How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO by Foreign Policy Research Institute

EURASIA PROGRAM

How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO

Bruce Pannier

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policyoriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. Author: Bruce Pannier Design: Natalia Kopytnik © 2022 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute March 2022

EURASIA PROGRAM

How Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO Bruce Pannier

Executive Summary The Russian Federation-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has existed for nearly 30 years, and, during all that time, it had never sent troops into a conflict zone in one of its members states. CSTO members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan had requested assistance in the past, but the organization did not send help as those situations were not part of the CSTO mandate. Faced with unrest that broke out in early January 2022, Kazakhstan’s government requested CSTO assistance to fend off what Kazakhstan’s president said was a threat to the country’s sovereignty from tens of thousands of terrorists. For the first time, the CSTO answered a call for aid and deployed some 2,500 troops to guard key facilities in Kazakhstan—but only in a few cities, and for less than two weeks. It looks now like there were no terrorists, and Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev’s call for help was not to save his country, but to save himself from elements in the government that were trying to oust him. That makes the CSTO decision to deploy forces more intriguing, as it appears the organization did not send the force to Kazakhstan to defend that country’s sovereignty, but to defend Tokayev and preserve a government that was friendly towards Russia.

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5 of Russian units of the CSTO peacekeeping Arrival forces at the Chkalovsky airfield. (Odkb-Csto.org)

Introduction For the first time in the 30-year existence

counterterrorism, and rapid deployment—but never sent troops when conflicts occurred in member states.

of the Russian Federation-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the organization responded to a member state’s call for help. The member state, Kazakhstan, requested assistance in the wake of peaceful protests in early January 2022 that were hijacked by provocateurs—whose identity has still not become clear—and violence that broke out in several cities. The basis for Kazakhstan’s request was dubious, and seems more so every day, but the CSTO reacted quickly in agreeing to its first-ever deployment of forces to a member state where the government seemed threatened; the CSTO seems to have expanded the mandate of the organization to include intervening to prop up a member government in danger of being overthrown by domestic forces.

The CSTO did not intervene in revolutions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 that ousted the country’s presidents. Kyrgyzstan called for CSTO help during the inter-ethnic riots in the country’s south in June 2010, but the CSTO refrained from sending troops because it was considered an internal affair—and therefore outside the CSTO Charter. Armenia called for the CSTO to send troops when Azerbaijan attacked pro-Armenian forces in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, but the CSTO declined saying that the territory was not recognized as Armenian. The organization did not attempt to intervene or mediate in the brief border fighting between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in late April 2021, even though the CSTO defense ministers and security council secretaries were meeting in Dushanbe at the time.

The CSTO was formed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in May 1992 by the leaders of Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Three other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia, joined in 1993.

Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty states: “If one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty. In the event of an act of aggression against any of the participating States, all other participating States will provide him [the affected state] the necessary assistance, including military, and will also provide support at their disposal in exercising the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.”1 Kazakhstan never had to invoke Article 4, but, as the situation inside the country rapidly deteriorated, the call for assistance was made—though the basis for

Uzbekistan announced in 1998 that it was leaving the organization after the Uzbek government sought security assurances if the Taliban crossed the Uzbek border and Belarus leader Aleksandr Lukashenko said that he would not send one Belarussian soldier to defend any of the Central Asian states. Azerbaijan and Georgia also withdrew in 1999. The CSTO remained something of a paper tiger since those departures. The organization conducted military exercises—peacekeeping,

1“From the Treaty to the Organization.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/.

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2012 stamp of Kazakhstan, featuring the CSTO emblem. (Wikimedia Commons)

the request seems likely to haunt the Kazakh government for years to come.

least 16 people dead and dozens wounded. The January 2, 2022, protest started as a result of the doubling of the price of liquefied petroleum gas, the major source of fuel for vehicles in the Mangystau Province, where Zhanaozen is located. Kazakh authorities have been cautious in dealing with protests in Mangystau Province since the 2011tragedy.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev really was in trouble as 2022 started. But his problems were a mixture of threats: nationwide antigovernment protests; violence and looting in country’s biggest city, Almaty, as well as in a few other cities in southeastern Kazakhstan; and what appears to have been power struggle within the government to oust Tokayev—none of which should have necessitated CSTO intervention.

But the latest protest—over a single issue— soon swept across the country, gathering new demands as demonstrations moved east. The price of fuel became the least of concerns amid calls for greater participation from the country’s citizens in choosing local and provincial officials, higher wages, increased social benefits, and, the chief complaint, an end to the system of rule created by Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

A peaceful protest had started in the remote western city of Zhanaozen, an oil-workers’ town that was the center of labor protests in 2011 that ended in tragedy on Kazakhstan’s Independence Day, December 16, when police fired on striking workers, leaving at

Internal Challenges to Tokayev Something else was happening at the

Nazarbayev greatly strengthened the chairmanship of the security council just months before he stepped down, and, as he handed over the presidency, he became the council’s lifetime head.

same time as the protests erupted across the country. In some towns and cities, notably in Kazakhstan’s largest city and former capital Almaty, police and security forces that had proven so effective in countering protests since Tokayev became president in 2019 suddenly seemed to be absent from areas where demonstrations occurred. The absence was especially noticeable when the violence started in Almaty. Three days into the protests, Tokayev announced that Nazarbayev had been removed from his position as Chairman of the National Security Council and that Tokayev assumed that position. Then, Tokayev dismissed Karim Masimov, the head of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB), the first public indications of governmental in-fighting.

presidential administration before he became KNB chief in 2016. His dismissal was the first clue that Tokayev faced opposition from within the government as anti-government protests took to the streets of major cities around the country.

Nazarbayev greatly strengthened the chairmanship of the security council just months before he stepped down on March 19, 2019, and, as Nazarbayev handed over the presidency, he became the council’s lifetime head. This post—combined with constitutional amendments from 20 years earlier giving Kazakhstan’s first president a range of privileges and powers—guaranteed that Nazarbayev would have a huge influence in governing Kazakhstan, even if he was no longer president. Masimov was a veteran politician. He had served as prime minister twice and as head of Nazarbayev’s

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A view shows a burning police car during a protest against LPG cost rise following the Kazakh authorities' decision to lift price caps on liquefied petroleum gas in Almaty, Kazakhstan January 5, 2022. REUTERS/Pavel Mikheyev

Terror Accusations and the CSTO’s Involvement On the night of January 5, as several

“Almaty was attacked, destroyed, vandalized, the residents of Almaty became victims of attacks by terrorists, bandits, therefore it is our duty . . . to take all possible actions to protect our state.”

government buildings in Almaty burned and shops were ransacked—the protestors even occupied the Almaty airport—Tokayev appeared on state television and said that Kazakhstan was facing a threat from “terrorists” who were responsible for the unrest. “In fact, this is no longer a threat,” Tokayev said, “this is an undermining of the integrity of the state, and most importantly, this is an attack on our citizens.”2

Tokayev’s assertion that foreign terrorists were behind the violence was therefore key to securing official CSTO support.

“These terrorist bands are essentially international, and have received extensive training abroad,” Tokayev declared, adding, “Their attack on Kazakhstan should be seen as an act of aggression.”3

A few hours later, the head of the CSTO’s security council, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, announced that the organization would deploy troops to Kazakhstan “for a limited period of time in order to stabilize and normalize the situation in that country.”4 On January 7, CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas stated that the CSTO would send approximately 2,500 troops into Kazakhstan, all of whom would be in Kazakhstan by the end of the day. “If needed, we will bring in more,”5 Zas added.

Tokayev’s accusations were specially designed to show that it was not citizens of Kazakhstan who were responsible for the violence; outsiders were doing this, and they were a danger to Kazakh sovereignty. An external threat to Kazakhstan was precisely what was necessary to call in the CSTO to help. “Today I turned to the heads of state of the CSTO countries to provide assistance to Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat,” Tokayev said, adding,

It was a surprising twist to these dramatic

2 Vaal, Tamara. “Tokayev requested help from the CSTO states – Analytical online magazine Vlast.” Vlast.kz. January 5, 2022. https://vlast.kz/novosti/48063-tokaev-zaprosil-pomos-u-gosudarstv-odkb.html. 3 “Tokayev asked help from the CSTO: ‘Near Almaty there is a battle with units of the Ministry of Defense.’” Radio Azattyk. January 6, 2022. https://rus.azattyq.org/a/31641170.html. 4 “The Statement by Nikol Pashinyan, the Chairman of the CSTO Collective Security Council - Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. January 6, 2022. https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_ odkb/zayavlenie-predsedatelya-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-premer-ministra-respubliki-armeniya-n/#loaded. 5 “CSTO Secretary General: ‘The number of military units in Kazakhstan will reach 2.5 thousand people.’” Radio Azattyk. January 7, 2022. https://rus.azattyq.org/a/31642820.html.

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A ceremony was held in the Moscow region for Russian paratroopers from the CSTO peacekeeping contingent performing tasks in the Republic of Kazakhstan. (Odkb-Csto.org)

events. Tokayev’s assertion that foreign terrorists were behind the violence was therefore key to securing official CSTO support. Tokayev had claimed that some 20,000 of these terrorists had gathered around Almaty. He put the country on “red alert” for terrorism and used these alleged terrorists as justification for giving shootto-kill with warning orders to quash the violence. Russian troops started arriving on January 6. Belarussian paratroopers followed, then Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Armenian soldiers. CSTO troops were only tasked with guarding vital infrastructure installations, all in the eastern part of the country. Russian troops, for

example, guarded the Almaty airport and Baikonur cosmodrome, while Kyrgyz soldiers guarded an Almaty thermal power plant.6 Tajik soldiers secured areas around schools and hospitals.7 The total deployment of some 2,500 soldiers was far too few to deal with the serious terrorist threat that Tokayev said was a danger to Kazakh sovereignty. CSTO troops started their withdrawal on January 13, and, by January 19, Olzhas Khusainov of Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry announced the completion of the CSTO mission and that there were no more foreign troops in the country.8 To date, there is scant evidence that international terrorists were involved at all.

6 Timirbaeva, Natalia. “The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan Showed How Peacekeepers from Kyrgyzstan Work (Video).” Kaktus.media. January 10, 2022. https://kaktus.media/doc/452491_minoborony_kazahstana_pokazalo_kak_rabotaut_mirotvorcy_iz_kyrgyzstana_video.html. 7 Bakozoda, Hiromon. “Tajik CSTO Peacekeepers Returned from Kazakhstan to Their Permanent Dislocations.” Radio Ozodi. January 14, 2022. https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31654222.html. 8 “Announcing the Completion of the Withdrawal of CSTO Troops from Kazakhstan.” Radio Azattyk. January 19, 2022. https://rus.azattyq.org/a/31661369.html.

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Arrival of Russian units of the CSTO peacekeeping forces at the Chkalovsky airfield. (Odkb-Csto.org)

Kazakhstan’s Attempt to Show Foreign Involvement Kazakh authorities did make an initial

attempt to show publicly that foreigners were involved in the unrest. On January 9, state television channel Qazaqstan showed a video of a young man who bore obvious signs of having been beaten. The man said that he was from Kyrgyzstan and confessed that unknown people had phoned him on January 1 offering to pay him roughly $200 to take part in the unrest.9 The man said that since he was unemployed, he accepted the offer, and these unknown people bought him a plane ticket to Kazakhstan on January 2, the first day of the protest in Zhanaozen. He also implicated citizens of other Central Asian countries in the alleged plot, saying that after he arrived, he was taken to a flat where there were people from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The work of the CSTO collective peacekeeping forces for the protection of state and socially significant facilities in Kazakhstan (Odkb-Csto.org)

Kazakh authorities continue to say that there were terrorists in the country when the unrest broke out, but to date, they have not publicly identified any terrorists.

The man was not a terrorist. He was Vikram Ruzahunov, a jazz pianist who was in Kazakhstan for a concert. He purchased his plane ticket to go there on December 16, and he said that he made those statements after being beaten and was told that if he confessed he would be sent home.10 Kazakh authorities continue to say that there were terrorists in the country when the unrest broke out, but to date, they have not publicly identified any terrorists or what terrorist group/groups were able to assemble a force that Tokayev originally said numbered in the tens of thousands.

9 “In Bishkek, at a Rally Outside the Embassy of Kazakhstan, They Demanded the Release of Vikram Ruzakhunov.” Radio Azattyk. January 9, 2022. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31645953.html. 10 “The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan: Vikram Ruzakhunov’s Ticket for the Flight to Almaty Was Purchased on December 16.” Radio Azattyk. January 9, 2022. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31645887.html.

What Really Happened? The failure of law enforcement bodies in

Almaty and a few other cities to respond to the protests, and the dismissal and subsequent arrest of Masimov, points to people within the government acting to oust Tokayev. There is speculation that some of these people might have played a part in sparking the violence. Nazarbayev’s brother Bolat fled to Kyrgyzstan by car in the early morning of January 6, then flew to Dubai.11 Bolat controlled the biggest market in Almaty and was rumored to have interests in other businesses rumored to be connected to organized criminal groups. There is speculation that Bolat, and possibly others, used such underworld connections to spark the violence. There are witness accounts and even videos of people in civilian clothing arriving in areas of Almaty by car and distributing weapons, or simply leaving them on the street for anyone to pick up.

Whatever the origins of the violence, the sudden appearance of thousands of foreign, or at least foreign-trained, terrorists seems to be among the least likely versions of how the peaceful protests turned violent.

11 Dzhumashova, Aida. “The Situation in Kazakhstan. Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Brother Was in Bishkek and Flew to Dubai.” 24.Kg. January 12, 2022. https://24.kg/vlast/220298_situatsiya_vkazahstane_brat_nursultana_nazarbaeva_ byil_vbishkeke_iuletel_vdubay

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Whatever the origins of the violence, the sudden appearance of thousands of foreign, or at least foreigntrained, terrorists seems to be among the least likely versions of how the peaceful protests turned violent

Demonstrators march on the central square of Aktobe, January 4, 2022. (Esetok/Wikimedia Commons)

Why Now for the CSTO? Why did the CSTO decide to make an

The CSTO was able to demonstrate that it could move forces, albeit a relatively small number of troops and equipment, quickly to a government in distress.

unprecedented deployment of forces to Kazakhstan? Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan officially announced the decision, but no CSTO decision is made without the Kremlin’s approval. The Russian military and intelligence service were surely aware that there was no terrorist threat. Kazakhstan is a key Russian ally and shares a 7,000-kilometer border with Russia. The CSTO has conducted military exercises many times in Kazakhstan, including at the Illisky training grounds in Almaty Province. The CSTO has a base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, some 40 kilometers outside Bishkek, and only several hours drive from where these alleged terrorists gathered. It is difficult to believe that the Kremlin would not have picked up some intelligence about thousands of foreign terrorists gathering near Almaty and not bothered to provide this information to its Kazakh allies.

The CSTO was able to demonstrate that it could move forces, albeit a relatively small number of troops and equipment, quickly to a government in distress. The Russian military has already proven that it could do this in its operations in Syria, but Kazakhstan was an opportunity to show that the CSTO as an organization could accomplish this task. CSTO troops, mainly Russian soldiers, were deployed to guard power plants, airports, other key installations, and the Baikonur cosmodrome, just as they would be expected to do in advance of any much larger arrival of forces, such as those that Zas had suggested could be brought into Kazakhstan if needed.

A more likely explanation for the CSTO deployment is that Tokayev could no longer trust the KNB and had doubts about other law enforcement bodies. The CSTO’s deployment was the Kremlin’s signal that it sided with Tokayev. Those in Kazakhstan who wished to continue efforts to oust Tokayev did so with the knowledge that Russia would oppose them, and the arrival of Russian troops within 24 hours of the request underscored Russia’s commitment to seeing Tokayev remain in power.

The deployment was a sign to the other Central Asian states of the value of Russian, or CSTO, friendship, in dealing with security threats. And it was also a clear sign to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, neither of which are CSTO members and both of which share borders with Afghanistan. Kremlin officials have regularly warned Central Asia about the threat from militant groups, some of which have Central Asian

That is all well for Tokayev, but what did the CSTO receive in return for its help?

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Meeting of the CSTO Military Committee via videoconference, December 8, 2021. (Odkb-Csto.org)

citizens in their ranks and are operating in northern Afghanistan, and reminded the two countries they might need help defending what some Russian officials have termed the “southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent States.” It was possibly also a message to member states that Moscow expected full commitment from CSTO members. Armenia and Kazakhstan chose not to send any troops to a CSTO exercise in Belarus in 2020, a move at least one report said showed that some CSTO members

were “growing disenchanted” with some of the CSTO drills.12 It also served notice to the People’s Republic of China that Russia calls the shots in Central Asian security matters. That is particularly important since Russia has been losing influence in Central Asia to China for more than two decades and China is now Russia’s main competitor in the battle for regional influence.

12 Altynbayev, By Kanat. “Kazakhstan, Armenia Sit out Russia-Led CSTO Military Exercises in Belarus.” Caravanserai. October 22, 2020. https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2020/10/22/feature-01.

Putting the SCO and China on Notice After the formation of the Shanghai

most of their territory there. China wants to be sure the Central Asian governments can prevent any militants in Afghanistan from reaching China through Central Asia.

Five in April 1996, which was comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and, five years later, when Uzbekistan was added and the group became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Beijing used the organization to increase its influence in Central Asia—mainly economic influence, but also including security matters. China’s borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are a combined 3,300 kilometers, most of it in the high mountains.

Beijing has always worried that the sympathies of the Muslim peoples in Central Asia lie with the Muslim peoples in western China, including the Uyghurs

Beijing has always worried that the sympathies of the Muslim peoples in Central Asia lie with the Muslim peoples in western China, including the Uyghurs, who are a Turkic people with linguistic and cultural affinities to the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbeks. This worry has intensified as Beijing cracks down on Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to eradicate separatist sentiment—a crackdown that has also affected ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.

China held joint military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002, “the first time China held a cross-border military maneuver with one of its neighbors.”13 In August 2003, the SCO conducted military exercises in eastern Kazakhstan, involving troops from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In June 2004, the SCO anti-terrorism center officially opened in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. At that time, the United States was using a base at Khanabad, Uzbekistan, and while relations with Washington were at arguably an all-time high, Uzbekistan’s relations with Moscow had been heading downward for several years. The SCO started Peace Mission military exercises in 2005 and continued to hold these exercises annually until 2010 and after that every other year.

The CSTO seemed to be losing ground to the SCO during the first decade of the 21st century, and Chinese bilateral military cooperation was, and still is, increasing with each of the Central Asian states. This change is in part due to Beijing’s concerns about Uyghur militant groups that have been operating in Syria and Iraq, and in Afghanistan, where Uyghur militants have been present since the late 1990s and where some of the Uyghurs fighting in Middle East fled after jihadist groups lost

13 “A Quick Guide to SCO and Its Military Cooperation | English.scio.gov.cn.” CGTN. June 5, 2018. http://english.scio. gov.cn/infographics/2018-06/05/content_51673238.htm.

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Exercises "Interaction-2021", "Poisk-2021", "Echelon-2021", Republic of Tajikistan, October 18-23, 2021. (Odkb-Csto.org)

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Exercises "Interaction-2021", "Poisk-2021", "Echelon-2021", Republic of Tajikistan, October 18-23, 2021. (Odkb-Csto.org)

After the SCO exercises went from annual to biennial events in 2010, the CSTO became more active during 2010-2020 period, particularly in the second half of the decade (links to sources on all the CSTO exercises mentioned on page 20 are found in an appendix at the end). The CSTO held the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 2013; the Search-2016 exercises in Tajikistan in April; Interaction drills by the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force in August 2016 in Russia’s Pskov region; Frontier-2016 Rapid Reaction Force exercises in Kyrgyzstan in October; Combat Brotherhood joint operation training exercise from October to November 2017 in Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan; Cobalt-2018 and the Search-2018 tactical exercises in Kazakhstan in May and October, respectively; the Interaction-2018 command-staff exercise in Kyrgyzstan in October; Indestructible Brotherhood-2018

in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in November; Thunder-2019 in Kyrgyzstan in October; Echelon-2019 and Interaction-2019 in Russia in October; Indestructible Brotherhood-2019 in Tajikistan, also in October; and Indestructible Brotherhood-2020 in Belarus in October. After the Taliban captured most of Afghanistan in August 2021, the CSTO quickly organized and conducted the Rubezh-2021 military exercise in Kyrgyzstan in September and Interaction-2021, Search-2021, and Echelon-2021 exercises in Tajikistan in October. These exercises were conducted as a warning to the Taliban and to other militant groups not allied to the Taliban, such as the Islamic State of Khorasan, about CSTO resolve to defend member states threatened by militants in Afghanistan.

The Future of the CSTO and Deployment of Troops The CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan sets

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan? Kazakhstan has questioned, and at times resisted, new EEU regulations set by Russia, seemingly made without any discussion with other members. There were reports that after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow requested Kazakh troops, but Kazakh officials denied this request; there is no grounds under the CSTO Charter for sending Kazakh troops as Russia’s sovereignty is not threatened.

a precedent for the use of the CSTO in an actual emergency situation. The CSTO was in Kazakhstan in a supportive role, and it seems clear that the aim of the CSTO and the Kazakh government was for the CSTO forces not to engage in hostilities. There was, and probably will continue to be for some time, a lot of grumbling from people in Kazakhstan about bringing in foreign troops and the effect that move had on Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. Subsequent events showed that once Kazakh forces regrouped and rallied they were able to restore order—although at the cost of 227 lives, officially, and through the use of excessive physical force against civilians, as the increasing evidence of people being tortured shows.

Aggression by any state or group of states seems to have been expanded to include “external threats,” a reference to stateless terrorist groups, the basis for Tokayev’s request for CSTO help.

But the CSTO has opened the door to future deployments, with some caveats. Aggression by any state or group of states seems to have been expanded to include “external threats,” a reference to stateless terrorist groups, the basis for Tokayev’s request for CSTO help. There is great speculation that Tokayev is now deeply indebted to Russia for propping up his government. What will Tokayev have to do to pay this debt back is a common question now. Will Kazakhstan be pulled closer to Russia at the expense of Kazakhstan’s ties with the West? Or with China? Will Kazakhstan more often side with Russia in votes at the United Nations? Will Kazakhstan’s government mute its criticism of Russia’s often unilateral decisions in the affairs of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which groups Russia, Armenia,

Tokayev might have already paid off some of that debt simply by requesting and allowing the CSTO to send troops to his country. It sets a precedent that certainly any CSTO member state in Central Asia could follow Kazakhstan’s example in a future call for CSTO intervention to quell what is in effect a domestic threat to the regime—provided that they claim foreign terrorists are instigating the unrest. Kyrgyz political analyst Aida Alimbayeva said the CSTO deployment “creates a precedent for the authoritarian

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Exercise with the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces "Indestructible Brotherhood-2021", Kazan, November 8-12, 2021. (Odkb-Csto.org)

leaders of Central Asia.”14 That the CSTO would respond to Kazakhstan’s call indicates that the CSTO mandate has expanded to include coming to the aid of a member state government in jeopardy of being overthrown, so long, it would seem, as that government is friendly toward Russia, vital to Russia’s own security and interests, and makes the request based on threats from an external force.

in the 2004 “Orange Revolution.” Georgia and Ukraine are not a part of the CSTO, but the CSTO was a weaker organization then, and there are questions about how much good the deployment of troops would have done for Kyrgyzstan in 2005, especially since the Tulip Revolution was a nationwide protest that started during the campaign for parliamentary elections and had gone on for weeks before Akayev was toppled.

When the so-called March 2005 “Tulip Revolution” happened in Kyrgyzstan, thenPresident Askar Akayev did not request CSTO help. In any case, Kyrgyzstan was seen at the time as being the latest former Soviet republic to experience a “color revolution” after the Georgian government was ousted in the 2003 “Rose Revolution” and the Ukrainian government was ousted

The April 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan happened surprisingly quickly, and events that led to the ouster of Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, really only took place in the northern cities of Talas and Bishkek. Bakiyev also angered Russia when his son Maksim used part of a loan meant for construction of a large hydropower plant (HPP) to invest outside Kyrgyzstan

14 Shestakova, Natalia. “‘No One Attacks Kazakhstan from the Outside.’ Opinions on the Dispatch of the Kyrgyz Military.” Kaktus.media. January 6, 2022. https://kaktus.media/doc/452261_na_kazahstan_nikto_ne_napadaet_izvne._ mneniia_ob_otpravke_kyrgyzstanskih_voennyh.html.

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in the hopes of making quick profit before returning the principle towards the HPP project. Moreover, the loan was made available on the condition that Bakiyev ask the United States to vacate the Manas airport that U.S. forces had been using since 2001 as a transit center to support operations in Afghanistan. Bakiev instead demanded, and received, a higher rent from the United States for use of the airport. Russian soft power in the form of Russian television broadcasts received in Kyrgyzstan that featured negative portrayals of Bakiyev and his government played a key role in adding fuel to growing popular discontent in Kyrgyzstan leading up the April 2010 revolution. Russia had no interest in supporting Bakiyev, and the Kremlin was rightly confident that whoever replaced Bakiyev would continue to need Russian help. There was no question of Bakiyev appealing to Russia or the CSTO for help.

“created a state on a territory that never had a state,” and adding, “Kazakhs never had any statehood, he [Nazarbayev] has created it.”15 It might have been a compliment to Nazarbayev, but, for some in Kazakhstan, it was too similar to comments that Putin was making about Ukraine. And Kazakhstan, like Ukraine, has a large Russian population, most of whom live in northern Kazakhstan near the border with Russia.

CSTO support was also vital in keeping Tokayev in power, a lesson that will not be lost on other leaders, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, in particular.

Nikol Pashinyan came to power as a result of the 2018 revolution in Armenia that ousted Serzh Sargsyan, another example of protests changing leadership in a Commonwealth of Independent States country that is also a CSTO member that had unnerved the Kremlin. Pashinyan tried to distance Armenia from Russia. Therefore, it was hardly surprising when Russia, and the CSTO, rejected Pashinyan’s call for help when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan flared up in 2020.

But Nazarbayev, now 81, appeared frail at a meeting with Putin in Russia, which Tokayev also attended, less than one week before protests started. Faced with a choice of backing an old friend who is clearly in his twilight years or supporting someone who could guarantee the status quo and possibly more in Russian-Kazakh ties, Putin seems to have chosen the latter. It is noteworthy that Tokayev still insists that Nazarbayev be treated with respect, though not so much for members of Nazarbayev’s family, and there is no hint that Kazakhstan’s first president will face any charges. In this particular instance, Putin may have a had a hand, thinking about his own future.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, have met many times since Putin became Russia’s leader at the start of 2000, and the two always seemed to have an amicable relationship. They have both publicly complimented one another. And in controversial comments in 2014, Putin gave Nazarbayev credit for having

While the CSTO deployment might be seen

15 Dolgov, Anna. “Kazakhs Worried after Putin Questions History of Country’s Independence.” Moscow Times. September 2014. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/09/01/kazakhs-worried-after-putin-questions-history-of-countrys-independence-a38907.

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by some as a sign of Kazakhstan losing some of its sovereignty and Tokayev some of his credibility, the mission would overall have to be viewed as successful. The brief stay of CSTO troops demonstrated that the organization could transport and assemble forces from all members countries rapidly in a conflict zone, as it had trained to do for so many years.

transition from taking action to prevent it. CSTO troops neither inflicted nor suffered any casualties, which was important for the organization and for Kazakhstan. If CSTO troops had spilled the blood of any of Kazakhstan’s citizens, then there would always be some in Kazakhstan who would speak out against the CSTO and Kazakhstan’s membership in the organization. It was important for the CSTO troops to show they could conduct their mission without any injuries or deaths. The CSTO force was in Kazakhstan less than two weeks, which was important as the Russian military has a history of entering foreign territories to restore order and then remaining in these places for years under the pretext that order had not yet fully been established.

The deployment again signaled to China, and anyone else looking to expand their influence in Central Asia, that the responsibility for security in Central Asia still belongs to Russia.

The deployment again signaled to China, and anyone else looking to expand their influence in Central Asia, that the responsibility for security in Central Asia still belongs to Russia, whether as an individual country or as head of the multinational CSTO. Ultimately, the CSTO troop deployment was something of a watershed moment for the organization as it has moved from training exercises to an active phase, where it played a role in shoring up a member state faced with a crisis situation.

CSTO support was also vital in keeping Tokayev in power, a lesson that will not be lost on other leaders, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, in particular. The unpopular president of Tajikistan has been in power for nearly 30 years and has been grooming his eldest son, Rustam Emomali, to take his place. The country already fought a civil war in 1992-1997, and the constant predations of Tajikistan’s economy by Rahmon and his family since the war ended could stoke unrest if, or more likely when, the dynastic transfer of power takes place. The Tajik government has blamed terrorists for attacks, and alleged attacks, in the country several times without producing any compelling evidence to back such claims. CSTO support for a transfer of the presidency from father to son will be important when the time comes and could dissuade many who would oppose such a

CSTO DEPLOYMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN

Appendix “The Second Doctrine of the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces ‘Indestructible Brotherhood-2013’, October 7-11, 2013, Chelyabinsk Region of Chebarkul.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 11, 2013. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/indestructible_brotherhood_2013/vtoroe_uchenie_mirotvorcheskikh_sil_odkb_nerushimoe_bratstvo_2013_7_11_ oktyabrya_2013_g_chelyabinska/. “In Tajikistan, a Joint Exercise with the Forces and Reconnaissance Forces of the Armed Forces of the CSTO Poisk-2016 Member States Was Completed.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. April 22, 2016. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/ksorodkb2015/v_tadzhikistane_zavershilos_sovmestnoe_uchenie_s_silami_i_sredstvami_razvedki_ vooruzhennykh_sil_gosu-6109/. “During the Final Stage of the Active Phase of the Training of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces ‘Interaction 2016’, a Landing Force Was Landed in the Pskov Region, the Invasion of a Conditional Enemy Was Repelled, and the Allied Forces Launched a Count.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. August 19, 2016. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/ trainings_interaction/v_khode_zavershayushchego_etapa_aktivnoy_fazy_ucheniya_kollektivnykh_sil_operativnogo_reagirovaniya_-6928/. “The Joint Tactical Exercise ‘Frontier-2016’ with Contingents of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region Has Completed.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 7, 2016. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/rubezh/zavershilos_sovmestnoe_takticheskoe_uchenie_rubezh_2016_s_kontingentami_kollektivnykh_sil_bystrogo_r-8598/. “The CSTO ‘Combat Brotherhood 2017’ Joint Operational and Strategic Exercise Will Be Held in Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan from October 3 to November 20, 2017.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. September 27, 2017. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/CSTO_collective_forces/sovmestnoe_operativno_strategicheskoe_uchenie_odkb_boevoe_bratstvo_2017_proydet_na_territorii_rossii-10345/. “In Kazakhstan, the Active Phase of the Tactical-Special Exercise ‘Cobalt-2018’ Took Place, during Which the Illegal Armed Formations Were ‘Defeated.’” Collective Security Treaty Organization. May 22, 2018. https://en.odkb-csto.org/ training/other/v_kazakhstane_proshla_aktivnaya_faza_taktiko_spetsialnogo_ucheniya_kobalt_2018_v_khode_kotorogo_byli-12718/. “In Kazakhstan, the Final Stage of Combat Shooting by All Available Tactical and Special Exercises with the Forces and Means of Intelligence Services and Units of the CSTO Poisk-2018 Member States.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 4, 2018. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/the_brotherhood_of_war_2018/v_kazakhstane_proshel_zavershayushchiy_etap_s_boevoy_strelboy_vsemi_imeyushchimisya_sredstvami_takti-13355/. “Two Thousand CSTO CRRF Troops during the ‘Interaction-2018’ Exercise in Kyrgyzstan Plan and Work out a Joint Operation to Localize an Armed Conflict.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 11, 2018. https://en.odkb-csto. org/training/the_brotherhood_of_war_2018/dve_tysyachi_voennosluzhashchikh_ksor_odkb_v_khode_ucheniya_vzaimodeystvie_2018_v_kyrgyzstane_planir-13582/. “Joint Training with the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces ‘Indestructible Brotherhood-2018’ Ended in the Sverdlovsk Region. According to the Plan, a Peacekeeping Operation Was Conducted in a Conditional State on the ‘Resolution’ of the UN Security Council.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. November 4, 2018. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/the_ brotherhood_of_war_2018/sovmestnoe_uchenie_s_mirotvorcheskimi_silami_odkb_nerushimoe_bratstvo_2018_zavershilos_v_sverdlovsko-14031/. “In the Issyk-Kul Region of Kyrgyzstan, an Active Phase of the CSTO Large-Scale Anti-Drug Trainings - ‘Thunder-2019’ (‘Grom-2019’) Took Place, in Which the CSTO Acting Secretary General Valery Semerikov Took Part.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. August 8, 2019. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/other/v-issyk-kulskoy-oblasti-kyrgyzstana-proshla-aktivnaya-faza-masshtabnykh-antinarkoticheskikh-ucheniy-/. “Today, in the Territory of the Russian Federation, at the Training Ground of the 333rd Mulino Combat Training Center, the Special Training ‘Echelon-2019’ Was Launched with the Forces and Means of Material and Technical Support of the CSTO Member States.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 9, 2019. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/ the_brotherhood_of_war_2019/segodnya-na-territorii-rossiyskoy-federatsii-na-poligone-333-go-tsentra-boevoy-podgotovki-mulino-dan/.

“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region at the ‘Mulino’ Training Ground, the Opening Ceremony of the Joint Training with the CRRF CSTO ‘Interaction-2019’ Was Held.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 16, 2019. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/the_brotherhood_of_war_2019/v-nizhegorodskoy-oblasti-na-poligone-mulino-sostoyalas-tseremoniya-otkrytiya-sovmestnogo-uchenie-s-k/. “The Second Stage of the Joint Training ‘Indestructible Brotherhood-2019’ Joint Exercise Was Launched in Tajikistan at the Harb-Maidon Training Ground, 20 Kilometers from the Afghan Border. The CSTO CPF Commander Reported Peacekeeping Operation Plan.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 26, 2019. https://en.odkb-csto.org/ training/the_brotherhood_of_war_2019/vtoroy-etap-sovmestnogo-ucheniya-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2019-startoval-vtadzhikistane-na-poligone-khar/. “Opening of the ‘Indestructible Brotherhood-2020’ Peacekeeping Training, 12.10.2020, Republic of Belarus, Vitebsk Region, ‘Losvido’ Training Ground.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 12, 2020. https://en.odkb-csto.org/ training/indestructible_brotherhood/otkrytie-mirotvorcheskogo-ucheniya-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-12-10-2020-respublika-belarus-vitebskaya/. “‘Rubezh-2021’ Joint Training with the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region of Collective Security Began in the Kyrgyz Republic.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. September 7, 2021. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/rubezh/v-kyrgyzstane-nachalos-sovmestnoe-uchenie-s-kollektivnymi-silami-bystrogo-razvyertyvaniya-tsentralno/. “The Republic of Tajikistan Hosted a Large-Scale Joint Training ‘Interaction-2021’ with the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, a Special Training of Reconnaissance Units ‘Search-2021’, and Training of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Units “Echel.” Collective Security Treaty Organization. October 25, 2021. https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/trainings_interaction/v-tadzhikistane-proshli-masshtabnye-sovmestnye-ucheniya-vzaimodeystvie-2021-s-kollektivnymi-silami-o/.

About the Author Bruce Pannier is a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. He currently writes Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s blog, Qishloq Ovozi, and appears regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL. Prior to joining RFE/RL in 1997, Bruce worked at the Open Media Research Institute in Prague. In 1992, he led a sociological project in Central Asia sponsored by the University of Manchester and the Soros Cultural Initiative Foundation. During that time he lived in villages in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Bruce studied at Tashkent State University in the summer of 1990 and studied at Columbia University under Professor Edward Allworth. Bruce has also written for The Economist, Janes Intelligence, Oxford Analytica, Freedom House, The Cairo Review, the FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and Energo Weekly.

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