Drugs, Guns and Cash

Drugs, Guns and Cash Analysis and Proposals on How to Manage the Crisis in Central America

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CONTENTS I. Purpose II. Cooperating Organizations III. Executive Summary IV. Important Points of Mention: Action Plan Guide V. Findings and Recommendations i. National Responsibilities i. Alternatively Governed Spaces ii. Corruption and Politics iii. Potential State Failure iv. Systematic and Structural Problems v. Citizen Security ii. Regional Initiatives i. Unbalanced Resource Allocation ii. Neutralizing Criminal Organizations iii. Flourishing Informal and Shadow Economics iv. Raise the Sense of Urgency v. Quick Wins vi. Multilateral Alliances vii. Territorial and Political Penetration viii. Gang Violence iii. International Support i. Additional Resources ii. Guatemala – A Pivotal Axis iii. Land Trafficking Routes iv. Human Trafficking v. High-level Political Attention iv. Action Plan i. Shared Responsibility ii. Criminal Justice Reform iii. The Caribbean Connection iv. Intelligence Sharing v. Media Responsibility vi. Systems of Systems Analysis 3

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vii. Research – Based Solutions v. United States and Canada i. Responsibilities and Solutions to Organized Crime, both Foreign and Domestic VI. Introduction VII. Situational Analysis i. Mechanics of Central American Drug Trafficking ii. Actors Involved iii. Organized Crime iv. Modus Operandi, Structure, Network and Activity of Gangs in Central America v. Structure i. Drug Trafficking Organizations, Criminal Groups, and Gangs Operating in Central America ii. Central American Risk Factors for Youth and Gang Violence vi. Gangs Network and Activity i. Maras: Origin, Structure and Network of Activity ii. A Research Assessment of the Maras vii. Guatemala‘s Geostrategic Nightmare viii. Challenges to Democracy and Demographic Institutions i. Violence and the Impact on Citizen Security ii. The Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGSs) iii. The Link to Terrorism VIII. Case Studies i. Chicago i. Drug Cartels Operating in Chicago ii. Street Gangs in Chicago ii. Panama i. FARC and Smuggling ii. Human Trafficking iii. Conclusion iii. Guatemala i. Brief History ii. Statistical Graphs and Charts IX. Discussion and Conclusion i. The Link between Organized Crime and Politics 4

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ii. A Reality Check iii. A Way Forward i. Struggle Against the Large Mafias ii. Combating the Municipal Chain that Feeds the Large Mafias iii. Peaceful Co-Existence and Security for the Population X. Conclusion XI. Advisors, Background Papers and References, and Additional Resources

CHARTS, TABLES AND GRAPHS 1.

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Global Potential Cocaine Production, 1990 – 2008 (Graph) Tunnels Discovered by Law Enforcement in the U.S. (Table) 3 x 3 Matrix of Action (Table) Homicide Rates in Central America (Map) Intensity of Drug Smuggling (Map) Potential Boost of Annual Economic Growth Rate from Reducing Homicide Rate by 10% (Graph) 7. Illicit Drug Use at the Global Level, 2006 (Graph) 8. Drug Routes – Mexico (Map) 9. Share of Cocaine Flowing to the U.S. through Transport Corridors (Graph) 10. Size of Shadow Economies of a Share of Official GDP, 2002/2003 (Graph) 11. Organized Crime: The Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, The Yakuza, Mexican Cartels – The Underworld is Ruled by a Complex Network of Criminal Groups (Map) 12. Key Risk Factors for Homicide in Central America (Graph) 13. Firearms Owned by Civilians in Central America, 2007 (Table) 14. Central American Gangs (Table) 15. The Broker – Comparing Anti-Gang Approaches and Policies: Gang Violence in Central America (News Article) 16. Relative Sizes of Police Forces and Private Security in Central America (Map) 17. Share of the Population Living on less than U.S. $2 Per Day Household Per Capita Income (Map) 18. Crime rates against Unemployment rates in Central America (Map) 19. Alternatively Governed Spaces in Colombia: Areas where FARC Operate (Map) 20. Merida Aviation Breakdown and Delivery Estimate (Table) 5

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21. Annual Causes of Death in the United States 22. Chicago (Map) 23. Sinaloa Cartel (Hierarchy Graph) 24. Street Gangs in Chicago (Picture) 25. Street Value of Cocaine, 1 (Graph) 26. Street Value of Cocaine, 2 (Graph) 27. Annual Percentage of Individuals Deported on Criminal Grounds from the U.S., 2008 - 2010 (Table) 28. Number of Central American Nationals Arrested for Drug Trafficking in the U.S. in 2004 by Country (Graph) 29. Panama (Map) 30. Guatemala (Map) 31. Deprived of Liberty for every 100,000 Inhabitants, and Capability and Population in the Penitentiary System, 2010 (Graph) 32. Number of Homicides in Guatemala per 100,000 Inhabitants (Graph) 33. World Rank of Guatemala for Criminal and Violence Cost (Picture Statistic) 34. Economic Growth Per Capita and Annual Population Growth in Latin America, 2000-2010 (Graph) 35. Military Expense in Guatemala as % of GDP (Graph) 36. Composition of Military Budget (Graph) 37. Homicides and Police for every 100,000 Inhabitants (Graph) 38. Development Rate in Guatemala (Picture Statistic) 39. Economic Growth Per Capita in Latin America, 2000-2010 (Graph) 40. Midyear Population for Guatemala, 2010 (Graph)

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PURPOSE The most important message extracted from this study is that without intergovernmental and international cooperation and support, primarily between the countries most involved, Guatemala and Central America will soon collapse into failed states dominated by shadow economies and run by Criminal Organizations that buy political power. Without decisive action, these countries will be ―handed‖ to these criminal organizations and groups of people that wish to form their own type of government system and inadvertently create greater regional instability.

This scenario must not be permitted. These same groups of people will eventually take control of the agricultural and industrial markets in the region, to which the United States and many other countries depend and, will determine where and at what price they would want to sell their products. Simultaneously, the United States would lose its position and influence in Central America. As a result, the region would begin to foster a unique environment where Narco-Terrorism and quasi-states can flourish. Efforts to stem the momentum of these events from evolving must be instantaneous and holistic to produce the desired effect. The carnage and destruction experienced in Colombia and Mexico is on the doorstep of Central American countries and the criminals have resources that are far greater today.

Therefore, this report was developed with the hope of achieving three purposes. First, it is a learning process and a means to bring better understanding about the deteriorating situation in Central America. Secondly, it is to engender a general awareness on the various issues that impact the national security, wellbeing and safety of the citizens of countries in Central America. Thirdly, it is to initiate a deeper and more thoughtful discussion about these topics, recognizing that old debates, paradigms, and historical assumptions must be revisited to better analyze the gravity of the situation as critically and objectively as possible.

The forces of organized crime are clashing against the forces of development. This clash impedes the regions ability to develop concrete solutions. Traditional strategies have led to limited results. The type of alternative solutions that should be favored are not based on conventional wisdom but instead of a result-oriented approach.

The supporting structural ideas applied throughout this report will attempt to stimulate strategic thinking, debunk myths, understand displacement and its consequences, 7

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suggest concrete and cost-effective solutions, and develop an analytical framework, which allows a balanced fact-based approach.

The most significant ideas that relate to strategic thinking are cohesive intelligence sharing, combined tactics, operational strategies and a collective initiative without regional borders and barriers. In the case of debunking myths, it is necessary to end the denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that this is a regional problem that requires an Integrated Regional Security Strategy and, unmask numerous erroneous conceptions and assumptions within Guatemala - and other regional countries - in their political, social, and economic arenas. Lastly, to understand the seriousness of displacement and its consequences, especially around the Latin American and Caribbean region. Prioritized allocation of counter-initiative resources must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will remain being shuffled around the geographic chessboard that haunts the region.

Much time and effort has been devoted to the escalating problems of the region with few concrete and cost-effective solutions implemented in a timely manner. In contrast, an integrated analytical framework will guide the type of actionable strategies that are necessary to better approach these critical issues in Central America.

In brief, the goal of this study is to promote a new and informed dialogue on these complex and vastly misunderstood matters. The proposed suggestions and recommendations are not meant to be final or conclusive, but rather, they are meant to spark a debate around sustainable solutions and ideas, and their potential results and benefits to the region. Hopefully, with this Central Americans can find common ground within which these findings and recommendations can be formulated and executed.

Nonetheless, this report was developed with the intention of finding immediate and strategic regional solutions, underscoring a sense of urgency more so for Guatemala.

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COOPERATING ORGANIZATIONS CACIF The Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial y Financial Associations (CACIF) is the organization which represents the business sector in Guatemala since the late 1950s. Organized, inclusive, proactive, modern and in constant coordination with the different areas of society, it promotes a productive country whose economic growth and social development is based on: Market economy, democracy and rule of law. It strongly believes that the free enterprise system is the best way to achieve progress for this country, supported by the rule of law, and the principle that the general interest must prevail over individual interests.

CIEN The National Economic Research Center (CIEN in Spanish) is a 30-year-old private, non-lucrative, and political but nonpartisan institution, whose mission is to improve the living conditions of people through research proposals based on technical, analytical and rigorous challenges related to the promotion of welfare in its proper context. Their institutional vision is to be the leader and reference point within and outside Guatemala, in developing creative, critical, and inspiring proposals and that effectively contribute to the welfare of humans.

FUNDESA The Foundation for the Development of Guatemala (FUNDESA in Spanish) is a 30-yearold private, non-profit organization, comprised by business people who act on their own accord. It works as a Think Tank that strives to contribute to integral, sustainable and democratic development within a market economy and rule of law. The Foundation acts as an independent institution that is representative, with a proactive approach, and a long-term vision regarding key issues that affect the development of the Guatemalan people. FUNDESA has positioned itself as a source of relevant, technical information and data about Guatemala, a hub for key projects that aid longterm economic and social transformations, and an advocate for innovations and the implementation of new ideas and concepts jointly with national and international organizations in Guatemala.

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Foundation G Foundation G (Fundaci贸n G in Spanish) is a recently created (2011) private, non-profit foundation, whose mission is to generate awareness and propose solutions to the challenges Security and Justice of Guatemala, National Unity and collaboration, education and poverty reduction. It has recently supported rule-of-law initiatives such as Guatemala Visible (www.guatemalavisible.org), Congreso Visible (www.congresovisible.org), Movimiento C铆vico Nacional (www.mcn.org.gt), and Ciudades Seguras (www.unifemweb.org.mx).

Integrated Security Solutions (ISS) ISS served a collaborative role in this study by recruiting academics and researchers in the various fields of interest contained in this report, compiling and refining bulk data to sanitize the ideas presented and providing expert analysis for the delivery of the final report. Of specific mention are two prominent contributors (1) Professor Anthony T Bryan, who has a long and distinguished career as an academic and scholar, researcher and analyst in many disciplines that were relevant to this study. (2) Mr. Eric Davis is a former Chicago police Officer, Specialist in gang reform and containment and respected speaker on the many subjects that proved critical to better understanding the dynamics that impact the complexity of the problems faced in the Americas today.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The insatiable consumption of illicit drugs has created a very powerful enemy that thrives on violence, lust for money and power and which has set its sights on Central America - as one of its vital organs. This enemy is not new to the global arena, as Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have existed since ancient times and remains a part of the underground economies that sustain many traditional economies.

Be it the trafficking of drugs, weapons, contraband or humans, TCOs sponsor and enable Localized Criminal Organizations (LCOs) to facilitate and execute their operational activities within specific jurisdictions. Shifting sociopolitical dynamics in the Americas - over the last decade - have empowered and emboldened many TCOs and LCOs as expanding drug transit routes to the U.S.A. and elsewhere are posing a serious and escalating threat to the sovereignty of many countries within Central America. In this struggle, Central America must reestablish the ‗Rule of Law‖ as the basis of its counter initiatives.

These TCOs (of which many are Mexican and Colombian drug cartels) have the finances, organizational structures, geostrategic influence and illegally obtained firepower to destabilize many Central American countries. As a result, they provide alternative governance to areas within countries that are not under the direct control of governments. These Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGS)* have become logistics hubs for road, maritime, and aerial deposit and storage of large amounts of illicit cargo destined for the U.S. and other markets, and primarily for TCOs active in Mexico that operate a complex variety of land crossings and tunnels into the lucrative U.S. market.

Central American countries have been drawn into this narcotics and contraband quagmire largely due to greed, its geostrategic location with Mexico and the fact that it‘s a maneuverable land, sea and air bridge between North and South America.

While the United States (U.S.) remains the prime destination for South Americanproduced cocaine – and Florida is no longer the primary trans-shipment route - the transit routes between Mexico and South America have clearly changed. The myriads of trafficking routes passing throughout Central America have become the new superhighway due to many shifting dynamics over the last decade. As part of the U.S. sponsored Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) several countries in the region have stepped up their monitoring and interdiction of airborne and maritime shipments

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transiting from South America to the U.S. and elsewhere. However, they have not seen similar successes in the interdiction of road transit shipments primarily due to the absence of adequate border control mechanisms; corrupt and inefficient Security Forces, clandestine transit routes being used by TCOs and LCOs and collusion on many levels.

During the Presidency of both Pastrana and Uribe, Plan Colombia was part of the ACI program. Colombia has learned many lessons on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that could prove beneficial to safety and security concerns Central American countries face today. More so, it is important to conceptualize the impact and consequences of the ACI program and Plan Colombia within the broader context of the many crossroads faced by the U.S. (9/11, economic collapse and two wars in the Middle East) in the last decade and the resultant effect on its regional focus and involvement.

According to a December 2008 report from the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center, less than 1 percent of the estimated 600 to 700 tons of cocaine that departed South America for the United States - in 2007 - transited through Central America. The rest, for the most part, passed through the Caribbean Sea or Pacific Ocean.

Recently, former U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Stephen McFarland estimated - in an interview with a Guatemalan newspaper - that cocaine now passes through Guatemala at a rate of approximately 300 to 400 tons per year. In reality, Guatemala has become a geostrategic storage and wholesale distribution hub for South American produced cocaine. Notwithstanding the difficulty associated with estimating drug trafficking, it is clear that Central America has evolved into the main trans-shipment route for drugs and contraband cargo, and that the logistic and transit changes have taken place rapidly and in response to active interdiction programs supported and funded by the U.S. These developments warrant a closer look at the mechanics of the drug trade in the region, the actors involved, and the implications for Central American governments for whom TCOs and LCOs represent a much more daunting threat than current national security resources can manage – and that of the Americas as a whole.

In the 1980‘s and early 1990‘s Colombia‘s warfare with drug cartels saw unprecedented bombings, assassinations and kidnappings – directed at government and civilian targets in what was labeled the ―age of Narco-terrorism‖. By the U.S. definition of terrorism, TCOs in Mexico and the Northern Triangle (Guatemala; El Salvador and Honduras) operate as terrorist groups as evidenced by their recent emboldened actions. Despite the media spotlight on Mexico, Honduras has the highest per-capita murder rate in Central America of 77:100,000 inhabitants, followed by El Salvador with 66:100,000, Guatemala 12

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with 50:100,000 and Mexico with 18:100,000. These numbers tell a story of their own as corruption, collusion, greed and poverty create a formula that has facilitated cheap guns for hire, turf wars for control of lucrative drug transit routes and an opportunist mentality among many, based on desire to improve their economic circumstances.

The Northern Triangle has become - in the last decade - the most dangerous part of the world outside of active war zones. This is primarily because of the geostrategic location as a bridge between North and South America. The Merida Initiative in Mexico is pressuring TCOs and LCOs and the result is that they have broadened their operational arenas and shifted their activities to countries immediately south of Mexico. Northern Triangle countries are today feeling the brunt of these expansionist ambitions. Central American governments must be prepared to dialogue with TCOs and LCOs – as was the case in Colombia – to arrive at compromises that facilitate acceptable levels of safety and security for the region.

The solutions presented in this report are built around the promotion of interdependent criminal justice programs that will primarily remain internal and situational to every country but at the same time support a collaborative set of goals that are regional. The security and public safety concerns of the region should be unified into a collective effort that simultaneously addresses the holistic needs and desires of Central American countries to combat organized crime, regain control of their territories and strengthen their respective national security programs. This interdependence of effort would in turn reinforce the independence of the respective Intelligence and Policing efforts and reintroduce the Military into the fold - of participating security forces - after years of psychological exile following the civil war era. Collective Intelligence (CI) and Intelligence Led Operations (ILOs) have proven to be the soundest approach in leading combat, interdiction and reform initiatives required.

The lessons of the past forty years of combating drugs and organized crime – primarily in South America and Mexico - offer a great strategic advantage to Central American countries. The Central American crisis will not pass without cohesive intelligence sharing and combined tactical and operational strategies. Joint initiatives should remove the pitfalls of going alone against this phenomenon, as has been the case, for the most part, so far. This effort has to be a cohesive initiative without borders and barriers which hinder a holistic approach and which foster perpetual bureaucratic deliberations that play into the hands of criminal organizations. Time is of the essence for success to be real or even achievable. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan points 13

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out, ―we will not enjoy either (security or development) without respect for human rights. Unless all causes are advanced, none will succeed.‖ The old paradigm of a heavy-handed approach to crime control has proven fruitless and destructive. Although operational and tactical intervention is required as a parallel initiative, the more strategic approach would be the coordinated application of all of the resources of the national governments, private sectors, NGOs, friendly foreign governments and regionally aligned agencies. Conducting this orchestra of efforts will leverage the collective intelligence and creativity of the next generation of leaders, in what is likely to be the only real way to solve the complex issues at hand. In the words of former CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana ― The problem is that, in Guatemala, criminal organizations have never been confronted‖. Commissioner Castresana also coined the phrase ― Looking the monster in the face‖, which is what Guatemala and all of Central America is now forced to do should democracy, development and principlecentered leadership prevail.

So as we look at the monster in the face, we have come to realize that the monster in fact has many faces that represent different cultures, religions, nationalities and an operational framework that engenders the ideals of criminal organizations, Islamic terrorists groups, corrupt politicians, money laundering institutions and States that sponsor strategies and tactics that promote ideological principles that are meant to divide and dominate its people. This cocktail of collusion and apathy has brought an entire region to the brink of implosion because of its inequities and uncertainties that all form part of a growing formula that may well see the return of civil strife and internal conflicts that will turn back the hands of time in Central America.

The ultimate reality is that certain cold-war ideologists and strategists have not given up on the goals and objectives in the Americas. Civil wars continue on social and political battlefields, where Hidden Powers combine gangs, well-placed bureaucrats, clandestine groups and historical trading routes to enable and facilitate a tactical, operational and strategic infrastructure that has survived the forty-year war on drugs.

It is not coincidental that time is telling a story all of its own as declassified information exposes strategic ties between common enemies of democracy and the freedoms, transparencies and accountabilities that are derived from democratic systems. So as battlefields change along with doctrines and instruments of modern warfare, what

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remains consistent is the use of organized crime, shadow economies and political strategies to seize power and wealth to continue funding these ideological revolutions.

Central America has become a pawn in a much greater chess-game that transcends regional and ideological borders and promotes the ongoing struggle between conflicting political extremes with which the region continues to struggle in this modern era. Even in this great debate, time has proven to be the best storyteller, as democratic countries are protected and defended by security forces that operate on quasi-authoritarian principles, where command and control is centralized and unchallenged.

Perhaps, as we evolve as a humanity we will one day arrive at the conclusion that all realities have valuable lessons that when fused and edited could offer a collective approach that is inclusive, respectful and based on the fundamental human rights of all.

When we go to the supermarket we do not take everything on the shelf, but rather the things we need. Central America must decide on the menu of ideas that must be executed for its development and take the things it needs from its collective local, regional and international access to grow and develop progressively.

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IMPORTANT POINTS OF MENTION ACTION PLAN GUIDE Has the cold war really ended or, have ideological guerilla organizations simply used peace accords and political objectives to further their cause in seeking power and control of territories in the region? Since the negotiated settlement with the FARC in 1998 - that gave them autonomous territory - Colombia surpassed Peru as the largest producers of cocaine in the world. Criminal organizations are openly accessing and utilizing indigenous land and waterway travel routes to traffic drugs, humans and other contraband. Weapons used by guerilla organizations – during the civil war era are the primary weapons still in use by criminal organizations and clandestine groups active throughout Latin America. Equally alarming is the fact that most confiscated weapons in the war on drugs are U.S. made.

Democratic elections throughout Latin America are masking the growing lack of democratic governance by the political parties that assume office. National election campaigns in many countries are seen and used as investments to more lucrative sources of revenue derived from state coffers and institutions. Government contracts and projects are being farmed out to criminal organizations that use these programs to launder money and gain social credibility through employment. Throughout this crafty process of indulgence and patronage, socio-political power structures are being established and funded by illicit cash.

The breath and depth of the vast empires of TCOs have become so complex over time that dismantling them have become greater challenges with the successive changes in governments throughout Latin America. In most of these countries, two-term Presidencies are not common and actually work in favor of the more established TCOs. This lack of constituency of political will and divergent loyalties have negatively affected national efforts and breathe distrust among neighboring countries with opposing political interests and intents. This mistrust hampers collective intelligence sharing and interdiction initiatives as Politicians are more concerned with their return on investment – spent on getting into office – as opposed to the collective benefit of the country.

Since the attacks on the U.S. on September 11th 2001 (9/11), U.S. strategic interest has shifted away from Latin America and over these past ten years there has been a tidal

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wave of criminal activity, socio-political shifts and measurable reduction in the positive impact in the region by U.S. Policymakers. U.S. Military, Political, Economic and Intelligence vulnerabilities exposed during and since the 9/11 attacks have left many developing countries without a realistic true-north in seeking their own socio-political identities. However, all is not lost, democratic values and principles are still very much alive but require more determined focus and leadership to recover lost ground throughout Latin America.

International and regional support must return to Central America to guide necessary reforms and must take on an all-inclusive appeal to the varied aspirations and motivations of this dynamic and evolving region. Latin America has the potential to become a world power if fairly and transparently managed.

1. A Paradigm Shift To Deal With Criminality. The past forty years, since the U.S. declaration of the war on drugs, has seen tremendous human and material resources dedicated to the disruption of supply and other operational aspects of the drug trade, the capture of visible leaders, and sprinkled initiatives at reducing demand and prosecuting the intellectual authors behind the large criminal networks. This approach is predominantly why the impact of the war on drugs has netted meager results. The paradigm shift that must take place now - to deliver measurably significant results – is to focus on understanding how criminals can penetrate, and simultaneously derive profits and power from, the current governmental, social, and financial structures. Furthermore, delve into what psychological, social, economic, and political factors compel criminals to become malfeasants and to engage in illegal activities and groups. Finally, grasp the idea that illegal global markets and criminal organizations mainspring from a rebellion to political/governmental actions and the ‗Western‘ desire to consume.

In simpler terms, we must not focus all energies and resources towards the ‗producers‘ but focus equal or more attention towards the ‗consumers‘. After all, if people really want something they will find a way to get it.

2. Culture of Consequences. Latin American countries have struggled to establish a law-abiding socio-cultural system. However, the lack of consequences has allowed a parallel culture of permissiveness. This sort of ‗culture‘ is beneficial to criminal organizations, mafias, and terrorists. In order to dismantle such groups, we must start by creating a culture of consequences. The punishment of those 17

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who are guilty of the criminal activities, that facilitate and enable narco-terrorism and corruption, should be sufficiently strengthened to reflect that of the estimated value of the trade or activity in the context of fines and asset confiscations, along with lifetime imprisonment sentences. Furthermore, penal disincentives due to illegal affiliations would disrupt the recruitment capability of criminal organizations throughout the region.

3. Learn to Deal with Smart Evolving Criminals. The tactics utilized by transnational criminal organizations are outsmarting the conventional approaches utilized by governments: they adapt to economic recessions, invade ―impenetrable‖ government institutions, infect the altruistic efforts of people and groups, operate in lawless border regions and adjust themselves or their behavior to survive in whatever host they spread into. For instance, there is clear evidence of an active collaboration and cooperation between drug and terrorist organizations, who are great threats to the national security of every country in the region. As a result of this ‗network strengthening‘, national security is at risk because this ―sinister criminal enterprise‖ is expanding at an accelerated pace. In contrast, there has not been a concomitant expansion in transnational law enforcement capabilities.

4. Strengthen Government Institutions. Increase efforts to strengthen democratic institutions that uphold and support the Rule of Law, judicial expedience, economic and social development, political awareness, and civic responsibility.

The key pillars of human and social development must be strengthened to reduce the apathy upon which criminal organizations prey.

5. Technological Intelligence. As human development initiatives are improved to support solutions, so too must technological intelligence be applied to reinforce efforts that stem the growth of global shadow economies that feed corruption and apathy. Citizen security programs that make cities safer, promote crime prevention programs, and leverage technology to promote greater efficiencies are key. Monitoring data from air and seaports, land border crossings, and national archives generated through e-Government initiatives should be standard practice and represent an immediate action item.

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6. Ideological Divide. Rhetorical ideological differences among countries in the Americas and lack of trust are the most determining factors that hinder collective initiatives to combat criminality and corruption. The lack of collective efforts allows the free flow of criminal organizations and their operations. In reality, the main instigating factors that led to civil wars throughout Latin America remain integral to the ideological divide that still besieges the region‘s ability to derive holistic solutions to its many challenges.

7. Rethinking Tactics and Policies. Globalization has reduced the barriers to international criminal networks. Lower barriers have allowed criminogenic behavior to grow at exponential rates. In addition, this behavior demonstrates great resilience to the established government and law enforcement institutions.

We need to rethink the methodology and policies being used to combat illegal activities such as drugs, money laundering, human prostitution, and the sale of weapons to criminals. The U.S. ‗War on Drugs‘ policy has contained the overall problem but has failed to dismantle and eliminate Narcos and the illegal activities they are associated with. It is time to create a new framework that will permit governments, law enforcement, and social institutions to eradicate criminal organizations.

8. Shared Responsibility. World governments have struggled immensely to curtail illegal global markets. Yet, such markets continue to proliferate. The type of mechanisms and approaches used in this struggle have generated a set of collateral problems and externalities. It is within this framework that countries all around the world must take personal responsibility within their respective borders and collective responsibility in support of trans-national interdiction, in addressing illicit activities in a comprehensive manner. Because the U.S. and Canada are regionally the main consumers and beneficiaries of the proceeds from several of the products traded in illegal markets, a more integral and responsible role is necessary – from both countries - in funding interdiction efforts that are commensurate with the magnitude of the problem itself.

9. Smarter Government and Private Sector Involvement. As a national and regional concern, criminal organizations and their illicit activities must be addressed at a governmental level. Security Forces in the region must be strengthened along the lines of increased capacity to Naval, Air, Police, and Military Forces that can 19

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better control the various indigenous and covert trafficking routes used by criminal organizations to move drugs, guns and bulk cash. As such, government accountability and responsibility must become primary for tangible results to be achieved. Private sector involvement must also be a parallel initiative to promote the formalization of the economies and to act as social auditors to monitor the use of resources.

10. Accountability and Transparency. The role of each Public Controller‘s Office throughout the region must also be strengthened and brought into national prominence as a Fourth Power within the national architecture of administrative governance. Public accountability and transparency must serve as guiding principles that factor in the public‘s right to know and to hold officials in public office accountable for their actions or lack thereof.

11. Stronger Anti-Crime Global Networks. Finally, the chain is as strong as the weakest link. A Systems-of-Systems analysis must become the core driver in identifying and dismantling the elements of the supply and demand logistics and operational chain that maintains the activities of criminal organizations. A similar analysis must be conducted for the financial activities of criminal organizations to better understand and defeat money-laundering practices and bring down the organizations that facilitate and enable these activities.

Complementary to all of this should be revised gun laws in the U.S. and Latin America to also bring much needed order to this fundamental dilemma.

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

National Responsibilities

Findings: Alternatively Governed Spaces The structure and network of active TCOs and LCOs have led to the creation of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGS) in which criminal organizations, rather than formal state authorities, effectively control the residents, act as the arbiter of internal order, and serve as ―de facto‖ administrations. These areas provide uninterrupted operational activity and attract other clandestine groups that swap capabilities, ideas and resources that reinforce intent and effectiveness. The FARC in Colombia are a prime example of AGSs having a direct impact of crime and violence in a state. In Guatemala, 40% of the territory is currently an alternatively controlled.

Notions of ungoverned spaces or lawless areas increasingly have been seen as a dangerous phenomenon, especially because they provide safe havens for terrorists. In fact, many of them are not so much ungoverned as alternatively governed by groups, which act as surrogates for the state. The ―dons‖ in the slums of Kingston, Jamaica, for example, are not merely the heads of drug trafficking organizations; they are also the social and economic patrons of marginalized people who have little or no assistance from the state 1.

Between 400 and 500 tons of cocaine flow through the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) per year. This is equivalent to approximately $12 billion in wholesale value in the U.S. market. This amounts to approximately $65 billion in estimated street-sale profits in the U.S. with about 50% of that amount making its way back to Mexico and Latin America countries.

Total 2010 tax collection for the Northern Triangle was at $11.7 billion. This means, that the drug/cocaine business is over 5 times larger than the combined states 2.

Central American countries are out powered and out gunned in fighting the epidemic of drug trafficking and organized crime. No amount of tax reform or local resources 21

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would ever be enough to address the problem independently and effectively. That is, without the support of international organizations and/or other countries.

Recommendations National Security Forces should collaborate to address the threat that TCOs and LCOs pose to democratic governance and ―Rule of Law‖.

Promote economic, educational and social opportunities and activities that generate alternative livelihoods for these communities.

Develop an ―Inclusion Indicator‖ by community. The Indicator should gauge the degree to which the government is reaching each community with key services, i.e. public schools, police, health, electoral registry, property registry, communications, infrastructure, etc.

Develop a prioritized plan with specified dates by which services would reach communities and, set goals and monitor progress for the Inclusion Indicator.

Findings: Corruption and Politics In addition to violence, corruption plays an integral role in undermining state institutions. The financing of political parties and/or candidates with money from criminal organizations is a direct threat to the survival of democracy in the region.

TCOs and LCOs are able to clobber the state from without and weaken it from within.

Governments must put more resources to work against corruption, money laundering and embezzlement. Congressional appropriations for national projects have become get-rich-schemes for politicians in an environment where checks and balances are nonexistent and oversight is overlooked.

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Recommendations Urgently modify Campaign Financing norms to make contributions transparent and to hold Political Parties accountable to a higher standard of due-diligence in accepting funds.

Assist civilian and National Security leaders to develop a cohesive and broad strategic vision to solve the emerging TCO and LCO security problems, while dealing with the changing societal values in the 21st Century. Leaders must consider these problems from multiple angles, multiple levels and varying degrees of complexity. Key elements must include: weapons, transparency and money launder.

Reinforce local Public Comptroller Offices and functions through legislation, which (i) criminalizes the new corruption schemes (including the usage of NGOs to execute government funds), and (ii) creates significant consequences for violations.

Establish E-Government and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) strategies to promote greater transparency within government which allow Civil Society oversight, accountability in financial practices and a data warehouse that can feed national intelligence. E-Government and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) strategies and systems should be considered as medium-to-long term initiatives to promote transparency and accountability.

Findings: Potential State Failure The ultimate threat of TCO and LCO activities is not instability or even criminal violence. Instead, it is either state failure or the forced imposition of a radical socioeconomic - political restructuring of the state and its governance.

Most political leaders in the region are still thinking about the TCO and LCO phenomenon in traditional terms of criminal activity, and have not yet caught up with stark reality. They do not appreciate the extent and nature of the threat to political order and responsible democratic governance being raised by the rapidly moving clash of two types of fundamental values. One set of values seeks the general wellbeing of the state while the other serves criminal greed for money and power. Leaders whose discourse 23

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favors the first ideals but whose actions and ideals espouse the second, pose the greatest threat to progress

Recommendations Restructuring efforts should provide checks and balances that prevent corrupt officials or criminal actors themselves from taking up high-level government positions, which offer immunity as an additional incentive.

Create national and regional policies that facilitate in-depth financial investigations and asset-seizures to take the profits away from corruption rings, drug traffickers and organized crime groups.

Remove the immunity associated with congressional and mayoral positions. At the very least, create expedited processes for lifting immunity in cases of state asset theft, Narco - trafficking or money laundering.

Create specialized Investigation and Prosecution units for the above-mentioned crimes.

Create national vetting and Polygraph centers to verify credible and uproot corrupt officials in public sector institutions.

Findings: Systematic and Structural Problems Addressing the deteriorating security environment in the region is a complex and difficult task. Part of the problem is the seeming inability or reluctance of regional leaders to address the structural and systemic problems of a skewed distribution of opportunities, insufficient fiscal incomes, rampant corruption, unrelenting violence, lack of consequences and weak state institutional capacity to make a difference.

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Recommendations Harness political will to persist bravely in the defense of fundamental human and democratic values, by standing together to make a difference and rally grass-roots movements to support this effort.

Promote micro-financing and other market-based poverty reduction solutions to enable economic opportunities in rural areas. Also, promote small business financing programs to strengthen the middle class in the region.

Regulate salaries of professional staff in the public sector to enable pay packages that are commensurate to their merits and responsibilities.

Consideration of pay-per-performance or pay-per-qualifications should be introduced to promote results and enhance self-improvement.

Revise criminal laws and punishments to strengthen consequences.

Promote a culture of consequences. All laws must be obeyed starting with seemingly unrelated things such as traffic laws. Colombia used this as a way to reduce the subjectivity around which laws are obeyed and which are not.

Promote awareness campaigns to inform citizens of the very real cost-benefits associated with investing in security and to generate awareness that security and rule-of-law are everyone‘s responsibility.

Improve public safety initiatives to reduce crime indexes and encourage increased local and foreign investment.

Findings: Citizen Security Regional governments should do more to protect its citizens, enhance crime prevention programs, unify the efforts and initiatives of Security Forces and enhance response initiatives to create real time consequences for criminal activity and unified approaches.

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

Recommendations Citizen Security is fundamental and critical to success; therefore ―Safe City‖ programs should first be initially implemented in high-crime and high-risk areas, but should eventually spread to other departments to unify the country‘s development through human and technological intelligence.

Because violence burdens economic development and direct investment, reductions in violence supports national development, therefore the cost/benefit ratio of action makes it economically desirable to make the required sacrifices necessary to confront TCOs and LCOs that challenge state institutions and sovereignty.

Regional Initiatives

Findings: Unbalanced Resource Allocation Mexican criminal actors are moving south and resources must now be properly reallocated to address this growing concern. The United States has dedicated a vast amount of resources over the last 11 years to efforts in Colombia through Plan Colombia, and a vast number of resources over the past four years to the situation in Mexico through the Merida Initiative. The situation in Central America must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner by involving all Central American and Caribbean countries that bridge the gap between North and South America, which has become the critical ―chessboard‖ where transit schemes are played out.

Recommendations There can be no regional integration without security and no security without integration, therefore only a collaborative approach and agreement would serve the security needs of the region. This collaboration must first take place with national rank and file operations and should then strengthen regional and otherwise collective approaches.

26

Drugs, Guns and Cash

Lobby for a change in the prioritized allocation of resources. Resources given to Plan Colombia and to the Merida Initiative have generated displacement towards Central America, thus escalating the insecurity environment. Prioritized allocation must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will continue to be shuffled around the geographic chessboard.

Findings: Neutralizing Criminal Organizations Following the civil war era that plagued Central America over the past fifty years, peace negotiations and signed accords disempowered Military structures, placed them in psychological exile, diminished their resources, marginalized their deployment in supporting National Security initiatives and significantly reduced their manpower strength. National Police Forces were then empowered to protect the state and have been overwhelmed in facing the challenges presented by better equipped, trained and financed TCOs and LCO. Strengthened Military involvement in current National Security concerns in Central America is needed.

Recommendations Establish nationally dedicated Intervention Force - the equivalent of a Military Division - of 1000 National Security personnel, to include both internal and external Intelligence agencies, that act together to reclaim territory controlled by TCOs and LCOs, marginalize their illicit operations and restore public confidence by achieving acceptable levels of violence and national security.

Another element that is essential is the creation of functioning institutions in the most affected states that can both investigate and judicially prosecute transnational criminal organizations. The most efficient way to do this is through the creation of vetted police and military units and judicial corps that are specially trained and who can be protected from reprisals.

Strategies in Central America must go beyond an effort to salvage judicial systems and Security Forces increasingly overwhelmed by drug cartels, organized crime and

27

Drugs, Guns and Cash

violence. TCOs and LCOs must be neutralized and contained in order to achieve real and sustainable success.

Findings: Flourishing Informal and Shadow Economies Although Central America‘s organized crime problem cannot be reduced to drugs – as numerous other illicit activities flourish in a number of different sectors of the informal economy - it is a key factor in the overall deteriorating situation and, if constructively addressed, would help mitigate the worst consequences of crime, corruption and impunity. Organized crime groups facilitate and enable the laundering of bulk-cash, the trafficking of weapons, contraband and humans provide a ―Reverse Logistics‖ to bring contraband south from where 50% or more of the drugs go up to in the north.

Recommendations Make asset forfeiture in drug, human trafficking, illegal weapons dealings, state asset theft and contraband related cases mandatory for all countries that directly benefit from the financial pledges made in support of mitigating and interdicting these activities. Countries that fail to pass this law will send a clear message to the rest of the world that their legislative bodies are not sufficiently sterile to receive international funding for such efforts.

Tighten fiscal and border controls in order to squeeze the informal economy and eliminate an important auxiliary system that enables organized crime to thrive.

Target brothels, illegal casinos and other businesses which exist in the ―parallel economy‖ and which provide auxiliary services such as money laundering.

Findings: Raise the Sense of Urgency This is more than a law enforcement problem or a security issue. Democracy is seriously under siege since organized crime has exposed the inability of Central American states to control their territory or to protect their citizens. This weakness in governance has a 28

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deleterious effect on public psyche, and the wellbeing of the majority of citizens, where public safety is absent

Recommendations Raise the collective policy discussion to the level of a threat to national, regional and international security and enact appropriate legislation to that effect.

Encourage the public to join the government in standing up to criminal organizations by establishing rewards for information that lead to arrests, whistleblower hotlines, prioritize the development of witness protection programs and confidentiality measures to protect identities of those that come forward.

Work towards strengthening democratic institutions within the security and justice sectors.

Findings: Quick Wins National and regional stability is at stake. Quick wins are required to inspire confidence and strengthen political will.

Recommendations Draw on the experience and lessons learned by Columbia and Mexico to assist in the struggle ahead for Central American countries as they seek to recover control of their countries, economies and violent existence.

Vetted specialized units capable of collecting actionable information and intelligence – with proper oversight – are vital and a far more achievable goal than the strategic level goal of National Security reform.

Leverage the power of information to strengthen border security programs, redeploy National Security Forces, improve the security of air and seaports and 29

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empower communities to recover spaces that are alternatively controlled and administered by criminal organizations.

End the denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that this is a regional problem that requires an Integral Regional Security Strategy.

Findings: Multilateral Alliances There must be a regional approach to deal with local and transnational crime. In the case of local crime, integrated policies for peaceful co-existence and citizen security encompassing crime prevention and control are required. In the case of transnational crime, regional and multilateral alliances are needed to combat TCO activity. In addition to hunting down leaders, efforts need to focus on mid-level command and links in the supply and demand chain to take the profit and glory out of drugs, guns, and other illicit trades. Targeting the prospects and allure of the ―get rich quick‖ would break apart these organizations, and enable the design of policies to encourage young people to leave criminal groups and prevent others from joining.

Recommendations Simultaneously attack all links in the supply and distribution chain of drug, human trafficking and contraband to weaken its infrastructure from within.

Create and maintain a regional platform for information sharing in support of a collective intelligence effort, through links to Interpol, UNODC and Intelligence Agencies from supporting nations globally.

Findings: Territorial and Political Penetration The transnational dimension of the security challenge - largely because of the drug trade behind it - calls for coordinated action. Organized criminal networks pose a major security challenge to both the Central American and Caribbean regions, using them as a convenient transport route to move drugs from the south to the north and bulk cash and weapons north to south. Their networks have infiltrated urban centers and overrun

30

Drugs, Guns and Cash

rural ones. In some countries, they have even secured entry points into critical state institutions and high-level political offices.

Recommendations TCOs and LCOs are not constrained by borders, so the response to their activities by states cannot be either. Collective effort is mandatory. Appropriate legislation must be passed to enable regional intelligence sharing and hot pursuit mechanisms.

Perseverance must refute deterrence.

Investing in education and jobs must run parallel to fighting crime and violence by establishing a national awareness program that is tied to real-time economic opportunity derived from incremental steps towards inclusion and empowerment.

Findings: Gang Violence To address issues of youth and gang violence in the short term, policy makers should borrow from the evidence-based toolkit of programs from other regions, such as early childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase retention of high-risk youth in secondary schools.

Recommendations Work against the poverty, social exclusion, lack of education, and destruction of families.

Central America must stop killing its young people, by condemning them to the curse of gangs.

The stigma and ruthlessness of civil war atrocities have germinated the origins of the violence into which active and prospective gang members have fallen.

Harsher penalties is not the solution, better opportunities and principle based national leadership will yield more positive results.

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

Repression should be replaced by dialogue with gang leaders at their headquarters level in the U.S.

International Support

Findings: Additional Resources Central America will require significant additional resources to fight this multi-front war.

Recommendations Develop an instrument to channel and manage financial contributions, ensuring adequate transparency and accountability of donor funds. This entity could also administer the liquidation of seized assets from drug and human trafficking and other contraband related cases to supplement repayment of loans offered in combating these scourges. Generated proceeds from the law should be used to supplement funding that sustains interdiction and mitigation programs throughout the region.

The region should be encouraged to consider a surtax for improved administration of justice perhaps by creating a facility along with other Central American nations to pay into a regional ―lock box‖ whose closely monitored resources could be used to promote security on both a country-specific and regional basis.

Establish communications channels with Washington and other members of the International Community to obtain additional support which is commensurate to the size of the enemy that Central America is being asked to fight.

Establish well-equipped National Training Centers for all disciplines of the criminal justice sector – with experienced and credible Instructors and Mentors. All Central American countries, especially Guatemala, needs a training institution for both police and military forces. In addition, part of the gun control proposition,

32

Drugs, Guns and Cash

individual citizens and other private security firms could benefit from such training.

I‘m thinking about some sort of academic/military/law enforcement academy or school, composed of certain active and retired military and law enforcement officers, who could come to Guatemala and offer their expertise and training.

Findings: Guatemala – A Pivotal Axis The May 2011 report of the U.S. Senate caucus on International Narcotics Control‘s report on U.S. and Mexican responses to Mexican DTOs, estimates that between $18 and $39 billion dollars in wholesale illicit drug distribution proceeds, crosses the southwest US/Mexican border making its way back to Mexico and Latin America. In addition to these bulk cash figures moving south from the U.S., Guatemala has become a pivotal axis and the largest regional wholesale storage and distribution locale for - roughly 50% of overall U.S. consumption of - illicit drugs and locally generates an estimated $5 billion dollars in additional illegal drugs cash flow in the region.

Recommendations Post - Merida counter - narcotics support to Latin America must cater to the deteriorating security environment in Guatemala - and other Northern Triangle countries - brought about by increased drug flow through Central America by land routes.

The conditions that make Guatemala an ideal safe haven for the storage and transshipment of drugs must be corrected in the short-term.

Findings: Land Trafficking Routes The Merida Initiative has focused significant resources on maritime and aerial assets in support of the war on drugs in Mexico; however, land trafficking routes throughout Central America remain primary options to TCOs and LCOs and require immediate strengthening through collective initiative.

33

Drugs, Guns and Cash

Recommendations Post-Merida resources should be directed towards strengthening land border crossings – both formal and informal.

Joint Police and Military operations should be used to establish checkpoints along main highway arteries and intersections.

Vehicle X-Ray screening technology and Canine sniffers should be employed to stem the flow of drugs, weapons drugs and human cargo.

Important point of mention: Post Merida support to Central America must produce a more comprehensive approach to addressing the problems on the ground.

Findings: Human Trafficking The trafficking of humans across international borders for the purposes of sex slavery and the sale of human organs is more than just an illegal immigration concern and remains a timeless and profitable business to criminal organizations. It is estimated that one sex slave earns these organizations a net profit of approximately one million USD over a five-year period and the victims are also used as unwilling donors of vital organs and other body parts that are sold for exorbitant amounts to ailing and desperate clients.

The ageless network of illicit transit routes, corrupt officials and organized criminal activity that supports the trafficking and flow of drugs and contraband into countries is what is also being used to traffic and sell humans, transfer weapons and explosives and move bulk cash across international borders. In times past these very routes and clandestine networks were used to traffic bootleg whiskey and other contraband, and though the content of the illegal merchandize being trafficked has changed with time, the well-guarded secrets of these criminal networks continue to thrive.

34

Drugs, Guns and Cash

Recommendations International agencies and organizations that deal with the interdiction of human trafficking should work closer with Counter-Narcotics and Counter-Terrorism organizations to share valuable intelligence and strategies to collectively address the common concerns that facilitate and enable the illegal flow of illegal merchandise and immigrants and persons trafficked specifically or sexual exploitation.

International policies and national legislation should be strengthened to address the plague of sex slavery and the sale of humans organs from unwilling donors and victims of exploitation.

Findings: High-Level Political Attention Given the magnitude of the challenge and the high stakes involved it is not clear whether past efforts, however worthwhile, have been sufficient to deal effectively with problems that require sustained, high-level political attention and a more robust and energized multilateral system.

Recommendations For Washington, a broader strategy would, for example, focus seriously on stemming continuing flows of arms and money from the United States to the region; fostering more genuine cooperation among Central American governments and other Latin American countries and rethinking an antidrug policy that has yielded small national victories but has fueled a larger regional crisis.

Collective Responsibility and Tangible Initiatives.

Findings: Shared Responsibility The consumption of drugs produces externalities which are borne by the transit countries. Those externalities include (i) over 15,000 drug/organized crime related

35

Drugs, Guns and Cash

deaths per year in the Northern Triangle, (ii) the corruption, bribery and other efforts to weaken security and justice institutions, and (iii) the weakening of the moral fiber of society by strengthening the gangs.

Leading consumption countries should shoulder a greater burden of responsibility in funding and supporting efforts to bring about the necessary reforms and strengthening initiatives that are necessary to take the profits out of drug and contraband trafficking, restore stability in rapidly declining countries and curtail demand on their side of the fence by applying sufficient resources in addressing the escalating security concerns and increasing violence in the region.

Recommendations European countries and Canada could do more – by providing funding and expertise - in supporting U.S. and Latin American efforts to stem the flow of South American produced cocaine.

Greater technological know-how can be made available to Latin American countries in the management of airports and seaports.

Findings: Criminal Justice Reform The process of reform required for Central America must be built on the axis of Criminal Justice and not the old mantra of Security and Justice. Criminal Justice reform brings a more comprehensive approach to a broader spectrum of pillars that are essential to capacity building and development of a more holistic national security agenda.

Recommendations Criminal Justice Reform must address transformation of the system as a body and should include the following:

36

Drugs, Guns and Cash

 The Spine – Rule of Law and Integrity of Justice.  The Spirit – Education and opportunity for all economic and social groups.  The Head – National Intelligence services that work in harmony.  The Conscience – Citizen Security and Public Safety Initiatives derived through safer cities.  The Hands and Feet – Credible Security Forces that have adequate mobility, communications, equipment and training.  The Heart – Restored faith and confidence in the legal and judicial system.  The Stomach – Penal systems that educate and prepare inmates for constructive reinsertion into society.

Findings: The Caribbean Connection There is a Caribbean connection. With each modest achievement in the Mexican and Central American fight against drug trafficking, the prospects for the Caribbean decline, since it is the best alternative route for traffickers. Colombian, Mexican and Central American TCOs and LCOs have made alliances with the stronger and better-connected organized criminal networks in the Caribbean and will continue to corrupt state and government officials there, as they have effectively done in Central America.

Recommendations Any collective intelligence and or operational instrument used to counter drug trafficking within Latin America must also be simultaneously applied to Caribbean interdiction initiatives and coordinated through a central Strategic Management Committee (SMC) dedicated to the coordinated management and control of collective actions.

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

Findings: Intelligence Sharing The security challenge can be addressed by strengthening intelligence sharing between the Caribbean and Central America, and also by increasing capacity support between the Caribbean and North America. Such co-operation will minimize the incidence of traffickers taking the path of least resistance when put under pressure in one place.

Recommendations Establish closer collaboration between Central American intelligence bodies and those of CARICOM such as The CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and its sub agencies, the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) and Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC) would bring added value to both regions.

Improve local Counter-Intelligence capabilities to strengthen collective intelligence initiatives that drive operational and tactical operations.

Vet local intelligence offices so as to regenerate the trust which has been eroded since their infiltration by organized crime.

Findings: Media Responsibility Collectively, we should hold media outlets morally responsible for spreading fear, duress and promotion of the violent acts committed by TCOs and LCOs.

Recommendations Promote self-restraint by media outlets (radio, TV, print and Internet) from glorifying the actions of TCOs and LCOs by displaying gruesome images of murdered individuals and other initiatives that promote duress and fear among the population of the country. This should in no way infringe upon the freedom of the

38

Drugs, Guns and Cash

press, but rather promote responsible reporting that supports the safety of the masses and not the intent of the criminals.

Findings: Systems of Systems Analysis Conduct a system of systems analysis of the production, logistics, distribution and sale of illicit drugs by finding innovative ways of assessing the vulnerabilities of the process from development to consumption. This analysis must engender ways to curtail the availability of precursor chemicals for drug production, U.S. manufactured weapons readily available due to inadequate arms control laws and money-laundering operations that fund the illegal arms trade.

Recommendations Establish weapons control policies and mechanisms that are nationally driven and regional in its approach, context and scope, where traceability is key.

Intercept and limit the availability of precursor chemicals that support the production of illicit drugs.

Make money laundering and drug trafficking crimes against the state, which is punishable at the level of maximum sentencing.

Findings: Research-Based Solutions The issue of drug use, addiction and related social dilemmas is clearly not a one-sizefits-all scenario. Evidence based researched is emerging that offer credible support to the global struggle with drug abuse, trafficking and bulk cash profits that feed informal economies. The past forty years has taught us many lessons and sensible leadership must now prevail if successful outcomes are to become reality.

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

Recommendations 3 Encourage experimentation by governments with models of legal regulation of drugs to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their citizens. This recommendation applies especially to cannabis, but we also encourage other experiments in decriminalization and legal regulation that can accomplish these objectives and provide models for others. Incorporate the costs of long-term health care and other externalities into the price through taxation. This would (i) generate fiscal income and (ii) eliminate fears of increased demand due to price effect.

End the criminalization; marginalization and stigmatization of people who use drugs but who do no harm to others. Prevention and rehabilitation should be the main strategy towards end-users.

Challenge rather than reinforce common misconceptions about drug markets, drug use and drug dependence.

Apply much of the same principles and policies stated above to people involved in the lower ends of illegal drug markets, such as farmers, couriers and petty sellers.

Many are themselves victims of violence and intimidation or are drug dependent.

Arresting and incarcerating tens of millions of these people in recent decades has filled prisons and destroyed lives and families without reducing the availability of illicit drugs or the power of criminal organizations. There appears to be almost no limit to the number of people willing to engage in such activities to better their lives, provide for their families, or otherwise escape poverty. Drug control resources are better directed elsewhere.

Invest in activities that can both prevent young people from taking drugs in the first place and also prevent those who do use drugs from developing more serious problems.

Eschew simplistic ‗just say no‘ messages and ‗zero tolerance‘ policies in favor of educational efforts grounded in credible information and prevention programs that focus on social skills and peer influences. The most successful prevention efforts may be those targeted at specific at-risk groups.

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

Focus repressive actions on violent criminal organizations, but do so in ways that undermine their power and reach while prioritizing the reduction of violence and intimidation.

Law enforcement efforts should focus not on reducing drug markets per se but rather on reducing their harms to individuals, communities and national security.

Begin the transformation of the global drug prohibition regime.

Replace drug policies and strategies driven by ideology and political convenience with fiscally responsible policies and strategies grounded in science, health, security and human rights – and adopt appropriate criteria for their evaluation.

Ensure that the international conventions are interpreted and/or revised to accommodate robust experimentation with harm reduction, decriminalization and legal regulatory policies.

Break the taboo on debate and reform. The time for action is now.

Findings: Money Laundering Over 70% profits from drug trafficking stays in the U.S. Military grade weapons primarily of U.S. origin or U.S. factories are being sold to Mexican, Colombian and Guatemalan TCOs and LCOs. In 2010, Wachovia bank, now part of Wells Fargo & Company and the 4th largest bank holding company in the United States, paid $110 million to federal authorities for violating the Bank Secrecy Act, and fined another $50 million for failing to keep an eye on funds responsible for trafficking 22 tons of cocaine (roughly $550 million in whole sale value of cocaine). That same year, Wachovia divulged information that between 2004 and 2007 they were responsible for laundering $378.4 billion belonging to the Sinaloa Cartel. This amount is equal to 1/3 of Mexico‘s real GDP and 5 times greater than Guatemala‘s real GDP. Meanwhile, Forbes magazine rated the leader of this drug syndicate, El ―Chapo‖ Guzman, as one of the 68 ―most powerful people in the world‖.

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

In brief, Wachovia bank was only fined less than 2% of what it made in 2009, which amounts to $12.3 billion in profits. What‘s more striking is that during the week of the court settlement, Wells Fargo stock traded at 1% more than the previous week, at $30.86. Jeffrey Sloman, the federal prosecutor, commented that, "Wachovia's blatant disregard for our banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche to finance their operations,‖ 4.

Recommendations Learn mistakes from the Gunrunner project, and find more effective methods to control and trace weapons sales.

A single global system that stores and documents a guns registration number, ballistic signature (from factory), and traceability of ownership.

Guatemala is in serious need for a federal police agency, a national intelligence agency and a joint intelligence committee with strong regional sharing capacity.

Put ―real‖, not a ―slap-on-the-wrist‖ penalties and consequences for money laundering, and prosecute the cases for which information already exists.

Regulate store valued instruments, such as gift cards, internet payments, and other methods, which are providing unregulated transfer methods to organized crime.

Raise drug trafficking to the same threat level international repercussion and awareness as terrorism, by exposing the direct links between both phenomena.

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INTRODUCTION

The father of penicillin, Alexander Fleming, for some time doubted whether he should share his invention with the world. The reason was because he knew there was a risk that his medicine would not always be applied with the intensity and discipline required and that this could produce a strain of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Dr. Fleming released his invention to the world but, even as he accepted his Nobel Prize for its creation, he continued to caution the world on the risks of not using it with lethal strength.

The United States has invested 40 years and over $1 trillion dollars in the war on drugs.

However, 9% or 21 million of its population still actively consumes drugs today.

Unquestionably there has been progress - in the war being waged on drugs - as U.S. efforts managed to drastically reduce the use of maritime and air routes from South America to the U.S. and Europe. However, this effort has not been sufficient to mitigate the impact of the growth of this global billion dollar illicit enterprise.

Whereas focus on interdiction funding has traditionally fingered the U.S. as the primary source, Europe and Canada – where consumption levels are increasing - should be equally committed to reducing South American drug supply and assist regional countries to regain control and get back on the path towards development. For the U.S. and Canada, this plague is a back door problem, but for Europe the spread of narcotics is a front door reality as opened borders through EU initiatives have broadened the playing field for cartels.

Successes derived from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), Plan Colombia and Caribbean interdiction efforts have reduced and discouraged maritime and air transit options. These actions have shifted operational focus to land routes through Central America and Mexico, and it is evident that business is booming. This shifting dynamic of strategic route displacement - forged the implementation of the Merida Initiative in Mexico, which left Central America open to expansionist ambitions by Criminal Organizations. While route displacement was in motion due to the success of Plan Colombia, another strategic displacement was also taking place on the production side as a result of peace negotiations in Colombia. The chart below demonstrates the coincidental increase in Colombian cocaine production soon after the appropriation of

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Drugs, Guns and Cash

state property to the FARC by the Pastrana administration. An important point to mention is that in November 1998 Colombian President Pastrana granted the FARC safe haven – the size of Switzerland – in the southeast of the country. From that period onward Colombia has become the largest global producer of cocaine [inserted from the Document version 6, pp. 42, under the graph]

Global Potential Cocaine Production (mt), 1990 – 2008

As an antibiotic applied without the strength, consistency or the extent necessary for 40 years, the groups who were to be affected have become resistant to the medication. It certainly did not help that, being forced to leave their native environment; the bacteria landed the petri dish of Mexico and Central America. The region provided them with a favorable environment to develop and strengthen. They found weak and easily corrupted institutions that allowed them to coexist and grow without limitation. They also found young people in poverty, eager to find a way out of that poverty status. With the passing of time its roots within the power structures strengthened, their organizational cells became swollen and they came to rule vast areas of territory.

It is within this culture broth that the Merida Initiative was launched four years ago. A decision was taken to increase the dose of medicine and apply it elsewhere in the body.

However, the disease was now much better prepared to react and manifested itself as an extreme ailment with crippling effects and an unexpected virulence: demonstrating 44

Drugs, Guns and Cash

its ability to coerce its host and to intimidate its members. Drug cartels, gangs and other clandestine groups have evidenced their capacity and will to perform extreme acts of violence that coerce the civilian population and influence the policy of governments by intimidation or hostile take-over. By U.S. definition, these groups operate as terrorist organizations and pose a serious threat to governance in the region. (See links to Terrorism in the Analysis section below) Along with their extreme violence and agenda of fear and intimidation - to affect social and political decisions - these groups have developed partnerships with global terrorist organizations through their network of resource sharing, secured trafficking routes and common target area. Tunnels found along the U.S./Mexico border tell a story all its own which supports these insights of a common agenda and shared resources. In the The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working with other U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies to investigate discover cross-border last 10 years 125 tunnels were discovered along and the U.S./Mexico border where drugs, tunnels and bring those associated with their construction and operations to justice.

The construction of these tunnels can be very complex.

In December guns and cash flow without restriction and/or detection.

2009, the multi-agency San Diego Tunnel Task Force, led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), discovered a partially constructed passageway originating in Tijuana that extended more than 860 feet into the United States. The tunnel had lighting and ventilation systems, and was equipped with an elevator.

Tunnels Discovered by Law Enforcement FY 90

FY 93

FY 95

FY 98

FY 99

FY 00

FY 01

FY 02

FY 03

FY 04

FY 05

FY 06

FY 07

FY 08

FY 09

FY 10

FY 11

TOTAL

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

2

3

3

0

13

5

1

4

5

2

40

1

0

1

0

3

4

2

3

3

1

3

4

10

14

20

6

10

85

Yuma, AZ

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

3

TOTAL

1

1

1

1

3

4

2

5

7

5

5

18

16

16

26

12

14

137

Brown Field, CA El Centro, CA El Paso, TX San Diego County, CA Tucson, AZ

Source: Department of Homeland Security

Also in December 2009, the Department of Homeland Security searched a warehouse in Calexico, California and discovered a partially-built tunnel from Mexicali to Calexico. The tunnel was a small hole that ran horizontally between situation theinvestigation case of Walid Makled who was recently the borders. Anis ongoing resulted in the arrest of Daniel Bernable Alvarez-Peralta, a United States citizen. Alvarez explained that he planned to Venezuela.

Arab", he and, is utilizing known, insert a twelve-inch "The hard plastic pipe throughas the hole a pulley is alleged to be system, would use the tunnel to pull narcotics into the United States. Alvarez

Another worrying extradited from Colombia to one of the most influential drug dealers in the world with an estimated turnover of over 10 tons of 44 cocaine a month from South America to the rest of the world. Media reports speculate on his alleged links to known terrorist groups. Makled claims that Venezuelan Legislators and Generals are part of his payroll. Narco-trafficking has been the primary source of financial support to radical extremists, guerillas groups and terror networks for centuries. It is assessed that South American cocaine is being sold to U.S. and European markets to weaken them from within while extracting bulk cash profits - of 45

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untraceable funds - to maintain their threat capabilities, territorial control and overall power.

To address this problem, we must recognize that the Narco problem is really three problems: Drugs and other illicit trades (supply, demand and accessibility), Guns (lack of computerized records, political sensitivities and availability) and Cash (laundering, black markets and corruption). In turn, these three problems must be addressed from three different geographical aggregations. The United States (and other major consumption markets), through regional coordination and locally from within each country. This leads to a 3 x 3 matrix of action:

United States In the United States cocaine is referred to as the "The party drug." While the U.S. is partying, Central Americans are burying their dead and living in fear. Although Latin America makes up 8% of the world‘s population, it represents 40% of the world‘s homicides statistics. Given the virulence of the phenomenon and the low impact of the war on drugs to date, it seems that the population should rethink certain historical debates as it seeks creative solutions.

The U.S. remains the largest consumer market for illicit drugs and more money is spent on combating supply and distribution than on demand and addiction. The use of

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cocaine can be detected using a single hair. Yet, random testing and other proactive measures have proven effective in other regions like Hong Kong are successfully challenged by special interest groups and ambitious politicians. More than 15,000 deaths per year are reported in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador! These three countries have been branded the Northern Triangle and the most dangerous place on earth outside of active war zones. Over 30 percent of reported deaths are drug related.

Wouldn‘t you sacrifice a single hair from your head to save 5,000 lives per year?

On another front, United Parcel Services (UPS), the U.S. shipping company, moves and tracks 15.6 million packages a day! In today's world of technology, it is inconceivable that there is no comprehensive and cohesive electronic record that enables the tracing of weapons produced and sold in the U.S. Creative money laundering and smuggling schemes continue to funnel large amounts of bulk cash out of the U.S. to Mexico and other countries. A portion of the illicit cash is also used to purchase of weapons and ammunition in the U.S. Untraceable high-caliber weapons are then shipped to Mexico, Central and South America and are being used to kill Americans and locals alike.

Homicide Rates in Central America

Regional Drug trafficking is a global phenomenon. The system involves complex and highly coordinated logistics from production in South America, to the Maras in El Salvador and Guatemala to the cartels in Mexico for delivery to counterparts in cities like New 47

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York, California and Chicago. Addressing the problem involves uniting as Central Americans and creating opportunities for cooperation, coordinated strategies and trust between key actors of the region.

It is only by action that fear is removed and it‘s only by collective initiative that control of alternatively governed spaces and criminal organizations can be achieved. Initiatives such as the Central America Integration System (SICA), can make a difference in forging international alliances, however, it is the people of Central America that must lead the revolution that deposes apathy, collusion and greed. The creation of Sensitive Investigation Units (SIU) in El Salvador and Honduras is mandatory as such investigation and intelligence units can fill vital intelligence and operational gaps existing in the region – and complement similar initiatives in Mexico, Panama and Guatemala.

Intensity of Drug Smuggling

Local It is important to stress constructive initiatives such as crime prevention, the strengthening of criminal justice institutions, capacity building in the security and justice sector, public safety and citizen security, as well as ways and means to regain territorial control and protect our ports and borders. Today in Guatemala the military spending is only 0.4% of GDP, putting the country in position 136 out of 139. In a calculated review of current realities, this was a mistake that needs to be addressed to reestablish a strengthened national security presence and territorial control.

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There is a perception that prisons and inmates are isolated actors. Our research and analysis of Central America made it abundantly clear that ―the prisons control the streets‖ and that prison reform cannot be effective or complete without factoring this reality into the equation. Prisons have become universities for crime, terror and delinquency, when in fact they are meant to be a place of rehabilitation for reinsertion into society. Governments must see and treat imprisonment as a transitional dilemma that offers a significant opportunity to listen, learn and act on the dynamics that breathe and nurture crime in the first place. Criminals should not be treated as societal outcasts when in fact they mirror the ills and shortcomings of the country‘s development. The influence of deported criminals on TCOs and LCOs operating in the region is very significant in the displacement and expansion of criminal networks and know-how.

All actors must make great efforts and sacrifices to find funding sources for this fight against organized crime. Guatemala is ranked - as a country - 139 out of 139 from the point of view of the costs of insecurity that must be absorbed by companies to operate.

It is estimated that costs of private guards, insurance premiums, theft and other losses account for 7.7% of the GDP in Guatemala. Moreover, these additional costs are transferred, to some extent to the consumer, who pays the price of living in an unsafe country. Today Guatemalans are spending large sums on security, but spending more has not guaranteed or generated actual safety.

The State's ability to provide Public Safety has eroded; parallel security structures have emerged, which are independently owned and exercise unimpeded control of their activities and actions. For example, today Guatemala has an independent security force which outnumbers by 5:1 the state police. Lower national spending on private security would be an important source of economic competitiveness. In addition it would result in better prices and savings for local consumers and other end-users.

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Potential boost of annual Economic Growth Rate from reducing Homicide rate by 10%

In summary, the patient of the Mesoamerican region is in crisis. Organized crime not only found a host where it could flourish but also one whose immune system was prone to penetration. The issue of Narco-Terrorism is an issue of national, regional and international security. It is an issue that must be addressed in a holistic and integrated manner. The 3x3 medicine matrix should include strong action in each of the following axis boxes: Drugs, Guns and Cash as well as the United States, the Regional Coordination, and the Local Actions. Finally, it will require significant contributions and commitment from all the stakeholders. Efforts can produce a clear return on investment if appropriately directed and executed. Guatemala‘s asset forfeiture law was recently ratified and is a critical step in the right direction and an example of regional leadership. As Fleming would recommend, we must apply the medicine with the intensity, consistency and accuracy required. The patient only has this one chance to survive.

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SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Whether as producers of illicit crops, as transshipment countries, as entry points to key markets, as money laundering locales or as consumption markets, all countries in the Central American region take part in a drug trade that mobilizes tens of billions of dollars every year. This money flow - and the growing sophistication of the criminal networks that sustain it - feeds many other illicit activities and have transformed the region‘s political and security landscapes.

This situation is also the product of outdated governance structures, ineffective judicial institutions, morally bankrupt political parties, and a far from propitious external environment. The consequences of the severe economic downturn in the United States particularly in sectors of the economy in which Hispanics are disproportionately active - have hit Central America with unusual force. All of these factors contribute to enriching the petri dish that feeds and houses organized crime groups.

UNODC World Drug Report 2010

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Mechanics of Central American Drug Trafficking

It is important to clarify that what we are defining as land-based trafficking is not limited to overland smuggling. The methods associated with land-based trafficking can be divided into three categories: overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking and short- range aerial trafficking. The most straightforward of these is simple overland smuggling. As a series of investigations in Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua demonstrated last year, overland smuggling operations use a wide variety of approaches. In one case, authorities pieced together a portion of a route being used by Mexico‘s Sinaloa Cartel in which small quantities of drugs entered Costa Rica from Panama via the international point of entry on the Pan-American Highway. The cocaine was often held for several days in a storage facility before being loaded onto another vehicle to be driven across the country on major highways.

Upon approaching the Nicaraguan border, however, the traffickers opted to avoid the official port of entry and instead transferred the shipments into Nicaragua on foot or on horseback along a remote part of the border. Once across, the shipments were taken to the shores of the large inland Lake Nicaragua, where they were transferred onto boats to be taken north, at which point they would be loaded onto vehicles to be driven toward the Honduran border. In one case in Nicaragua, authorities uncovered another 52

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Sinaloa-linked route that passed through Managua and is believed to have followed the Pan-American Highway through Honduras and into El Salvador.

The second method associated with land-based trafficking involves littoral maritime operations. Whereas long-range maritime trafficking involves large cargo ships and self- propelled semisubmersible vessels capable of delivering multi-ton shipments of drugs from South America to Mexico without having to refuel. Littoral trafficking tends to involve so-called ―go-fast boats‖ that are used to carry smaller quantities of drugs at higher speeds over shorter distances. This method is useful to traffickers who might want to avoid, for whatever reason, a certain stretch of highway or perhaps even an entire country. According to Nicaraguan military officials, several go-fast boats are suspected of operating off the country‘s coasts and of sailing outside Nicaraguan territorial waters in order to avoid authorities. While it is possible to make the entire trip from South America to Mexico using only this method — and making frequent refueling stops - it is believed that littoral trafficking is often combined with an overland network.

The third method associated with land-based drug smuggling involves short-range aerial operations. In these cases, clandestine planes make stops in Central America before either transferring their cargo to a land vehicle or making another short flight toward Mexico. Over the past year, several small planes loaded with drugs or cash have crashed or been seized in Honduras, Mexico and other countries in the region. In addition, authorities in Guatemala have uncovered several clandestine airstrips allegedly managed by the Mexican drug-trafficking organization Los Zetas. These examples suggest that even as overall aerial trafficking appears to have decreased dramatically, the practice continues in Central America. Indeed, there is little reason to expect that it would not continue, considering that many countries in the region lack the resources to adequately monitor their airspace.

While each of these three methods involves a different approach to drug smuggling, the methods share two important similarities. For one, the vehicles involved - be they speedboats, small aircraft or private vehicles - have limited cargo capacities, which means land-based trafficking generally involves cocaine shipments in quantities no greater than a few hundred pounds. While smaller quantities in more frequent shipments mean more handling, they also mean that less product is lost if a shipment is seized. More importantly, each of these land-based methods requires that a drugtrafficking organization maintain a presence inside Central America.

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Share of cocaine flowing to the U.S. through transport corridors

Actors Involved There are a variety of drug-trafficking organizations operating inside Central America.

In addition to some of the notorious local gangs - such as Calle 18 and MS-13 - there is also a healthy presence of foreign criminal organizations. Colombian drug traffickers, for example, historically have been no strangers to the region. However, as we have observed over the past year, it is the more powerful Mexico-based drug-trafficking organizations that appear to be overwhelmingly responsible for the recent upticks in land-based narcotics smuggling in Central America.

Based on reports of arrests and drug seizures in the region over the past year, it is clear that no single Mexican cartel maintains a monopoly on land-based drug trafficking in Central America. Los Zetas, for example, are extremely active in several parts of Guatemala, where they engage in overland and short-range aerial trafficking. The Sinaloa cartel, which appears to be the most capable Mexican trafficker of cocaine, has been detected operating a fairly extensive overland smuggling route from Panama to El Salvador. Information gaps remain regarding, for example, the precise route Sinaloa follows from El Salvador to Mexico or the route Los Zetas use between South America and Guatemala. It is certainly possible that these two Mexican cartels do not rely exclusively on any single route or method in the region. Nevertheless, the logistical challenges associated with establishing even one route across Central America make it likely that existing routes are maintained even after they have been detected - and are defended if necessary.

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The operators of the Mexican cartel-managed routes also do not match a single profile.

At times, Mexican cartel members themselves have been found to be operating in Central America. More common is the involvement of locals in various phases of smuggling operations. Nicaraguan and Salvadoran nationals, for example, have been arrested in northwestern Nicaragua for operating a Sinaloa-linked overland and littoral route into El Salvador. Authorities in Costa Rica have arrested Costa Rican nationals for their involvement in overland routes through that country. In that case, a related investigation in Panama led to the arrest of several Mexican nationals who reportedly had recently arrived in the area to more closely monitor the operation of their route.

One exception is Guatemala, where Mexican drug traffickers appear to operate much more extensively than in any other Central American country; this may be due, at least in part, to the relationship between Los Zetas and the Guatemalan Kaibiles. Beyond the apparently more established Zeta smuggling operations there, several recent drug seizures — including an enormous 1,800-acre poppy plantation attributed to the Sinaloa cartel — make it clear that other Mexican drug-trafficking organizations are currently active inside Guatemala. Sinaloa was first suspected of increasing its presence in Guatemala in early 2008, when rumors surfaced that the cartel was attempting to recruit local criminal organizations to support its own drug-trafficking operations there. The ongoing Zeta- Sinaloa rivalry at that time triggered a series of deadly firefights in Guatemala, prompting fears that the bloody turf battles that had led to record levels of organized crime-related violence inside Mexico would extend into Central America.

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Organized Crime

The criminal mix that affects Central America is in many cases better organized than the countries in which it operates and forms part of transnational organized crime that has found a way to profit from the advantages of globalization. Organized crime does not respect borders or operate through treaties, bilateral or multilateral agreements, but rather bases its activities on profitability and the convenience of these businesses.

With a history of civil strife, weak institutions, and staggering impunity, the isthmus has struggled for decades to maintain stability. However, with pressure mounting on drug traffickers in the past decade in Colombia and Mexico, Central America has found itself swept into a new era of violence. The traditional problems of public safety (theft, personal injury, smuggling, homicide and small-scale use and sale of drugs) is now complicated by the presence and actions of large cartels - involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, human trafficking and the contributing to the growth of violence, drug consumption, kidnapping, extortion and contract killing.

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Key Risk factors for Homicide in Central America

The region is no longer dealing with small criminal groups - that the local police can control - but with structures that manage territories and illegal businesses and in some cases are capable of challenging government authority. As a result, hard won democratic institutions and practices are under severe threat. Leaders are trying to forge a security plan for a region that many say has been overlooked by the billiondollar U.S. aid packages provided for Colombia and Mexico. The situation is quite serious and Presidents from Central America converged at a security conference hosted by the Central American Integration System (SICA) in Guatemala City in June 2011. The SICA conference sought to provide international support for a security protocol signed in 2007 called the Central American Security Strategy, and to determine what strategic, operational, financial, human and material resources are needed. Highlights below from a recent study brings credible light to the problem of organized crime in Central America 5: On December 14, 2010, authors of three studies commissioned by the Latin American Program on organized crime in Central America presented the initial results of their research. The case studies explored the specific, local dynamics of organized crime in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the three countries of the ―Northern Triangle,‖ while also reflecting on the transnational nature of the major criminal networks in the region. According to Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American Program, an analysis of sub-regional dynamics is especially critical given the levels of violence in Mexico and the displacement of drug cartel activity from Mexico to Central America.

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Quoting analyst Stephen Dudley, Arnson noted that 90 percent of illegal drugs arriving in the United States pass through Central America and Mexico; about half this amount is trafficked through El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

The transformation of ideological groups into criminal actors was facilitated by their access to ―wartime structures and tactics,‖ including intelligence and smuggling routes.

This has led the Mexican and Colombian organizations to use El Salvador as a ―pipeline where there are different nodes where you can pop things in, and be sure that the product [cocaine, immigrants, or money flows] will be delivered on the other side of the border.‖ As a result, most of the organizations that participate in drug trafficking in El Salvador are tasked primarily with protection and transportation of the Colombian or Mexican-owned product. One example of this relationship is the Sinaloa cartel‘s (Mexico) reliance on Los Perrones Orientales, an organized crime group that transports product by land from the Pacific Coast to Guatemala. At least one police official believes that Los Perrones Orientales aspire to ―become mini Mexican cartels.‖ Indeed, Farah noted that they frequently emulate the extravagant and risky lifestyles of the Mexican cartel members through activities like car and horse racing, and narcocorridas, or musical tributes to their work.

The upper echelons of transnational gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) provide security, or ―muscle,‖ for the Mexican cartels and frequently for transport organizations like Los Perrones Orientales. These upper levels are often made up of former combatants. The MS-13 is it is one of the most powerful gangs in El Salvador, known for its ruthlessness and transnational ties. There is evidence that the Mexico‘s Zetas are attempting to recruit upper level gang leaders because of their ―contacts, markets and security arrangements‖ in the United States that the Zetas would otherwise not be able to access. The lower levels of the gang control the small percentage of drugs received from the cartels and sold locally. Neighborhood cocaine sales, known as narcomenudeo, drive local violence as gangs fight to control territory in order to convert cocaine into profit.

According to consultant James Bosworth, Honduras, like El Salvador and Guatemala, has experienced the effects of organized crime in Mexico, especially with respect to illicit trafficking. In recent years, the country has recorded one of the highest (if not the highest) homicide rates in the world, upwards of 60 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.

Honduras has also become one of the world‘s most dangerous countries for journalists.

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However, Bosworth said, what distinguishes Honduras from its Central American neighbors is the 2009 coup against President Manuel Zelaya. The coup facilitated the expansion of organized crime in the country and demonstrated to the international community the incompatibility of goals of democracy promotion and public security.

Freelance journalist Julie López described Guatemala as a state fighting two wars: one with organized crime and one with itself, confronting a legacy of corruption and impunity rooted in the 36-year internal armed conflict. She emphasized that organized crime incorporates not only foreign criminal networks and local criminal organizations, but also local authorities—military, police, and civilian. As in El Salvador, the roles these actors played during the country‘s civil conflict are an important—though not the only—part of the current dynamic of crime and violence in the country. According to López, organized crime in Guatemala was sheltered by the armed conflict and grew following the end of the war.

The Colombian cartel incursion into Guatemala was ultimately facilitated by military corruption. It was not until the 1996 peace accords and the withdrawal of the military— the main contacts for Colombians—that Colombian influence declined and the Mexican cartels entered to fill the vacuum. Now, the Zetas have taken over the northern area of Huehuetenango. The Sinaloa cartel, on the other hand, operates mostly in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Of the seven organized crime groups alleged to be operating in Guatemala, López identified two in particular as ―historical anchors‖ in Guatemala. The Lorenzano and Mendoza families control drug trafficking in Zacapa and Petén, respectively. These family-oriented structures—composed of fathers, sons, and sons-in-laws—appear to coexist with the Mexican cartels and exercise control over territories and populations. The relationships these groups foster at the local level help guarantee their impunity; it has been suggested that the local police in Zacapa warn the Lorenzanos of any attempts to arrest them and they appear to be supported by their community.

Almost all institutions—civilian, military, and police—have shown some connection to organized crime and attempts to address this corruption have created unique challenges. Police reform and the transformation of the military‘s role with respect to public security are major areas of focus. The government‘s attempts to demilitarize and reform the police coincide with a strategy of militarizing certain parts of the country overtaken by drug trafficking. In addition, a deeper and more comprehensive police 59

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reform is financially impeded by the government‘s inability to convince the Congress and society to raise taxes.

Finally, political factors will influence how the security agenda is defined and how policies are developed to respond to organized crime. These political factors include the levels of polarization in the countries, the 2011 elections in Guatemala—where criminal structures operate in over 40 percent of the territory—and the role of military forces in suppressing political protest in Honduras.

Christopher C. Ashe of the State Department‘s Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) described mostly frustration in light of the steady deterioration of security in Central America since 2008. He noted that homicide rates in Honduras alone exceed the combined rate of all countries of the European Union. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Guatemala in March 2010 and has taken a personal interest in Central America. Citizen security is the principal concern for the region, he said, and without development, investment, and social inclusion, the situation will not improve.

Modus Operandi, Structure, Network and Activity of Gangs in Central America Across Central America, an array of criminal groups - international drug traffickers, violent Youth gangs, and organized crime syndicates have largely replaced Marxist rebels as the chief instruments of disorder. These groups have carved out niches in a variety of illicit activities - drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms dealing, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, and money laundering - and made insecurity a fact of life. In some Central American countries, violence is exceeding levels last seen during the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s. Even where murder levels are lower, violence and crime have driven down economic activity, fostered widespread fear, and made life miserable for much of the population 6.

In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (the Northern Triangle), criminal organizations ranging from youth gangs to sophisticated drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) control large portions of the national territory. They serve as de facto governments as they collect ―taxes‖ through dues and extortion, demand the loyalty, or at least the acquiescence, of the people under their control, and punish those 60

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who interfere with their illicit activities. Such groups wage irregular warfare—defined as ―a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations‖—against their competitors and governments 7.

There is no single model of organized crime. Some criminal groups are relatively small street gangs that are involved mainly in petty robbery, small-scale extortion and drug trafficking, and murder for hire. At the other end of the spectrum are sophisticated, multi-tiered organizations that operate in several cities or even on a transnational basis.

Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in Central America, Calle 18 and paramilitary groups like Los Zetas in Mexico, have hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of members organized into numerous cells and overseen by a centralized hierarchy.

They employ individuals ranging from hit men to accountants and lawyers, who occupy key nodes in illicit networks. With different divisions and sub-divisions responsible for specific activities some criminal groups actually resemble corporations.

Some analysts refer to these groups as ―third-generation gangs,‖ because they represent the highest evolution of organized crime in Latin America 8. These gangs use a mixture of violence and corruption to neutralize governments and protect their business; they employ a variety of light and heavy weapons, including crude armored vehicles, and strike with astounding brazenness and savagery. What the gangs are doing, in essence, is seeking to intimidate the state and the citizenry into submission and win a free hand in pursuing lucrative illicit business dealings 9. In addition to violence, corruption plays an integral role in undermining state institutions. Criminals have long used the formula of plata o plomo (money or lead) to corrupt government officials; third-generation gangs have become masters of this strategy. Confronted with the choice of an easy payout or a violent death, law enforcement frequently opts for the former. Gangs are able to batter the state from without and weaken it from within.

Structure Drug Trafficking Organizations, Criminal Groups, and Gangs Operating in Central America Drug Cartels are largely, highly sophisticated organizations composed of multiple drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and cells with specific assignments such as drug transportation, security/enforcement, or money laundering. Drug cartel command-and61

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control structures in Central in Central America and elsewhere in Latin America produce, transport, and distribute illicit drugs in the region and in the United States with the assistance of DTOs that are either a part of or in an alliance with the cartel.

Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are complex organizations with highly defined command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute large quantities of one or more illicit drugs.

Criminal groups operating in the region are numerous and range from small to moderately sized, loosely knit groups that distribute one or more drugs at the retail level and midlevel.

Street gangs known as “pandillas� are defined as groups or associations of three or more persons with a common identifying sign, symbol, or name, the members of which individually or collectively engage in criminal activity that creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. These are gangs that operate throughout the urban and rural areas of states in the Region. Criminal activities such as violence and drug trafficking perpetrated by street gangs is magnified as national and regional level street gangs migrate from urban areas to suburban and rural communities, expanding their influence and magnifying their presence.

Prison gangs are highly structured criminal networks that operate within prison systems in the region. They pose a serious national and regional threat, particularly those that affiliate with and maintain substantial influence over street gangs in the communities in which they operate. Released members typically return to their home communities and resume their former street gang affiliations and perform criminal acts on behalf of the prison gang.

Both street gangs and prison gangs share the same Modus Operandi and are often made up of the same members. To members, these gangs offer acceptance and a sense of both street security, a surrogate family, power and control over one's self, others, and life situations, easier access to money and intimidation.

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Central American Risk Factors for Youth and Gang Violence 10 Societal Culture of violence: A system of norms, values, and attitudes that enables, fosters and legitimizes the use of violence in interpersonal relationships (i.e., physical discipline of children, violence against women, etc.)

Poverty and income inequality: Although correlated with risky behaviors such as dropping out of school (a risk factor for youth violence), no causal relationship exists between poverty and violence. However, relative deprivation in LAC is correlated with higher homicide rates.

Rapid and uncontrolled urbanization: Patterns of victimization in LAC have shown that cities whose population had experienced growth spurts also experienced a greater degree of violence as a result of disorganization and poor urban planning. Deteriorated public spaces have also been associated with gang presence and victimization of residents.

Youth unemployment and inactivity: Youth unemployment is associated with a higher probability of youth engaging in risky behavior, including crime and violence. Youth inactivity rates (youth who are not in school or are unemployed) are often much higher than youth unemployment rates.

Migration: Evidence shows that school-going youth who feel close to their parents have lower substance abuse rates and participate less in violence and risky sexual activity. It has also been demonstrated that children who feel close to their families are about 10 percent less likely to engage in risk-taking behavior such as violence, smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, and risky sexual activity. This is particularly relevant given the trend in the last decade of one or both parents migrating to the U.S. Drug trafficking: Drugs and violence are linked in three main ways: (i) the altered state generated by drug use can produce violent behavior and a loss of control; (ii) drug abuse generates physical and psychological dependence, which often leads young people to become involved in criminal activities as a means of supporting their drug addictions; and (iii) gang member participation in drug networks and Organized crime.

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The second hypothesis is that recent armed conflict may contribute to higher violence levels through the Community transfer of firearms and munitions into the region. In 2007, about 4.5 million legal and illegal small firearms wereschool circulatingenrollment, in Central America (Table 7); the great of them arerates: illegallyJuvenile owned.

Low secondary completion and majority attainment For example, Guatemala reported just over 147,000 legally owned civilian firearms but estimated a total delinquency is correlated with lower levels of education due to the low cost that number of nearly 2 million in circulation. Similarly, Honduras counted about 133,000 registered firearms, engaging in criminal behavior has for these young people, the absence of positive social but the number of total firearms actually in the country is estimated at close to 600,000. In Central influences from mentors and peers, and from delinquency being the best income America as a whole, there is estimated to be about one weapon for every ten people, ranging from a low alternative young any of 2.8forpera100 peopleperson in Costa without Rica to nearly 16marketable per 100 people skills. in Guatemala.

School violence: schools have been to to serve as anconflict. important Certainly notWhile all firearms in circulation can beproven traced back the armed Betweenprotective 2000 and factor in2006—several the lives years of at-risk youth, they can also teach violence through corporal after the last of Central America’s civil wars had ended—arms imports increased in punishment teachers andcountries. through students. all sixby Central American In violence Guatemala,between for example, the value of imported firearms nearly

tripled from about US$3 million to US$8 million during this period. Costa Rica experienced a similar jump from under US$1The million to moreofthan US$3 million.

Firearms imported to the region Availability of firearms: number firearms in circulation has a direct effectincluded on the revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, shotguns, AK-47 assault rifles, M-16s, rocket launchers, hand grenades ability of those at risk of violence to obtain guns, whether from legitimate sources or and semi-automatic illegal firearms sales. rifles, according to official customs data. A thriving illegal trade in firearms associated with the drug trade is believed to have fueled at least part of this increase. As drugs flow north into Mexico and the United States, firearms flow south.

Table 7: Firearms Owned by Civilians in Central America, 2007 Country Registered Estimated Guns per 100 people Costa Rica 43,241 115,000 2.8 El Salvador 198,000 450,000 7.0 Guatemala 147,581 1,950,000 15.8 Honduras 133,185 450,000 6.2 Nicaragua NA 385,000 7.0 Panama 96,600 525,600 5.4 Sources: Karp 2008; Arias Foundation 2005.

Recent spikes of violence in the region have been accompanied by the appearance of more powerful firearms, resulting in higher Relationship/Interpersonal mortality levels. Indeed, firearms are used in most murders in Central America. Figure 12 shows the breakdown by weapon linked to murders in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Household poverty: Povertysimilar: within a countries, household canwere cause one or both parents to The patterns are remarkably in both firearms used for 80 percent of killings. migrate for better job opportunities or to be absent from the home for many hours, or A 2008 victimizationfamily survey inmembers Guatemala toconducted by the Geneva-based can drive the younger bring additional incomeSmall intoArms the Survey home, a range similar in trends. present in all reported incidents of causing spotlighted some youth to of engage theFirearms illegal were drugoverwhelmingly trade.

violent crime. In addition, 31 percent of those participating in the survey said they owned some kind of firearm; a third of them said they had handguns. Of those who did not own a gun, 16 percent said they would like to own one.

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Dysfunctional families: Children and youth who experience or observe violent behavior in the home are more likely to engage in violent behavior themselves.

Peers who are gang members: Studies show that relationships established with peers who are gang members or juveniles with criminal records typically have a significant impact on a young person‘s decision to join a gang. Unlike the families of these young persons, peers can offer solidarity, respect, and sometimes even access to money.

Individual Alcohol abuse: Alcohol can increase the likelihood of youth violence by reducing selfcontrol and the ability to process incoming information and assess risk, by increasing emotional liability and impulsiveness, and by increasing the likelihood that a young person will resort to violence.

Lack of identity: Many young people join gangs due to the absence of positive role models both at home and in their communities, and to being socially excluded (from education and employment opportunities.

Gangs Network and Activity

From an analytical perspective, it is clear that countries across the region are experiencing irregular warfare. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (Calle 18 and MS-13) and the Zetas have used violence to carve out geographic areas where government is essentially powerless to intervene. In areas of Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador gang violence has become so intense and gang influence so pervasive that authorities have largely retreated. Gangs use these areas as free zones for drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other illegal activities, and exert their own form of governance. They lay down a code of conduct, specifying which activities are allowed.

Those who comply with this code are generally rewarded with protection as well as limited social services like food, toys, and clothing - the allure of which is not to be underestimated in impoverished areas where the population has long been slighted by the state. Those who do not comply are punished/killed 11.

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Maras: Origin, Structure and Network of Activity The Maras (which began as a Los Angeles barrio gang composed of young Salvadoran immigrants whose parents had fled that country‘s civil war in the 1980s) have evolved from a street gang to a transnational organization. The U.S. policy of mass deportations of undocumented immigrants helped spread both MS-13 and Mara 18 (Calle 18) to Central America. Though they are rivals, their methods and interests are the same.

Some experts claim that both have developed command and control structures; others say that their component cliques (clicas), who range from ten to 100 members function as franchises.

Gang cultures in Central America quickly adapted to the California Mara style.

Typically, street gangs are localized; leadership changes frequently and activities revolve around drug sales, petty crime, and turf battles. Clearly the movement of money within the gangs seems mysterious. Despite their extortion rackets and sale of drugs (both highly lucrative enterprises), observers on the ground report that most member appear to be poor.

Unfortunately, they show no restraint in their use of violence, both against rivals and within their own organizations to maintain internal order. Indeed, the use of violence is the most defining characteristic of the Maras. Their vocabularies emphasize brutality and criminal activity and the leadership promotion process within the gang is based on violence including random killings of innocent persons for no apparent reason. The implication of this is that once a gang member has killed another, be he from a rival clica or some other group, the killer is marked and can never leave the gang. Gang initiation rites, which involve merciless beatings, can be fatal. Women are initiated either through beatings or forced sex with some or all the male members of the clica. The Maras fight very frequently, not only against the authorities but also against each other, for control of turf and markets, especially to sell drugs. Researchers estimate that on average these gang members do not reach 30 years of age.

The Maras is one of the largest criminal networks in the Americas, and perhaps one of the largest in the world. Unlike most other street gangs, Maras have shown a tendency in recent years to organize in a more traditionally hierarchical manner and to coordinate their criminal activities not only across the United States but also across North and Central America. They are organized and sophisticated. They use throwaway mobile phones and the Internet, including MySpace, to keep in touch 12.

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Recent reports suggest that the Maras are becoming involved in cross-border human and arms trafficking, as well as the entrenched drug trade, with some suggesting that factions of MS-13 are evolving to resemble an organized crime syndicate more than a street gang. Unlike in the United States where strong legal institutions have kept the Maras largely in check, weak governments, narrowly punitive policy choices, and a widespread cultural tolerance of extrajudicial violence have allowed the Maras to essentially run amok in Guatemala, El Salvador, and especially Honduras, to the point that they challenge the state's ability to govern. Although there is little evidence that the Maras have anything to do with foreign terrorist groups, their association with drug cartels may be contributing to the uncontrolled violence in Mexico's border cities and elsewhere 13.

The gang problem in Guatemala had its origins in the civil war, as displaced and uneducated—but often well-armed—young people turned to crime. This phenomenon subsequently received a major boost from destabilizing refugee flows, particularly the deportation of Guatemalan émigrés-turned-gang members from Southern California in the U.S.

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Country

Gang Members

Number of Gangs

Honduras

36,000

112

Guatemala

14,000

434

El Salvador

10,500

4

Nicaragua

4,500

268

Costa Rica

2,660

6

Panama

1,385

94

Belize

100

2

Total

69,145

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A Research Assessment of the Maras 14 There are differences in the nature and scope of the Mara issue in Central America.

There are also major difference in the nature of the threat to security among the countries of Central America and the responses of the individual governments.

Literature on the gangs in the media is very sensationalist. Some of the reporting comes through the police or other institutions that may have subjective reasons for portraying the Maras as even more of a security threat than they appear to be.

Scholarly literature in English on the Maras is almost non-existent; the literature in Spanish is more balanced.

The greatest limitation is in obtaining accurate statistics. The ways at which governments arrive at ―official estimates‖ of the number of gang members in their countries is quite arbitrary. There is no standardized basis for gang membership. (For example, in El Salvador the estimate of 10,500 gang members nationwide is based completely on those who have been imprisoned at one time or another; in Honduras the estimate is based quite curiously on a reading of gang graffiti multiplied by some indeterminate factor.) Researchers now go directly to the gangs to do self-report surveys of its members 15. Obviously, these survey methods involve serious risks for the researcher. The results may still be inaccurate, if one assumes that many respondents are lying, to make themselves look good, make the gang look good, and/or to intentionally mislead authorities.

The following extracts are illustrative: Gang Activity in Guatemala [World Bank Opinion] Guatemala is another case in which data paint a mixed picture on the overall contribution of gangs to violent crimes. For example, during a month in which the number of homicides was especially high, police statistics attributed only 14 percent of them to gangs. Moreover, the majority of murders during that period occurred in areas where gang presence was minimal, but where the presence of organized crime and drug trafficking was high 16. Additional data from Guatemala on the number of gang 68

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members in prison and why they were there, suggest that gang members might not be as violent as the public believes. Data from the Guatemalan penitentiary system indicate that gang members accounted for 5.8 percent of the total number of arrestees in June 2006, a figure suggesting that others are behind the high levels of violence in Guatemala. Furthermore, 2004 data from the Guatemalan National Police showed that drugs were the primary reason for arrests of gang members (23 percent), followed by robbery (20.4 percent). Homicides caused gang member detentions in only 1.8 percent of cases.

However, other data from Guatemala suggest that gangs might play a larger role in violence. A study conducted by the Office of the Attorney General for Human Rights (ProcuradorĂ­a de Derechos Humanos), which analyzed the causes of death for youth aged 25 and under for the period of July 2002 through August 2003, found that 27.4 percent of these deaths were caused by gang-member attacks on non-gang youths 17. The study showed that in total, gangs were responsible for about one third of all deaths covered by the research, including those between gang members and from gang members leaving their gang. Although deaths caused by gangs accounted for 27.4 percent of all deaths of those under age 25, common criminal acts accounted for a marginally higher percentage of deaths of this age group: 28.5 percent 17. Again, data are ambiguous about gang involvement in these criminal acts, further reducing clarity on the issue.

Central American Gangs (World Bank) Youth violence and gangs are a critical concern in Central America today. Men between the ages of 15 and 34 account for the overwhelming majority of homicide victims and they also comprise the membership of youth gangs. There are more than 900 gangs or Maras operating in Central America today, with an estimated 70,000 members. While gangs are doubtless a major contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the very evidence indicates that they are responsible for only a minority share of violence; multiple sources suggest that perhaps 15 percent of homicides are gang related. Furthermore, reliable data related to the role of youth gangs in the narcotics trade are scarce.

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Comparing Anti-Gang approaches and policies: Gang violence in Central America

Issue: 13 March 2009 Government Policy

In their analysis of gang control programs, Malcolm Klein of the University of Southern California and Cheryl Maxson of the University of California classify official anti-gang programs as political, ideological or bureaucratic according to the way they develop.

Such programs or policy can be described as political if they are initiated within the framework of a political or electoral agenda. Ideological programs are largely generated by the law enforcement agencies and strongly reflect the value system of the police.

Anti-gang policy classified as ‗bureaucratic‘ is developed by local government or ministries, and is designed to match the capacity and experience of the institutions that have to implement it.

There is a remarkable difference in anti-gang policies across the various countries of Central America. In 2002 El Salvador and Honduras declared the gangs to be a national security problem and developed a strict public safety policy. This policy was largely based on a political agenda, as evidenced by the names of the programs alone: Operación Libertad (Operation Freedom) and Plan Super Mano Dura (Super Iron Fist Plan). The programs involved the deployment of the military and were accompanied by rapidly drafted and introduced ‗anti-Mara‘ legislation, which criminalized membership of a street gang such as Mara Salvatrucha or Eighteen Street Gang. Despite the intense media coverage, observers rapidly gained the impression that this had ‗more face than substance‘. Guatemala hesitantly followed the example set by its neighbors with its Plan Escoba (Broom Plan), but on a smaller scale and without banning membership of gangs.

The approaches in Guatemala and Nicaragua are more ideological, although there are considerable differences in approach to dealing with gang violence. In Guatemala the police conduct patrols with the help of soldiers and hunt down gang members. In Nicaragua the emphasis is on prevention: the police try to establish a relationship with

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the local community in the neighborhoods concerned and to organize them into committees for social crime prevention under the banner of safety and crime prevention. But the burden of organizing such prevention falls primarily on the police, who receive relatively little help from other government agencies or NGOs, and sometimes little support from residents.

The repressive policy pursued in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala seems to be largely counter-productive. During police operations, which mostly take place in deprived neighborhoods, suspected gang members are arrested and locked up.

Although the courts immediately release many, the result is that the prisons are overflowing. The lack of supervision in custodial institutions has helped Mara Salvatrucha and Eighteen Street Gang become better organized in jail; they regard prisons as ‗universities‘ for their members. Despite the increased number of imprisoned gang members, homicide rates have risen and the number of people who fall victim to crime has remained generally the same. Meanwhile the perception of insecurity among broad sections of the population has remained the same or has declined only slightly.

Hence, the question remains: how much of this violence are street gangs responsible for?

Nicaragua‘s national police focus on the early identification of gang formation and activities and on demobilizing gangs. Youngsters and their families are called to account for their violent and criminal behavior. Police attempt to weaken the gangs‘ position by threatening prosecution of the leaders and offering training and work experience to members who quit the gang. If the members are open to talking to police and the local community, the police attempt to reach peace agreements between neighboring gangs and to organize an official ceremony at which the gangs hand in their weapons in exchange for study grants. The police are by no means always successful in dismantling the gangs, but Nicaragua is managing to prevent the escalation of the problem. Furthermore, the transnational gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha and Eighteen Street Gang have not managed to establish cliques in the country. Nevertheless, Nicaragua has been confronted with the same trends as its neighbors: violence in terms of homicide figures has increased in recent years; the proportion of the population that has become the victim of crime has remained the same and perceptions of insecurity have also decreased.

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Guatemala’s Geostrategic Nightmare

Of all the countries in Central America, Guatemala, which shares an uncontrolled and porous border with Mexico, is one of the most vulnerable. A national discussion about violence and crime is dominating this year‘s presidential election campaign in Guatemala, fed by a steady flow of headlines on violent crimes that contribute to a sense of rising lawlessness. The perception and the image that most of the Guatemalan population has is that they are increasingly overshadowed by violent homicides, corrupt officials, incompetent national security structures and a regional perception of weakness. There is also consensus that Security Forces need to be reassessed, equipped and deployed to protect the country. In Guatemala, rooting out corruption will require significant investment in public institutions, where resources are scarce. The finance ministry predicts the total tax take in 2011 will equal 11.8 percent of gross domestic product, which is low even by Latin American standards. The Inter-American Dialogue reported last year that government revenue in the region averaged 25 percent of GDP, compared with 42 percent in developed countries. These and other factors have made Guatemala a vast recruitment pool for foot soldiers and drug runners throughout the region. Guatemalan nationals are among the causality statistics in most violent operations in Mexico and Northern Triangle countries.

Challenges to Democracy and Demographic Institutions

Violence and the Impact on Citizen Security The everyday impact of violence is visible in the genocide of youth in Mexico and Central America. They are expendable foot soldiers - with limited sentences - in the service of the international cartels. A very disturbing trend in Mexico is the role of children in this criminal mix. The Network for the Rights of Children in Mexico (REDIM), an advocacy group, says some 30,000 children are believed to work for criminal gangs where delinquency is often blamed on high dropout rates at school.

Detailed figures on the role of minors in the cartels are scarce, but the Mexican

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newspaper Reforma says the number charged with involvement in organized crime jumped to 214 in 2010 from 8 in 2007, citing data from the attorney general's office.

"Organized crime has become a job provider for a section of the population who don't have a lot of other options," said Victor Clark-Alfaro, director of the Binational Center for Human Rights in Tijuana on the Mexican border with California. Poverty and lack of economic opportunity plays a vital role in supporting this reality.

Although authorities have arrested a number of teenage ―hit men‖ in the past few years, it is highly unusual for women to work as killers for drug gangs. Nevertheless, the fact that youth unemployment in Mexico is now double what it was ten years ago -in a country whose growing population is one of the youngest in the Americas -- the trends present the cartels with a rich source of cheap labor. There is little doubt that the trend has also spread to Central America. It seems like a new pattern is emerging in the world of organized crime.

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Fear and insecurity have become the central concern of the citizenry, surpassing topics such as poverty and unemployment. Today, according to surveys on victimization and the perception of security, between 50 and 75 per cent of citizens in the region have been victims of some type of crime, and more than 50 per cent of the population feels insecurity has increased.

A very disturbing development is the level and character of related violence. Mexico's brutal Zetas drug cartel has set up operations in Guatemala in the largely indigenous region along the countries' shared border with Mexico. The Zetas are blamed for a recent mass killing in Mexico where 183 bodies were found in mass graves in early May 2011, along with 29 beheaded farm workers in PetĂŠn, Guatemala – in a single incident during the same period. The Zetas are suspected of forcefully recruiting migrants to fight their former allies in the Gulf cartel. Those who refuse are killed. Never have such massive killing fields been found in such a short time in Mexico and Guatemala‘s recent history and only a few parallels in this hemisphere exist.

The Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGSs)

The structure and network of activity of TCOs and LCOs have led to a very serious development, namely the creation of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGSs) in which criminal organizations, rather than formal state authorities effectively control the population and act as the arbiter of internal order. Criminal fiefdoms have taken shape in Central America against the backdrop of rampant criminality and the competition between rival drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Criminal organizations ranging 74

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from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control substantial portions of national territory in Central America. They serve as de facto governments, collect ―taxes‖ through dues and extortion, demand the loyalty or acquiescence of those under their control and punish those who try to disrupt their illicit activities.

The Link to Terrorism On July 1, 2010, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York unsealed an indictment that outlined the rapid expansion of operations of transnational criminal organizations and their growing, often short-term strategic alliances with terrorist groups. These little-understood transcontinental alliances pose new security threats to the United States, as well as much of Latin America, West Africa, and Europe.

The indictment showed drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Colombia and Venezuela including the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); a designated terrorist organization by the United States and European Union had agreed to move several multi-ton loads of cocaine through Liberia en route to Europe.

The head of Liberian security forces, who is also the son of the president, negotiated the transshipment deals with a Colombian, a Russian, and three West Africans. According to the indictment, two of the loads (one of 4,000 kilos and one of 1,500 kilos) were to be flown to Monrovia from Venezuela and Panama, respectively. A third load of 500 kilos was to arrive aboard a Venezuelan ship. In exchange for transshipment rights, the drug traffickers agreed to pay in both cash and product.

What the drug traffickers did not know was that the head of the security forces with whom they were dealing was acting as an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and had recorded all conversations, leaving the clearest body of evidence to date of the growing ties between established designated Latin American terrorist organizations/drug cartels and emerging West African criminal syndicates that move cocaine northward to lucrative and growing markets in Europe and the former Soviet Union. The West African criminal syndicates, in turn, are often allied and cooperate in illicit smuggling operations with operatives of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a radical Islamist group that has declared its allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.

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What links terrorist and criminal organizations together are the shadow facilitators who understand how to exploit the seams in the international legal and economic structure, and who work with both terrorist and criminal organizations. These groups use the same pipelines and the same illicit structures, and exploit the same state weaknesses. Of the 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed by the Department of State, the DEA states that 19 have clearly established ties to DTOs, and many more are suspected of having such ties.

While the groups that overlap in different pipeline structures are not necessarily allies, and in fact occasionally are enemies, they often make alliances of convenience that are short- lived and shifting. Even violent drug cartels, which regularly take part in bloody turf battles, frequently engage in truces and alliances, although most end when they are no longer mutually beneficial or the balance of power shifts among them.

An example of the changing balance of power is that of Los Zetas, a group of special operations soldiers in Mexico who became hit men for the Gulf Cartel before branching out and becoming a separate organization, often now in direct conflict with their former bosses of the Gulf organization.

Another case that illustrates the breadth of the emerging alliances between criminal and terrorist groups is Operation Titan, executed by Colombian and U.S. officials in 2008 and still ongoing. Colombian and U.S. officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a DTO that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Most of the drugs originated with the FARC in Colombia, and some of the proceeds were traced through a Lebanese expatriate network to fund Hezbollah, a radical Shi‘ite Muslim terrorist organization that enjoys the state sponsorship of Iran and Syria.

Colombian and U.S. officials allege that one of the key money launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb (also known as ―Taliban‖), acted as the central go-between among Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah.

Among the groups participating in Harb‘s operation in Colombia were members of the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups, and Marxist FARC. This mixture of enemies and competitors working through a common facilitator or in loose alliance for mutual benefit is a pattern that is becoming common—and one that significantly complicates the ability of law enforcement and intelligence operatives to combat, as multiple recent transcontinental cases demonstrate.

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The cases above show the connectivity among these disparate groups operating along different geographic parts of the overall criminal-terrorist pipeline. Rather than operating in isolation, these groups have complicated but significant interactions with each other based primarily on the ability of each actor or set of actors to provide a critical service to another, while profiting mutually from the transactions. Many of the groups operate in what have traditionally been called ―ungoverned‖ or ―stateless‖ regions. However, in many of these cases, the groups worked directly with the government or have become the de facto governing force in the areas they occupy.

A 2001 Naval War College study insightfully described some of the reasons for the occurrence of cross-border black holes in terms of ―commercial‖ and ―political‖ insurgencies. These are applicable to organized criminal groups as well and have grown in importance since then: The border zones offer obvious advantages for political and economic insurgencies.

Political insurgents prefer to set up in adjacent territories that are poorly integrated, while the commercial insurgents favor active border areas, preferring to blend in amid business and government activity and corruption. The border offers a safe place to the political insurgent and easier access to communications, weapons, provisions, transport, and banks.

For the commercial insurgency, the frontier creates a fluid, trade-friendly environment.

Border controls are perfunctory in ―free trade‖ areas, and there is a great demand for goods that are linked to smuggling, document fraud, illegal immigration, and money laundering.

For the political insurgency, terrain and topography often favor the Narco-guerrilla.

Jungles permit him to hide massive bases and training camps, and also laboratories, plantations, and clandestine runways. The Amazon region, huge and impenetrable, is a clear example of the shelter that the jungle areas give. On all of Colombia‘s borders with Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela—jungles cloak illegal activity.

In parts of Guatemala and along much of the U.S.-Mexico border, these groups have directly and successfully challenged the state‘s sovereignty and established governing mechanisms of their own, relying on violence, corruption, and largesse to maintain control.

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While the transnational trafficking and financial operations of the Sinaloa Cartel are important, FARC alliances and actions offer an important look at the use of non-state criminal/terrorist armed groups by a criminalized state. The well-documented links of Venezuela‘s Bolivarian Revolution, led by President Chávez, to both Iran and the FARC, as well as the criminalization of the Venezuelan state under Chávez point to the evolution of the model described above in which a criminalized state franchises out part of its criminal enterprises to non-state actors.

More worrisome from the U.S. perspective is the growing evidence of Chávez‘s direct support for Hezbollah, along with his ties to the FARC. These indicators include the June 18, 2008, U.S. Treasury Department‘s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designations of two Venezuelan citizens, including a senior diplomat, as Hezbollah supporters. Several businesses were also sanctioned. Allegations included coordinating possible terrorist attacks and building Hezbollah-sponsored community centers in Venezuela. OFAC has also designated numerous senior Venezuelan officials, including the heads of two national intelligence services, for direct support of the FARC in the acquisition of weapons and drug trafficking.

The Chávez model of allying with state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran while sponsoring violent non-state terrorist organizations involved in criminal activities and terrorism strongly resembles the template pioneered by Hezbollah. In fact, the military doctrine of the Bolivarian Revolution explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model of asymmetrical, or fourth generation, warfare and its reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terror- ism, including the use of nuclear weapons. This is occurring at a time when Hezbollah‘s presence in Latin America is growing and becoming more identifiable.

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CASE STUDIES

Chicago – A Case Study

Chicago is the third most populated city in the United States. The population of almost 3 million is slightly more than 1/3 Hispanic, with the strongest representation being of Mexican descent. Chicago is a city that was built by immigrants, their hard work ethic and family values. The city has been designated as the fourth best business city in the world, due to its diversity in businesses operating in the city. Chicago is also known as a city of the arts and culture, great restaurants, five star hotels, and Gangsters. Only New York and Los Angeles consumes more drugs than Chicago, nevertheless, the brutality of the city and fierceness of the criminal organizations there are second to none.

Chicago, since its early beginning, has had to deal with criminal elements, from the Irish mob, to the Italian mob, the gangs and now the bulk cash Latinos that represent South/Central American drug interests. Chicago is also a city of segregation that plays right into the hands of organized criminal groups. Many groups started off as the protectors of their communities to ward off those that wanted to victimize the newcomers to America. In a short time though, these organizations began to control their communities with intimidation and violence and the seeds of organized

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communities blossomed into organized crime syndicates.

In the 80‘s & 90‘s, African-American and Hispanic youth gangs were becoming major forces in cities across America. In Chicago, these youth gangs quickly became entrepreneurs, and are now multi-million dollar organizations with legitimate businesses through which they cleanse illegal earnings. The largest drug distributing youth gangs in Chicago are: the Black Gangster Disciples, the Vice Lords, and the Latin Kings. The Latin Kings have always had a drug connection to Mexico, facilitated by the Herrera Drug Trafficking Organization. The Kings are considered ―local‖ wholesalers, and were connected with Sinaloa and Beltran-Leyva through family ties in Mexico.

In 2005 the Flores twin brothers took drug dealing by youth gangs in Chicago to new heights, moving what the DEA claims to have been 2,000 - 3,000 kilos per month – which is roughly $55,000,000 USD - for Sinaloa and Beltran-Leyva cartels. The Flores twins were arrested by the DEA in 2010, and are still awaiting trial. Indictments have also been made against the leaders of Sinaloa and Beltran-Leyva cartels for their connection with the 28-year-old Flores brothers, Pedro and Margarito.

It is reported that the Beltran-Leyva cartel gave DEA the intelligence to arrest the Flores brothers, after Sinaloa ordered the Flores brothers not to accept or sell drugs from the Beltran-Leyva cartel any more.

Drug Cartels Operating in Chicago There was a time in the U.S. when both wholesale and retail distribution of cocaine was facilitated by Colombian cartels through diverse groups that fed the consumption market. Today most Colombian cartels have been replaced by Mexican TCOs that have broadened the span of distribution bases throughout the U.S. and brought new levels of sophistication in moving bulk cash and weapons out of the U.S. to central and South America. Mexican immigrants are very much a recognized part of today‘s U.S. society and economy and their access and local knowledge of the U.S. system has been beneficial to Mexican drug cartels.

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The Sinaloa Cartel

The Sinaloa Cartel led by Joaquin ―El Chapo‖ Guzman, is one of the most powerful and violent drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. Guzman is reportedly obsessed with establishing himself as the most dominant drug lord in Mexico. While the Sinaloa organization has a broad presence throughout Mexico, it is particularly dominant on the western coast of Mexico, from Hermosillo to Acapulco.

The Sinaloa Cartel is said to smuggle drugs along the United States border from Imperial County, California, across Arizona and New Mexico, and into parts of Texas.

Because the organization‘s territory overlaps with that of many other drug trafficking organizations, the opportunities for violent conflict are rampant.

An extremely violent battle for control of the Juarez trafficking routes has been waged 81

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between the Sinaloa and Juarez Cartels since 2008. Sinaloa also has a growing presence outside of Mexico. The organization is present in most of the Central American countries, as well as Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Sinaloa‘s expansion into Central America is thought to be a response to the increased government efforts and U.S. pressure within Mexico as increased interdiction activities along the Mexican coasts and U.S. borders have impacted their operations. The Sinaloa Cartel also operates in South America, with a presence in Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina.

The Beltran-Leyva

The Beltran-Leyva Organization also has also been severely weakened. If the Mexican government succeeds in arresting Hector Beltran, it could represent the first full dismantling of a drug trafficking organization. Formerly aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltran Leyva organization splintered into two separate factions following the death of its leader, Arturo Beltran Leyva, in December 2009. One faction retained the organization‘s alliance with Los Zetas, while the other operated more or less independently. Some evidence indicates that remnants of the Beltran Leyva Organization continue to collaborate with Los Zetas to traffic drugs into the U.S. through Texas. The Beltran Leyva Organization has been known for its extreme violence in recent years. For example, in December 2008, the bodies of seven decapitated soldiers and five other victims were found in southern Guerrero state of Mexico, a region in which the Beltran Leyva Organization had been battling for control.

The bodies were accompanied by a sign that warned: "For every one of mine that you kill, I will kill ten." A bag with their heads, some still gagged with tape, was found nearby. The Beltran Leyva Organization also reportedly maintains a presence in Colombia.

In December 2009, the Mexican Navy killed Arturo Beltran Leyva and six of his associates. Beltran Leyva was the leader of the Beltran Leyva Organization and one of Mexico‘s principal drug lords. In January 2010, Carlos Beltran Leyva, Arturo‘s brother, who also held leadership roles in the drug trafficking organization, was arrested in Mexico. On August 30, 2010, another leader in the Beltran Leyva organization, Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez was arrested by an elite squad of the Mexican Navy. According to 82

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Mexican authorities, Valdez is said to have trafficked a ton of cocaine each month and was responsible for "several dozen" murders. He was known to be extremely brutal, often videotaping beheadings and torture. It is expected that he will be extradited to the United States for trial. The strength of the Beltran Leyva Organization following recent arrests and deaths is unclear.

Herrera Organization The Herrera Organization has long standing ties with Chicago‘s underworld. They have been the kingpins of heroin distribution in Chicago and the Midwest for many generations. Historically the Herrera Organization had been an independent entity.

They are now partnered with the Sinaloa Cartel.

Street Gangs in Chicago

Image complements, dailycaller.com (http://dailycaller.com/2010/07/15/chicago-street-gangsincreasing-presence-in-suburbs/)

Latin Kings The Latin Kings street gang was formed in Chicago in the 1940s and consisted predominantly of Mexican and Puerto Rican males. Originally created with the philosophy of overcoming racial prejudice and creating an organization of "Kings," the

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Latin Kings evolved into a criminal enterprise operating throughout the United States under two umbrella factions--Motherland, also known as KMC (King Motherland Chicago), and Bloodline (New York). All members of the gang refer to themselves as Latin Kings and, currently, individuals of any nationality are allowed to become members. Latin Kings associating with the Motherland faction also identify themselves as "Almighty Latin King Nation (ALKN)," and make up more than 160 structured chapters operating in 158 cities in 31 states.

The membership of Latin Kings following KMC is estimated to be 20,000 to 35,000. The Bloodline was founded by Luis Felipe - in the New York State -correctional system in 1986. Latin Kings associating with Bloodline also identify themselves as the "Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (ALKQN)." Membership is estimated to be 2,200 to 7,500, divided among several dozen chapters operating in 15 cities in 5 states. Bloodline Latin Kings share a common culture and structure with KMC and respect them as the Motherland, but all chapters do not report to the Chicago leadership hierarchy. The gang's primary source of income is the street-level distribution of powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Latin Kings continue to portray themselves as a community organization while engaging in a wide variety of criminal activities, including assault, burglary, homicide, identity theft, and money laundering. Kings have maintained alliances with Sinaloa, Beltran-Leyva, and Herrera Organization 18.

Black Gangster Disciples The Gangster Disciples, originally Black Gangster Disciple Nation, is a street gang formed on the South-side of Chicago in the late 1960s by David Barksdale, leader of the Gonzanto Disciples, and Larry Hoover, leader of the Supreme Disciples. The two groups, both members of the Folk Nation alliance, united to form the Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN). They are by far the largest group that makes up the Folk Nation coalition of street gangs, which includes the Black Disciples, Maniac Latin Disciples, Spanish Cobras, Satan Disciples and a number of smaller gangs. They also have a heavy presence in Southern cities such as Memphis, Atlanta, and Houston.

BGDN criminal activity includes drug trafficking, robbery, extortion and murder. Like the Latin Kings, the gang's primary source of income is the street-level distribution of powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, and they have developed ties with the Sinaloa drug cartel.

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Vice Lords The Almighty Vice Lord Nation is the second largest and one of the oldest street gangs in Chicago. Their total membership is estimated to be as many as 30,000. They are also one of the founding members of the People Nation multi-gang alliance. In 1958, the Vice Lords "club" was founded by several African-American youths originally from the North Lawndale neighborhood of Chicago. These youths met while incarcerated in the Correctional Facility. At the time, founding member Edward ―Pepalo‖ Perry led them.

The name is taken from the dictionary definition of "vice", meaning, "to have a tight hold".

As the original Vice Lords group was released from incarceration, they quickly began to recruit other African American youths from their neighborhood and began engaging in conflicts with other "clubs" from various Chicago neighborhoods. By 1964, they had grown significantly and law enforcement officials named them as a primary target for their various illegal activities, including the current street-level distribution of powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. They also have developed ties with the Sinaloa drug cartel and are strong allies with Latin Kings.

One of the most significant accomplishments of gang discipline in Chicago and Los Angeles came through the proactive efforts of one of Chicago‘s Police Officers. A former gang member himself, he jokingly claims that he saw the light of change after being shot twice and learned a few life-changing lessons during his recovery.

What both Chicago and Los Angeles accomplished were agreed rules of leadership and management that enabled the following:

All splintered and nonaligned gangs would have to align themselves to one of the more powerful gangs for command and control purposes.

Gangs were then asked to police their own neighborhoods, control violence in their areas and operate in a disciplined and structured manner.

All major incidents from gang members would be dealt directly with the Head of the organization in the first instance and the Police would address inaction in a deliberately forceful manner in the concerned area. Maintaining uninterrupted 85

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business served as an incentive for prompt action, when public safety concerns arose.

The groups were then informed that their illegal activity remained illegal and concerning and that the law applied to them in every way.

One can purchase a kilo of cocaine in Colombia for $800.00; in Panama the same kilo would cost you $1700.00. As a kilo of cocaine moves further north – through Central America and into North America – the price escalates and in the U.S. the current wholesale price per kilo is $25,000.00 USD. That same kilo has a street value of between $120,000.00 - $170,000.00 depending on the quality received by the end-user (See chart below) Whereas exact prices may vary depending on the quantity purchased, what remain constant are the violence, corruption and deaths that each kilo of cocaine generates throughout the process of production, distribution and consumption. There is no exact measure to quantify the true impact of drug trafficking, associated violence and corruption that launders the bulk cash proceeds from the trade.

Just as Mexican and Colombian drug cartels have active operational cells in Latin America, so too street Hispanic level gangs in the U.S. have coordinated cells operating in North and Central America. The deportation of gang members arrested in the U.S. – to Mexico and Central American countries – has further reinforced these connections and ties between Latin America criminal organizations.

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Wholesale Price of Cocaine (per kilo) 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Colombia

Panama

Triangulo Norte

Mexico

Street Value of Cocaine (per kilo)

120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 Colombia Panama Triangulo Mexico Norte

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Panama - Case Study

FARC and Smuggling In the last decades Panama has been one of the important connections for shipping narcotics to the U.S. and other countries. The International Narcotics Control Strategy has reported that traffickers have managed to smuggle narcotics through the country's uncontrolled transportation system, such as airfields, coastlines, and containerized seaports and highways. The FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has also contributed the drug increase in the country. Many of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) soldiers who seek shelter and refugee from Colombian Armed Forces, cross the border between Darien and Colombia. Since the presence of the FARC

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in Panama, drug trafficking has been increasing in large numbers. Waterways are being watched carefully by the Panamanian Naval Forces, but the FARC has adapted their ways of smuggling narcotics through the land across Panama. This unchecked flow of narcotics trafficking and the resulting devastation has imposed an unprecedented breach of security and stability for the entire Central American region.

Human Trafficking Panama is a source, transit, and destination country also for trafficking of persons. It‘s location between North and South America provides an intermediary point for smuggled immigrants. Panama is considered a transit point for victims en route to the U.S. The Chinese Mafia considers Panama a safe route for trafficking to the United States, according to a 2007 article by Panama American. Women are trafficked from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and other Central American countries to Panama.

Instances of trafficking women from Panama to Jamaica have been reported. Trafficking activity throughout Central America is aided by the free transit agreement between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, accompanied by a lack of security on the borders. A lack of technology and tools to investigate certain sexual crimes contributes to the continuity of child trafficking and sexual exploitation, according to a 2009 article in the Panama Star.

Forms of Trafficking Women from surrounding countries travel voluntarily to Panama in search of jobs and are forced into prostitution after their handlers confiscate their passports, leaving them with no other option for work. A sexual crime prosecutor in Panama has stated that the most common crimes reported are child pornography, child prostitution, and child slavery. Children are trafficked internally from rural to urban areas for labor purposes.

Underage children from Columbia and the Dominican Republic are reportedly employed in massage parlors within the country.

Prostitution There is a well-established network of corruption in Panama designed specifically to extort money from the Colombian prostitutes who regularly and routinely have sexual encounters with tourists for money. This activity is reportedly coordinated through the Panamanian National Immigration Service. It is done in such a way - using lawyers as cutouts that actually receive the bribes - that everyone involved can maintain a level of 89

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"plausible deniability." The people who are involved are immigration officials, lawyers, and Police Officers on the street. The immigration officials and Police rarely target or hassle the foreign tourists because the entire point of this operation is to extort money from the girls. The girls do the work and the system extorts the money from the girls.

Calculated Extortion Colombian prostitutes are in Panama legally and normally go to the same establishments to seek business. Therefore, Immigration Officials and the Police simply carry out periodic "raids" and arrest everyone, legal or not. These women are arrested and are kept in custody until they pay a fee of $1,000 dollars to be released. The money is paid in cash to "specialized Immigration Lawyers" that live off of this type of business. They tell the girls that they have "contacts" within immigration that will get them released. Once they pay the money they are immediately released with no paperwork, no change to their status, and no additional stamps in their passport and obviously no receipts of any kind. It's a huge business and everyone gets paid. Every raid normally nets about 40 girls that pay $1,000.00 each to be released and these extortion artists‘ share of the illicit earnings among themselves.

Conclusion Therefore, in effect, corrupt Panamanian government officials are indirectly involved in organized crime, and their system allows them to profit from prostitution and other illegal activities. Everyone in the government knows about it and they have actively decided not to shut it down - precisely because everyone gets a cut. The Panamanian National Immigration Service is one of the best ―producers" of under the table illicit cash in the government. It all comes from foreign prostitutes who are in no position to complain. Quite simply, they are being exploited through official channels.

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Guatemala - Case Study

The 1996 Peace Accords in Guatemala marked the end of a prolonged thirty-six year civil war that deeply polarized the country, dismantled the Security Forces and brought to life an over-empowered National Police (PNC). After a long series of military-led governments, failed coup d‘états and a growing semblance of democratic rule, Guatemala finds itself drowning in corruption, crime and violence as its internal weaknesses are being exploited by TCOs and LCOs that are having a feeding frenzy over the vulnerability of weak institutions, compromised political leaders and poor economic circumstances.

After centuries of prominence during the Mayan Dynasty, Guatemala is facing the measure of a ―Failed State‖ status as donor countries, international institutions and concerned citizens piece together loose legislations, sporadic funding and agenda laden ideas that inspire little hope, renewed fears and intangible results. Guatemalans recognize the problems that are affecting their country, are aware of the personalities and groups that benefit from and sustain their security dilemmas and are afraid to confront this reality for fear of returning to an internal armed conflict that further destroys the economy and divide the country.

Divided by ethnicity, culture, race, creed, language, aspirations and economic circumstances, Guatemala – like most other failing states globally – requires a unifying 91

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leader that does not represent any particular segment or sector of the nation, one that speaks on behalf of all the people, openly embraces the differences of this complex society and use the diversity of the people to harness creativity and opportunity for all.

Only then can political-will translate meaning on the ground that encourages Guatemalans to work together for the country‘s future.

In retrospect, the dismantling of the Security Forces created free land passages through the country to Mexico, exposed the border to free transit routes for drugs and contraband and inadequate accountability systems for weapons and munitions belonging to the Security Forces, enabled and facilitated the creation of parallel security structures, clandestine groups. Hidden powers emerged that today fund and support political powers, which in turn maintain a corrupt bureaucratic system that facilitates and nurtures impunity and corruption. The statistics and messages below tell a story all by themselves, as Guatemala‘s post-civil war dilemma continues.

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CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

The trend toward the merging of terrorist and criminal groups to mutually exploit new markets is unlikely to diminish. Both will continue to need the same facilitators, and both can leverage the relationship with the other to mutual benefit. This gives these groups an asymmetrical advantage over state actors, which are inherently more bureaucratic and less adaptable than non-state actors.

Europe and the United States will face a growing threat from the region, particularly from radical Islamist groups—those affiliated with al Qaeda and those, such as Hezbollah, allied with Iran. Yet given the current budget constraints and economic situation, it is highly unlikely that additional resources from either continent will be allocated to the threat.

There are few options for putting the genie back in the bottle. Transnational criminal organizations and terrorist networks have proven themselves resilient and highly adaptable, while governments remain far less so. Governments have also consistently underestimated the capacity of these disparate and non-hierarchical organizations.

Human intelligence, perhaps the most difficult type to acquire, is vital to understanding the threat, how the different groups work together, and what their vulnerabilities are. A major vulnerability is the dependence of the Latin American drug traffickers on local African networks. To make the necessary alliances, cartel operatives are forced to function in unfamiliar terrain and in languages and cultures they do not know or understand. This creates significant opportunities for penetration of the operations, as the Liberian case shows.

Another element that is essential is the creation of functioning institutions in the most affected states that can both investigate and judicially prosecute transnational criminal organizations. The most efficient way to do this is through the creation of vetted police and military units and judicial corps that are specially trained and who can be protected from reprisals.

The almost universal mantra of judicial and police reform is valid, but it can only be realistically done in small groups that can then be expanded as time and resources permit. Most efforts are diluted to the point of uselessness by attempting to do 96

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everything at once. The Colombian experience in fighting drug trafficking organizations and the FARC is illustrative of this. After years of futility, the police, military, and judiciary were able to form small vetted units that have grown over time and, just as importantly, were able to work together.

Vetted units that are able to collect intelligence and operate in a relatively controlled environment, which can be monitored for corruption, are also vital and far more achievable than macro- level police reform. These are small steps, but ones that have a chance of actually working in a sustainable way. They do not require the tens of millions of dollars and large-scale human resource commitments that broader efforts do. In addition, they can be easily expanded as resources permit.

However, human intelligence and institution building, operating in a vacuum, will have limited impact unless there is the will and ability to match the transnationalization of enforcement to the trans-nationalization of crime and terror. These groups thrive in the seams of the global system, while the global response has been a state-centric approach that matches the 20th century, not this one.

Without this type of human intelligence able to operate in relative safety through vetted units, the criminal and terrorist pipelines will continue not only to grow but also to develop the capacity to recombine more quickly and in ever more dangerous ways 19.

The link between organized Crime and Politics

Since the 1990s there have been reason to believe that the drug-politics link has grown deeper in the region - particularly in Mexico and a little less so in Central America with the exception of Panama. The funding of parties and candidates is just one of the fronts where the battle between organized crime and democratic institutions is played out.

Drugs and Politics have a long history in the region but several new political factors ironically have made Central American (and indeed Latin American politics) more vulnerable to organized crime.

Competitive Elections: Competitive elections are a victory for a region that knew only decades of civil war but it may have its downsides. In most Central American countries,

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elections are more competitive. While competitive elections and viable opposition parties probably help to improve the levels of political transparency, they also tend to raise the cost of politics. (The current president of Panama, Ricardo Martinelli, a wealthy businessman, spent $19 million in his campaign, a remarkable figure in a country with barely 2 million registered voters.) Competitive elections, in other words, offer terrific opportunities for crime syndicates hoping to make political investments.

Campaign Finance: While Central American countries have made significant strides toward regulating campaign finance, the enforcement of these rules continues to be extremely weak. With the exception of El Salvador, every country has either banned certain kinds of political funding or introduced contribution limits. In Central American countries, despite numerous blatant violations of political finance laws, not a single criminal or electoral sanction has ever been meted out to anyone. Mexico stands out as the only regional example in which a powerful electoral authority has made a genuine effort to enforce campaign finance laws, in some cases with extraordinary severity.

The weakness of Political Parties and Party Systems throughout the region also has troubling financial implications. Candidates are heavily dependent on their ability to attract private contributors. The weak party systems make them particularly prone to the emergence of political outsiders who are supported by little more than a wellfunded electoral machine.

The capture of parties and elected officials by moneyed interests is bad news for democracy. At a minimum, it compromises the premise of political equality that supports the whole edifice of democracy, reflected in the principle of ―one person, one vote,‖ and stunts the ability of parties and leaders to channel broader social demands.

Such loss of political autonomy is serious if it occurs vis-à-vis legitimate interests, business or otherwise. It is, however, devastating when it involves organized crime.

Unlike interactions between private donors and politicians, where quid-pro-quos are seldom articulated explicitly and elected politicians always retain the possibility of not fulfilling the donor‘s expectations, the normal codes of etiquette and uncertainty in the case of drug traffickers do not apply. In the classic formulation that became Pablo Escobar‘s trademark, ―plata o plomo‖ (buck or bullet) are often the only choices public officials face.

In addition, there is a crucial difference between organized crime and any other interest group. Legitimate interests that contribute to campaigns seek to shape the law in their

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favor. Organized crime seeks to prevent the law from being enforced altogether - and strikes at the heart of the viability of the state. In the worst cases of political penetration by organized crime, (Mexico is the prime visible example today) the distinction between institutions and crime—between inside and outside the law - dissolves as the state and its authorities become effective abettors of criminal activities, and may even depend on such activities to function 20.

A Reality Check

Trafficking of small and heavy arms, bulk cash money laundering, human trafficking, rampant corruption, lack of confidence in the institutions of state security, the widespread and dangerous privatization of security and the rise of non-aligned clandestine groups are also concerning items in the new menu of security challenges in the region. A Guatemalan case study brought to reality the chart above, which shows the vicious cycle of collusion that Hidden, Bureaucratic and Political Powers have spun into a web of parallel initiatives that have crippled the economic, socio-political and security environment of the country, while promoting impunity.

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To meet these challenges, the cooperative relationships between governments necessary to deal with transnational crime are not progressing appropriately. Central American security and justice institutions each work independently, suffer from issues of corruption and are not trusted by large segments of the population. Often there is no coordination between the different police organizations and little teamwork between public prosecutors, judges, governors, mayors and other agents of the state. Many jails and adolescent detention facilities are obsolete, overcrowded and fail in their function to punish, rehabilitate and reinsert lawbreakers into society. Instead they have become loosely governed institutions that often play the role of ―universities‖ to train professionals who continue crime upon their release from prison and advance the agendas of TCOs and LCOs. Inserting additional resources without cleansing the institutions, demanding transparency and strengthening Public Controller and Citizen Oversight will only prove fruitless.

The region cannot put the genie back in the bottle unless they trust sufficiently to work collectively.

TCOs and LCOs have proven themselves resilient and highly adaptable, while governments remain far less so. Governments have also consistently underestimated the capacity of these disparate organizations. Human intelligence and institutionbuilding (two of the universal tactics for correcting the problem) if operating in a vacuum, will have limited impact unless there is the will and ability to match the trans-nationalization of enforcement to the trans-nationalization of crime. These groups thrive in the seams of the global system, while the global response has been a state-centric approach that matches the 20th century and not the 21st.

Central American gangs are also spreading across Canada and the U.S.A. In essence, the threat is much greater than just Mexico and Central America as TCOs extend their regional and global reach. Interestingly gang leadership originates in U.S. prisons and transmits instructions through street-level operatives in North American countries to the various cells operating throughout Central America.

Understanding the true dynamics of what‘s taking place in prisons would advance the cause of control, management and interdiction of organized crime.

When TCOs and LCOs become de facto administrations, it is more than a just a national security problem, as it reflects a much deeper wound within the society itself. As these become more and more involved in politics, economics, and social

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and civic organizations, TCOs, LCOs and their allies become social actors that win the confidence of the people. While it appears that monetary gain remains the primary motivation of these various groups, they are in fact challenging governments for virtual control of the loyalty and respect of the masses.

In addition to violence, corruption plays an integral role in undermining state institutions. The financing of political parties and/or candidates by drug money and organized crime is a direct threat to the survival of democracy in the region.

Criminals have long used the formula of plata o plomo) to corrupt government officials. Third-generation gangs have become masters of this strategy. What the TCOs and LCOs are doing, in essence, is seeking to intimidate the state and the citizenry into submission and win a free hand in pursuing lucrative illicit business dealings. Criminal organizations are therefore able to clobber the state from without and weaken it from within.

The ultimate threat of a destabilizing security environment is not instability or even criminal violence. Instead, it is either state failure or the forced imposition of a radical socioeconomic-political restructuring of the state and its governance. The challenges come in many destabilizing forms and in a matrix of different kinds of challenges, varying in scope and scale.

Most political leaders in the region are still thinking about the phenomenon in traditional terms of criminal activity, and have not yet caught up with reality. They 101

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do not appreciate the extent and nature of the threat to political order and responsible democratic governance being raised by the slow-moving clash of two types of values. One set of values serves criminal greed. The other seeks the general wellbeing. The chart below illustrates the availability and distribution of money that remains the main incentive for corruption and violence in Central America.

Mechanisms of integration, within the Central American sub-region have not responded adequately to the worsening problems - particularly the organized crime in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and the authoritarianism in Nicaragua.

The U.S.-backed MĂŠrida Initiative - started under the George W. Bush administration and extended under President Barack Obama - has essentially sought to assist Mexico, through the provision of various kinds of equipment and training, in its enormously difficult fight against drug-fueled violence and organized crime.

Within that package of some $1.6 billion over three years, however, relatively few resources have been directed further south, to Central America, despite the problems aggravated by drug trafficking and the war on drugs. With no hope in sight for reduced demand for drugs – from major consumption countries – the security crisis in Central America would persist in the short-term.

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The Way Forward

The problem of violence and criminal activities in Central America has produced a plethora of detailed studies by academics, sociologists, criminologists, security firms and agencies; however, the situation – that affects the region – is so broad and dynamic that there is no holistic documented approach that addresses the situation and solutions as a collective. Therefore, whereas analyses from various forums are excellent and recommendations are many, actual solutions and plans of action remain scarce.

Aid from the U.S. and elsewhere has attempted to deal with the situation, but those efforts have largely been piecemeal. A regional effort to tackle this problem in an organized fashion is mandatory, but the challenges include a lack of trust and understanding between countries, a lack of trust and understanding between countries, a lack of political will and resources and weak institutions.

Noteworthy is the seeming inability or reluctance of the regions‘ leaders to address the systemic problems of a skewed distribution of wealth, insufficient fiscal income, corruption, and unrelenting violence. Security, funding of political parties, justice, greater economic equality, regional cooperation, inclusive dialogue, citizen participation, and the preservation of democracy have all been identified as the leading challenges to the consolidation of democracy in the region and to the neutralizing of criminality.

Some leaders have voiced concern that a Central America initiative will merely replicate hard line, military-led efforts in Colombia and Mexico. Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom has sought to reassure Guatemalans that any plan will place an emphasis on ―co-responsibility,‖ and will include measures to reduce consumption, arms sales, money laundering, and the sale of chemicals used in drug production.

One thing is clear: In no country in the region is it simply a domestic issue. At a minimum, effectively addressing the problem of transnational crime and its impact on the security of the region requires a multi-track, balanced and integrated strategy and one that is regional in scope but with strong bi-lateral components. Otherwise, success in one jurisdiction simply transfers the problem to neighboring areas as the agents of cartels and organized crime move freely between countries by legal or illegal means.

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The level of the threat has to be raised to the level of a threat to national, regional and international security. As Hugo Acero Velรกzquez 21 sees it, the solution involves three areas of concentration: struggle against the cartels and mafias; combating the municipal chain that feeds the large mafias; and working toward peaceful co-existence and security for the population 22.

Struggle against the Large Mafias First, there must be a joint strategy to combat the other criminal organizations that are intimately linked to drug trafficking, such as those involved in illegal arms dealings.

This is a topic where the U.S. can play a fundamental role, since they produce and sell weapons in their territory that often end up supplying criminal groups in Latin American countries, sometimes providing sophisticated weapons that not even the police and other justice organizations in those countries possess.

Second, the discussion must also include the problem of drug consumption, given that it continues to increase in the region and that, as well as representing a public health problem, also seriously affects citizen security. On that point, the countries of the Americas will have to discuss, earlier rather than later, the 2009 proposals of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy: decriminalize the possession and consumption of marijuana, treat drug consumption as a public health issue, focus strategies of repression against organized crime, and reduce consumption through innovative information and prevention campaigns.

Combating the Municipal Chain that Feeds the Large Mafias The strategy against drug trafficking and production must go beyond the pursuit of the bosses and target the middle levels of command, as yet still unknown, and groups of youths and children in working-class sectors who today are becoming involved or are at risk of becoming involved in and used by organized crime. In this regard, a threepronged strategy must be designed. The first element involves strengthening intelligence operations and criminal investigation in the different countries, where police, public prosecutors and judges work together as a team focused on the identification, pursuit and detention of the middle levels of command in the criminal

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organizations so that the process of replacing the management of these groups once the leaders fall is difficult, or so that such groups are truly dismantled. The second thrust is aimed at facilitating the exit and social re-insertion of members of criminal groups who wish to do so and are willing to assist the authorities.

Peaceful Co-existence and Security for the Population Citizens from the majority of countries in the Americas have seen the problems associated with organized crime grow, and today daily violence seriously affects the quality of life and wellbeing of the residents of urban centers. Given this situation, national governments must prepare integrated plans of peaceful co-existence and security for their citizens aimed at reducing risks (weapons, drugs, alcohol); giving attention to vulnerable groups (youth at risk, persons displaced by violence, immigrants, the poor, etc.); prevention and attention to gender violence; peaceful resolution of conflicts (interpersonal, family and community); the rehabilitation of deteriorated urban areas; strengthening of security, justice, intelligence; and criminal investigation institutions and detention centers. National, integrated plans must be carried out in municipalities, departments and states with the participation of mayors, prefects, and governors, and be adapted to the particular contexts at hand.

To make progress along these lines, it is important to delve deeper into these matters and increase the actions that some multilateral and co-operation agencies have started to carry out in certain Latin American countries. In addition to these actions, it is necessary for co-operation agencies and multilateral banks to aim their efforts at financing the strengthening of security and justice agency resources in terms of the professionalization of human resources, facilities (police, justice, jails and detention centers), communications (central communication hubs and personal communication devices) and mobility (maritime, surface and air).

In this way, the integrated policies proposed for development in the Americas will include programs and projects for the prevention, control and punishment of crimes, financed and adapted to both old problems of common crimes and the new problems imposed on governments by the emergence of organized, transnational crime that intends to persist and reap the benefits.

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With the bulk of the cash from cocaine sales residing in the U.S., due to high demand and uninterrupted supply, money laundering and corruption in the Americas has many tentacles that go way beyond the global network and influence of TCOs and LCOs that media outlets give featured reporting. This study has looked at many perspectives – on the subject – and arrived at startling conclusions that require more indebt research and analysis. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the problem is as big as the real actors behind the scene that enable and facilitate the trafficking of illicit drugs and other contraband and profit handsomely at the expense of many.

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Endnotes 1. ―From the new Middle Ages to a new Dark Ages: the decline of the State and U.S. strategy‖ – Phil Williams.

2. CIA World Factbook, Guatemala.

3. Excerpts taken from the Report: War on Drugs; June 20.

4. Vulliamy, Ed. ―How a big U.S. bank laundered billions from Mexico‘s murderous drug gangs‖. Guardian.co.uk. The Observer. 3 April 2011. 5 August 2011.

5. The following points are extracts from the Woodrow Wilson International Center.

6. Sergio Pinheiro 7. DOD/JOC 8. John P. Sullivan 9. USAID Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment: Guatemala Profile 10. Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge, World Bank/LAC 2011.

11. Manwaring, 2007.

12. (http://www.gangwatchers.org/gang-names.html.) (www.xv3gang.com) 13. José Miguel Cruz/ in Bruneau / Dammert / Skinner pre-publication December 2011.

14. Central American and Caribbean Commission of Police Chiefs. There is controversy on the contribution of Central American gangs to violent crimes and on the relative success of anti-gang policies.

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15. Several of these surveys are carried out on a regular basis by prestigious organizations such as the Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (Guatemalan Institute for Comparative Studies in Penal Sciences), Vanderbilt University, the Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (Association for Research and Social Studies), and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

16. Lara, 2006.

17. Ranum, IUDOP3.

18. Arrest and Conviction of Alleged Leader of the Chicago-based Latin Kings Street Gang: http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13315640 19. Extract from Douglas Farah‘s Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: PRISM, VOL. 2, NO. 3 – 06/2011.

20. The foregoing discussion on the links between organized crime and politics draws heavily on the work of Kevin Casas-Zamora, ―Dirty Money: (http://www.americasquarterly.org/casas-zamora).

21. A sociologist at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

22. Hugo Acero Velázquez, ―Citizen Security, a challenge for the Americas,‖ http://www.focal.ca/images/stories/Acero_Citizen_security_a_challenge_for_t he_Americas_June_2011_e.pdf 23. ―Top Banks in the World by Bankersalmanac.com‖. Bankersalmanac.com. 12 July 2011. Web. 5 August 2011.

24. Krauss, Clifford. ―Exxon‘s Profit Rises in Quarter, Helped by Higher Oil Prices‖.

Business Day. The New York Times. 28 July 2011. 12 August 2011.

25. ―Bernard L. Madoff: Overview‖. New York Times. 27 April 2011. 12 August 2011. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/bernard_l_m adoff/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Bernard%20Madoff&st=Search 26. "Monsanto Annual Report 2010 shows decrease in profits: Annual income and earnings.‖ Financeinvestments.com. 30 July 2011. 14 August 2011.

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27. CitiGroup Inc quote. CNNMoney. 14 August 2011. 14 August 2011. http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=C 28. Boeing Co. quote. CNNMoney. 14 August 2011. http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=BA

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2011.

Background Papers and References 1. Crime and Violence in Central America – A Development Challenge – World Bank/LAC 2011.

2. PRISM – Vol. 2, No 3 – 06/2011 – Center for Complex Operations.

3. UNODC world Drug Report 2010.

4. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy – June 2011.

5. Report of the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control – U.S. and Mexican Responses to Drug Trafficking Organizations – May 2011 6. Looking the Monster in the Face – Julia Schunemann – FRIDE – October 2010.

7. CARICOM Report 2007 – One Team, One Space, One Caribbean.

8. USAID – Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment – April 2006.

9. CIEN – Policia Nacional Civil de Guatemala – 2011

Bibliography Acero Velásquez, Hugo.

Citizen security, a challenge for the Americas. Ottawa: FOCAL Policy Brief June 2011. http://www.focal.ca/images/stories/Acero_Citizen_security_a_challenge_for_the_A mericas_June_2011_e.pdf Americas Society and Council of the Americas. ―Trafficking and Transnational Crime: The Greatest Threat to Democracy Today.‖ Americas Quarterly. Spring 2010. http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1476 109

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Andersen, Martin Edwin. ―A Road Map for Beating Latin America‘s Transnational Criminal Organizations‖ Washington, D.C: National Defense University. Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) Issue 62, 2nd Quarter, July 2011: 81-88. http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada546704.pdf Rojas Aravena, Francisco. ―Democracia, seguridad y crimen organizado.‖ Documento de Referencia. Democracia para la Paz, la Seguridad y el Desarrollo. Mesa 3: Diálogo Subregional de los Miembros del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana y México. San José, Costa Rica – 11 al 13 de mayo de 2011. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/3832-1442-4-30.pdf Bruneau, Thomas, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, eds.

Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011 (Forthcoming December) Bryan, Anthony T. ―Ganging up on Central America: Corporate Business as Usual?‖ Bizjournalonline, June 2011: http://bizjournalonline.com/?p=2095 Casas-Zamora, Kevin. ―The Security Summit in Central America: On the Modest Meaning of Shared Responsibility.‖ BROOKINGS. June 30, 2011. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0630_central_america_casaszamora.aspx? p=1 Casas-Zamora, Kevin. ―Dirty Money: How to break the link between organized crime and politics.‖ Americas Quarterly. Spring2010. http://www.americasquarterly.org/casas-zamora Casillas, R. Rodolfo.

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Farah, Douglas. ―Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliances.‖ PRISM 2, no. 3. June 2011. http://www.ndu.edu/press/prism2-3.html Farnsworth, Eric. ―A Plan of Action for Guatemala.‖ Poder 360. May 18, 2011. http://coa.counciloftheamericas.org/article.php?id=3338 Georgetown University Law Center Human Rights Institute.

Between the Border and the Street: A Comparative Look at Gang Reduction Policies and Migration in the United States and Guatemala. Washington, D.C: Georgetown Law, 2007. http://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/OCOIM/pdf/Kleiman-SurgicalStrikesDrugWarsFA.pdf Graham, Dave. ―Mexican teenage girls train as drug cartel killers.‖ Reuters, Jun 17 2011. http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE75G5F820110617 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Democracy, Conflict and Human Security Policy Summary: Key Findings and Recommendations. Stockholm, Sweden: 2006. http://www.idea.int/publications/dchs/upload/Inlaga.pdf Kleinman, Mark.

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Ordaz, Pablo. ―Entrevista: Alvaro Colom, Presidente de Guatemala : Los narcos nos están invadiendo.‖ El Pais, 24 May, 2011. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/narcos/nos/estan/invadiendo/elpep iint/20110524elpepiint_7/Tes Ribando Seelke, Clare. ―Anti-Gang Efforts in Central America: Moving Beyond Mano Dura?‖ Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force Report (September – November 2007) Miami: Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of Miami, April 10, 2007. https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/SeelkeTaskForcePaper.pdf Ribando Seelke, Clare.

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Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. RL33200, December 9, 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33200.pdf Schünemann, Julia ―Looking the Monster in the Face‖: The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala and the ‗Rule of Law-builders Contract.‘ Madrid: FRIDE. IFP Security Cluster Country case study: Guatemala. October 2010. http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/GuatemalaOct.pdf Shifter, Michael. ―Central America‘s Security Predicament.‖ Current History. Vol. 110, Issue 733.

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Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge. 2011. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLI SH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf Myers, Jody. ―Blow, Bling and Bucks: IMF work against money laundering and terrorist financing‖. iMFdirect. IMF. 27 June 2011. 5 August 2011.

Brands, Hal. "Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America: Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces." Policy paper prepared for US SOUTHCOM. Miami: Florida International University, Applied Research Center, The Western Hemispheric Security Analysis Center. September 2010 Manwaring, Max G. ―Sovereignty Under Siege: Gangs and other Criminal Organizations in Central America and Mexico.‖ Air & Space Power Journal. 1 July 2008 Savenije, Wim and Chris van der Borgh. ―Gang violence in Central America: Comparing anti-gang approaches and policies.‖ The Broker. Issue: 13 March 2009

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