FROM NATURE" ARGUMENTS

Emblematic of much Aristotelian thought, “from nature” arguments, which aim to justify dominant social ideologies by appealing to nature, the natural, or human nature, also appeal to order. Before examining how “from nature” arguments vindicate certain social values, then, we must establish the connection between nature, order, and the environment.

Until the 17 th century, Aristotle’s Physics was the intellectual basis of scientifc belief for educated classes. His project was to discover the nature of motion and change, so he identifed and described the natural. “Of things, some exist by nature, others through other causes,” Aristotle writes in the Physics, adding that “animals and their parts exist by nature, and so do plants and the simple bodies, for example, earth,

fre, air, and water.” Here, Aristotle distinguishes between “things” that are natural and “things” that are not. He distinguishes these “things” by motion: “All things existing by nature appear to have in themselves a principle of motion and of standstill whether with respect to place or increase or decrease or alteration.” Te principle of motion is either inherent in a thing, in which case the thing is natural, or it arises as a result of the thing’s natural components. Beds or shoes, for instance, have no capacity for motion, but insofar as they happen “to be made of stone or earth or to be a composite of these,” they have “a tendency [toward motion] and only to that extent.” And, to Aristotle, motion, whether inherently natural or not, always tends towards order.

Aristotle’s principle––that motion is

integral to the natural and that natural motion always tends towards order––informs his physical and metaphysical understanding of the world. But this key principle also extends beyond his interpretation of the material world, informing other areas of his thought, including moral philosophy. In his Ethics, Aristotle claims that since natural order necessitates equality, it ought to be maintained. Inequality, which is unnatural, is unjust. For Aristotle, nature has moral authority. Te idea of nature as motion towards order is the necessary link between his metaphysical understanding of nature and his ethics.

Te “natural,” then, includes all things that have a capacity for motion that tends towards order. Deserts, tundra and rainforests—biomes that maintain themselves without outside infuence—are all natural. Joel Kaye, a Barnard College history professor, calls this ability of self-maintenance “systemic self-ordering.” Tat is to say, even biomes seem to have this capacity for motion in that their component parts (namely plants, animals, features of the natural environment like rivers and lakes, weather, and climate systems) change, or rearrange themselves of their own accord. Contrary to what some may believe, the weather is not being controlled; no autonomous will or entity causes rain. Rain, however, is essential for environments—tens of thousands of

DANIEL DRISCOLL plants and animals rely on rainwater to survive. Without it, the order of the environment is at stake. If not for the rain, or, more broadly, any necessary elements, the environment falls into disorder and chaos. Tis is what it means to say that a system is self-ordering: it provides the necessary elements with which to maintain itself. It is systemic because these elements are generally needed on a regular basis. Rainforests need rain every day, just as human bodies need food. Te systemic self-ordering characteristic of “the natural” may have roots in the observation of various biomes, but it is not only confned to the “natural” world. “From nature” arguments, which are used to justify values and ideological commitments, are also characterized by this systemic self-ordering.

Who is most likely to assert a “from nature” argument? From which social class, for instance, do they originate? I believe there is a proclivity for the dominant social classes to describe their contemporary social arrangements as systemic and necessary, as natural. Consider, for example, Appleby, Hunt and Jacob’s description of American historical writing before and after WWII in Telling the Truth About History. Before 1939, they explain, historical categories––gender, race, sexuality, and class––were all rooted in the dominant social tradition of their

moment, namely, white Protestantism. After WWII, with “increasing emphasis on the diversity of ethnic, racial, and gender experience,” these categories were called into question; in a way, they were de-naturalized. Due to critical analysis, their status lost authority.

“From nature” arguments generally justify the values and decisions of the powerful few. Little else explains the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a minority except the frame of an intelligent design, rational order, or a systemically self-ordering nature. 1 Tus, these types of “from nature” arguments are central to the construction of many ideologies of power and dominance. And nothing fuels contradictory logic quite like ideology. As Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob note, “It is one of the great strengths of ideologies that they defy logic and hence are able to weld incongruous, even conficting ideals.”

Mercantile economics, for its part, highlights this interplay between dominant social values and “from nature” arguments. Even in Ancient Greece, “the natural” was connected to commerce. Economies were considered to be systematically self-ordering. 2 However, Aristotle understood that greedy acquisition resulted in disorder: frst, by directing virtues and talents towards fnancial gain; second, by allowing unbridled desire to rule proft-seekers. Notice how the “from nature” argument works here: the system of exchange which forms the economy approaches disorder— thus, it is not systemically self-ordering—thus, it is not natural— thus, it is unethical. Later, in the 13 th century, Tomas Aquinas, a Domincan priest, took up the question of nature and the economy, agreeing with Aristotle that exchange and price regulation are determined by nature. In Summa Teologiae, he identifes indigentia, or human need, as the quality associated with a good that determines its price. Since indigentia is in some sense natural to the human, so too can exchange be ascribed to nature. But Aquinas perceived this economic order in contrast to the hierarchy established by

1. Tis sort of argument comes from a Marxist historical lens, which argues that the bourgeois will, in an unself-conscious way, seeks to normalize their ideal social arrangement as the ideal social arrangement for society at large. As Patrick Gardiner writes in Teories of History, “Te dominant ideals are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas, and thus of the relationships that make one class the ruling one; they are consequently the ideas of its dominance.” Tis occurs because the means of material and intellectual production often yield to the same monopoly. 2. Te bulk of Aristotle’s discussion of the ethical obligations of economic actors is found in Book I of his Politics. Here, he argues that it is ethical to trade in order to satisfy natural human needs. He describes barbarous nations that still exchange “the necessaries of life and nothing more” with one another, while arguing that “this sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men’s natural wants.”

an intelligent creator. If God’s order (the natural order) was maintained, “a mouse, which possesses sensitive life, would be priced higher than a pearl, which is inanimate.” Due to his theological commitments, Aquinas did not consider human need as self-ordering. In this sense, the sphere of economic activity does not merit its classifcation as natural nor is it ft to establish a just price for exchange.

Te use of the “from nature” argument drastically reordered 13 th century conceptions of mercantile economics. Referring to the theories of Peter of John Olivi, a Franciscan scholar writing in the same century as Aquinas, Joel Kaye explains that “Market price came to be seen as an aggregate product—the concrete (if ever-changing) numerical representation of a complex, supra-personal system.” Peter of John Olivi wanted to show that economic realities were as natural as celestial motion or physical arrangement. To this end, Olivi attributed price to common estimation, which, though not natural in and of itself, was nonetheless a composite of natural things: the composite of many individual human needs. Indigentia, now translated as a working aggregate of natural human wants, satisfed the requirements of nature laid out by both Aristotle and Aquinas. According to Peter of John Olivi, then, common estimation of price and value were natural. All that was required was an apologetic rationalization of contemporary economic realities and a new conception of the relationship between order and natural motion. But why call for such a rationalization? What accounted for this drastic shift—from unnatural to natural––in economic philosophy over the 13 th century?

Te Franciscan Order, founded by St. Francis of Assisi, with an extreme commitment to poverty, was in those decades becoming notably more elite. As the historian Neslihan Senocak notes, “illiterate or poorly educated brothers were increasingly alienated and ofcially not wanted.” Dominant classes were increasingly represented in the order. Could it be that Olivi, a Franciscan, projected the ideal social arrangement of the dominant class as necessary and universal, or synonymously, as natural? Tough this article traces the philosophy of “from nature” arguments, not Mendicant history, this example nevertheless demonstrates how these arguments were used to justify various social positions. Te winning arguments are those in support of the dominant social order: in this case, a burgeoning mercantile class.

Of course, “from nature” arguments fnd their way into economic decision-making in other ways, perhaps most notably in arguments about “human nature.” Tese egregious arguments assume that human beings have essential characteristics, whether physical, mental, intellectual or emotional, and are readily made with respect to ability, gender, race, sexual identity, and nationality. Consider, for example, the false dichotomy of gender, the supposed element of criminality present in the nature of some specifc minorities which results in their mass incarceration, allusions to natural rules of procreation or an essentialist understanding of sexual intercourse, or any other form of prolonged and sustained systemic injustice, oppression, marginalization, or erasure. Tese are some of the most obvious and pervasive instances of this kind of social dominance and of the elevation of certain values and orientations through the use of “from nature” arguments. As this erasure and marginalization is enacted, it normalizes attitudes of essentialism. “From nature” arguments at once establish and maintain a status quo. Indeed, even our understanding of the “natural” functioning of the human brain and the notion of reason has been colored by the dominance of the neuro-typical class of society. Be sure to recognize these sorts of arguments in your own life, and to address them as the instruments of power that they are. DANIEL DRISCOLL

WHO IS THOMAS STOCKMANN?