CANADA AND THE COLD WAR

Buying the CF-18 It would be long, hard slog to find a multi-role fighter to meet commitments from both Norad and NATO

In the early 1970s, the Canadian Air Force needed a new fighter jet. The CF-104s flying in Europe for NATO were becoming obsolete, and the CF-101s in Norad, despite their nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles, definitely were outdated. But the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau had many priorities more important than defence, and it would prove a long, hard slog to get new aircraft into service. Trudeau’s government had undertaken a major defence review when it took over in 1968, and the review froze the defence budget, cut Canada’s NATO commitments by 50 per cent, and the CF-104’s nuclear role came to an end. The CF-101’s nuclear role, however, did not. The reasons seem clear—the United States government, the USAF which was partnered with Canada in Norad, and the Canadian Air Force strongly objected to anything that would reduce the chances of destroying attacking Soviet bombers in the event of war.

Defence minister Donald Macdonald produced a White Paper on Defence in 1971 that did nothing to improve funding for the Canadian Forces, and it was not until 1975 that the situation began to change. The government by then was interested in strengthening trade ties with Europe, and the prime minister, after talks with friendly European leaders, realized that Canada was a laggard in NATO defence circles. As a result, major defence purchases began to move forward in the next few years.

For the air force, reorganized as Air

Command in 1975, the New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) project could now move ahead. Any new fighter had to be multi-role, able to fulfill commitments to both NATO and Norad. In other words, a new fighter had to be capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. It had to be purchased off the shelf, essentially ready to fly without the need for Canadianspecific upgrades. This requirement aimed to control costs which were set at $2.34 billion for from 130 to 150 aircraft and had to include everything from training to spares to import taxes. To keep matters moving through the government, the project office included officials from DND, Supply and Services, Industry, and Trade and Commerce. Oversight came from the Treasury Board and the Privy Council Office, among others.

To head the NFA Project Office, Air Command selected fast-rising Colonel Paul Manson. An intelligent RMC graduate in his early 40s, a fighter pilot, an organizer, Manson was the right choice, and he managed the selection process and issued the Request for Proposals in 1977. Aircraft manufacturers in the United States and Europe offered their wares, and the choice soon came down to two: the F-16 produced by General Dynamics and the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A.

Both aircraft were first-rate, and Barney Danson, the defence minister in the late 1970s, recollected that McDonnell Douglas worried that it was a stalking horse because of comments by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Robert Falls, that seemed to favour the F-16. To keep them in the competition, Donald Macdonald, by then out of politics and on their board, was used, but he couldn’t tell them that many in DND favoured the F-18. The best plane was another McDonnell Douglas fighter, the F-15, but it was simply too expensive, Danson said.

Everything now came down to negotiating with the manufacturers. According to Manson, “By dealing directly with the two short-list manufacturers, the Canadian government was able to negotiate fully executable contracts for both the F-16 and F-18 in an intensely competitive environment, which ultimately paid dividends in the final evaluation in terms of the number of aircraft purchased and in the negotiation of favourable industrial regional benefits to Canada.”

In April 1980, the choice was made: the F-18. As Danson said later, “The F-18, soon to be used by U.S. Marine Corps and THE F-18, A RELATIVELY LARGE LIGHTWEIGHT FIGHTER, HAD BEEN on U.S. carriers, was DESIGNED TO LEAVE durable and would ROOM FOR UPDATES last longer which was why Canada wanted it. The two engines also TO KEEP UP WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS mattered, although AND TO MEET there were studies NEW CHALLENGES. showing one or two engines made no safety difference.” Danson said he didn’t believe those studies: “The Norad role required vast distances to cover.” Manson, already promoted to brigadier-general, made clear that while two engines were advantageous, that feature did not determine the choice. The F-18, he wrote in 1980, could fill both of the needed roles, it was fast, easier to fly than the CF-104 (which had an alarmingly high crash rate), easy to maintain, A technician from 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron in Bagotville, Que., guides a CF-18 before it takes and easy to upgrade. The F-16 had little off from Trapani, room for modifications; the F-18, a rela- Italy, in 2011.tively large lightweight fighter, had been designed to leave room for updates to keep up with new developments and to meet new challenges. Moreover, with the same aircraft operating in Canada and overseas, squadrons could be readily switched. That made sense for the small Air Command.

The procurement contract for 137 aircraft had a ceiling of US$2.369 billion; the offsets that McDonnell Douglas agreed to amounted to Cdn$2.453 billion, to be invested in Canada over a 15-year period.

In all, between 1982 and 1988, 138 CF-188s, as they were officially designated, came to Air Command. The CF-188 operated in Canada and Europe and in the Gulf War, over former Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq in a variety of combat roles. It remains in service with the RCAF, now recently (and expensively) upgraded. Its procurement remains an example of how to do it, and it should be no surprise that Paul Manson continued his meteoric rise through the ranks to become chief of the defence staff in 1986. L