Security
Security in Central Asia is of primary importance to China and Russia. The rise of jihadist groups in the unstable political environments of Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan is a concern for Moscow and Beijing when they look at Central Asia. Central Asia’s governments have been effective at preventing Islamic extremist groups from gaining a foothold with ample help from Moscow and Beijing.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The organization regularly conducts joint military exercises on the territories of member states. The CSTO has a base in Kyrgyzstan at Kant, some 25 miles from Bishkek, though the bulk of troops there are Russian. Russia’s 201st Division has two bases in Tajikistan, one in Dushanbe and the other at Bokhtar. Having the bases near populated areas is a constant reminder of Russia’s presence in the two countries.
China has an outpost manned by troops from the People’s Armed Police (PAP) high in the mountains of sparsely inhabited eastern Tajikistan near the Chinese border to watch for Islamic militants trying to cross through Tajikistan to China from nearby Afghanistan. The remote location of this Chinese base ensures minimal contact between Chinese troops at the base and the local population in Tajikistan, and Tajik and Chinese officials rarely talk about the base.
Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and China’s PAP separately conducted counternarcotics operations with Tajik security forces in northeastern Afghanistan during the last decade US-led forces were operating in Afghanistan.
The relationship between the security services of Russia and the Central Asian states remains strong. This relationship is particularly important to certain Central Asian states as it has seen Russia apprehend and extradite Central Asian opposition figures back home where they are then imprisoned. There is an FSB presence in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to help monitor the Afghan border.
The relationship between Chinese and Central Asian security services is mostly confined to the countries bordering China and centers on China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Beijing’s interest here is in helping Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan prevent Islamic militants, such as those from the predominantly Uyghur group the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, from entering Xinjiang and in ensuring Muslims from Xinjiang, ethnic Uyghurs and Kazakhs mainly, cannot cross in Central Asia and speak to international media about the ongoing horrific crackdown against Muslims in Xinjiang.
One area where China has been particularly effective is in sharing digital surveillance technologies with Central Asian governments.
One area where China has been particularly effective is in sharing digital surveillance technologies with Central Asian governments. Again, Beijing prefers the current governments in Central Asia stay in power, and the so-called Smart City projects in which China is partnering with Central Asian governments are designed to help those Central Asian governments keep close
watch on what happens in large cities or restive areas, such as Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), which is also where the Chinese PAP base is located. The regional capital of GBAO is Khorugh, a city of some 30,000 people high up in the Pamir Mountains. Most of the population of GBAO are Pamiris, an ancient people who are now mainly Shiite Muslims. Chinese-made CCTV cameras keep surveillance throughout this small, remote city and were instrumental in identifying Pamiri protesters in May 2022, when government security forces brutally crushed a planned anti-government rally.
All the Central Asian governments have seen how effectively China is at controlling internet activity and have turned to China for assistance in techniques and equipment for monitoring the internet and blocking websites.
The big question in the coming years will be how much Central Asia will lose faith in Russia’s ability to help with major security problems. Since independence, the Central Asian governments have been counting on Russia to send military forces to help confront any serious security threats. The poor performance of the Russian military in Ukraine raises questions about Russia’s ability to assist Central Asia militarily, and the war in Ukraine is also draining Russia’s economy, raising questions as to whether Russia financially would be able to transfer and support a large force in Central Asia.
This is probably equally concerning for China. There has been speculation about the possibility of Chinese boots on the ground in Central Asia for years, but the reality is that China’s harsh policies in Xinjiang have already made enemies in the Islamic world. Sending a large contingent of troops to Central Asia would make Central Asia a
Members of Kyrgyz armed forces line up in Ala-Too Square after President Sooronbai Jeenbekov declared a state of emergency in the capital and ordered troops to be deployed there, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan October 10, 2020. REUTERS/Mariya Gordeyeva
lightning rod for global jihadists anxious to shed Chinese blood and probably worsen any hypothetical security problem.
The comments of Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, and celebrities about “historic Russian lands” that include Central Asia present a different security concern for Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has most often been targeted by Russian Duma deputies such as Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, suggesting Russia reclaim northern Kazakhstan and “liberate Russian speaking people.”1
China has taken advantage of these irredentist threats. In September 2022, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan, he made a point of saying China was “determined to support Kazakhstan in defending its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 2
Beijing sends the same message to the other Central Asian states. China has spent a significant amount of money helping to extract the resources it needs from Central Asia and create an infrastructure to ship these resources back to China. Any outside influence, including Russian, that threatens this network can expect strong opposition from China and prompt the Chinese government to pressure Central Asian governments into defending Chinese interests.
Economics
Russia and China are Central Asia’s biggest economic partners, though for very different reasons, as Russia is generally an exporter to Central Asia and China is generally an importer. Both countries have large investments in Central Asia, but in the last 15 years, China has spent more there than Russia.
Russian exports of flour, for example, have been important for Central Asia since independence, though restrictions on those exports following February 2022 have disrupted what was a steady supply. Kazakhstan has filled some of the shortfalls with its flour exports, but Russian flour is usually better quality and cheaper than Kazakh flour.
Russian petroleum products, particularly gasoline, are still vital to countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which both receive 90 percent or more of their gasoline from Russia. Central Asia has continued to purchase essential foods and fuels from Russia since February 2022, and demand is growing.
Russian petroleum products are still vital to countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which both receive 90 percent or more of their gasoline from Russia.
Heating and electricity problems during winter in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have led both countries to reach deals for supplies of natural gas from Russian gas giant Gazprom. In 2023, Gazprom sold some 1.22 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Uzbekistan and 7.25 bcm to Kazakhstan.3 Uzbekistan has signed a deal with Gazprom to import up to some 11 bcm of gas by 2026.4 Just a few years ago, the pipelines now carrying that Russian gas were shipping Kazakh and Uzbek natural gas to Russia as they had since Soviet times.
Remittances from Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia are vital, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where they account for more than 30 percent of GDP. Conservative estimates say some eight million Central Asian migrant laborers are working in Russia (out of a total Central Asian population of less than 80 million). These Central Asian laborers are in Russia because there are no jobs back home, and the documentation process to work in Russia has been easier than in most other countries, though this is changing after the March 22 terrorist attack in Moscow in which citizens of Tajikistan were implicated. The wave of xenophobia that has swept across Russia since then, and the announcement of new restrictions for Central Asian migrant workers seems bound to send many Central Asians looking for work in other countries, even if travel and documentation procedures are more difficult.
For years Central Asian governments have worried about the possibility that any move
that angered Russia could lead the Kremlin to expel most or all of the Central Asian migrant laborers which would create a socioeconomic crisis for the Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek governments.
From having no footprint at all in Central Asia when the USSR collapsed, China is now everywhere in Central Asia. China is a key investor in Central Asia and an importer of Central Asian energy resources. Since 1997, China has invested tens of billions of dollars in Central Asia, much of it in infrastructure projects to develop oil and gas fields, mining of raw materials, and roads and railways to ship these resources back to China. China now receives oil from western Kazakhstan via a pipeline China helped fund and build and similarly a network of gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China.
China has been a steady investor in other projects in Central Asia, notably the construction of the thermal power plant in
Kuryk Port, Kazakhstan. (primeminister.kz)
the Tajik capital Dushanbe, the overhaul and upgrade of the thermal power plant in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, a new north–south road in eastern Kyrgyzstan, and the PapAngren railroad in eastern Uzbekistan. China was the only country with sufficient funds and interest to participate in these projects that are essential to these Central Asian countries.
The Central Asian countries have all gone into debt to China to varying degrees, and there is a wariness now in Central Asia about accepting more Chinese loans and credits. However, China is often the only country that will undertake multi-million or multi-billiondollar projects in Central Asia.
China is often the only country that will undertake multimillion or multi-billion-dollar projects in Central Asia.
China has lately become more cautious in funding large-scale projects in Central Asia that inevitably require Chinese financial support. A railway line connecting China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan was proposed in the 1990s. While discussion of the railway link has increased in the last two years, China seems reluctant to start a project with an estimated cost of more than US$ 6 billion, understanding both Central Asian countries will need loans from China to build their sections of the railway. The same is true of Line D of the Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline network. Plans call for Line D to pass through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and again, those Central Asian countries, including Turkmenistan, are almost certain to request Chinese financial assistance to construct their sections of the pipeline.
Russia and China’s loan policies differ significantly. Russia has, at times, written off part or all of the individual Central Asian countries’ debt to Russia, which has been a huge relief to those Central Asian governments.
China has already shown it will not follow Russia’s model in matters of loans. China has been willing to renegotiate the timetable for repayment but never hinted it would cancel any of the Central Asian states’ debt.
Soft Power
Russia clearly has an advantage in its ability to project soft power into Central Asia. Many people in Central Asia speak Russian, and Russian television is still widely available in most of Central Asia (and usually more entertaining than local television broadcasts). Russian products from food to machinery abound in every Central Asian country. Millions of migrant laborers have worked in Russia, exposing them to Russian culture and propaganda. There are still several million ethnic Russians living in Central Asia. The five Central Asian states have been independent for more than 30 years, but their SovietRussian heritage is visible in every Central Asian country in the names of towns and villages, on the signs along major highways, and in the architecture across the region.
In contrast, relatively few people in Central Asia speak Chinese. Chinese workers in Central Asia tend to live together and rarely socialize with the local population. Generally, people in Central Asia are worried about their eastern giant neighbor’s future regional intentions despite repeated statements of friendship from China. There is generally great concern among Central Asia’s people that China already has too much political and
economic influence in their region.
Some Chinese soap operas dubbed into local languages are occasionally shown on television, notably in Kyrgyzstan. China started opening Confucius centers in Central Asia in 2005 and there are now at least five in Kazakhstan,5 four in Kyrgyzstan,6 two in Uzbekistan,7 and two in Tajikistan8. Chinese universities offer scholarships to Central Asian students, but Russian universities do too and seem to be more popular with young Central Asians.
Conflict in Energy and Trade in Central Asia
Turkmenistan has been the leading supplier of natural gas to China for about a decade since the three branches of the pipeline network China helped fund started operating. Russia’s Power of Siberia 1 gas pipeline started exporting gas to China in 2019. When European countries drastically cut their imports of Russian gas (between 150–160 bcm annually) in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese gas market became much more important to Russia.
Turkmenistan exported more than 35 bcm of gas to China in 2023. Russia exported 22.7 bcm to China in 2023, but that figure was up from 15.4 bcm in 2022. Plans call for Power of Siberia 1 to reach full capacity of some 38 bcm by 2025. Russia has plans to build a Power of Siberia 2 pipeline with a capacity of some 50 bcm, but China has not committed to this project as it similarly has delayed approval to start construction of Line D from Turkmenistan.
Russia would prefer China was buying Russian gas rather than Turkmen gas. There have been suggestions that since Gazprom is shipping gas to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and there is still spare capacity in those pipelines, Russia could tap into the Turkmenistan–China pipeline and ship some of the 10 bcm Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are each entitled to export via the pipeline network, since neither Kazakhstan nor Uzbekistan is in a position to export such volumes to China at the moment.9 Turkmenistan would undoubtedly be upset with this arrangement as it has enough gas to increase volumes through the pipelines. Beijing has not given any indication as to what or when its choice will be and for now, the current level of imports of both pipeline gas and LNG seems enough for China’s gas needs.
Potentially more troubling for Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia is the role of Central Asia as a transit region for goods.
Potentially more troubling for Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia is the role of Central Asia as a transit region for goods.
The ties of the Soviet Union have never been severed, and in some cases, new connections have been added in the postSoviet years. Most goods shipped between Central Asia and Europe, including Turkey, go by road or rail through Russia. That situation has changed since February 2022, but the familiar routes of trade between Central Asia with countries to the west through Russia are still dominant. One example is Kazakhstan’s oil exports, some 80 percent of which continues to be shipped through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC)
oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port at Novorossiysk. Most of the oil Kazakhstan exports to countries in the European Union goes through Novorossiysk and no alternative can handle such large volumes of Kazakh oil (more than 50 million tons annually).
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, all of Central Asia’s connections to the outside world were through Russia. Railways and roads, pipelines, and power transmission lines were all built when Central Asia was under Russian rule. For the newly independent states in Central Asia, this presented an enormous problem for foreign trade.
China did not have a significant presence in Central Asia for centuries and owing to more than 30 years of frosty Sino-Soviet ties that started in the late 1950s, there were no
connections with China when the Central Asian states became independent. In May 1992, the Druzhba–Alashankou railway border crossing connecting Almaty to Urumqi was launched. Construction of the railway line was actually started in 1956, but work stopped not long after when ties between the Soviet Union and China soured. Kyrgyzstan and China opened the border checkpoint on the Torugart Pass in July 1993, connecting the two countries by road.
More than 30 years later, there is a network of modest but rapidly growing trade routes through Central Asia that avoid Russian territory and connect China to the Middle East and Europe. Much of that is due to the Asian Development Bank’s 1997 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program that created six corridors linking Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan,
(oilgas.gov.tm)
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Parts of these corridors are included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and more recently what is being referred to as the Middle Corridor.
The Middle Corridor is still far from being able to replace the traditional Northern Corridor through Russia, but the Middle Corridor has expanded rapidly since Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine. Beijing is trying to avoid Western sanctions being placed on China, and so it is an active partner in developing the Middle Corridor to maintain solid trade ties with Europe. The Middle Corridor gained even more importance since Houthi militants in Yemen started attacking ships trying to transit the Red Sea and Suez Canal in late 2023.
Russia has inadvertently helped spur progress on expansion of the Middle Corridor. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is part of the Middle Corridor (as are some of the CAREC corridors) and is the
connection between Central Asia and Europe through the Caucasus and one of the export routes for oil from Kazakhstan.
On February 22, 2022, the day after Russia recognized the independence of occupied eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, then-Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi said Kazakhstan was not even considering doing the same.10 In June that same year, sitting next to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Kazakh President KasymJomart Tokayev said Kazakhstan would not recognize the independence of “quasigovernments” Donetsk and Luhansk.11
The CPC pipeline that Kazakhstan depends upon so heavily started experiencing a series of mishaps and complications in late March 2022, despite having functioned smoothly since its launch in 2001. On March 22, 2022, officials at the Novorossiysk port reported a storm had damaged two of the three berths used to load Kazakh oil and repairs would
Northern Corridor Middle Corridor Ocean route
Map adapted from Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin
take some two months.12 Full operations resumed a month later, but Kazakhstan’s Finance Ministry said the country had lost between $220–$330 million during that time.13
In June 2022, loading was stopped again due to Russia’s alleged discovery of WWII mines in the waters near the port.14 The demining work was completed on July 5, but on July 6, a Russian court ordered operations of the CPC to be suspended for 30 days over violations in cleaning up leaked oil.15 The CPC appealed the decision and on July 11 a different court lifted the suspension after imposing a 200,000 rubles (some $3,250) fine on the CPC.16 On August 17, operations were reduced due to two of the loading berths again requiring repairs.17
All the Central Asian states are seeking new sources for a variety of Russian goods that are now in short supply or no longer available due to Russia’s need for import substitution.
After the March 2022 suspension of operations at Novorossiysk, President Tokayev ordered the government to find alternative export routes, and before the end of the year, Kazakhstan had signed an agreement to ship 1.5 million tons of oil annually through Azerbaijan to export some 5–6 million tons of oil via Azerbaijani pipelines in the coming years.
It is still far short of the amount of oil shipped by the CPC, but Kazakhstan continues to explore other potential export routes that avoid Russian territory.
More broadly, all the Central Asian states are seeking new sources for a variety of Russian goods that are now in short supply or no longer available due to Russia’s need for import substitution. Several transportation projects that were started before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have started operation since February 2022, including a railway from China through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran to Turkiye, a multimodal route through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to Iran, and the railway and maritime route from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan then by rail through Georgia to Turkiye. In January 2024, a freight train from Xian, China arrived in Baku after making a 3,200-mile journey in 11 days.18 Only a few years ago, that trip would have taken 50 days or more.
The Middle Corridor works to Russia’s disadvantage. Further, the Chinese routes into Afghanistan and Iran also compete with Russian designs to create a north–south route between Russia and India via either the Caucasus or Central Asia and then to the Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf. This Russian plan makes Chinese development or the Middle Corridor (BRI) in Central Asia an unwelcome development.
Conclusion
It is easy for China and Russia to cooperate in Central Asia regarding security issues. Both agree on the need to fight what China calls the three evils—terrorism, extremism, and separatism—in Central Asia.
Beijing and Moscow also agree on the need to prevent any other countries from gaining too much influence there. They worked to undermine US credibility in the region during the years US and NATO allies were using facilities in Central Asia in support of the
Exercises "Interaction-2021", "Poisk-2021", "Echelon-2021", Republic of Tajikistan, October 18-23, 2021. (Odkb-Csto.org)
operation in Afghanistan. Russia and China will probably do the same if the Organization of Turkic States (which groups Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan with Turkmenistan as an observer country) continues to increase its interests in Central Asia as it has for the last two years.
However, the potential for disagreement in Central Asia is growing. Moscow sees Central Asia as a former colony that some in Russia believe will again be part of a greater Russian empire one day.
The potential for disagreement in Central Asia is growing. Moscow sees Central Asia as a former colony that some in Russia believe will again be part of a greater Russian empire one day. China sees Central Asia as useful.
China sees Central Asia as useful. The Central Asian governments are friendly, unlike some of China’s other neighbors (India and Vietnam, for example). Huge investment has made the Central Asian governments publicly supportive of China when it comes to issues such as the crackdown against Muslims in Xinjiang or the Taiwan question, and Central Asia is what Chinese General Liu Yazhou once called, referring to vast energy and mineral resources there, the “thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the heaven. ”
In the middle of these two world powers are the Central Asian states that want to continue being independent, but they want China and Russia as security and trade partners
while wanting other partners as well. Central Asia is also where the people are becoming more religious and less tolerant of their government’s inability to improve the lives of their citizens and of the governments that continue to support the current Central Asian leaders to stay in power.
1“Kazakhstan FM Comments on Gennady Zyuganov,” KYPиCB, March 10, 2022, https://kz.kursiv.media/ en/2022-03-10/kazakhstan-fm-comments-on-gennady-zyuganov-statement/.
2 “China will always support Kazakhstan in protecting its territorial integrity, Xi Jinping said,” Vlast.kz, September 14, 2022, https://vlast.kz/novosti/51669-kitaj-budet-vsegda-podderzivat-kazahstan-v-zasite-territorialnoj-celostnosti-zaavil-si-czinpin.html
3 “Gazprom Supplies Uzbekistan with Gas at Approximate Rate of $160 per Thousand Cubic Meters—Kommersant,” Kun.Uz, March 7, 2024, https://kun.uz/en/ news/2024/03/07/gazprom-supplies-uzbekistan-withgas-at-an-approximate-rate-of-160-per-thousand-cubicmeters-kommersant
4 “Gazprom Swaps Berlin for Tashkent,” Kommeрсанть, March 6, 2024, https://www.kommersant.ru/ doc/6553261.
5 “Center for Confucius on the Basis of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages,” Ablai Khan.KZ, 2024, https://www. ablaikhan.kz/en/60-root-category-english-articles/ news/university/1038-center-for-confucius-on-the-basis-of-kazakh-ablai-khan-university-of-international-relations-and-world-languages.html.
6 “Another Confucius Institute Will be Opened in Kyrgyzstan,” TAG News, April 12, 2016, https:// silkroadnews.org/en/news/another-confucius-institute-will-be-opened-in-kyrgyzstan.
7 “Confucius Institute Opened in Samarkand,” UZ Daily, March 12, 2019, https://www.uzdaily.uz/ru/post/22805.
8 “Second Confucius Institute Opens in Tajikstan,” Sputnik, August 21, 2015, https://tj.sputniknews. ru/20150821/1016503961.html.
9 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan’s Search for New Gas Markets,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 17, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-turkmenistan-looks-for-gas-markets/32865088.html.
10 Tamara Waal, “Kazakhstan Will Remain Neutral on the Issue of “DPR” and “LPR” - MFA,” Vlast.KZ, February 21, 2022, https://vlast.kz/novosti/48778-kazahstan-budet-priderzivatsa-nejtraliteta-v-voprose-dnr-i-lnr-mid. html.
11 “Kazakhstan Does Not Recognize LPR and DPR-Tokayev,” KazTAG.KZ, June 17, 2022, https://kaztag.kz/ru/ news/kazakhstan-ne-priznaet-lnr-i-dnr-tokaev.
12 “Kazakhstan is Looking for Alternative Routes for Oil Shipment Due to the Accident at the CPC-Ministry of Energy,” Báige News, March 23, 2022, https:// baigenews.kz/kazakhstan_ishchet_alternativnye_marshruty_otgruzki_nefti_iz-za_avarii_na_ktk_-_minenergo_129193/.
13 Laura Keffer, Kazakhstan Estimated the Damage from the Accident at the Terminal Near Novorossiysk at $220-330 Million,” Kommeрсанть, April 19, 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5316522.
14 Olga Mordyushenko, “Oil Shipment Torpedoed,” Kommeрсанть, June 18, 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5421340.
15 “Russian Court Orders Halt to Caspian Oil Pipeline but Exports Still Flow,” Reuters, July 6, 2022, https:// www.reuters.com/business/energy/caspian-pipeline-consortium-says-court-orders-suspension-operations-30-days-2022-07-06/.
16 Lusine Balasyan, “The Court Replaced the Decision to Suspend Work for CPC with a Fine of 200 Thousand Rubles,” Kommeрсанть, July 11, 2022, https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/5458122.
17 “Media: CPC Again Suspends Oil Shipments from Two Berths,” Ралио Азаттык, August 22, 2022, https:// rus.azattyq.org/a/31998636.html.
18 Bruce Pannier, “The Middle Corridor is Opening,” Caspian Policy Center, January 22, 2024, https:// caspianpolicy.org/research/economy/the-middle-corridor-is-opening.
