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burning of Lac-Mégantic

Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, killing 47

ed demolition. Initial news reports described the blast radius as spanning a distance of one kilometre (0.6 miles).

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Situated east of Montreal, approximately 155 miles (250 km) away, merely 20 miles (32 km) from northern Maine, Lac-Mégantic nestles in a captivating region of Quebec renowned for its charming hills and serene lakes. As trains make their way towards the town, they traverse a lengthy downward slope, eventually reaching a point where the tracks gracefully curve.

This calamity stood as the most devastating rail accident witnessed in North America in nearly a century.

The accident

The disaster unfolded when an unattended 73car freight train operated by Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway (MMA) experienced a derailment in the downtown area. This followed a downhill descent with a gradient of 1.2% while carrying crude oil. This catastrophic event culminated in a series of explosions and a raging fire, causing the unfortunate loss of life of forty-seven individuals. The freight train, designated MMA 2, was 1433 m (4701 ft) long and weighed 10,287 tonnes (10,125 long tons; 11,339 short tons). The train was composed of:

MMA C30-7 #5017 (ex-BN) a remote-control "VB" car (a former caboose) used to house the Locotrol equipment necessary for MMA's single-engineer train operation

MMA C30-7 #5026 (ex-BN)

CITX SD40-2 #3053 (ex-CP #5740)

MMA C30-7 #5023 (ex-BN)

CEFX SD40-2 #3166 (ex-UP #3360) a loaded box car used as a buffer car

72 non-pressure dangerous goods DOT-111 tank cars loaded with Bakken Formation crude oil (Class 3, UN 1267). Each tank car carried 113,000 litres (25,000 imp gal; 30,000 US gal) of crude oil.

The oil, shipped by World Fuel Services subsidiary Dakota Plains Holdings, from New Town, North Dakota, originated from the Bakken Formation.

The destination was the Irving Oil Refinery in Saint John, New Brunswick. Shipment of the oil was contracted to CPR, which transported it on CPR tracks from North Dakota to the CPR yard in Côte-Saint-Luc, a Montreal suburb. CPR sub-contracted MMA to transport the oil from the CPR yard in Côte-Saint-Luc to the MMA yard in Brownville Junction. CPR also sub-contracted NBSR to transport it from the MMA yard in Brownville Junction to the final destination at the Saint John refinery.

Ministry of Transport senior inspector Marc Grignon opined: “When the shipper is based outside Canada, the importer becomes the shipper.” Irving Oil Commercial was the shipper in this case. Some 3830 rail cars of Bakken crude were shipped by 67 trains in the nine-month period preceding the derailment.

The runaway train, without anyone at the controls after a stop at Nantes for a crew change, derailed at approximately 01:20 and four of its cars exploded.

After the accident the railway's safety record was called into question. The train had been left unattended and improperly secured overnight on the mainline, with one locomotive running, on a -0.92% grade leading 18 km (11 miles) from Nantes, Quebec downhill to a 10 mph (16 km/h) curve where the line entered downtown Lac-Mégantic. By then the track had fallen 360 ft over 7.2 miles. The railway air brakes appear to have released after a local fire brigade shut down the locomotive to extinguish a fire in the engine, allowing the oil-laden cars to roll downhill into the town as an insufficient number of hand brakes had been applied to hold the train.

Following the accident, the MMA ceased operations on its lines between Lac-Mégantic and Jackman, Maine, effectively severing rail transport on its lines between Maine and Quebec, though rail traffic continued outside the affected area. MMA’s aggregate gross revenue dropped two-thirds, losing $1 million per month in revenue on the broken line.

On July 30 2013, the Maine Department of Transportation established contingency plans for MMA's rail clients, contacting every Maine freight railroad to find an operator to carry local factory freight should MMA completely cease operation. These plans were developed due in part to US federal law, which requires that a trustee step in to keep a bankrupt rail line operating until a buyer is found, due to the railway's status as a monopoly in many communities.

Aftermath

The majority of the residents who were evacuated were able to return to their homes within a three-day period, with only 800 individuals remaining displaced. Furthermore, by the sixth day, all but 200 residents were able to go back to their homes. Unfortunately, it was reported that at least twenty individuals did not have a home to return to. Although there were reports of homes being broken into during the evacuation, the police denied any incidents of looting.

While the exact cause of the disaster was still being investigated by the provincial authority Sûreté du Québec (SdQ) and the Canadian federal agency Transportation Safety Board (TSB), the railway suspended the engineer for allegedly mishandling the handbrakes on the rail cars. The MMA instructed its employees not to co-operate with the police without consulting the company's legal team. In support of the engineer, a former colleague established a legal defense fund based in Albany. On July 25, the Sûreté du Québec conducted a raid on MMA offices in Farnham as part of a criminal investigation into the fatalities in Lac-Mégantic. Additionally, on August 1 the TSB, backed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), conducted a search.

Raymond Lafontaine, a local contractor who suffered the loss of his son, two daughtersin-law, and an employee, expressed concerns about the poor condition of the MMA-owned track and the increasing transportation of dan- gerous goods through downtown areas by rail, not only in Lac-Mégantic but also in cities like Sherbrooke. He requested that the tracks be repaired and rerouted to bypass the central part of the town.

After effects

According to the Railway Investigation Report R13D0054 by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, to secure the train the engineer applied hand brakes on all five locomotives and two additional cars, leaving only the lead locomotive operational. Railway regulations dictate that hand brakes alone must be capable of holding a train, as verified through a test. However, on that night, the locomotive air brakes were inadvertently left engaged during the test, resulting in the train being secured by a combination of hand brakes and air brakes. This created a false impression that the hand brakes alone would be sufficient to hold the train.

Subsequently, the engineer contacted the rail traffic controller in Farnham, Quebec, to confirm the train's security. Following this, the engineer communicated with the rail traffic controller in Bangor, Maine, who managed movements for crews east of Lac-Mégantic. During the conversation, the engineer reported ongoing mechanical difficulties with the lead locomotive throughout the trip, along with the excessive emission of black and white smoke from its smokestack. It was decided to leave the train as is, anticipating the smoke to dissipate and addressing the situation the following morning.

Shortly after the engineer departed, the Nantes Fire Department responded to a 911 call reporting a fire on the train. In compliance with railway instructions, the firefighters shut off the locomotive's fuel supply and turned the electrical breakers inside the cab to the off position. They encountered an MMA employee, a track foreman dispatched to the scene but lacking a background in locomotive operations.

After successfully extinguishing the fire, the firefighters and track foreman discussed the train's condition with the rail traffic controller in Farnham before leaving the site. With all locomotives shut down, the air compressor no longer supplied air to the air brake system. As air gradually leaked from the brake system, the primary air reservoirs depleted, leading to a gradual reduction in the effectiveness of the locomotive air brakes. Shortly before 1 a.m., the air pressure dropped to a critical level where the combination of locomotive air brakes and hand brakes could no longer hold the train. Consequently, it began rolling downhill towards Lac-Mégantic, covering a distance of just over seven miles.

As the train descended the grade, its speed increased, reaching a maximum velocity of 65 mph before derailing near the town's centre.

Safety action following the accident

In the aftermath of the incident, the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) effectively communicated crucial safety information regarding the securement of unattended trains, the classification of petroleum crude oil, rail conditions at Lac-Mégantic, and the employee training programs of short line railways. Concurrently, MMA undertook decisive actions, including the discon- tinuation of single-person train operations, cessation of moving unit trains of petroleum crude oil, and an increase in testing and enforcement of operating rules.

Transport Canada also played a significant role by implementing various initiatives. These included the issuance of an emergency directive that prohibited trains carrying dangerous goods from operating with single-person crews. Furthermore, specific sections of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules were revised, and proposals for new tank car standards were introduced.

2014 Sale

In January 2014, MMA’s assets were auctioned and sold to Railroad Acquisition Holdings to maintain the railway as a functioning business. Railroad Acquisition Holdings made the sole bid of $14.25 million in December 2013, expressing interest in acquiring the entire MMA system. The sale was officially announced in mid-February 2014, coinciding with the registration of the new railroad named Central Maine and Quebec Railway (CMQ) in the United States and Canada. The transaction was completed in March 2014.

Following court approval of the sale, Great Northern Paper, a company operating in East Millinocket, announced the temporary closure of its mill for 16 weeks. This announcement occurred a few hours after the sale was finalized.

On January 30, the trustees representing the bankrupt railway filed a lawsuit in the United States, alleging negligence on the part of World Fuel Services. The lawsuit claimed that World Fuel Services had failed to properly label the train's hazardous cargo. The trustees argued that if the true volatility and flammability of the cargo had been accurately disclosed on shipping documents, MMA procedures would have prevented the train from being left unattended on a main rail line. Subsequently, on May 12 2014, the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway faced 47 counts of criminal negligence. This led to the arrests of engineer Thomas Harding, manager of train operations Jean DeMaître, and rail traffic controller Richard Labrie. The individuals arrested were scheduled to appear in court in Lac-Mégantic.

Within Lac-Mégantic, a significant number of residents are advocating for the most robust measures possible to avert any future accidents, primarily by relocating the rail line away from the town. In 2018, both the Canadian and Quebec governments unveiled a plan to construct a rail bypass encircling the city, with an estimated minimum cost of C$400 million ($302 million) at present.

However, despite these intentions, no tangible progress has been made thus far. The 8-mile bypass project has been entangled in a state of uncertainty, primarily due to ongoing negotiations with landowners and environmental concerns.

During the commemoration ceremony marking the 10-year anniversary, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau expressed his commitment to initiating the construction of the bypass in the upcoming fall season. Furthermore, the Canadian government is set to assume ownership of the required parcels of land on August 1.

FULFILLING a commitment made in February, Norfolk

Southern Corporation announced on June 26 that it has completed the remediation of both tracks that run through East Palestine, Ohio. The removal of impacted soil from underneath and between the tracks marks another milestone in Norfolk Southern’s commitment to clean up the derailment site safely, thoroughly, and with urgency.

“We promised to listen to residents and support East Palestine for the long haul. Fully cleaning up both tracks shows that we are keeping our promises,” said Norfolk Southern President and CEO Alan H Shaw. “We fully understand our responsibility to make things right in East Palestine, and as we mark this phase of remediation, we are dedicated to making further progress and investing in the community.”

The track remediation process included excavating impacted soil and replacing it with approved backfill material, as well as replacing the tracks. Both tracks were reinstalled under a US EPA-approved protocol that confirmed all impacted soil had been excavated. With this phase completed, rail traffic will resume a normal schedule in the coming weeks. Additional remediation work will continue at the site, including: n Characterisation of soil in potentially impacted areas outside of the tracks n Additional soil excavation and restoration in other impacted areas n Management and disposal of additional waste n Assessment and washing of Sulphur and Leslie Run

Regular testing continues to show the air and water are safe. To date, the company has excavated and transported more than 73,000 tonnes of soil off-site for proper disposal.

Additionally, over 20 million gallons of impacted water have been recovered and transported off-site. All of Norfolk Southern's site work has been supervised by the US and Ohio Environmental Protection Agencies and Unified Command.

Norfolk Southern has also made significant investments in the East Palestine community. In the last few

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