—the commodity—, and a cultural legitimation system—the institutions of art—. All these double binds cancel out the effect of avant-garde interference within the signifying practice, and turn it into a renewed

legitimation of existing power structures.40 While pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs: it is to parody what that other interesting and historically original modern thing, the practice of a kind of blank irony, is to what.41 A derivative approach to architecture can be better understood in terms of what Eisenstein called ‘mimesis of principle’ opposed to ‘mimesis of form.42 Derivative practices offer the possibility to appropriate the principles of a given work and combine them with others in order to produce a different outcome under new conditions and context. Architecture is then not reduced to a design problem, instead it involves an appropriation of form and principles, broadening the range of material that can be appropriated, turning architecture into a compositional task. From appropriation to derivation, material needs to be studied, transformed, reformulated, and re-contextualised. Appropriations should not depend on iconic references, getting immersed in an allusive act that only an inner circle of architects will read, instead it should appropriate and transform any kind of architectural knowledge that might be relevant for the given task. A derivative approach to architecture would take advantage of our mimetic desire and change it into a transformative appropriation act, in which architecture is recombined. Appropriation should not be only a commentary of past architecture but a critical combination of architecture, of existing architectural knowledge, rather than translating other cultural production to architecture, considering that architecture has its own language and vast body of knowledge.

FROM MIMESIS & APPROPRIATION TO DERIVATION

40. Buchloh, NeoAvantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975. Pg. 387

41. Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Pg. 64

42. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 148

NEORENAISSANCE Nihil dictum quin prius dictum Nothing can be said which has not been said already

1. Anke Naujokat, “Ut Rhetorica Architectura. Leon Battista Alberti’s Technique of Architectural Collage,” Candide 02(2010). Pg 87

2. Ibid. Pg 85 3. Ibid. Pg 77

4. Ibid. Pg 77

5. Ibid. Pg 77

6. Ibid. Pg 83

Should he find anything anywhere of which he approves, he should adopt and copy it.1 Leon Battista Alberti – De re aedificatoria Book IX, 10 In the fifteenth century Leon Battista Alberti formalized architecture as the practice we know. What is most striking of Alberti’s architectural theory was the contradiction between his idea of authorship in architecture, notions of originality and his architectural method. As a humanist, he had spent years internalizing a methodology that was regarded as valid for the production of literary and rhetorical texts as an art of compilation and recombination.2 These assumptions were transferred to his approach of architectural and artistic design.3 He was not trained to engage in free literary invention—an emphasis that would have been atypical for a humanistic education of the times—but was instead taught to imitate classical literary models. Gasparino da Barzizza showed Alberti how quality literature and rhetoric emerged from the imitation of the classics, and taught him with his own pedagogical texts De imitatione and De compositione to incorporate anecdotes from the classics into their own efforts.4 The first step was inventio, which places emphasis not on independent invention, but instead on discovery, that is, on the compilation and assembly of the arguments and materials required for the effective treatment of a given topic.5 In a second step, students concentrated on dispositio, referring to the selection and arrangement of individual arguments, with an eye directed in equal measure toward the subject matter, the purpose of the discussion, and the anticipated audience. In illustrating the importance of a calculated arrangement of materials and ideas for the effectiveness of an oration.6 The conclusion of the creative process of classical oration as studied and practiced by Barzizza’s Latin students was elocutio, the actual production of the speech through stylistically ingenious verbalizations and the formulation of ideas. Essentially, the iron law of the teaching of imitation in antiquity was to avoid plagiarism, that is to say, to avoid copying a given model directly, and to strive instead to create an original work by transforming

its premises.7 Alberti’s understanding of inventio, then, mirrors his conception of classical rhetoric: inventio is less invention in a sense of the creatio of romanticism, and instead discovery, which is to say the selection, appropriation, manipulation, and recycling of pre-existing materials, and their assembly and reformulation in conformity with the principles of classical rhetoric, including dispositio and elocutio.8 In De re aedificatoria, Alberti indicates that he adapted the collage technique familiar from the art of rhetoric as a methodology for architectural composition and design. He expressly advises the architect who is engaged in designing a funerary chapel, for example, to exploit various prototypes from his collection of models, provided that these seem suitable to the task at hand: ‘Nor will I object if lineaments are incorporated from any other building type, provided they contribute to both grace and permanence.’9 For Alberti, accordingly, every architectural design is—like every literary creation—characterized by a conscious connectedness to proven prototypes, and as paradoxical as this might sound, each derives its originality precisely from this intertextuality.10 With the use of intertextuality and a collage technique, Alberti was able to transpose rhetorical methods into the realm of architectural production. At the same time Alberti created the idea of the architect as an author, by clearly separating the act of designing and the act of building, regarding the design—set of drawings—as the original architectural piece and the building as a copy. Architecture was established as what Mario Carpo has called an ‘allographic, notational and authorial art.’11

7. Ibid. Pg 83

8. Ibid. Pg 87

9. Ibid. Pg 93

10. Ibid. Pg 93

11. Mario Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm (MIT Press, 2011). Pg 44

A clear example of Alberti’s collage technique is the sepulchre in the Cappella Rucellai. The Tempietto Rucellai was commissioned to Alberti in order to reproduce the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The Florentine Tempietto of the Holy Sepulcher is an outstanding object for exploring the practical implementation of Alberti’s conception of design as derived from his knowledge of rhetoric. The visual language of this work of miniature architecture betrays an astonishing affinity for the forms of literary expression favored by the humanist. When engaging in architectural design, and in ways analogous to the procedures

NEORENAISSANCE

12. Naujokat, “Ut Rhetorica Architectura. Leon Battista Alberti’s Technique of Architectural Collage.” Pg 93

of rhetorical and literary production, Alberti handles a repertoire of knowledge and anecdotes of the most various provenance confidently, and without shying away from joining the contradictory and the incongruous. In selecting his elements, he always ensures that a highly diverse vocabulary supports and reinforces a unified rhetorical intention, the architectonic statement toward which he is striving. Both the shrine-style miniaturization of the Tempietto by means of the crowning lily element and its monumentalization by means of the classical frieze inscription are intended to present the building as a venerated, reliquary-style triumphal monument to the Risen Christ.12

13. Ibid. Pg 93

Alberti’s architectural eclecticism even involves the adoption of non-classical details. The rhetoric of the Tempietto of the Holy Sepulcher is not restricted to an architectural vocabulary of ancient Roman provenance, but is also enriched by local idioms as well as by tried-and-true and appropriate locutions drawn from other contexts, for example medieval or Oriental traditions, to the extent that these can be integrated with his architectural intentions.13

14. See AD, The Innovation Imperative: Architectures of Vitality. Volume 83 Issue 7 January/February-2013

Alberti’s contradiction was on the one hand establishing the image of the architect as an author and on the other hand transgressing authorship by collecting, appropriating and collaging anything at hand. If architecture was founded as the discipline we know today by Alberti, using a collage approach to architectural production, one could say that architecture was founded on derivative principles. If architecture was a derivative practice at the time of Alberti, when did this collage method stopped being used? When did innovation in architecture become an imperative? When did architecture become an innovative practice? Was architecture ever innovative or original?14 Six centuries later, a similar approach to Alberti’s cultural production is taking place. More and more derivative methods are used among different fields of cultural production, from the pictorial collage to the musical remix, selection, appropriation, manipulation, and recycling of pre-existing materials, and their assembly and reformulation seem to be the current mode of production. Not new since appropriation and imitation are human practices that go far before the renaissance. In 1915, the historian and philosopher of art Heinrich

Wölfflin defended a cyclical view of the evolution of man-made forms, which would swing from classical sobriety to baroque fancifulness, then back to reason, and so on ad infinitum.15 Are we experiencing a swing ‘back’ from ‘innovative’ parametric baroque to a derivative neorenaissance? Under the label of postproduction, Nicolas Bourriaud notes that since the early nineties, an ever increasing number of artworks have been created on the basis of pre-existing works; more and more artists interpret, reproduce, re-exhibit, or use works made by others or available cultural products.16 These artists who insert their own work into that of others contribute to the eradication of the traditional distinction between production and consumption, creation and copy, readymade and original work.17 Notions of originality—being at the origin of—and even of creation—making something from nothing—are slowly blurred in this new cultural landscape marked by the twin figures of the DJ and the programmer, both of whom have the task of selecting cultural objects and inserting them into new contexts.18 The artistic question is no longer: ‘what can we make that is new?’ but ‘how can we make do with what we have?’ In other words, how can we produce singularity and meaning from this chaotic mass of objects, names, and references that constitutes our daily life?19 Here is important to distinguish singularity rather than originality, whereas originality has an authorial connotation singularity is something exceptionally good, great or remarkable, singularity frees production in general from originality and its dependency on authorial ideas, inventiveness and novelty.20

15. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg 83

16. Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World (Lukas & Sternberg, 2005).. Pg.13

17. Ibid. Pg 13

18. Ibid. Pg 13

19. Ibid. Pg 17

20. oxforddictionaries. com

The difference with what Bourriaud has noticed in the field of artistic production and architectural production is a matter of intent and the use of cultural references. While art has been able to surpass and transgress—to a certain extent—notions of originality, creativity and authorship, architecture is caught up in copyright and plagiarism discussions. Should architecture appropriate all cultural references, translating anything into architecture or should it remain within its own field? Not to say that architecture is an autonomous practice but that architecture has a vast body of knowledge that can be appropriated without the need of using external influences. What is the difference between this ‘new’ mode of production and the humanist mode in

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the renaissance? Is the contemporary DJ similar to the renaissance architect, collecting and recombining? To what extent are appropriation art and postproduction similar? Is it the same modus operandi but under a different cultural condition? What are the consequences of the immediate access to knowledge and media, and the advent of digital technologies? Much has changed since the renaissance, in terms of means of production and reproduction, what advantages or obstacles does digital technologies pose to derivative methods relying on compiling and combining? What possibilities could derivative methods offer for the production of architecture, under the contemporary sociocultural condition and the use of digital tools?

21. Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying (Harvard University Press, 2010). Pg 21

The contemporary interest and usage of derivative work seems to be a response or a reaction to the modernist dictum of innovation and originality. Now we are going back to renaissance modes of production in which culture was produced by means of collecting, appropriating, reformulating and mixing. What nowadays is called the remix culture is nothing but a neorenaissance an appropriation culture. The current stage of capitalism, cognitive capitalism, has fetishized knowledge, Intellectual-property law functions through Platonic concepts. Its three constituent partsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;copyright, trademark, and patent lawâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;are each built around the paradox that you cannot protect an idea itself, but can protect only a fixed, material expression of an idea.21 As a reaction to this we are experiencing an increasing interest, discussion and usage of derivative practices. Bourriaud has mentioned that the history of appropriation remains to be written, is it possible that this history is still to be written due to the ubiquity of appropriation, in the sense that all production on one form or another is an act of appropriation and reformulation.

22. Ibid. Pg. 205

Most of what we call history is arguably the history of appropriation.22

‘…tante cose tante varie poste in uno e coattate e insite e ammar ginate insieme, tutte corrispondere a un tuono, tutte aguagliarsi a un piano, tutte estendersi a una linea, tutte conformarsi a un disegno.’ Leon Battista Alberti - ed. Grayson 1960–1973, vol. II: 162 ‘various things joined together into one, and in such a way that all are aligned with one another, unified with one another, so that all produce the same tone, correspond to a plan, extend along a single line, conform to a design.’ Engl. trans. Ian Pepper.

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WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB Authorship & the New

I 1. Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author,” The Foucault Reader, New York: Pantheon Books (1984). Pg. 108 2. Ibid. Pg. 120 3. Adolf Loos, “Heimatkunst, 1914,” in Trotzdem (Vienna: Georg Prachner Verlag, 1982). Pg 130

First of all, discourses are objects of appropriation.1 What difference does it make who is speaking? 2 Enough of the original geniuses! Let us repeat ourselves unceasingly! 3

4. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 105

It is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating—after Nietzsche—that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by the author’s disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers.4

5. Tim Anstey, Katja Grillner, and Rolf Hughes, Architecture and Authorship (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2007). Pg. 6

Among the myths that appear central to the development and maintenance of the discipline of architecture from its modern beginnings is the notion of authorship. From the fifteenth century architects have staked their claims, defended their territories and maintained their status through arguments modulated around subtly changing notions of authorship and intention.5

7. Ibid. Pg. 9

If architects claim to be authors, one might ask, first, exactly what are they authoring?6 This is to investigate the nature of architectural action and the context for this action. Second, who is to be identified with the role of authoring in architecture—and who is excluded from such an account? This is to consider the challenges that exist to the hegemony of architects in the fashioning of the built environment.7

8. Ibid. Pg. 6

Despite provoking a range of responses and attitudes, authorship provides a kind of topography for architectural action, therefore, forming a conceptual surface that allows architecture to develop as a coherent discipline.8

9. Ibid. Pg. 7

The author is a construction produced out of the work as vice versa.9

6. Ibid. Pg. 6

From Leon Battista Alberti to Cedric Price, architectural figures and the debates and theories that surround them oscillate around paradoxes and ambiguities that emerge from the projection of the

‘classical’ model that produces a link between a work and an ‘authorial’ creator.10 The concept of authorship in architecture has always been tied to questions of architectural responsibility, but since the beginning of modernity, it increasingly raises issues of copyright, and underlines a blind quest for originality, somewhat shifting the emphasis from the work and its appropriateness to the individuality of the creative mind.11 One thing only seems to hold fairly constant in the vanguardist discourse and that is the theme of originality. Understanding originality here as more than just the kind of revolt against tradition that echoes in Ezra Pound’s ‘Make it new!’ or sounds in the futurists’ promise to destroy the museums that cover Italy as though ‘with countless cemeteries.’ More than a rejection or dissolution of the past, avantgarde originality is conceived as a literal origin, a beginning from ground zero, a birth.12

10. Ibid. Pg. 9

11. Louise Pelletier, “Genius, Fiction and the Author in Architecture,” in Architecture and Authorship, ed. Tim Anstey, Katja Grillner, and Rolf Hughes (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2007). Pg. 92

12. Rosalind Krauss, “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,” The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (1986). Pg 157

Since the Renaissance, and certainly since the Enlightenment, the concept of invention has been associated with the idea of rupture, a breaking away from traditions or conventions and their forms and practices.13

13. Tom Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention,” Oase Invention, no. 74 (2007). Pg. 2

Invention denotes the moment when the supposed ‘genius’ of the architect-artist comes to the surface, when new expressions or solutions appear suddenly, without earlier announcement.14

14. Ibid. Pg. 2

The new does not arrive from some ‘other place’—transcendence— but is produced from the very matter of the world, after all what else is there? And where else can the new come from? The new then involves a recombination of already existing elements in and of the world—a new dice throw as Deleuze might say.15 The new would then be a repetition, but with difference.16 The new—as it is figured in science, or indeed, the humanities—is really just more of the same—more ‘knowledge’ as it were.17

15. Simon O’Sullivan, “The Production of the New and the Care of the Self,” in Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New, ed. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008). Pg 91 16. Ibid. Pg 91

17. Ibid. Pg 94

In 1914 Adolf Loos wrote: ‘Architects failed when they wanted to

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

18. Loos, “Heimatkunst, 1914.” Pg. 122 19. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, “Technology Architecture (Speech Delivered at Iit, 1950),” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture, ed. Ulrich Conrads (London: 1970). Pg. 154 20. Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention.” Pg. 2

21. Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” Image, music, text (1977). Pg. 142

reproduce the ancient styles and they are failing now after having tried without success to discover the style of our times.’18 Almost forty years later Mies van der Rohe was equally cautious about generating formal inventions, stating that: ‘architecture has nothing to do with the invention of forms . . . Architecture depends on its time. It is the crystallisation of its inner structure, the slow unfolding of its form.’19 These statements indicate that, despite the declared ambition of modern architects to break away from the past, inventions in architecture are never the result of a total renunciation of the existing.20 II The author is a modern figure, a product of our society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, of, as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person’. It is thus logical that in literature it should be this positivism, the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology, which has attached the greatest importance to the ‘person’ of the author.21 The very term auctor—from which author is derived—was very late to garner the connotations of originality with which it is today (dis) credited. Of the four terms from which auctor is held to derive, the three Latin verbs don not imply any sense of textual mastery. Agere, ‘to act or perform’, is close to the Medieval Barthesian ideas of the scriptor as acting through a text which in some sense precedes its performance, augere, ‘to grow’, for all its organicist resonances, does not suggest that the text originates with its author. Auieo, ‘to tie’, derived from the poetic lexicon and referred to the connective tissue—metre, feet, etc.— by which pets such ad Virgil structure their verses—in which regard it is more pre-figurative of the structuralist notions of bricolage and authors as assemblers of codes than the concept of author as a creative potency. Only the fourth root, the Greek noun autentim, ‘authority’, is suggestive of authorship as hegemonic, and even here the idea of authority is entirely remote from that of in the first instance from their relation to tradition and ultimately from canon. If the Medieval view of the book could be unanchored from its theological moorings, it is unlikely that anti-authorial theories would find much to contest in this

structural placement of the author.22 The coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences.23 It would be worth examining how the author became individualized in a culture like ours, what status he has been given, at what moment studies of authenticity and attribution began, in what kind of system of valorization the author was involved, at what point we began to recount the lives of authors rather than of heroes, and how this fundamental category of ‘the man and his work criticism’ began.24

22. Sean Burke, Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh, 1995). Pg XVII 23. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 101

24. Ibid. Pg. 101

Prior to the nineteenth century, the author was defined less in terms of the individual who held most control over the end product than in the mind that generated the intention for a project. Consequently, the author of a medieval cathedral was more likely to be identified with the patron who ordered the construction than with the Master Mason who supervised the construction. In the Renaissance, with the development of tools of representation, the process by which an idea was conveyed— through drawings and their translation—became a determining factor The architect, through his ability to convey the intention of a project, was considered the true author of a building even if the process of construction was delegated to a third party.25

25. Pelletier, “Genius, Fiction and the Author in Architecture.” Pg. 97

As it emerged historically, therefore, the notion of the authorial work appeared to bind production to the individual creator, suggesting that there is something of the ‘self’ in the work—the work becomes in some sense the ‘property’ of the creator. And it is worth noting, in this respect, that the patriarchal notion of an author ‘fathering’ his text, rather as God purportedly ‘fathered’ the world, has been an enduring myth in Western literary thought, metaphorically linking the male author with the authority of writer, deity, mid paterfamilias.26

26..Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 9

Within classical and medieval thought, mimesis—be it Plato’s notion of an artist copying a natural world that is itself an inferior copy of the higher realm of Ideas or Aristotle’s theory of imitation as the representation of a significant action—allows very little room for

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

27. Ibid. Pg. 8

authorial inventiveness. Instead poets and tragedians were deemed to work within pre-established systems, rules or conventions of the sort specified in Aristotle’s Poetics. As Sean Burke observes, other manifestations of this paradigm of authorship include medieval designations of the artist as copyist working within long established traditions, Russian Formalist notions of the author as craftsperson, the Structuralist concept of the writer as an impersonal assembler and arranger of literary codes, and traditional Marxist criticism of the Lukacsian variety wherein the author’s primary duty is not to his or her inner feelings, but to allow the truth of a historical moment to find its expression within the text.27

28. Leon Battista Alberti et al., On the Art of Building in Ten Books (The MIT Press, 1988). IX, 10

[T]o make something that appears to be convenient for use, and that can without doubt be afforded and built as projected, is the job not of the architect but of the workman. But to preconceive and to determine in the mind and with judgement something that will be perfect and complete in its every part is the achievement of such a mind as we seek.28

29. Mario Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm (MIT Press, 2011). Pg 71

The modern history of architecture as an authorial art began with a building, Brunelleschi’s dome for the cathedral of Florence; but the new definition of architecture’s allographic and notational status came into being only with Leon Battista Alberti’s theory and his treatise, De re aedificatoria.29

30. Tim Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action,” in Architecture and Authorship, ed. Tim Anstey, Katja Grillner, and Rolf Hughes (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2007). Pg 20

Alberti claims that there is a structural distinction between the building as physical object, over which the builder rules, and the building as idea, which is the architect’s province and it becomes clear that architects do not ‘make’ buildings; they make representations of buildings.30 Alberti endowed architectural discourse with a continuing relationship with rhetoric, which continued to condition the way in which architectural discourse developed through to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Much of the radical quality of De re aedificatoria emerges out of the way in which Alberti translated terms and ideas from one category of intellectual activity into another, in this case from the studia humanitatis, which addressed the complexities of contemporary

life through the medium of ancient texts, to the ‘Art of Building’. Both Alberti’s discourse on the architectural object, and that on the architect, have their origins in models and ideas adapted from antique texts on oratory ethics and law, particularly those of Cicero.31

31. Ibid. Pg 18

In oratory the condition where the relationship between a composition and its context is convincing was called decorum— appropriateness. In the best known accounts from antiquity, particularly that of Cicero, the persuasiveness of actions in oratory is thus read in terms of their appropriateness ‘in context’, and this context, as much as the content of the actions themselves, guarantees their decorous nature. It is this assumption that is moved over to discussions about ‘appropriate action’ in architecture—that what will be appropriate in one place is not correct in another—because of the relation between that architectural action and its context.’32

32. Ibid. Pg 20

Alberti asserts the presence in the phenomenal object of a single persuasive, this quality is distinct from the building’s physical presence, and its existence is evidence of the will and mind of a—single— ‘creator’. The architect as author/artist has arrived.’33

33. Ibid. Pg 19

According to Alberti an architect may claim an authorial link to a work, but not necessarily an authoritative one.34

34. Ibid. Pg 19

When did architecture evolve from its pristine autographic status as a craft—conceived and made by artisan builders—to its modern allographic definition as an art—designed by one to be constructed by others?35

35. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg 16

An original, autographic work—for example, a painting made and signed by the artist’s hand—is the unmediated making of its author. But in the Albertian, allographic way of building the only work truly made by the author is the design of the building—not the building itself, which by definition is made by others.36

36. Ibid. Pg 22

A building and its design can only be notationally identical: their identicality depends on a notational system that determines how to translate one into the other. When this condition of notational

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

37. Ibid. Pg 23

identicality is satisfied, the author of the drawing becomes the author of the building, and the architect can claim some form of ownership over a building which in most cases he does not in fact own, and which he certainly did not build—indeed, which he may never even have touched. The transition from Brunelleschi’s artisanal authorship—’this building is mine because I made it’—to Alberti’s intellectual authorship—’this building is mine because I designed it.’37

38. Ibid. Pg x

Two instances of identicality were crucial to the shaping of architectural modernity. The first was Alberti’s invention of architectural design. In Alberti’s theory, as mentioned previously, a building is the identical copy of the architect’s design; with Alberti’s separation in principle between design and making came the modern definition of the architect as an author, in the humanistic sense of the term. After Alberti’s cultural revolution, the second wave of identical copies in architecture came with the industrial revolution, and the mass production of identical copies from mechanical master models, matrixes, imprints, or molds.38

39. Ibid. Pg 25

Thanks to the cultural and technical logic of mechanical replication, authorship was extended from the author’s original to all identical copies of it.39

40. Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action.” Pg 20

41. Ibid. Pg 20

What is implicit in the argument of De re aedificatoria, yet remains invisible in the text, is the potential use of visual representation as a rhetorical tool.40 The Albertian definition of the architect as a figure produces a tendency to read architectural intention primarily through an analysis of the architectural ‘work’—whether built or otherwise. This reading of architecture introduced habits that can appear long-lived in architectural history and criticism. Once intention must be read in projected buildings the habit of reading works of architecture as objects—like pieces of art, things with discreet beginnings and ending points—becomes established.41 Alberti created an important equivalence between the architect and the ‘work’ in that he attributes to both a similar responsibility to

define their places in the world through persuasion. Taken to its logical conclusion, this double responsibility created space in architectural discourse for a final notion that was to re-emerge during the late twentieth century—that of context.42

42. Ibid. Pg 20

A certain number of notions that are intended to replace the privileged position of the author actually seem to preserve that privilege and suppress the real meaning of his disappearance. The first is the idea of the work. What is a work? What is this curious unity which we designate as a work? Of what elements is it composed? 43 Is it not what an architect has composed?

43. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 103

The word work and the unity that it designates are probably as problematic as the status of the author’s individuality.44

44. Ibid. Pg. 104

III In literary studies the author has appeared variously as a scribe, medium, prophet or genius—i.e. as a vessel for external inspiration that originates from the divine, from Nature or from recreational drugs, Coleridge’s Kiibla Khan being a celebrated example of the latter—or as an exceptional individual—a visionary an embodiment of universal human spirit, a scientific experimenter, one capable of creatio ex nihilo— creation out of nothing—actively shaping the materials thus produced. Burke, refines this distinction as dependent on whether cultural production is regarded as an inspirational or an imitative practice.45

45. Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 8

The personifications of the artist, for example, as a persona mixta, which arose out of the intersection of humanist discourse and jurisprudence in fifteenth century Italy and which fixed much of the modern idea of the artist as a producer of unique works, imbued that figure both with the facility to articulate in terra firma the divine beyond the confines of the world and, specifically’ to use existing material to create ‘something from nothing.’46

46. Ibid. Pg. 8

The modern representation of the author as the originator and proprietor of a special commodity—the oeuvre—is held to derive from a blend of Lockean discourses of property and selfhood with the eighteenth century discourse of original genius.47

47. Ibid. Pg. 9

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

48. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 108

Systems of ownership at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century-the possibility of transgression attached to the act of writing took on, more and more, the form of an imperative peculiar to literature.48

49. Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 9

The figure of the Romantic author accordingly, by virtue of stamping the imprint of a unique personality on original works, takes them into ownership and thereby provides the paradigm and reference point for intellectual property law—as well as for author personality cults, a strategy that remains effective today for shifting units in saturated markets.49

50. Pelletier, “Genius, Fiction and the Author in Architecture.” Pg. 92

From the middle of the eighteenth century in Europe, a work of imitation came to have a definite derogatory meaning and its author was criticised for lack of imagination, while a mind of genius was celebrated for its ability to transcend rules and create new forms and ideas. Soon, the expression ‘fire and genius’ had become a well-known expression of praise in architectural discourse.50

51. Ibid. Pg. 92

Preceding Nicolas Le Camus de Mezieres’, ‘The Genius of Architecture, Or the Analogy of That Art With Our Sensations’ by only a decade, Jacques-François Blondel also discusses at length the distinction between talent, taste and genius in his Cours d’architecture. The man of talent, he writes, is an individual who is well versed in the theory of architecture and in the practice of building construction, but who produces nothing that might depart from principles and proportions established by traditional authority. The man of genius, Blondel continues, also needs to be familiar with all the rides of the art, but is guided in his choices by a higher form of inspiration and an enthusiasm that will free him from enslaving rules. He knows how to create the different genres and assign the proper character to a building; he will take advantage of the natural conditions of a site and the available materials. Most importantly, the man of genius will produce creations that surpass the masterpieces they were meant to imitate.51 For Le Camus, however, rules were no longer dictated from Antiquity but were drawn from other disciplines such as theatre, music, and literature. Le Camus’s theory of architectural expression assumes

that all shapes, colours, light, and texture employed in the design of a building convey to the senses specific predictable sensation in the observer.52

52. Ibid. Pg. 93

The article ‘Genie’ from Denis Diderot’s Encyclopedie describes a mind of genius not in its rationality or its ability to formulate complex abstract concepts, but rather in its great sensitivity. A mind with a fertile imagination combines ideas to create new concepts, by transcribing abstract ideas into sensitive ones. The genius not only uses memory and association to create new meanings for a particular object, but also engages her/his mnemonic faculty to transform the tragic into the terrible and the beautiful into the sublime, to animate matter and to colour the mind by re-enacting every sensation.53

53. Ibid. Pg. 93

The article from the Encyclopedie also traces the origin of the word ‘Genie’ in classical mythology. The genies were beings whose bodies were made of an aerial substance and who inhabited the vast realm between the sky and the earth. These subtle spirits were considered to be ministers sent by gods to mediate in human affairs. As inferior divinities, the genies were immortal like gods but felt passions like humans. They were assigned to protect specific humans during their life and to guide their souls after death. From this interpretation, genie came to mean the human soul delivered and detached from the human body.’ This notion of freedom of the mind and proximity to the divine remained the most powerful attributes of the genius, and still lingers— even if secretly—in the highest aspiration of the contemporary author.54

54. Ibid. Pg. 93

According to Étienne Bonnot de Condillac’s definition, the philosophical constructions of a mind of genius do not rest on reason, nor can they be appreciated in terms of truth or falseness. They are more akin to poems, revealing their meaning through the beauty of proportions. This analogy with literary works became an important model for artists and architects in the eighteenth century Following the radical changes in the nature of architectural expression brought about by Claude Perrault’s questioning of the Vitruvian canon, the proportions of the architectural orders lost some of their natural legitimacy as the shared language of architecture.55

55. Ibid. Pg. 93

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56. Tim Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action,” ibid. Pg 21

57. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg 44

The crucial changes that turned architecture into a profession in the middle nineteenth century, through the establishment national institutes, can be read in terms of a more or less clear reification of the shadowy authority that results from the Albertian definition of the architect.56 Alberti’s definition of architecture as an authorial, allographic, notational art held sway until very recently, and defines many if not all of the architectural principles that the digital turn is now unmaking.57 IV

58. Ibid. Pg 24

Most extant classical texts were mosaics of citations, interpolations, additions, subtractions, and plain copy errors.58

59. Barthes, “The Death of the Author.” Pg. 142

It will always be impossible to know, for the good reason that all writing is itself this special voice, consisting of several indiscernible voices, and that literature is precisely the invention of this voice, to which we cannot assign a specific origin: literature is that neuter, that composite, that oblique into which every subject escapes, the trap where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes.59

60. Ibid. Pg. 142 61. Ibid. Pg. 144

As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins.60 Accepting the principle and the experience of several people writing together.61 The modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now. The fact is—or, it follows—that writing can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’—as the Classics would say—; rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative, a rare verbal form—exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense—in which the enunciation has

no other content—contains no other proposition—than the act by which it is uttered.62

62. Ibid. Pg. 146

The scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than imitate the book and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred.63

63. Ibid. Pg. 147

The total existence of writing is revealed: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination.64 Roland Barthes questioned the relevance of the author to the work, thereby liberating the text from the automatic presumption of its holding a fixed and unified meaning.’ By this argument the act of writing becomes one of severance; it is the reader, for Barthes, not the author who endows a text with its meaning. He understood the assignation of the link between works and authors, together with the confirmation of authorial status that it implies, as habitual—something socially produced and subject to challenge.65 A common criticism of Barthes’ work has been how his argument forces him to construct an over- simplified—some would say idealised or even ‘heroic’—author, whose very existence prior to suffering a Barthesian death may be questioned.66 There appears to be a paradox at the core of the Western concept of literary authorship; mastery of the materials of authorship in their passage from idea, inspiration or commission to audience involves a surrendering of self-mastery—to influences ‘beyond one’s control’ such as divine afflatus or Romantic inspiration—combined with a highly disciplined command of materials—and therefore self.67

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64. Ibid. Pg.148

65. Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 7

66. Ibid. Pg. 8

67. Ibid. Pg. 8

68. Ibid. Pg. 9

While in literature this shift was mortgaged to the development of post-structural theory in architecture it was related on one hand to technology particularly the growth of computer technologies, and on the other to the rise of user-oriented—participatory—design.68

69. Carola Ebert, “PostMortem: Architectural Postmodernism and the Death of the Author,” in Architecture and Authorship, ed. Tim Anstey, Katja Grillner, and Rolf Hughes (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2007). Pg. 45

‘The Death of the Author’ is interesting for this discussion in that it presents three protagonists, the author, the reader and the scriptor, among whom the location of significance and meaning of any text is negotiated. Barthes’ text shifts focus onto the reader, who individually recreates the text in the act of reading, and onto a new writer or scriptor whose writing is based on the intertextual, and thus implicitly quotational practice of all reading and writing.69

70. Ibid. Pg. 46

When one system is superimposed on another, the subject—the architect—is erased. Barthes wants the critic, or reader in general, to take an active role as producer of meaning.70

71. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 102

We can say that today’s writing has freed itself from the dimension of expression. It is an interplay of signs arranged less according to its signified content than according to the very nature of the signifier. In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.71

72. Ibid. Pg. 102

Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he writes, the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality. As a result, the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the dead man in the game of writing.72

73. Ibid. Pg. 103

None of this is recent; criticism and philosophy took note of the disappearance—or death—of the author some time ago.73

74. Ibid. Pg. 105

To imagine writing as absence seems to be a simple repetition, in transcendental terms, of both.74

75. Ibid. Pg. 108

The author function is characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society.75 A characteristic of the author function is that it does not develop

spontaneously as the attribution of a discourse to an individual.76

76. Ibid. Pg. 110

It would be just as wrong to equate the author with the real writer as to equate him with the fictitious speaker; the author function is carried out and operates in the scission itself, in this division and this distance.77

77. Ibid. Pg. 112

1. the author function is linked to the juridical and institutional system that encompasses, determines, and articulates the universe of discourses; 2. it does not affect all discourses in the same way at all times and in all types of civilization; 3. it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to its producer, but rather by a series of specific and complex operations; 4. it does not refer purely and simply to a real individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects positions that can be occupied by different classes of individuals.78

78. Ibid. Pg. 113

‘Founders of discursivity.’ They are unique in that they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. Freud is not just the author of The Interpretation of Dreams or Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Marx is not just the author of the Communist Manifesto or Das Kapital: they both have established an endless possibility of discourse. On the other hand, when speaking of Marx or Freud as founders of discursivity, it is meant, that they made possible not only a certain number of analogies, but also —and equally important— a certain number of differences.79

79. Ibid. Pg. 114

What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself?80

80. Ibid. Pg. 120

Like Barthes, Foucault acknowledges authorship as a social construction; unlike Barthes, he also suggests that the mechanisms of authorship are enduring and might usefully reveal the mechanisms of society. To study how what he termed the ‘author-function’ operates differently across disciplines is to reveal much about such disciplines, their legitimising institutions and the allegiances in their discourses. Foucault accordingly historicises the author-function and its

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81. Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 7

attachment to varying kinds of texts in different discursive cultures.81

82. Barthes, “The Death of the Author.” Pg. 146

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning—the ‘message’ of the Author-God—but a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.82

83. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 109

A reversal occurred in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. The author function faded away, and the inventor’s name served only to christen a theorem, proposition, particular effect.83

84. Ibid. Pg. 118

The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning. As a result, we must entirely reverse the traditional idea of the author. We are accustomed, as we have seen earlier, to saying that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations.84

85. Ibid. Pg. 118

The author does not precede the work.85

86. Barthes, “The Death of the Author.” Pg. 143

The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author ‘confiding’ in us.86

87. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 119

Since the eighteenth century, the author has played the role of the regulator of the fictive, a role quite characteristic of our era of industrial and bourgeois society, of individualism and private property, still, given the historical modifications that are taking place, it does not seem necessary that the author function remain constant in form, complexity, and even in existence.87

88. Barthes, “The Death of the Author.” Pg. 146

The writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to express himself, he ought at least to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to ‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely.88

Making good architecture is like learning to speak all over again. Everything that has already been said is fundamental; all the words already exist. So they do not have to be created in an inventive way, but employed in an intentional way. The result is new sentences, which emerge in conjunction with their grammar, and yet never—if done correctly—end up as complete nonsense.89

89. Kersten Geers, “Intentions, Inventions,” Oase (2013). Pg 13

V Two important observations. First, that although the subject of authorship in architecture might seem to be one that has been projected recently into the limelight, the ambiguities and challenges that precipitate that emergence are long established. Architecture as a discipline is arguably defined by the complex issue of how we define architects as authors; if the issue of how we define authorship in architecture is currently ‘at stake’, this is merely to acknowledge that a long-standing ambiguity is again accorded the significance it deserves for architectural practice. Second, that the new discourse on architectural authorship, and the new paradigms of authorship in architecture that are currently being suggested, are neither a clarification, an advance nor a solution to some traditional and clearly defined ‘problem.’ Rather, contemporary discussions around architectural authorship can be read within a complex fabric of accounts that both react to changing temporal conditions and that introduce conditions of change.90

90. Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 9

It can be suggested that the complexities unfolding from the definition of the architect in De re aedificatoria conditioned the way in which architecture developed as a discipline from the sixteenth, through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. The class of the decorous appears to have had a long and lasting fascination for architects, who habitually frame their arguments around the trope of appropriateness. The fact that architects during the gestation of and at the birth of Modernism used a moralised rhetoric of appropriateness, defined in terms of societal ‘need’, to argue their case, did nothing to undermine the authority of this category; modern debate and criticism was thus played out on a field that, to a certain extent, took the moral authority of ‘the fitting’ as its given topography.91

91. Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action.” Pg 22

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92. Ibid. Pg 21

93. Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes, Architecture and Authorship. Pg. 10

94. Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action.” Pg 24

Cedric Price and Colin Rowe are intriguing specifically in relationship to the question of architecture’s engagement with rhetoric. The lines of thought developed in their work between 1960 and 1970 can be seen to operate on three similar fronts: to query what is the nature of architectural action; to question the sovereignty of the architectural ‘work’; and to challenge the sovereignty of the architect as author of the work.92 Cedric Price promoted the idea of architecture as ‘service’ and which questioned the status of the architect as artist. The career and architectural rhetoric of the English architect Cedric Price, 1934-2003, can be seen as emblematic of the period. Price contested the ground on which architectural actions take place, a challenge made particularly evident in the body of architectural production—drawings, diagrams notes and correspondence—that defines a project like the Fun Palace.93 The Fun Palace was developed by an interdisciplinary team and was to be a building with an open programme, whose form and organisation should be steered and temporarily altered by its users. Its authorship was proclaimed as diffused in relation to the object, therefore, both in terms of promoting the notion of a team rather than an individual initiator, and in terms of the hoped-for relation between occupation and spatial definition in the building. The project was to ‘redesign’ an invisible topography of contractual and institutional conditions that surrounds architecture as object. The Fun Palace also questioned the status of visual imagery as the benchmark for defining architectural projects. This seems entirely logical given Price’s position. The rhetorical control of ‘drawing’ must be seen as one of the principle tools by which the traditional hegemony of the architect was maintained.94

95. Ibid. Pg 24

Price’s activities began to suggest that traditional architectural drawing was no longer sufficient for the action of producing architecture.95

96. Ibid. Pg 25

Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter’s Collage City reconfigured the idea of the ‘project’ produced by the ‘architect figure’ as a category. This alignment can be seen in one sense as a shift in concern from single buildings to the city.96The emphasis on collage readmitted to

architectural thought the category of the fragment; and suggested a sophisticated means to evaluate the happenstance of reality according to its correspondence with a preconceived ‘projection’ of ideal architectural forms.97

97. Ibid. Pg 26

Rowe and Koetter shared with other proponents of contextualism a tendency to define boundaries in the city that reflected forces other than authorial architectural intention. The emblematic example used to represent this condition in ‘Collage City’ is the Villa Adriana, Hadrian’s Villa at Tivoli outside Rome.98

98. Ibid. Pg 26

Like Alberti’s twinning, which relied on the categories of rhetoric, this identity places ‘context’ as a central issue for architecture.99

99. Ibid. Pg 26

From its resurrection as a term during the 1960s, context was used to describe the physical, and often specifically historic, surroundings of a project. It was as a term used within an extremely object-based interrogation of architecture. Yet it is noteworthy that the discourse on context and Price’s questioning of the nature of architectural action developed contemporaneously and that both see the experiential space around architectural projects on one side the space of institutional and contractual relations, on the other the physical space of the city—as profoundly important. In this sense Price’s iconoclastic challenges can be linked into the emergence of this discourse on context, in which Colin Rowe’s engagement was central.100

100. Ibid. Pg 25

Price espoused a highly contingent version of authorship in relation to the control of architectural projects, particularly at the urban level. Partly this appears ideologically connected with the perception that architects in the mid-twentieth century pretended an authority over the built environment that they did not deserve and which did damage. Partly it appears the result of his acknowledgement of the fluidity of the context, political and social, in which architectural decisions must be made.101

101. Ibid. Pg 27

Self-evidently, neither Price nor Rowe had problems with being an ‘author’ in the latter sense. What is refreshing, both reassuringly familiar and radical about both Price and Rowe is the way in which they

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102. Ibid. Pg 27

relax into the realm of rhetoric; they clearly eschew dictatorial authority for demonstration.102

103. Carola Ebert, “Post-Mortem: Architectural Postmodernism and the Death of the Author,” ibid. Pg. 43

Rowe and Koetter suggest that the strategy of bricolage may present a way to liberate architecture from this restrictive ideology. For this discussion, they make use of the work of French structural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and his concept of bricolage. LeviStrauss terms bricolage ‘a ‘prior’ rather than primitive activity’ on the level of speculation. Rather than a specialist operating from a grand scheme, the bricoleur is a versatile ‘odd-job-man’ who works with material that is at hand and has already been used.103

104. Claude LéviStrauss, The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1966). Pg. 19

It might be said that the engineer questions the universe while the ‘bricoleur’ addresses himself to a collection of oddments left over from human endeavours.104

105. Ebert, “PostMortem: Architectural Postmodernism and the Death of the Author.” Pg. 44

Rowe and Koetter thus simultaneously rethink the authorial role of the architect, via the bricoleur, and suggest architectural appropriations of collage as potential new means of authorship. By arguing for an incorporation of bricoleur qualities into the role of the architect, Collage City aims not only for an extended responsiveness to the world but also for the ability to address problems individually without the need for a new meta-theory as ‘blueprint’.105

106. Ibid. Pg. 45

A close relationship between collage and bricolage is already suggested by Levi-Strauss’ description of collage as ‘the transposition of ‘bricolage’ into the realms of contemplation’, and it also resonates in Werner Oechslin’s critical statement that—despite more obvious suggestions that the term collage holds for architecture —Collage City ‘in the best tradition of art history’ uses the term primarily as an abstraction collage as a state of mind. Collage City also counters the dominance of formal and functional aspects in canonised Modernism with a stimulating contemplation of materiality and a sensibility towards surface qualities innate to the visual syntax of collage.106 Rowe and Koetter, like Price, challenged the sovereignty of the architect at an urban level. Collage City asserted that the line around any authorial ‘set piece’ in a composition could not be considered to

have any sure status of closure—that the region that existed outside that line, that was defined by the collection of many such lines, was of equal status for the success of failure of the work. And to take account of this condition they advanced the model of the architect as bricoleur, one who reacts to the situation at hand and who, although predisposed to a take a particular path, can act like ‘a dog straying or a horse swerving from its direct course to avoid an obstacle’. The actions of this figure, like those of Price’s architect, are likely to be contingent, a contingency that has much to do with a specific distrust of unilateral authorial ‘vision’ at the urban level.107

107. Tim Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action,” ibid. Pg 27

The questioning of the architect’s position in relation to authorship, authority and representation, which began in the twentieth century discourse of Collage City and of Cedric Price, appears to have a valuable legacy. It allows historical conditions to be brought into perspective and forms the platform for new definitions of architectural action in the future.108

108. Ibid. Pg 27

With regard to architectural authorship, it is important to note how postmodernist theories are combined with the practice of montage, and seamlessly developed into a disjunctive approach to architectural design that is based on the idea of the fragment and on the formulation of various strategies for its superimposition, montage or collision with fragmented forms or unexpected programmatic contents.109

109. Carola Ebert, “Post-Mortem: Architectural Postmodernism and the Death of the Author,” ibid. Pg. 42

Collage City, and Bernard Tschumi’s early writings, 1975-1984, as assembled in his book Architecture and Disjunction, both explicitly employed modern artistic practices based on fragmentation as a critique of modern architecture.110

110. Ibid. Pg. 40

A very general notion of montage aligns the term with collage and assemblage in that it contains ‘preformed natural or manufactured materials, objects, or fragments’. Peter Bürger characterised avantgarde artwork by the importance of the key principle of montage, in which discrepancies and dissonances are imported by way of its being constructed from fragments that are separated from a contextual origin and made to take on new relationships.111

111. Ibid. Pg. 41

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112. Ibid. Pg. 42

Tschumi’s works must be seen in the light of surrealist and dadaist actions, especially because of his regular habit of juxtaposition. His strategy, then, is to further disjunction, via ‘cross programming’ or ‘transprogramming’, and he establishes a design method based on fragmentation and montage practices such as irrational combination and superimposition.112

113. Ibid. Pg. 43

Tschumi’s Parc de la Villette project in Paris in which three different systems of lines, points and surfaces are each to represent ‘a different and autonomous system —a text—, whose superimposition onto another makes impossible any ‘composition’, maintaining differences and refusing ascendancy of any privileged system or organizing element.113

114. Ibid. Pg. 45

Collage City and, Architecture and Disjunction have in common that in their critique of architectural Modernism, drawn from innumerable sources outside the discipline of architecture, they employ fragmentary Modernist practices for a critical re-affirmation of architecture in the light of the ‘postmodern condition.’114

115. Ibid. Pg. 48

Tschumi’s theory of architecture assumes a homogeneous coherence at least for the cultural world. His critique and his architectural theory are grounded in the seamless applicability of other discourses’ theories for the discourse of architecture. In the process of transposition, the content of each theory and its relevance for the architecture are not questioned, nor is the compatibility of different theories with each other at all addressed.115

116. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg 47

Once an esoteric modernist theory, now an ordinary postmodern practice, the death of the author affects today but one, particular, time-specific category of authors: the author of identical, mechanical copies—the modern, Albertian author.116

117. Rene Girard, “Innovation & Repetition,” in Architects & Mimetic Rivalry, ed. Samir Younes (Winterbourne: papadakis, 2012). Pg 41 118. Ibid. Pg 42

VI As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, innovation became the god that we are still worshipping today.117 The new cult meant that a new scourge had descended upon the World ‘stagnation’. Before the eighteenth century, ‘stagnation’ was unknown; suddenly, it spread its gloom far and wide.118

Is there such a thing as ‘absolute innovation’? 119

119. Ibid. Pg 46

Innovation, from the Latin innovare, innovatio, should signify renewal, rejuvenation from inside, rather than novelty, which is its modern meaning in both English and French. Judging from the examples in the Oxford English Dictionary and the Littré, the word came into widespread use only in the sixteenth century and, until the eighteenth century, its connotations were almost uniformly unfavourable. In the vulgar tongues, as well as in medieval Latin, the word is used primarily in theology, and it means a departure from what by definition should not change—religious dogma.120

120. Ibid. Pg 39

Hostility to innovation is what we expect from conservative thinkers, but we are surprised to find it under the pen of authors whom we regard as innovators. When Calvin denounces ‘l’appétit et convoitise de tout innover, changer et remuer’—the appetite and desire to innovate, change, and stir up everything.121

121. Ibid. Pg 40

A social and political component is present in all this fear of the new, but something else lies behind it, something religious that is more archaic and pagan than specifically Christian. The negative view of innovation reflects an external mediation, a world in which the need for and the identity of all cultural models is taken for granted. People mutually accuse each other of being bad imitators, unfaithful to the true essence of the models. Not until a little later, with the great querelle des anciens ct des modernes, does the battle shift to the question of which models are best, the traditional ones or their modern rivals?122

122. Ibid. Pg 40

The reason, for the change in meaning, was the shift away from theology, and even philosophy, toward science and technology. The foul smell of heresy finally dissipated and was instantly replaced by the inebriating vapours of scientific and technical progress.123

123. Ibid. Pg 42

As in most semantic revolutions, rhetoric plays a role, but more than rhetoric is involved. The world that reviled innovation was changing very fast, faster, no doubt, than at any previous time in its history, but the world that exalts innovation has been changing even faster. Our little

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124. Ibid. Pg 42

revolution coincides with two big ones that have not yet completed their course: the democratic revolution and the industrial revolution. The latter is rooted in a third, the scientific revolution.124

125. Antoine Picon, “Architecture, Innovation and Tradition,” Architectural Design 83, no. 1 (2013). Pg. 128

In technology and economics, experts usually distinguish between ‘invention’ and ‘innovation’ by contrasting the new as a mere singularity, with newness as a spreading phenomenon that changes entire fields of practice.125

126. Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention.” Pg. 2

Invention denotes the moment when the supposed ‘genius’ of the architect-artist comes to the surface, when new expressions or solutions appear suddenly, without earlier announcement. Since the Renaissance, and certainly since the Enlightenment, the concept of invention has been associated with the idea of rupture, a breaking away from traditions or conventions and their forms and practices.126

127. Girard, “Innovation & Repetition.” Pg 42

The negative view of innovation is inseparable from a conception of the spiritual and intellectual life dominated by stable imitation. Being the source of eternal truth, of eternal beauty, of eternal goodness, the models should never change. Only when these transcendental models are toppled can innovation acquire a positive meaning. External mediation gives way to a void in which, at least in principle, individuals and collectives are free to adopt whichever models they prefer and, better still, no model at all.127

128. Ibid. Pg 43

During the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, as the passion for innovation intensified, the definition of it became more and more radical, less and less tolerant of tradition, that is, of imitation. As it spread from painting to music and to literature, the radical view of innovation triggered the successive upheavals that we call ‘modern art.’ A complete break with the past is viewed as the sole achievement worthy of a ‘creator’.128

129. Picon, “Architecture, Innovation and Tradition.” Pg. 129

The past decades have been marked by a strong tendency to neglect historical references.129 But why are history and historical consciousness so important? The answer perhaps lies in the strong self-referential character of

the architectural discipline. From the Renaissance to the end of the eighteenth century, at the time when the doctrine of imitation still prevailed in the arts, theorists often remarked that whereas painting and sculpture imitate nature, architecture had a propensity to imitate itself. Architecture is partly based on the meditation of its former achievements as well as its shortcomings. Modernism did not break with this self-reflexive stance, and now modern architecture itself has become a legacy that must be reinvested with new meaning.130

130. Ibid. Pg. 132

In the case of architecture, self-referentiality does not mean that external conditions do not matter; to the contrary. 131

131. Ibid. Pg. 132

The relation to the past represents in reality a convenient way for architectural design to open itself to the challenges of the present without becoming trapped by its limitations. To be aware of its legacy makes design more receptive to the unforeseeable future that true innovation entails. It appears as the necessary stabiliser that makes the passage from mere novelty to widespread change—from invention to innovation—possible in the field of design.132

132. Ibid. Pg. 132

Another way to understand the role of history is to recognise that architecture is as much a tradition as a discipline. A tradition, a living tradition that is not something static. At each stage it implies transmission, but also a series of reinterpretations as well as abandons, the price to pay for innovation.133

133. Ibid. Pg. 133

In its freewheeling rewriting of the past, architecture uses history as a slingshot into the future. It endlessly re-stages itself, self-consciously folding its own past into its future, rewriting its own myth into its very fabric. At the same time it legitimises its new propositions by embedding them within lineages of existing languages, materials and typologies. The re-enactment’s repetition of the existing helps to naturalise the shock of the new, declaring itself an inevitable product of historical circumstance. Architecture, then, mythologizes its own creation while making a historical argument for itself and proposing a future world—all within the substance of its own body.134

134. Sam Jacob, Make It Real: Architecture as Enactment (Strelka Press, 2012). Pg. 7

‘It is easier to imitate than to innovate.’ 135

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135. Girard, “Innovation & Repetition.” Pg 45

136. Ibid. Pg 45

This conception is false, its falsity is easier to show in some domains than in others. The easiest illustration is to be seen in contemporary market economies. In a vigorous economy, it is a matter of survival, pure and simple. Business firms must innovate in order to remain competitive. 136

137. Ibid. Pg 45

Competition, from two Latin words, cum and petere, means to ‘seek together’. What all businessmen seek is profits; they seek them together with their competitors in the paradoxical relationship that we call ‘competitive’.137

138. Ibid. Pg 46

By imitating its successful competitors, an endangered firm can innovate in relation to itself; it will thus catch up with its rivals, but it will invent nothing really new.138

139. Ibid. Pg 46

The specificity’ of innovation is not denied. But simply observing that, concretely, in a truly innovative process, it is often so continuous with imitation that its presence can be discovered only after the fact, through a process of abstraction that isolates aspects which are inseparable from one another.139

140. Ibid. Pg 47

All imitators select models whom they regard as superior. In ‘internal mediation’, models and imitators are equal in every respect except one: the superior achievement of the one, which motivates the imitation of the other. This means, of course, that the models are successful at their imitators’ expense. Unlike external mediation, the internal variety is a reluctant mimesis that generally goes unrecognized because it hides behind a bewildering diversity of masks.140

141. Ibid. Pg 48

The tendency to define ‘innovation’ in more and more ‘radical’ and anti-mimetic terms—the mad escalation that was briefly sketched earlier—reflects a vast surrender of modern intelligence to this mimetic pressure, a collective embrace of self-deception which Marx himself, for all his insights, remarkably exemplifies. Marx sees competitiveness as an unmitigated evil that can and should be abolished, together with the free market, the only economic system that, for all its faults, channels the competitive spirit into constructive efforts instead of exacerbating it to the level of physical violence or discouraging it entirely.141

The urge to imitate successful rivals is so abhorrent that all forms of mimesis must be discredited. Instead of re-examining imitation and discovering its conflictual dimension, the eternal avant-garde has waged a purely defensive and ultimately seif-destructive war against it. In the arts, the scorched- earth policies of the recent past have led to a world in which radical innovation is so free to flourish that there is little difference between having it everywhere and having it nowhere at all.142 Most people still try to convince themselves that our ‘arts and humanities’ will remain forever ‘creative’ and ‘innovative’, fuelled by ‘individualism’, but even the most enthusiastic espousers of recent trends are beginning to wonder Innovation is still around, they say, but its pace is slackening.143

142. Ibid. Pg 49

143. Ibid. Pg 50

The Latin word innovare implies limited change rather than total revolution—a combination of continuity and discontinuity. The main prerequisite for ‘real innovation’ is a minimal respect for the past and a mastery of its achievements, that is, mimesis.144

144. Ibid. Pg 50

At the beginning of the Modern Age, the power of identical copies arose from two parallel and almost simultaneous developments: on the one hand, identicality was an intellectual and cultural ambition of the Renaissance humanists; on the other, it would soon become the inevitable by-product of mechanical technologies, which it has remained to this day.145

145. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg 44

Inventions in architecture are hardly ever the result of a total renunciation of the existing.146 After Alberti’s cultural revolution, the second wave of identical copies in architecture came with the industrial revolution, and the mass production of identical copies from mechanical master models, matrixes, imprints, or molds. Industrial standardization generates economies of scale—so long as all items in a series are the same.147

146. Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention.” Pg 2

147. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg x

Mechanization was changing the world, and architecture had to rise to the challenge. Architects should invent new architectural forms, made to measure for the new tools of mechanical mass production;

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148. Ibid. Pg 13

and town planners should invent new urban forms, made to measure for the new tools of mechanical mass transportation. For the rest of the twentieth century many architects and urbanists did just that. Oddly, many architects and urbanists are still doing that right now, as they ignore, or deny, that today’s machines are no longer those that Le Corbusier and his friends celebrated and sublimated almost a century ago.148

150. Ibid. Pg 14

The new architectural books in print—manuals, treatises, pattern books, etc—changed the course of architecture first and foremost because of the printed images they contained.149 The most successful spin-off of this media revolution was the new ‘method’ of the Renaissance architectural orders—the first international style in the history of world architecture.150

151. Ibid. Pg X

The modern power of the identical came to an end with the rise of digital technologies. All that is digital is variable, and digital variability goes counter to all the postulates of identicality that have informed the history of Western cultural technologies for the last five centuries.151

152. Ibid. Pg 11

The sequential chronology of these three technical ages—the ages of hand-making, of mechanical making, and of digital making—lends itself to various interpretations. Some objects were still handmade well into the mechanical age, and some will still be handmade, or mechanically made, well into the age of digital making. But, by and large, the second break in this sequence, the passage from mechanically made identical copies to digitally generated differential variations, is happening now. The first break, the transition from artisanal variability to mechanical identicality, occurred at different times in the past—depending on the classes of objects and technologies one takes into account.152

153. Ibid. Pg 12

For centuries the classical tradition was based on the recording, transmission, and imitation of architectural models. In turn, this tradition, or transmission, was and still is dependent on the media technologies that are available, at any given point in time, to record a trace of such models and to transmit them across space and time.153

149. Ibid. Pg 13

The capacity to mass-produce series of no identical items led to a new range of theoretical and practical issues. The idea of nonstandard seriality, as this mode of production is often called.154

154. Ibid. Pg 40

Nonstandard seriality, in turn, already contains the seeds of a potentially different authorial approach. As digital fabrication processes invite endless design variations —within given technical limits—and promise to deliver them at no extra cost, the question inevitably arises as to who is going to design them all.155

155. Ibid. Pg 42

The bottom line seems to be that digital technologies are inherently and essentially averse to the authorial model that rose to power with mechanical reproduction, and is now declining with them.156

156. Ibid. Pg 44

The copy must be distinguished from the imitation—which seeks to act as the original—and plagiarism—which wants to erase or deny the presence of the original. To copy is to approach the new from the oblique, to swerve away from traditional notions of authorship, originality, and creativity. The copycat works as an editor, a choreographer, and a connoisseur. Of primary importance to the copycat is how to pick and choose, remix, blend, add, shake, share, crop, and cut.157

157. Alex Maymind, “Copycat,” Conditions, no. 2 (2009). Accessed November 15, 2013, http://alexmaymind. com/Copycat Pg. 2

Whether at the scale of copying a mullion detail, copying an elusive style, copying a theoretical idea, copying a method, copying unknowingly, copying as serial repetition, to copying as appropriation, quotation, and sublimation, all the way to copying a building, and the exportation of cultural artifacts, copying is ingrained in the very nature of architectural culture. Copying liberates architecture from proliferating platitudes, endless repetition of popular clichés, and antiquated psychological limitations.158

158. Ibid. Pg 2

The copycat believes that the very notion of the original has become out of sync with today’s multivalent culture and that instead a work is never closed or complete but can continue to move, update and evolve.159

159. Ibid. Pg 2

At any given moment architecture projects its historical situation— the great teeming mass of narratives that prefigured its existence—into

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

160. Jacob, Make It Real: Architecture as Enactment. Pg. 5

the contemporary world. And in doing so it fundamentally rewrites that history, splicing and sewing the narratives together to make a radical new proposition for the future.160

161. Ibid. Pg. 5

In contrast to written history, architecture’s victorious narrative manifests itself as reality. It not only represents and illustrates this fictional history but physically embodies it, playing it out through substance, space and programme.161

162. Ibid. Pg. 5

In Greek architecture too we can read architecture’s compulsion to re-enact. Not only is the Egyptian column re-staged in the Doric, Ionic and Corinthian orders, but re-enactment generates the entire language of classical architecture through the re-staging of primitive timber Greek temples.162 VII

163. Krauss, “The Originality of the AvantGarde.” Pg 157

One thing only seems to hold fairly constant in the vanguardist discourse and that is the theme of originality. Understanding originality here as more than just the kind of revolt against tradition that echoes in Ezra Pound’s ‘Make it new!’ or sounds in the futurists’ promise to destroy the museums that cover Italy as though ‘with countless cemeteries.’ More than a rejection or dissolution of the past, avantgarde originality is conceived as a literal origin, a beginning from ground zero, a birth.163

164. Ibid. Pg 157

Now, if the very notion of the avant-garde can be seen as a function of the discourse of originality, the actual practice of vanguard art tends to reveal that ‘originality’ is a working assumption that itself emerges from a ground of repetition and recurrence. One figure, drawn from avant-garde practice in the visual arts, provides an example. This figure is the grid.164 In saying that the grid condemns artists not to originality but to repetition, it is not suggested a negative description of their work. Instead trying to focus on a pair of terms—originality and repetition—and to look at their coupling unprejudicially; for within the instance we are examining, these two terms seem bound together in a kind of aesthetic

economy, interdependent and mutually sustaining, although the one— originality—is the valorized term and the other—repetition or copy or reduplication—is discredited.165

165. Ibid. Pg 160

We can see that modernism and the avant-garde are functions of what we could call the discourse of originality, and that that discourse serves much wider interests—and is thus fuelled by more diverse institutions—than the restricted circle of professional art-making. The theme of originality, encompassing as it does the notions of authenticity, originals, and origins, is the shared discursive practice of the museum, the historian, and the maker of art.166

166. Ibid. Pg 162

What would it look like not to repress the concept of the copy? What would it look like to produce a work that acted out the discourse of reproductions without originals, that discourse which could only operate in Mondrian’s work as the inevitable subversion of his purpose, the residue of representationality that he could not sufficiently purge from the domain of his painting? The answer to this, or at least one answer, is that it would look like a certain kind of play with the notions of photographic reproduction that begins in the silkscreen canvases of Robert Rauschenberg and has recently flowered in the work of a group of younger artists whose production has been identified by the critical term pictures.167

167. Ibid. Pg 168

Roland Barthes. In his characterization, in S/Z, of the realist as certainly not a copyist from nature, but rather a ‘pasticher,’ or someone who makes copies of copies. As Barthes says: To depict is to . . . refer not from a language to a referent, but from one code to another. Thus realism consists not in copying the real but in copying a —depicted— copy. . . . Through secondary mimesis [realism] copies what is already a copy.168

168. Ibid. Pg 168

In deconstructing the sister notions of origin and originality, postmodernism establishes a schism between itself and the conceptual domain of the avant-garde, looking back at it from across a gulf that in turn establishes a historical divide.169

169. Ibid. Pg 170

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

170. Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention.” Pg. 4

Invention in architecture involves an engagement with traditions, which resurface and become visible in the new. Invention cannot be separated from a deep, if intuitive knowledge of the repository of formal and technical solutions that an architect inherits.170

171. Ibid. Pg. 8

In a culture that treats architecture as purveyor of entertaining images, it could be said that the need for invention is more than amply satisfied. Creating architecture is not served by looking for the exceptional. On the contrary, invention in architecture thrives on a precise understanding of precedents, technical requirements and conventions.171

172. Picon, “Architecture, Innovation and Tradition.” Pg. 129

A characterisation of what ‘true innovation’ means in architecture, is namely a reflexive stance on history and tradition. Such a stance constitutes one of the prerequisites of long-term design innovation. Without it, architectural change remains at the level of superficial trend and fashion.172

173. Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention.” Pg. 8 174. Irénée Scalbert, “Invetion and the Market,” ibid.Pg. 140

Re-discovering architecture itself through the generation of knowledge paired with intellectual independence, and responsibility.173 Architecture has become a pleasing and often absurd diversion within the larger plot of modernity.174

175. Ibid.Pg. 140

The market, it appears, has been more favourable to the creation of successful townscapes than it has to the design of great buildings.175

176. Ibid.Pg. 140

A warning sign of collapse was the relentless search for novelty. More and more new varieties came on the market to challenge established favourites.176

177. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke, “Introduction,” in Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008).Pg. 4 178. Ibid.Pg. 9

Today this euphoria of creation operates in the everyday, and is a favoured buzz-word of capitalism’s new entrepreneurial class.177 The production of the new proposes a schizo-aesthetics against schizo-capital, a logic of sensation against a logic of profit, embodied in strategies succinctly summarized by Deleuze, and extendable to all strategies of resistance.178

The question then is not whether capitalism also colonizes the virtual/produces the new—it most certainly does—but rather what types of relationship might there be with the virtual, with the new and so on.179

179. O’Sullivan, “The Production of the New and the Care of the Self.” Pg 97

Paradoxically, our culture is one of both instant gratification generated by the media saturation of images and simultaneously one in which the original, unique, and new object is regarded as the sign of progress. While architecture has already passed through a period where copying and engaging history was a central design strategy and a major theoretical issue, currently questions of why have never been overshadowed as much by more recently pressing questions of how.180

180. Maymind, “Copycat.” Pg 2

Today, copying seeks to emancipate potential futures and not archaeologize the past.181

181. Ibid. Pg 2

Copying problematizes the linear progression of history, and brings forth questions in relation to historicism and historiography. The question is not one of reference—i.e. from where did you copy? —but one of affects—what is the new result and for whom?182

182. Ibid. Pg 2

Copying today wants to repeat the lessons of the past without being simply repetitive. Instead, copying today begs the question: what kind of repetition can be theorized that is not simply emulative, historicist, or pastiche?183

183. Ibid. Pg 3

Not only can anyone copy, everyone already has copied. Yet to be a copycat is to not simply copy but to think and benefit from copying in an unexpected way.184

184. Ibid. Pg 3

Emancipate history into an active source.185

185. Ibid. Pg 3

To copy is not to refuse the creative potential of our discipline but to engage it wholeheartedly.186

186. Ibid. Pg 3

Copying once worked best after dark, when the lights were off and no one could see you. Now it thrives in broad daylight.187

187. Ibid. Pg 3

Through the unfolding of architectural history we see culturally, technologically or programmatically redundant fragments of

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188. Jacob, Make It Real: Architecture as Enactment. Pg. 6

architecture re-enacted. In each case, this re-enactment of a preexisting image is a radical new iteration.188

189. Ibid. Pg. 7

Fast-forwarding through history, we see Greek architectural language stretched around new Roman typologies. We see architecture’s classical language resurrected—and re-invented—to ennoble and legitimise Renaissance culture. We see medieval forms of construction re-enacted by the arts and crafts movement as a means of opposition to the industrial revolution—a visual, material and structural analogue to its proto-socialist politics. And we see modernism’s appropriation of the language of industrial buildings, where the grain stores of Buffalo, for example, are cited by Le Corbusier as ‘the magnificent first fruits of the new age’. Modernism’s re-performing of industrial architecture’s logics of mechanisation and efficiency operated as a polemic. First it was a way of undermining the social and political hierarchies that Beaux-Arts architecture represented. Secondly it allowed modernism to lay claim to a pre-existing machine aesthetic, to propose an architecture already embedded in the contemporary condition it described.189

190. Ibid. Pg. 6

What architecture chooses to re-enact, as well as the manner of its re-enactment, constitutes an ideological statement.190 VIII

191. Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and the Production of the New,” in Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New, ed. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008). Pg. 153 192. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Columbia University Press, 1994). Pg. 136

The production of the new, that is, the production of a new difference.191 The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, remains forever new, just as the established was always established from the outset, even if a certain amount of empirical time was necessary for this to be recognized. What becomes established with the new is precisely not the new. For the new—in other words, difference—calls forth forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognized and unrecognizable terra incognita.192 For Deleuze, the conditions of the new can be found only in a

principle of difference-or more strongly, in a metaphysics of difference. If identity—A is A—were the primary principle, that is, if identities were already pre-given, then there would in principle be no production of the new—no new differences.193

193. Smith, “Deleuze and the Production of the New.” Pg. 151

If the new means ‘what did not exist earlier’ then everything is new. On the other hand, one can say with almost equal assurance, and with the writer of Ecclesiastes (1 :9-10), that there is nothing new under the sun: the dawn of today was just like the dawn of yesterday, and simply brings with it more of the same.194

194. Ibid. Pg. 151

The concept of the new in Deleuze, which resists this threat, attempts to lay out the conditions under which novelty itself would become a fundamental ontological concept—Being = Difference = the New.195

195. Ibid. Pg. 151

In Deleuze’s theory of repetition—temporal synthesis—the present plays the role of the foundation, the pure past is the ground, but the future the ungrounded or unconditioned, that is, the condition of the new.196

196. Ibid. Pg. 154

When a differential relation reciprocally determines two—or more—virtual elements, it produces what is called a singularity, a singular point.197 For Deleuze, the question ‘What is singular and what is ordinary?’ is one of the fundamental questions posed in Deleuze’s ontology, since, in a general sense, one could say that ‘everything is ordinary!’ as much as one can say that ‘everything is singular!’198

197. Ibid. Pg. 156

198. Ibid. Pg. 157

An assemblage of ordinary and singular points constitutes what Deleuze calls a multiplicity—a third concept. The singularities are precisely those points where something ‘happens’ within the multiplicity.199

199. Ibid. Pg. 156

At the very least, Deleuze is breaking with a long tradition which defined things in terms of an essence or a substance—that is, in terms of an identity. He replaces the traditional concept of substance with the concept of multiplicity, and replaces the concept of essence with the concept of the event.200

200. Ibid. Pg. 157

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201. Ibid. Pg. 158

The problem of causality stems from the fact that an event A causes event B, B causes C, C causes D and so on, and that this causal network stretches indefinitely in all directions. If we could grasp the totality of these series, we would have the World. But in fact, we cannot grasp this infinite totality. The true object of the idea of the world is precisely this problem, this causal nexus. When, rather than grasping it as a problem, we instead think of it as an object —the World—and start posing questions about this object—’Is it bounded or endless?’ ‘Is it eternal or did it have a beginning?’—, we are in the domain of a transcendental illusion, prey to a false problem.201

202. Simon O’Sullivan, “The Production of the New and the Care of the Self,” ibid., ed. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. Pg 92

A certain depth, or move beyond the horizontal plane of matter—the ‘what-is’. Put simply, the new involves accessing something outside’ the present plane of existence. The new might be rephrased here as freedom, freedom from habit and from he present plane of purely utilitarian interests.202

204. Jacob, Make It Real: Architecture as Enactment. Pg. 6

In this place the new—as it is figured in science, or indeed, the humanities—is really just more of the same—more ‘knowledge’ as it were.203Through the unfolding of architectural history we see culturally, technologically or programmatically redundant fragments of architecture re-enacted. In each case, this re-enactment of a preexisting image is a radical new iteration.204

205. Ibid. Pg. 23

Architecture constantly repeats itself, re-enacts its own body in order to create itself. It repeats typologically, where genres of programme such as house or tower block are reiterated countless times. Even in architecture’s most novel formations, fundamental architectonic forms repeat: floor, wall, door and so on.205

206. Ibid. Pg. 24

We might even say that architecture only achieves its reality through replication, when its forms, aesthetics or materiality appear in multiple sites, to the point where its qualities achieve total ubiquity—and architecture becomes a totalised environment on a planetary scale.206

203. Ibid. Pg 94

When Mies said it was better to be good than original, perhaps he meant that originality is a problem because it impairs architecture’s ability to provide a totalising system for the world, whereas repetition

sharpens architecture’s innately mimetic core.207

207. Ibid. Pg. 24

Architecture’s repetitive mode turns away from endless creativity, preferring instead the endless cycle of re-enactment that has the same quality as any ritual.208

208. Ibid. Pg. 24

This repetitive mode is not explicitly one of re-enactment. That is to say, repetition is less explicit than re-enactment, in that it does not attempt to manufacture a copy or a replica of a past event or structure. In fact, there is no relationship of original to copy, of referent to reference, or even of signifier to signified—they are all equivalents, all enactments of each other.209

209. Ibid. Pg. 26

Once may be exceptional, twice is coincidence, three or more and the serial nature of architecture begins to operate, each iteration reinforcing its fabrication of reality, its manufacture of the commonplace.210

210. Ibid. Pg. 26

Architecture’s repetitive and mimetic mode allows it to make an image of itself. As it repeats itself, architecture uses building as a medium to represent architecture. Repetition, then, does not necessarily condemn us to the production of direct simulations, but can be a method by which radical change is achieved.211

211. Ibid. Pg. 27

Is it enough to affirm a recombination of matter in order to produce something new? For example, a new art—or indeed a new subjectivity? Would this not merely involve playing with that which is already here, already has reality as it were? Or, following Deleuze, would not such a recombination involve playing with that which is ‘possible’, the latter being a mirror-image or isotope of the real.212

212. O’Sullivan, “The Production of the New and the Care of the Self.” Pg 91

Architecture’s own history is one of radical re-enactment of its own pasts—the Egyptian stone version of the wooden column, for example. But architecture’s mode of repetition is not only confined to its past, nor to exceptional examples. In the way that it repeats an image of an actual ceiling, and in its modular repetition to form this image, it presents us with an example of how architecture uses repetition to become real. 213

213. Jacob, Make It Real: Architecture as Enactment. Pg. 23

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

214. Anstey, “Architecture and Rhetoric: Persuasion, Context, Action.” Pg. 26

If the sovereign architect is a myth—architectural actions are carried out in, and are subject to, a technical, political and institutional topography which conditions such actions—and if the self-sufficiency of the project asserted by modernism is a myth—projects have an equally large responsibility to the surroundings they cannot control as they do to the contents which they can—then in both cases the explosion of this myth is based on the significance of the surroundings for any architectural action.214

215. Foucault, “What Is an Author.” Pg. 118

216. Ibid. Pg. 118

The author does not precede the work.216

217. Ibid. Pg. 119

We are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function. When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inverts it, one has an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.217

218. Avermaete et al., “Editorial, Architecture and Moments of Invention.” Pg. 8

In a culture that treats architecture as purveyor of entertaining images, it could be said that the need for invention is more than amply satisfied.218

219. Ibid. Pg. 8

Creating architecture is not served by looking for the exceptional. On the contrary, invention in architecture thrives on a precise understanding of precedents, technical requirements and conventions. Re-discovering architecture itself through the generation of knowledge paired with intellectual independence, and responsibility.219 Invention in architecture involves an engagement with traditions,

which resurface and become visible in the new. Invention cannot be separated from a deep, if intuitive knowledge of the repository of formal and technical solutions that an architect inherits.220

220. Ibid. Pg. 4

The band, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription—and not of expression—traces a field without origin - or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins.221

221. Barthes, “The Death of the Author.” Pg. 146

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning—the ‘message’ of the Author- God—but a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.222

222. Ibid. Pg. 146

223. Ibid. Pg. 146

In the case of architecture, self-referentiality does not mean that external conditions do not matter; to the contrary. 224

224. Picon, “Architecture, Innovation and Tradition.” Pg. 132

The relation to the past represents in reality a convenient way for architectural design to open itself to the challenges of the present without becoming trapped by its limitations. To be aware of its legacy makes design more receptive to the unforeseeable future that ‘true innovation’ entails. It appears as the necessary stabiliser that makes the passage from mere novelty to widespread change—from invention to innovation—possible in the field of design.225

225. Ibid. Pg. 132

In this place the new—as it is figured in science, or indeed, the humanities—is really just more of the same—more ‘knowledge’ as it were.226

226. O’Sullivan, “The Production of the New and the Care of the Self.” Pg 94

Poggio and Alberti were active wikipedists of the late scribal age.227

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHO IS SPEAKING? THE LION IS MADE OF ASSIMILATED LAMB

227. Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm. Pg 24

TYPE & TYPOLOGY EXPANDED A Taxonomy of Architecture

The better we know tradition—i.e., ourselves—and the more responsibly we deal with it, the better things we shall make similar, and the better things we shall make different.

1. Gerhard Richter, Gerhard Richter: Text: Writings, Interviews and Letters, 1961-2007 (Thames & Hudson, 2009). Pg 129

Gerhard Richter1 I 2. Werner Oechslin, “Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion of Typology,” assemblage, no. 1 (1986). Pg 37

The discussion of typology was at the front ranks in architectural circles in the 1960s and early 1970s, but has lately fallen back to the second echelon.2 Crisis, sustainability and parametricism now take all the headlines instead.

3. Brett Steele, “Going against Type,” in Working in Series, ed. Christopher M. Lee and Kapil Gupta (London: Architectural Association, 2011). Pg. 2

Over the past years, architecture has lost much of the historical knowledge by which it formerly understood not just itself, but the whole world around it. Architecture’s greatest forms of knowledge and expertise have always been those related to its own disciplinary history. For 2,000 years, from the Ten Books of Vitruvius, historical knowledge was embedded within a decidedly iterative and serial embodiment of architectural design.3

4. Marina Lathouri, “The City as a Project: Types, Typical Objects and Typologies,” Architectural Design 81, no. 1 (2011). Pg 29

It seems that the question of type and typology could become extremely effective if it is rethought in terms of 4 an expanded taxonomy of architecture. Recognising the generative potential of thinking in groups and at the same time considering the projective capability of the single case, example, model or archetype. II

5. Rafael Moneo, “On Typology,” Oppositions 13, no. 1 (1978). Pg 23

A work of architecture can be seen as belonging to a class of repeated objects, characterized, like a class of tools or instruments, by some general attributes. It can be said that the essence of the architectural object lies in its repeatability.5

To understand the question of type is to understand the nature of the architectural object today,6 whereas to raise the question of typology in architecture is to raise a question of the nature of the architectural work itself. To answer it means, for each generation, a redefinition of the essence of architecture and an explanation of all its attendant problems. This in turn requires the establishment of a theory, whose first question must be, what kind of object is a work of architecture? This question ultimately has to return to the concept of type.7 Thinking through type allows the architect to reach the essence of the element in question, rather than using it as a model to be copied. This affirmation for the essence or idea draws attention to type as a primarily cultural and aesthetic construct it is abstract and constitutes a form of critical reasoning.8 III What is then type and typology? Type can most simply be defined as a concept which describes a group of objects characterized by the same formal structure,9 and typology is the discourse, theory, treatise— method—or science of type.10 Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy first introduced the idea of type in the architectural discourse. He wrote in his dictionary, the word type presents less the image of a thing to copy or imitate competely, than the idea of an element which must itself serve as a rule for the model.11 Type derives from the Greek word typos, a word which according to general acceptance, and consequently applicable to many nuances or variaties of the same idea, expresses what is understood by model, matrix, impession, mould, figure, in relief or in bas relief.12 Type consequently is an element, an object, a thing that embodies the idea. Type is abstract and conceptual rather than concrete and literal.13

6. Ibid. Pg 44

7. Ibid. Pg 23

8. Christopher M. Lee, “Working in Series, Towards an Operative Theory of Type,” in Working in Series, ed. Christopher M. Lee and Kapil Gupta (London: Architectural Association, 2011). Pg 5

9. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 23 10. Christopher M. Lee and Sam Jacoby, “Typological Urbanism and the Idea of the City,” Architectural Design 81, no. 1 (2011). Pg. 17 11. Samir Younés, The True, the Fictive, and the Real: The Historical Dictionary of Architecture of Quatremère De Quincy (Papadakis, 1999). Pg. 254

12. Ibid. Pg. 254

13. Lee and Jacoby, “Typological Urbanism and the Idea of the City.” Pg. 19

It is fundamentally based on the possibility of grouping objects by

A TAXONOMY OF ARCHITECTURE

14. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 23

certain inherent structural similarities. It might even be said that type means the act of thinking in groups.14

15. Giulio Carlo Argan, On the Typology of Architecture (1963). Pg 565

The ‘type’ therefore, is formed through a process of reducing a complex of formal variants to a common root form. It has to be understood as the interior structure of a form or as a principle which contains the possibility of infinite formal variation and further structural modification of the ‘type’ Itself.15

16. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 28

For Quatremère the concept of type-enabled architecture to reconstruct its links with the past, forming a kind of metaphorical connection with the moment when man, for the first time, confronted the problem of architecture and identified it in a form.16

17. Anthony Vidler, “The Idea of Type: The Transformation of the Academic Ideal, 17501830,” in Oppositions Reader, ed. K. Michael Hays (Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). Pg. 437

He successfully introduced the neo-platonic theory into the tradition of neo-classicism by the 1830’s; for him the eternal type of architecture was the primitive hut, and its perfect achievement the Greek temple. The type theory of Durand, on the other hand, stressed the productive capacity of rules and elements according to programs inductively defined.17

19. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 28

Quatremère drawing upon Plato’s theory of art, goes on to define the notion of idea more as an ideal, and this idea—that must serve as the rule to the model—compels the creative process to imitate the idea and to strive for the ideal.18 The type was thus intimately related with “needs and nature.” “In spite of the industrious spirit which looks for innovation in objects.”19

20. Lathouri, “The City as a Project: Types, Typical Objects and Typologies.” Pg 24

Architecture has always recurred to studies of language from Alberti’s translation of rhetoric procedures to the production of architecture, to Quatremère’s notion of type. The concept of type in architecture has a function inherently related to the one of language wherein type enables a manner in which to name and describe the artefact, primarily as part of a group of objects.20

18. Lee, “Working in Series, Towards an Operative Theory of Type.” Pg 5

21. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 24

The very act of naming the architectural object is also a process that from the nature of language is forced to typify. Type, implies the idea of change, or of transformation,21 and operates something like a

literary metaphor.22 Architecture, however—the world of objects created by architecture—is not only described by types, it is also produced through them.23

22. Anthony Vidler, “The Third Typology,” in Architecture Theory since 1968, ed. K Michael Hays (The MIT Press, 2000). Pg 286 23. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 23

Based in this way on history, nature, and use, the type had to be distinguished from the model—the mechanical reproduction of an object.24

24. Ibid. Pg 28

According to Quatrèmere, the idea of type —the originating reason of a thing—which cannot command nor furnish the motif of an exact similitude, is confused, with the idea of model—the complete thing— which compels a formal resemblance.25

25. Younés, The True, the Fictive, and the Real: The Historical Dictionary of Architecture of Quatremère De Quincy. Pg. 255

Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand develops the idea of the ‘model’, in his typological design method of the Precis des lecons. For Durand, the first aim of architecture is no longer the imitation of nature or the search for pleasure and artistic satisfaction, but composition or ‘disposition.’26

26. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 28

Composition is the tool by which the architect deals with the variety of programs offered by the new society; a theory of composition is needed to provide an instrument capable of coping with a diversity that, with difficulty, can be reduced to known types.27

27. Ibid. Pg 28

According to Durand, the architect disposes of elements—columns, pillars, foundations, vaults, and so on—which have taken form and proportion through their relationship with material and with use. These elements, argues Durand must be freed from the tyranny of the Orders; the classical orders should be seen as mere decoration. Having established the elements firmly through use and material, Durand says that the architect’s task is to combine these elements, generating more complex entities, the parts of which will—at the end, through the composition—be assembled in a single building. These parts, ordered and presented like a repertoire of models, constitute the materials available to the architect. By using these parts, the architect can achieve architecture through composition and still retain responsibility for final unity—a classical attribute that Durand does not deny to the

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28. Ibid. Pg 29

building.28

29. Ibid. Pg 32

The old definition of type, the original reason for form in architecture, was transformed by Durand into a method of composition based on a generic geometry of axis superimposed on the grid. The connection between type and form disappeared. Both mechanisms—the axis and the grid—are essentially contrary to Quatremère’s idea of type as based on elemental and primitive forms. Type had become a mere compositional and schematic device.29

30. Oechslin, “Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion of Typology.” Pg 50

Durand does not speak only of a “geometrical reduction of architecture.” On the contrary, he is concerned with clarifying the relationship in architecture between a concrete—historically—existing typology and the general form based on the universal laws of geometry.30

31. Lee and Jacoby, “Typological Urbanism and the Idea of the City.” Pg. 19

Durand attempts to establish a systematic method of classifying buildings according to genres and abstract them into diagrams. This notion of type as model, graphically reducible to diagrams, introduced precepts that are fundamental to working typologically: precedents, classification, taxonomy, repetition, differentiation and reinvention.31

32. Vidler, “The Idea of Type: The Transformation of the Academic Ideal, 17501830.” Pg. 452

Describing the ends of architectural activity—the social needs— Durand, began the nineteenth century project of typological construction on the basis of the inner structure or programmatic functioning of things. He nevertheless permitted architecture for the first time to think of its autonomous, technical existence in the full consciousness of the absolute relativity of that existence to social development. Thus it became possible for architecture to predict its own death.32

33. Lathouri, “The City as a Project: Types, Typical Objects and Typologies.” Pg 25

Signifying a process as much as an object, type claimed a functional justification as well as an active role in the process of design. It was in these terms that it became extraordinarily evocative in late 19th and early 20th century. Not a fixed ideal to imitate or aspire to, but instead a historically contingent idea, subjected to functional and programmatic changes.33

The final effect of Durand’s system was in a very real way to introduce, however unwittingly, the concept of historicity into architecture.34

34. Vidler, “The Idea of Type: The Transformation of the Academic Ideal, 17501830.” Pg. 452

IV Anthony Vidler outlined three critical moments in the history and theory of architecture when the question of type was raised to revalidate and renew the discipline of architecture: in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the legitimization was found in nature to sustain the doctrine of imitation; in the early twentieth century, it was in the processes of industrial production; and in the 1970s the historical city— both as concept and artifact—became the site for this revalidation and renewal.35

35. Christopher M. Lee, “The Fourth Typology: Dominant Type and the Idea of the City” (Phd. Diss, Berlage Institute and TUDelft, 2012). Pg. 1

From the middle of the eighteenth century three dominant typologies have served to legitimize the production of architecture: The first returned architecture to its natural origins—a model of primitive shelter—seen not simply as historical explanation of the derivation of the orders but as a guiding principle, equivalent to that proposed by Newton for the physical universe. The second, emerging as a result of the Industrial Revolution, assimilated architecture to the world of machine production, finding the essential nature of a building to reside in the artificial world of engines. Laugier’s primitive hut and Bentham’s Panopticon stand at the beginning of the modern era as the paradigms of these two typologies.36

36. Vidler, “The Third Typology.” Pg 288

The second typology of modern architecture emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century, after the takeoff of the Second Industrial Revolution; it grew out of the need to confront the question of massproduction, and more particularly the mass-production of machines by machines.37 The classical ideal type was thus, by 1927, firmly wedded to the cause and processes of mass production.38

37. Ibid. Pg 290 38. “The Idea of Type: The Transformation of the Academic Ideal, 1750-1830.” Pg. 437

With the third typology, as exemplified in the work of the new Rationalists, however, there is no attempt at validation. Columns, houses, and urban spaces, while linked in an unbreakable chain of continuity, refer only to their own nature as architectural elements, and

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39. “The Third Typology.” Pg 291

their geometries are neither naturalistic nor technical but essentially architectural. It is clear that the nature referred to in these recent designs is no more nor less than the nature of the city itself, emptied of specific social content from any particular time and allowed to speak simply of its own formal condition.39 V

40. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 32

When, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a new sensibility sought the renovation of architecture, its first point of attack was the academic theory of architecture established in the nineteenth century. The theoreticians of the Modern Movement rejected the idea of type as it had been understood in the nineteenth century, for to them it meant immobility, a set of restrictions imposed on the creator who must, they posited, be able to act with complete freedom on the object.40

41. Oechslin, “Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion of Typology.” Pg 51

Introducing typology to design practice would not—as, for example, Bruno Zevi seems to do—replace the creativity of the design process that would necessarily follow, but rather would merely set out more demanding conditions and premises. The self-evident interaction with these conditions has been lost to the architect in the new myth of the unbound desire for invention—even the doctrine of mimesis had decisively limited this! This myth leaves the architect wholely at a loss, so that architecture is then surrendered ever more completely to accidents and to forces foreign to architecture itself.41

42. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 32

43. Vidler, “The Third Typology.” Pg 291

Architects now looked to the example of scientists in their attempt to describe the world in a new way. A new architecture must offer a new language, they believed, a new description of the physical space in which man lives. In this new field the concept of type was something quite alien and unessential.42 Architecture, in its final apotheosis of mechanical progress, was consumed by the very process it sought to control for its own ends. With it, the city, as artifact and polis, disappeared as well. In the first two typologies of modern architecture we can identify a common base, resting on the need to legitimize architecture as a “natural” phenomenon and a development of the natural analogy that corresponded very directly to the development of production itself.43

Modern Movement architects wanted to offer a new image of architecture to the society that produced it, an image that reflected the new industrialized world created by that society. This meant that a mass- production system had to be introduced into architecture, thus displacing the quality of singularity and uniqueness of the traditional architectural “object.” Industry required repetition, series; the new architecture could be pre-cast. Now the word type—in its primary and original sense of permitting the exact reproduction of a model—was transformed from an abstraction to a reality in architecture, by virtue of industry; type had become prototype.44

44. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 33

Functionalism-the cause/effect relationship between requirements and form seemed to provide the rules for architecture without recourse to precedents, without need for the historical concept of type. And, although functionalist theory was not necessarily coincident with the other attitudes already described, all had in common the rejection of the past as a form of knowledge in architecture.45

45. Ibid. Pg 35

The ethical value of the Modernist type consisted in the combination of the ideal of architectural perfection with the laws of economy and the reality of mass production46

46. Lathouri, “The City as a Project: Types, Typical Objects and Typologies.” Pg 25

The doctrine embedded in the modern movement, consists of a tension of two apparently contradictory ideas—biotechnical determinism on the one hand, and free expression on the other.47

47. Alan Colquhoun, “Typology and Design Method,” Perspecta (1969). Pg 73

The removal of the type from the artistic process of mimesis shows— though admittedly not as radically or as clearly as in Zevi—the rejection of the corresponding creative process.48

48. Oechslin, “Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion of Typology.” Pg 41

The exclusion by modern architectural theory of typologies, and its belief in the freedom of the intuition, can at any rate be partially explained by the general theory of expression. Expressionist theory rejected all historical manifestations of art, just as modern architectural theory rejected all historical forms of architecture.49

49. Colquhoun, “Typology and Design Method.” Pg 73

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50. Steele, “Going against Type.” Pg. 3

Throughout the 1970s the writings of Rossi and others on typology ended up being morphed into various kinds of contextualism that sought above all a justifiable fit between architectural form and its real—or imagined—historical setting - a condition that quickly devolved into a weakened architectural historicism.50

53. Ibid. Pg 36

Now it is also true, however, that in Italian discussions of typology, such positions have been worked out, in part independently. And as a result, it is precisely in these discussions—specifically within the so-called rationalist tradition—that history as a problem has been rediscovered, and in a much more clearly refined way than postmodernism is able to manage, relying as it does on a superficial conception of mimesis, as invoked by Argan, or on mere imitation.51 In the case of Robert Venturi, type is reduced to image, or better, the image is the type, in the belief that through images communication is achieved. As such, the type-image is more concerned with recognition than with structure. The result is an architecture in which a unifying image is recognized whose elements belong clearly to architectural history, but in which the classic interdependence of the elements is definitively lost. The type as inner formal structure has disappeared, and as single architectural elements take on the value of type-images, each becomes available to be considered in its singleness as an independent fragment.52 For Aldo Rossi the logic of architectural form lies in a definition of type based on the juxtaposition of memory and reason.53

54. Lathouri, “The City as a Project: Types, Typical Objects and Typologies.” Pg 27

Any architectural form, existing or new, was the expression of its particular character at a specific time and place, but also embodied the memory of previous forms and functions. If the work was to be read, by means of associations, within the construct of this collective memory, type was the ‘apparatus’—using Rossi’s term—which, fusing history and memory, could produce a dialectics between the individual object and the collective subject.54

51. Oechslin, “Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion of Typology.” Pg 44

52. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 39

The technique or rather the fundamental compositional method suggested by the Rationalists is the transformation of selected types—partial or whole—into entirely new entities that draw their communicative power and potential criteria from the understanding of this transformation. It refuses all eclecticism, by resolutely filtering its “quotations” through the lens of a modernist aesthetic. In this sense, it is an entirely modern movement, and one that places its faith in the essentially public nature of all architecture.55

55. Vidler, “The Third Typology.” Pg 294

Here, in fact, one is confronted with a broken structure, shattered into formally autonomous pieces. Venturi has intentionally broken the idea of a typological unity which for centuries dominated architecture. He finds, however, and not without shock, that the image of architecture emerges again in the broken mirror. Architecture, which in the past has been an imitative art, a description of nature, now seems to be so again, but this time with architecture itself as a model. Architecture is indeed an imitative art, but now imitative of itself, reflecting a fragmented and discontinuous reality.56

56. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 39

The misunderstanding of type and typology, attacked by many for its perceived restrictions—in addition to the functionalist misunderstanding of type—has resulted in the deliberate rejection of typological knowledge. This is evident in the exotic formal experiments of the past years: every fold, every twist and bend, every swoosh and whoosh is justified as being superior to the types it displaces. However, it remains unclear what these ill properties or characteristics of type are that the novel forms want to replace and to what ends. These architectural experiments have no relevance beyond the formal and cannot be considered an invention, for invention, as Quatrèmere stated, ‘does not exist outside rules; for there would be no way to judge invention.’57 It can be argued that the indexical obsession in academia and in some speculative practices for the past two decades draws from the same ambition to institute the rigorous system of architectural knowledge afforded by the diagram. However, the focus for this continued obsession has largely been around the generation of novel form—with today’s latest incarnation of parametric design.58

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57. Lee and Jacoby, “Typological Urbanism and the Idea of the City.” Pg. 19 “Far from rules being injurious to invention, it must be said that invention does not exist outside rules; for there would be no way to judge invention” - Quatremère de Quincy – in Younés, Samir. The True, the Fictive, and the Real: The Historical Dictionary of Architecture of Quatremère De Quincy. Papadakis, 1999.

58. Lee, “Working in Series, Towards an Operative Theory of Type.” Pg 6

VII

59. Vidler, “The Third Typology.” Pg 292

60. Lee and Jacoby, “Typological Urbanism and the Idea of the City.” Pg. 17

61. Vidler, “The Third Typology.” Pg 288

62. Ibid. Pg 292

63. Ibid. Pg 293

The concept of the city as the site of a new typology is evidently born of a desire to stress the continuity of form and history against the fragmentation produced by the elemental, institutional, and mechanistic typologies of the recent past. The city is considered as a whole, its past and present revealed in its physical structure. It is in itself and of itself a new typology. This typology is not built up out of separate elements, nor assembled out of objects classified according to use, social ideology. or technical characteristics: it stands complete and ready to be decomposed into fragments. These fragments do not reinvent institutional type-forms nor repeat past typological forms: they are selected and reassembled according to criteria derived from three levels of meaning-the first, inherited from the ascribed means of the past existence of the forms; the second, derived from the specific fragment and its boundaries, and often crossing between previous types; the third, proposed by a recomposition of these fragments in a new context.59 The relationship between architecture and the city is reciprocal and the city is the overt site for architectural knowledge par excellence.60 The city, that is, provides the material for classification, and the forms of its artifacts over time provide the basis for recomposition.61 If the city is considered as a whole, its past and present revealed in its physical structure. It is in itself and of itself a new typology. This typology is not built up out of separate elements, nor assembled out of objects classified according to use, social ideology, or technical characteristics: it stands complete and ready to be decomposed into fragments.62 The fragmentation and recomposition of the city’s spatial and institutional forms can never be separated from their received and newly constituted political implications.63 On the one hand, the city was read, in the Italian context, as a structure that constantly evolves and changes, yet certain features

were constant in time, and therefore typical; that is, constituent factors of that structure. On the other, this was an attempt to develop a working method; a method which invoked history in a series of transformations rather than a sequential unfolding of time. This method brought together ideas on history and principles of morphology already formulated in the 1930s by thinkers such as Henri Focillon. In particular, Focillon’s idea of art as a system in perpetual development of coherent forms and of history as a superimposition of geological strata that permits us to read each fraction of time as if it was at once past, present and future is interestingly relevant.64 As Rossi wrote in the early 1960s, ‘the city is in itself a repository of history’.This could be understood from two different points of view. In the first, the city is above all ‘a material artefact, a man-made object built over time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discontinuous way’. Studied from this point of view, ‘cities become historical texts’ and type is but an instrument of analysis, to enter into and decipher this text, a function similar to the archaeological section. The second point of view acknowledges history as the awareness of the historical process, the ‘collective imagination’. This leads to one of Rossi’s prominent ideas that the city is the locus of the ‘relationship of the collective to its place’.65 For him there is only one ideal city, filled with types—rather impure types, but types nonetheless, and the history of architecture is none other than its history.66

64. Lathouri, “The City as a Project: Types, Typical Objects and Typologies.” Pg 27

65. Ibid. Pg 28 66. Moneo, “On Typology.” Pg 37

VIII Once again the issue of typology is raised in architecture, not this time with a need to search outside the practice for legitimation in science or technology, but with a sense that within the city and architecture itself resides a unique and particular mode of production and explanation.67

67. Vidler, “The Third Typology.” Pg 288

No other recurring modem project within architecture has a greater capacity to renovate design theories than architectural typology, with its focus on the inherently iterative, serial aspects of architectural production itself.68

68. Steele, “Going against Type.” Pg. 2

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69. Christopher M. Lee, “Working in Series, Towards an Operative Theory of Type,” ibid. Pg 5

To work typologically is to analyse, reason and propose through things which are of the same type, thus considering them in series. Working in series allows us to understand the shared traits between things—be it architecture or the city—and to harness the embodied and cumulative intelligence of that series into architectural projections, considering the fundamental precepts of working typologically: precedents, classification, taxonomy, continuity, repetition, differentiation and reinvention. Although the process begins with a precedent type, the fundamental goal of working typologically is to surpass the precedent type whilst maintaining its irreducible traits or DNA in the transformed or reinvented type.69

70. Oechslin, “Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion of Typology.” Pg 51

It further becomes apparent that the discussion of typology is by no means a matter of simplification or standardization or of a reductive model of architectural invention. On the contrary, we must perceive as in the work of Quatrèmere, an intelligently developed construct in which the link is ensured between the systematic and the historical or conventional—and therefore always societally oriented—limitations of architecture in their reciprocal dependence.70

71. Ibid. Pg 45

What is required, then, are fundamental, systematic, analogic, rational, and combinatory kinds of processes in the context of the encounter with history71—past, present and future. IX Derivative practices and working typologically share fundamental precepts, nevertheless there is one essential difference between these modes of production. The distinction and validity between type and model. On the one hand working typologically considers the type, as a fundamental principle, which informs the production of the new, making paramount the type over the model. On the other hand a derivative approach to architecture looks at the potential of fragmentation and combination, assemblages of architectural knowledge. The potential not only in the group as a whole and its type but also the potential in the archetype as an example or single case.

To better understand the distinction between type and model, Eisenstein’s differentiation between mimesis of form and mimesis of principle, could be useful when translated to the production of architecture. Using typology for the production of architecture relies primordially on principles, on types, whereas using a derivative approach to architecture could allow a sort of dialectic between form and principle, model and rule, type and archetype. The category of archetype is advanced here as an alternative to the idea of type. If type traditionally indicates the idea that regulates the development of a group of forms—and for this reason is irreducible to any particular form—, archetype offers the possibility of addressing a found singular form as a definition for a possible group of forms. In architecture, an archetype is thus a paradigmatic form.72 A singular form that due to the clear exhibition of its generative principle is able to define a milieu of possible forms. While a type is never reducible to a singular form and it can only emerge from a variety of forms, the archetype is always put forward by the individualisation of a precise and recognisable form. For this reason, while the type indicates a model of design based on the concept of evolution, an example is always based on the idea of decision.73

72. Pier Vittorio Aureli, “City as Political Form, Four Archetypes of Urban Transformation,” Architectural Design 81, no. 1 (2011). Pg. 34

73. “A Simple Heart: Architecture on the Ruins of the Post-Fordist City,” Architectural Design 81, no. 1 (2011). Pg. 113

X We are no longer under a scientific paradigm but a legal paradigm. In that sense working typologically could allow bypassing this current legal paradigm—where everything is being copyrighted, a sort of fetish for intellectual property—if types are ideas, fundamental principles and ideas can’t be copyrighted. Typology enables the appropriation of principles generating the potential for new combinations, therefore freeing architecture from what is commonly regarded as an ‘unethical practice’ such as copying.Therefore transgressing authorship by appropriating types as fundamental principles derived from architectural knowledge. One could go as far as saying that typology is a ‘scientific’ method to copy or an attempt to make scientific the act of copying, by copying principles—mimesis of principles. Architecture frees itself from matters

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of appropriation and authorship by working typologically relying on types as principles derived from architectural objects. If the third typology rescued the city as the ‘overt site for architectural knowledge par excellence’, a taxonomical understanding where type and model coexist, could rescue the architectural project, in all its forms of representation. Providing a middle point between the abstraction of the type and the concreteness of the single case, a taxonomy that does not only see the city as Rossi would call a repository of history as the base of its classification and re-composition but all architectural knowledge, which is subject to appropriation and transformation. A non-linear—vertical and horizontal—usage of history. An expanded taxonomy of architecture. Recognising the generative potential of thinking in groups and at the same time considering the projective capability of the single case, example, model or archetype. Such taxonomy would allow in a way the transgression of both the type—thinking in groups—and the archetype—a model or example with the capacity to generate a group—by fragmenting and assembling different elements in order to produce the new. The possibility of abstract and concrete, as well as the potential of both working with the whole or fragmenting it, in order to produce new assemblages. Ultimately typology is always a question of origins. Working taxonomically while acknowledging the potential of the type, is put forward, as a way to steer and open up from the rule to the single case. Considering that single cases can be appropriated and transformed without necesarily entering a question of origin.

74. Ibid. Pg. 113

The taxonomy here proposed is not meant to question the idea of type or typology, all the contrary acknowledges type’s and typology’s potential while expanding it in order to coexist with the notion of model, not as something that must be followed as the carrier of the truth but as material available for appropriation and transformation. A singular form that due to the clear exhibition of its generative principle is able to define a milieu of possible forms.74 A dialectic between type and model.

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THOU SHALT NOT COVET COMMONS & LAWS

If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispose himself of it.1

1. Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 7 (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903). Pg. 93

Thomas Jefferson, 1813

2. David M. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright,” (Pluto Press, London, UK, 2008). Pg. 71

3. Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in EighteenthCentury Britain (16951775) (Hart Publishing, 2004). Pg. 212

Copyright and other intellectual property rights are often defended using claims for the superiority of the ‘rationality’ of private property by using an economic model of the market. This justifies private property by the claim that only by allocating value to a particular resource can it efficiently be used and its use maximised. By fostering progress in economic organisation and increasing efficiency, it is argued that society as a whole will benefit from increased wealth and greater quantities of culture and information.2 There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affectations of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of every other individual in the universe. And yet there are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of this right. Pleased as we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those laws have been built. 3 John Locke’s theory of property, provided the philosophical basis for the first formulations of copyright law in Britain in the eighteenth

century, he stated property is appropriated from nature through labour. Ownership, says Locke, begins with our bodies, and their capacity for labour and work. Through the sensuousness of labour, man establishes ownership of the commons of nature and God:4

4. Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying (Harvard University Press, 2010). Pg. 210

Although Locke does not say so, ownership is established mimetically: the contagiousness of the conceptual “me” and “mine” passes through “my” work on the world around me, allowing me to appropriate elements of that world.5

5. Ibid. Pg. 211

The key to Locke’s thought was the axiom that an individual’s ‘’person” was his own property. From this it could be demonstrated that through labour an individual might convert the raw materials of nature into private property. 6

6. Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press, 1993). Pg. 4

If the individuality of the work is identical to that of the author, then the category of the work has been dissolved. Interestingly, this action traces in reverse the Lockean notion of the creation of property in which property originates when an individual “person’ is impressed on the world through labour: 7

7. Ibid. Pg. 126

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.8

8. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Awnsham and John Churchill, 1965). Pg. 305

William Blackstone’s philosophical rock proved to be the writings of John Locke. Asserting that the natural foundation of property was “invention and labour” he explained that an original composition exhibited both these qualities: its originality implied invention; the composition implied industry and labour. Of labour in particular, he argued that the “exertion of animal faculties” and “the exertion of the rational powers” should have “as fair a title to confer property” as each other. “Property” he declared “may with equal reason be acquired by mental, as by bodily labour”. Blackstone was clearly influenced by

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Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, but had obviously failed to acquaint himself with Locke’s personal views as to what property subsisted in books. He continued with two logically spurious arguments. The first, born out of common utility, operated as follows:

9. Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695-1775). Pg. 142

Without some advantage proposed, few would read, study, compose or publish. This advantage can only arise from the profits of publication: and those profits can only be secured, by vesting in the author an exclusive right of publication. Universal law has established a permanent perpetual property in bodily acquisitions: and reason requires, that the property in mental acquisitions should be equally permanent.9

10. Ibid. Pg. 142

The second turned upon the fundamental premise that “[t]he one essential requisite of every subject of property is, that it must be a thing of value”. From this he continued that value consists in an object’s capacity to be exchanged for other valuable things. Therefore, if something can be so exchanged, it must have value and “[w]hatever therefore has a value is the subject of property”. That is, property equals value equals opportunity to exchange; therefore, an ability to exchange equals value equals property.10

11. Ibid. Pg. 144

For Joseph Yates, property was, above all, a physical rather than a metaphysical entity; it was something “that may be seen, felt, given, delivered, lost or stolen”, something that one could lay one’s hand upon.11

12. Ibid. Pg. 145

In Yates’ consideration there could exist no natural common law right to literary property. Only the state, through legislative intervention could provide succour for the author. Agreeing with Edward Thurlow, that there was no difference between the work of an author and that of an inventor. 12

13. Ibid. Pg. 145

Both are the productions of genius, both require labour and study, and both by publication become equally common to the world.13 Moveable property was of two kinds: “the product of the hand, and of the mind; as an utensil made; a book composed”; moreover, “the

product of the mind is as well capable of becoming property as that of the hand”. This, for William Warburton, was self-evident in that a product of the mind had in it “those two essential conditions … namely common utility, and a capacity of having its possession ascertained.”14

14. Ibid. Pg. 157

Property, originality, personality: the construction of the discourse of literary property depended on a chain of deferrals. The distinctive property was said to reside in the particularity of the text-”the same conceptions, cloathed in the same words”-and this was underwritten by the notion of originality, which was in turn guaranteed by the concept of personality.15

15. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 128

The valorization of the expressive power of the individual artist emerged around the same time as copyright laws, during the Romantic period. But the integration of the original artist into the marketplace was also accompanied by the rise of an avant-garde whose work has constantly been built around a critique of notions of originality, identity, and property.16

16. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 206

II All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society. In this sense it is a tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a precondition of production. But it is altogether ridiculous to leap from that to a specific form of property, e.g. private property. (Which further and equally presupposes an antithetical form: non- property.) History shows rather common property (e.g. in India, among the Slavs, the early Celts, etc.) to be the more original form . . . But that there can be no production and hence no society where some form of property does not exist is a tautology. An appropriation which does not make something into property is a contradictio in subjecto.17

17. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993). Pg. 87-88

Appropriation—the act of claiming the right to use, make, or own something that someone else claims in the same way. Thinking about appropriation enables us to ask: Who has the right to make a copy? Which people have the right to prohibit someone else from copying them or that which they believe belongs to them?18

18. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 205

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19. Ibid. Pg. 205

Most of what we call history is arguably the history of appropriation19

20. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in Early Writings (Penguin UK, 2005). Pg. 351

Man appropriates his all-sided essence in an all-sided way, as a total man. Every one of his human relations to the world, seeing hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, observing, sensing, willing, acting, loving, in short, all the organs of his individuality . . . are, in their objective relation, or in their relation to the object, the appropriation of it. The appropriation of human actuality, its relation to the object, is the exercise of human actuality, human activity and passivity or suffering.20

21. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 6

The act of appropriation involved solely the individual in relation to nature. Property was not a social convention but a natural right that was prior to the social order. Indeed, the principal function of the social order was to protect individual property rights. Extended into the realm of literary production, the liberal theory of property produced the notion put forward by the London booksellers of a property founded on the author’s labour, once the author could sell to the bookseller. Though immaterial, this property was no less real and permanent, they argued, than any other kind of estate.21

22. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 243

We cannot actually live in a world without mimesis. For Locke and for Marx, appropriation is constitutive of being-in-the-world through labour or sensuous activity; for Hegel, property, ownership of self, is the basis of society. Both appropriation in general, and ownership as a particular form of appropriation, are mimetic in that they bestow a particular name on something—a name that identifies and frames it.22

23. Ibid. Pg. 246

It is possible to think of copying outside the realm of right and ownership if we conceive of copying as a practice, or rather a multitude of practices.23

24. Ibid. Pg. 111

The “original” itself is also necessarily an appropriation, translation, imitation of other materials now presented, packaged, and marketed in ways that objectively constitute deception.24

25. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008). Pg. 58

All authorship builds upon pre-existing expression. Authors—not just the greats, but all of us who share our thoughts and creative impulses through traditional media or the Internet—regularly take from existing art, literature, music, and film.25

Copyright expansion has sharply constricted authors’ liberty to take from others’ expression in creating their own. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, authors were free to build upon existing works as long as they made their own substantial contribution and did not displace demand for the original work in its original form.26

26. Ibid. Pg. 59

Today, copyright law’s governing premise, far from being solicitous to secondary, transformative authorship, is that ‘‘no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.’’27

27. Ibid. Pg. 59

Creative appropriation ranges from modifications and adaptations of a single work to samplings, remixes, and mashups that incorporate an array of discrete components from numerous existing works.28

28. Ibid. Pg. 196

What happens when all questions of authorship, originality, use, and access to ideas and expressions become framed in the terms of “property rights”? The discussion ends. There is no powerful property argument that can persuade a people concerned about rewarding “starving artists” not to grant the maximum possible protection. How can one argue for “theft”?29

29. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity (NYU Press, 2003). Pg. 12

Depropriation means indifference to possession. It indicates a willingness to relate to the world without imposing conditions of ownership in doing so, an ethics of care that does not require ownership, that requires an ethos other than that of ownership in order for there to be caring. It means allowing to circulate according to context, and therefore to remove from the logic of appropriation, and from enslavement to a particular context that is naturalized as “what must be.” Depropriation is a form of “renunciation.”30

30. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 224

Can depropriation and what we call “copying” coexist? Copying is a form of appropriation because making a copy involves positing a relationship between two objects, the name of one being given to another, the form of one being produced or recognized in the other. “To appropriate” means to make a claim of identification and property, in the sense that the claimed object has a name or form that belongs to it.31

31. Ibid. Pg. 226

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32. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 3

Discussions of copyright frequently regard intellectual property as an “ancient and eternal idea” or “a natural need of the human mind”. But copyright-the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are treated as commodities-is a specifically modern institution, the creature of the printing press, the individualization of authorship in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, and the development of the advanced marketplace society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.32

33. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 72

Indeed, objects can be exchanged and treated as property and in some cases as a commodity. But when it comes to creative work, claims to intellectual property become contestable and problematic. For these types of objects it is also necessary to create new subjects of rights; thus the classification of the object and the subject become vitally important.33

34. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 21

Intellectual-property law functions through Platonic concepts. Its three constituent parts—copyright, trademark, and patent law—are each built around the paradox that you cannot protect an idea itself, but can protect only a fixed, material expression of an idea.34

35. Ibid. Pg. 21

One claims an idea as property by materially fixing it through describing a process for realizing it (patent law), by inscribing or figuring it materially in the form of a picture, text, notated music, film sequence (copyright law), or by developing some method of inscription that one uses to mark otherwise generic objects as one’s own (trademark law).35 IV Copyright is not a transcendent moral idea, but a specifically modern formation produced by printing technology, marketplace economics, and the classical liberal culture of possessive individualism. It is also an institution built on intellectual quicksand: the essentially religious concept of originality, the notion that certain extraordinary beings called authors conjure works out of thin air. And it is an institution whose technological foundation has recently turned, like a

vital organ grown cancerous, into an enemy. Copyright developed as a consequence of printing technology’s ability to produce large numbers of copies of a text quickly and cheaply. But present-day technology makes it virtually impossible to prevent people from making copies of almost any text-printed, musical, cinematic, computerized- rapidly and at a negligible cost.36

36. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 142

In many ways, copyright now stands for private censorship, not public liberty. Copyright once helped to free authors and the press from servile dependency on royal and church patronage; it now gives behemoth media conglomerates control over the images, sounds, and texts that are the very language of our culture. Copyright once made it possible for authors to disseminate their message to a broad audience; it now makes outlaws of millions of individuals who post their creative digital remixes and mashups of copyrighted expression on Pinterest and Soundcloud, amongst others. Copyright once underwrote new contributions to our store of knowledge; it now places archival material out of reach for documentary filmmakers and online libraries. Copyright once supported Thomas Paine and Charles Dickens; it now provides corporations, churches, and authors’ estates a tool to silence critics.37

37. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. vii

The U.S. Supreme Court has famously labelled copyright ‘the engine of free expression.’ 38

38. Ibid. Pg. 3

It is with copyright. Property rhetoric, whether invoked reflexively or strategically, has tended to support a vision of copyright as a foundational entitlement, a broad ‘‘sole and despotic dominion’’ over each and every possible use of a work rather than a limited government grant narrowly tailored to serve a public purpose.39

39. Ibid. Pg. 7

In the Middle Ages the owner of a manuscript was understood to possess the right to grant permission to copy it, and this was a right that could be exploited, as it was, for example, by those monasteries that regularly charged a fee for permission to copy one of their books. Perhaps this practice might be thought to imply a form of copyright, and yet the book owner’s property was not a right in the text as such but in the manuscript as a physical object made of ink and parchment.40

40. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 9

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41. Ibid. Pg. 9

The earliest genuine anticipations of copyright were the printing privileges, which first appeared in fifteenth-century Venice. ‘Privileges’ were exclusive rights granted by the state to individuals for limited periods of time to reward them for services or to encourage them in useful activities.41

42. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 70

Essentially, copyright is understood as a monopoly, a bundle of rights that applies to the ‘expression’ of an idea. It establishes the author as the creator of an intellectual work and creates exclusive legal rights for the author to control derivatives, duplication, performance or distribution of their creative works.42

43. Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in EighteenthCentury Britain (16951775). Pg. xxi

The transformation of copyright as publishers’ right to copyright as authors’ right takes place in the years following the 1709 Statute of Anne.43

44. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 7

Copyright is increasingly treated more akin to conventional property than a finely honed instrument of expressive diversity.44

45. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 24

Thomas Jefferson explicitly dismissed a property model for copyright, and maintained his skepticism about the costs and benefits of copyright for many years. Fearing, justifiably, that copyright might eventually expand to encompass idea protection, not just expression protection, Jefferson elucidated the flaw in the political economy of copyright as property. Unlike tangible property, ideas and expressions are not susceptible to natural scarcity. As Jefferson wrote of copyright, “Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” Therefore, Jefferson feared, the monopolists could use their state-granted power to strengthen their control over the flow of ideas and the use of expressions. Monopolies have the power to enrich themselves by evading the limitations of the competitive marketplace.45 Copyright law was designed to create order in the publishing trade, to prevent ruinous competition when unscrupulous firms engage in wholesale commercial piracy. So how does copyright law apply in an age

in which millions of individuals are both authors and publishers? How is copyright to respond when anyone can easily make perfect copies of existing works, as well as cut, paste, edit, remix, and post them on Tumblr, Soundcloud, and a multitude of other Web sites online?46

46. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 8

In the discourse of copyright, the goal of protecting the rights of the creative author is proudly asserted even as the notion of author is drained of content This is because the legal concept of authorship is “simultaneously an artifact of the marketplace in commodity art and a throwback to early, pre-industrial ideas of the artist’s relation to society”.47

47. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 136

Copyright issues are now more about large corporations limiting access to and use of their products, and less about lonely songwriters snapping their pencil tips under the glare of bare bulbs. Instead of trying to prevent “theft,” we should try to generate a copyright policy that would encourage creative expression without limiting the prospects for future creators. We must seek a balance. Historically and philosophically, “intellectual property” accomplishes neither. The idea and the phrase have been counterproductive. Instead of bolstering “intellectual property,” we should be forging “intellectual policy.”48

48. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 12

Through most of the nineteenth century authors were free to build on existing works so long as they made a substantial independent contribution. But today, works that build upon existing works commonly runs afoul of the copyright holder’s broad proprietary rights. Copy- right now includes an exclusive right to make derivative works. Moreover, the reproduction right has expanded dramatically. In addition to substantial literal or near-literal copying, it now encompasses nonliteral ‘‘total concept and feel’’ similarity and literal copying of small fragments of the original work.49

49. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 196

To envision the best possible copyright system—one that would encourage creativity and democracy—we must revise our notion of intellectual “theft.” You cannot “steal” an idea, a style, a “look and feel.” These things are the raw material of the next move in literature, art, politics, or music. And using someone’s idea does not diminish its power. There is no natural scarcity of ideas and information. To enrich

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50. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 14

51. Ibid. Pg. 39

democratic speech and foster fertile creativity, we should avoid the rhetorical traps that spring up when we regard copyright as “property” instead of policy.50 V The Stationers’ Charter and the licensing acts that followed it were clearly publishers’ laws. They regulated printing, yet had no dimension of property to them. Although authors had status and a place in the commercial process of bookmaking, they were not mentioned as parties to the legal calculus. That changed in 1709, when publishers appealed to the interests of authors to renew their monopoly protection. To secure what would become known as the Statute of Anne, printers argued that the interests of both authors and the public were harmed by the lack of price stability in the marketplace. The title of the legislation read: “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.”51 The 1709 British Statute of Anne, established two levels of copyright. The first level was issued in the name of the author for all books that would be published after the act took effect. The term of protection was for fourteen years, renewable for another fourteen years. In other words, this reward for authorship was an “encouragement of learning,” an incentive to produce more books. The second level reinforced the Stationers’ exclusive rights to previously published works for a non-renewable twenty-one-year term. The addition of these term limits created the first codified notion of a “public domain,” a collection of works old enough to be considered outside the scope of the law and thus under the control of the public and the culture at large. Although the author was mentioned as the beneficiary of the statute, the act was really another regulation of the practice of printing and selling books, not writing them, and a recognition of the public’s interest in the process. The codification of authorship was merely an appeal to a straw man. A manuscript is worth nothing on the market until an author assigns the rights to a publisher. At that point, the publisher is the real player in the legal and commercial game. Mainly, the Statute of Anne was an elabourate attempt to regulate publishers, a way to balance the

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interests of the book printing industry with the concerns that monopolies were growing too powerful in England.52

52. Ibid. Pg. 40

The Statute of Anne marked the beginning of the modern concept of copyright that accorded exclusive rights to authors and their publishers.53

53. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 67

The Statute of Anne of 1709, was in part a rearguard effort to protect the rights of the Stationers Company in the face of the effects of the English Revolution; copyright and patent law was inscribed in Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution (1787), and in a law of 1793 in France; the Russian Revolution was accompanied by a variety of changes to copyright law (which had hitherto been in line with those of bourgeois European law), including a 1923 decree nationalizing the works of authors such as Tolstoy, Gogol, and Chekhov.54

54. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 10

The focus shifts away from the bookseller and over the course of the next seventy years the Statute of Anne, and copyright law, comes to signal and embrace the emergence of the modern proprietary author. As Mark Rose suggests, this second story is one of progression from trade regulation and marketplace economics to the liberal culture of possessive individualism.55

55. Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in EighteenthCentury Britain (16951775). Pg. 221

Beginning with the Statute of Anne of 1709, copyright law has been premised on the intuition that authors and publishers will not make works available to the public unless they can prevent others from making copies, at least for a limited time. Definitive empirical support for that intuition is difficult to come by. Accordingly, commentators dating back to Adam Smith have generally found justification for copyright in economic theory. Economic analysts posit that copyright provides authors and publishers with a financial incentive to produce and disseminate creative expression. It does so by preventing ‘‘free riders’’ from undermining the market for books, paintings, sound recordings, films, and other works of authorship.56

56. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 84

In the Statute of Anne, the author was established as a legally empowered figure in the marketplace well before professional authorship was realized in practice.57

57. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 4

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58. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 4

Gradually the law has lost sight of its original charge: to encourage creativity, science, and democracy. Instead, the law now protects the producers and taxes consumers. It rewards works already created and limits works yet to be created. The law has lost its mission, and the people have lost control of it.58

59. Ibid. Pg. 4

Digital reproduction, international commerce, and digital music sampling have exposed gaps in the law’s ability to deal with new forms of production and new technologies.59

60. Ibid. Pg. 99

The most significant change to the copyright law in the United States of America in the 1909 revision, however, was largely unexpected. The new law created a new definition of authorship: corporate authorship.60

61. Ibid. Pg. 102

The creation of corporate copyright in 1909 was the real “death of the author.” Authorship could not be considered mystical or romantic after 1909. It was simply a construct of convenience, malleable by contract.61

62. Ibid. Pg. 24

According to the Copyright Act of 1976, a work is protected in all media and for all possible derivative uses as soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. This means that as soon as a writer types a story on a computer or typewriter, the work carries the protection of copyright law. Authors need not register the work with the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress unless they plan to pursue legal action against someone for violating the copyright.62

63. Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in EighteenthCentury Britain (16951775). Pg. 221 64. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 28

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Copyright today is entirely the creature of statute. It is no longer an emanation of the common law. It extends to both published and unpublished works.63 There is an alarming and steady erosion of a very valuable— yet theoretically suspect—legal construction: the idea/expression dichotomy. American copyright law has clearly protected only specific expressions of ideas, yet allowed free rein for ideas themselves.64 The idea/expression dichotomy came into being when copyright holders’ rights expanded to encompass creative adaptations and

reformulations of existing expression. Once copyright holders’ exclusive rights extended beyond mere verbatim and near-verbatim copying, it became necessary to define some outer limit to those rights, lest copyright holders’ proprietary control over existing expression unduly burden new speech.65

65. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 61

At bottom, the problem is not simply that expression has steadily gob- bled up idea, but that there is no clear line between idea and expression. The idea/expression dichotomy is notoriously malleable and indeterminate, far more useful as a shorthand for justifying judges’ case-by-case conclusions regarding when a defendant has prima facie inappropriately copied than as a mechanism for predicting what sorts of copying and borrowing are permissible.66

66. Ibid. Pg. 61

The dichotomy is not merely a given. It has many complications and flaws. But it is best explained through textual examples. Consider the specific string of text: “And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.” The same underlying idea could be expressed as: “Oh, God said to Abraham kill me a son. Abe said, ‘man, you must be putting me on.’” While the first expression is unprotectable under American copyright law because the King James Version of the Old Testament is in the public domain, the second expression is quite protected.67

67. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 28

Since the 1976 copyright revisions, the idea/expression dichotomy has been part of the federal statute. The text of section 102 (b) of the copyright law reads: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”68

68. Ibid. Pg. 29

When very different words and phrases such as “idea theft,” “copyright violation,” “appropriation,” and “plagiarism” are used interchangeably in the public discourse surrounding the commerce of creativity, the idea-expression dichotomy becomes harder to define, harder to identify, and therefore harder to defend.69

69. Ibid. Pg. 35

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70. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 60

The move from solicitude to general intolerance for a secondary author’s creative appropriation is manifested in both statute and case law. The Copyright Act of 1976 now accords copyright owners a broad, exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the original. These include translations, arrangements, versions in other media, and ‘‘any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.’’ At the same time, courts have liberally construed the exclusive right to reproduce copies, holding that a secondary author may infringe that right by evoking an existing work’s ‘‘total concept and feel,’’ without literally copying or even paraphrasing any of the original’s expression.70

71. Mario Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm (MIT Press, 2011). Pg 46

Similarity, imitation, and mimesis are essentially premodern, nonquantifiable notions, and as such are hard to appraise in a modern marketplace, and hard to defend in a modern court of law.71 VI

72. “Law 23 1982 Copyrights in Colombia,” (Bogota: Diario Oficial, 1982).

Article 1. The authors of literary, scientific and artistic works shall enjoy protection for their works as laid down by this Law and, in so far as they are compatible with it, by ordinary legal provisions. This Law shall also protect performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations with respect to their rights neighboring on copyright.72 Article 2. Copyright shall subsist in scientific, literary and artistic works, which shall be understood as being all creations of the mind in the scientific, literary and artistic domain, whatever may be their mode or form of expression and purpose, such as: books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and mime; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography, including videograms; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science and, finally, any production in the scientific,

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literary or artistic field that can be reproduced or executed by any form of printing or reproduction, or by phonographic, radiophonic or any other known or future means.73

73. Ibid.

Article 39. It shall be permissible to reproduce, by painting, drawing, photography or cinematography, works that are permanently located on public highways, streets or squares, and to distribute such reproductions or works and communicate them to the public. With regard to works of architecture, this provision shall be applicable solely to outward views. 74

74. Ibid.

Article 43. The creator of an architectural design may not prevent the owner from making alterations to it, but he shall have the right to prohibit his name from being associated with the altered work.75

75. Ibid.

Colombia is one of the few countries in the world to have an established copyright law that seeks to balance the moral rights of architects and the rights of building owners. Article 43 of Law 23 of 1982 on Copyright essentially states that if the owner of an architectural work wishes to modify it, the architect of that work has no legal grounds on which to stop this. It does, however, add that the architect “may prohibit his name from being associated with the altered work.” 76

76. Jorge Ortega, “Architecture & Copyright Controversies,” WIPO Magazine, no. 05 (2011). Pg. 3

This practice is uncommon in Europe where the right to the integrity of a work includes protecting it against any unauthorized material modification or against damage to the author’s reputation.77

77. Ibid. Pg. 3

The Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Is an international agreement governing copyright that was first accepted in Bern, Switzerland, in 1886. Its purpose was to extend copyright protection internationally. It was strongly supported by Victor Hugo and the Association litteraire et artistique Internationale. The convention has been updated several times, with the latest version dating to 1979. In 1967 the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property that conceived and managed the Convention became the World Intellectual Property Organization (WlPO). In 1974, WlPO became an organization within the United Nations.78

78. Fabrizio Gallanti, “Slippery Dialogues: Recent Copyright Infringements in Architecture,” San Rocco Collaborations, no. 06 (2013). Pg. 138

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79. Ibid. Pg. 138

The Copyright Act in the U.K., which was approved in 1988, considers both designs and built buildings as works of architecture. In American law, the application of the term “intellectual property” to architecture was established in 1990 through the amendment of the Copyright Act with the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA).79

80. Ibid. Pg. 138

in France architecture was included among the intellectual and creative activities protected by copyright in 1992 with the promulgation of the Code de la propriete intellectuelle, American and French legislation share a common and not insignificant detail: they both protect “original” and “creative” features but not the functional elements of projects, with the distinction between the “artistic” and the “functional” being left to the determination of the courts.80

81. Ibid. Pg. 138

Copyright legislation appears to be based, perhaps unconsciously, on the Hegelian notion that architecture is characterized by an undefined artistic supplement that provides an aesthetic and symbolic content which goes beyond simple construction.81

82. Hancks Gregory, “Copyright or Copy Wrong?,” (2012), http:// www.aia.org/practicing/ AIAB093915. accessed, November, 27, 2013

A building design can qualify for copyright protection as an “architectural work” regardless of whether it was created by an architect.82

83. Ibid.

An American court ruled that architectural works are akin to “compilations,” that is, works formed by the “collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work or authorship.” Under copyright law, protection for a compilation is frequently described as “thin” because the creator of the compilation might not hold any copyright in the individual parts, which themselves may not be original to the compilation’s creator.83

84. Gallanti, “Slippery Dialogues: Recent Copyright Infringements in Architecture.” Pg. 138

The core legal argument, especially in California, was the question of whether construction was equivalent to publication; only such a loophole would have allowed the consideration of architectural drawings as “words” and their “publication” through as an infringiment of copyright.84

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Copyright protects against copying. It is the simplest right as it automatically arises without registration as soon as a drawing, letter, list etc. is produced and protects original literary.85 Within the field of architecture many copyright works arise. The artistic works category in the CDPA describes three types: graphic works, photographs, sculptures and collages; works of architecture being a building or a model of a building; and works of artistic craftsmanship. An architect’s sketches, detailed drawings, models of buildings and buildings themselves are all protected under copyright. Copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years from the end of the year in which they die.86 The customer or client only obtains a licence to use the material – which is not the same as ownership of the copyright in it unless the relevant contract between the parties states that the person commissioning the copyright work will own the resulting copyright.87 The distinction between the author and the owner is significant. If an architect designed a building in the course of employment they would be the author, but not the88 If nothing is said about IP rights in the contract, or there is no written contract, then the rights remain with the architect unless the client did the designs.89

85. Rebecca Singleton, “Architecture and Intellectual Property,” Architectural Research Quarterly 15, no. 03 (2011). Pg. 294

86. Ibid. Pg. 294

87. Ibid. Pg. 294

88. Ibid. Pg. 295

89. Ibid. Pg. 295

The copying of a building by a two-dimensional representation, such as a photograph or drawing, is not an infringement of copyright.90

90. Ibid. Pg. 295

Sometimes it is impossible for architects to know whether their ideas are truly novel or whether they have been conceptualized before.91

91. Ortega, “Architecture & Copyright Controversies.” Pg. 5

Who owns an idea? Who can claim design concepts and architectural solutions as their exclusive property?92

92. Gallanti, “Slippery Dialogues: Recent Copyright Infringements in Architecture.” Pg. 137

Copyright in architecture is a peculiar matter. For the better part of its development. Western architecture has been based on - and has even encouraged - copying.93

93. Ibid. Pg. 137

How much of the ‘original’ work derived from previously copyrighted work that had since lapsed into the public domain as copyrights

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94. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 85

expired? Isn’t all creative work, when it comes right down to it, derivative?94

95. Gallanti, “Slippery Dialogues: Recent Copyright Infringements in Architecture.” Pg. 137

The conceptual shift from the established custom of repeating exemplary models and formal archetypes to the recognition of originality or a novelty of design as something that needs to be protected by law is extremely recent.95

96. Ibid. Pg. 142

With the singularity of a design having become an important real estate asset, the alleged imitation of typologies has been at the heart of several cases.96

97. Ibid. Pg. 142

Architecture has entered a new era in which what is being falsified and replicated has begun to be not design ideas, but also the authors of these: architects themselves.97

98. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 226

One cannot understand copying without recognizing that the difference between original and copy is merely one of designation, and that both original and copy are ultimately nondual.98

99. Ibid. Pg. 111

The “original” itself is also necessarily an appropriation, translation, imitation of other materials now presented, packaged, and marketed in ways that objectively constitute deception.99 VII

100. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 2

Copyright is founded on the concept of the unique individual who creates something original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labours. Until recently, the dominant modes of aesthetic thinking have shared the romantic and individualistic assumptions inscribed in copyright. But these assumptions obscure important truths about the processes of cultural production. As Northrop Frye remarked many years ago, all literature is conventional, but in our day the conventionality of literature is “elabourately disguised by a law of copyright pretending that every work of art is an invention distinctive enough to be patented.’100 The representation of the author as a creator who is entitled to

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profit from his intellectual labour came into being through a blending of literary and legal discourses in the context of the contest over perpetual copyright.101

101. Ibid. Pg. 6

In the early modern period, in connection with the individualization of authorship, the transformation of the medieval auctor into the Renaissance author, there developed a general sense that it was improper to publish an author’s text without permission. The acknowledgment of an author’s interest in controlling the publication of his texts is not necessarily the same as the acknowledgment of a property right in the sense of an economic interest in an alienable commodity. In practice, however, the right to control publication has economic implications, and it sometimes becomes difficult to distinguish what we might call matters of propriety from matters of property.102

102. Ibid. Pg. 18

The production of the discourse of original genius coincided with that of authorial property. The logical point of connection was the idea of value: both were concerned with the worth of texts.103

103. Ibid. Pg. 115

The representation of the artist as a transcendent genius is born ‘just when the artist is becoming debased to a petty commodity producer,’104 and this mystification can be understood in part as ‘spiritual compensation for this degradation.’105 The distinguishing characteristic of the modern author, is proprietorship; the author is conceived as the originator and therefore the owner of a special kind of commodity, the work. How are origin and ownership related, and how are these notions incorporated in what Foucault calls ‘the solid and fundamental unit of the author and the work.’106 Along with the concept of the author as a creator and proprietor came that of the property itself, the ‘’work” as an immaterial commodity. In response to the challenge from those who denied that ideas could be property, William Blackstone worked out his influential representation of the original work as ‘’the same conceptions, cloathed in the same words”, a formulation that anticipates the present-day distinction between idea and expression.107

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104. Terry Eagleton, “The Ideology of the Aesthetic,” Cambridge, MA (1990). Pg. 64 105. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 120

106. Ibid. Pg. 1

107. Ibid. Pg. 132

109

108. Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour,” Radical thought in Italy: A potential politics (1996). Pg. 144

As far as immaterial labour being an “author” is concerned, it is necessary to emphasize the radical autonomy of its productive synergies. Immaterial labour forces us to question the classical definitions of work and workforce, because it results from a synthesis of different types of know-how: intellectual skills, manual skills, and entrepreneurial skills. Immaterial labour constitutes itself in immediately collective forms that exist as networks and flows. The subjugation of this form of cooperation and the “use value” of these skills to capitalist logic does not take away the autonomy of the constitution and meaning of immaterial labour. On the contrary, it opens up antagonisms and contradictions that, to use a Marxist formula, demand at least a “new form of exposition.”108

109. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 28

The figure of the proprietary author depends on a conception of the individual as essentially independent and creative, a notion incompatible with the ideology of the absolutist state. It was in direct opposition to the absolutist court as celebrated by Ben Jonson that a new form of political subject, the autonomous private man, came into being; and it is in John Milton’s Areopagitica (1644), published in angry response to the reinstitution of licensing by Parliament, that the figure of the autonomous author, the man whose authority is based not on public office or sanction but on personal experience, study, and deliberation, is defined.109

110. Ibid. Pg. viii

The claim that there is a connection between the invention of the author as original genius and the invention of copyright was prefigured by Benjamin Kaplan in An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967).110

111. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 10

Foucault defined the author as a legal and cultural function, but one that matters deeply to how a culture understands, uses, and is manipulated by texts. So for Foucault, the author matters. But it matters for what it does in a culture, not necessarily whom it represents.111 We must get beyond such esoteric discussions about the rise of the romantic author. Instead, we should define an “author” broadly, as a cultural entity: a “producer.” Since 1909, the copyright statute has recognized this broad sense of authorship, the “unromantic” author.

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The unromantic author might be a young rapper with a $2,000 MIDI sampling machine or a corporation like Disney, through a team of writers working on the cartoon version of Don Quixote. American copyright law itself undermines any romantic sense of individual genius. It recognizes both Microsoft and Miles Davis as authors in a legal sense.112

112. Ibid. Pg. 10

The historical origins of originality and authorship are as murky as the concepts themselves. What is clear, however, is that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British authors organized to protect their financial interests and place in society. They called for a valorization of their profession. They recognized that they controlled a valuable financial and cultural commodity in a thriving empire that based its imperialistic motivations on the superiority of its culture. They lobbied for copyright laws to protect their financial interests.113

113. Ibid. Pg. 46

The “author” must lose its individual dimension and be transformed into an industrially organized production process (with a division of labour, investments, orders, and so forth), “reproduction” becomes a mass reproduction organized according to the imperatives of profitability, and the audience (“reception”) tends to become the consumer/communicator. In this process of socialization and subsumption within the economy of intellectual activity the “ideological” product tends to assume the form of a commodity. However, the subsumption of this process under capitalist logic and the transformation of its products into commodities does not abolish the specificity of aesthetic production, that is to say, the creative relationship between author and audience.114

114. Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour.” Pg. 143

All along, the author was deployed as a straw man in the debate. The unrewarded authorial genius was used as a rhetorical distraction that appealed to American romantic individualism. As copyright historian Lyman Ray Patterson has articulated, copyright has in the twentieth century really been about the rights of publishers first, authors second, and the public a distant third. If we continue to skewer this “straw man” of authorship with our dull scholarly bayonets, we will miss the important issues: ownership, control, access, and use.115

115. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 11

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111

VIII

116. Ibid. Pg. 20

Originality is a fundamental principle of copyright. It implies that the author or artist created the work through his or her own skill, labour, and judgment.116

117. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 56

Creativity has become the key source of value in late capitalism, which draws on the source of value that can be extracted from living labour. That is, the productive labour to form immaterial objects through intellectual and affective endeavour is a growing and important source of value in capitalism.117

118. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 6

With its concerns for origins and first proprietors, the liberal discourse of property blended readily with the eighteenth-century discourse of original genius. As David Quint has shown, the notion of originality had roots in Renaissance literature, but the representation of originality as a central value in cultural production developed, as M. H. Abrams’ classic study reveals, in precisely the same period as the notion of the author’s property right. As late as 1711 Alexander Pope could still evoke the idea of the poet as the reproducer of traditional truths, speaking of ‘True Wit,’ as ‘Nature to Advantage drest, / What oft was Thought, but ne’er so well Exprest,’ Seven years earlier, however, John Dennis made originality the basis for his praise of Milton, and in 1728 Edward Young was also insisting on its importance.118

119. Ibid. Pg. 6

While the idea itself exists in a realm beyond the human realm, the expression belongs to this world, and to the person who, receiving the idea as author, inventor, or owner, fixes it materially as self-expression through his or her labour and turns it into property. This is called “originality.”119

120. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 42

Over the past forty years, ‘creativity’ has become the focus of an intensified interest by governments and capital. Claims are made that creativity is the key to the functioning of modern economies and as such creativity must be ‘democratised’, that is that we must all equally be able to ‘be creative’ and through this creativity, more productive.120 The eighteenth-century discourse of original genius can be understood as an anticipation of romantic doctrines of creativity.

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These anticipations of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s distinctions between the material and immaterial aspects of a book and between content and form also suggest the continuity between the issues raised in the English debates and those raised by the German romantics. Why should an author have a property right in his work? What does that work consist of? How is a literary composition different from a mechanical invention? In representing the author as a specially gifted person able to produce from the depths of personal experience an organically unified work of art, romanticism provided codified theoretical answers to these critical legal questions.121

121. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 132

Questioning the assumptions of the ‘information’ or ‘creative’ society. One of the most common of these is the argument that ‘incentivation’ can encourage individual creativity and hence economic growth. Thus the motivation for the artist, musician, designer or writer is explained purely through their desire for profit t; to stimulate their creativity and innovation more intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation is required. The argument for a ‘creative’ economy can therefore be used to cast everyone in the unlikely Thatcherite model of one-dimensional profit-motivated entrepreneurs rather than complex and multifaceted human beings.122

122. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. xii

Much of the notorious difficulty of applying copyright doctrine to concrete cases can be related to the persistence of the discourse of original genius and to the problems inherent in the reifications of author and work. But much also has to do with copyright’s role as mediator between private and public.123

123. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 141

The attempt to anchor the notion of literary property in personality suggests the need to find a transcendent signifier, a category beyond the economic to warrant and ground the circulation of literary commodities. Thus the mystification of original genius.124

124. Ibid. Pg. 128

At the core of this problem is the creative industries’ attempt to link copyright and creativity – they argue that without copyright there could not be creativity. Here, creativity is correlated with a nation’s economic success that, it is argued, relies on the creative productivity of its.125

125. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 36

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126. Ibid. Pg. 43

Creativity is generally linked to the concept of immaterial production or mental labour of all kinds which connects to computerisation; explicitly because computers rely on the work of human minds in order to produce, code, control and communicate using technology. Today the discourse of creativity is also used widely to distinguish between an older industrial form of capitalism, and the new world of media, information and knowledge, often titled the ‘creative’ economy.126

127. Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. Pg. 186

Artists collabourate over space and time, even if they lived centuries and continents apart. Profound creativity requires maximum exposure to others’ works and liberal freedoms to reuse and reshape others’ material.127

128. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. xii

No woman or man is an island and creativity is always a collective achievement.128

129. Umberto Eco, “Innovation & Repetition: Between Modern & Post-Modern Aesthetics,” Daedalus 114, no. 4 (1985). Pg. 193

The author must invent every time a “new” crime and “new” secondary characters, but these details only serve to reconfirm the permanence of a fixed repertoire of topoi.129

130. Ibid. Pg. 194

Lets consider the case of an historical period (our own) for which iteration and repetition seem to dominate the whole world of artistic creativity, and in which it is difficult to distinguish between the repetition of the media and the repetition of the so-called major arts.130

131. Ibid. Pg. 195

The repetitiveness and the seriality that interests us here look instead at something that at first glance does not appear the same as (equal to) something else.131

133. Ibid. Pg. 195

The first type of repetition is the retake. In this case one recycles the characters of a previous successful story in order to exploit them, by telling what happened to them after the end of their first adventure.132 The second type of repetition is the remake. It consists in telling again a previous successful story.133

134. Ibid. Pg. 201

Seriality and repetition are not opposed to innovation. Nothing is more “serial” than a tie pattern, and yet nothing can be so personalized as a tie.134

132. Ibid. Pg. 195

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Rather, there is an aesthetics of serial forms that requires an historical and anthropological study of the ways in which, at different times and in different places, the dialectic between repetition and innovation has been instantiated.135

135. Ibid. Pg. 201

Much art has been and is repetitive. The concept of absolute originality is a contemporary one, born with Romanticism; classical art was in vast measure serial, and the “modern” avant-garde (at the beginning of this century) challenged the Romantic idea of “creation from nothingness,” with its techniques of collage, mustachios on the Mona Lisa, art about art, and so on.136

136. Ibid. Pg. 203

The human baby protects itself by means of repetition (the same fairy tale, one more time, or the same game, or the same gesture). Repetition is understood as a protective strategy in the face of the shock caused by new and unexpected experiences. So, the problem looks like this: is it not true that the experience of the baby is transferred into adult experience, into the prevalent forms of behavior at the center of the great urban aggregates (described by Simmel, Benjamin, and so many others)? The childhood experience of repetition is prolonged even into adulthood, since it constitutes the principal form of safe haven in the absence of solidly established customs, of substantial communities, of a developed and complete ethos. In traditional societies (or, if you like, in the experience of the “people”), the repetition which is so dear to babies gave way to more complex and articulated forms of protection: to ethos; that is to say, to the usages and customs, to the habits which constitute the base of the substantial communities. Now, in the age of the multitude, this substitution no longer occurs. Repetition, far from being replaced, persists. It was Walter Benjamin who got the point. He dedicated a great deal of attention to childhood, to childish games, to the love which a baby has for repetition; and together with this, he identified the sphere in which new forms of perception are created with the technical reproducibility of a work of art.137

137. Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (Semiotext (e) Los Angeles, 2003). Pg. 39

Classical literary tradition is no different. Shakespeare borrowed heavily from Plutarch; Milton from the Bible; Coleridge from Kent, Schelling, and Schlegel; Yeats from Shelly; Kafka from Kleist and Dickens; Joyce from Homer; and T. S. Eliot from Shakespeare, Whitman,

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138. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox. Pg. 22

and Baudelaire, all in ways that would infringe today’s bloated copyright. In literature and music, as in other forms of expression, such ‘‘patterns of influence—cribbing, tweaking, transforming— [are] at the very heart of the creative process.’138

139. Alan Liu, The Laws of Cool (University of Chicago Press, 2004). Pg. 2

What is of interest now is the distinctive form of that churning in relation to the general economic and social churning that Joseph A. Schumpeter, in his classic phrase about capitalism, called “creative destruction.” A “perennial gale of creative destruction,” Schumpeter wrote in 1942, “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” The real competition, Schumpeter said, is not the normal furor over prices, quality, and sales effort, but “competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization . . . [competition] which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.” Recent scholars of business and economic history take such furious creativity to be simply post-industrial business as usual. In “post-capitalist society,” Peter F. Drucker says, “creative destruction” is “innovation,” compelling the “systematic abandonment of the established, the customary, the familiar, the comfortable.” The “spirit of informationalism,” Manuel Castells adds, “is the culture of ‘creative destruction’ accelerated to the speed of the optoelectronic circuits that process its signals.”139

140. Ibid. Pg. 325

In the age of corporatized “creativity,” the modernist and originally Romantic premise that critique goes hand in hand with “renovation,” which is to say “innovation” and “originality,” is now dysfunctional as an overarching aesthetic, no matter how functional creativity may be at lower levels of ideology (e.g., as motivation for individual artists and authors, as an argument for funding, or as the rationale for an arts festival).140

141. Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour.” Pg. 141

Innovation is no longer subordinated only to the rationalization of labour, but also to commercial imperatives. It seems, then, that the post-industrial commodity is the result of a creative process that involves both the producer and the consumer.141

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Creativity and productivity in post-industrial societies reside, on the one hand, in the dialectic between the forms of life and values they produce and, on the other, in the activities of subjects that constitute them. The legitimation that the (Schumpeterian) entrepreneur found in his or her capacity for innovation has lost its foundation. Because the capitalist entrepreneur does not produce the forms and contents of immaterial labour, he or she does not even produce innovation.142

142. Ibid. Pg. 145

The concept of creativity is being reconfigured to meet the needs of capital, no longer limited to the Romantic myths of authorship, nor predicated on the concept of the ‘Great Men’ or the ‘Genius’. Instead, creativity is understood as a ‘floating signifier’, that is it can correspond to a number of different meanings across society.143

143. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 42

Paradoxically, since ideas do not or cannot receive legal protection, IP law encourages those who produce commodities to exaggerate the inevitable distortion of the idea as manifest in the actual object. And the result of this is the kitsch version of originality, “thinking outside the box,” that prevails in the marketplace today.144

144. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 22

If capitalism is new in its modes of accumulation, in its centres of initiative, in its ideology, this is not because it is itself creative, innovative and revolutionary. It is because it is forced to mutate in order to survive.145

145. Yann MoulierBoutang, Cognitive Capitalism (Polity, 2012). Pg. 36

146. Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air (USA: Penguin Books, 1988). Pg. 288

IX The information society usually refers to a shift in Western

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147. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 43

economies from the production of goods to the production of innovation. Sometimes referred to as ‘post-fordism’, this identifies a shift from a Fordist mass industrial society that was epitomised by Henry Ford’s huge mass-production factories, to that of an economy based on information and technology, and shifts in the patterns of consumption, flexible changes in the workplace and a higher intensity of profit-related growth by the move from a mass market to concentrating on a higher stratum of high-earning consumers. Generally, the shift is understood to have occurred in the 1960s and 1970s in response to various factors such as union activity, the high cost of the welfare state, strikes and the oil shock that led to a drop in competitiveness in the West.147

148. Ibid. Pg. 44

Manuel Castells, exploring the rise of networks, has argued that we can see the emergence of an information society that is built around the growing importance of knowledge and information to the generation of profit.148

149. Ibid. Pg. 45

[There has been a] deepening of [the] capitalistic logic of profit seeking in capital-labour relationships; enhancing productivity of labour and capital; globalising production, circulation and markets, seizing the most advantageous conditions for profit making everywhere; and marshalling the state’s support for productivity gains and competitiveness of national economies, often to the detriment of social protection and public interest regulations.149

150. Ibid. Pg. 45

The information society remains a capitalist society, which Castells argues has grown from three major causes; the information technology revolution, the restructuring of capitalism in the 1980s and the longterm effect of social and political movements in the 1960s and 1970s. However, Castells stresses that the actual deployment of information technology is the result of conscious social action – not merely a deterministic result of technical change.150

151. Ibid. Pg. 45

The development of information and knowledge as important new economic resources differs from previous usages of information and knowledge that were embedded within the commodity.151 There has been a move away from the importance of material inputs

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(which previously were critical elements in production) to ideas and knowledge as contributing significant value to the product. But this information has also become disarticulated from its carrier (that is, the commodity) and consequently has been accorded a separate value. Therefore value-added is increasingly reliant on non-material inputs into products and services.152

152. Ibid. Pg. 45

On one hand, there is immaterial or mental activity which “results in commodities which exist separately from the producer [...] books, paintings and all products of art as distinct from the artistic achievement of the practicing artist.’153

153. Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude. Pg. 53 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1887). Appendix

The debates around the constitutive role of intellectual property laws in commercial and popular culture and its monopoly on the use and reuse of meaning, interpretation and transformation is increasingly excluded from the political sphere and articulated through the market.154

154. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 52

The consequences for democracy and creativity have largely been ignored in the rapid enclosure of ideas and expressions that has intensified in the past decade. With a world economic system being created on the basis of a global monopoly on property rights in intellectual and immaterial production, nations and corporations are increasingly focusing on the collection of intellectual property portfolios and securing rights in knowledge.155

155. Ibid. Pg. 52

Whereas industrial capitalism could be characterised as the production of commodities by means of commodities, cognitive capitalism produces knowledge by means of knowledge and produces the living by means of the living. It is immediately production of life, and thus it is bio-production. The production of new knowledge can only be done on the basis of an accumulation of knowledge that is not reduced to technical material means. But it can therefore only take place on the basis of collective brain activity mobilised in interconnected digital networks. This type of capitalism corresponds to a development in society that has come to be known as ‘the knowledge society’. Insofar as invention-power (far more than physical labour power) is what is mobilised specifically by cognitive capitalism, this creates a situation in which cognitive capitalism produces knowledge and the living through

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156. Moulier-Boutang, Cognitive Capitalism. Pg. 56

the production of the population.156

157. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 54

To help distinguish new modes of alienation of labour-produced goods, here the analytical category of immaterial goods is used, that is, the form of goods and services within an informational milieu. This category is aimed at helping to distinguish a particularly informational mode of exploitation, whereby through the use of enclosing techniques, including IPRs and digital locks, the ownership and control of information can be organised and manipulated. The concept of immaterial goods raises questions about a new class of ownership that is supported through the monopolisation of information, data or knowledge talk about a new feudalism.157

158. Ibid. Pg. 56

Non-material inputs (such as design, marketing, advertising, quality-control and technical ideas), or what Marx called ‘universal labour’, are now the subject of furious competition amongst states and corporations.158

159. Ibid. Pg. 56

Information has always been important to capitalism, of course, but the relative weight of the ownership of information is increasing as the potential for monopoly control of its creation, dissemination and use has been strengthened. The control and codification of knowledge has become increasingly subject to the attention of capitalists as accordingly, while the weight of current economic output is probably only modestly higher than it was a half-century ago, value added [i.e. knowledge and non-material additions], adjusted for price change, has risen well over threefold.’159

160. Ibid. Pg. 56

These questions are not new, but they point to issues over the changing structure of creativity referred to earlier, and how it is being configured to serve as a locus for profit in late capitalism.160

161. Ibid. Pg. 57

The expansion of capital into information, knowledge and communicational arenas raises particular questions about the extent to which capitalism intervenes in our social life to a different degree than in previous modes of production.161 Today with knowledge becoming a key resource for capitalism,

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the question remains as to what lengths capital may go to control the raw materials of creative or informational production. This has been achieved in the past through what some theorists refer to as the ‘enclosure of the common’ or the privatisation of knowledge objects.162

162. Ibid. Pg. 144

As capital expands it seeks ownership of more of the common intellectual space in order to control the production of immaterial goods and services. This tendency can contradict some of the requirements for creative production (such as access to knowledge).163

163. Ibid. Pg. 145

Carlo Vercellone’s motto goes “rent is the new profit” in cognitive capitalism. Rent is parasitic because it is orthogonal to the line of the classic profit.164 Rent is the parasitic income an owner can earn just by owning an asset and it traditionally refers to land property. Profit on the contrary is meant to be productive and it refers to the power of capital to generate and extract surplus (from commodity value and workforce).165

164. Matteo Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage,” Policy Futures in Education 8, no. 6 (2010). Pg. 8

165. Ibid. Pg. 8

The digital revolution made the reproduction of immaterial objects easier, faster, ubiquitous and almost free. But as the Italian economist Enzo Rullani points out, within cognitive capitalism, “proprietary logic does not disappear but has to subordinate itself to the law of diffusion.” Intellectual property (and so rent) is no longer based on space and objects but on time and speed. Apart from copyright there are many other modes to extract rent.166

166. Ibid. Pg. 9

For Rullani the value of a knowledge (extensively of any cognitive product, artwork, brand, information) is given by the composition of three drivers: the value of its performance and application (v); the number of its multiplications and replica (n); the sharing rate of the value among the people involved in the process (p). Knowledge is successful when it becomes self-propulsive and pushes all the three drivers: 1) maximising the value, 2) multiplying effectively, 3) sharing the value that is produced.167

167. Ibid. Pg. 9

A taxonomy of rent and its parasites is needed to describe cognitive capitalism in detail. Taxonomy is not merely a metaphor as cognitive

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168. Ibid. Pg. 9

systems tend to behave like living systems. According to Vercellone, a specific form of rent introduced by cognitive capitalism is the cognitive rent that is captured over intellectual property such as patents, copyrights and trademarks. More precisely Rullani contextualises the new forms of rent within a speed-based competitive scenario. He shows how rent can be extracted dynamically along mobile and temporary micro-monopolies, skipping the limits of intellectual property.168

169. Ibid. Pg. 10

All these types of rent are immaterial parasites. The parasite is immaterial as rent is produced dynamically along the virtual extensions of space, time, communication, imagination, desire.169

170. Nigel Thrift, “Foreword,” in Cognitive Capitalism (Polity, 2012). Pg. vi

Over the last thirty years or so it has become standard wisdom, both inside and outside business, that capitalism requires the appliance of more and more brain power in conjunction with information technology— the construction of collective intelligence in order to run complex operations, in order to foster innovation, in order to provide better service experiences, in order simply to reproduce.170

171. Ibid. Pg. vii

Capitalism is not just interested in codified knowledge but equally in noncodified knowledge, which it can codify by all kinds of means— an activity that was one of the keys to the Industrial Revolution and has now become. Indeed, the emphasis on teaching ‘creativity’ in educational systems the world over is a tacit acknowledgement of an even greater ambition: in the cases of both codified and noncodified knowledge, it is supposedly somewhere within the excess of creativity, however defined, that new knowledge and innovation can be found that can continually get the system off the hook.171

172. Moulier-Boutang, Cognitive Capitalism. Pg. 59

Cognitive capitalism is not only a type of accumulation oriented towards the valorisation of knowledge and innovation. It is also a new mode of capitalist production.172 X Literature on freeculturalism is vast but can be partially unpacked through focusing the lens of surplus. Reading authors like Stallman and Lessig, a question rises: where does profit end up in the so-called Free

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Society? Free Culture seems to focus only on the issue of immaterial property rather than production. Although given a closer look, the ghost of the surplus reappears. In his book Free Culture Lawrence Lessig connect the Creative Commons initiative to the Anglo-American libertarian tradition where free speech always rhymes with free market.173

173. Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage.” Pg. 5

With The Future of Ideas, Lessig began to link his ideas to a concept of the commons and social creativity, highlighting the importance of ‘the freedom to tinker’ in order that innovation and new forms of social and technical practices emerged. Perhaps due to his legal background, or his instinctive liberal desire to achieve a consensual ‘middle-ground’ position, Lessig used a somewhat idiosyncratic term ‘open code’ – presumably to avoid offending either the free software or the open source movement. In the end he was forced to revise his ideas with Free Culture where he admitted that a return to the focus on ‘free culture’ was important.174

174. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 22

Lessig takes inspiration from the copyleft and hacker culture quoting Richard Stallman, but where the latter refers only to software, Lessig applies that paradigm to the whole spectrum of cultural artefacts. Software is taken as an universal political model. The book is a useful critique of the copyright regime and at the same time an apology of a generic digital freedom, at least until Lessig pronounces the evil word: taxation. Facing the crisis of the music industries, Lessig has to provide his “alternative compensation system” to reward creators for their works. Lessig modifies a proposal coming from Harvard law professor William Fisher: Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would 1) be marked with a digital watermark [...]. Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop 2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then 3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.175

175. Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage.” Pg. 5

Lessig launched the Creative Commons organisation in 2001 to provide a unified front for a number of different free culture movements, through a variety of Creative Commons licences. However, this project has been fraught with infighting, institutionalisation and controversial

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176. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. 22

relationships with industry that have been widely criticised. He now positions himself as a spokesperson for the ‘free culture’ movement, although increasingly it is defined within a narrow conception of remixing and reuse of culture, which he calls ‘read/write culture.’176

177. Ibid. Pg. 178

The open source movement conception of the social good is strongly neoliberal and libertarian. It privileges both a vision of a highly individualistic social order, a vision strongly influenced by Darwin and the theory of the survival of the fittest, and also holds that collective goods can be produced through the selfish action of individuals.177

178. Ibid. Pg. 38

Open source certainly highlights questions regarding the ‘common’ production of public goods that have been lost from our contemporary vocabulary, especially through viewing the monopoly granted by intellectual property rights through a narrow public/private binary.178

179. Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage.” Pg. 5

180. Ibid. Pg. 6

In the “tradition of free culture” the solution is paradoxically a new tax.179 After an initial honeymoon the Creative Commons (CC) initiative is facing a growing criticism that comes especially from the European media culture. Scouting articles from 2004 to 2006, two fronts of critique can be distinguished: those who claim the institution of a real commonality against Creative Commons restrictions (non- commercial, share-alike, etc.) and those who point out Creative Commons complicity with global capitalism. An example of the first front, Florian Cramer provides a precise and drastic analysis: To say that something is available under a CC license is meaningless in practice. [...] Creative Commons licenses are fragmented, do not define a common minimum standard of freedoms and rights granted to users or even fail to meet the criteria of free licenses altogether, and that unlike the Free Software and Open Source movements, they follow a philosophy of reserving rights of copyright owners rather than granting them to audiences.180 Berlin-based Neoist Anna Nimus agrees with Cramer that CC licences protect only the producers while consumer rights are left unmentioned: “Creative Commons legitimates, rather than denies, producer-control and enforces, rather than abolishes, the distinction

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between producer and consumer. It expands the legal framework for producers to deny consumers the possibility to create use-value or exchange-value out of the common stock.”181 They are “Creative Anti-Commons.”182 Although Lawrence Lessig’s Free Culture and James Boyle’s Public Domain make a liberal critique of existing intellectual-property law, these critiques accept the capitalist system as it currently stands, and propose modifications of IP law that basically support the expansion of that system and its need to exploit creative labour, entrepreneurship of ideas, and so on. If those seeking a “free culture” can posit the freedom of culture only in terms of the existing system, then how free can such a culture really be?183 The logic of Free/Libre/Open Source Software seems only to promise a new space for entrepreneurial freedom where we are never exploited or subject to others’ command. The sole focus upon ‘copyright freedom’ sweeps away consideration of the processes of valorisation active within the global factory without walls.184 Martin Hardie criticise Free/Libre/Open Source Software precisely because it never questions the way it is captured by capital and its relations with the productive forces.185 A tactical notion of autonomous commons can be imagined to include new projects and tendencies against the hyper-celebrated Creative Commons. In a schematic way, autonomous commons 1) allow not only passive and personal consumption but even a productive use of the common stock — implying commercial use by single workers; 2) question the role and complicity of the commons within the global economy and place the common stock out of the exploitation of large companies; 3) are aware of the asymmetry between immaterial and material commons and the impact of immaterial accumulation over material production (e.g. IBM using Linux); 4) consider the commons as an hybrid and dynamic space that dynamically must be built and defended.186

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181. Ibid. Pg. 6

182. Ibid. Pg. 6

183. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 239 184. Martin Hardie, “Change of the Century: Free Software and the Positive Possibility,” Mute 2013(2006), http://www.metamute. org/editorial/articles/ change-century-freesoftware-and-positivepossibility. 185. Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage.” Pg. 6

186. Ibid. Pg. 6

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187. Ibid. Pg. 11

Many of the subcultures and political schools emerged around knowledge and network paradigms (from Free Culture to the ‘creative class’ and even many radical readings of these positions) do not acknowledge cognitive capitalism as a conflictual and competitive scenario. Paolo Virno is one of the few authors to underline the “amphibious” nature of the multitude, that is cooperative as well as aggressive if not struggling “within itself.”187

188. Ibid. Pg. 12

The constitution of autonomous and productive commons does not pass through the traditional forms of activism and for sure not through a digital-only resistance and knowledge sharing. The commons should be acknowledged as a dynamic and hybrid space that is constantly configured along the friction between material and immaterial. If the commons becomes a dynamic space, it must be defended in a dynamic way. Because of the immateriality and anonymity of rent, the grammar of sabotage has become the modus operandi of the multitudes trapped into the network society and cognitive capitalism. The sabotage is the only possible gesture specular to the rent—the only possible gesture to defend the commons.188

189. Boon, In Praise of Copying. Pg. 8

Various popular practices of copying already contain a politics that is not only resistant to the dominant logic of late capitalism, but that already operates in a semi-autonomous manner.189 XI

190. Berry, “Copy, Rip, Burn: The Politics of Copyleft and Copyright.” Pg. xi

The common is a key aspect to thinking in terms of the ways in which a ‘technology of the common’ could raise critical awareness of the collective moment in production. But it also contributes positively to new ways of approaching and applying methods of working, which legitimate and encourage the flourishing of social action and political practices.190 According to Roger Silverstone the common is that material space we share and the precondition for our commonness, our shared understandings as human beings. Hannah Arendt argues that without commonality we are condemned to a ‘private world of self- interest and political impotence’. Arendt uses the metaphor of a table, around

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which we can sit and which provides a material environment for us to communicate and share a common world – it both connects and separates us.191

191. Ibid. Pg. 26

The discussion of the citizen in the space of the public or ‘common’ is by no means a modern phenomenon. These questions are made up of multiple historical, philosophical, cultural, political and economic understandings of the citizen and public identity vis-à-vis the rest of society. However, what is a relatively new phenomenon is the association with and appropriation of a ‘creative’ citizen that inhabits a common world of technology within the process of the emergence of an information-based economy and, more particularly, new intellectual property laws.192

192. Ibid. Pg. 27

Recent moves to try to protect some ideal of the commons in liberal discourse have resulted in the hollowing out of the concept of the commons. The commons has been transformed into a ‘Creative Commons’, which is a distorted and diminished concept of the commons, predicated on a system of private rights codified in intellectual property rights.193

193. Ibid. Pg. 28

This is important in regard to debates and contradictions found in discussing the concept of the ‘common’ in general, but useful to explore the case of the ‘intellectual commons’. The commons itself is an essentially contested concept, and categorical slippage is frequent in the literature between (i) ‘common’; (ii) ‘commons’; (iii) ‘common-wealth’; (iv) ‘public domain’; (v) ‘public sphere’; (vi) ‘freedom’; (vii) ‘commonalty’ (or ‘commonality’); (viii) ‘copyleft’; (ix) ‘sharing’; and (x) ‘anti-copyright.’194

194. Ibid. Pg. 79

According to Cicero, the meaning of res publicae is res populi (the people’s business) where ‘the people’ is ‘a union of a number of men, acknowledging each other’s rights and pursuing in common their advantage, utility or interest’. Indeed, the English ‘republic’ is derived from the Latin res publicae meaning ‘the public thing’, ‘the public concern’ or the ‘people’s business’. Cicero had a particular interest in justice, and in the distinction between commons and private goods, and argued that one should treat common goods as common and private ones as one’s own. He argued that no property is private by

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195. Ibid. Pg. 86

nature – instead it becomes private: 1) by long occupation (by custom); 2) by victory (the spoils of war); or 3) by law (settlement, contract or lot). Today, the term most often associated with this definition of res publicae is ‘commonwealth’. For Cicero, private owners must ‘contribute to the common stock of things that benefit everyone together.’195

196. Ibid. Pg. 89

The ‘common’ is often understood with regard to commonalty (the common body of man) or commonality (that which we share in common). For example, Hardt and Negri argue that it should be considered with regard to the common interest, that is the general interest that is not made abstract in the control of the state (that is, the public interest) but rather is held in common by ‘the singularities that co-operate in social, biopolitical production ... managed by the multitude’.196

197. Ibid. Pg. 89

Res communes define things that are capable of non-exclusive ownership or incapable of ownership. In other words, things that are open to all by their nature.197

198. Ibid. Pg. 189

An excursus on the concept of the common. Outlines a genealogy that includes res nullis (things belonging to no-one), res privatae (private things), res publicae (public things), res universitatis (things belonging to a group), res communes (common things), res divini juris (things that are under the jurisdiction of the gods) and res imperium (things owned in the international arena). This genealogy highlighted how these property forms are based on contingent turns in history, rather than rational or planned outcomes. These concepts were intended as an ongoing contribution to research into the way in which we understand our current formation of property rights, and more importantly, to bring back to our attention older forms of communal and shared rights (in many cases the concept of ownership would not apply here).198 There are two main issues relating to the privatised nature of the commons in the twenty-first century. 1) Where previously the commons was a non-owned community resource, today we see many dispersed private projects opened up ostensibly for the commons (such as the Creative Commons project) but which still reserve copyright and intellectual property rights to the private licenser. This book has examined whether a new concept of the commons is beginning to

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develop through conflicts over intellectual property rights, perhaps as a form of community-owned intellectual property (such as a res universitatis, as a state-backed utility or collecting society that protects and licenses materials freely) or through a market-based system based on contract and private property (that is, res privatae); and 2) The concept of the creative citizen as a new subjectivity is being contested by hackers within free/libre/open source software, in practices like the distribution/creation of open source material/software and discursive practices that reject the policies, advocacy and governmentality of state interests that promote corporate ownership and copyright culture.199

199. Ibid. Pg. 195

The crisis of the copyright system and the contradictions of the so-called Free Culture movement are taken as a starting point to design the notion of autonomous commons against the creative commons. A new political arena is outlined around Rullani’s cognitive capitalism and the new theory of rent developed by Negri and Vercellone. Finally, the sabotage is shown as the specular gesture of the multitudes to defend the commons against the parasitic dimension of rent. 200

200. Pasquinelli, “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage.” Pg. 2

Among all the appeals for “real” commons only Dmytri Kleiner’s idea of ‘Copyfarleft’ condenses the nodal point of the conflict in a pragmatic proposal that breaks the flat paradigm of Free Culture. In his article “Copyfarleft and Copyjustright” Kleiner notices a property divide that is more crucial than any digital divide: 10% of the world population owns 85% of the global assets against a multitude of people owning nearly nothing. This material dominion of the owning class is consequently extended thanks to the copyright over immaterial assets, so that these can be owned, controlled and traded. In the case of music for example intellectual property is more crucial to the owning class than musicians, as they are forced to resign author rights over their own works. On the other side the digital commons do not provide a better habitat: authors are sceptical that copyleft can earn them a living. In the end the authors’ wage conditions within cognitive capitalism seem to follow the same old laws of Fordism. Moving from Ricardo’s definition of rent and the so-called “Iron Law of Wages” Kleiner develops the “iron law of copyright earnings.”201

201. Ibid. Pg. 7

The solution advanced by Kleiner is copyfarleft, a license with a

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202. Ibid. Pg. 7

hybrid status that recognises class divide and allow workers to claim back the “means of production.” Copyfarleft products are free and can be used to make money only by those who do not exploit wage labour (like other workers or co-ops). For copyleft to have any revolutionary potential it must be Copyfarleft. It must insist upon workers ownership of the means of production. In order to do this a license cannot have a single set of terms for all users, but rather must have different rules for different classes. Specifically one set of rules for those who are working within the context of workers ownership and commons based production, and another for those who employ private property and wage labour in production.202

203. Ibid. Pg. 8

Kleiner says that if money cannot be made out of it, a work does not belong to the commons: it is merely private property. How does cognitive capitalism make money? Where does a digital economy extract surplus? While digerati and activists are stuck to the glorification of peer production, good managers — but also good Marxists — are aware of the profits made on the shoulders of the collective intelligence.203

204. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Pg. 142

Why, then, don’t we abandon copyright as an archaic and cumbersome system of cultural regulation? Why don’t we launch into the brave new world that Michel Foucault imagines at the end of “What Is an Author?” where the authorial function disappears and texts develop and circulate, as Foucault puts it, “in the anonymity of a murmur.” The institution of copyright is of course deeply rooted in our economic system, and much of our economy does in turn depend on intellectual property. But, no less important, copyright is deeply rooted in our conception of ourselves as individuals with at least a modest grade of singularity, some degree of personality. And it is associated with our sense of privacy and our conviction, at least in theory, that it is essential to limit the power of the state. We are not ready to give up the sense of who we are.204 The world is one and common to those who are awake, but that everybody who is asleep turns away to his own. Heraclitus (2006, Fragment 89)

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131

SELECTION

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

Mundaneum, Musée mondial, Geneva- 1929

Musée d’art Contemporain , Paris- 1931

Centre d’esthétique contemporaine, Paris - 1937

Musée Chandigarh - 1952

Musée, Ahmedabad - 1951

Palais des congrès, Strasbourg, 1964

Hôpital, Venice, 1964

Musée à croissance illimitée, Sans lieu, 1939

Musée National d'Art Occidental, Tokyo, 1957

142

al, Geneva- 1929 Mundaneum, MusĂŠe mondial, Geneva- 1929

143

Paris- 1931

144

mporaine, Paris - 1937

145

e, Sans lieu, 1939

Musée à croissance illimitée, Sans lieu, 1939

146

ndigarh - 1952

147

148

MusĂŠe National d'Art Occidental, Tokyo, 1957

149

ongrĂ¨s, Strasbourg, 1964 Palais des congrĂ¨s, Strasbourg, 1964

150

H么pital, Venice, 1964

151

Altes Museum

152

Hotel Berlin

153

154

155

156

157

plans 134. Corner detail, Lake Shore Apartments, 1951, Ludwig Mies Van der Rohe 135. Corner detail, Pepsi Cola Co. World Headquarters, 1960, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill

136. Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, 325 137. Rucellai Sepulchre, Florence, 1467, Leon Battista Alberti

138. Farnsworth House, 1951, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe 139. Rosen House, 1963, Craig Ellwood

140. Churchill College, Cambridge, 1968, Richard Sheppard 141. Churchill College, Cambridge, 2009, 6a Archatects

142. Squares, Spirals and Swastikas, Le Corbusier 143. Mundaneum, Musée mondial, Geneva, 1929, Le Corbusier 144. Musée d’art Contemporain , Paris, 1931, LC 145. Centre d’esthétique contemporaine, Paris, 1937, LC 146. Musée à croissance illimitée, Sans lieu, 1939, LC 147. Musée Chandigarh, 1952, LC

158

148. Musée, Ahmedabad, 1951, LC 149. Musée National d’Art Occidental, Tokyo, 1957, LC 150. Palais des congrès, Strasbourg, 1964, LC 151. Hôpital, Venice, 1964, LC

152. Altes Museum, Berlin, 1830, Karl Friedrich Schinkel 153. Hotel Berlin, Berlin, 1977, Oswald Matthias Ungers

154. School, Klotzsche, 1925, Heinrich Tessenow 155. Student Housing, Chieti, 1976, Giorgio Grassi

156. Locomotiva 2, Torino, 1962, Aldo Rossi 157. Locomotiva 3, Torino, 2010, DOGMA

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POSTSCRIPT Premises for the Resumption of the Discussion & PRACTICE of Copy & Derivative Works

There is nothing new. Everything is new. Everyone copies. Architecture is reified by repeating itself. All architecture is singular. Architecture has a vast body of knowledge, suitable to be appropriated and transformed. Derivative practices from other fields of cultural production can be useful for the production of architecture. Architecture has always translated different aspects from other fields, in this sense architecture is not autonomous. Architecture is fundamentally a derivative practice. Architecture is a mimetic practice. After the death of God, architecture started repeating itself and not imitating natureâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;God. The mimetic desire can be transformed into an operative and projective tool for the production of architecture. Copying is inherent to architecture. Copy should be distinguished from plagiarism, copycat and replica.

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Copying requires a commitment to architectural history. What is required, are fundamental, rational, and combinatory kinds of processes in the context of the encounter with history — Werner Oechslin Every act of copying is an act of appropriation. Depropriation means indifference to possession — Marcus Boon Most of what we call history is arguably the history of appropriation — Marcus Boon Derivative works are destructive in order to produce the new. Derivative works allow history to be operative rather than a mere account of objects, facts and events. Copying should not only limit to re-employ knowledge that is already available and public. Appropriation should be both from the past and laterally from the present. Architecture as the practice we know was founded on derivative principles, translating methods used in rhetoric to the production of architecture. The so-called ‘remix culture’ is a neorenaissance, in terms of cultural production.

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The better we know tradition —i.e., ourselves—and the more responsibly we deal with it, the better things we shall make similar, and the better things we shall make different — Gerhard Richter Architecture has nothing to do with the creation of new forms — Mies van der Rohe Through repetition architecture becomes a language — Sam Jacob Copying today wants to repeat the lessons of the past without being simply repetitive. Instead, copying today begs the question: what kind of repetition can be theorized that is not simply emulative, historicist, or pastiche? — Alex Maymind The new is the production of a new difference, repetition but with difference — Gilles Deleuze Originality is a myth — Rosalind Krauss Everything made since Duchamp has been a readymade, even when hand painted — Gerhard Richter Innovation is capitalism’s biggest driving force, a never-ending progress.

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Innovation went through the reverse process of copy, whereas innovation was negative and is now a positive term, copy was a positive term and now it has a negative connotation. Copying still relates to abundance. The figure of the architect as author/creator/genius sustains the myth of originality and the innovation imperative. Typology could be understood as a systematic or ‘scientific’ method to copy—mimesis of principle. Working typologically might allow bypassing the current legal paradigm, by copying principles, types. Copyrights in architecture are pervasive for the development of the practice. Chicago Manual of Style for architectural production. Copying transgresses traditional intellectual property. The notion of the commons should be well defined in architecture, if what is common can be copied. Architecture should establish clearly what is of public domain. Architecture is a collective project. If architects want to keep their status of authors/creators/genius maybe all public architecture should be really public, of common property, even its intellectual property, and all private architecture could remain private, as ‘art works.’

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Enough of the original geniuses! Let us repeat ourselves unceasingly! â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Adolf Loos, Heimatkunst, Trotzdem, 1914