Georgetown Journal of
ASIAN AFFAIRS POLICY FORUM Lee Kuan Yew: The Restless Achiever Michael Barr Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat Takashi Inoguchi Chinese Leadership Under Xi Jinping Christopher Johnson South Korean Youth in Crisis: Implications for Political Leadership Jiyoon Kim A Tale of Two Leaders: Modi and Widodo Pallavi Aiyar
Kim Jong-un of DPRK: In the Shadow of his Grandfather and Father Jerrold Post Leadership in Asia: Personal Impressions Tom Plate The Perils of the Autocratic Developmental State: Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan Sean Roberts Makers of Modern Asia: Past, Present, and Future Trends in Leadership Michael Green Consensual Leadership: Notes from APEC Robert Wang
Architects of Asia
The Great Man Theory Revisited with an introduction by John Kane
Published by the Asian Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown Journal of
ASIAN AFFAIRS Vol. 2 | No. 2 | Winter 2016
The Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs is the flagship scholarly publication of the Asian Studies Program housed within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Established in 2014, the Journal aims to provide a forum for scholars and practitioners in the field of Asian affairs to exchange ideas and publish research that further the understanding of the world’s largest and most populous continent. The views expressed in this issue do not necessarily reflect those of the Journal ’s editors and advisors, the Asian Studies Program, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. Winter 2016 [i]
editorial board Editor-in-Chief Alex Rued
Managing Editor
Publisher
Brian Spivey
Daye Shim Lee
Associate Editors Wafi Abdul Manan Michael Sliwinski Jennifer Mayer Taylor Wettach
Assistant Editors Kimberly Agarth Anna Scott Bell Kenneth Lee Lauren Sung
advisory board Amitav Acharya American University Charles Armstrong Columbia University Harley Balzer Georgetown University Carol Benedict Georgetown University Kurt Campbell The Asia Group Victor Cha Georgetown University
Philip Kafalas Georgetown University
Jordan Sand Georgetown University
David Shambaugh David Kang University of Southern California George Washington University Christine Kim Georgetown University
Gi-Wook Shin Stanford University
Joanna Lewis Georgetown University
Sheila Smith Council on Foreign Relations
Kristen Looney Georgetown University
James Steinberg Syracuse University
Mike Mochizuki George Washington University
Elizabeth Stephen Georgetown University
Andrew Nathan Bruce Dickson George Washington University Columbia University
Robert Sutter George Washington University
Michael O’Hanlon Brookings Institution
Andrew Yeo Catholic University of America
Irfan Nooruddin Evelyn Goh Australian National University Georgetown University Michael Green Georgetown University Touqir Hussain Georgetown University Christopher Johnson CSIS Freeman Chair
Lynn Parisi University of Colorado Saadia Pekkanen University of Washington
Send inquiries to: SFS Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University Box 571040, 37th and O Streets, NW Washington, DC 20057 Email: guasiajournal@gmail.com [ii] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Yuhki Tajima Georgetown University
contents Volume 2 | Number 2 | Winter 2016
1
Editor’s Note
policy forum Architects of Asia: The Great Man Theory Revisited 5
Introduction Leadership and International Politics John Kane
14
Lee Kuan Yew The Restless Achiever Michael D. Barr
21
Shinzo Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat Takashi Inoguchi
31
A Pragmatic Approach to Power Chinese Leadership Under President Xi Jinping Christopher K. Johnson
39
South Korean Youth in Crisis Implications for Political Leadership Jiyoon Kim
45
A Tale of Two Leaders Narendra Modi and Joko Widodo Pallavi Aiyar
53
Kim Jong-un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea In the Shadow of his Grandfather and Father Jerrold M. Post Winter 2016 [iii]
64
Leadership in Asia Personal Impressions Tom Plate
72
The Perils of the Autocratic Developmental State Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan Sean Roberts
82
Makers of Modern Asia Past, Present, and Future Trends in Leadership Michael Green
90
Consensual Leadership Notes from APEC Robert Wang
research 97
The Rush for Hydropower A Product of the Chinese Communist Party’s Legitimacy Concerns Qi Zhang
123 The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Explaining Japanese Politicians’ Behaviors M. Erika Pollmann
interviews 153 Myanmar’s Post-Election Future Christina Fink
158 ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman
167 The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm Victor Cha and David Kang
[iv] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Editor’s Note
As the title “Architects of Asia: The Great Man Theory Revisited” suggests, the Winter 2016 issue of the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs features a Policy Forum in which international experts examine past, present, and future leadership in Asia. International relations theorists have arguably marginalized the study of leadership from the field, characterizing leadership as an amorphous variable and, therefore, unhelpful in understanding political phenomenon. Leadership is certainly not an exact science; however, circumstances that influence the direction of leadership—from institutional limitations to public opinion—can be clearly defined. Additionally, though leaders’ personal preferences are difficult to determine, examining leaders’ formative life experiences yields great insight into their personal beliefs, which in turn aids in efforts to understand or even predict leaders’ policy preferences. The study of leadership in Asia often centers on the prevalence of Asia’s “strongmen” leaders. However, the Editorial Board chose this topic not to simply examine leaders’ individual lives, but to use leadership as a springboard to explore broader historical, cultural, and political trends across Asia. The Winter 2016 Editorial Board hopes that this issue will offer fresh perspectives to revive discussion of an understudied but valuable topic: leadership as it relates to international politics in Asia. The Policy Forum begins with an introduction by John Kane, which equips readership with an overview of the theoretical concepts framing the discourse of leadership in international relations. Kane’s article traces the study of leadership from Hans Morgenthau to Robert Jervis, laying the theoretical foundation for the Policy Forum’s multi-faceted discussion of leadership trends across the Asia-Pacific region. Michael Barr’s article sheds light on the life of Singapore’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew, whose influence was so profound that the leader could hardly be separated from the city-state he established. Barr reflects on Lee’s formative life experiences and what his absence as the so-called “CEO of Singapore Inc.” will mean for the region. Will political divergence take form among the current political elite, or will Lee’s legacy endure for years to come? Of course, even leaders as strong as Lee Kuan Yew do not act in a vacuum, but are constrained by surrounding institutions, societal norms, and even the very thing that their authority depends upon: public opinion. Takashi Inoguchi takes an institutional approach in his analysis of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, specifically walking readers through the tumultuous evolution of Abe’s security legislation and the manifold limitations Abe has faced as prime minister of Japan. Public approval sets the parameters for both elected and unelected leaders to act within. An interview with Chris Johnson examines the inner workings of the notoriously opaque Communist Party of China (CCP). Johnson’s measured analysis of CCP leadership defies theories that President Xi Jinping is bound by various interest groups, but recognizes the regime’s dependency on public approval. Jiyoon Kim’s article turns our attention to South Korea, assessing the current political tendencies of South Korea’s apolitical youth and drawing broader implications of this trend for political leadership. Winter 2016 [1]
Editor’s Note
Kim provides a compelling argument for why current leadership should appeal to this despondent generation—even though they will not be rewarded at the polls for such efforts. Perhaps no two leaders initially garnered more public support than India’s Narendra Modi and Indonesia’s Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Pallavi Aiyar’s comparative evaluation of Modi and Jokowi’s election and post-election experiences explores how elevated expectations surrounding both men’s accession to power shaped their time in office to date, as well as the role that personality and leadership style has played in their contrasting policymaking efforts. Institutions and public opinion certainly influence leaders, but their agency as individuals cannot be ignored in any holistic assessment of leadership; while some leaders acquiesce to institutional bounds, others stretch the ambit to fit their own ambitions. It is a leader’s psychological makeup that determines how he or she reacts in the face of obstacles. Thus, political psychologist Jerrold Post focuses our attention inward on the psychology of North Korea’s past and present leadership, identifying generational similarities and differences across the Kim regime. Tom Plate’s article emphasizes the way in which Asia’s successful leaders inspired the public through ideology, yet tempered such ideology with pragmatic compromise in order to achieve desired outcomes. Plate warns of a tragic future if the United States does not work to understand this pragmatism—a move that will require a dramatic shift in perspective for a Western elite focused more on human rights and political freedoms than economic growth and stability. Perhaps no situation better proves the paramount importance of leadership than a situation in which it might be absent. Sean Roberts’s article previews the impending succession crisis in Kazakhstan, cautiously outlining the options for future leadership in the Central Asian nation. Will President Nursultan Nazarbayev—a skilled proponent of the non-liberal developmental state—lay the necessary groundwork for Kazakhstan’s presidential succession? A key ingredient in healthy bilateral or multilateral relations —yet one that is often disregarded in analyses of state-to-state cooperation—is trust. Michael Green discusses the importance of mutual understanding and trust between individual leaders for successful relations between their respective nations. Green’s interview builds on a course he teaches at Georgetown University titled “Makers of Modern Asia,” in which he encourages students to assess the role of leaders in building East Asia’s post-war order. Twenty-first century problems—from environmental degradation to international organized crime—transcend national borders and necessitate strong multilateral mechanisms. Given the pronounced role for multilateralism in an increasingly multipolar world, effective leadership in the Asia-Pacific region is ever more tied to consensus-building capabilities. It is thus appropriate for this Policy Forum to conclude with [2] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Editor’s Note
Robert Wang’s analysis of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and call for continued consensual leadership in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. In addition to the Policy Forum, this issue features two original, peer-reviewed social science papers written by young scholars. Qi Zhang’s piece seeks to explain why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a series of large-scale hydropower development projects in the last several years—notwithstanding the nation’s electricity surplus and strong opposition from neighboring countries and environmental activists. Mina Pollmann’s research paper examines one of the more contentious issues in East Asia: Japanese politicians’ visits to the Yasakuni Shrine. Pollmann analyzes the relative importance of international versus domestic considerations in shrine visits, thereby providing a framework to predict how Japanese politicians might behave with regards to the Yasakuni Shrine. This issue also features several timely interviews. An interview with Christina Fink considers the challenges and opportunities ahead for the recently elected Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar. Given the military’s effective veto power and control of key government ministries, will the iconic leader be able to take Myanmar in a new direction? Our interview with Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman explores a topic that may, unfortunately, become of increasing importance to Southeast Asia: combatting radicalization in the context of growing ISIL authority. Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman’s assessment of ISIL’s rise in Southeast Asia provides readers with a factual understanding of the group’s recruitment efforts and linkages to preexisting Southeast Asian terrorist groups, but also provides a deep understanding of the religious narrative feeding fringe minorities’ interpretations of Islam. Last, but certainly not least, Victor Cha and David Kang revisit their North Korea debate, exploring approaches to engagement in a much changed environment and— perhaps more importantly—revealing their new research approach vis-à-vis the impossible state. The Winter 2016 issue of the Journal was only possible with the help of many individuals to whom I am extremely grateful. I would like to thank our authors, reviewers, editors, and advisors for their contributions. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Michael Green for not only contributing to another issue, but also for providing the inspiration for this issue’s Policy Forum on leadership in Asia—an idea that sprang from Dr. Green’s Georgetown University course titled “Makers of Modern Asia.” I am also very appreciative of Dr. Victor Cha’s continued counsel as both an advisor and contributor. I would be remiss not to recognize the Journal’s Managing Editor Brian Spivey for his unflagging commitment to the Journal, as well as our Publisher and primary advisor Daye Shim Lee for her guidance. The Winter 2016 issue of the Journal would not have been possible without these individuals’ time and generosity.
Winter 2016 [3]
Editor’s Note
It has been a wonderful opportunity and privilege to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs. I am excited about this issue’s renewed focus on leadership, and I hope that you enjoy it. Alex Rued Editor-in-Chief
[4] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kane | Leadership and International Politics
policy forum Architects of Asia: The Great Man Theory Revisited
Introduction Leadership and International Politics John Kane The study of leadership in international affairs presents us with two contradictory aspects, one practical and the other theoretical. For scholars engaged in historical or country-specific studies, the importance of leadership, and thus the need for its serious examination, is largely taken for granted. For academic scholars of international relations (IR), however, the question remains open and doubtful. Prominent IR theorist Robert Jervis, who recently wrote an article entitled “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?” concluded that, because we cannot positively prove the causal agency of individual leaders, we must fall back on structural explanations, with the implication that leaders do not truly matter.1 If this is so, then we might wonder what help IR theory can be to people actually engaged in studying leaders and leadership in different contexts. In this essay, I will first consider the logic and limits of the IR case against leadership, and then pursue more promising avenues for gaining a theoretical grasp of the phenomenon. Science versus Leadership in International Relations Theory It was not always the case that leadership was neglected or devalued in IR writing. The so-called classical realists of the 1930s and 1940s—Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, for example—assumed that the thoughts and actions of individual leaders and diplomats were central to the understanding of international affairs. Morgenthau argued that the political world was not amenable to “scientific” rationality, and stated, “Politics is an art and not a science, and what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and moral strength of the statesman.”2 But the scientific aspirations of “neorealists” eventually won out, most specifically in Kenneth Waltz’s landmark book Man, State and War. In the late 1950s, Waltz argued that, of the three dominant explanations (or “images” as he called them) of the causes Robert Jervis, “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?” Security Studies 22, No. 2 (2013): 153-179. 2 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 10. 1
Winter 2016 [5]
Policy Forum
of war—human nature (evidenced in individual motivation and behavior), internal regime politics, and the anarchical structure of international relations—only the last was persuasive. The genuine explanation for the causes of war was, in other words, a structural explanation based primarily on estimates of material power balances and imbalances.3 Contesting schools of IR theory ever since then—neoclassical realism, constructivism, liberal internationalism, and even feminism—have tended to revolve endlessly and inconclusively around this pole.4 Whatever their disagreements with structural materialism, however, their own contributions seldom highlighted, and often obscured, the role of leadership. To be sure, there have been some who have sought to rectify this deficiency with, for example, a plea to “bring the statesman back in.”5 Byman and Pollack argued that the problem was that theorists were at once too modest and too arrogant in their treatment of leaders: modest for thinking they had nothing useful to say about them, yet arrogant in asserting that “impersonal forces” explained the vast majority of events.6 But the real reason for preferring impersonal forces, as Waltz admitted in a later work, was the wish to generate an explanatory (and possibly predictive) general theory of international relations based on the model of the physical sciences.7 This was assumed to require models that were elegantly simple, rigorous, and parsimonious in their choice of variables. Individual leaders with their varying temperaments, experiences, and capacities could simply not be captured in such abstract, rigorous models and therefore had to be dismissed as causally irrelevant. Indeed, Waltz argued that “the state,” not the individual, provided the basic unit of analysis—a view that seemed to reduce leaders to virtually interchangeable “rational actors” bound to respond to the structural conditions they encountered in more or less identical ways. Leadership was thus viewed as a mere moment of a larger “structure,” wherein it was the “structure” that ultimately determined future actions and outcomes. To be fair, the desire to uncover impersonal causal laws beneath the human surface of things had long been common to many of the social sciences, including economics, sociology, and political science. Historical studies had already gone a long way down this road by the end of the nineteenth century when Herbert Spencer rejected the “Great
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Something of an exception is the “English School”—represented by figures like Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Tim Dunne and Barry Buzan—who largely accepted the anarchical nature of international society but claimed that it nevertheless precisely was a society, one that required the activities of diplomats for its maintenance; see for an overview Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Structure of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 5 Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, No. 4 (2001): 107-146. 6 Ibid., 108-109. 7 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 3 4
[6] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kane | Leadership and International Politics
Man theory” of heroic leadership.8 This “Great Man theory” portrayed history as essentially a product of the ideas and actions of exceptional individuals, an idea Spencer thought hopelessly unrealistic, childish, and unscientific.9 Historians who agreed with Spencer sought what they supposed to be the “real” drivers of historical development—class struggle, geographic or climatic determinism, economic and technological development, and so on. In the most sweeping historical interpretations, individuals appeared as the mere “carriers” of impersonal forces rather than as independent agents. Indeed, in theories such as Marxian historical materialism, the forces of “History-with-a-capital-H” seemed to march inexorably forward, regardless of the intentions and actions of particular individuals. Yet it is instructive to note that Marx, contemplating the failure of the Paris Commune of 1871, put the blame on poor leadership.10 We should also recall his famous comment: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”11 This position is essentially the same as that echoed by Spencer in his critique of the “Great Man theory,” the intention of which was not to dismiss the agency of notable individuals, but to qualify and contextualize it appropriately. Spencer argued, “[We] must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown.... Before he can remake his society, his society must make him.”12 But on this reading, the “Great Man” (or woman) can and sometimes does remake his or her society, and perhaps pushes history decisively in one direction rather than another. This point is surely congruent with Machiavelli’s famous pairing of virtú (individual capacity, character, and force) with fortuna (luck or the opportunity for effective action), his point being that the two must meet if anything of political significance is to be accomplished.13 If we accept this, then it is time to move beyond the sterile, and seemingly interminable, “agency-structure debate” afflicting IR studies and admit that intelligent (not necessarily “rational”) human agents are both the producers and the
The “Great Man” theory was most famously the theory of Scots writer Thomas Carlyle. See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York: Frederick A. Stokes & Brother, 1888). 9 Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology (London: Appleton, 1896). 10 John Kane, “The End of Morality? Theory, Practice and the ‘Realistic Outlook’ of Karl Marx,” in NOMOS XXXVII: Theory and Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 403-439. 11 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx-Engels Library, 1852), https://www. marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm. 12 Spencer, The Study of Sociology, 34. 13 It is an ironic fact that the Russian Revolution, far from illustrating the truth of historical materialism, was a perfect example of Machiavellian logic, with the virtú to seize the moment being supplied by Lenin and his Bolsheviks. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (East Bridgewater, MA: Signature Press, [1532] 2008). 8
Winter 2016 [7]
Policy Forum
products of human structures and institutions.14 Indeed, human beings are themselves “structured” by virtue of their genetic, social, and cultural inheritance; their individual psychology and character; their educational and personal experiences, and so on. But is there any theoretical work in IR literature that can transcend this false binary and potentially capture the dynamic relationship between leadership and context? Toward a General Model of Leadership In fact, there is a theoretical work that transcends this false binary. The school of “foreign policy analysis,” for one, placed individuals and their social environment at the heart of inquiry. Snyder et al. stated in a seminal work: “It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers—those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers.”15 Leadership agency also received some concentrated attention from IR scholars working in the field of multilateral negotiations, as one might perhaps expect given that negotiations must be conducted by actual human beings with critical constraints and responsibilities.16 Such agency was also addressed by writers who emphasized the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy.17 Of particular importance here was Robert Putnam’s influential 1988 essay analyzing the complexity of such interactions in “two-level” game-theoretic terms. Putnam’s work gave policy elites situated at the nexus of the domestic and international realms a distinctive and privileged role as mediators of conjunctural forces, interpreters of possibilities, and formulators of foreign policy.18 The “statesman” is specified as the central strategic actor, crucially positioned to scan both domestic and international situations in order to discern constraints on and opportunities for creative statecraft. This work implied a rejection of the proposition that we must choose between Waltz’s “three images,” and instead intimated that a full explanatory account requires they be integrated and treated as simultaneously effectual. Although Putnam was principally For a comprehensive examination see Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), who argues the agency-structure problem has been generated by a positivist account of science that mistakenly privileges epistemology (how we acquire knowledge of a world) over ontology (what we implicitly assume the world we are investigating to be like. 15 Richard Snyder, Henry W. Bruck and Burton M. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, [1954] 2002), 59. 16 See I. William Zartman (ed.), International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1994; Victor A. Kremenyuk, International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2002). 17 See Robert S. Ross, “International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: US-China Relations since 1972,” World Politics 44 (1986): 235-269; Robert McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War,” International Organization 50, No. 3 (1996): 445-475. 18 See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, No. 3 (1988): 427-460; Michael D. Mastanduno, Anthony Lake and G. J. Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 22 (1989): 457-474. 14
[8] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kane | Leadership and International Politics
concerned with analyzing and investigating international negotiations, the model he developed is also useful for studying leadership in general. Putnam’s work is, to be sure, couched in the language of game-theoretic modelling, which—because initial conditions must be sufficiently simple and the number of players strictly limited to generate plausible “solutions” to a game—has well-known limitations for understanding events in the real world.19 Yet, Putnam’s model has the virtue of suggesting the huge complexity of real world situations. He wrote: [At] the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.20 It follows that political leaders in negotiations must simultaneously engage in two games. One, at “Level I,” with international interlocutors as they bargain for satisfactory outcomes (“satisfactory” being defined in terms of the alignment of possible “win-sets” for various players), and the other, at “Level II,” with domestic constituents and supporting coalitions who have their own interests and preferences and may fail to ratify particular agreements they deem unsatisfactory. Moreover, each side may have an interest in changing or distorting the other’s perceptions and even altering the rules of the game to its own advantage. This means that the game at Level I cannot be separated from or “solved” independently of that at Level II, for moves at either level may “reverberate” at the other, causing critical changes in perceptions. Putnam calls this two-level game a “metaphor” and notes that metaphors are not theories, though he expresses the hope that, as in other sciences, one may start with metaphor and end in algebra. However, he claims, “Deriving analytic solutions for two-level games will be a difficult challenge.”21 I would say instead “impossible” given that Putnam himself notes that the political complexities of two-level games are “staggering” given the “pervasive uncertainty” of international relations.22 As we know, even simple games with settled rules never have preordained outcomes, which is precisely why we enjoy watching and playing them. Puzzles may have solutions, but games typically have winners and losers produced by some combination of skill and luck. Moreover, Putnam observes that his two-levels are a simplification, and that the political reality is always a multi-level game whose outcomes, whatever they may be, must ever be marked by the utmost contingency.
Russell W. Cooper, Coordination Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 434. 21 Ibid., 435. 22 Ibid., 434, 454-456. 19 20
Winter 2016 [9]
Policy Forum
The value of this kind of metaphor for leadership studies is not that it may generate game-theoretic solutions, but that it obliges us to focus on the interrelationships among the players and on what is at stake for each of them in their interactions. It thus provides an analytic tool that helps us to make some sense of complexity and to gain understanding of the choices, uncertainties, and dilemmas confronting the actors involved, making it akin to historians’ methods to retrieve the causal story from significant historical events. This is a valuable base on which to build a broader and appropriately political account of leadership—an account capable of transcending the limitations of familiar leadership tropes such as trait theory, functional theory, transactional versus transformational leadership, and so on. Separate from IR theory, but similarly helpful, is other work on “agent-centered historical institutionalism” (ACHI). The issue of leadership has always been implicit in the work of historical institutionalists, yet seldom acknowledged because of their concentration on the abstract categories of “agency” and “structure.”23 An enduring problem for traditional institutionalism has been that, if institutional structures are taken as largely determinative of action (as they are generally designed to be), how are we to explain change over time? Stephen Bell’s account of ACHI presumes that agents are the “ultimate propellant of change,” but these agents must always operate within particular time-bound contexts of both institutions and wider influences (for example, structural economic factors, demographic factors, currently dominant ideas, and long-standing policy settings).24 Although necessarily interpreted by agents, these structures exert real causal constraints on what they can or may do at any particular time. Importantly, however, institutions also empower agents, while wider contexts provide opportunities for action as well as constraints upon it. Bell’s account does not explicitly raise the issue of leadership but, like two-level game analysis, his account is eminently adaptable to a leadership dynamic that situates leadership within particular contexts whose constraints and opportunities the leader must understand and negotiate to forward goals.25 What emerges from both bodies of work is a view that locates the explanation of real world events in the dynamic and mutually-shaping interplay of agents, institutions, and their broader environment over time. The value of both of these accounts lies in their discernment of a space for creative judgment and discretionary action—that is, for genuine leadership—at the nexus between outwardly-directed and inwardly-directed politics, thereby permitting a model that can be used to describe the structure of political leadership in general. The complex task of all political leadership lies in building and maintaining sufficient political See Mark Blyth, “Any More Bright Ideas: The Ideational Turn in Comparative Political Economy,” Comparative Politics 29, No. 2 (1997): 229-250; Colin Crouch, Capitalist Diversity and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 24 Stephen Bell, “Do We Really Need a New Constructivist Institutionalism to Explain Institutional Change,” British Journal of Political Science 41, No. 4 (2011): 883-906, 5. 25 As Putnam (1988, 434) observes: “On occasion … clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives.” 23
[10] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kane | Leadership and International Politics
support over time to achieve broader goals believed necessary or desirable. Therefore, leaders must always be “Janus-faced” in that they must simultaneously attend to the constituency that sustains them—which is generally multi-layered, diverse in outlook and interest, and possibly fractious—while pursuing wider goals of political action.26 The logic of the political field in which the leader must lead—which is also a complex of conflicting or converging forces—is seldom wholly congruent with the logic of constituency maintenance. Taking constituency support for granted as one pursues wider goals risks forfeiting the leadership position; looking only after constituency matters, on the other hand, risks impotence or irrelevance in the larger arena (which can, ironically, endanger constituency support). It is easy to see why leaders may become obsessed with maintaining their hold on leadership to the detriment of any useful action in the world. This is often attributed to their megalomania and desire to retain leadership at any cost (someone once said of Yasser Arafat that he did not care whether he drove his people into a ditch so long as he himself was at the wheel.) But the structural necessity of maintaining a leadership position is the objective ground on which personal ambition is played out, and in complex and unsettled conditions this task may be very dominating. The majority of Machiavelli’s Prince is devoted to just this theme, and only in the last chapter does he suggest that leadership may actually be employed for any broader purpose (in this case, the political unification of Italy).27 Leadership in Asia It is obvious that, whatever valid comparisons may be made across space and time, individual leaders can be properly understood only within their own distinctive historical and institutional locations. Even across similar regimes, say liberal democratic ones, the constraints and opportunities confronting leaders are very different due to important institutional and historical differences. An American president, for example, faces different and usually more severe constraints than a prime minister in a Westminster system, and a prime minister of Britain confronts different freedoms and constraints than one in, for example, Canada, Australia, or Israel. One can multiply these differences by comparing liberal democratic regimes with transitional democracies or with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian systems.28 The dynamic, structurally and institutionally situated model of leadership sketched Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).27 John Kane, “Leadership and Conflict: Some Necessary Conditions for Peacemaking” (paper presented to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Adelaide, Australia, October 2004). 28 A recent article in Foreign Affairs spoke amusingly of the ‘Putin envy’ of conservative political figures in the United States, who wished an American leader could be as free as Putin from “the endless stress of political campaigning, of having to defend his policy positions, vie for attention, and build an arsenal of post-hoc justifications for gaffes, misstatements, and errors” (See Valerie Sperling, “A Case of Putin Envy: Behind the Obsession with Russia’s Leader,” Foreign Affairs, accessed November 23, Sperling, Valerie 2015, ‘A Case of Putin Envy: Behind the Obsession with Russia’s Leader,’ https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-11-05/case-putin-envy2). 26
Winter 2016 [11]
Policy Forum
above, though it will hardly be productive of general laws, is surely well suited to the task of scholars seeking to trace the interplay of individual character and political environment in particular cases. This is precisely the task for contributors to the present volume, which studies leaders and leadership in a range of Asian countries. Certainly, Asia presents an interesting array of regime types for investigating the multiple and varied challenges presented to leaders or leadership cohorts—not just within their own domains, but also in their international relationships. The Policy Forum contributors’ task is to perform a concentrated study both of significant individuals and their entire social, historical, and institutional context—and the opportunities and obstacles that such contexts present—to determine exactly how and why they have acted and with what effect. This is in the first place a thoroughly empirical task and in the second a thoroughly interpretive one, as good historians have always understood. Even a cursory glance at the modern history of Asia reveals how important leaders have been to the founding and development of their countries. To try to tell the story of Singapore without Lee Kuan Yew, or Vietnam without Ho Chi Minh, or Taiwan without Li Teng-hui, or contemporary South Korea without Kim Dae-Jung, or China without Mao Zedong and later Deng Xiaoping, would surely be akin to trying to enact Hamlet without the prince. Even in a country like Japan whose political system long suppressed strong leadership by politicians (at least until the advent of Junichiro Koizumi and perhaps Shinzo Abe), interesting questions must be asked about the nature of the bureaucratic leadership that operated behind the political facade.29 Leadership is centrally about judgment regarding what, collectively, needs to be done (or not done), and what actions (or strategic inactions) should follow from such judgment. But judgments can be good, bad, or indifferent and their consequences either happy or disastrous. Leadership, in other words, may not always be good leadership. Indeed, strong leadership can itself be a problem. Mao Zedong’s political skills, ideological appeal, and charismatic authority enabled him to lead the Chinese Communist Party to found Communist China, but the congealment of that authority into idolatry allowed him to instigate and oversee the disastrous political experiments of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. By 1976, Mao’s leadership had become an impediment to re-founding China on an alternate, modern basis, an impediment that Deng Xiaoping—whose leadership was based on perceived competency and openness to reform rather than political inspiration—had most carefully to negotiate both before and after Mao’s death.30 My point is that the scholar must avoid the undue valorizing of leadership. A common
Shigeru Yoshida left an imprint on Japanese politics beyond his time in office, but did so prior to the founding of the so-called 1955 LDP regime, which ruled for forty-odd years, and whose ministers and prime ministers (with some notable exceptions) were factional choices in what Inoguchi and Jain (1997) called ‘karaoke democracy’ (meaning everyone got a turn). 30 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 29
[12] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kane | Leadership and International Politics
response to many intractable political problems is to call for politicians to show more “leadership,� but genuine leadership may create or exacerbate problems as much as ameliorate them. Leadership is a phenomenon that scholars must always seriously address as it is always active in the world (if not necessarily always highly visible). But scrupulous scholars of leadership are inevitably required to judge the judgments of leaders, first to understand them and second to assess their quality. This is usually done through retrospective analysis, but to make sense of any particular judgment scholars must, in their research, project themselves mentally into the world as it presented itself to the decision-maker even while keeping the intellectual distance necessary for assessing the quality of the judgment. This is a challenging and important task in which descriptive and normative elements are necessarily closely enmeshed. It is the task that has been taken up by the contributors to this Policy Forum whose work provides a broad perspective on contemporary leadership in Asia.
John Kane is a Professor in the School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, Australia. His recent books include Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of US Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2009) and (with Haig Patapan) The Democratic Leader (Oxford University Press, 2012). His edited collections include (with Haig Patapan and Loy Hui Chieh) Political Legitimacy in Asia: New Leadership Challenges (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and (with M. Heazle) Political Legitimacy, Science and Political Authority (Earthscan, 2016).
Winter 2016 [13]
Policy Forum
Lee Kuan Yew The Restless Achiever Michael D. Barr Vladimir Lenin famously asked, “What is to be done?” Like Lenin, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew always had an answer to that question. Lee was so driven to decision and activity that he always knew absolutely what was to be done and, usually, how it was to be done. His only doubts were about how competently his subordinates could carry out his wishes. For most of his adult life, Lee was a goal-oriented man of decision who also had the power to impose his decisions without facing many restraints, checks, or balances. Neither complacency nor restless indecision stood in his way. He could not bear the thought of himself or other people enjoying life without a goal. In March 1965, when he was struggling to maintain Singapore’s place in Malaysia— and probably already fearful that he might be detained by the government in Kuala Lumpur—he found time to pontificate publicly along these lines: You have got to believe in something. You are not just building houses in order that people can procreate and fill these houses up because there is no point in that. You do these things because you believe that in the end you create a happy and a healthy nation, a society in which man finds fulfilment and you have got to have the ideological basis… If you treat human beings just like animals, you just feed them, keep them sleek, well-exercised, healthy like dogs or cats. I don’t think it will work. Nations have gone through tremendous privations and hardships in order to achieve specific goals which have inspired and fired their imagination.1 The particular target of his opprobrium at that time was the Malay community. His perspective derived directly from his life-long practice of viewing peoples and societies Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 77. 1
[14] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Barr | Lee Kuan Yew
through the prism of race. According to Lee, Germans were strong, intelligent, and driven, like the Chinese and Japanese. Indians and Italians were soft and prone to laziness. Malays, like most dark-skinned races, were lazy, weak, and generally hopeless.2 He had a special affection for the British, though his regard for them as a “race” slipped during the first decades of his adulthood, because the introduction of the welfare state and the spread of a dependency culture had weakened them. Lee had no intention of letting Singapore go down any of the various paths to laziness and “ordinariness.” He envisioned creating this ideal society by pursuing a heady and racist cocktail of eugenic improvement, cultural engineering, modernist progressivism, and unembarrassed elitism. A little-known address that he gave to students at the University of Singapore in December 1967 captured much of his vision for Singapore. When the chair of the meeting asked, “What is the “X-factor” in development?” Lee replied: Three women were brought to the Singapore General Hospital, each in the same condition and each needing a blood transfusion. The first, a Southeast Asian [read: Malay], was given the transfusion but died a few hours later. The second, a South Asian [read: Indian], was also given a transfusion but died a few days later. The third, an East Asian [read: Chinese], was given a transfusion and survived. That is the “Xfactor” in development.3 In later life, he liked to identify the sources of his inspiration as being primarily Chinese or Confucian in origin, and we should concede that such elements did play their roles. Certainly, his penchant for trusting and privileging his own family as well as fellow Chinese is one of the more identifiable “Chinese” traits in his pattern of governance. He also had a propensity for viewing society through a series of hierarchical and personal relationships. These traits have proved to be his most basic and enduring instincts. Yet beyond his impulse to consanguinity, the wellspring of his philosophy was thoroughly Western: colonial-inspired racism, confidence in progress through science, faith in social engineering taught by the Cambridge Law School, and an elitism which was imbibed in Singapore’s most elitist colonial secondary school and then reinforced at Cambridge. To this, we can add the drive of his personal demons: the fear of failing to live up to the destiny that he knew, in his heart of hearts, was his desert. He grew up a man driven, pragmatic, and utterly free of moral inhibitions. If he had been unintelligent, a stutterer, or a member of a social class that had no opportunity to exercise leadership, he may not have had much impact on the world. But he was intelligent and a magnificent communicator. He came of age as a member of a privileged class at the tail-end of a colonial period—an interregnum of revolutionary change, new directions and, ultimately, a new nation. The success of his quest to become leader of Barr, Lee Kuan Yew, Chapter 6; Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas (Singapore: Times Editions and Singapore Press Holdings, 1998), 173–75. 3 Barr, Lee Kuan Yew, 185. 2
Winter 2016 [15]
Policy Forum
the newly emerging polity was far from automatic, but given his personal attributes, it should not have been—and, in fact, was not—a surprise to anyone. CEO of Singapore Inc. Lee formally entered public life in 1954 at the age of thirty-one, when he was elected to a seat in the colonial Legislative Assembly. He became prime minister of the Colony of Singapore in 1959. He died in 2015, no longer prime minister, but still representing the same constituency in the Parliament of Singapore. Over those sixty-nine years, and especially in the three decades from circa 1970¬ to circa 2000—when he was at the top of his game—Lee crafted the tiny nation of Singapore to be something akin to his vision of an ideal society. In doing so, he both adopted and discarded ideas and values according to their usefulness. Thus, Lee moved seamlessly from being a socialist in the 1940s and 1950s to a capitalist; from a democrat when he was in opposition in Singapore and Malaysia to an autocrat after he found himself running independent Singapore; from being anti-American in the 1950s and early-to-mid-1960s to being a favorite adopted son of the Harvard University Kennedy School establishment in the 1970s and thereafter;4 from leading the rhetorical fight against Western “decadence” for most of his life to upholding the legitimacy of homosexuality in his old age.5 Lee was very adept at cherry-picking convenient and peripherally important ideas and values, usually for short-term gain. When it came to his core vision, though, he was relentless and ruthless. But if he was so thoroughly utilitarian in choosing his causes, what can be identified as his truly “core” values? Ultimately, nothing was absolutely “core” beyond the perpetuation of his and his family’s rule. Without being quite so strict in our delineation of his “core” interests, however, we can still point to the elements that stayed with him consistently throughout his life: elitism, Chinese supremacism, and a drive for progress and success. We might add that so strong was his need to be in control of the levers of power that the state was, at all times, his favored vehicle for delivering progress. This is not a minor point, since one of his greatest achievements (and most likely one of his most enduring legacies) was his use of the state as an effective vehicle for capitalist success and social change. Nowhere else in the world has the state been so successfully deployed as an investment and management vehicle as it has been in Lee’s Singapore. It was fortunate that Lee found himself in charge of a micro-state and not a giant nation like China—a point that severely limits the “Singapore model” of development as a template for other states to emulate. After initially operating through companies and statutory boards fully owned and directly managed by government ministries, the government settled See, for instance, Michael S. Avi-Yonah, “HKS Professor Recognizes Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew,” The Harvard Crimson, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/10/3/hks-lee-kuan-yew. 3 Han Fook Kwang, Zuraidah Ibrahim, Chua Mui Hoong, Lydia Lim, Ignatius Low, Rachel Lin, and Robin Chan, Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Singapore Times Press, 2011), 247, 362, 377–80. 4
[16] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Barr | Lee Kuan Yew
on its preferred model: the government-linked company (GLC). A GLC would be at least partially government-owned, usually given preferential treatment in domestic markets, and always imbued with enough independence to act like a business in day-to-day affairs, but with more than enough government control to make it a reliable instrument of the state. Perhaps Lee’s greatest legacy will prove to be the extraordinarily high regard he engendered throughout both Singapore’s elite and society for professional management. He succeeded where generations of communists, socialists, corporatists, and fascists had failed before him in using the state to successfully manage businesses. He was not the absolute first to do this, and he certainly did not do it on his own. Both post-war Japan and South Korea provided something of a model, but neither could boast the directness of Singapore’s model of government-in-business, whereby “Singapore Inc.” operated through direct government ownership (or part-ownership), and overarching but indirect government management of most of Singapore’s domestic economy and foreign investment. By contrast, “Japan Inc.” and “Korea Inc.” worked through pre-existing private-and-family business entities. Even within the Singapore experiment, Lee was very much the political facilitator for the real managers and fixers: men like his first two ministers for finance, Goh Keng Swee and Hon Sui Sen. By its nature, his methodology entailed surrendering real managerial power to trusted subordinates like S. Dhanabalan and J.Y. Pillay. Goh Keng Swee, in particular, deserves to be singled out as the architect of Singapore’s early “bulldoze-and-build” model of export-oriented industrialization, whereby tracts of land (especially in the west of the main island and on the smaller southern islands) were flattened to make way for factories and, eventually, oil refineries purpose-built for multinational companies. This project was Goh’s main focus throughout most of the 1960s, and with it he laid the foundation for Singapore’s rapid economic development in the following decades. In the years following independence, Goh also built the Singapore Armed Forces from the ground up and, in the late 1970s, Goh played a pivotal role in developing central aspects of Singapore’s primary and secondary school systems. Yet, power never drifted very far from Lee’s personal hands or those of his eldest son, Lee Hsien Loong, especially after the mid-1980s when his own personal standing was at its highest, and virtually all of his peers from the 1960s had either stepped down or been pushed out. Eventually, the logic of keeping management at notional arm’s length reached its logical conclusion when the government consolidated its GLCs into two major sovereign wealth funds (which were among the first such entities in the world): Temasek Holdings, designed to house Singapore-based companies, and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), which was intended for direct off-shore investments. Neither were allowed to drift out of the Lee family’s orbit: both Temasek and the GIC had members of the Lee family firmly embedded at the most senior levels of management. Lee Kuan Yew himself, supported by his son, was the GIC’s chairman. Lee Hsien Loong’s wife, Ho Ching, was the chief executive officer of Temasek Holdings and his first cousin, Kwa Chong Seng, was the deputy
Winter 2016 [17]
Policy Forum
chairman.6 Authoritarianism as a Model The size and ubiquity of the government’s role in business and society mean that the government has dealt itself a powerful hand in handling domestic politics, thereby setting up a virtuous cycle (at least virtuous for those in power) whereby the economic and political arms of the state support each other in mutual embrace. In this, Lee has left the twenty-first century a separate, but closely-related legacy: the legitimation of authoritarian rule. The particular form of authoritarianism practiced in Singapore includes legitimation by clean but unfree and unfair elections whereby limited electoral contestation keeps government responsive to public opinion without actually putting the regime at risk of being toppled through the ballot box.7 Lee built his form of authoritarianism around a system of responsive and responsible government that represented the electorate’s interests without allowing the uncertainties and untidiness of democracy and political contestation—or, for that matter, universal access to legal rights and freedoms—to intrude on the serious business of government.8 Yet this detail has not stopped more thoroughly authoritarian regimes from watching Singapore for lessons about governance.9 Indeed, Lee has demonstrated how, at least in a micro-state, authoritarianism can deliver good government (or at least better than most alternatives), high levels of prosperity, and both domestic and international political legitimacy. Achieving this was not a simple task. Over the last ten years, the project has come perilously close to coming undone—thanks to the more limited level of administrative and political competence displayed by his successors, including his son, current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.10 And yet the 10 percent swing to the government in the 2015 elections—taking the share of the vote for the People’s Action Party up to 70 percent—shows that the system has survived with flying colors. The election was the first held since a massive swing against the government in the 2011 elections and the first since Lee Kuan Yew’s death in March 2015. Its outcome showed that the overwhelming majority of Singaporeans—including, it seems, the
See especially chapters 4, 6, and 7 of Michael D. Barr, The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). 7 See Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 8 Chua Beng Huat, “Political Culturalism, Representation and the People’s Action Party of Singapore,” Democratization 14, No. 5 (2007): 911–927; Garry Rodan and Kanishka Jayasuriya, “The Technocratic Politics of Administrative Participation: Case Studies of Singapore and Vietnam,” Democratization 14, No. 5 (2007): 795–815; Michael D. Barr, “The bonsai under the banyan tree: democracy and democratisation in Singapore,” Democratization 21, No. 1 (2014): 29-48. 9 Stephan Ortmann and Mark Thompson, “China’s Obsession with Singapore: Learning Authoritarian Modernity,” The Pacific Review 27, No. 3 (2014): 433–455. 10 Michael D. Barr, “Ordinary Singapore: The Decline of Singapore Exceptionalism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia (2015), DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2015.10w51387. 6
[18] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Barr | Lee Kuan Yew
the internet generation—have embraced authoritarian government as their security blanket. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong explained on the night of his election victory: We have a new generation with better education, with access to social media, who expect their views to be heard and given more weight. … [The election result] shows that the young people understand what is at stake, support what we are doing.11 I would interpret his point somewhat differently. As much as they might grumble about the government, complain about its many failings, and enjoy poking fun at it, young, educated, and well-travelled Singaporeans could not endure the thought that Singapore might have to manage without the security and confidence that comes with the Lee Kuan Yew-brand of managerialism. Furthermore, it is now clear that Lee Hsien Loong has at last been accepted as the standard bearer for his father’s “brand,” and will be able to keep the family at the center of the Singapore story for some time to come. Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy in Singapore is seemingly safe for another generation, and probably longer if the current and next cohort of elites can recalibrate their education, recruitment, and training procedures to pull themselves out of the culture of entitlement and mediocrity that has put the system at risk over the last decade. Since the 1980s, admission into Cabinet has been treated as the professional extension of a high-flying career in the civil service, the military, government-linked companies, or—very occasionally—in the private sector. Candidates earmarked for Cabinet are recruited into politics using a model of corporate headhunting, testing, and training borrowed originally from Shell Oil in the 1980s, and subjected to perpetual improvement thereafter.12 Today, the model is very nearly cradle-to-grave, with successful candidates following an inexorable path through elite kindergartens, schools, and universities into government service and politics. Explicit in this model was an assumption that constituency politics will not get in the way of Cabinet candidates being appointed or rewarded. During the 1980s and 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew’s political intelligence and experience could be relied upon to take care of the politics, but in the long-term this comfort blanket bred complacency as new generations of “leaders” rose to peak political roles without ever having engaged in real political contestation. Such complacency died in the 2011 general election—even before Lee Kuan Yew’s death—when two sitting cabinet ministers and a new candidate for Cabinet were rejected by the voters. There is clearly a new realization in the Prime Minister’s Office that politics per se needs to be taken seriously, but how the People’s Action Party can do this without tearing down the cradle-to-grave system of elite regeneration has yet to be answered. Kyunghee Park and Andrea Tan, “Lee Hsien Loong turns focus on Singapore’s young after winning election,” Australian Financial Review, 13. 12 Barr, The Ruling Elite of Singapore, 86-87. 11
Winter 2016 [19]
Policy Forum
Nonetheless, the victory of authoritarianism in Singapore to date has profound implications for the prospects of authoritarian rule more generally, especially for those states that have been identified by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge in Foreign Affairs magazine as practicing “modernizing authoritarianism” (of which Singapore is the listed as the prime example, and China as the second).13 Long before his death, Lee had already presided over the marriage of authoritarian rule and capitalism. In Western capitalist societies, politicians routinely say they want government to be an ally of business and the middle class, but Lee’s brilliance was to turn business and the middle class (and the working class, for that matter) into undemanding government allies. In the aftermath of Lee’s death, his successors have now confirmed that adherence to the outward forms of electoral democracy can facilitate such a union in the long term. Indeed, they have shown that the demands imposed by the use of democratic forms can keep ruling elites responsive and alert. This is indeed a legacy of which Lee would have been proud.
Michael D. Barr received his Ph.D. in History from the University of Queensland in 1998 and is now Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of History of International Relations, Flinders University, Australia. He has edited and written several books on Singapore politics and history, beginning with the book of his dissertation, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man (Georgetown University Press, 2000). He is currently Editor-in-Chief of Asian Studies Review and is writing a new history of Singapore.
John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, “The State of the State: The Global Contest for the Future of Government,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, 118-32. 13
[20] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Inoguchi | Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat
Shinzo Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat Takashi Inoguchi In August 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe released a statement on the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Second World War.1 In the seventy years since 1945, Japan has not registered any war-related deaths, which might be viewed as analogous to Sweden and its experience following the Great Northern War of 1700 to 1721.2 Barring its participation in the Napoleonic War from 1805 to 1809, Sweden has since this time renounced war.3 As defeated countries that have pursued no-war state policies, Sweden and Japan may be two of the major exceptions for the last four centuries. Experiencing no war-related deaths from 1945 to 2015 is not an easy accomplishment for Japan or perhaps for any country. Thus, it is no wonder that Prime Minister Abe sounded very proud of Japan’s seventy-year record post-1945. Abe’s six years “in the wilderness” after his sudden departure from the Prime Minister’s Office in 2007 gave him much time to reflect on how he might lead, if and when he was given another chance.4 His dream is to restore Japan’s beauty, by which he means that war and colonialism should not entirely color modern Japanese history.5 Instead, post-war Japan should be judged by the history of Japan’s proud accomplishment of peace and prosperity—bereft of the Tokyo Tribunal verdict. Restoring Japan’s beauty has remained a central theme throughout the development of Abe’s leadership, which I will summarize in the following paragraphs. Abe noted that Japan has repeatedly expressed “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for the nation’s actions during the war, adding, “such position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakeable into the future.” He also said Japan would never again resort to “aggression” and would abandon “colonial rule” forever, key phrases from past statements. “Japan’s Apologies for World War II,” The New York Times, August 12, 2015. 2 Takashi Inoguchi, “Uncertain Times Cast a Cloud Over Happiness in Asia,” East Asia Forum Quarterly 7, No. 3 (2015): 24-26. 3 Peace has prevailed in Sweden for a total of 209 years since 1721, and Sweden has since registered no war-related deaths since 1809, except for those in support of United Nations Peacekeeping. 4 Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan in 2012: Voters Swing, and Swing Away Soon,” Asian Survey 53, No. 1 (2013): 65-73. 5 Shinzo Abe, “Utsukushii Kunie [A Beautiful Japan],” (Tokyo: Bungeisyunjyu, 2006). 1
Winter 2016 [21]
Policy Forum
First, Abe changed course with regards to Yasukuni Shrine visits. Liberated from the self-imposed restraint of the first Abe government from 2006 to 2007, Abe paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on December 29, 2013. This triggered a somewhat unexpected reaction from Xi Jinping, the new Chinese president who was steadily consolidating power during this period. December 26 marks the 120th birthday of Chairman Mao Zedong, and as such Xi paid a visit on this day to the Mao Zedong Mausoleum in Tiananmen Square. Xi initially suppressed Chinese citizens’ anger about Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, a month later in January 2014, Xi mobilized pens and weapons massively to denounce Abe and to threaten the Japanese Self Defense Force Navy, Air Force, and Maritime Safety Agency vessels in the East China Sea.6 Chinese assertiveness has continued until today but never overshadowed Abe’s well-performed diplomatic achievement since then, especially with the United States; President Xi’s three recent meetings with President Obama to persuade him to approve China’s great power status as on par with the United States have not been well received by the United States. Second, Abe turned his efforts to the economy in order to stop the two-decade-long recession that he believed most afflicted Japan.7 To this end, Abe announced a carefully prepared monetary easing-based policy, “Abenomics,” to be executed from March 2013 onward. One component of Abenomics is to increase the printing of money so that the annual inflation rate reaches 2 percent in the ensuing two years after its 2013 implementation, with the ultimate goal of positively impacting public opinion toward the Abe government. The Ministry of Finance, however, was preoccupied with the astronomical government deficit and repeatedly pushed Abe regarding a consumption tax hike. In this regard, Abe’s predecessor, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, had legislated a consumption tax hike, with its implementation to occur during Abe’s tenure. This tax hike from 5 percent to 8 percent was enacted in April 2014. The negative effect of this tax on citizens’ psychology was perhaps much larger than Abe had expected. The Economist magazine captured the mood surrounding this first condition of economic recovery with its October 2015 article titled, “Less of the Same,” which suggests that Abe’s economic arrows “missed their mark.”8 Third, Abe energetically carried out economic and diplomatic gambles. Responding to Abe’s policies, economic figures like stock prices initially rose steadily and the exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar decreased, thus triggering an increase in Japanese exports of manufactured products and dramatic inflows of foreign money and tourists. Among all Japanese prime ministers since 1945, Abe has had the most meetings with top foreign leaders in the first, second, and third years of his term. The contrast is especially Takashi Inoguchi, “Uncertain Times Cast a Cloud Over Happiness in Asia,”; Takashi Inoguchi and Ankit Panda (forthcoming), “Japanese Perspectives about the South China Sea,” in Anders Corr, ed., Anatomy of the South China Sea Conflict Vol. I: International Fora and Major Power Perspectives. 7 Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan in 2013: Abenomics and Abegeopolitics,” Asian Survey 54, No. 1 (2014): 101-112; Mahito Shimizu, “Zaimusho no Seiji [Politics of the Ministry of Finance]” (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2015). 8 “Less of the Same,” The Economist, 3 October 2015, 79. 6
[22] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Inoguchi | Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat
sharp when compared to his great uncle, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who stayed at home in his first year due to concerns that uncertain domestic politics might dangerously evolve in his absence. Abe, however, actively pursued diplomatic efforts to show that Japan is a country to be reckoned with or, in Abe’s own words, that “Japan is back.”9 Simultaneously, these efforts are meant to demonstrate that Abe is a vigorous and effective leader returning Japan to both a vibrant economy and a reliable ally and friend of the world. As a sub-climax of this policy package, Abe gave a speech to a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress in April 2015. His speech focused on enhancing Japan’s alliance with the United States. For that purpose, he targeted the American narratives of World War II and—despite the fierce battles fought during the war—appealed to themes of mutual trust, eternal reconciliation, and peace between the United States and Japan. Most touching was the encounter of two men: Lieutenant General Lawrence Snowden, an American war veteran who fought at Iwo Jima, and Yoshitaka Shindo, a former cabinet minister under Abe and the grandson of General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, whose forces inflicted massive casualties on the U.S. forces at Iwo Jima. Fourth, when two conditions were met, namely the departure from recession and the resumption of Japan’s role as a respectable ally, Abe embarked on Japan’s security legislation. As is normal to Japanese political conventions, a council of pundits and experts, including both academics and practitioners, was assembled in the spring of 2015. They discussed what the Abe Statement of August 15, 2015 should contain and how it should be expressed. Abe was presented with their policy proposal in July 2015. Academic consensus on modern Japanese history formed the organizational basis of the policy proposal, with academic leader Shinichi Kitaoka widely regarded as the best historian on the subject. Before and after this proposal came out, citizens were somewhat atavistically reminded of August 15, 1945 and the events preceding this date.10 The Abe Statement in August of this year was both applauded and criticized among Japanese citizens. What is striking, however, is that the conservative nationalist and liberal pro-alliance schools both came away with a positive impression of the statement’s basic tone.11 Right-wing nationalists like Shoichi Watanabe and moderate liberals like Fumiaki Kubo praised it. Watanabe gives full marks to the statement, which he interprets as rejecting the line of the Tokyo Tribunal, whereas Kubo notes that the statement is intended to deny the ill-founded rumor that Abe is a revisionist. Needless to say, many other commentators are sharply critical of the statement. Opposition grew as the security legislative process unfolded in August and September of 2015. Poll data helps to explain this phenomenon. First, 60 to 70 percent of Japanese
Shinzo Abe, “Japan is Back,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2013. August 15, 1945 marks the day on which Japan surrendered. 11 “Omoiyari yosan gengaku teian [omoiyari budget reduction proposed],” Mainichi Shimbun, October 11, 2015. 9
10
Winter 2016 [23]
Policy Forum
citizens believe that neither the pre-1945 experience of aggression nor colonialism should be repeated, and that Japan should continue to register no war-related deaths in the future.12 When asked about the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related laws, 55 to 65 percent of citizens support the alliance. Yet, divergence of opinion is clear if one asks the question, “When the power disparity between the United States and China narrows, which of the following options do you think is the best?” Japanese citizens’ responses are fairly evenly split among (a) “neutrality with nuclear arms buildup”; (b) “Japan-U.S. security alliance retained as the fundamental pillar, plus friendship with China managed”; (c) “neutrality with the current level of arms buildup”; and (d) “neutrality after nonnuclear arms buildup.”13 It is important here to note that although the Japan-U.S. alliance should function to deter potential threats, economic transactions between Japan and China are enormous and, therefore, important to Japan.14 Simultaneously, President Obama’s perceived procrastination vis-à-vis interventions and managing global issues, such as terrorism and protracted civil wars, draws some concern from Japanese citizens. As is typical in Japanese parliamentary meetings, questions from parliamentarians and answers from the prime minister and other relevant cabinet ministers are exchanged first in the lower house and then in the upper house. All the legislative bills are reviewed in the Cabinet Legislative Bureau to ensure that bills are correctly presented and do not violate the Constitution. Article 9 of the Constitution has been a contentious issue since the new Constitution was set up during the Allied Powers’ occupation period in 1946. Aware of these concerns, Prime Minister Abe appointed a diplomat well-versed in international and constitutional law, who argued that Article 9 was de facto frozen once the United States recognized security threats derived from the Cold War, especially when the Korean War broke out and the Police Reserve Force, (the predecessor of Japan’s Self Defense Force), was established to cope with rising internal security concerns in Japan. In this regard, Abe has ended the old convention in which the director-general of the bureau was automatically chosen from inside the bureau according to bureaucratic rules. Since Abe became prime minister, the Cabinet Bureau has not touched upon the constitutionality of the security bills processed in these reviews. Therefore, opposition parliamentarians focused their questions on the unconstitutionality from narrowly partisan interests. Additionally, constitutional experts were summoned to present their views as part of Japanese parliamentary convention. One after another, the experts argued against the security bills on the basis of unconstitutionality, which resulted in unexpected confusion in the lower house; it appeared as though the small parliamentary minorities might usurp the National Diet to
Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Foreign Policy Line after the Cold War,” in Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Troubled Triangle: Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan and China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 35-62. 13 Ibid.; Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan in 2012: Voters Swing, and Swing Away Soon,” Asian Survey, 53 No. 1 (2013): 65-73. 14 Shiro Armstrong, “Economic embrace is warm enough to thaw the politics,” East Asia Forum Quarterly 7, No. 3 (2015): 29-30. 12
[24] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Inoguchi | Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat
kill the security bills. Notwithstanding this confusion and despite the odds, Abe was determined to pass these bills. Abe was, however, forced to compromise on two issues. The first compromise is related to constitutional interpretation, while the second has to do with the capability and training of the Self Defense Force (SDF). The Cabinet Legislative Bureau chief informed Abe prior to the parliamentary sessions that constitutional interpretation cannot be overstretched under certain circumstances, and Defense Minister Gen Nakatani conceded that the SDF did not have the capacity to meet various assignments that—per the security bills—the SDF would be expected to carry out. Thus, Abe had to take a step back. Next, the upper house session proceeded. Instead of constitutional pundits, national security experts were summoned to present their views on the security bills. From September 19, 2015, thousands of protestors surrounded the National Diet, and yet the upper house passed the proposed bills. To Abe, some of the legislative entanglements were a surprise since he had been confident in the coalition’s parliamentary majority in the lower house, particularly following his successful speech to the U.S. Congress in April 2015. To understand Abe’s confusion, I need to review the immediate postwar arrangements covering the emperor’s status, Article 9 of the Constitution, and Japan’s alliance with the United States. I will briefly show that the three arrangements have continuously functioned as key parameters of Japanese politics. The postwar arrangements after the defeat, including the Constitution, (especially the Constitution’s treatment of the emperor’s status and sovereign matters of war and peace), and the alliance are intricately entangled and had to be settled—if hastily and provisionally—in the initial period of occupation.15 Emperor Showa was astute in persuading both General Douglas MacArthur and the Japanese citizens of the indispensability of the emperor despite war responsibility issues.16 The emperor’s role became strictly symbolic, rather than substantive. Sovereign matters of war and peace were settled in Article 9—that is, non-possession of armed forces and non-resort to war to settle international disputes. Given the Japanese decision-making record of hiding and plotting behind the name of the emperor—who was the sovereign monarch as well as commander in chief—and given the combat resilience and tenacity of Japanese fighters even during desperate situations, the symbolic emperor and the no-war Constitution were American proposals for the new Constitution before other Allies joined the process of decision-making. The entire Japanese archipelago was occupied between 1945 and 1952.17 The Amami islands (northern Ryukyus) were occupied until 1953. The Okinawa islands were
Takashi Inoguchi, “1945: Post-Second World War Japan,” The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy, ed. Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012): 304-311. 16 Following World War II, the American occupation sought to ensure that the emperor was exonerated of any responsibility for Japan’s wartime policies. Narahiko Toyoshita, “Showa tenno no sengo Nihon [Japan after the War under Emperor Showa]” (Tokyo: Iwatani Shoten, 2015). 17 Ibid. 15
Winter 2016 [25]
Policy Forum
occupied until 1972. During the Korean War, all the U.S. bases were utilized for war execution. When the war was nearly over, Japan was granted independence. During the Vietnam War, Okinawa military bases were heavily used for war execution. When the war was almost over, Okinawa was to be returned to Japan on the condition that U.S. military bases and facilities would be used continuously by the United States and would retain special privileges akin to extraterritoriality and tariff autonomy. Since February 1979, East Asia has registered virtually no war-related deaths except in that between North and South Korea—which is more or less a domestic civil war—and between China and Vietnam. Thus, what Timo Kivimaki calls the “Long East Asian peace” since 1979 continues through today.18 When Abe became prime minister in 2006, rumor spread that he might lead Japan in a more nationalistic direction with heavy militarization. The rumor turned out to be false, at least in the short term. Abe was prompt in moving the country toward reconciliation with China, in sharp contrast to his predecessor, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine. When Abe returned to power in late 2012, the rumor again immediately spread that he would lead the country in such a direction, bolstered by his decision to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on December 29, 2013—one year after becoming prime minister.19 As mentioned previously, Abe had not paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine during Abe I from 2006 to 2007—a fact that he sought to make up for once the opportunity presented itself. When Abe II started on December 26, 2012, the mood was extremely unfavorable to Abe since his predecessor Yoshihiko Noda and Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao blew up disputes surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in autumn 2012.20 Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was perhaps overwhelmed by Chinese citizens’ outburst of anger and outrage against Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s nationalization of the disputed islands, which were under Japanese control in October 2012.21 After witnessing large-scale demonstrations and violent activities against Japanese shops and factories in China, Xi learned a lesson and took a different route. Xi’s assertive diplomacy, combined with his consolidation of internal security, might well have originated as he watched these events unfold in autumn 2012. No incidents took place on December 29, 2012, or thereafter, in China directed against Japan, except for the Chinese government’s harshest denunciation of
Takashi Inoguchi, “Uncertain Times Cast a Cloud Over Happiness in Asia.” In 2012, the Japanese government nationalized some of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This was done in an attempt to preempt efforts on the part of nationalist Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to purchase some of the islands with private money. While the goal of the Noda government’s decision to purchase the islands was to bolster Japan-China relations, the result was actually a significant rise in tensions. 21 Takashi Inoguchi, “Uncertain Times Cast a Cloud Over Happiness in Asia.” 19 20
[26] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Inoguchi | Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat
Japan.22 Then from January 2013 onward, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Navy and Maritime Policing Agency’s armed vessels took aggressive action against their Japanese counterparts. Chinese Naval vessels set fire control radar targeting against Japanese vessels. Then, on February 1, 2013, the PLA Liberation Daily carried an article penned by the PLA Air Force, which reported that a simulation of the Chinese Air Force versus the U.S.-Japan combined Air Force ended in the former’s devastating defeat.23 Following this report, the PLA Air Force proceeded to visibly and repeatedly risk the “unusual approach” to the Japanese air force aircraft. When the Chinese government announced its Air Identification Defense Zone (AIDZ) in the East China Sea, the United States responded by flying a bomber aircraft over the AIDZ. Although China shifted its focus to the South China Sea, Chinese actions in the East China Sea continued, including constructing oil rigs and militarily threatening Japanese vessels and aircraft.24 By August 2015 when the statement was released, both Japan and China intermittently resumed moves toward reconciliation. They steadily expanded trade, investment, and related economic transactions, registering one of the largest and most dynamic bilateral economic partnerships in the world. Yet, Japan has simultaneously focused defense spending on improving the quality of weapons and training for forces, which is revealing of the mood in Japan. Yet, it is also important to note that Japan has actually reduced its defense spending from $45 billion in 2005 to $42 billion in 2016. Alternatively, China’s defense budget is set to rise from $30 billion in 2005 to $140 billion in 2016.25 It is clear that the Abe II administration resembles the Abe I administration in terms of Abe’s policy towards China, specifically reconciliation, an incremental increase in weapons and improved quality of armed forces training, as well as stagnation in the quantity of defense spending.26 This similarity is the result of the trio of post-war arrangements and their limitation of Abe’s goals—a result that has been reinforced by a less-than-strong economic comeback, despite high-levels of quantitative easing since March 2013. The subsequent paragraphs will further explore why the Abe I and Abe II administrations have exhibited similar outcomes.
Shortly after Abe’s visit, China summoned Japan’s Beijing envoy to lodge a “strong protest.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said Beijing seriously condemned the visit. “This poses a major political obstacle in the improvement of bilateral relations. Japan must take responsibility for all the consequences that this creates,” he said. See “China Condemns Japan PM Shinzo Abe’s Yasukuni Shrine Visit,” BBC News, December 26, 2013. 23 Jiefang Junbao, “Nankong yanyu zhang chuxian jiang yinyu di sanfan moni yuji jibo jiluo, [During Air Force military exercise in the Nanjing Air Force Area, a third party speaking in English appeared and an Airborne Early Warning craft was shot down],” February 1, 2013. 24 Takashi Inoguchi and Ankit Panda (forthcoming), “Japanese Perspectives about the South China Sea.” 25 “Less of the Same,” The Economist, 79. 26 Abe I refers to the first Abe administration from 2006 to 2007, while Abe II refers to the current Abe administration. 22
Winter 2016 [27]
Policy Forum
To explain the similarity between the Abe I and Abe II administrations, it is instructive to delve deeper into the three key issues of 2015: the emperor’s status, Article 9 of the Constitution, and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Judging from Abe’s oft-used phrases like “I am the top leader” or “I am in charge” or “the problem is under control,” Abe might have overestimated the power of prime minister in Japanese politics before security-related legislation was carried out in the National Diet, especially after his very successful speech at the U.S. Congress.27 The trio of postwar arrangements has remained up to today. First, Emperor Akihito—along with Empress Michiko—has emerged as a key defender of the postwar trilateral arrangement. For years, the emperor and empress have been most arduous expressing their deep remorse and compassion for those killed in the battlefields of the Pacific, as well as for those who have suffered from disasters like the March 11, 2011 East Japan earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power destruction. Remolding Article 9 in a fundamental way and nullifying no-resort to war could place the arrangement of the 1946 Supreme Commander for the Allied Power’s (SCAP) “democratization and demilitarization” in limbo. Article 9 and SCAP are linked tightly but subtly; if “no resort to war” is fundamentally changed, then “the symbolic emperor” may, too, experience a fundamental change.28 The “substantive emperor” could then re-emerge as a possibility, which may lead some to think that an incremental and concerted metamorphosis of the emperor’s status, Article 9, and the U.S.-Japan alliance might be an option in the future. Second, many laws are connected to Article 9. Although it is not well-known, it is significant to point out that neither the honor of those killed in war-related duties nor the compensation given to those families left behind have been enshrined in law. Japanese citizens are not oblivious to how the Japanese government has differentiated in its treatment of soldiers and officers after the war. For example, when a Japanese police officer was killed during the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to Cambodia, the Japanese government gave what is considered a high honor to the individual killed, as well as significant compensation for his family members.29 Yet, if he had been a SDF officer, the state would not have bestowed such a high honor or granted significant compensation for family dependents. The general interpretation is that the Constitution prohibits such actions. Therefore, some of the assignments relating to the SDF’s expeditionary nature that the government initially intended to legislate have been limited or removed due to the harsh criticism of security legislation inside and outside of the National Diet. Third, of all laws and agreements connected to the alliance, perhaps the most significant are agreements such as the Special Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States about the provision of weapons and materials to Japan.
“Abe Claims Fukushima Radioactive Water Woes Are Under Control,” Japan Times, October 16, 2013. 28 Takashi Inoguchi and Ankit Panda, “Japanese Perspectives about the South China Sea.” 29 Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s United Nations Peacekeeping and Other Operations,” International Journal 50, No. 2 (1995): 325-342. 27
[28] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Inoguchi | Abe’s Leadership and the Legacy of Japan’s Defeat
Although the alliance was revised in 1960 to enable the United States to help Japan deter and resist potential aggressors, the United States government is happy to receive what is called an omoiyari (sympathy) budget from the Japanese government, covering such items as military base rents, Japanese employees’ services, electricity, and training camp relocation fees. The United States government wants the Japanese government budget on this item to increase to some $300,000 dollars from the current $200,000 dollars for the 2015 fiscal year.30 The U.S. “rebalancing” policy, despite the overall U.S. federal government budget squeezing, leads the United States government to demand a larger omoiyari budget from the Japanese government. It seems, at least in the short term, that Emperor Akihito’s uncompromising pacifism by example, the public’s instinctive and somewhat atavistic anti-militarism, and the United States’ quiet determination to preserve U.S. primacy in the region have kept the trilateral arrangement rock solid. The short-term outcome of security legislation is thus described in terms of “evolutionary change” or “Abe the evolutionary.”31 Broadly speaking, the trio of immediate postwar arrangements limited the security legislation, and is also responsible for Abe’s confusion regarding the difficulty of passing such legislation. Ultimately, this limitation is the reason that Abe II parallels Abe I, provided that the economic policy was insufficient and only helped Abe to pass the security legislation with some setbacks to the original thrust of the legislation. Since 1938, mankind has trended towards fewer war-related deaths on an annual basis—dropping from five million deaths per year over the years 1938 to 1945, to 10,000 war-related deaths per year since 1989.32 The Abe Statement is broadly in harmony with this trend. Needless to say, the future trend of human collective violence remains to be carefully watched in the dynamic and diverse East Asia region, which currently represents the heights and depths of global economic prosperity coupled with a deep sense of mutual distrust and hyper insecurity among states. In summary, several core elements have and continue to influence Abe’s leadership progression. First, Abe was keenly aware that his loyal supporters should be considered immediately following his inauguration. While his trip to the Yasukuni Shrine was politically applauded, it carried with it numerous consequences. The visit has drawn enduring criticism from Chinese, Korean, and, most importantly, Japanese citizens who suspect Abe of revisionist tendencies, which has ultimately prevented him from fully exercising his leadership. Secondly, Abe learned from his grandfather that citizens’ economic purses must be taken care of before a leader can pursue any political agenda,
“Omoiyari yosan gengaku teian [omoiyari budget reduction proposed],” Mainichi Shimbun. Jennifer Lind, “Japan’s Security Evolution, Not Revolution,” Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2015; Adam Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe Evolutionary,” The Washington Quarterly 38, No. 2 (2015): 79-99. 32 The world saw five million war-related deaths per year from 1938 to 1945; 100,000 war-related deaths per year from 1945 to 1989; and 10,000 war-related deaths per year since 1989. See “War Occurrence: Hyper-Insecurity and Multilateral Institutions,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 16, No. 3 (2015): 388-398; Takashi Inoguchi, “Uncertain Times Cast a Cloud Over Happiness in Asia.” 30 31
Winter 2016 [29]
Policy Forum
including the security legislation. While this brilliant political strategy facilitates policy preparation, Abe is well advised to note that the market has its own illogic in an era of uncertainty, unpredictability, and unexpected risks.33 Thirdly, Abe’s security legislation was successful because of his pragmatic willingness to take two steps forward and one step backward. The trio of the immediate postwar arrangements—the emperor’s status, Article 9, and the alliance with the United States—turned out to be solid, while Emperor Akihito’s pacifism, citizens’ apprehension of war, and the United States’ determination to maintain primacy are all structurally deep. What can we expect of Abe in the future? Two key factors loom large. First, Japanese citizens’ continued high-level support for Abe cannot be assured as the “new normal” economies of the world—including the G-7 and emerging economies, but excluding China—fail to register significant annual growth rates. Public approval of Abe’s leadership rests on successful economic reforms, which have not yet been realized.34 The second critical factor is the international security environment, specifically that of East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, which does not bode well for future stability. Going forward, Japan must augment its ability to defend and deter against threats, as well as articulate the nation’s position and vision in a manner that encourages global citizens to join Japan’s endeavor for peace and stability over the next seventy years.
Takashi Inoguchi, a Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo; former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations; President of the University of Niigata Prefecture; a prolific author and (co-)editor of books and articles on political theory, comparative politics, and international relations as well as Japanese politics and international relations. He has been Director of the AsiaBarometer project since 2002 and is the founding editor of three journals: Japanese Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press), International Relations of the Asia Pacific (Oxford University Press), and Asian Journal of Comparative Politics (Sage Publications).
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (London: Random House, 2007); Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Foreign Policy Line after the Cold War.” 34 “Less of the Same,” The Economist, 79. 33
[30] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Johnson | Chinese Leadership Under Xi Jinping
A Pragmatic Approach to Power Chinese Leadership Under President Xi Jinping An Interview with Christopher K. Johnson
In this interview, Christopher Johnson discusses some of the earlier formative experiences that may have shaped the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s political beliefs and policy preferences. Johnson’s measured analysis of Xi’s approach to power and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s dependency on public approval provides valuable insight into the inner workings of the CCP. The interview concludes by examining Xi’s relations with other leaders in Asia, including President Park Geun-hye of South Korea and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India.
Journal: Perhaps we could begin by discussing some of the earlier formative experiences that shaped Xi Jinping’s leadership style. What is Xi’s approach to policymaking and which core principles guide his political beliefs? Johnson: On Xi’s formative experiences, there are two tone-setting aspects. First, he grew up during the 1950s in the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, so there was a certain headiness in that experience. Going from basically nothing to sitting in the Imperial Palace must have been quite an experience for Xi. Obviously, that’s also where Xi formed a lot of the critical bonds that he still enjoys with princelings, primarily, but with others as well.1 So, the 1950s was crucial—a lofty and exciting period that Xi references regularly in his speeches.
“Princeling” is an informal term that refers to the descendants of influential senior communist officials in the Communist Party of China. 1
Winter 2016 [31]
Policy Forum
Secondly, I think the corollary to his experience growing up in the Zhongnanhai compound is the purge of Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, and being “sent down” to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution.2 Being a “sent-down youth” impacted Xi in a variety of ways. The major lesson for him was that Chinese politics is a risky business. Xi understands that if he is going to play the political game, then he better fight hard and come out on top. Xi also understands that he is operating in a system with no—or at least very few—rules, which I think guides a lot of his actions. We see this, for example, with the anti-corruption campaign, where the goal is to keep all of his opponents or detractors off balance. Xi keeps a perpetual-motion machine constantly churning.3 After spending five years as understudy to former President Hu Jintao, one of the chief lessons Xi took away was the following: don’t be too deliberative, otherwise the others will coalesce against you. Journal: It is difficult to talk about China under Xi without noting his anti-corruption campaign. In your assessment, would a campaign of this size and scale be possible with a different leader? Johnson: I doubt it. Xi seems to have mobilized resources in a unique way. There were anti-corruption campaigns under former leaders Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, but they were campaigns with defined start and end points. One could argue that those campaigns were more political because they were designed to help the leaders consolidate power, especially given that both leaders ran their campaigns relatively early on in their tenures. Frankly, I think a lot of officials thought that Xi’s campaign was similar in that respect; many officials assumed that if they kept their heads down and waited it out, then the campaign would end once Xi successfully consolidated power. Apparently, there are still people who think the anti-corruption campaign will come to an end at some point, but I don’t see that happening. If anything, anti-corruption efforts seem to be ramping up yet again. For example, look at what’s happened in the financial sector over the last couple of weeks.4 We have also recently seen the detentions of major stateowned enterprise (SOE) chiefs. Xi’s campaign is more pervasive, certainly in the military, which I think would have been the challenging part. When Jiang Zemin effectively forced the military out of business in 1998, large compensation was given, not too many arrests were made, and The term “sent-down youth” (zhiqing) refers to the young individuals who were sent to the rural countryside as part of Mao Zedong’s “Down to the Countryside Movement,” which aimed to root out the bourgeois mindset. Approximately seventeen million youth, including many in current Chinese leadership, were sent down as a result of this policy. 3 Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign began after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012. Under Xi’s guidance as general secretary, more than 100 high-ranking officials and 100,000 people have been indicted for corruption. 4 In the wake of the stock market’s tumble this past the summer, the government cracked down on traders suspected of fraud and irregularities. In November 2015, authorities detained Xu Xiang, who runs the hedge-fund Zexi Investment, for suspected insider training and stock-price manipulation, which served as a clear warning to other financial industry professionals. 2
[32] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Johnson | Chinese Leadership Under Xi Jinping
so on. However, one could argue that, even after these efforts, corruption still prospered under Jiang Zemin. Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, for example, were both his close supporters. So, either Jiang Zemin knew about their corruption and tolerated it, or he didn’t know about it—both of which are fairly damning. Xi Jinping has definitely taken a more severe approach regarding anti-corruption efforts in the military. He has also taken a different approach in the security services. One could argue that what makes Xi’s campaign unique is that he is doing a lot of the damage in the most sensitive areas. Journal: In terms of the anti-corruption campaign, what is Xi’s endgame? Johnson: I think Xi is trying to accomplish a couple of things. A challenge right now is that folks want to distill the anti-corruption campaign down to one or two motivations, painting the campaign as either purely crass and political with Xi as a megalomaniac like Mao, or as an attempt to ultimately establish the rule of law in China. My view is that it’s much more complicated and nuanced. For one, Xi’s motivations differ by the level of the target. Certainly at the so-called “tiger” level—the high level officials—the campaign is pretty political, so we don’t see many friends of Xi being wrapped up at the high levels.5 At the “flies” level—the mid-and-lower-level officials—I think his motivation is very different. The campaign at this lower level is designed to end practices that are alienating the Party from the public. One of the key messages of the anti-corruption campaign is changing the so-called “ugly face of the regime,” which includes shakedowns for licenses (or whatever else officials might need), the selling of hukou, and the public security bureau’s harassment of the people. All low-level forms of graft are problematic for the regime, and the campaign is, in part, a classic Chinese tactic to convince people that the emperor is great, and that it is actually the local officials who are evil and corrupt. Yet, the campaign at the “tiger” level indicates that it is more than just pure politics. The Chinese public likes the blood sport of purging high-level officials, so it is effective. But, targeting all of these senior-level officials, including people in the Politburo Standing Committee, reveals that corruption reaches all the way to the top. At some point the public might begin to think that the entire apple barrel is rotten and needs to be tipped over. Xi must be aware of this risk, so I think this speaks to his greater tolerance for risk than Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin. Journal: How does Mao Zedong’s legacy live on today in Xi’s China? In what ways do we see the Cultural Revolution linger on in current political practices? Johnson: I think the legacy lives on in several ways. Xi has been very clear since he came into power that you cannot separate the first thirty years of the regime from what happened afterward. In fact, the so-called Document No. 9 that was released publicly
Throughout the anti-corruption campaign, Xi has vowed to target both “tigers” and “flies,” which respectively refers to powerful senior officials and low-level bureaucrats. 5
Winter 2016 [33]
Policy Forum
in 2013 by the propaganda types in the Party remains a theme that Xi harps on publicly as well.6 Xi fundamentally rejects the notion that Mao was bad, and everything after Deng was good. However, the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth in December 2013 presented a real opportunity if Xi wanted to go “big time” on the Mao cult, but instead he kept it fairly understated. Another subtle example of Mao’s lingering presence occurred when Xi sent a wreath to Maoist ideologue Deng Liqun’s funeral. Deng very diligently went after Xi’s father in the 1950s and 1960s, yet Xi sent the wreath anyway. So, Xi is very much balancing the factional pieces within the Party. I think what’s interesting is that China currently has a generation of fairly senior-level officials who have all had some kind of formative experience related to the Cultural Revolution. These officials were scapegoated, sent down to the countryside, or some combination of both. There is a greater sensitivity among those who experienced the Cultural Revolution—academics and officials alike—to signs of reemergence. Given the current atmosphere, many are watching and wondering whether China is heading in that direction. Some of the “god-king” elements of Xi Jinping’s leadership style do cause people to worry, but their worry is not so much that the phenomenon of the Cultural Revolution is happening again. Instead, they worry that the effort after the Cultural Revolution to prevent such a concentration of power has come under some form of assault. Typically, when a top leader runs into problems politically—if the problems are severe and the leader is powerful enough—then a full-scale assault on the bureaucracy comes next. Based on what did and did not come out of the Fifth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, we are seeing signs of a potential bureaucratic shake-up. And that would certainly have Cultural Revolution undertones. Journal: When Xi replaced predecessor Hu Jintao in 2012, a flurry of reports attempted to answer the question, “Who is Xi Jinping?” Many scholars predicted Xi would be a reformer, while others remained skeptical. Today, analysis of Xi and the future trajectory of the Communist Party of China (CPC) remains fairly divided. In your opinion, what is the biggest misconception about Xi? Johnson: A huge misconception is that Xi is weaker than he appears. I don’t know if that is actually the biggest misconception, but I would say it is the riskiest misconception. Xi is powerful enough to affect change in the way that he wants. If the analysis is that Xi is weak and manipulated by other forces, then there is an underlying notion that Xi would act in accordance with what others such as the United States want—if only he weren’t constrained by forces like the military or SOE chiefs. That is not correct. Xi is the force directing a majority of what we are currently seeing in China. I think Document No. 9, also known as “Concerning the Situation in the Ideological Sphere,” is a document first published in July 2012 and circulated within the Communist Party of China. The document warns of seven dangerous values, including Western constitutional democracy and criticism of the Party’s past errors. 6
[34] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Johnson | Chinese Leadership Under Xi Jinping
the other common misconception is that Xi is a megalomaniac—a power-mad, Maolike figure. My view is that Xi remains a pragmatist at his core, and that his concentration of power is a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. Journal: How has Xi concentrated and consolidated his power since he became general secretary? Johnson: There are three key factors. The first is Xi’s ability to exploit his background. I would argue that Xi’s “princeling” status gives him a unique understanding of the way the Chinese system works, and how to manipulate it. In other words, the princeling status gives him what you might call a “DNA map” that is particular to those who have spent their lives steeped in the system—a network of insiders, particularly across key bureaucracies such as the military, Party organs, and even business. This network is something that recent predecessors like Hu Jintao did not enjoy upon arrival and instead had to attempt to build. Even Jiang Zemin had to build the so-called “Jianghai” group over time.7 Xi’s connections have helped him do certain things right from the beginning, including immediately securing the Central Military Commission chairmanship and establishing leading groups like the National Security Commission and the Comprehensively Deepening Reform Leading Group. The National Security Commission was something that both Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin tried to form, but couldn’t accomplish in their tenures. The National Security Commission and leading groups have been a real enabler for Xi’s further concentration of power. The second factor is decisiveness. Xi has moved quickly. My sense is that Xi was working with a kitchen cabinet group of advisors who had a fully-baked plan by the time he became general secretary. There’s no way anyone could come up with something as comprehensive as the Third Plenum document during the first year in power while also trying to consolidate authority—unless they already had 80 percent of the plan in the can before arriving. Xi’s initial remarks on the day he was elected general secretary clearly signaled the direction that the Party would head. The third and final element is the coercive toolkit that Xi has developed. There are three aspects to this toolkit: the anticorruption campaign, the mass-line effort, and the stultifying political retrenchment. All three parts have been designed to instill a lot of fear in officialdom in order to make officials believe that they are in an unsteady position. Journal: U.S.-China relations are strained due to disagreements over cybersecurity, human rights, and maritime security, with some experts even going so far as to call the recent atmosphere a “tipping point” in U.S.-China relations. What role will individual leaders play in resolving rising tensions? Ideally, what should we see from the Obama and Xi administrations in order to manage these tensions? The “Jianghai group,” also called to as the “Jiang clique” or “Shanghai clique,” refers to a group of officials who rose to power in connection to the Shanghai municipal administration under former General Secretary Jiang Zemin. 7
Winter 2016 [35]
Policy Forum
Johnson: I think we are seeing some attempts to manage tensions, but the challenge is that the Obama-Xi summit in September provided the last opportunity within President Obama’s tenure to set things on a more strategic plane. I think the summit was a missed opportunity. Although President Xi and President Obama are able to meet at the G-20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, these gatherings are generally single-hour meetings, most of which is consumed by translation and the exchange of “must-do” talking points. In reality, these meetings allow for less than fifteen minutes of actual conversation, as opposed to the hours that were available during the various summits. My sense is that few understandings were reached at the most recent summit in September 2015, especially on critical issues such as cybersecurity and freedom of navigation. A challenge is that, on the one hand, the two nations must resolve some of these issues because they are sensitive at a senior level. Yet, on the other hand, we have the presidents of these two powerful countries and economies talking about extremely “in the weeds” stuff, such as construction on reefs in the South China Sea and specific cybersecurity cases. My question is this: where were the mid-level officials who are supposed to clear the underbrush so that senior leaders can do what they need to do? I think a big part of the answer is Xi’s concentration of power. Nobody in the Chinese system today wants to take a risk and say, for example, “I’ve got a great idea on cyber,” unless they know Xi’s exact mindset on the matter. However, I think something we saw coming out of the summit was a commitment to try and emphasize the positive. Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recently gave a public speech that heavily emphasized the positives in the relationship, while also being very clear about the United States’ “nogos,” particularly on cyber and freedom of navigation. My sense is that U.S.-China relations are going to be pretty testy, because it’s too late in the administration for someone on the Obama side to be named a “China Czar,” if you will (and that is a very tricky thing to do). I think that needs to be done, but it probably will wait until the next administration. However, even then it’s unclear if the new administration would have the thought or desire to name a “China Czar.” I think we need something beyond the mechanisms we already have because current mechanisms are not solving these problems. We have the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the JCC ( Joint Coordination Committee meetings under the U.S.-China Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement), and various working-level meetings where groups of people decamp from their respective capitals to meet. While good stuff happens at these meetings, this process doesn’t deal with the fundamental issues. To deal with fundamental issues, I think we need more high-level engagement; yet, the reality is that both President Xi and President Obama are busy. We need individuals just below that most senior level—people who are trusted by their respective leaders—to have a continuing dialogue. That’s my sense of what is necessary, but I don’t think we’ll see any changes to the U.S.-China engagement process until the changeover following the U.S. election.
[36] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Johnson | Chinese Leadership Under Xi Jinping
Journal: Switching gears, what is your analysis of Xi’s relations with other leaders in Asia? For example, in September, Xi declared the China-ROK relationship “the best-ever national relationship in history.” Xi also recently met with President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan. How else do we see Xi building strategic relations in the region, and are these relationships sustainable? Johnson: Xi’s relationship-building efforts are an example of risk-taking. The Ma-Xi hui (Ma-Xi meeting) is certainly a risk, though some would argue less so because Xi is engaging with a leader who is leaving office before long. It’s hard for me to tell whether that meeting is more of a Hail Mary pass to help the Kuomintang Party (KMT), or whether Xi actually thought it was the right thing to do.8 Either way, it was a bold move. I don’t think, for example, Hu Jintao would have met with Ma Ying-jeou. Of course, there was likely a lot of talk upfront and the meeting was largely just for show— but Xi still did it, which was risky. As for China’s relationship with South Korea, I think this is a situation in which President Park Geun-hye is trying to walk a fine line between acknowledging South Korea’s economic dependency on China, yet remain close to the United States in the security sphere. My own view is that after Xi and Park meet, they both walk away saying, “I got what I wanted.” It’s that kind of relationship. When Xi diverted into a security-oriented space at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and asked whether Park would sign the CICA Joint Communique, which included language on “Asia for Asians,” the answer from South Korea was “no.” I think “no” will continue to be South Korea’s answer on the security side. Their relationship becomes more complicated on issues like the 2015 China Victory Day Parade. I thought it was strange that President Park chose to attend, but I think the goal was really to demonstrate “South Korea is here, while North Korea is either absent or their representative is seventeen rows back.” The interesting piece will be whether South Korea views China as the answer to their North Korea problem, as opposed to relying on the U.S.-led alliance structure. China’s relations with nations throughout the region are difficult, but Xi recently had good meetings with Singapore and Vietnam. I think China’s relationship with Vietnam will be driven by Vietnam’s own political transition process. If the current Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung becomes the party secretary, that could make things more complicated, because he is more on the pro-United States side than the pro-China side. The current sitting party secretary is more the latter, so we will have to wait and see. China’s relationship with India is very interesting. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi shouldn’t be getting along. I think there is a mutual recognition that they both sort of hate each other, but they find a way to at least have a fairly viable commercial relationship. At the time of this interview, the ruling KMT party and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were gearing up for elections in January 2016. The DPP is known for its pro-independence stance. 8
Winter 2016 [37]
Policy Forum
Modi’s pragmatic approach towards a relationship with Xi should serve as a lesson for those in the U.S. strategic community who seek to return to the “democratic pincer movement” in order to ensnare China between Japan and India. India is not going to play that game. There has been a lot of criticism surrounding Xi’s foreign policy, but I come back to the core point that it has been at least reasonably effective. One issue we hear frequently is that China’s foreign policy is counterproductive. Perhaps, but China is getting away with it so far. For example, take Scarborough Shoal in the Philippines: the facts are that it used to be controlled by the Philippines and now it’s controlled by China, resulting in the first handover of a land feature in twenty-odd years without firing a shot—and without any consequences. So, I think Xi’s steady game plan has some effectiveness to it. Of course, the economy remains a big piece of this plan. Regional neighbors feel more bound to China when the economy is doing well because they want to take advantage of this economic opportunity. The effort on the Chinese part becomes more complicated if there is a serious slowdown in the economy because then the snarling teeth show more than the outstretched hand.
Christopher K. Johnson is a senior adviser and holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. An accomplished Asian affairs specialist, Mr. Johnson spent nearly two decades serving in the U.S. government’s intelligence and foreign affairs communities and has extensive experience analyzing and working in Asia on a diverse set of country-specific and transnational issues. He has frequently advised senior White House, cabinet, congressional, military, and foreign officials on the Chinese leadership and on Beijing’s foreign and security policies.
Christopher Johnson was interviewed by Kenneth Lee and Alex Rued on November 9, 2015.
[38] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kim | South Korean Youth in Crisis
South Korean Youth in Crisis Implications for Political Leadership Jiyoon Kim At the end of the year, the mass media in Korea was busy picking up keywords that describe Korean society in the year 2015. For Koreans in their twenties, one of the most referred-to buzzwords is “hell-Chosun.” This bizarre combination of two words—”hell” and “Chosun”—circulated widely among the young generation. “Hell” implies all the negative and depressing features of South Korean society today. For example, South Korean teenagers have to study at hak-won (private tutoring institutions) after school and are only able to go home around midnight—all for the goal of getting into a prestigious college. College graduates, of course, have their own competition of acquiring a secure and well-paying job. But the most serious problem is that these efforts do not necessarily guarantee success. It is not so difficult to imagine then why many young people in South Korea are pessimistic about their own futures and the society in which they live. The other half of the phrase, “Chosun,” refers to the last dynasty of the Korean monarchy. The term is frequently used to insinuate that, like the Chosun dynasty, the Korean government today is unable to cope with global trends. From its conception, the Chosun dynasty subordinated itself to China’s Ming dynasty, promising gifts in exchange for the Ming court’s approval. In addition, Chosun society was pre-modern: it had a strong class system, severe gender inequality, and poor leadership. Because of this “humiliating” history, “Chosun” is not a flattering term—particularly when used by progressives in Korea. The fact that this word is being invoked today, with all of its negative connotations, again underlines the unease and anxiety that South Korean youth are feeling toward their society. Another buzzword related to this phenomenon is the so-called “spoon theory,” which stems from the well-known English idiom of “born with a silver spoon.” South Korean youths creatively developed a theory to classify “spoons” into three types: a gold spoon, a silver spoon, and a dirt spoon. A gold or silver spoon refers to people born to a wealthy or relatively well-off family. On the other hand, a dirt spoon indicates someone born to a low-income family—someone who will ultimately have to make a living on
Winter 2016 [39]
Policy Forum
their own. “Spoon theory” acts as a reminder of the country’s inequality and it not only discourages South Korean youth, but also their parents, who often feel guilty for not providing their kids with so-called gold or silver spoons. Inheritance of Wealth and the Myth of the Self-Made Man Both “hell-Chosun” and the “spoon theory” indicate the demoralized state of the South Korean youth. Older generations worked hard and sacrificed much in order to escape from absolute poverty. Their experiences suggested that if individuals simply try hard, society will reward them with a chance to become rich and successful. They believed that while life was tough, they had the power to determine their own futures. Unfortunately, the situation surrounding South Korean youth in 2015 is quite different. Class hierarchy is now considerably more rigid, which makes climbing the socioeconomic ladder much more difficult. Twenty years ago, college students who went to top universities were almost automatically recruited by large, major corporations and given steady jobs. Now, the best students at top universities have to compete intensely for even mediocre jobs. This is partly due to the fact that, compared to twenty years ago, a much higher number of people in their twenties now hold a bachelor’s degree. For example, only 33.2 percent of high school graduates went to college in 1990. In 2009, the amount increased to 77.8 percent. As more college students are out in the job market, competition becomes harsher.1 Another phenomenon that reflects the disenchantment of South Korea’s youth is the overwhelming number of self-help books. Many of these books are aimed at reminding young people that, while life may seem to be unfair, their situation will improve once they dedicate themselves to a particular path. For instance, the intellectual celebrity Kim Nando has published a book titled “Ap’ŭnikka Ch’ŏngch’ŭnida” (Being Young is Painful), which has sold millions of copies as a must-buy title for young South Koreans. But, contrary to what those books tell young readers, they no longer believe that dedication or commitment guarantee success. Instead, they believe that their futures— successful or unsuccessful—are predetermined by the socioeconomic status of their families. According to the 2015 Asan Annual Survey, attitudes toward the poor and the rich vary greatly across age groups.2 When asked why the rich are rich, 67.8 percent of people in their twenties answered that they are rich because they have rich parents. This number was even higher among those in their thirties, scoring 76.4 percent. On the contrary, South Koreans who are sixty or older showed a more optimistic view by answering that rich people worked hard to become rich. As for why the poor are poor, 49.4 percent of South Korean youth answered that the poor must have parents who are also poor. Again, 54.2 percent of people in their thirties answered the same way. H. Kim, T. Hwang, and Y. Jang, “Ch’ŏngnyŏn Ch’wiŏp Sam Nyŏn Kan Chobŭn Mun ,” Donga Daily, June 30, 2015, http://news.donga.com/3/01/20150630/72185352/1#. 2 Asan Annual Survey 2015 (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2015). 1
[40] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kim | South Korean Youth in Crisis
On the contrary, Koreans who are sixty or over stated that the poor are poor because they did not work hard. In a more direct sense, the survey asked respondents if they thought that South Korean society allows for social mobility. 56.7 percent of those in their twenties answered negatively. This pessimistic perspective is, again, more prevalent among those in their thirties. About 61 percent of the respondents in their thirties thought it was not possible for one to climb the socioeconomic ladder; the likely reason is that those in their thirties have actively participated in the labor market and so have directly confronted the class ceiling. What is most astounding is that elderly people, nearly across the board, believe that anyone in South Korean society can improve their socioeconomic situation simply through hard work. As high as 70.3 percent of those in their sixties or over agreed as such. Furthermore, many in their twenties feel that the lives of their children will not be better than their own, with 53.6 percent saying so. Again, we find a contrast with the older generation: as many as 80.8 percent of those in their sixties or older are confident that future generations will be much better off than themselves. Indifference toward Politics and Political Parties Job insecurity, a rigid class structure, endless competition, and the virtually ceaseless effort needed for daily survival have made South Korean youth apathetic toward politics and political solutions. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 74.6 percent of those in their twenties responded that they do not support any political party. 31.2 percent of them even answered that they are not at all interested in political news.3 This lack of interest in politics is also displayed in the low voter turnout by South Korean youth in elections. According to the exit poll for the Eighteenth Presidential Election in 2012, the number of individuals in their twenties who voted was 68.5 percent, which was the lowest across all age groups and lower than the average turnout of 75.8 percent.4 In general, the young generation tends to consider themselves liberal and are not particularly appreciative of conservative politics. This tendency is, of course, not exclusive to South Korean youth, but can be found practically everywhere. In any case, the ruling Saenuri Party and therefore, President Park, are not very popular among this age cohort. While the Saenuri Party has been enjoying, on average, around 30 percent of support in the Asan Annual Survey, only 11.8 percent of the young generation supported the party.3 Note that this result does not necessarily mean that the younger generation is more inclined to support the progressively-minded opposition party, the Asan Annual Survey 2015 (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2015). “Voter Turnout Data for the Republic of Korea,� International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, January 18, 2013, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=KR. 5 Asan Annual Survey 2015. 3 4
Winter 2016 [41]
Policy Forum
New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD), either. The support for them is, in fact, even lower than that for the Saenuri: only 9.1 percent of those in their twenties support the NPAD. Conservative presidents, of course, usually have trouble winning the support of younger generations, and President Park is not an exception. When asked whether or not they approved of how President Park was handling her job as president, 79.1 percent of those in their twenties disapproved. This is quite an incredible divergence from people in their sixties or older, of which 78.5 percent approved of her presidency. Considering that she garnered over 30 percent of votes from Koreans in their twenties in the 2012 presidential election, her popularity is certainly dwindling.6 Since the 2002 presidential election, in which a clear and divisive generational gap appeared, the South Korean youth has tended to support the progressive opposition party when it comes to actual voting. The Saenuri Party claims to care about increasing their share of youth voters. Yet, in reality, there is little reason to increase its popularity among the younger generation: support for President Park from the elderly is so remarkable that it needs only support from them plus a handful of youth votes to win elections. Thus, even though President Park repeatedly mentions and stresses issues like “youth unemployment” in her speeches and economic policies, she and her party have little practical reason to appeal to youth voters. Who Will Win the Youth Support? And Does It Matter? The next logical question is: which party—if any—will be successful in garnering support from the South Korean youth going forward? If the South Korean youth votes are not a priority for the Saenuri Party, does that mean the NPAD is more likely to win their support? Not necessarily. On the contrary, the NPAD is regarded as having already failed in its attempt to become a viable alternative to the Saenuri Party. Since its loss in the 2012 presidential election, the NPAD (known then the United Democratic Party and now, most recently, known as the Deobul-eo Democratic Party) has never recuperated, and its support has not exceeded 30 percent, whilst the Saenuri Party has successfully maintained approval ratings of 40 percent overall according to a Gallup poll.7 In fact, NPAD is very much seen as an “establishment party” in the eyes of many young South Koreans. Disappointed with the inattentiveness of established political elites and frustrated with their own demoralizing situation, the South Korean youth does not seem willing to lend support to any political party.8
M. H. Park, “18-dae Daeseon, Yeonryong-pyeollo Barabon Yechuk Deukpyoyul,” Newsis, December 19, 2012, http://isplus.live.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=10218036. 7 Han’gukkaellŏp Teilli Op’iniŏn 2014 Nyŏn 1~8 Wŏl Wŏlgan T’onghap – 2013 Nyŏn Chuyo Wŏlgan Chip’yo Ch’ui P’oham,” Gallup Korea Daily Opinion (blog), Gallup, September 12, 2014, http://gallupkorea.blogspot.kr/2014/09/2014-18-2013.html. 8 This is how Ahn Cheol-soo came into the political scene. Ahn, as an outsider to politics, received huge support from the younger generation. 6
[42] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Kim | South Korean Youth in Crisis
In her speech at the National Assembly in 2015, President Park used the term “youth” thirty-seven times—more than the number of times she said “people.”9 However, there is criticism that her policies are not lining up with the contents of her speech. She somehow linked youth issues—particularly youth unemployment—to the enforcement of labor reforms, which is her primary policy goal during the remainder of her term. In addition, while the welfare budget for citizens over sixty-five in 2015 was approximately 1,100 U.S. dollars (1.3 million won) per capita, budget outlay for the youth employment program was only about 230 U.S. dollars (260,000 won) per capita.10 The same goes for NPAD, for they, too, fail to provide realistic policy options. Why are both the current government and the NPAD neglecting youth issues? For one, parties have to be efficient in distributing their resources in order to attract the electorate, and it is likely that this logic determines the neglect of South Korean youth. Keep in mind that the number of voters varies significantly across different age groups. According to the 2015 population survey, Koreans in their twenties only constitute 16 percent of total eligible voters. Whereas the largest electorate group, at 23 percent of total eligible voters, are those in their sixties or over. To make matters worse, Koreans in their twenties do not turn out to vote to the same degree that voters in their sixties do. Therefore, from a political and electoral perspective, it may be rational for political elites to pay less attention to the South Korean youth while, at the same time, paying lip service to youth issues. After all, a political party’s primary goal is to be elected.11 Why the Youth Still Matter The South Korean electorate generally determines how they vote based on only a few criteria. One of the most well-known criteria is national security and, to be more specific, the government’s stance toward North Korea. Traditionally, conservatives prefer a hardline policy toward North Korea, whereas liberals tend to prefer engagement with the North. Interestingly enough, the young South Koreans most likely to label themselves as liberal today are as conservative and hawkish toward North Korea as individuals over sixty years old.12 This appears to be good news for the ruling conservative Saenuri Party. The twist, however, is that national security issues and government policy towards North Korea are not as important as they once were. Currently, the most important election issue is the country’s economic welfare. For example, according to the Asan Institute’s opinion poll in October 2015, 39.3 percent of respondents thought that
“Address by President Park Geun-hye at the National Assembly on the Government Proposal for FY 2016 Budget Plan and Fiscal Operations,” Office of the President, last modified October 27, 2015, http://tinyurl.com/jfl5243. 10 D. Park, “Noin 1indang Bokji Yesan 130 Manwon…Ch’ŏngnyŏn Yesansui 5 Bae,” Money Today, November 12, 2015, http://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2015111004547648558. 11 See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 12 Asan Annual Survey 2015. 9
Winter 2016 [43]
Policy Forum
creating jobs was the most important issue in South Korea. Also, economic equality and income redistribution were considered important by 13.5 percent and 13.4 percent of respondents, respectively.13 In addition, the young generation is more liberal and progressive in terms of economic issues than other demographics. They emphasize the redistribution of wealth more than economic growth. But, more than that, it is clear that they long for a society that is governed by fair rules. Essentially, South Korea—a country that was once geared almost entirely towards economic growth—is changing in meaningful ways, and the young generation is driving this change. South Korea’s youth have indeed often led major political movements in the country. During South Korea’s democratization period, the youth—particularly college students—played an essential role in leading the movement. In 2002, Koreans in their twenties and thirties led the anti-American movement caused by an accident in which a U.S. armored vehicle killed two Korean junior high school students. This anti-American sentiment was translated into support for a progressive presidential candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, and it was again the South Korean youth who were at the center of that year’s election campaigns. Given the potential for South Korean youth to instigate meaningful political change in their country, it is not surprising that the disposition of the South Korean youth has been of interest to both neighboring countries and other observers, such as the United States. At this moment, though, due to the fact that young individuals constitute a relatively small fraction of South Korea’s overall voting bloc given their persistently low turnout, South Korean youth continue to remain relatively unimportant in the eyes of South Korea’s major political parties. Nonetheless, these parties’ leaders must understand that the youth will someday replace them as the leaders of their country. It is the current generation of leaders’ responsibility to leave a healthy society for the youth to lead. A significant step toward doing so would be to put more effort toward resolving the major problems currently afflicting the youth in South Korea today.
Jiyoon Kim is a research fellow of the Public Opinion and Quantitative Research Center at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, Korea. Her research interests include elections and voting behavior, distributive politics, political methodology, and Korean politics. She holds her M.P.P. from the University of California at Berkeley and received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
13
Asan Monthly Opinion Survey, October 26-28, 2015, (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2015).
[44] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Aiyar | A Tale of Two Leaders
A Tale of Two Leaders Narendra Modi and Joko Widodo Pallavi Aiyar A rarely made, yet revealing, comparison is that between maritime neighbors India and Indonesia. As populous and pluralist democracies, the two nations face similar challenges: cleaning up politics and public life, harnessing their demographic dividend to productive use, fixing creaking infrastructure, and maintaining national ideals of respecting religious freedom. These myriad parallels were brought into relief by the nearly contemporaneous elections, in mid-2014, of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Indonesian President Joko Widodo. These elections disrupted established political structures by supplanting dynasts—a prominent feature of the region’s electoral landscape—with a new breed of popular leader. Modi and Widodo are outsiders to the traditional sources of political power in their countries. Modi, a veteran politician, rose from the lower rungs of India’s caste and class hierarchies, while Widodo was the son of a carpenter before he became the mayor of Solo, a mid-sized city in central Java. Both Modi and Widodo faced opponents who were embodiments of the political establishment: Rahul Gandhi, scion of the Nehru-Gandhi family which has led India’s Congress Party since Indian independence, and Prabowo Subianto, a military general and former son-in-law of the Indonesian dictator, Suharto. The two candidates enjoyed strong grassroots support that sprung, in part, from their anti-corruption crusades and promises of a break from the venal, nepotistic politics of the past. In India, two terms of Congress Party rule under a seemingly lame-duck prime minister, Manmohan Singh, were wracked by large-scale corruption scandals that elicited major civil society protests. In Indonesia, where Suharto-era oligarchs had maintained a stranglehold on power even after the downfall of the dictator in 1998, members of all the major political parties were accused of graft by an anti-corruption commission. The calls for change that were the rallying cry of both Modi’s and Widodo’s campaigns were welcomed not only by their electorates, but also by voices around the world.
Winter 2016 [45]
Policy Forum
Foreign media portrayed them as reformers whose elevation to top posts would benefit social equity, businesses, foreign investors, and “democracy” all at once.1 The sky-high tide of contradictory expectations that attended their elections set Modi and Widodo up to disappoint—and they have. More than a year into their terms, both the Indian Prime Minister and Indonesian President have lost much of their pre-electoral sheen. They preside over stuttering economies and have found it difficult to make bold reforms. However, the superficial similarities between them should not obscure trenchant differences in temperament, political circumstances, and policy inclinations that could lead to divergent legacies and outcomes for the countries they lead. That the outcomes, so far, are not so different speaks more to the similarities between the countries—the national and global circumstances they face—than to their leaders. Leadership Styles in National Context Modi is a controlling and combative leader, while Widodo is consensual and conciliatory. In his reign as chief minister of the state of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014, the Indian prime minister acquired a reputation for governing with a firm hand, as he pursued an aggressive, pro-business agenda. Since taking charge of the country, he has ensured a concentration of powers in the prime minister’s office (PMO). Cabinet ministers, for example, are left with little elbowroom and must first secure the PMO’s approval before appointing key staff. Modi was widely described in the Indian media as running a presidential-style campaign for his election, even though India has a parliamentary system of government.2 His projection of power is physical. During the campaign, he crisscrossed the country attending thousands of events and used 3D holograms to project his image in places where he could not be present.3 Modi famously remarked that it took a man with a “fifty-six-inch chest,” a reference to his own broad torso, to bring development to the relatively backward parts of India.4 When he met with U.S. President Barack Obama in January 2015, Modi wore a suit with pinstripes that spelled out his own name in tiny gold lettering. Because of these tendencies, critics accuse Modi of megalomania.5 Neha Thirani Bagri, “Analysts Have High Hopes for Big Economic Changes Under Modi,” The New York Times, May 19, 2014; Simon Tisdall, “Joko Widodo Takes Office with Plans for Economic Growth and Political Clout,” The Guardian, October 20, 2014. 2 Unni Krishnan, “Modi Eyes South in Presidential-Style Bid to Run India,” Bloomberg Business, December 4, 2013. 3 Tom Lasseter, “India’s Top Candidate Went Full Tupac, Campaigned Via Hologram,” Bloomberg Business, May13, 2014. 4 Prasad Sanyal, “You’re Right. You Can’t Turn UP into Gujarat, Says Narendra Modi to Mulayam Singh Yadav,” NDTV, January 23, 2014. 5 Suchandana Gupta, “Modi Is a Megalomaniac, Digvijaya Singh Says,” The Times of India, January 28, 2015. 1
[46] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Aiyar | A Tale of Two Leaders
In contrast, Widodo is physically slight and unassuming in manner. He tends to eschew the tangible trappings of power like fancy cars and security details. He flew to attend his son’s high school graduation ceremony in Singapore last year in economy class—reasoning that the presidential jet was for official trips only—and lined up for check-in at the airport like any ordinary passenger.6 As governor of Jakarta (a post he held from 2012 until his election as president), he often walked around public markets to hear people’s concerns first hand, and was known for unexpectedly joining popular city events like rock concerts and marathons. Modi’s track record suggested he was an economic reformer with capitalist instincts. A known admirer of the Chinese-style of development (he visited China four times as chief minister), his reputation was built in Gujarat where he attracted substantial investments in large manufacturing and power projects. He introduced business-friendly policies aimed at cutting red tape and making land acquisition easier than in other parts of the country. For example, he instituted a “single window” system to facilitate government approvals for corporate projects, which were also a distinguishing feature of China’s Special Economic Zones. He also reduced political interference in public sector companies, enabling many loss-making enterprises like Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. to return to profitability. Under Modi, Gujarat enjoyed a double-digit economic growth rate that made the state a favorite with investors.7 Unlike the Congress Party’s redistributive economic policies that had dominated independent India’s policy landscape for decades, Modi’s Gujarat model had a distinctive Deng Xiaoping-like quality to it, with an emphasis on trickle-down growth. As one article in the Financial Times described it, Modi’s focus in Gujarat was on increasing the size of the economic pie rather than trying to slice it up fairly.8 It is likely that a sizeable chunk of those who voted for Modi as prime minister did so believing that he would scale up his Gujarat model nationwide, bringing about widespread economic development and modernization. Even significant sections of the Muslim community (approximately 14 percent of the Indian population), who have traditionally voted against the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), supported Modi in the election.9 Widodo’s reputation derives from his two-term stint as mayor of Solo, during which he was able to transform a crime-ridden city into a center for regional arts and culture. As mayor, he demonstrated strong mediation skills and a consultative approach when he relocated street vendors away from a park in the city center. The vendors had built up a squalid, semi-permanent marketplace that caused major traffic snarls. Spurning
“Indonesian President Flies Economy to Son’s Graduation,” BBC, November 22, 2014. James Fontanella-Khan, “Modi Puts Gujrat Growth on a fast track,” Financial Times, May 6, 2012. 8 David Pilling, “A Vote for Modi could make India more Chinese,” Financial Times, March 19, 2014. 9 John Chalmers and Aditya Kalra, “Even in Muslim Heartlands, India’s Modi Racks Up Gains,” Reuters, May 16, 2014. 6 7
Winter 2016 [47]
Policy Forum
heavy-handed tactics, Widodo held over fifty-five informal meetings with the street sellers, on occasion squatting on his haunches to talk with them, in order to find a mutually acceptable solution.10 The street vendors eventually agreed to move to an alternative location in exchange for financial incentives as well as the establishment of public transportation links to this new venue. As Jakarta governor, Widodo employed a similar (albeit less successful) approach in encouraging about 500 smallholders at the city’s crowded Tanah Abang market to move it off of the streets. The Indonesian president’s hallmark approach is therefore patience and dialogue with an aim to develop conciliatory solutions through compromise. Before his election to the top post, the chief beneficiaries of his policies were small and medium enterprises, rather than the kind of big business houses who have been amongst the mainstay of Modi’s support. Negotiating Pluralism One of the most significant differences between the Indian and Indonesian leaders is their stance towards their country’s minority communities. Both nations have a high degree of religious pluralism. India is a Hindu-majority country, but the population is comprised of almost as many Muslims as that of Pakistan—175 million—in addition to substantial numbers of Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Zoroastrians. In Indonesia, around 88 percent of the country’s 250 million-strong population identifies as Muslim, making it home to the largest Islamic population in the world. The state, however, recognizes five other official religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Confucianism. When Widodo ran for governor of Jakarta, he chose Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian, as his running mate. This choice was made more significant by the facts that Basuki is of Chinese descent and that Indonesia has a long history of racially motivated discrimination against its ethnic Chinese community. During the Presidential campaign, Widodo’s main rival, Subianto, openly played the “Muslim” card, garnering support from the majority of Islamic parties and laying claim to the mantle of “true” Muslim.11 A misinformation campaign against Widodo insinuated that he was a Chinese Christian, rather than a Javanese Muslim. Nonetheless, the former Jakarta governor remained steadfast in his vocal espousal of pluralism. However, Modi’s track record with regards to India’s minority communities is bleak. The Indian prime minister is accused of doing little to stop the 2002 religious riots that took place under his watch as chief minister in Gujarat, in which more than 1,000
Inclusive Governance of Informal Markets: The Street Vendors of Surakarta. The International Institute for Environment and Development, Briefing: June 2015. 11 Ben Otto, “As Indonesia Election Nears, Joko Widodo Makes Trip to Mecca,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2014. 10
[48] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Aiyar | A Tale of Two Leaders
people—mostly Muslims—were killed. Modi denies this and has been cleared of such allegations by the courts, yet many civil society groups continue to hold him responsible. Modi is also closely affiliated with the right-wing Hindu organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), whose objective is to make India a Hindu nation.12 Another difference lies in the political circumstances under which the Indian and Indonesian leaders came to power. Under Modi, the BJP won a landslide victory that gave him a clear majority in the lower house of parliament. But Widodo rules as part of a coalition of political parties that does not have a majority in the Indonesian legislature. Moreover, the president’s authority is weak even within his own party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). It is PDI-P chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri who controls the party machinery, further constraining Widodo’s room to maneuver. Leadership Falls Flat In office, neither leader has lived up to expectations. A 50 percent fall in global crude oil prices last year helped ease the fallout of the decision made independently by both Modi and Widodo to cut expensive fuel subsidies. But the manner in which the saved funds will be redirected and spent remains unclear. Despite figures indicating faster economic growth in India (which was as much the result of a change in the official methodology for calculating output as real growth), corporate results remained dismal through 2015.13 Modi has undertaken a few modest reforms, such as relaxing foreign investment rules for insurers, military contractors, and real estate companies. But he has proven surprisingly timid when it comes to big-ticket changes like easing restrictions on the process of land acquisition for infrastructure and industry, instead retreating in the face of sustained opposition. In another example of retreat, Modi cancelled his government’s railway budget proposal to raise suburban fares, following the inevitable protests of commuters.14 He has also been unable to push through key legislation to simplify the tax regime by imposing a unified goods and services tax for all of India’s states. Rather than implementing the bold and decisive changes on the economic front that were expected of him, Modi’s tenure has so far been characterized by the kind of “Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Mission,” accessed November 16, 2015, http://rss.org/Encyc/2015/4/7/1254694.aspx. 13 The new data was the result of India’s Statistics Ministry changing the base year against which calculations are made from 2005 to 2012, as well as switching from a factor cost calculation of GDP based on the costs of production to a market price calculation of GDP based on consumption. See Raymond Zhong, “India Changes GDP calculation Method,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2015. 14 Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, “Why Land Acquisition Bill Reveals PM Modi as Indecesive,” The Economic Times (blog), August 5, 2015, http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/Swaminomics/ why-land-acquisition-bill-reveals-pm-modi-as-indecisive-happier-retreating-than-an-authoritarian/. 12
Winter 2016 [49]
Policy Forum
incrementalism that was the hallmark of the preceding government. His inability to push through daring reforms is partly because the BJP remains in a minority in the upper house of the Indian legislature, the Rajya Sabha, which has blocked several key bills. Since Rajya Sabha members are elected by state assemblies, Modi has also kept a populist eye on the state elections, staying away from policy announcements that might cost the BJP votes in crucial regional assembly polls.15 More predictably, perhaps, the Indonesian president has spent much of his first year in office being ineffective and indecisive. Despite passing a forward-looking budget that increased the allocation for infrastructure by 53 percent, only a fraction of Widodo’s 2015 infrastructure budget has actually been utilized. Bureaucratic wrangling, the lack of strong, strategic direction, and land acquisition issues help explain these delays. A year into Widodo’s term, Indonesia’s economic growth was languishing at a six-year low and the rupiah had fallen heavily.16 Global market turmoil, coupled with China’s slowdown, has not helped Widodo’s cause. But a major problem has been the president’s lack of an autonomous political base. Widodo owes his nomination to the PDI-P, a party to which he is a newcomer. His cabinet is filled with party loyalists who owe him little personal fealty. Some have even undercut the president by announcing unilateral measures such as the abrupt cancellation of thousands of import licenses. Widodo’s more surprising failure has been in fighting graft. Indonesia’s once powerful anti-corruption commission, the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), has weakened following a face off earlier this year with the powerful police faction. The showdown was triggered by Widodo’s nomination of a graft suspect as national police chief, purportedly under pressure from his political patron Megawati Sukarnoputri.17 Widodo eventually withdrew the nomination, but his popularity has been sliding ever since. In India, Modi seems to have tackled corruption more effectively. Under his watch, no large-scale scams of the kind that contributed to the downfall of the Congress coalition have come to light. However, the Indian prime minister has not fared well when it comes to upholding India’s secular ethos, where all religious communities are constitutionally equal. Several of the country’s top posts in educational and cultural institutions have been stacked with supporters of the RSS, the Hindu right-wing organization, of which Modi is himself a former member. Attacks against Muslims, including murder, by Hindu mobs on suspicion of their possession or consumption of beef are on the
“Among several of the factors that forced Modi to withdraw the land bill was a fear of defeat in local elections. See Anita Katyal, “Among the factors that forced Modi to withdraw land bill: fear of defeat in Bihar polls,” Scroll.in, August 5, 2015. 16 I. Made Sentana, “Indonesia Growth Slows to More Than Five-Year Low,” The Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2015. 17 Wilda Asmirini, “Indonesian parliament approves new police chief after graft scandal,” Reuters, April 16, 2015. 15
[50] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Aiyar | A Tale of Two Leaders
rise.18 In October 2015, dozens of prominent writers protested what they described as an atmosphere of intolerance under the current government by returning prestigious literary awards presented by the state.19 The writers’ demonstrations began in response to the murder of M.M. Kalburgi, a well-known scholar who was shot dead in August by suspected Hindu fanatics. Modi has always had a dual appeal. To different constituencies he has variously represented economic development and religious or social conservatism. Some analysts predicted that once elected Modi would focus on the former, given the electoral divisiveness of the latter. However, it is Modi’s economic policies that have fallen short of expectations, while his commitment to Hindutva (the anti-secular ideology that claims India as country exclusively for Hindus) appears steadfast. In the run-up to November’s elections in the state of Bihar, for example, the BJP openly campaigned on communal issues like beef eating, which has a long history of fanning tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities. Modi himself told voters that the secular alliance standing against the BJP (which ultimately won) in the election would reduce affirmative action benefits for lower caste Hindus and tribes in favor of “a particular community”—a plain reference to Muslims.20 Maintaining their rich and multiple diversities is arguably the greatest achievement of both India and Indonesia. The Indonesian national motto, “multiple but one,” is in essence identical to the Indian catch phrase of “unity in diversity,” and underscores their mutual accomplishment in having woven a unified tapestry out of the fractured ethnic, linguistic, and religious plurality of their societies. But ensuring the rights of minorities remains a fraught undertaking for both countries—an endeavor at which Widodo has had more success than Modi. The Road Ahead Given the range of interests and political actors that Widodo needs to reconcile, his soft and consensual style, while open to charges of weakness, is a hidden strength. A bridge-builder in such a polity may be more successful in the long run than a centralising strongman. In India, too, there are sharp limits to how a unilateral approach to governance can succeed. The unprecedented support that swept the prime minister to power in 2014, termed the “Modi wave,” is already showing signs of weakening, particularly given that BJP roundly lost the state elections in Delhi and Bihar earlier this year. Cow slaughter is illegal in many Indian states. James Traub, “Is Modi’s India Safe for Muslims?,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2015. 20 “A Rebuke to India’s Prime Minister,” The New York Times, November 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes. com/2015/11/10/opinion/a-rebuke-to-indias-prime-minister-narendra-modi.html. 18 19
Winter 2016 [51]
Policy Forum
There are also some belated indications of the success of the Indonesian president’s approach. In September, a major opposition party, the National Mandate Party, announced it would join the ruling coalition, giving Widodo an additional forty-eight seats in parliament. A cabinet reshuffle in August further strengthened his hand.21 Widodo was able to replace certain ministers who had been foisted upon him as political compromises with technocrats and loyalists. Both the Indian and Indonesian leaders are elected for five-year terms. Consequently, these are still the early days. Widodo may develop stronger control over his government, while Modi may rein in the right-wing fringe amongst his supporters and refocus his agenda on economic development. India and Indonesia are at an inflection point where tough decisions made by their leaders could translate into long-delayed structural reforms, thereby realizing the potential for much stronger growth than actualized so far. Given the similarity of their challenges, the policies of these temperamentally and ideologically divergent leaders provide an interesting case study. Which country will successfully catapult to the next level of development, and which will fail? What kinds of compromises will prove necessary and which trade-offs will prove disastrous? The answers to these questions will yield significant insights in the coming years.
Pallavi Aiyar is an award-winning journalist who has spent over a decade reporting from China, Europe and Indonesia. She is the author of Smoke and Mirrors, Chinese Whiskers and New Old World. Pallavi is a Young Global Leader of the World Economic Forum and a former Reuters Fellow at Oxford University.
Prashanth Parameswaran, “What Does Indonesia’s Cabinet Reshuffle Mean?,” The Diplomat, August 13, 2015. 21
[52] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Post | Kim Jong-un of the DPRK
Kim Jong-un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea In the Shadow of his Grandfather and Father1 Jerrold M. Post “The child is the father of the man.” One cannot understand the personality and political behavior of Kim Jong-un without placing them in the context of the life and leadership of his grandfather, Kim Ilsung—North Korea’s first leader—and his father, Kim Jong-il. One of the difficulties in assessing the personality and political behavior of Kim Il-sung has always been discerning the man behind the myth. The gap between the available but sparse facts and the hagiographic portrait presented in North Korea is staggering. This extends to the gap between the facts of Kim Jong-il’s life and the mythic public presentation. Examining this gap is instructive as it may reflect areas of sensitivity, the ideal versus the real. Consider the following: The Mangyongdae family is the greatest pride of our nation. From old times it is said that a great man is produced by a great family. There are many families in the world that produced great men. But there is not such a great family as Marshal Kim Jong-il’s family whose all members [sic] were famous as patriots, generation after generation. Marshal Kim Jong-il’s family is praised as the greatest family unprecedented in all countries and in all ages…The greatness of Marshal Kim Jong-il is related with the greatness of his family.2 Kim Il-sung was a man of heroic stature. The founding father of the modern state of North Korea, he was a guerilla fighter who rose to power under Stalin’s patronage and was named eternal president. He conceptualized the ideology of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), called juche, and the DPRK’s goal of reunifying This profile of Kim Jong-il is drawn in part from a profile of Kim Jong-il published in Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Followers in a Dangerous World, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). 2 “The Great Mangyongdae Family,” National Democratic Front of South Korea, http://ndfsk.dyndns. org/kuguk8/pym/nr3/Magdae.htm. 1
Winter 2016 [53]
Policy Forum
the Korean peninsula.3 Kim’s hold on power was absolute. Strongly influenced by Stalin and Mao, Kim Il-sung was a devoted communist. He established tight control over North Korea by crushing any opposition and eliminating potential rivals. Suspicious of outside intervention, Kim Il-sung closed the borders of his country, severely limiting not only the exit of his citizens, but also the influx of foreign visitors and foreign ideas. Throughout the course of his life, Kim worked tirelessly to create a cult of personality that sustained him not only in life, but has continued to persist after his death. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Worker’s Party of Korea (KWP) has been devoted since its inception to furthering the image of Kim Il-sung and his family as loyal and fiercely patriotic Koreans. Known as the Great Leader, the near divine image of Kim Il-sung continues to influence North Korean policy, and the leadership decisions of his grandson. Indeed, Kim Il-sung was named Eternal President in the 1972 revision of the constitution; the slogan “The Great Leader Will Always Be With Us” is written in bold letters across the bottom of the DPRK website. Kim Jong-il, the Dear Leader: Unlike Father, Unlike Son But Kim Jong-il was unlike his father. Though Kim Jong-il was raised to succeed his charismatic father, there was almost no resemblance between the two. The son was not a heroic guerilla fighter, not the founder of his nation, and not an ideology conceptualizer. Rather, he inherited his charismatic image and the national ideologies of juche and reunification from his father. In his role as Director of the KWP, Kim Jong-il created the cult of personality around his father and attempted to strengthen the continuity between his father and himself. This myth of continuity made him captive to his father’s ideology. For himself, Kim Jong-il created the myth of “the man from Mount Baekdu” when, in
Juche, a word of Kim Il-sung’s own construction, is a combination of two Korean words. The first chu means lord, master; the second, che, means the body, the whole. The concept juche signifies an intense need for independence and a desire to make one’s own decisions. It often appears with the suffix song, forming the word juchesong, meaning to act in accord with one’s own judgment. Juche was the most important political idea with which Kim Il-sung ruled the people. It pertains both to domestic and to international policy. Internationally, it signified the end of political dependence and subservience to the Soviet Union, and represented the elevation of Kim as a leader and political philosopher to the non-aligned world. See Suh, Dae-Sook. Kim Il-sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988: 301. While juche grew out of Kim Il-sung’s personal experience, Korea as a nation had long struggled to establish its identity and independence from its surrounding great powers: Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Internally, it meant to Kim forwarding the revolution on the basis of his own ideas, without slavishly following the precepts of Marxism. As Suh (302) notes, juche became the ideological system for North Korea, encompassing the idea of chaju (independence) in political work, charip (self-sustenance) in economic endeavors, and chawi (self-defense) in military affairs. 3
[54] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Post | Kim Jong-un of the DPRK
fact, he was “the boy from the Soviet Union,” having been born there in 1942.4 His first trip out of Korea was to the Soviet Union when he was fifteen. There are reports that he graduated from the Air Force Officers School in East Germany, but this is considered highly unlikely. Because of his lack of military credentials and experience, he had a great deal of insecurity in dealing with military matters and military officers. “Majesty Sits Uncomfortably on his Shoulders” Also unlike his father, Kim Jong-il grew up in luxurious surroundings, pampered and raised to be special. This is the formative recipe for a narcissistic personality, with a grandiose self-concept and a lack of empathy. Insofar as Kim Jong-il was in charge of the propaganda machine and directed the cult of personality around his father, he must have been particularly conscious of the gulf between his father’s mythological standing—one that he helped to create—and his own shortcomings. This disparity contributed to a lifelong sense of insecurity, so that “majesty sits uncomfortably on his shoulders.” It is always a challenge to succeed a powerful father. But to succeed a father of God-like stature is psychologically impossible. Moreover, being the son of God is very dangerous, as religious history tells us. When Kim Jong-il was in his early thirties, his father began systematically preparing him for succession. While his father remained the public face of the KWP, Kim Jong-il worked behind the scenes, progressively increasing his influence and control. By grooming his son, Kim hoped to avoid in North Korea the same chaotic aftermath that followed both Stalin’s death in the Soviet Union and Mao’s demise in the People’s Republic of China. This would guarantee generational continuity and provide a basis not only for stability, but also for the “perpetuation of the system characteristics that tend[ed] to be unique and peculiar.”5 It was during the 1970s that Kim Jong-Il consolidated his position of power within the North Korean political system. Not tolerant of dissent, Kim “replaced thousands of officials at all levels of the party with younger members who would be personally loyal to him in gratitude for their promotion.”6 Kim worked assiduously to incorporate or eliminate his father’s peers, depending upon their support for his succession. By 1973, Kim Jong-il was named Secretary of the KWP, and in 1974 was named a full member of the Politburo. In that year, he announced the Ten Principles, which among other things required absolute loyalty to Kim Il-sung, but also cleverly reinforced the image of Kim Jong-il as fully aligned with his father and stressed the continuity between Kim Il-sung and his son.
Mount Baekdu is the sacred mountain in Korea from which, according to myth, the Korea peninsula emerged. 5 Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 149. 6 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Brookings Institute, 2001), 88. 4
Winter 2016 [55]
Policy Forum
The Heir Apparent, Fully in Charge By the late 1970s, Kim Jong-il was, in effect, in charge of the DPRK—including the intelligence apparatus. This can be seen in three events that he is believed to have orchestrated: the 1978 kidnapping of South Korea’s leading actress, Madame Choe, and her director-producer husband; the 1983 bombing in Rangoon by DPRK commandos, which killed seventeen senior officials and narrowly missed the South Korean President; and the 1987 midair bombing of KAL Flight 858, which killed 115 people. These bold, even foolhardy, missions demonstrated that Kim Jong-il was in full control. It was not until the 1990s that Kim Jong-il began to assume formal DPRK government positions. Because his lack of military experience was a concern at this time, the Propaganda and Agitation Department, where he began his Party career, began to fabricate a military background for the younger Kim.7 In addition, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation aimed to further enhance Kim Jong-il’s image as, not only the rightful leader of North Korea, but as an extension of his father. He never took on the Presidency of North Korea, but rather maintained control and power through chairing the National Defense Commission. Instead, he designated his father President for Eternity. This can be characterized as an adroit political move, sparing him ultimate responsibility for policies that misfired, but it also suggests apprehension toward fully stepping into the giant shoes of his father. While reportedly a micro-manager in most aspects of leadership, economic development was an exception. Recounting a conversation with his father, Kim Jong-il said: The Leader, while alive, told me that I must never get involved in economic issues. If I get involved in the economic issues, I can never take part in the party’s activities or military activities. He said this to me over and over so that I do not forget the advice. [passage omitted in original] He told me I must let party officials and the administration’s economic officials take charge of economic issues.8 This quote, from a secret speech he gave to senior officials following an inspection tour of Kim Il-sung University in December 1996, reflects an artful shifting of responsibility for economic problems to his subordinates. What is not entirely clear is the degree to which he was aware of the magnitude of his country’s economic difficulties. He was well aware of the South’s economic superiority, though he criticized the Republic of Korea (ROK), saying all that South Korean
Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Brookings Institute, 2001), 88. 8 Monthly Chosun, April 1997, originally published in Korean, http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/kjjkisu.htm. 7
[56] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Post | Kim Jong-un of the DPRK
industry did was assemble parts imported from other countries. On the other hand, he frankly admitted that 60 percent of North Korean factories were not operating.9 Kim Jong-il, Insecure About Personal Appearance and Stature Kim Jong-il, reportedly taking after his mother, was described as a short, overweight man who was very self-conscious about his appearance. Standing roughly five-feettwo-inches tall, Kim reportedly had platform shoes custom built to make him appear taller.10 Clearly, his short stature was a long-standing issue for him. Kang Myong-to, a son-in-law of [former] Premier Kang Song-san, recalled: “The elders of the village (Ch’ilgol, the hometown of Kim Jong-il’s mother) called Kim Jong-il ‘shorty.’” After eight years of house arrest, Madam Choe Un-hui, the South Korean actress he kidnapped, escaped. In her memoir, she recalled Kim’s first words on meeting her. He reportedly said, “Well, Madame Choe, you must be surprised to see I resemble the droppings of a midget.”11 He wore only custom-tailored clothing made in Korea, and was rarely seen without his dark glasses. Although he chose to wear styles that were in keeping with North Korean society, the professionally tailored element of his wardrobe was apparent. He never appeared in public wearing a military uniform, likely because he was self-conscious about never having served. Hedonistic Life Style: A Vivid Contrast with Suffering of His Own Population Kim Jong-il lived an extremely hedonistic life. Both Kim’s lack of empathy and sense of entitlement were evident in his indulgence, which contrasted with the struggle of most North Koreans to simply feed themselves. Kim lived in a lavish seven story pleasure palace in Pyongyang, and defector reporting indicates that Kim maintained villas in each of North Korea’s provinces and had them furnished with imported luxury goods. He is reported to have secreted upwards of $10 billion into Swiss bank accounts.12 According to the Hennessey Fine Spirits Corporation, for the decade from 1989 to 1999, his annual expenditure for their most expensive cognac, Paradis, which sells for about $630 a bottle, was between $650,000 and $800,000—similar to the annual income of a Korean peasant at $900-$1000 a year.13 He entertained frequently at his residences, hosting wild parties. These parties probably included entertainment provided by strippers and his “Joy Brigades,” which were Jerrold Post, “Kim Jong-Il of North Korea: In the Shadow of His Father,” International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies 5, No. 3 (August 20, 2008): 208. 10 Jerrold Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 247. 11 Elaine Sciolino, “Blurred Images of North Korea’s ‘Junior,’” The New York Times, July 17, 1994. 12 Post, “Kim Jong-Il of North Korea: In the Shadow of His Father,” 201. 13 Isaac Fish, “Hennessy responds to the loss of its best customer,” Foreign Policy, December 23, 2011, accessed December 5, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/23/hennessy-responds-to-the-loss-ofits-best-customer. 9
Winter 2016 [57]
Policy Forum
comprised of beautiful young women trained to entertain him and his cronies. Members were reportedly recruited from junior high schools every July and had to be virgins with pale, unblemished skin.14 At these lavish parties, he drank heavily and expected those around him to do so as well. According to the memoirs of the South Korean actress Ch’oe Un-hui, Kim Jong-il drank as if he were a man who believed “the amount of liquor a man drinks shows how big a man he is.”15 When in a benevolent mood, Kim Jong-il was known to lavish expensive gifts on guests and friends, ranging from televisions and stereos to bananas, pineapples, and mandarin oranges—all rare luxuries in North Korea. Kim appeared to maintain power both through such special perquisites, as well as through domination and fear. Defectors report that Kim’s manipulative style included alternating special privileges with humiliation and the threat of punishment, including execution. Stories abound of executions ordered by Kim, though there is no direct evidence. Some stories claim that Kim himself carried out executions—whether true or not, their persistence served to reinforce his image as a strongman.16 The gap between the self-indulgent hedonistic life style of Kim and his inner circle in Pyongyang and the privation of his people, including the lower-level military, was extreme. Because Kim regularly called for sacrifice from the Korean people in pursuit of the mission of reunification, news of his lavish lifestyle and that of his inner circle could significantly undermine his legitimacy. Kim Jong-il was very concerned with appearances, and preferred to stay out of the public eye as much as possible; he was sometimes described as a recluse. In contrast with his father, who seemed at ease with large crowds and comfortable with people, Kim has been likened to the Wizard of Oz, “remaining out of sight, pulling levers from behind a screen.”17 He has rarely spoken in public; in fact, his “Glory to the heroic Korean People’s Army” speech, given at the end of a two-hour military display in 1992, was the first time that Kim is known to have done so. Even speeches aired on television and radio were read by narrators.18 Malignant Narcissism Indeed, the characteristics he displayed indicate that he had the core characteristics of the most dangerous personality disorder: “malignant narcissism.” This is characterized by:
“North Korea’s Likely New Leader Seen as Bizzare,” St. Petersburg Times, July 10, 1994. Post, “Kim Jong-Il of North Korea: In the Shadow of His Father,” 201. 16 Ibid., 202. 17 R. Jeffrey Smith, “North Korean Strongman: Crazy or Canny?” The Washington Post, September 26, 1993. 18 “North Korea’s Likely New Leader Seen as Bizzare.” 14 15
[58] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Post | Kim Jong-un of the DPRK
•
• • •
Grandiosity and self-absorption, lack of ability to empathize with others. This was reflected in his lack of empathy with his own people, as well his difficulties in understanding his principle adversaries: the United States, South Korea, and Japan. This trait can be associated with major political and military miscalculation. No constraint of conscience. Kim’s only loyalty was to himself and his own survival. Paranoid orientation. Kim was always on guard and ready to be betrayed, because he saw himself as surrounded by enemies. Unconstrained aggression. Kim used whatever aggression he believed necessary, without qualms of conscience, eliminating individuals or striking out at a particular group.
Other characteristics of the narcissistic personality also contributed to flawed leadership performance and distorted decision-making. They include: • • • • • •
Great insecurity and preoccupation with one’s own brilliance. Because of the need to be perfect, imparting new information to Kim proved diffi cult, as he reacted negatively to criticism. Extreme sensitivity to being slighted, and a tendency to surround oneself with sycophants who tell the leader what he wants to hear rather than what he needs to hear; out of touch with political reality. Optimism about one’s own chances and a tendency to underestimate the adversary. Words used instrumentally to accomplish whatever is seen as necessary; apparently sincere commitments are thus easily changed or disregarded (for example, violation of the Agreed Framework). Flawed interpersonal relationships because of a tendency to see another as the extension of the self with little capacity to appreciate their needs. Loyalty viewed as a one-way street. Moreover, individuals who are seen to be powerful in their own right are perceived as a threat and eliminated.
Since narcissistic individuals must be seen as perfect, when one of Kim’s plans misfired, the problem was never the concept, but the execution. Thus, Kim was ready to find a scapegoat whenever his plans did not work out. Implications for Decision-Making Decision-making in the DPRK was not by committee; Kim Jong-il had ultimate power. Although the exact structure in the military was unclear, it is believed that no military decision of any consequence was made without Kim Jong-il’s approval. It is unlikely that there was a free exchange of ideas, but shrewd advisers were able to get information to the Dear Leader and influence his opinions as long as they did not contradict his worldview. Kim had only limited empathy with his own people, and he tolerated high levels of Winter 2016 [59]
Policy Forum
death from famine. In confronting the famine, saving lives was not a top priority. Early on, Kim cut off nearly all food supplies to the four eastern provinces and denied these provinces access to international aid.19 During the famine, large numbers of deaths also occurred when several hundred thousand people were herded into displaced persons camps, where few survived the conditions.20 Moreover, according to the testimony of eyewitnesses, Kim ordered the systematic killing of babies born to political prisoners.21 A revealing incident that he recalled with pride occurred during the last years of his father’s life, when his father remonstrated with him concerning the starving North Korean people: Only once have I disobeyed President Kim Il-sung. The President said, “Can you shave off some defense spending and divert it for the people’s livelihoods?” I responded, “I am afraid not. Given the military pressure from the United States, the Korean people must bear the hardship a little longer.” How much pain I felt at my failure to live up to the expectations of the President who is concerned about raising the living standards of the people!22 What Kim Values Kim Jong-il valued his safety, the survival of the regime, Pyongyang, personal wealth, elite support, and total domestic control. It can be presumed that Kim Jung-un shares these values. No Core Organizing Ideas or Principles Given that his position flowed from his identification with and succession to his father, Kim Jong-il could not appear to abandon the twin founding principles of the Republic: juche and the ultimate goal of Korean reunification. If we accept the premise that Kim Jong-il was only loyal to himself (and by necessity his inner circle), and that his survival and hold on power was his first priority, it should not be a surprise that he felt that his father’s core principles were subject to interpretation. He thus paid them lip service, while in reality modified them significantly. Like relationships, ideas are instrumental for the narcissist, and can be radically modified or discarded if no longer useful. While Kim Jong-il did not possess core organizing ideas or principles, he was in many ways a captive of his oft-declared public policy, for he frequently invoked the doctrines of juche and “reunification” to call for sacrifice on the part of the North Korean people.
Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001): 106-107. 20 Ibid., 73-74. 21 “Defectors from North Korea Tell of Prison Baby Killings,” The New York Times, June 10, 2002. 22 Kim Myong Chol, “Kim Jong Il’s Military Strategy for Reunification.” Comparative Strategy 20, No. 4 (2001), 305. 19
[60] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Post | Kim Jong-un of the DPRK
The Next Generation: Stroke Precipitates Appointment of Kim Jong-un as Successor Given the careful manner in which Kim Il-sung prepared for his son’s succession, it is interesting to observe how Kim Jong-il ignored this issue until he suffered a major stroke in August 2008. This confrontation with his own mortality led him to hastily designate his third son, Kim Jong-un, as successor. The aggressive, provocative acts by the DPRK at that time were probably designed to demonstrate the regime’s “toughness” and pave the way for the dynastic succession of Kim Jong-un. Unlike Kim Jong-il, who was designated successor some thirty years before his father’s death, Kim Jong-un was only designated successor after his father’s stroke. Indeed, there had been great uncertainty as to who would succeed Kim Jong-il. The initial favorite of the Kim sons was the eldest Kim Jong-nam, who faced a great deal of public embarrassment in 2001 after being caught trying to enter Japan with a fake Dominican Republic passport in order to visit Tokyo’s Disneyland. Kim Jong-il’s second son, Kim Jong-chul, was reportedly passed over for being considered “too effeminate” (a euphemism for homosexuality). Despite lacking military experience, Kim Jong-un was named four-star general in the People’s Army, Deputy Chairman of the Military Commission of the Workers’ Party, and member of the Party’s Central Committee in 2010. Kim Jong-un surely carries with him an acute awareness of his lack of military experience, a consequence of his father’s insecurity. At the same time, his sensitivity to this shortcoming likely makes him reject constructive criticism. It is widely speculated that North Korea’s attack on the South Korean frigate that killed forty-six South Korean sailors in March 2010, and the later artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, were evidence that Kim Jong-il was helping to build the credentials of his son. His father was well seasoned: while provocative actions have been taken for two decades, frequently accompanied by belligerent rhetoric, Kim Jong-il always showed restraint and pulled back from the brink. In vivid contrast, Kim Jong-un is unseasoned and inexperienced, and we cannot be confident of his wisdom and judgment. Especially with the changed climate in South Korea under President Park Geun-hye and widespread support in South Korea for a strong response to provocations, a significant possibility of one side or another precipitating conflict exists. Recognizing his son’s youth and inexperience, Kim Jong-il appointed Choe Ryong-hae and his sister’s husband, Jang Song-thaek, as co-regents. It is not clear how disabled Kim Jong-il was from his stroke in terms of his leadership functioning. What is clear is that Jang Song-thaek was exercising close control over the leadership of Kim Jong-un, who increasingly resented him. When Kim Jong-il died at the end of 2011, Winter 2016 [61]
Policy Forum
never having fully recovered from his stroke, the influence of the uncle began to decline. We can infer that Kim Jong-un was feeling increasingly confident and continued to resent the control of his uncle. Moreover, Jang became estranged from his wife, Kim’s aunt, who apparently accused him of forming a plot. Following the arrest and execution of Jang’s two deputies in November 2013, he was secretly detained until his staged public arrest and then execution in December of that year. Reports later emerged that, following the execution of his uncle, Kim Jong-un ordered the execution of Jang’s followers and extended family. He had now fully consolidated power with the elimination of any challenges or constraints on his leadership. The dramatic fall of Jang Song-thaek recalls a historic parallel: Kim Jong-il also purged his uncle in the mid1970s, deeming him a threat to power.23 Picking up the Nuclear Baton The first recorded nuclear test was in 2006, with Kim Jong-il fully in charge. The second test, which occurred in 2009 after Kim Jong-il’s stroke, may have represented the military’s commitment to a long-planned operation. Despite active warnings against another test by China, Russia, European nations, and the United States, the third test occurred in February 2013 after Kim Jong-il’s death, when Kim Jong-un was in place as his successor. This came after Jang Song-thaek’s influence began to decline at the end of 2012. Ongoing decisions about the nuclear program were now solely in the hands of Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-un’s nuclear posturing is worrisome because he lacks the seasoning of his father, who always was able to pull back from the brink. The Third Generation The personality of Kim Jong-il has been presented in detail and can perhaps provide a model for how his son might behave. However, there has as of yet been little reporting on Kim Jong-un’s behavior. His boastful manner is worrisome, and it may be that he is a victim of his own propaganda. In particular, he may tend to overreact because of his underlying insecurities, and could underestimate President Park’s resolve. Kim Jong-un was probably given training on how to rule by his father during the three years following his father’s stroke. However, little has been reported on the nature of interactions between father and son in the brief interval before his father’s death. Kim Jong-un would have been treated in the same manner by the inner circle as his father. Yet, just as Kim Jong-il purged his inner circle of those he did not trust when his father died, so Kim Jong-un stripped the leadership circle of those whose loyalty he doubted. There is no reason to believe that Kim Jong-un shares his father’s insecurity about appearance, and he closely resembles his grandfather Kim Il-sung. The evidence thus
Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: The Dramatic Fall of Jang Song Thaek,” 38 North: Domestic Affairs, December 9, 2013. 23
[62] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Post | Kim Jong-un of the DPRK
shows a concerning lack of expertise in the broader realm of leadership. However, early indicators suggest that he is emulating the confrontational style of his father.
Jerrold M. Post is Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs and Founding Director of the Political Psychology Program at The George Washington University. He is the former director of the CIA Center for Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. Dr. Post has published widely on crisis decision-making, leadership, on the psychology of political violence and terrorism, including his book Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior (Cornell University Press, 2004).
Winter 2016 [63]
Policy Forum
Leadership in Asia Personal Impressions Tom Plate Do so-called “larger than life” individuals make history, or is it history that makes leaders seem larger than life? This age-old question rises to spectacular relevance and prominence when examining both Asia’s inclination toward soft authoritarians as well as the West’s often thoughtless response to such archetypal leadership. Before exploring the attributes of leadership in Asia, let us first turn to a seeming digression that illuminates the leadership phenomenon for our times. Back when I was a social science major, I viewed my greatest professors with awe. There was Earl Latham and George Kateb at Amherst College, as well as Richard Falk and George Kennan at Princeton University. These capacious minds refused to imprison history behind the bars of mathematical modeling or bracket out professorial judgment—even in the face of social science data, should it seem marginal or dubious. In considering the vital role of leadership, certainly with regard to Asia in the post-war era, quantifiable social science only tells us so much. I, along with my former professors, would agree with the late Noel Annan, Cambridge don and champion of Isaiah Berlin, who once put this matter rudely: “Social scientists have depersonalized acres of human experience so that history resembles a ranch on which herds move, driven they know not why by impersonal forces, munching their way across the prairie.”1 Perhaps that is harsh. Social scientists do tend to glaze over the unquantifiable force of personality in history, but in fairness it must also be stipulated that journalists often dwell on it precisely because it is so visible, accessible, and indeed assessable—as it were, on the surface. We political journalists overuse the word “leadership,” as if an answer for nearly everything, and elevate “charisma” to the status of some overriding magical elixir when, in fact, charisma is more of a media construct than anything strictly Isaiah Berlin (1909–97) was a British philosopher, political theorist, and essayist who emphasized leaders’ significant role in shaping historical events. Noel Annan (1916-2000) was a British military intelligence officer, author, and academic. After his war service, Annan became a fellow of King’s College, Cambridge, a university lecturer in politics, and a leading academic and administrator. 1
[64] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Plate | Leadership in Asia
quantifiable. Even with this admitted, there is a problem for the serious journalist analyzing Asia, and it is bluntly this: The astonishing economic rise of Asia over the past few decades cannot possibly be understood without spotlighting national leaders and appreciating their particular leadership styles. Trying to imagine India without the peculiar impacts of Mahatma Gandhi and Jewaharlal Nehru is not remotely possible. Try, for example, putting on your thinking cap about modern China without giving a thought for Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, or Zhu Rongji; or viewing post-war Japan while leaving out Yasuhiro Nakasone and Akio Morita; or examining tiny Singapore without the endless ego of Lee Kuan Yew or the sure-handedness of his son; or studying Vietnam without Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap; or evaluating sprawling Indonesia without leftwing Sukarno and rightwing Suharto. For a most recent example, consider Myanmar in the absence of Aung San Suu Kyi who, at the time of this writing, is so triumphant in Myanmar. It simply cannot be done. Asia cannot be evaluated without understanding how the region’s leaders think, assume, judge, decide, and react. Strong Leadership in Asia: A Double-Edged Sword Asia’s dramatic rise since decolonization has correlated with outstanding leaders. New nations thrown out on their own and forced to start up from near ground zero with poorly established or non-existent institutions, except possibly their armies, necessarily drafted special leadership. Power, as we all know, does abhor a vacuum, which is exactly the kind of vacancy made to order for the political ego that believes destiny drafts him or her to occupy it—and to convince people to follow behind in good order. Asia’s deeply engrained cultures—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Asian Christianity—all welcomed “soft authoritarians” with open palms.2 Bad strong leaders have hurt Asia as much as good strong leaders have transformed it. Strong leadership benefits nations when those leaders evidence a special transformative character. Of course, the paradox is that just as concentrated power can advance development, it can also advance the kind of corruption that impedes economic growth. Without a single-minded commitment to national development, leadership marinates in demagoguery or degrades into mere dictatorship as an administration’s gains wind up in secret offshore bank accounts maintained in relatives’ names or numerical sequences, rather than in people’s hearts, pockets, and memories. Unless rigorously monitored by exemplary leadership at the very top—such as in See Mark Kesselman, et. al, Introduction to Comparative Politics (Boston: Wadsworth, 2007). “Soft Authoritarianism” is defined as “political control in which a combination of formal and informal mechanisms ensure the dominance of a ruling group or dominant party, despite the existence of some forms of political competition.” 2
Winter 2016 [65]
Policy Forum
Singapore with the graft-free People’s Action Party—powerful central governments are prone to either demagoguery or rank corruption, as has been the case in the People’s Republic of China. It is telling that the current government of President Xi Jinping has prioritized corruption control to a higher degree than any predecessor in recent memory. Despite such cases of demagoguery and corruption, the sickening looting syndrome seems in general slightly truer of other continents than Asia. On balance, strong leadership was an advantageous quality for much of Asia, particularly in those nations emerging from the colonial period. For example, two historic, under-assessed Asian leaders were Sukarno and his successor Suharto. These late Indonesian strongmen inherited from the Dutch a sprawling psychedelic archipelago of a country that is about as manageable as the quarrelsome General Assembly of the United Nations. Both Sukarno, who emerged from the left with communist tendencies, and Suharto, who emerged from the military right with fascist ones, had many grave and embarrassingly obvious flaws; however, these men were “giants” in the sense that they held together the political psychedelia thrown into their laps from the Dutch as they fled their colonial outpost after World War II. Assumptions About Strong Leadership in Asia It is difficult for most Americans to accept that strong leadership in the context of authoritarianism should be considered successful. In most educational institutions, Americans are taught democracy as a system of government—not as a philosophy or psychology of citizen participation. Americans validate the democratic process even though our elections produce “results that are erratic,” as Lee Kuan Yew once deftly put it. It is an American assumption that public debate, aided by a media unencumbered by government control, will drive superior public policy, as Jürgen Habermas imagined it.3 Asians leaders do not often take that view, to put it mildly. As Americans—the worst of it being with the Western media and, to some extent, Western academe—our particular cultural ideology impedes a sensitive understanding of other political cultures. In my opinion, American cultural insight is particularly handicapped with regards to largely Islamic countries. Understanding the governance of an Islamic political culture requires examining its leadership in a different way than Americans view their own leadership.4 Governing a neo-Muslim country such as Malaysia, for example, is a qualitatively different challenge from governing a secular or multi-religious one. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad,
Jürgen Habermas is a German sociologist and philosopher who identified the “public sphere” as a social space in which individuals freely exchanged ideas in conversation or via the print media, thereby identifying societal issues and, ultimately, influencing political processes. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Great Britain: Polity Press, 1989). 4 See Tom Plate, Conversations with Mahathir Mohamad (Singapore: Marshall Candevish Editions, 2011) for more information on Mahathir Mohamad’s leadership in Asia. 3
[66] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Plate | Leadership in Asia
originally a country physician, served for twenty-three years as prime minister of a country with a population that was approximately two-thirds Islamic. And yet, Malaysia during Mahathir’s strongman rule from 1982 to 2003 was anything but a hotbed of Islamic terrorism. Instead, the country developed rapidly—including a good measure of Westernization in its acquisition of technology and Silicon Valley-type startups. The Mahathir era was quite remarkable, but it was not until 9/11 that the West began to appreciate the story of this “soft authoritarian.” A purely secular leader perhaps could not have achieved the astonishing development of Mahathir’s government. Yet, as Mahathir nurtured his Malaysia into the twenty-first century, Western media institutions and human rights groups obsessed over Malaysia’s human rights and corruption issues, viewing the nation entirely through Western lenses. The result was that the outstanding achievement of Mahathir’s two decades of leadership was obscured in the miasmic fog of Western assumption. This miasma repeatedly confuses Americans’ understanding of Asia. Western values emphasize procedure, process, and the particular individual. By contrast, modern Asian values, though they are changing, emphasize results, filial loyalty, and overall group rights. People in America may not be permitted to shout “fire” in a movie theater unless it is under incendiary threat, but individuals have the right to shout fiery imprecations in public. In much of Asia, however, individuals do not have such rights of disruption or overt challenge to the composed societal order. The Triumph of Pragmatism Over Ideology in Asian Governance While forces of globalization are gradually diluting differences between the East and West, these differences remain politically significant. Utilitarianism and pragmatism more than ideological purity have reigned in successful Asian leaders’ nations. Lee Kuan Yew, for example, assessed the otherwise ethically impeccable Jimmy Carter as the weakest American leader he had ever met. Strong leaders of Asia have their Machiavelli on their night table and operate on the assumption that a multi-party system that defaults at gridlock—instead of boasting day-to-day functionality—is an impediment to superior public policy. Thus, the test of a government or political system in Asia is not based on whether it is constitutional, politically correct, or ideologically pure, but whether it is successful. Successful governance in Asia begins with economic development, because it paves the way to social stability and political development. This continuing, grinding process of development proceeds as if steps up the ladder of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.5
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a theory proposed by Abram Maslow. According to Maslow, “Man is a hierarchy of needs, with the biological needs at the base of the hierarchy and the spiritual needs at the top.” Thus, Maslow’s hierarchy ranks physiological needs (e.g., food and water) above safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization. See Abram Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, No. 4 (1943). 5
Winter 2016 [67]
Policy Forum
Serious leaders, such as Malaysia’s Mahathir, are unrelenting in scaling this ladder, while unserious ones usually surface as demagogues, whether competent icons such as Indonesia’s mercurial Sukarno or transparently incompetent ones such as the Philippines’ President Joseph Estrada. A serious one-party system devoted to demonstrating continuous domestic and economic development will attract to it the brightest and most motivated governing talent—rendering the ranks of any would-be opposition pale by comparison and impotent in political reality. Moreover, a tower of Babel cannot speak with one national voice and a fledgling judiciary cannot and should not possess national authority. In essence, too many equally powerful branches of government may produce a tree with no fruit. Even in terms of regional and international relations, the most successful leaders have been pragmatists, while the least successful leaders have been ideologists. Nehru, who succeeded Gandhi in India, stubbornly stuck with Stalinist central planning formulas for far too long, and practically made a cult out of the imagined Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.6 Nehru was a brilliant speaker and passionate Indian, but, given his overreliance on ideology, he ultimately failed the test of what makes a great leader. Similarly, the three dynastic Kims of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are not widely viewed—on the Asian Left or anywhere else on the spectrum—as great leaders. These leaders’ unwavering ideology and system of government simply failed the utilitarian test: It did not work to benefit the nation’s people. Successful Asian Leaders’ Shared Characteristics Asia’s most successful leaders, defined in Maslovian terms, have spurned rank ideology, whether allegedly “communitarian” as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or Lao People’s Democratic Republic, “military authoritarian” as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, or “monarchical authoritarian” as the Kingdom of Thailand. On one level, Asia’s successful leaders tend to offer highly stylized leadership, while on another level this leadership is duplicative in its frank public policy banditry from neighboring success stories. Prior to the 2006 military coup, for instance, Thailand’s elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra often visited Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to acquire transportable policy ideas. Perhaps most famous of all was China’s Deng Xiaoping, who listened very carefully to Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, among others, when he set out to resurrect Mainland China’s moribund economy. As Asia’s national leaders act in an environment that favors pragmatic utilitarianism over ideology, the region’s most successful leaders often exhibit a unique set of traits. The common characteristics of successful national leaders whom I have studied are not
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) period refers to those nations who were not formally aligned with any one power bloc. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is often credited with conceiving the NAM concept, which was officially founded in Belgrade in 1961. 6
[68] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Plate | Leadership in Asia
numerous, but they are consistently observable.7 The first is perhaps the most obvious but also the most necessary to political character: a deeply caring nationalism based not on expansionism or trans-ideology but on pragmatic development within cultural boundaries. Great leaders are quite aware that their greatness depends on the direction and speed of the rail of history on which they are riding; but they do not jump on a train for some ideological Finland Station.8 Whatever the creepy dimensions of Pol Pot’s putative “charisma,” his vision for Cambodia was one that required destroying Kampuchea in order to save it—with the consequence that the nation was nearly dissolved into a suburb of Vietnam. That is not leadership, but rather an insane leader. The second characteristic is obvious as well. The great leader possesses the ability to mass communicate vision and policy in a way that commands respect and, ultimately, aims toward consensual agreement. Government by “elite-only” or “force-often” will not suffice. “You must carry the people along with you,” the late Lee Kuan Yew once told me. “You cannot do it all by yourself.”9 Whatever the political system—whether authoritarian, communist, or democratic— consent and consensus must, to some significant extent, be earned. The best current example of this characteristic is “The Lady” Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite living under house arrest for decades, the daughter of the legendary Aung San, Burma’s founding father, was widely viewed as the country’s future, secular “leader-queen.” Paradoxically, a departure from pure military authoritarianism via a transitory democratic process will likely produce a kind of new backroom “people’s” authoritarianism: rule by “The Lady” herself. But, she will be viewed as a success inside the country if broad development follows, even as the West will no doubt be disappointed in other respects such as human rights. Governing in Asia is not meant for parlor intellectuals. A third character trait might come as a surprise; no matter how big or small the state, the great leader will choose to display an extraordinary attention to details. She or he will often delegate policies and projects to ministers, but not always. I had to chuckle appreciatively when I discovered that one Southeast Asian prime minister, sometimes accompanied by his wife, would visit the site of an iconic construction project as late as midnight, joking with the work crew on the late shift, double checking that only the good cement was being used, and seeing that all was well. This was none other than Mahathir of Malaysia. Another in Southeast Asia wound up knowing more about hydrology—from water reclamation to dike building—than almost anyone. This was
For additional analysis of Asia’s most influential leaders, please see Tom Plate’s syndicated newspaper column (1996) and the “Giants of Asia” quartet (2010-2014). 8 This is a reference to Vladimir Lenin’s highly ideological, impassioned speech upon arriving at Petrograd’s Finland Station, after which he seized control of the Bolshevik revolution. 9 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew: Citizen Singapore: How to Build a Nation (Singapore: Times Printers Pte Ltd, 2010). 7
Winter 2016 [69]
Policy Forum
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. Yet another Asian leader understood macro and microeconomics—not to mention equity and capital markets—at a level higher than any leader I had ever interviewed. This was Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand. Of course, the big picture is hugely important but, unless little cracks in the window are attended to, the big picture will eventually fracture and the leader will have a mess on his or her hands. A fourth shared character trait is a “ruthlessness-in-reserve” combined with a sense of superiority that is as embedded in the successful leader as in the otherwise serenely domesticated house cat. True leaders prefer to be both loved and feared, but will choose the latter if only one can be had. It is my prediction that many will be amazed to observe “The Lady” in this Asian context as her strong-woman style becomes more evident. Deng Xiaoping exhibited such “ruthlessness-in-reserve” in the substantial ugliness of Tiananmen Square. Yet, during his time in office from 1981 to 1987, Deng engineered a massive mid-course correction of China’s economic system that—looking back at it objectively and forgetting Tiananmen for the sake of analysis—was breathtakingly unprecedented, particularly given the generally terrible record of Communist Party rule in most other countries. Lee Kuan Yew would always declare Deng the greatest leader of the many leaders he personally met in his half-century at the top tier of Singapore’s government. The admired Deng, tough-as-nails strongman though he was, certainly manifested the four common characteristics of Asia’s successful leaders as he combined “ruthlessness-in-reserve” with a practical vision for the escape from economic purgatory. The Implications of Asian Leadership for Regional Dynamics The greatest leaders in recent decades have prioritized domestic and economic development, and looked at regional and international relations issues in wholly pragmatic terms. A textbook example is the city-state Singapore, which lacks a rural hinterlands and found its “agricultural sector” in the foreign fields of Indonesia and Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew was forced to reach out across national lines in order to make up for the city-state’s inherent shortcomings, including size and economic complexity, which presented a strikingly successful example of a non-ideological foreign policy shaped entirely for domestic development. With considerable skill, Singapore’s foreign policy still manages to play both sides of the ideological street by, for example, keeping close ties to Washington while honoring the rising Beijing. With luck and skill, other Asian leaders will follow the Singapore way. Why align against China or against the United States if it is possible to take a positive position toward both? Only in this sense does Nehru’s imaginative efforts to chart a policy of ideological nonalignment offer a measure of suggestion today. So long as China and the United States do not come to blows and force nations to choose up sides for the larger conflict, a foreign policy of this practical sort will make sense in the twenty-first century.
[70] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Plate | Leadership in Asia
It is far easier to imagine than to truly believe that China will surface in the seas of Asia like some friendly whale of Baja Mexico. With centuries of resentment and a stockpile of ambition, it might be wise to anticipate China’s emergence as more similar to Moby Dick’s. Yet, the result of China’s rise will depend on the quality of Beijing’s top leadership more than any one factor, which has remained a persistent pattern throughout Asia since the end of World War II. Thus, the final leader who has not yet been examined—but may be the most critical for the future regional dynamic—is President Xi Jinping, who appears paramount in China in a way not seen since Deng. Given Xi’s goals to purge the party of blatant corruption, keep the economy moving forward, and, ultimately, return China to a central position on the world stage, Xi is arguably Asia’s most ambitious leader. It is absolutely certain that Xi will proceed apace the Asia way: right—a lot more like Lee Kuan Yew than Jimmy Carter. Yet, what will this mean in terms of China’s foreign policy? Unlike the former Soviet Union, no component of Xi’s policy will have a recognizable ideological dimension. From the Chinese perspective, significant international thrusts will be driven by domestic concerns, strategic economic needs, and pressures such as energy security. However, the United States may fail to understand Xi’s motives, and thus misinterpret China’s moves for the worst. To understand China and its current leader, we must trace back some centuries to see how China collapsed, how much it suffered, and how terribly eager the nation is to replace the United States as the leader of the second half of the twenty-first century. Without America improving its understanding of China, calamity is on the horizon.
Tom Plate, author of the “Giants of Asia” series, is an American journalist who has had an international career at media institutions from London to Los Angeles. Professor Plate completed his studies at Amherst College and Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, where he earned his master’s degree in public and international affairs. Professor Plate’s syndicated columns focusing on Asia and America have run in major newspapers in both regions, including a fortnightly column on China and America that runs in the South China Morning Post of Hong Kong. Professor Plate is currently Distinguished Scholar of Asian and Pacific Studies at Loyola Marymount University.
Winter 2016 [71]
Policy Forum
The Perils of the Autocratic Developmental State Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan Sean R. Roberts Leadership, Autocracy, Stability, and Development in Central Asia The former Soviet states of Central Asia are one place in the world where politics is almost all about leadership. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, the leaders of these countries are autocrats who rely heavily on personal power to steer the course of their states. Kyrgyzstan only recently broke out of this autocratic model to form a parliamentary system after two successive popular ousters of authoritarian presidents. The other four Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—show little intention of following Kyrgyzstan’s lead by abandoning powerful, autocratic presidential systems in favor of more pluralistic models of governance. In the case of the region’s four authoritarian states, political leadership has proven itself at least capable enough to prevent state failure, protracted conflict, or economic collapse. While such accomplishments only meet a very low bar of good governance and leadership, they appear to satisfy many Central Asians, who fear radical change and cherish stability following the fall of the Soviet Union. The leaders of these states perpetuate this attitude among their citizens by suggesting through their speeches and via the media that strong-armed leadership is paramount to stability in their respective countries and that political change is likely to bring chaos. Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been particularly successful in promoting this idea, continually suggesting that his leadership has been the key to the country’s stability and success. In campaigning for elections last year, in which he won over 95 percent of the vote, he simply made his candidacy synonymous with stability, noting, “I am confident Kazakhstanis will vote for stability in our state, to support the policy our country has so far been following under my leadership.”1
Raushan Nurshaeyva, “Kazakh Leader Sails to New Term with ‘Stability’ Mantra,” Reuters, April 26, 2015. 1
[72] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Roberts | Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan
These narratives of autocratic stability dovetail nicely with the “developmental state” theory popular among economists and social scientists studying emerging economies. Since the rise of the “Asian Tigers” in the 1980s, numerous social scientists have advocated for an authoritarian “developmental state” model in developing countries.2 These scholars argue that an autocratically well-run state focused on facilitating development can push through reforms and establish an enabling environment for rapid economic growth—without the messiness of political competition and populist policies. While these assertions make sense theoretically, they require leaders with benevolent intentions and a vision for their countries’ development—leadership qualities that are not easy to find. It is difficult to argue that the authoritarian “developmental state” model inherently outperforms a democracy when comparing autocratic Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to democratic Kyrgyzstan. These four countries all rank as “medium human development” on the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), suggesting that their overall level of development is comparable. Still, they are qualitatively quite different, in regards to both their level of development and their civil liberties. Tajikistan remains the region’s least developed country, and its quality of life measured via virtually any metric is poorer than that in Kyrgyzstan. While gross domestic product (GDP) figures for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are significantly greater than those for Kyrgyzstan, these two autocracies’ wealth, which depends heavily upon natural resources, is poorly distributed and accumulated alongside extreme political repression and human rights violations. Thus, despite their larger economies, it is difficult to argue that either Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan has witnessed more favorable development than Kyrgyzstan, especially if seen through the prism of Armatya Sen’s capabilities approach to development.3 If the authoritarian “developmental state” argument is not strongly supported by the examples of Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, it appears much more salient when comparing Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan stands out from the rest of the states in the region in terms of overall development. If the other four Central Asian states have been relatively stable since the fall of the Soviet Union, their general development trajectory appears to lack vision and remains unpredictable. In contrast, Kazakhstan’s development appears to build on the country’s strengths and is driven by a vision for its future. While Kyrgyzstan’s liberal political system offers its citizens more input on governance issues, Kazakhstan’s government is far more efficient. See Ziya Onis, “The Logic of the Developmental State,” Comparative Politics 24 (1991): 109-26; Peter Evans and James Rauch, “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth,” American Sociological Review 64 (1999): 748-65; and Mustaq Khan, Governance, Economic Growth, and Development Since the 1960s: Background Paper for the World Economic and Social Survey, 2006 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006). 3 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). Sen expands on traditional economic development, positing that development necessarily involves freedoms such as political freedoms, freedom of opportunity, and freedom from abject poverty. 2
Winter 2016 [73]
Policy Forum
Furthermore, despite its lack of political liberalism, Kazakhstan does have a high level of economic liberalism; Kazakhstan provides citizens with opportunities to pursue a variety of development paths which are not available to Kyrgyzstani citizens given their country’s poor overall economy. Furthermore, while Kazakhstan controls information about internal political debates, it encourages its citizens to obtain high quality education and to develop critical thinking skills, which ultimately enhance their capabilities to guide their own development.4 In short, Kazakhstan’s experience appears to support the argument that a non-liberal “developmental state” model can be optimal for emerging economies if it is open enough to provide citizens with certain liberties. Even citizens in the more democratic Kyrgyzstan look to Kazakhstan’s economy as an example of what a post-Soviet state can accomplish. Although Kazakhstan’s success is largely due to the country’s natural resource wealth, which Kyrgyzstan lacks, its political leadership also deserves credit for managing those resources intelligently. However, Kazakhstan’s autocratic-led “developmental state” model is heavily dependent upon its present leadership and therefore not sustainable over the long-term. In fact, despite being the most successful state in the region in terms of development, Kazakhstan may ironically be the country in Central Asia that is most vulnerable to instability as it prepares to pass the mantle of leadership for its “developmental state” to a new personality. Kazakhstan and the Developmental State Model President Nazarbayev has proven to be an extremely skilled leader who has drawn on “developmental state” examples from East Asia, including Singapore and Malaysia. He has established a diverse group of foreign investors in the country, carefully avoiding dependence on any single economic power. Nazarbayev has also cultivated a class of technocrats in the spheres of finance and international economics, and, while he ensures his closest associates benefit the most from Kazakhstan’s economy, his policies have facilitated the establishment a largely merit-based middle class of entrepreneurs and professionals. Additionally, he has helped build relatively strong state institutions and populated them with a mostly professional cadre of civil servants. Finally, he has recently sought to further copy Singapore’s success in building human capital by establishing state-sponsored, elite educational institutions and welcoming highly skilled foreign specialists to work in Kazakhstan. These policies have helped Kazakhstan lead Central Asia and most of the former Soviet Union outside the Baltic states in nearly every indicator of development.5
“World Data on Education: Kazakhstan,” United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2010. 5 Kazakhstan leads Central Asia and most of the former Soviet Union outside the Baltic states in GDP per capita, GNI, and the Human Development Index. Kazakhstan also boasts high rankings in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” index and, according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, has the second most effective governance and is the third most stable state in the former Soviet space outside the Baltics. 4
[74] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Roberts | Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan only significantly lags behind a number of its post-Soviet neighbors in the areas of political freedoms and civil liberties. According to Freedom House, Kazakhstan falls behind over half of the post-Soviet states in these categories, including the Baltic States, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.6 However, it is noteworthy that even in such areas of political development, Kazakhstan ranks slightly better than all of the other post-Soviet autocracies.7 The relative liberalism that positions Kazakhstan as “more free” than other post-Soviet autocracies is part and parcel of the country’s economic success as a “developmental state” in the age of neo-liberalism and globalization. If these indicators suggest that Kazakhstan presents an excellent example of how an authoritarian “developmental state” model can spur development in the post-Soviet context, they suggest little about the sustainability of this development. The country’s success is largely due to Nazarbayev’s leadership, and, while he shows no signs of stepping down from power, the seventy-five-year-old leader cannot live forever. The sustainability of the successes achieved by Nazarbayev will depend upon his successor, raising obvious concerns regarding that person’s leadership qualities and capacity. However, given that Kazakhstan has not facilitated a change in leadership since its independence from the Soviet Union, I would argue that Kazakhstan faces an even larger dilemma regarding presidential succession: uncertainty about how Nazarbayev’s successor will be chosen. The “Black Box” of Kazakhstan’s Presidential Succession Nazarbayev is the only president to have held office in an independent Kazakhstan. Despite a constitutional stipulation of a maximum of two presidential terms, Nazarbayev is now in either his fifth or sixth term, depending upon how one interprets “presidential terms” in Kazakhstan.8 While “loopholes” in the constitution first facilitated his additional terms, a 2007 law determined that, as the country’s first leader, Nazarbayev would not be subject to term limits. While this law appears to allow Nazarbayev to remain in office for life, it also paves the way for him to step down graciously while alive. First, it protects Kazakhstan’s first president from any legal repercussions for his actions while in office. Second, it gives him the right to appoint his successor. Finally, it outlines a special role for him as advisor to any successor in the event that he does step down. In short, this law appears to be tailored in a way that explicitly facilitates a “golden parachute” departure scenario for Nazarbayev.
Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2015: Discarding Democracy: The Return of the Iron Fist (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2015). 7 The post-Soviet autocracies include Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; Ibid. 8 Since independence, Kazakhstan has held five presidential elections (1991, 1999, 2006, 2011, 2015) and one referendum on whether to extend Nazarbayev’s first term an additional five years without an election (1995). 6
Winter 2016 [75]
Policy Forum
Soviet autocratic regimes, which have successfully appointed successors. In particular, citizens of Kazakhstan have long speculated that Nazarbayev would adopt one of two models—drawn from either Azerbaijan or Russia—for a managed succession. The Azerbaijan model is drawn from the experience of that country’s first president, Heydar Aliev, who installed his son as successor shortly before his death. The Russia model is based on the events surrounding Boris Yeltsin’s alleged appointment of Vladimir Putin as his successor prior to stepping down. However, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the expectation that Kazakhstan would be able to replicate either of these scenarios. First, Nazarbayev does not have a legitimate male heir as did Azerbaijan’s Aliev, and it is unclear whether one of his daughters would be supported in Kazakhstan’s relatively patriarchal society. Second, Nazarbayev shows no immediate intention of stepping down from the presidency, and he demonstrates few signs of favoritism towards any particular political figure as an obvious successor. Finally, Nazarbayev’s most recent election has him scheduled to be in office until 2020—when he will be eighty years old.9 While this situation does not ensure that Nazarbayev will serve as president until his death, it does increase the odds that this will be the case. Kazakhstan’s constitution prescribes an orderly procedure for presidential succession if Nazarbayev were to die in office. According to Article 48 of the Constitution, in the event of the premature discharge or death of the country’s president, the chairperson of the Senate should fulfill the remaining presidential term.10 Once that term has ended, regular presidential elections are to be held to determine who takes over the office of president. However, there is little reason to expect that these procedures will actually be followed given the country’s history of circumventing the constitution and rule of law for political purposes.11 Due to frequent manipulation of the constitution and other laws related to elections, Kazakhstan has never held a free and fair competitive election that meets international standards, and it would be hard-pressed to implement such elections even if the political will to do so existed. In short, given the precedent set by Nazarbayev in the political manipulation of the constitution and state legislation, there is little reason to believe that others would follow these prescribed “rules of the game” once Nazarbayev leaves the scene. Since a strictly constitutional and democratic change of leadership in Kazakhstan is unlikely, many await a succession scenario that involves negotiations among the country’s Nazarbayev allegedly received 98 percent of the vote in the most recent election. See “Kazakhstan’s Strongman Leader Re-elected with 97.7% amid Record Voter Turnout,” Reuters, April 27, 2015. 10 “Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Official Site of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution#_Toc150237531. 11 For example, the constitution’s stipulation that Kazakhstan’s president can only serve two consecutive terms has been circumvented in a variety of ways to allow Nazarbayev to remain president for the last twenty-four years. The government has also manipulated laws to suppress political opposition, disqualify candidates, and change the timing of presidential elections. 9
[76] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Roberts | Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan
elites. In Turkmenistan, for example, a new leader essentially emerged without much explanation, quietly circumventing that country’s constitutional stipulations for such a succession. It is generally assumed that Turkmenistan’s new leader, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, was chosen through elite negotiations, but the process was certainly not transparent.12 Turkmenistan’s succession was at least peaceful, smooth, and without crisis. For this reason, one might suggest that Kazakhstan can also weather a smooth, elite-managed transition in its presidency that does not disrupt the country’s “developmental state” model and keeps the economy on track. However, Kazakhstan also differs markedly from Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s population, for example, is over three times larger in comparison. Furthermore, Turkmenistan is an extremely closed society with a small and tightly knit elite stratum, which must collude to facilitate the country’s insular natural gas-driven economy that supports their wealth and power. By contrast, Kazakhstan’s elite population is larger in size and more diverse in its economic interests, and its wealth is not as dependent upon the country’s internal political economy as much as it is tied to the wider global economy. In this sense, there is more competition among Kazakhstan’s elite, and its members may perceive less risk to getting involved in a power struggle for the presidency given their economic resources outside the country. These factors suggest that Kazakhstan’s presidential succession process remains a completely unpredictable “black box.” It is possible that Nazarbayev will choose a successor in the near future and manage his succession while he is still alive. It is also plausible that his health will remain excellent, and he will serve as president for another two decades. However, there is a third possibility, in which he remains president until he passes away sometime in the next several years. If that were to happen, it may lead to an unpredictable process of elite negotiation that could easily devolve into a power struggle between the wealthiest and most powerful people in the country, including those within Nazarbayev’s own family. The uncertainty around this process is disconcerting, but the situation is further compounded by the country’s present economic situation and increasingly precarious geopolitical position. Perils of Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan in the Present Geopolitical Moment Despite the ambiguity regarding the process of presidential succession in Kazakhstan, there is hope that the country’s elites would rise above their personal interests and peacefully negotiate a new system of political power in a post-Nazarbayev state. After all, Kazakhstan’s diverse and relatively robust elite stratum does share a common interest in the continued success of their country. That said, at the present historical moment, there are additional stresses that could prevent a smooth elite-negotiated Joshua Foust, “Inside Turkmenistan’s Surreal Presidential Election,” The Atlantic, January 7, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/inside-turkmenistans-surreal-presidential-election/251021/. 12
Winter 2016 [77]
Policy Forum
succession process in Kazakhstan. First, the country is facing perhaps its gravest economic crisis to date, propelled by the low price of oil internationally and the impact of Western sanctions on Russia, to whom Kazakhstan is inextricably linked by its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Kazakhstan remains extremely dependent upon its oil exports, but its energy sector is running a large deficit in contrast to generating a substantial surplus only a year ago. Its foreign currency reserves are being depleted, and its industrial sector is experiencing difficulties competing with Russian companies. This situation has led to a rapid 40 percent devaluation of the country’s currency, creating serious stresses in the local consumer market and financial anxiety among the population writ large.13 In his capacity as the leader of a “developmental state,” Nazarbayev has responded to this crisis by undertaking a massive privatization of state enterprises to, hopefully, attract foreign investors and generate needed capital for the country’s economy. However, international analysts remain skeptical that this plan will succeed.14 Kazakhstan’s deteriorating economic situation is likely to lead to substantial social discontent as the population struggles with almost inevitable inflation and a resultant drop in their standard of living. While Kazakhstan may be able to weather this crisis if global oil prices rise and Nazarbayev generates capital from his privatization plan, resolution of the crisis would be seriously disrupted by a sudden need to manage presidential succession. If Nazarbayev were to unexpectedly depart from the scene in the midst of managing the present economic crisis, one would anticipate a lack of consensus within the country’s elite regarding to how to remedy Kazakhstan’s financial woes. This situation, in turn, could generate a prolonged and vicious power struggle to determine new leadership for the country, which could even mobilize segments of the population that are experiencing significant economic stresses. The instability resulting from such a scenario is unpredictable without clear “rules of the game.” Second, and perhaps more ominously, a power struggle may not only be propelled by rival oligarchs and politically powerful people within Kazakhstan, but also aggravated by external influence. One of Nazarbayev’s most important policy successes has been balancing Kazakhstan’s international political and economic partners. As a country situated between Russia and China, Kazakhstan has established strong relations with both of these global powers, while also courting substantial interest from Europe and the United States. This approach to foreign policy, which Nazarbayev has called “multi-vectorism,” has helped balance Kazakhstan’s foreign investment and allowed the country to avoid dependence upon any one powerful neighbor. While Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy affords it the ability to avoid outright dependence on
Nariman Gizitdinov,“Devaluation Nightmare Haunts Kazakh Banker Over Tenge Legacy,” Bloomberg, October 29, 2015. 14 For a thorough analysis of Kazakhstan’s economic crisis at the time of the writing of this article, see Stratfor, “Kazakhstan Confronts Economic Uncertainty,” December 1, 2015, https://www.stratfor. com/analysis/kazakhstan-confronts-economic-uncertainty. 13
[78] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Roberts | Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan
Russia, Nazarbayev makes clear that he will not abandon his loyalty to Moscow.15 In this context, the outcome of Kazakhstan’s presidential succession could have critical implications for Russia. If Nazarbayev’s successor fails to display his same loyalty to Moscow, it could be devastating to Russia, particularly given the present international isolation of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, if Kazakhstan’s second president is more subservient to Moscow than his predecessor—perhaps abandoning the “multi-vector” foreign policy approach in favor of dependence on Russia—it would be even more advantageous to Russia. As a result, there exist significant incentives for Russia to have a hand in who succeeds Nazarbayev. For Europe, the United States, and China, there would be far less interest in either influencing Kazakhstan’s succession or reacting to Russia exerting undue influence on the process. As a result, Russia has both the incentives and capacity to interfere in Kazakhstan’s succession with impunity. Those in Kazakhstan who assume Russia is a source of stability in the region might actually welcome Moscow’s interference in its succession process, but others, including ethnic Kazakh nationalists and those with pro-Western sentiments, might resist Russian involvement. In this context, one would expect that Russian interference in the succession process could further aggravate a nascent power struggle and increase the likelihood of instability in the country. In fact, one could even imagine that Russia might interfere militarily to support Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russian population—as it has done in Ukraine—if it sensed that other avenues to influence the succession process were closed. Thus, due to the present economic and geopolitical climate, Kazakhstan would face numerous challenges if it were required to manage a post-Nazarbayev presidential transition in the near future. This is not to say that Kazakhstan is facing an imminent political crisis, but—in the event of an unplanned succession—there is enough uncertainty, as well as internal and external factors, to possibly destabilize the country. Kazakhstan has the human capital and institutions to avert such a succession crisis, but it would also require leadership from Nursultan Nazarbayev himself. The question that remains is whether Nazarbayev has the leadership capacity and vision to change the conditions under which his successor is chosen in order to put his country on a path to more sustainable development. Conclusion: Leading the Transition from a “Developmental State” to a Democracy This essay has sought to demonstrate why Kazakhstan’s “developmental state” model of governance has been successful to date, but also why it remains unsustainable and vulnerable to a potential downward spiral of instability resulting from a succession crisis. In opposition to this argument, it is noteworthy that there are few examples of authoritarian leaders of “developmental states” leaving their countries in disarray after Michael E. Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-vector Foreign Policy: Diminishing Returns in an Era of Great Power Pivots,” The Asan Institute, April 9, 2015, http://www.theasanforum.org/. 15
Winter 2016 [79]
Policy Forum
dying in office. Rather, the downfall of most autocrat-led developmental states has resulted from leaders who have stayed in office too long prior to passing away, leading to entrenched corruption within the elite and the leaders’ ouster by popular political movements. In Tunisia and Indonesia, for example, the extended rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Suharto, respectively, eventually led to a squandering of many of the developmental gains these leaders had ushered in earlier in their reigns and ultimately led to the downfall of their regimes.16 Thus, even if Nazarbayev does not pass away in the next several years, historical precedent suggests that he would face difficulties maintaining his concentrated power for too far into the future. I would argue that this is an almost universal problem for authoritarian “developmental states.” The vision and discipline of a single capable leader can jump-start a country’s development and result in economic growth; however, such autocratic leadership must eventually give way to more pluralistic forms of governance if the state is to maintain sustainable growth, particularly as development broadens the capabilities of the citizenry writ large. While some might suggest that China presently provides a counter-example to such a progression from autocratic developmental statehood to democracy, it should be remembered that the People’s Republic of China is not led by a single personality, but by the corporatist body of the Communist Party. Although Nazarbayev is attempting to replicate such a corporate style of leadership in his Nur-Otan mega-party, this party is built around his personality rather than around a durable ideology, and thus could easily dissolve with his death. However, there may be a way for Nazarbayev himself to lead the transition from his autocratic style of benevolent despotism to a more pluralistic democratic model capable of sustaining Kazakhstan’s impressive development record. The question of whether he has the capacity to manage such a transition will ultimately determine his historical legacy as a leader. First, he could allow functional opposition political parties to develop in the country, permitting them to freely compete in the next parliamentary elections. Second, he could allow the establishment of truly independent television stations to cultivate a more vibrant political debate about Kazakhstan’s future development trajectory. Finally, he could appoint a successor, whose time in office would be limited to one five-year term while he or she oversees political reforms with Nazarbayev as advisor. To be successful, such reforms do not need to follow a democracy model based on American liberalism. The country could choose from manifold paths towards more pluralistic governance, which provide varying balances between the powers of the parliament, the president, and other state structures. Regardless of the form of governance
In Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali led the country through a period of unprecedented economic development, but state corruption prevented the full population from benefiting from these achievements, and he was deposed by a popular “revolution” in 2011 after twenty-four years in office. Similarly, Suharto helped to industrialize and develop Indonesia, but his regime’s systemic corruption and the impact of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis on the country’s economy eventually led to a popular “revolution” that deposed him in 1998 after thirty-one years as president. 16
[80] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Roberts | Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan might choose, it will be critical that the nation not invest its entire future in a single personality. While such authoritarian leadership has helped the country to develop over the last twenty-four years, the likelihood that Kazakhstan could find another leader as capable as Nazarbayev to continue this trend is unpredictable. In this sense, Kazakhstan stands at a critical crossroads in its history—one that will likely determine its future development trajectory. While the political reforms suggested above would indeed be radical for the country, as well as for the former Soviet Union more generally, Nazarbayev presently has the political capital to carry them out. The remaining question is whether he has the leadership qualities to do so, thus securing his legacy as the true “father of the nation” he aspires to be. If not, there is a strong likelihood that Kazakhstan’s substantial developmental success to date could be squandered and become merely a part of the historical memory. In turn, Nazarbayev’s legacy would likely resemble those of Ben Ali and Suharto, who will be more remembered for their inability to let go of control over their countries than for their developmental achievements.
Sean R. Roberts is an Associate Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University (GWU) and the Director of GWU’s International Development Studies Program at the Elliott School. Trained as an anthropologist, Dr. Roberts has conducted ethnographic research and published extensively on the Uyghur people of Central Asia. Additionally, having worked for six years for the Central Asia Regional Mission of the United States Agency for International Development on Democracy and governance issues, Dr. Roberts frequently publishes on the region’s political development, producing policy papers, providing congressional testimony, and consulting on development projects in Central Asia and elsewhere in Eurasia. Dr. Roberts is a member of the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS), Associate Editor of the journal Central Asian Affairs, and a founding member of GWU’s Central Asian Program. He speaks Russian, Uyghur, and Uzbek languages.
Winter 2016 [81]
Policy Forum
Makers of Modern Asia Past, Present, and Future Trends in Leadership An Interview with Michael Green
In this interview, Michael Green discusses the importance of mutual understanding and trust between individual leaders for successful relations between their respective nations. Green offers his views on what the biggest challenge is for U.S. leaders and policymakers as they form relationships with their counterparts in Asia. The interview builds on a course Green teaches at Georgetown University titled “Makers of Modern Asia,” in which he encourages students to assess the role of leaders in building East Asia’s post-war order.
Journal: As you know, the theme of this issue’s Policy Forum is inspired by a course you teach at Georgetown titled “The Makers of Modern Asia.” What was the impetus behind this course and what do you encourage your students to think about, both culturally and historically, as they analyze leadership in Asia? Green: I started teaching “Makers of Modern Asia” after serving at senior levels on the National Security Council staff. As I briefed President George W. Bush, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor, I realized that the president and senior officials wanted to know where the leaders they were meeting were coming from, including their ambitions, their domestic political opponents, and the narratives they were perpetuating. So, analytically—and in terms of policy—I had to think about leaders more than in previous government or university positions. I also saw clearly how the personal relationships between leaders impacted international relations. The U.S.-China relationship during the early George W. Bush administration is a good example. We had a crisis when a Chinese fighter jet collided with an EP-3 U.S. Navy surveillance plane, and President Bush tried to call President Jiang [82] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Green | Makers of Modern Asia
Zemin twelve times but couldn’t get through to him. When Bush finally did reach Jiang, they both agreed that they needed to connect and build a dialogue of trust. President Bush successfully did that with President Jiang and, later, President Hu Jintao. Given the opacity of the Chinese decision-making system, its relatively weak foreign ministry, and the fact that information does not always flow to senior leaders, (at least it didn’t in those days), U.S. presidents’ relationship with their Chinese counterparts is critical. Moreover, between China and the United States, the two nations’ governments do not align institutionally, which makes it more difficult for decisions to be reached and negotiations to be effective down the chain. A lot of it comes down to the leaders. Even with close allies like Japan, the fact that President Bush became close friends with Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi made a big difference in that alliance because President Bush would not do anything that might affect Japan’s interests without telling his own government that he needed to talk to Koizumi first. So the level of trust was very strong. In contrast, Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea (ROK) had a hard time connecting with the president. They liked each other on a personal level, but their domestic political situations in particular made for an unpredictable relationship between the two leaders. For the National Security Council staff at the time, which included me and Victor Cha, it took a great deal of effort to ensure that the leaders’ personal dynamic didn’t send a damaging signal to the world, particularly to North Korea. From these experiences, I realized that when I came back to teach that students of international relations, particularly those focused on Asia, do not have enough opportunities to think about how leaders affect bilateral and multilateral dynamics in Asia. In my course “Makers of Modern Asia,” I encourage students to understand leaders in terms of the instruments they have to advance their power. As one of my advisors, Dick Samuels, points out in his book Machiavelli’s Children, leaders have a toolkit comprised of three choices to advance their agendas. The first is to inspire people to follow them. The second is to bully or coerce people into following them. And the third is to buy followers through political deal-making, electoral support, or pure bribery. Leaders use all three of these strategies, whether they are acting in a democracy like Japan or a totalitarian dictatorship like North Korea. While something a leader does may seem contradictory to national interest, it may make perfect sense in terms of the domestic political environment. So, understanding this toolkit is one way to begin to explain why leaders say and do the things that they do—and why they do or do not succeed. Journal: Your experience at the National Security Council highlighted the significance of relationships between leaders for bilateral relations in Asia. Do U.S. policymakers have any common misconceptions that impact U.S.-Asia relations? Green: I would first point out that it is tempting for American policymakers—who are focused on achieving policy objectives—to assume “it’s all about us.” So, when a summit is canceled or a diplomatic initiative collapses, it is tempting for the U.S. government to think, “Why did they do that to me?” In this case, providing context is critical so that U.S. leaders do not become vindictive when they could instead help achieve policy outcomes with a slightly different approach. For example, President Roh Winter 2016 [83]
Policy Forum
Moo-hyun was unhappy when the Department of Defense (DoD) requested in 2005 that Korea agree to what we called “strategic flexibility” in our alliance, which means that U.S. forces in Korea should be free to respond to regional crises outside of Korea. Roh Moo-hyun thought this would mean granting U.S. forces a blank check to fight in contentious regions like the Taiwan Strait. Leadership at the DoD was furious and wanted President Bush to demand at a widely publicized summit that Roh Moo-hyun agree to the strategic flexibility proposal. However, President Bush realized that agreeing to strategic flexibility would place Roh Moo-hyun in a difficult position domestically—and that rejection of strategic flexibility by Seoul might unnecessarily signal that Korea was not a strong ally. Instead, President Bush gave Roh Moo-hyun time to work on a quieter approach that would still allow for something close to de facto strategic flexibility. A U.S. President who did not understand the complexities of leadership in South Korea may have unnecessarily harmed the U.S.-ROK relationship. Journal: Discussions of leadership in Asia often center on Asian archetypes of leadership, which are typically described as paternalistic and rooted in cultural or philosophical traditions such as Confucianism. Do you see certain leadership qualities and strategies as truly unique to Asia? Green: Yes, but they’re not necessarily uniquely “Asian.” That is to say, Asian leaders in the post-war era were heavily influenced by the archetypal leadership of their own cultures. Japanese leadership style does not involve a lot of bombast, and often Japanese leaders are trying to maintain consensus. This is because of the factionalized nature of Japanese politics, which reflects Japan’s traditional clan structure in the first thousand years of the nation’s existence. Similarly, leaders in Indonesia, including President Jokowi, reflect the classic Javanese “shadow puppet” style of avoiding direct confrontation. Alternatively, Korea has long been on the receiving end of other decisive leaders and the object of international relations, so Korean leadership style today reflects an archetype of leadership in which leaders who roll the dice and seize decisive moments are rewarded. So, all of these residual or historic archetypes are still very powerful. Asia scholars in the West often have wanted to explain how Asians are different. I think many of these scholars have lent too much legitimacy to this theme—that there are uniquely “Asian” values—and have probably underappreciated how universal norms actually have resonance. The high-watermark of this tendency is the book Asian Power and Politics, which was written in 1985 by the great China scholar Lucian Pye. He tried to explain Asian leadership types and said, in effect, that if you look at the history of Asian leaders, they tend to like communalism and authoritarianism more than we do. Yet, a few years later, Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan and the Philippines democratized. Young scholars today don’t recognize a lot of Asia’s supposedly enduring political-cultural attributes. So, on the one hand, scholars have to be careful about projecting Western norms. On the other hand, scholars have to be careful about the tendency to ignore basic human needs for openness, free speech, and so forth. There is a strong characteristic of Asian leaders in the post-war era which is Western in its roots, and that is nationalism and national development—and the conduit for this [84] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Green | Makers of Modern Asia
In post-war Asia, nation builders like Deng Xiaoping, Park Chung-hee, and Lee Kuan Yew adopted models that mirrored the way Japan imported Western learning, nationalism, and the developmental state model to secure national sovereignty in the Meiji era. The ideology of nationalism is a Westphalian Western concept. So, in analyzing the developmental state, it is important to look at the fusion of traditional leadership archetypes that reflect, for example, Confucianism or Buddhism with Western ideology. In the modern era, you must also look at the diffusion of power—as a result of the Internet and globalization—and how this has forced leaders to act differently than their fathers or grandfathers. Journal: To follow up on the rise of the Internet, nearly half of the world’s Internet users are in Asia—and the Internet has yet to penetrate even half of Asia’s total population. How has technology required current heads of state to exercise different leadership qualities than their predecessors? Green: The Internet is a powerful and transformative tool, but it is neutral in terms of whether it is used for good or evil, or whether it is used by leaders or by the public. It is definitely transformative in Asia, but in different ways depending on the country. One effect of the rise of social media is that nationalism is expressed in spontaneous outbursts: Koreans against Japan, the Vietnamese against China, and the Chinese against Japan. In many ways, this terrifies the state. While China’s protests against Japan are sanctioned by the state, somebody in those rallies will eventually pull out a poster protesting the Chinese state. In Vietnam, social media is a major driver for nationalism against China, because of conflicts over the South China Sea, but that converges with criticism of the state. In both Vietnam and China, criticism of the external adversary and expression of historical grievances is useful to the state for legitimacy purposes, but that also provides a space for anti-regime liberalizers to de-legitimize the state. Journal: Would you say that leaders in Asia are generally wary of the Internet? Green: I think Chinese and Vietnamese leaders are terrified of it because they do not have elections, so they never test where the people are to understand how deeply resentment and anti-regime protests have penetrated society. Alternatively, Japan or Korea have elections and a free media that is constantly rating the government’s strength; they are less afraid of the Internet because these elections ultimately judge how leadership is doing and whether or not they’re in peril. Journal: On the topic of elections, given Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent electoral victory in Myanmar, do you think she could become a “maker of modern Asia” and leave her imprint on Myanmar as aforementioned leaders have left a mark on their respective states? Green: Aung San Suu Kyi, like Mahatma Gandhi, used non-violence effectively. That’s where the toolkit becomes important because, like Gandhi, Aung San Suu Kyi was not just an inspiring visionary; she also used her iconic status to sustain Western sanctions against the regime in Burma. That would be called “bullying” since she coerced her Winter 2016 [85]
Policy Forum
rivals even as they imprisoned her. The one thing she didn’t do previously was buying or deal-making because she was under house arrest. Now, Aung San Suu Kyi is a politician. It was really interesting when I met her two years ago because she was this iconic figure, yet she was talking like a politician: who in the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the military party could she trust and work with? Who did she have to isolate? How could she cut deals to enhance her power? That is really critical because the constitution that the junta established bars her from becoming president, retains 25 percent of legislative seats for the military, and includes a clause allowing the chief of the defense forces to stage a coup and declare martial law based on his judgment that there is a national emergency. So, institutionally and in terms of power, there are still many obstacles, despite the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) victory. Aung San Suu Kyi’s ability to inspire was huge in this election. The question now is how does she use “buying” with this regime? Can she overcome the institutional disadvantages? Will she and the NLD be wise enough not to overreach? She is declaring herself a de facto leader, but, given the military’s powers, she could provoke a coup if not careful. Similarly, the military leadership has staked its economic development and new status on democratization, so it is a delicate game that requires a full toolkit. I am, on balance, optimistic—but barely because this is a very delicate transition point. Journal: We would be interested to hear your thoughts on the broader trend of female leadership in Asia, despite the region’s strong gender norms and paternalistic hierarchies. Is this the result of international values and influence from Western democracies? Green: In a lot of cases, female leadership is the result of dynastic succession, especially in South Asian states like India with Indira Gandhi, Bangladesh with Sheikh Hasina, or Pakistan with Benazir Bhutto. Female leadership in Asia is often hereditary. What is interesting in Taiwan is that Tsai Ing-wen is a scrapper from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), rather than from some lineage in the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT). She worked her way to the top as a smart lawyer and negotiator. Her lifestyle is not traditional for a woman either, which indicates how much Taiwanese society, since its democratization, has become open and accepting. Tsai Ingwen is an exception in many ways. In Japan, there are a number of prominent women who are on the cusp of leadership. Seiko Noda in the center, Tomomi Inada on the right, Mizuho Fukushima on the far left, and it seems that none of them are dynastic. A significant number of Japanese politicians in the ruling party are the sons or grandsons of politicians. Yet, many of the women who have risen to cabinet rank did it on their own (with some exceptions). Interestingly, some of the most nationalistic politicians in Japan are women; I’ve wondered whether some of this is because as a woman in Japan, they are proving their bona fides in terms of patriotism and nationalism. It is interesting that the leaders who are becoming particularly prominent, like Park Geun-hye or Tsai Ing-wen, are unmarried, don’t have children, and are not facing the challenge of finding a work-life balance.
[86] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Green | Makers of Modern Asia
Overall, the future of women politically in Asia is still uncertain, and there is not a big wave of women leaders in Asia just yet. Journal: Most current leaders did not grow up using the Internet. Yet, for future leaders the Internet will have been a common and prevalent tool that they used every day. This highlights a difference in formative life experiences for young people in Asia compared with those of their parents or grandparents. What are the implications of such generational differences for future leadership in Asia? Green: Taking a sweep across Asia, the generation that’s now in their twenties in most of these nations experienced no trauma. The sociologist Karl Mannheim proposed a theory of how generations are “imprinted on” by certain events that define their ideology and leadership style; Americans with the Vietnam War, Chinese with the Cultural Revolution, and Japanese with the war and post-war poverty. Yet, the current generation—people in their twenties—in many Asian states have experienced economic growth, with important exceptions like Myanmar (and in some ways Japan). Japanese millennials have lived through economic stagnation, which explains why they are slightly more nationalistic and resentful of external factors causing fewer opportunities for them compared with the previous generation. But this also made the younger generation in Japan more willing to look on the Internet and think of different ways of doing things. For example, many never thought Japan would join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) because of the nation’s closed agriculture market, but younger Japanese are now buying their seed and fertilizer online. Since they are not relying on the agricultural cooperative and the closed system, they’re very open to a more globalized market. Journal: Another generational difference might be that future leaders in Asia are more likely to have been educated in Western countries. How might this phenomenon impact future leadership qualities and ambitions in Asia? Green: On the whole, I think it is positive—but it is not determinative. The fact that future leaders in Asia were educated in the United States doesn’t guarantee they’ll like us. Japanese foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, who walked out of the League of Nations in 1932 and convinced Tojo and the Cabinet that Germany was going to win the war and that Japan should attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, had gone to school in Oregon and California. Matsuoka returned home with huge resentment because of, among other things, the racism he witnessed. That said, U.S. higher education is an eye-popping experience for students who come out of authoritarian systems without free debate—or even democracies where debate in the classroom is limited because they are studying to the test. I think this soft-power edge for the United States is on the whole, very positive. This phenomenon certainly indicates how little confidence Chinese leaders have in their own institutions. According to the Wall Street Journal, around 90 percent of politburo members’ kids attend school in the West. That doesn’t really square with the “China Dream” or the narratives that Xi Jinping is pushing, and is an indicator of how frail the system appears in the long run.
Winter 2016 [87]
Policy Forum
Journal: It also seems that in thirty years it will be much more likely for an Asian leader to have been educated in the United States, whereas future U.S. leaders are probably less likely to have had any educational experiences in Asia. How might this impact future U.S. relations with Asian countries? Green: In terms of American leadership, the past few years have been discouraging, frankly, because leaders in Congress leaders with an interest in understanding the region (and who were really like a “second State Department” in dealing with Asia)— Senator Inoue and Senator Stevens in Alaska—are gone. Meanwhile in the U.S. military leadership, the four-star senior officers were all promoted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The senior State Department positions, including the current secretary of state, are mostly Atlanticists. We may have, except for the president himself, the weakest literacy and understanding of Asia among our top national security officials that we have had in decades. On the optimistic side though, Asian studies programs like Georgetown are booming and polls show that over half of Americans now think Asia is the most important region, rather than Europe. You have senators coming up who are very interested in Asia, including Dan Sullivan from Alaska, Senator Mazie Hirono from Hawaii, Senator Cory Gardner from Colorado, or even Marco Rubio of Florida. I think over time we are going to grow a really good cadre of senior political, business, and diplomatic leaders who’ve lived in Asia and studied there, done business there, served there. But we are in a bit of a deficit right now. Frankly, I think the U.S. pivot to Asia has suffered because of this lack of senior level literacy on Asia in the second term. Journal: In your assessment, what is the biggest challenge for U.S. leaders and policymakers as they form relationships with their counterparts in Asia? Green: The biggest challenge for Americans in senior levels of government is that Americans tend to be very transactional. Senior U.S. officials tend to be lawyers or academics and believe that if they can get the argument right, then they can make the deal—which is more or less how politics, business, and academia works in the United States. However, relations in Asia are very sticky, rather than transactional. Ties are based on, for example, regions in Korea, schools in Japan, and membership in the Communist Youth League in China. Yet, as an American, you do not have to be, for example, a former member of the Communist Youth League to build strong relationships with Chinese counterparts. Robert Zoellick did it. Jim Steinberg did it. However, building trust in China takes time, meaning long-term commitment, as well as an understanding that immediately demanding a transactional response in Asia actually sets relationships back. Journal: Is this emphasis on the relationship related to ideology for Asian leaders? Green: No, and that is one thing that most of Asia still does have in common. An overly simplistic explanation for this is that much of Asia evolved from rice cultivating societies which to required collective agricultural production and so in Asian history collectivization really still has a strong effect. For example, Abe is a bit more decisive but, if you watch carefully, his decisions are very much based on consensus-based [88] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Green | Makers of Modern Asia
politics within the LDP leadership. Successful leaders in Asia are generally good at consensus-building. U.S. leaders have to strike a balance between getting results and investing in a trusting longer term relationship for when it really counts, like a security crisis or a financial crisis. When you have to deal with a crisis, which is when leadership really counts, does the person on the other end of the phone understand that you understand them and are committed to the relationship? In 2004, I was a senior Asia guy in the National Security Council, Victor Cha had just started working for me there. I told him come between Christmas and New Year because it would be a quiet period. Then we had this massive tsunami. One of the things we were able to do quickly was create this “quad,” which included the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. Within a day, everyone had agreed to create a joint task force for operations among the four countries—four countries that were not all allies. Yet, the reason it worked was because the senior naval leadership and the senior diplomatic leadership knew people. Sure, the U.S. is a global power, but it’s going to be increasingly important to invest in relationships in Asia. There is only so many hours in a day and, frankly, investing in relationships in Asia is going to have to come at the expense of some of the traditional trans-Atlantic relations. It once made sense for Americans to focus on Europe because that was the center of economic output, but now we have to redistribute our efforts.
Michael Green is an Associate Professor of international affairs and holds the Chair in Modern and Contemporary Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy at Georgetown University. He is also Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He previously served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), from January 2004 to December 2005, after joining the NSC in April 2001 as director of Asian affairs with responsibility for Japan, Korea, and Australia/New Zealand. His current research and writing is focused on Asian regional architecture, Japanese politics, U.S. foreign policy history, the Korean peninsula, Tibet, Burma, and U.S.-India relations.
Michael Green was interviewed by Jennifer Mayer and Brian Spivey on November 12, 2015.
Winter 2016 [89]
Policy Forum
Consensual Leadership Notes from APEC Robert Wang In an increasingly globalized world, most of the critical issues that countries face either originate from outside their borders or require the cooperation of other countries to resolve. Accordingly, we have seen the growth of multilateral institutions designed to tackle 21st century challenges such as financial crises, environmental pollution, cross-border terrorism, and regional stability. Moreover, while longstanding institutions such as the G-7 continue to serve an important purpose, much of the work of addressing our regional and global challenges has shifted to the expanded and more diversified G-20, which includes emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil. Within the Asia-Pacific region, we have seen the expansion of the East Asia Summit (EAS) to include the United States and India, movement toward an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Community, as well as a resurgence of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in recent years. Unlike national governments or some regional security alliances, however, these institutions do not possess hierarchical, legal, or political structures. Reflecting an increasingly multipolar world, these institutions need to operate in a consensual manner in which each member—whether large or small, developed or developing—has the opportunity to play a leading role in shaping the decisions of that institution. With multilateral institutions taking on a more critical role today, it is thus important for governments to examine how they can effectively pursue their national priorities within this broader and more complex framework. Here, leaders cannot rely on well-defined legal or political decision-making structures nor can they appeal to nationalism. Unlike in bilateral mechanisms, leaders working within multilateral institutions cannot simply focus on protecting or advancing their own interests vis-à-vis the other. Instead, leaders need to consider the goals and interests of the institution itself—beyond those of individual members. The more successful the multilateral institution is, the more effectively it can serve as a platform to advance the agenda of its members. In turn, the success of the institution depends on the extent to which it is able to benefit all of its members. Hence, leadership in this context requires that each member not only seek to advance its own interests, but also to relate them to the interests of the other members. [90] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Wang | Consensual Leadership
This effort is less about establishing one’s own vision and getting others to accept it—as “leadership” is sometimes defined in more hierarchical structures—and more about mobilizing consensus for what are seen as common goals. Consensus building in APEC APEC is a good example of such a multilateral institution. It is a diverse forum of twenty-one members on both sides of the Pacific focused on promoting the economic development of this expansive region. APEC currently includes the three largest economies in the world—the United States, China, and Japan—as well as developing economies from within ASEAN and the Pacific (i.e., Papua New Guinea). Member economies represent different cultures from the four continents bordering on the Pacific, including North and South America, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and Russia. APEC was formed over twenty-five years ago and initially focused on facilitating trade and investment, but has since expanded its agenda to work on a range of economic development and capacity building issues. This broad range of issues, including human resource development, energy, infrastructure, education, health, emergency preparedness, anti-corruption, and the environment, reflects the diverse needs and concerns of its members. Indeed, the operating principle of APEC is that its initiatives and agreements require consensus and are not legally binding. There is no dispute settlement mechanism, unlike those in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or in some other regional free trade agreements. APEC’s success is based essentially on the continued willingness and commitment of each member to work with others to define common goals and to cooperatively achieve them. Although the APEC host economy for a given year has a leading role in shaping the agenda for that year, any member economy has the opportunity to propose and lead initiatives as well as the responsibility to find and build support for them. Leadership in APEC is thus achieved by consensus. In this paper, I look at some examples of U.S. engagement in APEC over the past two years to illustrate how the United States sought to pursue various priorities in this context. It is my hope that this article will provide ideas on how governments might function more effectively in such multilateral institutions in general. APEC 2014: Combatting Corruption One of the most serious and urgent problems among many APEC economies today, unfortunately, is that of pervasive and systemic corruption. This problem has not prevented rapid economic growth in the short-term; however, corruption has a corrosive impact on the political and economic fabric of a society that threatens long-term economic development by limiting opportunities to a select few and generating social instability. Corruption is one of the most significant factors impeding the growth of developing economies, even contributing to other factors that produce what is known
Winter 2016 [91]
Policy Forum
as the “middle income trap.”1 Fortunately, many governments have begun to recognize the severity of this problem and are taking steps to address it. For example, after President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, he stated that anti-corruption is a top domestic priority for China. Over the past two years, the Chinese government has made increasingly public efforts in this endeavor.2 Similarly, President Aquino of the Philippines (APEC host in 2015) and other APEC economy leaders, have also recently highlighted this issue and begun to take on the challenge of combatting corruption and developing the rule of law in their respective countries. Recognizing the increasing severity of this problem and the expressed desire of leaders to combat pervasive corruption in the region, the United States decided to launch an initiative in 2014 to strengthen and expand anti-corruption work within APEC itself. Despite years of efforts to coordinate law enforcement cooperation with China and other countries, progress had been quite limited. American companies continued to complain about the difficulty of competing in such environments and urged further action to strengthen anti-corruption programs. Thus, China hosting APEC in 2014 was viewed as an opportunity to strengthen anti-corruption cooperation. China wanted a broader regional platform to highlight its achievements and pressed for increased cooperation among APEC law enforcement officials on cross-border fugitive cases. The United States consulted with Chinese law enforcement officials and encouraged China to take the lead in this effort. At the same time, the United States was able to mobilize the support of other economies grappling with corruption, as well as economies like Hong Kong and Singapore, who have succeeded impressively in combatting this problem. As a result of these efforts to find common ground with China and others, APEC leaders collectively endorsed the “Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption” drafted by China and welcomed the “APEC Principles on the Prevention of Bribery and Enforcement of Anti-Bribery Laws” and the “APEC General Elements of Effective Voluntary Corporate Compliance Programs” drafted by the United States. Soon thereafter, the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) organized a workshop to consider taking measures to establish corporate compliance programs among private sector companies within APEC. This anti-corruption initiative is seen as one of the key achievements of APEC in 2014. APEC 2015: Promoting Inclusive Growth When the Philippines took over in 2015, its Senior Official made it clear early on that the Philippines would seek to focus on promoting balanced and inclusive economic Shekhar Aiyar, et al., “Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap,” IMF Working Paper 13/77 (International Monetary Fund, 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1371.pdf. 2 Tania Branigan, “Xi Jinping vows to fight ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’ in anti-corruption drive,” The Guardian, January 22, 2015. 1
[92] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Wang | Consensual Leadership
growth during its host year. This effort aims to reduce the widening disparity of wealth within and across APEC economies that threatens the sustainable development of the region as a whole. This is an unfortunate phenomenon that exists not only in the Philippines, but also in the United States and most other APEC economies. More specifically, the Philippines wanted to explore and launch initiatives to help small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) access financial resources and regional markets in order to enhance their viability and growth. As it turns out, the United States (led by the Department of Commerce) currently chairs the SME Working Group in APEC. Hence, the United States was in a particularly good position to support and expand on this goal. It was widely recognized that the rapid growth of APEC economies had in fact generated even greater economic and social inequality in these countries. If allowed to continue, this trend could indeed generate greater social and political instability and eventually slow, or even reverse, the growth of a region that has been the fastest growing market for American exports. At the same time, the United States had also been looking for ways to help American SMEs access global markets, especially because SMEs are the largest source of employment for American workers. The United States thus welcomed Philippine leadership in this effort and saw it as an opportunity to promote not only U.S. interests but also the goals of APEC and the region as a whole. In this connection, the United States expanded a scheduled SME Working Group meeting in Atlanta (Georgia) in June 2015 and invited over 150 SMEs from all of the APEC economies to participate in the first APEC Accelerator Network Forum, which was designed to facilitate early-stage investment in SMEs. The program for the week also included a series of workshops to assist SMEs in improving supply chain management (including the application of cold chain storage technology), integrating with the global value chain, and understanding non-tariff measures among APEC economies. Afterward, the SME Working Group held follow-up workshops in the Philippines and Taipei, including the second APEC Accelerator Network Forum, the SME Finance Forum, and workshops on SME Business Continuity Planning. Finally, the Philippines agreed to convene an APEC SME Summit during the Leaders Week in Manila in November, which included a large delegation from the United States. This event was designed to highlight the contribution of SMEs to APEC economies, provide lessons learned from successful SMEs, help connect SMEs around the region, and build stronger private sector support for APEC as an institution. Additional U.S. and APEC Priorities The United States and other APEC economies have also collaborated effectively to advance other common priorities over the past two years. On the trade front, for example, in 2013 the United States created an APEC fund to help economies improve their customs procedures in order to facilitate the annual movement of about $1.4 trillion worth of goods around the region. Since then, other APEC economies have made significant contributions to the Fund to help achieve a 10 percent improvement target from 2010 to 2015, which will bring enormous benefits to exporting companies in the region. Winter 2016 [93]
Policy Forum
APEC economies have also made progress toward implementing a major U.S. initiative and APEC commitment to reduce tariffs on environmental goods to 5 percent or less by the end of 2015. With respect to the goal of inclusive and sustainable growth, the United States took the lead in 2014 to expand economic opportunities for women by forging an agreement to establish the “Women and Economy Dashboard,” which uses twenty-six contributing indicators to track and measure progress in improving women’s economic participation among APEC economies. The United States worked with Australia and other APEC economies to prepare for the launch of the Women’s Entrepreneurship in APEC (WE-APEC) network to help connect women entrepreneurs throughout the region. Additionally, the United States sought to promote cross-border education to expand opportunities for students, particularly in developing APEC economies, by creating an APEC Scholarship program. By the end of 2014, eight APEC economies had offered over 150 scholarships and internships as a result of this initiative. In 2015, the United States actively supported China’s initiative within APEC to reduce barriers and create opportunities for people with disabilities to participate in the economy. The State Department’s Special Advisor for International Disability Rights traveled to China in November 2014 to begin engaging with China and other APEC members and, eventually, to develop an agenda for the first meeting of the APEC Group of Friends on Disability (APEC GOF), which China in the Philippines hosted in September 2015. This meeting—attended by delegates from nineteen APEC economies—resulted in an outcome document that proposed measures and commitments to be presented to APEC Leaders for endorsement at the end of the year. Also, recognizing the region’s particular vulnerability to natural disasters, the United States has taken the lead in APEC’s work on emergency preparedness by seeking to improve early warning systems, facilitate the movement of relief workers and supplies, and strengthen trade recovery mechanisms among APEC economies. Conclusion As seen from some of the above examples of APEC’s work over the past two years, leadership in this multilateral context is reflected in the ability of individual members to mobilize consensus in support of what are seen and accepted as common goals. This requires leaders not simply to articulate visions of their own national goals but also, more importantly, to relate and bind them clearly to the interests of other members and the institution as a whole. Effective leadership thus requires a genuine effort to understand the interests of other members and non-member stakeholders, (e.g., in the private sector), and determine how one’s own priorities relate to these interests. The successful matching of these interests and initiatives creates a synergy that maximizes the overall benefit to individual members and strengthens the institution itself. For an institution like APEC that requires consensus, there really is no alternative to this type of leadership. Furthermore, consensual leadership in such multilateral institutions must be sustained [94] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Wang | Consensual Leadership
because leaders cannot rely on legal or political authority to implement agreements. Leaders must continually mobilize and consolidate support to achieve their goals as well as the goals of the institution. Although the task and responsibility of leadership in this context is initially and necessarily more time consuming and difficult, this effort— if successful—can generate a “virtuous cycle” of increased habits of cooperation among an institution’s members. In the case of the United States’ work in APEC, for example, the United States was able to obtain stronger support for some of its initiatives in part because it was willing to mobilize support for the initiatives of other members. Such broad cooperation generates increased stakeholder interest in the institution itself because it is better able to address the diverse needs of individual member economies. The recent resurgence of APEC is reflected in part by the long list of economies that have volunteered to host APEC up to 2022 as well as the continued interest of nearly a dozen other economies in joining or participating in APEC. In the long term, the hope is that APEC and its model of consensual leadership is able to promote a “community of interests” that could lead to the increased integration of the Asia-Pacific region.
Robert Wang is currently a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Dr. Wang previously served as the U.S. Senior Official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of either the U.S. Department of State or CSIS.
Winter 2016 [95]
Interested in Asian Studies?
M.A. in ASIAN STUDIES
at GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
The Master of Arts in Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service provides students with an excellent opportunity to study the dynamics of Asia. Students will discover a unique post graduate experience wehther they seek regional expertise, functional training, or disciplinary study in preparation for a doctoral degree. asianstudies.georgetown.edu/admissions
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
research The Rush for Hydropower A Product of the Chinese Communist Party’s Legitimacy Concerns Qi Zhang
This paper seeks to explain why China suddenly accelerated its hydropower development on trans-boundary rivers, despite strong opposition from neighboring countries and environmental activists. Additionally, and perhaps even more perplexing, China did not have an electricity shortage problem at the time of accelerating hydropower initiatives and is unlikely to experience electricity shortage in the near future. This paper will explain why conventional explanations for China’s hydropower development— energy demand, economic benefit, and climate change—do not sufficiently explain China’s recent hydropower rush. Instead, this paper employs government documents and hydropower data to advance the argument that the primary factor driving the Communist Party of China (CCP) to remove constraints on hydropower development and accelerate exploitation of this energy source is their sensitivity to regime legitimacy, which is currently threatened by the public’s reaction to excessive air pollution.
Environmental activists, experts, technocrats, and neighboring countries have heavily criticized China for selfish and excessive hydropower development.1 For this reason, For domestic criticism, see Song Guocheng 宋国诚, “Zhongguo shuidian kaifa guandian de lunxi” 中国水电开发观点的论析 [Analysis of China opinions on hydropower development], “Zhongguo shuizhili yu kezhixu fazhan yanjiu” 中国水治理与可持续发展研究 [China’s Water Governance and Sustainable Development Research], 2012. For criticism from India, see Simon Denyer, “Chinese dams in Tibet raise hackles in India,” The Washington Post, February 7, 2013. For criticism concerning Myanmar, see Geoffrey Gunn and Brian McCartan, “Chinese dams and the great Mekong floods of 2008,” Japan Focus, August 31, 2008, or Sun Yun, “China, Myanmar face Myitsone dam truths,” Asia Times Online, February 19, 2014. For criticism from Vietnam, see Kraisak Choonhavan, “Vietnam screams for halt to Mekong dams as delta salts up,” The Nation, April 13, 2014, or “China rejects Mekong River dam criticism,” BBC News, April 5, 2010. 1
Winter 2016 [97]
Research
China slowed down and even halted its hydropower exploitation on trans-boundary rivers in 2004.2 Until recently, the rate of hydropower development on China’s trans-boundary rivers was far behind that of its domestic rivers. However, since 2012, China has greatly accelerated its hydropower development on several major international rivers. In fact, from 2012 to 2014 the Chinese government approved and preapproved twelve more hydropower projects on trans-boundary rivers than it had during the prior three decades combined.3 Interestingly, China’s demand for electricity during this period actually began to slow down as China entered an era of surplus electricity. Given China’s electricity surplus, why would the nation suddenly launch such largescale hydropower development projects? This paper aims to solve this puzzle by arguing that the primary factor driving the CCP’s large-scale hydropower development is its sensitivity to regime legitimacy (hereafter “legitimacy sensitivity”), which is currently threatened by the public’s dissatisfaction with the country’s poor air quality. Faced with rising social unrest and protests over air pollution, the CCP forcefully responded to the people’s demands with massive hydropower development. In order to send a powerful and unified message to the public, the CCP disregarded opposition from environmental activists and neighboring countries and launched large-scale hydropower projects. This paper argues that air quality issues—especially the public’s concern about excessive pollution—are not the driving factors behind China’s ambitious hydropower development. Instead, legitimacy sensitivity is the real motivation for the CCP’s hydropower efforts, which go beyond passively responding to public demand, and include a clean energy plan to restore the CCP’s image as a responsible and effective governing force. This paper first reviews China’s past and current hydropower policy. Next, the paper presents alternative explanations for the motivation behind China’s substantial hydropower development. Finally, the paper argues that legitimacy sensitivity is the primary rationale for the acceleration of hydropower development on trans-boundary rivers. To support this argument, the paper suggests a “time congruence” between the public’s discontent with air quality and hydropower development. After demonstrating that the CCP’s air governance plan is more than a functional response to decrease air pollution, “legitimacy sensitivity” is introduced as an intervening variable that connects the public’s discontent and China’s hydropower rush, thereby suggesting a causal link between “legitimacy sensitivity” and the CCP’s hydropower efforts.
Lei Yun 雷云, “Kuaguo shehui yundong yu zhongguo gonggong zhengce yicheng shezhi moshi biange—yi ‘Nujiang shuidian kaifa shijian’ weili” 跨国社会运动与中国公共政策议程设置模式变 革--以”怒江水电开发事件”为例 [Transnational social movements and the revolution of China’s public policy agenda-setting: Nu River hydropower development as case study], Lilun jie 理论界 [Theory Horizon], 2010. 3 Data is from the “China Hydropower Stations” database. 2
[98] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
The Puzzle China’s hydropower development is often misread. For instance, Donald Weatherbee has described China as a “trickle-down hegemony,” arguing that China has been selfish in hydropower development and does not care about neighboring countries’ concerns or the environmental costs associated with hydropower development.4 A similarly misleading argument is that China has a consistent hydropower strategy that is driven by its growing economy.5 In fact, China does not have a consistent hydropower strategy— the main factors guiding China’s hydropower policy have changed several times since the early 1980s. Energy demand, environmental issues, and opposition from neighboring countries are several factors that have influenced China’s hydropower policy. However, considering these three factors, one would expect to have seen a slowdown of hydropower development since 2012. In reality, though, the CCP has suddenly sped up hydropower development. Energy demand is an important concern that certainly influences China’s hydropower policy, but it is not always the main determinant of such policies. China’s first round of hydropower development occurred between 1985 and 1995, when the Chinese economy was growing. As a result, energy demand began to increase rapidly (see Figure 1).6 The second round started in 2001 and ended in 2006. During this period, China faced a serious electricity shortage problem, especially from 2003 to 2005 when twenty-four of its thirty-three provinces had to issue electricity rations. From 1996 to 2000 and from 2006 to 2009, hydropower exploitation was relatively limited, even though energy demand was growing steadily. The second round started in 2001 and ended in 2006. During this period, China faced a serious electricity shortage problem, especially from 2003 to 2005 when twenty-four of its thirty-three provinces had to issue electricity rations.7 From 1996 to 2000 and from 2006 to 2009, hydropower exploitation was relatively limited, even though energy demand was growing steadily. Environmental cost is also an integral factor in China’s hydropower activities and directed China’s hydropower policy from 2006 to 2009. On April 23, 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao stated for the first time that China “should control irrational exploitation of
Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 289-290. 5 Pichamon Yeophantong and Scott W.D. Pearse-Smith argue that China’s hydropower exploitation is driven by economic development. Richard Cronin argues that hydropower projects are proposed for the reason of promoting economic growth within an area. Pichamon Yeophantong, “China, Corporate Responsibility and the Contentious Politics of Hydropower Development: transnational activism in the Mekong Region?” Global Economic Governance Programme, GEG WP82 (2013); Scott W.D. Pearse-Smith, “‘Water War’ in the Mekong Basin?” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53, No. 2 (2012): 147-62; Richard P. Cronin, “Hydropower Dams on the Mekong: Old Dreams, New Dangers,” Asia Policy 16, No. 1 (2013): 32-38. 6 During the first round, the Three Gorges Dam was approved. 7 Shuti Fu and Jin Zhong, “Hydropower in China,” IEEE Power and Energy 6, No. 4 (2008): 47-51. 4
Winter 2016 [99]
Research
resources.”8 In 2008, the State Environmental Protection Administration was upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). This upgrade granted the MEP two new mandates: law enforcement and formal policy-making, which allowed the MEP to play a greater role in environment protection.9 Since 2008, the MEP has been an important opponent of hydropower exploitation due to its potential ecological cost. For example, in March 2015, the MEP required the Three Gorges Group to stop planning construction of the Xiaonanhai hydropower station, even though the State Council had already listed the project on the “Twelfth FiveYear Plan of Energy Development.”10 Hydropower development data also indicates a slowdown in hydropower developments; between 2007 and 2009, China only approved one large hydropower station—whereas from 2001 to 2006 they approved eight (see Figure 1).11 Figure 1. China’s Hydropower Plants on Major Rivers
Source: By Author.
Neighboring countries’ opposition is another concern, which is evidenced by approval State Council, “Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech on the Sixth National Conference on Environmental Protection,” April 23, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2006-04/23/content_261716_2.htm. 9 Chai Yongqiang, “Guojia huanbaobu: cong jigou shengge dao zhineng qianghua” 国家环保部： 从机构升格到职能强化 [Ministry of Environmental Protection: From administrative upgrades to function strengthening], China.com, May 8, 2009, http://www.china.com.cn/news/zhuanti/ hblps/2009-05/08/content_17745809.htm. 10 Liu Shixin, “Ecological Worries of Long River Induced by Xiaonaihai Hydropower Station,” China Youth Daily, April 12, 2015. 11 According to the Ministry of Water Resources classification system, hydropower stations are divided into five categories: Large Type 1, Large Type 2, Medium Size, Small Type 1, and Small Type 2. Hydropower stations with an installed capacity of 300 MW or above are classified as “Large Type.” 8
[100] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
procedures and development rates for hydropower stations located on rivers beyond China’s border, compared with approval procedures and development rates for stations located on domestic rivers. The State Council and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) established stricter approval procedures for hydropower development on trans-boundary rivers than they did for development on domestic rivers. For instance, in Guangxi Province (which is adjacent to Vietnam), it is required that “hydropower plant projects on the Xi, Xun, Qian, Hongshui, Nanpan, Liu, Yu rivers and international rivers shall be approved by the NDRC,” while hydropower stations on other rivers do not need to be approved by the NDRC unless their installed capacity is 250 megawatts (MW) or above.12 The Chinese government also established the International River Working Committee in 2006 to coordinate hydropower development and ecological issues with downstream countries.13 Additionally, China’s hydropower exploitation of its trans-boundary rivers has been much slower than that of inland rivers (see Figure 2). Prior to 2012, the Nu River remained untapped and there was only one hydropower plant on Yaluzangbu River, which is surprising given that these two large rivers hold great hydropower potential. Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of China’s Hydropower Development
Source: Chinese Hydropower Science and Technology Development Report 2012
However, since 2012, cautionary treatment of hydropower development has disappeared. From 2006 to 2011, the NDRC only approved four hydropower plants on
“The government approved investment project directory (Guangxi 2005),” September 28, 2005, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bh/200509/20050900474549.shtml. 13 Meng Xiaolu, “Dazao kuajing heliushang de ‘luse shuidian’” 打造跨境河流上的”绿色水电 [Construct “Green Hydropower Project” on trans-boundary rivers] China Reform Daily, December 27, 2012. 12
Winter 2016 [101]
Research
Lancang River (Mekong River), Yaluzangbu River (Brahmaputra River), and Nu River (Salween River), which are China’s three largest trans-boundary rivers according to their hydropower reserves. In 2012 alone, the NDRC preapproved four hydropower projects on these three rivers. In January 2013, the State Council announced an extremely ambitious hydropower plan as part of the 12th Energy Plan. In this plan, sixty-six large hydropower plants were listed as “key projects,” with twenty of them to be built on trans-boundary rivers.14 This plan proposed that construction commence on a conventional hydropower facility that could generate 120 gigawatts (GW) during the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan. This facility could produce as much as 30 percent of China’s overall exploitable hydropower, and 48 percent of the total hydropower projects that have already been constructed.15 The 12th Energy Plan indicated that most of China’s remaining hydropower reserves would be developed, such that 85 percent of China’s large and medium scale hydropower potential will be utilized.16 One of the most significant features of this round of hydropower development is that it appears rushed. The hurried nature of China’s air quality governance and hydropower development will be further explored in subsequent sections. The Alternatives Energy demand, economic benefit, (specifically pertaining to the “Development of the Western Regions” strategy), and climate change are three popular arguments explaining China’s hydropower policy. These arguments may have explained China’s hydropower policy in the past, but they cannot wholly explain why China has accelerated its hydropower development in an era of excess electricity and economic slowdown. As discussed above, China’s hydropower policy is not always driven by energy demand. China does not have an electricity shortage problem, and there is no evidence that China will face this problem in the foreseeable future. In fact, China’s Generating Equipment Availability Hours (CEAH) has been declining since 2011.17 In 2011, the CEAH was only 4,750 hours—well below the standard supply-demand balance of 5,000 hours. In 2014, this number further dropped to 4,286, which indicated an electricity surplus.18 Recent hydropower projects in southwestern China are part of the electricity transmission project aimed at providing electricity to the Yangtze River Delta and Zhu River Delta, but provinces in these delta areas are actually reducing usage of
National Energy Administration, “12th Five-Year Plan of Energy Development,” January 2013, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-01/23/content_2318554.htm. 15 Calculated by the author based on the date from the “12th Energy Plan” and “Chinese Hydropower Science and Technology Development Report 2012.” 16 Ibid. 17 Generating Equipment Availability Hours is an indicator of electricity supply-demand balance. It has three thresholds: 5500, 5000, and 4500 (hours), which suggest electricity shortage, balance, and oversupply, respectively. 18 Data from National Electricity Industry Statistical Bulletin 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, China Electricity Council, http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/. 14
[102] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
electricity generating equipment—clearly not a sign of an electricity shortage.19 Moreover, industrial electricity accounts for over 70 percent of China’s overall electricity usage.20 However, China today faces an excess capacity problem in energy-intensive industries such as steel, aluminum, and cement. In 2013, China issued the “State Council Guidelines on Resolving Severe Overcapacity Problems,” which aimed to contain further expansion of and reduce obsolescence in these energy-intensive industries. China’s economic structural reforms will also shift China from a manufacturing economy to a service-led economy—an economic model that is much less energy-intensive. Since 2011, China’s services sector output as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) has increased an average of 1.3 percentage points each year.21 On the contrary, the industrial sector’s share of GDP has been declining by 1.2 percentage points each year since 2011.22 By 2014, the share of the services sector output was 5.6 percentage points higher than that of the industrial sector.23 In light of this dynamic, growth in energy demand will be limited, and it is therefore unwise for the government and energy companies to launch another rush for electricity investment. Focusing on the “Go-West” strategy vis-à-vis hydropower development is another approach used to analyze China’s hydropower policy. Some scholars argue that the CCP uses large infrastructure projects, such as hydropower stations and railways, to promote the economic development of western China, which lags far behind eastern China.24 While this argument is justifiable in some cases, it does not apply in the case of China’s hydropower development since 2012. “Go-West” is a comprehensive project with multiple purposes. Hydropower exploitation is a part of the “West-East Power Transmission Project” under “Go-West,” which was initiated in 2000 in order to solve eastern China’s electricity shortage problem by transmitting electricity from China’s western regions to China’s eastern regions. Yet today, eastern China is not experiencing an energy shortage and, in fact, enjoys an excess of electricity. If energy demand is the major driving factor of energy policy, China should slow down—rather than speed up—hydropower development. Fears about climate change also fail to accurately explain China’s hydropower activities. The climate change argument suggests that the Party must take clean energy measures—like developing China’s hydropower capabilities—to achieve recently China Electricity Council, “Zhongguo dianli gongye xianzhuang yu zhanwang” 中国电力工业现状 与展望 [Current situation and the prospects of China’s power industry] March 10, 2015, http://www. cec.org.cn/yaowenkuaidi/2015-03-10/134972.html. 20 Data from National Electricity Industry Statistical Bulletin 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, China Electricity Council, http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/. 21 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, October 14, 2015, http://databank.worldbank. org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Scott W.D. Pearse-Smith, “‘Water War’ in the Mekong Basin?” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53, No. 2 (2012): 147-62. 19
Winter 2016 [103]
Research
established goals to reduce carbon emissions.25 However, the Chinese government does not appear particularly enthusiastic about carbon emission reduction. China did, of course, sign the Kyoto Protocol—a legally binding agreement that specified obligations for carbon emissions reduction in the country. But, after the first commitment period ended in 2012, China did not make any further legally-binding promises for the second commitment period. In fact, during the Doha Round of the UN climate change talks, China led India, Brazil, and other developing countries in resisting legally-binding emissions reduction obligations.26 In 2014 and 2015, in contrast with its behavior and attitude toward climate change before 2013, China has made several serious and legally-binding climate pledges, most notably the “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” (INDC) in the lead-up to 2014 Paris Climate Conference. At the Paris Climate Conference, Premier Li Keqiang announced China’s plan to cut its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60 to 65 percent of 2005 levels by 2030.27 Moreover, China pledged to increase the share of non-fossil fuels as a portion of the country’s primary energy consumption to approximately 20 percent.28 However, this policy shift only happened after China recognized its air pollution crisis and formulated a comprehensive plan for air pollution in 2012. Clean energy and pollution reduction serve both the purposes of air quality governance and climate change, which means that the government’s promise on air pollution governance is entirely compatible with its commitments on climate change. Thus, although China recently made substantial pledges regarding climate change, given the timing of the air quality governance and climate pledges, this paper suggests that the latter is simply an auxiliary outcome of the former. The Argument This paper argues that China’s recent rush for hydropower was a result of the CCP’s legitimacy sensitivity, which was sparked by a growing number of protests related to air pollution. Faced with rising social unrest, the CCP prioritized appeasing the public over other considerations, and employed every method possible to meet the public’s
Weatherbee argues that the shift to “non-fossil fuel” is one driver of China’s hydropower policy; see Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia, 289-290. In a similar vein, Song and Ye argue that China’s 12th Energy Plan is a response to climate change; see Ranping Song and Qi Ye, “China’s Climate Policies: How Have They Performed, and Where Do They Need to Go?” World Resources Institute, September 29, 2015. Ye, Zhang, and Li Ma think climate change is a priority for local governments in China; see Qi Ye, Li Ma, Huanbo Zhang, and Huimin Li, “Translating a global issue into local priority China’s local government response to climate change,” The Journal of Environment & Development 17, No. 4 (2008): 379-400. 26 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 62-67. 27 Julien Ponthus, “China to Cap Rising Emissions by 2030 in Boost to Paris Deal,” Reuters, June 30, 2015. 28 Jennifer Duggan, “China makes carbon pledge ahead of Paris climate change summit,” The Guardian, June 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/30/china-carbon-emissions2030-premier-li-keqiang-un-paris-climate-change-summit. 25
[104] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
expectations and demands. This legitimacy sensitivity argument borrows from James C. Scott’s description of an authoritarian regime. According to Scott, in the event of a crisis that threatens an authoritarian regime’s survival or popular legitimacy, the state will enhance state planning to cope with the crisis and deemphasize goals not related to legitimacy or regime survival.29 Legitimacy sensitivity, of course, is rooted in the CCP’s nature as it is a regime that is not elected by popular vote. Since the CCP is not an elected regime, its legitimacy is largely performance-based, which, as Susan Shirk argues, renders the regime weak and unstable.30 What is more challenging is that China is currently transitioning from a developing country to newly-industrialized one. As a result, the CCP’s ability to maintain power and legitimacy increasingly requires providing good governance and public goods. If these demands are not effectively met, the CCP’s legitimacy will be undermined.31 David Shambaugh argues that the CCP is keenly aware of these challenges, and that the Party is attempting to proactively reform and rebuild itself, thereby sustaining its political legitimacy and power.32 Based on these analyses, this paper further argues that the CCP is not only deeply aware of its challenges vis-à-vis regime legitimacy, but also very sensitive to them. When faced with growing demands for public goods coupled with unstable regime legitimacy, the CCP becomes highly sensitive to issues involving public discontent and is therefore likely to respond forcefully to people’s demands. As in Scott’s description of authoritarian states’ behavior, one characteristic of a sensitive government is overreaction: when an incident occurs that incites public discontent, the CCP will ignore opposition and employ any and all strategies—including controversial ones—to appease the public. The term “overreaction” is not to say that the CCP will take inappropriate or unnecessary measures, but rather that the Party will prioritize people’s demands over other considerations such as economic benefit and ecological stability. Another characteristic that is closely correlated with “overreaction” is “urgency,” which indicates that the CCP would set an urgent timeline for its problem-solving efforts. Urgency can serve as a signal to the public that the government is taking their opinions and concerns seriously. When there is a contradiction between appeasing the public and other factors—such as foreign relations, economic benefits, and technocrats or environmentalists’ opinions—the CCP will choose the former without hesitation. China’s hydropower exploitation is one component of the CCP’s response to the public’s desire for clean air. In December 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing began to release its own air quality data, which conflicted with the MEP’s data but was more consistent with the Chinese public’s perception. Exposure to more accurate air quality
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 30 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2008), 255. 31 David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, Atrophy, and Adaptation (University of California Press, 2008), 7. 32 Ibid., 1-9. 29
Winter 2016 [105]
Research
data combined with the several heavy hazes that swept eastern China caused an increase in public discontent over air pollution. According to two surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in China in 2012 and 2013, the percentage of respondents who thought air pollution was a big problem increased significantly.33 At the same time, multiple provinces experienced street protests over air pollution and massive online protests cropped up. Such social unrest touched upon a sensitive nerve for the CCP—regime legitimacy—and resulted in a series of strong responses, one of which is increased trans-boundary hydropower development. International experience has already informed us that air quality governance is time-consuming, as it typically takes several decades to effectively improve air quality. For example, when a heavy haze hit London in December 1952, the government began to take serious measures to control air pollution. In 1956, the government issued the “Clean Air Act” prohibiting the emission of dark smoke, with certain exceptions. This effort continued for four decades. In 2000, the government issued the last major document, “The Air Quality Strategy for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland,” which marked the final attack on air pollution.34 Joint research conducted by the International University of Business and Economics and Nagoya University also suggested that it would require at least fifteen to twenty years to resolve the air pollution problem.35 Nonetheless, the CCP has set a much more urgent timeline for air quality governance than the United Kingdom; the Party promised to significantly improve air quality by 2017, and to eliminate heavily-polluted weather by 2022. Additional, costly projects were needed in order to attempt to meet this urgent deadline, as well as to serve as a signal to the public of the government’s serious efforts to meet their expectations regarding air quality. To this end, the CCP issued an ambitious clean energy plan that included hydropower development on trans-boundary rivers and would quadruple the total installed capacity for clean energy that was proposed in the 2007 Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy.36 This plan will have environmental, economic, and political costs, but these efforts will contribute to anti-pollution efforts, and, more importantly, improve the CCP’s legitimacy and reputation.
Andrew Kohut and Richard Wike, Environmental Concerns on the Rise in China, Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/09/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-China-Report-FINAL-9-19-132.pdf. 34 “Air Quality: History of Air Pollution in the UK,” Enviropedia, http://www.air-quality.org.uk/02. php. 35 Zhao Zhongxiu and Xue Jinjun, Annual Report on China’s Low-Carbon Economic Development 2013, (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), 57-58. 36 Calculated by the author based on the data on the 12th Energy Plan and the 2007 Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy. In the 2007 plan, China proposed to construct renewable energy projects with a total installed capacity of 170 GW. In the 12th Energy Plan, the total installed capacity of natural gas and other renewable energy is 680 GW. National Development and Reform Commission, Kezaisheng nengyuan zhongchangqi fazhan guihua. 可再生能源中长期发展规划 [Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy]. August 31, 2007, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-09/05/ content_738243.htm. 33
[106] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
Methodology To interpret the CCP’s hydropower and air quality governance policy, this essay analyzes relevant government reports and planning documents, as well as data related to air pollution and hydropower exploitation. First, because China still retains many elements of a planned economy, the paper will explore government documents in order to interpret China’s hydropower and air quality governance policy. The legacy of a planned economy remains particularly strong in the energy and infrastructure industries, where the state monopolizes the construction of large projects, regularly publishes plans for infrastructure development, and regulates the plans’ development through the NDRC (which is the successor of former National Planning Commission). The relevant government documents generally fall into two categories: Five-Year Plans (FYPs) and Government Work Reports. FYPs are programmatic documents produced by each administration to guide the development of China’s economy and society in five-year increments. The Government Work Report is the annual report that the Chinese premier presents to the National People’s Congress. In this report, the premier will conclude the previous year’s work, analyze achievements and shortcomings, and introduce the focus of the upcoming year’s work. The Government Work Report provides more details than the FYP, thus making it easier to trace the policy changes from year to year. Second, in order to comprehensively present China’s hydropower policy changes over the past several decades, as well as to compare the hydropower policies between inland rivers and trans-boundary rivers, the author created a database titled, “China Hydropower Stations.”37 The database covers 204 hydroelectric projects on China’s ten largest rivers (largest based on hydropower reserves), including the three largest trans-boundary rivers: the Yaluzangbu River, the Nu River, and the Lancang River. The key variables in this database are (a) the preapproval and approval date, (b) the duration of hydroelectric projects, and (c) whether or not these projects are located on trans-boundary rivers. The completion of a hydropower project typically attracts a great deal of attention, but completing a hydropower project takes many years to finish and, therefore, may not reflect the policy change. Thus, the author will use the approval and preapproval dates as indicators of a policy change, and compare these dates with the following time series variables: air quality index, electricity supply and demand balance, The data is primarily derived from six sources: River Chronicle: One Century Record of China’s Hydropower Construction; Chinese Hydropower Science and Technology Development Report 2012; China Hydropower Development Since “Reform and Opening-up”; China Hydropower Resources Atlas; Planning Atlas of China’s Large and Medium Hydropower Stations; and The Yangtze River Records. These books fall into two categories: hydropower development planning books and hydropower exploitation chronicles. They are compiled by either hydropower research institutes or the planning branches of China’s energy development departments, such as the former Electricity Industry Ministry. The remaining data comes from Internet sources, such as large hydropower state owned enterprise websites, relevant government department websites, and news reports. 37
Winter 2016 [107]
Research
and Chinese people’s concerns over air pollution. Moreover, comparing the development rates of inland and trans-boundary rivers will be useful for determining how the government varies its treatment of different types of rivers. China’s Air Pollution Problem China’s air pollution problem is deeply rooted in its energy structure, in which coal accounts for more than 60 percent of total energy consumption.38 According to research by Green Peace on the haze of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei region (BTH), which is China’s most polluted area, the major origins of particulate matter (PM) 2.5 include the following: 34 percent SO2; 22 percent NOX; 19 percent VOCs (Volatile Organic Compounds); 15 percent primary particles; and 10 percent NH3. Coal usage produces 82 percent of the total SO2, 47 percent of NOX, 25 percent of primary particles, and 18 percent of VOCs.39 Coal is without a doubt the main origin of air pollution. Moreover, China’s air pollution issue cannot be completely resolved by raising pollutant emissions standards. First, coal consumption is so large that even a low-level of pollutant emission per unit would still create a large amount of air pollution. Second, the residential and commercial sectors also contribute significantly to air pollution; in fact, the residential and commercial sectors contribute 32 percent of primary particles, 25 percent of VOCs, and 14 percent of SO2. Many Chinese families, especially in rural regions, continue to use coal stoves for heating and cooking. Compared with the thermal energy department and industrial sector, it is difficult to put any emission constraints on the residential sector. To replace coal as a part of the nation’s energy makeup, the government must provide an energy substitute, such as natural gas, solar power, and hydropower. The Hydropower-Haze Link China’s air pollution problem became very severe in the early 2000s and has since persisted at a high level. Since 2008, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing began to record the PM 2.5 value hourly. From 2008 to 2014, the daily average PM 2.5 value has been on the 90 µg/m3 level (see Figure 3). This is a very dangerous level for human health—3.6 times higher than the maximum PM level as suggested by the World Health Organization’s guidelines.40 However, the Chinese government did not take steps to address the high
National Bureau of Statistics, Nengyuan xiaofei zongliang ji goucheng, 能源消费总量及构成 [Total energy consumption and composition], http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexch.htm. 39 The main component of China’s haze are tiny particles or droplets in the air that are two and one half microns or less in width. See Green Peace, “Haze Truth: Analysis of PM 2.5 of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and Emissions Reduction Suggestions,” 2013, http://issuu.com/gpchina/docs/jjj-frog-trackrpt/1?e=2023844/5837604. 40 World Health Organization, “WHO Air quality guidelines for particulate matter, ozone, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide,” http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/69477/1/WHO_SDE_PHE_ OEH_06.02_eng.pdf. 38
[108] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
PM values until 2012.41 Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of China’s Hydropower Development
Source: The U.S. Embassy in Beijing, http://www.stateair.net/web/post/1/1.html.
After the U.S. Embassy in Beijing released its own air quality data in November 2011, haze and air pollution became a hot topic in China.42 In the following year, anxiety about air quality grew rapidly, reaching a peak in June 2012 and January 2013 when heavy hazes swept eastern China. Two surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center documented Chinese people’s increasing concern over air quality. In spring 2012, before the heavy haze of June 2012 and January 2013 descended, 36 percent of respondents thought air pollution was a very big problem. In spring 2013, after the hazes, it increased 11 percentage points to 47 percent.43 To put this number in context, air pollution became the most concerning problem for Chinese citizens over other social issues, such as inflation and food safety—which either remained at the same level or decreased slightly.44 Meanwhile, as public concern burgeoned, exploitation of trans-boundary river hydropower accelerated. On June 15, 2012, shortly after a period PM 2.5 was not included in the MEP’s air quality index before March 2012, and China’s air governance plan mainly targeted PM10 and SO2. 42 Susan Shirk and Steven Oliver, “China Has No Good Answer to the U.S. Embassy Pollution-Monitoring,” The Atlantic, June 13, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/china-has-no-good-answer-to-the-us-embassy-pollution-monitoring/258447. 43 Andrew Kohut and Richard Wike, “Environmental Concerns on the Rise in China,” Pew Research Center, September 19, 2013. Drew Desilver, “As China Coughs and Chokes, Concern About Air Pollution Rises,” Pew Research Center, October 22, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2013/10/22/as-china-coughs-and-chokes-public-concern-about-air-pollution-rises. 44 Ibid. 41
Winter 2016 [109]
Research
of particularly heavy haze, the NDRC preapproved a large hydropower station on Lancang River. In September, it preapproved another three stations on Yaluzangbu River at once, signaling a shift of China’s hydropower policy. Another important “time congruence” is the expected completion date of hydropower projects and the air quality governance deadline. From the date of approval, a hydropower project takes 4.35 years on average to complete, while it takes 4.85 years from preapproval to formal approval.45 So, the average duration for a hydropower project is approximately nine years, which is near the CCP’s deadline for achieving air governance. This time coincidence suggests that these hydropower projects were proposed as part of China’s broader counter-pollution strategy. More Than a Functional Response Hydropower development certainly helps to resolve the air pollution problem. But, trans-boundary hydropower exploitation involves substantial economic, ecological, and political cost, while its immediate contribution to reducing air pollution is limited. Thus, it is likely that China’s acceleration of trans-boundary exploitation is more than just a functional response to resolve Beijing’s air pollution challenge. The CCP’s air governance target is not merely pollution itself, but also the Chinese people’s hearts and minds. Through restarting hydropower projects that were halted for nearly a decade, the CCP is signaling to the public that it is trying every measure to solve the pollution problem, thus attempting to regain the people’s support. Moreover, hydropower is only one part of China’s overall response to discontent over air quality. Other measures to counter air pollution also reflect the government’s “overreaction,” and demonstrate that the CCP’s activities are not part of a merely functional response to air pollution problem. Cost-Benefit Analysis It is necessary for the Chinese government to consider numerous factors when assessing whether or not to pursue hydropower development. To start with, it is very costly to develop hydropower on trans-boundary rivers, and China already has an electricity excess problem. Thus, additional hydropower development will further erode profit margins, exacerbate the excess electricity problem, and possibly have a negative impact on the overall economic situation. Both domestic and international environmental activists, bureaucrats, and experts are critical of China’s large-scale hydropower exploitation. Finally, trans-boundary river development will elicit opposition from neighboring countries that share the river, thereby further strengthening China’s image as a “trickle-down hegemony.”46 India and Southeast Asian countries have accused China of Calculated by the author based on the data from “China Hydropower Stations.” Hydropower stations approved before 1990 and with durations longer than 5.1 years for technological reasons are not included. 46 Alex Liebman, “Trickle-down Hegemony?: China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ and Dam Building on the Mekong,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, No. 2 (2005): 281-304. 45
[110] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
decreasing water flows to downstream areas, causing floods and harming their fishing industries as a result of large dams and hydropower projects. Yet, the CCP still plans to accelerate its simultaneous hydropower exploitation on the Lancang, Yaluzangbu, and Nu rivers. The Nu River and Yaluzangbu River are not only China’s major trans-boundary rivers, but also its only remaining untapped rivers.47 For this reason, both domestic and regional opposition for restarting hydropower development on these two rivers would be extremely strong. Given these factors, it would be less controversial if China focused on the development of domestic rivers alone. Furthermore, the contribution of hydropower development on trans-boundary rivers to air quality governance is fairly limited. According to the 12th Energy FYP, the total installed capacity of proposed hydropower projects on trans-boundary rivers will only be about 18 percent of the overall installed capacity of all newly proposed hydropower projects and 10 percent of the overall installed capacity of all proposed renewable energy projects combined.48 Moreover, renewable energy is just one part of the CCP’s comprehensive air governance plan (see Figure 4). In short, hydropower on trans-boundary rivers is only a small portion of China’s air governance plan, meaning the CCP would still be able to effectively address the air pollution problem even without such hydropower development. Figure 4. China’s Air Governance and Clean Energy Plan by 2020
Source: The “12th Energy Plan”, Energy Development Strategy Action Plan.
Only one hydropower station is present on the Yaluzangbu River. The hydropower exploitation rate on Yaluzangbu River is only about 1 percent. 48 Numbers are calculated by the author based on the data from the “12th Energy Plan” and the author’s hydropower database. 47
Winter 2016 [111]
Research
An Urgent Deadline The CCP’s urgent timeline for its air pollution governance initiative may also indicate an “overreaction” as defined earlier in this essay. According to international experience, air pollution governance is a long-term project. London and Los Angeles, for example, required several decades to eliminate the hazy weather associated with poor air quality. However, the CCP promised to basically eliminate heavy pollution in ten years, which is a much shorter timeline than those proposed in other countries. The “Action Plan on Prevention and Control of Air Pollution” (Action Plan), which is China’s guiding document for air governance, set important deadlines in 2017 and 2022. By 2017, the Action Plan establishes that “the overall national air quality shall be improved. Heavily polluted days shall be reduced dramatically. Through another five years’ or longer of effort (i.e., by 2022), heavily-polluted days shall gradually be eliminated and the national air quality shall be improved significantly.” Other countries’ experiences have shown that improving air governance requires time. If the CCP merely hoped to resolve the air pollution problem, there was no need to set such an urgent timeline. If the CCP’s main motivation behind the Action Plan was to improve air quality, we would expect a less hasty and less controversial plan, which would enable the CCP to deal with air pollution in a comprehensive, orderly fashion. This urgency suggests that the CCP’s goal is not merely to improve air quality, but to “win over” the Chinese population. “Overreaction” in Other Measures Hydropower is just one part of China’s comprehensive counter-air pollution plan. To resolve China’s air pollution problem, China’s air quality governance includes three general principles: energy consumption control, pollutant emission control, and clean energy alternatives. For each of these three aspects, we can see a continuation of this distinctive “overreaction” feature. For instance, in 2012, the Chinese government upgraded their thermal power emission standard, which was called the toughest standard in history. This standard is comparable to—and in many aspects even stricter than—the standards in the EU and the United States. With regard to clean energy alternatives, in the 2007 “Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy” (2007 Renewable Energy Plan), the Chinese government expected to develop about 150 GW of renewable energy from 2010 to 2020, which was upgraded to 340 GW in the 12th Energy Plan. Furthermore, China proposed to increase the usage of natural gas in its energy consumption to 340 GW by 2020 (see Figure 4). The summation of these goals quadrupled the clean energy generation capacity of China’s 2007 plan. Legitimacy Sensitivity as an Intervening Variable PM 2.5 air pollution can cause damage to respiratory systems and trigger heart disease. According to the Peking University College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, the January 2013 haze caused at least $3.6 million in (23 billion yuan) in economic loss in economic loss. Among the twenty-seven cities that released medical [112] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
information, the number of emergency cases increased significantly—between 10 and 150 percent—during the haze.49 These events stirred people’s environmental consciousness. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ statistics, 30 percent of all “mass events” in 2012 (i.e., protests) were related to environmental issues, while 50 percent of all mass events involving ten thousand or more people were caused by environmental issues.50 Compared to other contentious issues such as water pollution and land disputes, air pollution impacts the health of tens and even hundreds of millions of individuals. Given the range of individuals impacted, air pollution is most likely to instigate collaborative protests across various provinces. Since 2012, a series of street protests against air pollution have occurred in the Zhejiang, Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Guangdong provinces.51 People’s anxiety over air pollution and willingness to mobilize in protest increases when plans are announced for a specific project that may pollute the air. For example, in Heyuan, Guangdong, the protest against a waste incineration plant attracted more than ten thousand protestors.52 In addition to street protests, Chinese people are involved in other forms of protest such as through performance art or the Internet.53 Major protests in the Shaanxi, Jiangxi, Sichuan, and Hunan provinces were organized through the social media program WeChat.54 People have also protested on other internet mediums like Weibo. Even official media organizations, including CCTV, complained via Weibo about the Beijing Municipal Government’s inaction when a heavy haze hit Beijing and, ultimately, pressured Beijing to take action.55 To cope with this trend, many government departments opened their own Weibo accounts. For instance, in the provincial Department of Environment Protection in Shandong Province, all seventeen city-level departments for environment issues, and more than 100 county
Li Lin and Tian He, Annual Report in China’s rule of Law (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013): 271-286. 51 Jamil Anderlini, “Ningbo environment protest reflects pollution ‘time bomb,’” The Financial Times (London ed.), October 30, 2012. Also see: Leslie Hook, “China pollution protests grow,” The Financial Times (London ed.), July 4, 2012; “Arrests made after protest over air pollution in China,” Kyodo News Service, March 9, 2015. 52 Li Wen, “Guangdong heyuanshang wanren youxing kangyi fadianchang xiangmu” 广东河源上 万人游行抗议发电厂项目 [More than ten thousand people protest against thermal power plant in Heyuan, Guangdong Province], BBC China, April 20, 2015, 53 “Air fetches $860 in China. Artist sells jar to protest pollution,” Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette, April 27, 2014. 54 Xiao Shan, “Zhongguo gedi fasheng minzhong kangyi wumai shiwei dan dou bei jingfang zhicai” 中 国各地发生民众抗议雾霾示威但都被警方制裁 [Protests happened in multiple regions in China, but were punished by the police], October 3, 2015, http://cn.rfi.fr. 55 Dan Levin, “Beijing yanzhong wuran, zhengfu shanchu weibo piping shengyin” 北京严重污染， 政府删除微博批评声音, [Beijing faces heavy pollution, government deletes critique on Weibo], New York Times, February 26, 2014, http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20140226/c26smog. 50
Winter 2016 [113]
Research
counterparts, opened Weibo accounts in order to communicate with the public.56 Perhaps the most notable so-called online protest is the documentary titled Under the Dome (also Under the Sky), which was made by a former CCTV journalist; it was released online and attracted two hundred million viewers within forty-eight hours.57 Popular online protests hold great potential to increase individuals’ awareness of environmental issues and trigger large protests like the Heyuan case. Chinese Leaders’ Repeated Statements and Promises The CCP first responded to air pollution in February of 2012. Premier Wen Jiabao approved the modified Ambient Air Quality Standards and raised the standards of air quality.58 On March 5, 2012, Premier Wen demonstrated in the Government Work Report his commitment, saying, “We will show the world with our actions that China will never seek economic growth at the expense of its ecological environment and public health.”59 On March 18, 2013, the Government Work Report dedicated an entire chapter to air pollution. Premier Wen again offered assurance that he was committed to facing this challenge.60 After Wen’s retirement, new leaders also showed their deep concern for and determination to resolve the pollution issue. In March 2014, President Xi, stated, “Air quality is directly linked to people’s perception of happiness.” Premier Li also promised to improve air quality in three to five years.61 Relevant Government Planning and Legislative Acts Following these speeches and promises, relevant government departments quickly coordinated plans and legislation. In October 2012, the “Air FYP” was issued, which was the first FYP that specifically focused on air pollution. In September 2013, the State Council issued the “Action Plan on Prevention and Control of Air Pollution,” which provided ten comprehensive and specific methods for reducing air pollution, and set clear goals of reducing the PM 2.5 for every area. Along with this plan, the MEP signed the “Responsibility Letter for Air Pollution Control” with thirty-one provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial municipalities, which prescribes timelines and detailed criteria for air quality improvement. The National Energy Administration, the Gongzhong huanjing yanjiuzhongxin公众环境研究中心 [Public Environment Research Center (IPE)] and Ziran ziyuan baohu xiehui 自然资源保护协会 [Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)], 120 Chengshi wuran yuan jianguan xinxi gongkai zhishu 120 城市污染源监管信息公开 指数 [120 City Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI)], (NRDC, 2013), http://www.nrdc. cn/phpcms/userfiles/download/201510/21/PITI2014CN-1021.pdf. 57 “Chai Jing’s ‘Under the Sky’ viewed more than two hundred million times in forty-eight hours,” DoNews, March 2, 2015, http://www.donews.com/net/201503/2882208.shtm. 58 The National Council, “Premier Wen Jiabao Chaired a State Council Executive Meeting,” http:// www.gov.cn/ldhd/2012-02/29/content_2079351.htm. 59 State Council, “Government Work Report 2012,” The Central Chinese Government Website, March 15, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/test/2012-03/15/content_2067314.html. 60 Ibid. 61 Jia Yue, Chang Hong, Li Keqiang, “Improve Air Quality in Three to Five Years,” People’s Daily, October 24, 2013, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1024/c99014-23312046.html. 56
[114] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
NDRC, and each province also enacted supporting documents. Through these plans and documents, the CCP generated a strategy comprised of a guiding principle (i.e., reducing air pollution); an overall action plan; specific action plans for each region and relevant industries; detailed implementation plans; concrete regulations for specific regions and industries; assessment methods for the State Council; and supervision channels for the public (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Process and Structure of the Chinese Government’s Air Governance
Source: By Author.
New Hydropower Development Plan These government documents and plans altogether make up China’s air governance plan, which includes three general guidelines: energy consumption control, pollutant emission control, and clean energy alternatives (see Figure 4). Trans-boundary hydropower development is a part of this comprehensive plan. Three guiding government documents on air governance and energy development directly indicated a link between haze and hydropower exploitation. The first is the “12th Five-Year Plan on Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Key Regions” (referred to as “Air FYP”) in September 2012, which stated that the government wanted to “accelerate the development of natural gas and renewable energy in order to realize a clean energy supply and diversified energy mix,” and “actively develop hydropower with consideration to ecological conservation and migration resettlement.” The 12th Energy Plan in January 2013 enacted the most ambitious hydropower plan, including twenty large hydropower projects on trans-boundary rivers. This plan also indicates the reasons for such a huge plan, specifically that, “ecological and environmental constraints have become salient and green development is imminent.” The last document is the “Energy Industry Work Plan to Strengthen Air Pollution Control,” which, as its name implies, identifies the connection between air pollution and energy. The work plan directly suggests “constructing key hydropower bases on Jinsha River, Lancang River, Yalong River, Dadu
Winter 2016 [115]
Research
River, and midstream of Yaluzangbu River as way to eliminate air pollution.”62 Two of the three main trans-boundary rivers were listed in the plan. Conclusion This paper has sought to answer the question of why, in recent years, China suddenly launched large-scale hydropower development. In response to this question, this essay argues that the CCP’s legitimacy sensitivity precipitated substantial hydropower investment. Widespread social unrest prompted the CCP—an authoritarian government that is highly sensitive to any threat to regime legitimacy—to forcefully respond to people’s demands. It has also encouraged the CCP to tighten its control over policy-making and overlook opposing voices in order to utilize all available resources to respond to public concerns. Hydropower development on trans-boundary rivers has been controversial for its ecological costs and potential conflicts with downstream countries. Many Chinese non-governmental organizations, technocrats, and international organizations have opposed hydropower development on international rivers, especially the untapped Yaluzangbu River and Nu River.63 The CCP took this opposition into consideration and halted many hydropower projects before 2012. Since 2012, however, the CCP, facing rising social unrest over air pollution, perceived such unrest as a potential legitimacy crisis and responded with a comprehensive air governance plan, including restarting previously halted hydropower projects. While such hydropower projects’ contribution to air governance may be limited, they also serve as a signal of the government’s sincerity, and thus act to reconcile the public’s discontent. The average PM 2.5 concentration in the seventy-four cities that publish PM data declined 11.1 percent from 2013 to 2014. During that same period, the PM 2.5 concentration in three major polluted areas—Beijing, the Yangtze River delta, and the Zhu River delta—declined 12.3 percent, 10.4 percent, and 10.6 percent, respectively. The PM 2.5 concentration in Beijing and neighboring areas declined 20 percent from April 2014 to April 2015.64 These numbers indicate the effectiveness of the CCP’s air governance. Hydropower has played an important role in this achievement. Since 2011, the CEAH of thermal power equipment has declined, while the number of hydropower plants increased significantly.65 The share of hydroelectricity as a percentage of National Development and Reform Commission, National Energy Administration, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Nengyuan hangye jiaqiang daqi wuran fangzhi gongzuo fangan 能 源行业加强大气污染防治工作方案 [Energy Industry Work Plan to Strengthen Air Pollution Control], May 16, 2014, 16. 63 There is only one hydropower project on Yaluzangbu River, and its capacity is only about 1 percent of the river’s hydropower potential. 64 Chen Jining, Guowuyuan guanyu yanjiu chuli daqi wuran fangzhi zhifa jiancha baogao ji shenyi yijian qingkuang de fankui baogao. 国务院关于研究处理大气污染防治法执法检查报告及审议意 见情况的反馈报告. [State Council’s feedback report on air governance law enforcement inspection]. Last modified, June 29, 2015, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-06/29/content_1939889.htm. 65 China Electricity Council, “Zhongguo dianli gongye xianzhuang yu zhanwang” 中国电力工业现 状与展望 [Current situation and prospect of China power industry], March 10, 2015, http://www. cec.org.cn/yaowenkuaidi/2015-03-10/134972.html. 62
[116] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
all electricity increased from 15 percent in 2011 to 19 percent in 2014.66 Although the abovementioned proposed hydropower projects are not yet finished, increasing hydropower usage has shown its effectiveness. In 2014 and the first half of 2015, the NDRC did not preapprove any hydropower projects. On one hand, this shows that China has stopped proposing new hydropower projects and future hydropower development will be based on the 12th Energy Plan. On the other hand, this also demonstrates that this round of hydropower development is targeted to meet the 2022 air governance deadline. Thus, whether China will further develop remaining hydropower reserves depends largely on the effectiveness of other efforts to govern air pollution and the public’s evaluation of air quality in the near future.
Qi Zhang is an M.A. candidate in the Asian Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. His research interests include the Chinese Communist Party’s adaptability, the Chinese economy, and trade and investment in East Asia.
National Bureau of Statistics, Fadianliang 发电量 [Generated electrical energy], http://data.stats. gov.cn/search.htm?s=%E5%8F%91%E7%94%B5%E9%87%8F. 66
Winter 2016 [117]
Research
References Bader, Jeffrey A. Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012. Chai Yongqiang, “国家环保部：从机构升格到职能强化_中国网 [Ministry of Environmental Protection: From administrative upgrades to function strengthening],” China.com. May 8, 2009, http://www.china.com.cn/news/zhuanti/hblps/2009-05/08/ content_17745809.htm. Chen Shuisheng. “Analysis of China’s Public Policy Model Change from Nu River Hydro power Exploitation.” Oriental Morning Post, January 13, 2015. http://epaper.dfdaily. com/dfzb/html/2015-01/13/content_956572.htm. China Electricity Council. “National Electricity Industry Statistical Bulletin 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.” http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/. China Electricity Council, “中国电力工业现状与展望, [Current situation and prospect of China power industry]” March 10, 2015, http://www.cec.org.cn/yaowenkuaidi/ 2015-03-10/134972.html. China Society for Hydropower Engineering. “China Hydropower Development Since ‘Reform and Opening-up,’” China Electric Power Press, 2009. China Society for Hydropower Engineering. “Chinese Hydropower Science and Technology Development Report 2012,” China Electric Power Press, 2013. China Renewable Energy Engineering Institute. “中国大中型水电站规划图集, [Planning Atlas of China’s Large and Medium Hydropower Stations China Water & Power Press],” 1994. Encyclopedia of China Publishing House. “The Yangtze River Records (长江志),” 2000. Fu Shuti, and Jin Zhong. “Hydropower in China.” IEEE Power and Energy 6, No. 4 (2008): 47-51. Green Peace. “Haze Truth: Analysis of PM 2.5 of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and Emissions Reduction Suggestions.” 2013. http://issuu.com/gpchina/docs/jjj frog-track-rpt/1?e=2023844/5837604. Gongzhong huanjing yanjiuzhongxin 公众环境研究中心 [Public Environment Research Center (IPE)] and Ziran ziyuan baohu xiehui 自然资源保护协会 [Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)], 120 Chengshi wuran yuan jianguan xinxi gongkai zhishu 120 城市污染源监管信息公开指数 [120 City Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI)]. (NRDC, 2013), http://www.nrdc.cn/phpcms/userfiles/ download/201510/21/PITI2014CN-1021.pdf. Hydropower Development Division, Energy Ministry. “中国水力资源图集, [China Hydropower Resources Atlas],” 1991.
[118] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
Kohut, Andrew and Richard Wike. Environmental Concerns on the Rise in China. Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 2013. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/ 09/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-China-Report-FINAL-9-19-132.pdf. Lei Yun. “跨国社会运动与中国公共政策议程设置模式变革--以”怒江水电开发事件” 为例. [Transnational social movements and the revolution of China’s public policy agenda-setting: Nu River hydropower development as case study].” 理论界, 2013. Li Lin and Tian He. Annual Report in China’s rule of Law No. 11. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013. Liebman, Alex. “Trickle-down Hegemony?: China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ and Dam Building on the Mekong.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, No. 2 (2005): 281-304. Ministry of Environmental Protection. “12th Five-Year Plan of Air Pollution Control in Key Regions.” October 29, 2012. http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201212/ W020121205566730379412.pdf. Ministry of Environmental Protection. “2011 China Environmental Bulletin.” May 25 2012. http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zkgb/2011zkgb/. Mu Quan and Zhang Shiqiu. “The economic cost evaluation of haze event in China.” 中国环境科学, 2013. Nathan, Andrew J. and Andrew Scobell. China’s Search for Security. Columbia University Press, 2015. National Energy Administration. “12th Five-Year Plan of Energy Development,” January 23 2013. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-01/23/content_2318554.htm. Pearse-Smith, Scott W.D. “‘Water War’ in the Mekong Basin?” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53, No. 2 (2012): 147-62. People’s Republic of China National Bureau of Statistics, 2015. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj. Qi, Ye, Li Ma, Huanbo Zhang, and Huimin Li. “Translating a global issue into local priority China’s local government response to climate change.” The Journal of Environment & Development 17, No. 4 (2008): 379-400. Scott, James C. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Shambaugh, David L. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. University of California Press, 2008. Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press, 2008.
Winter 2016 [119]
Research
Song, Ranping and Qi Ye. “China’s Climate Policies: How Have They Performed, and Where Do They Need to Go?” World Resources Institute, September 29, 2015. http://www. wri.org/blog/2015/09/china%E2%80%99s-climate-policies-how-have-they-per formed-and-where-do-they-need-go. State Council. “Action Plan on Prevention and Control of Air Pollution.” September 2013. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/12/content_2486773.htm State Council. “Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014- 2020).” June 13, 2014. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-11/19/content_9222.htm State Council. “State Council Guidelines on Resolving Severe Overcapacity Problems.” October 25, 2013. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-10/15/content_2507143.htm State Council. “The Government Approved the Investment Project Directory-Guangxi 2005.” http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bh/200509/20050900474549.shtml State Council. “Government Work Report 2012,” March 15, 2012. http://www.gov.cn/test/2012-03/15/content_2067314.htm State Council. “Premier Wen Jiabao Chaired a State Council Executive Meeting.” http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2012-02/29/content_2079351.htm State Council. “Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech on the Sixth National Conference on Environmental Protection.” April 23, 2006. http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2006-04/23/ content_261716_2.htm. The National Council. “Premier Wen Jiabao Chaired a State Council Executive Meeting.” http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2012-02/29/content_2079351.htm. Weatherbee, Donald E. International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. World Bank. “World Development Indicators.” October 14, 2015. http://databank. worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators. World Health Organization. “WHO Air quality guidelines for particulate matter, ozone, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide.”http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/69477/1/ WHO_SDE_PHE_OEH_06.02_eng.pdf. Xiao Shan. “中国各地发生民众抗议雾霾示威但都被警方制裁 [Protests happened in multiple regions in China, but were punished by the police].” October 3, 2015. Yang Tuo, and Zhang Dehui. “Experience and Implications of London’s Air Governance for China.” Contemporary Economic Management, April 2014. Yang Yongnian. River Chronicle—One Century Record of China’s Hydropower Construction. Sichuankeji Press, 2013.
[120] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Zhang | The Rush for Hydropower
Zhao Zhongxiu and Xue Jinjun, Annual Report on China’s Low-Carbon Economic Development 2013. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013.
Winter 2016 [121]
Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
CALL FOR PAPERS The Journal welcomes original social science research papers written on issues relevant to politics, security, economy, culture, and society of contemporary Asia, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. “Contemporary� is understood broadly as recent, but not necessarily as current. We are pleased to consider articles with historical background sections so long as such analyses are crucial for advancing core arguments. SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Submissions should be emailed to guasiajournal@gmail.com as MS Word documents. Please do not submit in PDF format. Authors should include a short bio in the email text, but must avoid any self-identification in the manuscript as we send our articles out for anonymous review. Document: Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft Word, with 1-inch/2.5-centimeter margins on all sides. Length: Manuscripts should be 5,000-7,000 words in length. Style: Authors must follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed. Citations: All citations must be formatted as footnotes. Please also include a full bibliography at the end. Abstract: Authors must include an abstract (100-200 words) that effectively and concisely summarizes his/her study. *Submissions must not be plagiarized, copyrighted, or under review elsewhere.
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Explaining Japanese Politicians’ Behaviors M. Erika Pollmann1
This article examines the relative importance of international versus domestic considerations in order to predict how Japanese politicians will behave with regards to the Yasukuni Shrine. Whenever high-ranking politicians visit the shrine, there are substantial costs in Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. Yet, some Japanese politicians continue to visit the shrine. To better understand why they visit, this study not only looks at cases in which politicians were unresponsive to anticipated international costs (and hence visited the Yasukuni Shrine), but also moments when politicians were responsive and changed their behavior accordingly (and thus did not visit Yasukuni Shrine). This study concludes that domestic political considerations, specifically politicians’ ties to conservative groups that support shrine visits, their attachment of a positive ideological meaning to a shrine visit, and whether they have the popularity to withstand a domestic backlash to a shrine visit are the most important factors that facilitate the occasional visit, while the known diplomatic consequences of visits usually constrain politicians from visiting.
The Korean peninsula and Chinese mainland have historically played an important role in calculations of national security for Japanese elites. Yet, in recent years, Japanese I would like to first and foremost thank Michael J. Green, my thesis adviser, who guided me from the very beginning. I would also like to thank Jordan Sand for encouraging me to keep pursuing this venture until publication. I cannot thank Professors Green and Sand enough for their leadership of the Georgetown-Japan 2020 Initiative, an incredible opportunity to travel to and do research in Japan. And finally, I would like to thank Kendra Billingslea, my dean and friend, for her support and advice throughout the process. The original article was written to complete a requirement for Honors in the International Politics program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. The views expressed here and any mistakes are my own. 1
Winter 2016 [123]
Research
politicians seem to ignore the detrimental effects of Yasukuni Shrine visits on Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. The Yasukuni Shrine has courted regional controversy since the late 1980s due to the enshrinement of war criminals convicted by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. While conservative Japanese politicians wish to visit to pay their respects to the deceased, South Korean and Chinese observers see such homage as glorification of Japan’s militarist past, and react with anti-Japanese rhetoric and cancellation of state-level meetings. This study analyzes the decisions of Japanese politicians to visit or not visit the Yasukuni Shrine since fall 1998 to assess whether Japanese politicians give greater weight to (a) Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China or to (b) their domestic political standing.2 This study advances the argument that the most significant factor in predicting when politicians are more likely to visit the shrine is the structure of domestic politics—their electoral reliance on conservative groups that support shrine visits, their ideological commitment to visiting the shrine, and the overall popularity and strength of the Cabinet. Japanese politicians generally are responsive to anticipated international condemnation and more frequently choose not to visit the shrine, but when individuals do choose to visit, the decision is generally unrelated to changes in how Japan perceives its relationship with South Korea and China.3 This study goes beyond previous analyses because it does not exclusively focus on visits. To fully explain why politicians behave unresponsively, it is also important to analyze what factors may have led to their decision to behave responsively (i.e., to not visit). Also, this study goes further than previous studies by analyzing both the domestic and international aspects at once, allowing for a fuller examination of the constraints that Japanese politicians face. This is done by applying Putnam’s two-level game model, which is a more accurate reflection of the full range of considerations behind this decision-making process.4 It also considers the effect of China and South Korea on Fall 1998 was chosen as the cut-off point because that is when Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo met with South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and before those meetings his Chief Cabinet Secretary clearly admitted Japanese recognition of the diplomatic costs of a Yasukuni Shrine visit. 3 The term “politician” in this study primarily denotes prime ministers; however, this study does include a discussion of Cabinet ministers and Diet members as well, so the term loosely covers Japanese national-level elected officials. 4 A few previous studies have also considered the issue from both a domestic and international perspective. See Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 57-100: this chapter focuses on how domestic politics informed the debate over the Yasukuni Shrine, with special consideration of how Chinese pressure affected the domestic conversation. Also see Yew Meng Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation (London: Routledge, 2014), 114-50: Lai’s research takes a neoclassical approach and systematically examines both international and domestic factors. He argues that, “a critical examination of the context leading to [Koizumi’s] shrine visits, and the manner in which they were carefully choreographed and executed, not to mention the diplomatic maneuvering thereafter, suggest that shrewd calculations involving the use of nationalism for domestic political objectives, and its delicate balancing and trade-off with other factors, were also at play.” Lai primarily uses U.S. resolve/commitment to Japan and Japan’s diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China as his main international independent variables. The main advantage of this study over Lai’s chapter is 2
[124] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Japanese politicians’ decision-making, and analyzes the behavior of prime ministers both before and after Koizumi Junichiro. The first section of this article will provide a historical overview of the “Yasukuni Problem” in Northeast Asia’s regional diplomacy. The second section will discuss how Putnam’s two-level game model can be applied to Yasukuni Shrine visits. The third section explains the research design of the study, and the fourth section discusses the findings. The fifth section discusses the broader picture by extending the discussion beyond prime ministers to consider trends in Cabinet ministers and Diet members’ behavior. The final section discusses the implications of this study. A Brief History of the Yasukuni Shrine Controversy in Northeast Asia The Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1869 during the Meiji era to honor Japanese subjects who died for the emperor following the Boshin War, which ended the Tokugawa Shogunate. It enshrines almost 2.5 million people, including those who died in the Pacific War. Thousands of Class-B and Class-C war criminals were discreetly enshrined there from 1959 until 1970 without causing much international consternation. In 1978, however, fourteen Class-A war criminals were secretly interred, which became public knowledge in 1979. Until 1985, when Prime Minister Nakasone bowed to Chinese pressure and stopped visiting, it had been considered normal for prime ministers to visit the shrine. These visits only became a significant regional issue over the course of the 1980s, when China protested for the first time after Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko’s 1982 visit. South Korea did not react until much later, after Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro’s 1996 visit.5 The conflict over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine persists to this day because of uncompromising differences in the constitutive principles of what a prime minister’s shrine visit means. Akihito Tanaka identifies four potential meanings for a shine visit: “mourning of dead soldiers,” “state intervention in religion,” “justification of aggression,” and “rejection of Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.”6 While Japanese politicians who visit aim to that it can analyze more recent cases since Lai’s publication, as his chapter focuses on Koizumi’s visits and Shinzo Abe’s deliberate ambiguity. 5 Even though the origin of this conflict is commonly attributed to the internment of the Class-A war criminals, Lewentowitcz argues that neither the inclusion of fourteen Class-A war criminals nor the “official” capacity in which visits were made can fully explain why or when South Korea and China began reacting, as their reactions were either delayed after or inconsistent for a while following the revelation of the secret enshrinement and Prime Minister Suzuki’s first “official” visit. Based on his research, Lewentowicz concludes that Chinese and South Korean reactions have more to do with the strength and weakness of the Chinese Communist Party in China and democratization and economic development in South Korea than they do with the secret internment. Steven Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take Toward an Unresolved Link to the Past,” (Master’s dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 67-9, 85-6. 6 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (West Port CT: Prager Security International, 2008), 129.
Winter 2016 [125]
Research
restrict the meaning of their visit to the “mourning of dead soldiers,” foreign observers interpret it as “justification of aggression” and “rejection of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.”7 Before the 1980s, the dominant discourse was restricted to a Japanese understanding of what a shrine visit meant—with vocal but limited dissent from the pacifist left wing—and neither South Korea nor China understood different meanings. This, however, changed when South Korea and China began challenging the Japanese understanding and offering their own interpretations: shrine visits signaled “a resurgence of Japanese militarism” through a rejection of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and were thereby justifying Japanese aggression during WWII.8 After Hashimoto, Koizumi was the first prime minister to visit the shrine again. He visited annually between 2001 and 2006. Koizumi’s uncompromising attitude on the matter led to deterioration in relations between Japan and Japan’s neighbors, demonstrated through formal diplomatic protests and cancelled meetings.9 After Koizumi’s August 2001 visit, Beijing initially refused a bilateral summit with Koizumi, but he was still able to make a fence-mending trip to China in October. After the April 2002 visit, China postponed scheduled defense exchanges and cancelled Koizumi’s state visit to China (even though they proceeded with Chinese Communist Party leader Zeng Qinghong’s visit to Japan). After Koizumi paid a visit in January 2003, China demanded a moratorium on shrine visits as a precondition for high-level talks. Despite this, Koizumi was able to meet with President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of an international event in St. Petersburg in May. The January 2004 visit maintained the freeze in high-level diplomacy, and also led to the cancellation of a naval exchange. Relations worsened after his October 2005 visit, when Chinese officials began ignoring their Japanese counterparts even at international events, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in November of that year. China and South Korea also cancelled the tripartite meetings that had been conducted as part of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework. Ironically, Koizumi’s most high profile visit perhaps had the most limited impact; he stepped down just over a month after his August 2006 visit. Instead of holding his successor responsible for Koizumi’s recklessness, Beijing worked quickly to improve relations with Japan.10 Prime ministers since then have tried to salvage the relationship by pledging to not visit or refraining from visiting. The status quo was maintained until Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the shrine in December 2013. After each of his visits, there was a negative reaction from South Korea and China. For example, in response to Abe’s most recent visit on December 26, “State intervention in religion” is an important issue within Japan domestically; critics argue that visits by politicians violate Article 20 of the Constitution, which mandates separation of church and state. It is an issue that has been addressed by Japanese courts as well. However, this is not a focal point of the international dispute over the shrine. 8 Lewentowicz, “In Response to Yasukuni,” 103. 9 The Yasukuni Shrine issue is perhaps the most important history-related issue in Japan-China relations. It is still a significant issue in the Japan-South Korea relationship, but the issue of “comfort women,” a euphemism for sex slaves used by the Japanese Imperial Army, is an even bigger flashpoint. 10 Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 125-30. 7
[126] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
2013, the South Korean government warned of “huge diplomatic repercussions.”11 A South Korean government official warned, “All exchanges between Japan and South Korea may be suspended. We cannot predict what will happen.”12 After Abe’s shrine visit, South Korea’s defense ministry scrapped a memorandum of understanding between deputy defense ministers to promote more working-level exchanges and called off a series of defense meetings and military exchange programs that had been scheduled with Japan.13 As relations had already come to a standstill due to tensions over Abe’s views on history, the shrine visit was consequential because it dashed any possibility of reconciliation in the near future. After Abe’s visit, there was also a strong reaction from China, which was expressed through several diplomatic channels. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang issued the following statement: “We strongly protest and seriously condemn the Japanese leader’s acts…Japanese leaders are not only showing no moderation but have doubled their efforts and created a serious incident on historical issues. … The essence of Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine is to beautify Japan’s history of militaristic aggression and colonial rule.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned Japanese Ambassador to China, Masato Kitera, to lodge China’s protest. Wang said after the meeting, “This is a grave provocation to international justice and also a ruthless trampling on human conscience.”14 These statements exemplify the difference between Chinese observers’ and Japanese politicians’ interpretation of a visit. The Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, also lodged a protest with the Japanese Foreign Minister.15 The high-level rhetoric did not lead to popular protests, but it deepened the freeze in diplomatic relations. This issue is unlikely to disappear from Japan’s relations with South Korea and China. Instead, it seems that it is becoming further entrenched and problematic. Recently, South Korean and Chinese media have turned their attention to smaller details, such as the visiting behavior of junior politicians, and whether an offering is sent in lieu of
Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Abe visits Yasukuni, angering Beijing and Seoul,” Japan Times, December 17, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/26/national/abes-surprise-visit-to-yasukuni-sparks-criticism. 12 “Abe’s Yasukuni visit stirs hornet’s nest in Beijing, Seoul,” The Asahi Shimbun, December 27, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201312270076. 13 Kim Eun-jung, “Seoul cancels defense meetings with Tokyo following war shrine row,” Yonhap News Agency, December 29, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12/28/34/0301000000A EN20131228001800315F.html. 14 “China attacks Japanese PM’s war shrine visit,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2013, http://www.aljazeera. com/news/asia-pacific/2013/12/china-attacks-japanese-pm-war-shrine-visit-201312264250918500. html. 15 Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Abe visits Yasukuni, angering Beijing and Seoul,” Japan Times, December 17, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/26/national/abes-surprise-visit-toyasukuni-sparks-criticism/. 11
Winter 2016 [127]
Research
the prime minister’s attendance in person.16 Applying Putnam’s Two-Level Game Model to Yasukuni Shrine Visits In his seminal article about the link between domestic politics and foreign policy, Robert Putnam argues that central decision-makers are striving to achieve a “winset,” which constitute “win[s]” in two different games simultaneously. This “win-set” is limited by what is politically acceptable to domestic and international audiences. Putnam explains, “At the national level…politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups [that pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies]. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.”17 The challenge for politicians is to make decisions that create an optimal win-set, which may be contradictory between the two levels. A visit to the shrine could advance the Japanese politician’s goal domestically, but undercut his goal internationally, while a non-visit could have the opposite effect. Specifically, a “win” for Japanese politicians in the international arena would be to improve or maintain good relations with South Korea and China. One way to accomplish this goal is to not visit the shrine. A typical explanation of how international factors affect Japanese politicians’ calculations is offered by Daiki Shibuichi, who postulates that prime ministers abstained from shrine visits after Nakasone because Japan was still in a de facto “alliance” with China against the Soviet Union over this time period (it was only under Nakasone that shrine visits became an issue; before him, the international arena was nonexistent because neither South Korea nor China were interested in the Yasukuni Shrine).18 Up until 1982, there was no diplomatic cost associated with a shrine visit. But after these costs began to increase, the domestic payoff was no longer enough to offset the international loss, so Nakasone stopped visiting. Both Nakasone and Hashimoto specifically cited Japan’s “national interests” when they justified their decision to discontinue visits.19 Due to the international environment Japan faced— the exigencies of the Cold War—Japan valued good relations with its “quasi” or “de facto” allies South Korea and China, and this limited the international “win-set” to a discontinuation of shrine visits.20 Peter Landers and Yoshio Takahashi, “Japanese Minister Visits Controversial Yasukuni Shrine,” The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230387360457949 6782325799234; Jeyup S. Kwaak and James T. Areddy, “South Korea, China React to Yasukuni Shrine Visits,” The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/08/15/ south-korea-china-react-to-yasukuni-visits. 17 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 No. 3 (1988): 434. 18 Daiki Shibuichi. “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?” Asian Survey 45, No. 2 (2005): 209. 19 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (West Port CT: Prager Security International, 2008), 128, 133. 20 Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 16
[128] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
However, a politician may see a visit as relatively inconsequential if he either (a) has confidence that South Korea and China cannot afford to let their relations with Japan deteriorate, so they will forgive a visit, or (b) believes that relations with South Korea and China are already so poor that his visit could not possibly worsen relations even further. In such situations, the politician could interpret a visit as “neutral.” For the subject under consideration in this article, a “neutral” outcome from a visit is considered a part of the “win-set” because in the international arena there are no benefits to shrine visits—it is a matter of the relative size of the cost. An example of the first type of “neutral” outcome—when Japanese politicians believe relations will not deteriorate because Japan has diplomatic leverage over China—would be Koizumi’s 2002 visit. According to Yew Meng Lai, Koizumi may have calculated that he could visit without overly negative consequences on Japan-China relations because China was eager to improve relations to resume Japanese official development aid (ODA) disbursements, which had been delayed since relations deteriorated after the 2001 visit. Japanese aid, trade, and investment, which are all important to China’s continued economic growth, emboldened Koizumi to make his second visit because he interpreted a visit would be “neutral” in the international arena, meaning that it would not have significant consequences.21 When Japan values relations with South Korea and/or China more than South Korea/China value relations with Japan, then Japanese politicians are likely to proceed more cautiously, while if South Korea and/or China value the relationship more, Japanese politicians are likely act recklessly. Abe’s 2013 visit is an example of the second type of a “neutral” outcome, when relations with South Korea and China pre-visit were already so negative that they could not deteriorate further post-visit. Bilateral summits had stalled since Abe’s election, and had come to a standstill over history and security issues unrelated to the Yasukuni Shrine. Abe believed that a Yasukuni Shrine visit simply could not have made relations worse, making this a “neutral” decision for Abe. This research examines Japanese politicians’ calculations of whether a visit will result in a “neutral” outcome or a “loss,” and how it is related to Japan’s perception of its changing relationship with South Korea and China.22 If relations with South Korea and/ or China are improving, Japan has more to lose from a visit. Since the relationship is starting at a better place, a shrine visit would cause the relationship to deteriorate dramatically. A visit during a period of rapprochement is more likely to be seen as a “loss” than when relations with South Korea and/or China have been deteriorating. If relations with South Korea and/or China are deteriorating, however, a visit is more likely to be seen as a “neutral” outcome because relations simply do not have as far to fall.
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 137. This measure was chosen because it is impossible to measure whether Japan or South Korea/China value their bilateral relationship more, and because it makes more sense to evaluate the state of relations in the context of more recent developments rather than based on some arbitrary, absolute standard of what constitutes a “good” or “bad” state of relations. 21 22
Winter 2016 [129]
Research
A “win” for Japanese politicians in the other game, the domestic arena, is keeping office. Depending on the coalition that put the prime minister in power, visiting the shrine could be a key part of fulfilling this goal. If a proposed agreement (moratorium on visits) threatens the chief negotiator’s coalition, he is unlikely to endorse it (pledge not to visit).23 Interparty elections matter, of course, but because Japan is a parliamentary system, so do intraparty elections. Thus, the prime minister and his Cabinet’s overall popularity are important because of the ever-present possibility of dissolution and snap elections. Domestic interest groups, such as the pro-shrine Japan Association of Bereaved Families ( JABF), can play an important role in intraparty elections, especially for their natural allies, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).24 JABF, known as Izokukai in Japanese, has traditionally been “a major source of votes for the LDP” in general elections, and from the 1990s onward, “[their] vote could make or break a run at the leadership of the [LDP] and the prime minister’s office.”25 The most common explanation for why Koizumi continued visiting annually, despite the consistent and predictable negative reaction from China and South Korea, focuses on pressure by domestic interest groups, such as JABF. Because of nationalist groups’ close ties to the LDP, “its leaders are vulnerable to demands for official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.”26 However, it is important to consider individual prime ministers’ ideological beliefs as an intermediary that “translates” the input from the JABF into the output of political behavior. JABF pressure alone is not a convincing explanation for why Koizumi continued to visit, because the number of bereaved family members—and the number of votes they could get—was declining over the course of his tenure. During this time, the JABF’s influence not only declined numerically, but their views also became more nuanced and less categorically supportive of shrine visits.27 Furthermore, even in earlier periods when conservative political pressure groups had been more powerful, they did not have a uniform affect on prime ministers; Japanese prime ministers in the past either chose not to visit or, like Nakasone and Hashimoto, reversed their choice to visit in the face of international pressure.28 As the JABF becomes less influential, the potential “win” in the domestic arena from a shrine visit is also shrinking. Domestic explanations focus on the role of such interest groups as well as interparty Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 458. Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 118. 25 Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 70, 72. 26 For Japanese rightists, accepting critics’ negative image of Yasukuni Shrine is “tantamount to admitting that Japanese history of the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries was a mistake,” and, therefore, they push for prime ministers to visit the shrine as a representative of the state to validate the sacrifices made by the deceased. Shibuichi, 199-201. 27 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 89, 97-9. 28 Yusuke Shirai, “An Institutional Approach: Japan’s Prime Minsiter Junichiro Koizumi’s Controversial Visits to the Controversial Yasukuni Shrine,” (Master’s diss., University of Georgia, 2007), 65-7. 23 24
[130] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
competition and interparty factionalism. Yusuki Shirai explains Koizumi’s visits in the context of the declining power of the Japan Socialist Party ( JSP) and changes in the balance of power within the ruling LDP’s factions.29 According to Shirai’s institutionalist explanation, Koizumi could continue to visit every year—despite the diplomatic costs—due to the decline of the China-friendly JSP and the weakening of the “pro-China” Tanaka faction within the LDP.30 Even though international costs were increasing, domestic costs were also decreasing—because neither the JSP nor the Tanaka faction had the ability to punish him—so Koizumi could continue his visits.31 Even though the JSP is no longer a relevant factor in Japanese politics, some parties do openly oppose visits, such as the New Komeito Party, the LDP’s junior coalition partner, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the second largest party after the LDP. Therefore, the impact of domestic pressure groups is still a relevant factor in a prime minister’s decision-making. In the domestic arena, whether a shrine visit is a “win” or a “loss” depends on the particular coalition that supports the prime minister. There is a mutual dependency between politicians and their supporters, as politicians are unlikely to solicit the support of pro-shrine groups unless the politicians themselves attach a positive meaning to a shrine visit, and pro-shrine groups are unlikely to offer their support unless the politician was inclined to be sympathetic to their views. This research uses politicians’ stated preferences regarding the shrine visits as a proxy measure for how likely they are to be supported by and rely on pro-shrine visit groups. This research also considers the overall strength of the politician, because there is domestic opposition to shrine visits within Japan. Public opinion is the greatest check on a politician’s potential visit. As the Japanese public becomes more socialized to the international costs of shrine visits, they grow increasingly opposed to such visits; therefore, this research measures the strength of the prime minister and his Cabinet to ascertain whether the prime minister is in a strong enough position to withstand the anticipated domestic backlash. Table 1. lays out the different ways that Japanese politicians could calculate whether visiting the shrine would constitute a “win” (or “neutral”), or a “loss” in the two different arenas. Yasukuni Shrine visits are a clear way to apply Putnam’s two-level game metaphor, where different prime ministers try to achieve a “win-set” of maintaining office and achieving good relations with neighbors, because “No matter how much [supporters of shrine visits] may want this to be a domestic matter, it will have foreign
Shirai, “An Institutional Approach,” 16. Shirai, “An Institutional Approach,” 31, 36-7. 31 Another potential domestic benefit to visiting the shrine is issue linkage. See Phil Deans, “Diminishing Returns? Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian Nationalisms,” East Asia 24 No. 3 (2007): appealing to the ultra-right base through shrine visits helped bolster Koizumi’s position within the LDP so that he could push through his economic and postal reform program over the objections of members of his own party. 29 30
Winter 2016 [131]
Research
policy and security consequences for Japan.”32 Table 1. Modeling the Wins and Losses from the International and Domestic Perspectives How Japanese politicians perceive the domestic political environment How Japanese politicians perceive Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China
Ideologically value shrine visits (allied with pro-shrine visit groups) and domestically popular enough to withstand backlash from a visit >> visit is a domestic “win”
Ideologically do not value shrine visits (not allied with pro-shrine visit groups) and domestically popular enough to withstand backlash from a visit >> visit is domestically “neutral” OR Ideologically do not value shrine visits (not allied with pro-shrine visit groups) and not domestically popular enough to withstand backlash from a visit >> visit is a domestic “loss” OR Ideologically value shrine visits (allied with pro-shrine visit groups) but not domestically popular enough to withstand backlash from a visit >> visit is a domestic “loss”
Japan’s relationship with China and/or South Korea is improving >> Visit is internationally a “loss”
Outcome: ?
Outcome: No Visit
Japan’s relationship with China and/or South Korea is deteriorating >> Visit is internationally a “neutral” outcome
Outcome: Visit
Outcome: No Visit
Sheila Smith, “Abe’s Yasukuni Visit: The Consequences?” Council for Foreign Relations: Asia Unbound, December 30, 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/12/30/abes-yasukuni-visit-the-consequences. 32
[132] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
This article is primarily interested in examining two propositions from Putnam’s work. First, if a choice must be made because an action would have contradictory consequences in the two different arenas (as is the case in the upper left quadrant), Putnam expects the chief negotiator to “give primacy to his domestic calculus … not least because his own incumbency often depends on his standing [in the domestic arena].”33 This study will test his prediction by directly comparing how well international versus domestic factors correlate with expected behavior by Japanese politicians. Second, this article explores the chief negotiator’s proclivity to act as a “veto player.” A central decision-maker can act as a “veto player” when they put their parochial interests first and contravene the negotiator-approved international agreement. Central decision-makers are more likely to “veto” an “agreement” when their interests (i.e., winning support from Japanese conservatives) diverge from the interests of those they represent (i.e., the security of all Japanese citizens).34 In this case, the hypothetical “agreement” would be an informal moratorium on shrine visits, and the prime minister would “veto” it by visiting. Research Design and Hypotheses Scope of the Study: Why Yasukuni? The population of cases relevant to my research question is the range of actions that Japanese politicians could take that worsens relations with South Korea and China, but have domestic benefits. This study will focus on the particular range of such actions that (1) pit a politician’s personal domestic interest against his/her state’s national security interest, but (2) have little to no material cost to execute and little to no immediate material benefit, and (3) are laden with emotional import in that particular relational context. This study chooses to focus on symbolic provocative behaviors, because more concrete behaviors have substantial costs and benefits that must also be taken into account. For example, lifting the arms export ban or reinterpreting the Japanese Constitution to allow for collective self-defense are actions that, depending on the interpretation of Japan’s intention behind theses actions in South Korea and China, could worsen Japan’s relationships with these two countries. However, by strengthening Japan’s defense industry and increasing Japan’s deterrence capability, such actions carry substantial benefits to Japan. In such cases, the material benefits of the action may outweigh the costs to the relationship with South Korea and China. Of the population of potential symbolic gestures, this article analyzes Yasukuni Shrine visits for three reasons. The first is that Yasukuni Shrine visits are actions, while comments that unnerve South Korean and Chinese sensibilities about Japan’s colonial and imperial history (e.g., comfort women or the Nanjing Massacre) are “just” words. Actions indicate that a conscious choice had been made, and even after reflecting on the costs, the actor decided to proceed. Second, focusing on shrine visits eliminates 33 34
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 457. Ibid., 460.
Winter 2016 [133]
Research
incidents of provocation engineered by non-elected actors. For example, controversies over the content of textbooks are the outcomes of complex bureaucratic decision-making procedures that politicians do not fully control. Ministers are political appointees, but bureaucrats do not face the same pressure as elected officials to appeal to an electorate. Therefore, they do not fit into the structure of Putnam’s two-level metaphor; bureaucrats care about Japan’s security, but they are not accountable to the public, so they are not constrained by the domestic calculus. The third reason for the selection of shrine visits is the clarity and consistency of measurement, and the relative ease with which non-events can be measured. It is hard to anticipate when a disparaging remark about Japan’s imperial history could have been made but was not.35 However, with shrine visits, it is easy to observe when a politician could have visited but did not. There are very specific days during the calendar year when visits are more likely, and a non-visit on one of those days can be interpreted as a political decision. Scope of the Study: Why 1998? This study is limited to relevant cases from fall 1998 to the present.36 Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu’s statement in the prelude to Kim Dae-Jung and Jiang Zemin’s state visits to Japan in October and November, respectively, clearly set the standard that Japanese politicians have a responsibility to give South Korean and Chinese feelings “consideration” when deciding whether to visit the Yasukuni Shrine or not. At a pivotal press conference on August 5, Nonaka said, “Without having achieved sufficient understanding from neighboring countries, it is best to refrain from visiting because that is the best way for a member of the government to prevent unnecessary misunderstanding or irritation.”37 Thus, fall 1998 marks the beginning of the period of interest—instead of the end of the Cold War—because this statement by Nonaka clearly acknowledged Japanese politicians’ recognition that shrine visits have the potential to disrupt Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. It took a few repetitions after 1982 for Japanese politicians to adapt to South Korea and China’s new priorities, but after the fall of 1998, no Japanese politicians could feign ignorance about the potential international consequences of a visit.38 It is possible to anticipate the approval of new textbooks and teaching guidelines or the publication of the annual White Paper and Diplomatic Bluebook, but, as bureaucratic outputs, once a change has been made in a previous cycle or year, it takes on a life of its own through path dependency. 36 This research ends with December 2014 because the last Cabinet Office polls were conducted during that time. 37 “小渕首相、野中官房長官は靖国参拝見送 (PM Obuchi and CCS Nonaka will forego Yasukuni Shrine worship),” The Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1999. Author’s translation. 38 1998 also represents a generational change in Japan’s political leadership. See Daiki Shibuchi, “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan,” 11: On one hand, younger generations may be more willing to visit because while Nakasone’s generation are “often deeply concerned about Asian affairs” due to their wartime experiences, Koizumi’s generation’s “worldview … tends to encompass only Western countries.” On the other hand, younger generations may feel less attached to the shrine because they are no longer of an age to personally know or remember the war dead. Either way, the cut-off controls for such generational differences in penitent attitudes towards South Korea and China. 33
[134] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Types of Events: The Dependent Variable There are fifty-two discrete events over the time period of this study, which can be divided into three types: seven visits, thirty-six non-visits, and nine offerings. Offerings are a proxy for either a visit or a non-visit depending on the prime minister’s preferences (discussed in more detail later). Visits usually have a negative effect on Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China, and they are most likely during significant days for shrine celebrations. These days include the Spring Festival, usually on April 21, 22, or 23, the Fall Festival, usually on October 17, 18, or 19, and Victory-Japan (VJ) Day on August 15. The Spring and Fall Festivals are the most important days for the performance of religious duties. VJ Day is particularly sensitive for South Korea and China because it commemorates Japan’s defeat in WWII and Korea’s liberation from Japan. Visits have occurred on other days as well for various reasons; for example, a politician may attempt to mitigate controversy or commemorate a special event in his personal history by visiting. A non-visit is coded as a signal of diplomatic intent to improve or maintain relations when it falls on one of the three potential dates discussed above. Visits are gestures that signal unresponsiveness to anticipated international condemnation. Non-visits are responsive gestures.39 Offerings on potential visit dates represent a compromise between a visit and a non-visit, reflecting the balancing act between satisfying the demands of domestic supporters with the maintenance of good relations with South Korea and China. Whether an offering was made because the politician was responsive or unresponsive to international condemnation depends on the prime minister’s inclination towards a visit. If the prime minister had expressed a desire to visit, an offering is coded as a non-visit, because potential international backlash changed the politician’s calculus. If the prime minister did not express the desire to visit, but sends an offering, it is coded as a visit because consideration of domestic politics—the need to solicit support from conservative groups—led him to make a token gesture. The two prime ministers who sent offerings are Shinzo Abe and Aso Taro; it is known that these two politicians generally support shrine visits, yet their actions were responsive to international pressure. Therefore, these nine instances are coded as non-visits. International and Domestic Outlook: The Hypotheses and Independent Variables This research tests whether the correlation between changes in the value of the independent variables and the value of the dependent variable provide greater support for internationally-oriented or domestically-oriented hypotheses. The four hypotheses are as follows:
Additionally, four prime ministers went further and pledged that they would not visit while prime minister: Fukuda on September 16, 2007, Hatoyama on August 12, 2009, Kan on June 15, 2010, and Noda on September 2, 2011. Koizumi Junichiro, on the other hand, pledged on April 15, 2001 that he would visit every year. 39
Winter 2016 [135]
Research
H1a: When Japan perceives its relationship with South Korea is improving, Japanese politicians are more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from South Korea (not visit). H1b: When Japan perceives its relationship with China is improving, Japanese politicians are more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from China (not visit). H2a: When the prime minister does not personally support a shrine visit—he does not rely on the support of pro-shrine groups—he is more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from China and South Korea (not visit). H2b: When the prime minister and his Cabinet have low approval ratings—he is likely to be negatively affected by a domestic backlash—he is more likely to respond to an anticipated negative reaction from China and South Korea (not visit). In the first hypothesis, when relations are on an upward trajectory, Japan has more to lose from provocative gestures. Meanwhile, if relations are already declining, then Japan does not have as much to lose, so politicians are more willing to suffer South Korean and Chinese condemnation. Japan’s perception of South Korea and China will be measured by the Cabinet Office’s annual opinion polls, which are conducted in the fall, as the percentage of respondents who believe that relations with South Korea or China are “good” or “very good.” If the percentage of those who believe relations are “good” or “very good” increases, that is coded as Japan perceiving its relationship with said state as improving. If the percentage decreases, the relationship is seen as deteriorating. A minimum criterion of two percent change will be imposed to ensure the change is meaningful. These opinion poll numbers are compiled in Table 2. There are two issues with this measure that must be acknowledged. First, this measure does not capture small changes over the course of the year. Politicians may react more strongly to recent changes rather than year-on-year changes. Additionally, the timing of events may have a disproportionate impact on this measure. Incidents that occur in September or October may have greater impact than in other times of the year.40 The second problem is variable endogeneity; it is impossible to ascertain if relations deteriorated during the course of the year because of shrine visits, or if deteriorating relations enabled politicians to visit the shrine after deciding a visit would be a “win/ neutral” instead of a “loss.” For example, even if relations deteriorate dramatically in the spring over textbook controversies, that will not be captured in public opinion polls from fall-to-fall. Furthermore, the trawler crash between Japan and China in September 2010 could have a disproportionate impact on the dramatic change between 2009 to 2010 simply because it occurred in September, right before the poll was conducted in October—indeed, the percentage of those who perceived relations with China to be “good” or “very good” dropped from 38.5 percent to 8.3 percent. 40
[136] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Table 2. Public Opinion of Japan’s Relationships with South Korea and China H1a: Japan-South Korea Relations
H1b: Japan-China Relations
Good/Very Good
Good/Very Good
Obuchi
40.3
45.6
11/19-29, 1998
Obuchi
42.8
41.5
9/30-10/10, 1999
Obuchi
52.1
44.6
10/19-29, 2000
Mori
51.4
42.5
10/11-21, 2001
Koizumi
42
41.3
10/10-20, 2002
Koizumi
58.3
47.2
10/23-11/2, 2003
Koizumi
59.8
46.9
10/7-17, 2004
Koizumi
55.5
28.1
10/6-16, 2005
Koizumi
39.6
19.7
10/5-15, 2006
Abe
34.4
21.7
10/4-14, 2007
Fukuda
49.9
26.4
10/9-19, 2008
Aso
49.5
23.7
10/15-25, 2009
Hatoyama
66.5
38.5
10/21-31, 2010
Kan
59.9
8.3
9/29-10/16, 2011
Noda
58.5
18.8
9/27-10/7, 2012
Noda
18.4
4.8
9/26-10/6, 2013
Abe
21.1
6.8
10/16-26, 2014
Abe
12.2
5.3
Cabinet Office Survey Dates41
Prime Minister
9/25-10/5, 1997
Source: Japan’s Cabinet Office. Note: Bolded numbers represent changes ≥2.0%.
However, despite these weaknesses, these public opinion polls remain the best measure of the evolution of public opinion. Because they were collected over the entire period of time under consideration, they provide a consistent and coherent picture of public opinion. These issues do not undermine the essential arguments of the research because
When surveys coincided with the Fall Festival, the trend from the year before was used to generate a prediction. 41
Winter 2016 [137]
Research
they still capture how the Japanese perceive their relationship with South Korea and China, which shapes politicians’ calculus about the costs of their actions. The second hypothesis evaluates how domestic politics shape Japanese politicians’ responsiveness to anticipated South Korean and Chinese condemnation. Domestic politics are measured by (1) the prime minister’s expressed preference for shrine visits before becoming prime minister—based on statements and visits made before his premiership—as a proxy for support by conservative groups, and (2) opinion polls measuring “support” ratings for the prime minister and his Cabinet conducted by Nippon Housou Kyoukai (NHK). The prime minister’s expressed preference for shrine visits will be used as a proxy measure for the strength of pro-shrine interest groups’ influence. Pro-shrine groups are more likely to support prime ministers who have a strong personal inclination or motivation to visit. If the prime minister was ideologically opposed to shrine visits, he would not seek—or gain—those groups’ support. The conventional wisdom is that a visit to the shrine helps the politician win the support of conservatives domestically; however, if the prime minster does not have ties to groups that promote shrine visits, he is not reliant on them and has no need to appease them.42 Furthermore, if the public opposes shrine visits, then a visit could weaken his power, particularly when the support gained from the interest group does not outweigh the loss of political power from widespread domestic condemnation. Shrine visits encapsulate a complicated nexus of issues as discussed in the historical overview of the “Yasukuni Problem.” A prime minister could be disinclined to visit because they disagree with the meaning attached to a politicians’ visit to the shrine before they even consider the impact of such a visit on relations with South Korea and China. It is important to consider what the prime minister himself believes, because, as Putnam indicates, the chief negotiator is not always acting as an “honest broker”—his personal views matter as well.43 The ten prime ministers’ expressed preferences are a dichotomous variable. The first category includes those prime ministers who did not express an inclination to visit in the past. Some have clearly expressed a disinclination to visit. Some do not specify why they do not want to visit, for example Fukuda Yasuo, but usually it is because they are morally opposed to the enshrinement of the fourteen Class-A war criminals, which was explicitly expressed by Hatoyama and Kan. The second category includes those prime ministers who expressed a preference to visit by making strongly positive statements about the meaning of a shrine visit. They are categorized in Table 3.
Because JABF is aligned with the LDP, this matters more to the LDP than it does to the DPJ, and more in the context of intraparty elections for LDP presidencies than interparty national elections. 43 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 458. 42
[138] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Table 3. Prime Ministers’ Preferences Category
Cases (Prime Ministers)
1. No preference to visit
Fukuda Yasuo, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto
2.Preference to visit, based on past behavior and statements
Obuchi Keizo, Mori Yoshiro, Koizumi Junichiro, Abe Shinzo (2006-07), Aso Taro, Noda Yoshihiko, Abe Shinzo (2012-present)
Though this paper does not explicitly consider the prime ministers’ party affiliation, it is important to note here the difference between the LDP, which generally supports visits, and the DPJ, which generally opposes visits. Though there is a difference between parties, this research uses individual’s personal beliefs instead of party affiliation. The decision to visit or not is a personal choice as well as a political matter. Furthermore, there are instances of LDP prime ministers who oppose visits (e.g., Fukuda) and DPJ prime ministers who support visits (e.g., Noda), which shows that party affiliation is not entirely predictive of behavior in this situation. In addition to the prime minister’s relationship with pro-shrine visit groups and party affiliation, another important domestic factor to consider is the prime minister’s standing with the general public. Japan is a parliamentary democracy. Generally, the Japanese public wants good relations with South Korea and China. As the public becomes socialized to the costs of shrine visits, they are more likely to oppose it. As Lai analyzes, citizens were made more aware of how shrine visits influence Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea during Koizumi’s tenure: “The average Japanese started questioning the wisdom of continuing such visits, in light of the searing images of massive Chinese, anti-Japanese demonstrations, and widespread international criticisms that cost Japan dearly, in diplomatic terms.”44 This point is made clear by examining how support for shrine visits, as measured by public opinion surveys, dropped over time. Leading up to the 2001 visit, there was broad public support for Koizumi’s visit according to various public opinion polls, including Nippon Broadcasting System (August 3, 76 percent support), TV Asahi (August 4, 59 percent support), and Fuji Television Network (August 10, 49 percent support).45 Prior to his 2003 visit, Mainichi found that 47 percent supported Koizumi’s visit and 43 percent opposed it, but after the visit, 44 percent supported it and 48 percent opposed it. By the time Abe took office in 2006, a Mainichi poll found that 48 percent opposed a visit and only 39 percent supported it. If a prime minister is predisposed to visit the shrine, then he is more likely to visit when he is experiencing high levels of public support. The stronger the prime minister is domestically, the more he can withstand domestic backlash after a visit. However, 44 45
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 129. Ibid., 134-5.
Winter 2016 [139]
Research
a visit-inclined prime minister could visit even when he is domestically weak to use the issue to rally support from a smaller but more energized core. If he is already extremely unpopular, rallying this core could be worth the further loss in general support. In 2002, Koizumi might have been trying to rally the traditionalists to support his economic reform agenda, and in 2004, to garner support for his position on the Self-Defense Forces dispatch that would be debated in the upcoming Diet session.46 Another consideration is that a shrine visit can burnish the prime minister’s credentials with the general public by proving that he can “stand up” to China. This final variable was not considered for prime ministers who did not want to visit the shrine. It would be unlikely for a visit-disinclined prime minister to base his decision on such a variable because of his domestic standing; visit-disinclined prime ministers do not have the institutional ties to translate support from pro-shrine visit groups into positive support that can compensate for a loss of support from the general public. Whether the prime minister was domestically strong or weak was determined by the percentage of those who supported the Cabinet according to NHK’s monthly opinion poll. Political strength is calibrated to the individual prime minister by calculating the average “support” that they experienced over the entirety of the premiership. If, in the month before the event, his support rate was higher than his average “support” rate, he was domestically strong, but if his “support” rate was lower than his average, he was domestically weak. Table 4 shows the average “support” rate for each visit-inclined prime minister and his “support” rate a month before each of the events. Popularity is calibrated because each prime minister has a different base level of popularity; what might be considered very “good” numbers for one prime minister could be considered very “bad” numbers for another. For example, Koizumi is unequivocally the most popular contemporary prime minister—so his benchmark for when he is domestically “strong” is very different from the benchmark of his much less popular predecessor, Mori Yoshiro. Other Potential Hypotheses There are several other potential variables that this article did not consider but could be explored in future research. For instance, changes in how Japan perceives its relationship with the United States and North Korea could influence shrine visits. Japan’s relationship with the United States is important to consider because the United States wants Japan to cooperate more closely with South Korea, preferably as quasi-allies, so antagonizing South Korea too often has the potential to strain relations between Japan and the United States. Maintaining the U.S.-Japan relationship is still Japan’s most important foreign policy goal. The threat of North Korea could also influence how much value Japan places on its relationship with South Korea and China; if North Korea is believed to be more of a threat, then Japan could place greater priority on improving coordination with South Korea and China. A more estranged United States 46 47
Lai, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, 138, 143. For Abe, the cut-off was October 2014, the last month under consideration.
[140] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
Table 4. The Domestic Popularity of Visit-Inclined Prime Ministers
Obuchi: “Support” Average 38%
Mori: “Support” Average 22%
Koizumi: “Support” Average 55%
Abe: “Support” Average 45% Aso: “Support” Average 29% Noda: “Support” Average 33%
Month
“Support” Rating
Strength
August 1998
23%
Weak
March 1999
34%
Weak
July 1999
44%
Strong
September 1999
48%
Strong
March 2000
/
/
July 2000
28%
Strong
September 2000
28%
Strong
March 2001
9%
Weak
July 2001
77%
Strong
September 2001
74%
Strong
March 2002
51%
Weak
July 2002
42%
Weak
September 2002
55%
Strong
December 2002
61%
Strong
March 2003
45%
Weak
July 2003
55%
Strong
September 2003
61%
Strong
December 2003
46%
Weak
March 2004
54%
Weak
July 2004
43%
Weak
September 2004
43%
Weak
March 2005
46%
Weak
July 2005
46%
Weak
September 2005
58%
Strong
April 2006
51%
Weak
August 2006
46%
Weak
September 2006
/
/
March 2007
44%
Weak
July 2007
38%
Weak
September 2008
48%
Strong
March 2009
18%
Weak
July 2009
21%
Weak
September 2011
60%
Strong
March 2012
33%
Strong
July 2012
27%
Weak
September 2012
31%
Weak
Winter 2016 [141]
Research
Abe:
“Support” Average 57%
March 2013
66%
Strong
July 2013
57%
Strong
September 2013
59%
Strong
November 2013
60%
Strong
March 2014
51%
Weak
July 2014
47%
Weak
September 2014
58%
Strong
or more dangerous North Korea could increase Japanese politicians’ responsiveness to anticipated downturns in their relationship with their South Korean and Chinese counterparts. A few other factors to consider include how supportive Japanese politicians believed U.S. officials would be of their visits (potentially based on U.S. officials’ past reactions to visits by Japanese politicians), how clearly South Korean and Chinese policymakers communicated their potential reaction in the face of a visit, and how strongly South Korean and Chinese policymakers exerted pressure to prevent a visit. Greater foreign pressure could reinforce politicians resolve to visit in order to prove their conservative credentials by “standing up” to Chinese “interference” in domestic affairs.48 These hypotheses were not tested in this essay because it is very difficult to measure estrangement from the United States, fear of North Korea, U.S. support for shrine visits, and South Korean and Chinese pressure against shrine visits. Findings The success rate for each hypothesis was measured as the number of times a prediction was correct divided by the number of times a prediction could have been made based on the data available. Domestic strength (for only those prime ministers inclined to visit) had the highest success rate, at 56.1 percent. Relations with South Korea had a 50 percent success rate, relations with China a 42.5 percent success rate, and personal inclination of the prime minister—as a proxy for support by pro-shrine visit groups— was calculated to be successful in 30.8 percent of the cases. These findings are summarized in Table 5 and Table 6. Prime ministers who had expressed a strong desire to visit were emboldened to do so when they were in a strong domestic position. Relations with South Korea and China performed at about the same rate, at close to 50 percent; the status of relations with China and South Korea had an unpredictable effect on the prime minister’s actions. Individual preference of the prime minister performed poorly, but there is insight to be gained by disaggregating the results between visit-inclined and visit-disinclined prime ministers. For visit-disinclined politicians, the success rate is 100 percent; therefore, every prime minister who expressed a distaste for visiting did not visit. 48
Smith, Intimate Rivals, 81.
[142] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
For only visit-inclined politicians, the success rate is as low as 16.3 percent. This finding means that even prime ministers who want to visit usually do not. Prime ministers generally do not act as irresponsible “veto� players who annul the informal agreements that prevent visits. Despite all the hype about Yasukuni Shrine visits, visits tend to be the exception, not the rule. Table 5. Results for International Variables
Winter 2016 [143]
Research
Table 6. Results for Domestic Variables
[144] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
In addition to analyzing the decisions of prime ministers, this study also collected the number of Cabinet ministers and Diet members who visited Yasukuni Shrine on every visitable moment since the 1998 Fall Festival to the 2014 Fall Festival, as shown in Table 7. The number of Cabinet ministers who visit the Shrine is dependent on the type of visitable moment: significantly more Cabinet ministers visit on VJ Day than on the Spring or Fall Festival, regardless of the prime minister. Year-on-year changes strongly reflect the preference of the presiding prime minister. This finding is logical because These numbers only include visits on the exact days. Furthermore, “Diet members” includes only those who visited as part of the “Let’s Everyone Worship” delegation in person. It does not include retired politicians, politicians who chose to visit as individuals, or politicians who sent an aide in their stead. 49
Winter 2016 [145]
Research
Table 7. Visits by Cabinet Ministers and Diet Members, 1998-201450
The data was collected from Asahi and Yomiuri newspapers and is compiled in the table above. Blank spaces indicate cases for which data could not be found. In any case of discrepancy between the numbers reported by Asahi and Yomiuri, the number reported by Asahi is given on the right of the slash and the number reported by Yomiuri is given on the left of the slash. 50
[146] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
the prime minister appoints his Cabinet ministers, so he is likely to choose political and ideological allies. This overview reveals that the number of visits by Cabinet ministers is not particularly responsive to changes in the international environment. Instead, it reflects the prime minister’s own opinion toward shrine visits.51 Eight or nine Cabinet ministers visited on VJ Day under both Obuchi Keizo and Mori’s premiership; considering the conservative tendencies of both prime ministers and the relatively low-profile nature of shrine visits before Koizumi, this finding is unsurprising. While neither Obuchi nor Mori visited, South Korea and China did not vehemently react to Cabinet ministers’ visits. However, Koizumi’s visits politicized the issue of Cabinet ministers’ visits. Interestingly, the number of Cabinet ministers who visited the Shrine on VJ Day under Koizumi decreased to four or five per year, eventually tapering to two, despite the fact that Koizumi visited while Obuchi and Mori did not. This may reflect new costs to Cabinet ministers’ visits as well as Cabinet ministers’ socialization to these costs. It would appear that the norm of non-visits by Cabinet ministers became institutionalized through a series of LDP and DPJ prime ministers who chose not to visit, yet that trend reversed itself following Abe’s re-election. Since the 2013 Spring Festival, one to three Cabinet ministers have visited during every single visitable moment. These visits by Abe’s Cabinet ministers are likely to continue. Cabinet visits will be a continued source of low-level conflict with South Korea and China. Because these ministers know they have Abe’s endorsement for visits, they will continue to visit despite the international response. Diet members’ visits show similar patterns to those of Cabinet ministers, except for a significant difference between visits on VJ Day and the Spring or Fall Festivals. For Diet members, the Festivals appear to be more important than VJ Day. Diet members show a similar pattern to Cabinet ministers in that their numbers initially increase under Koizumi, then decrease towards the very end of his tenure, and then increase again after Abe’s re-election. While Diet members might be unresponsive to changes in the Under Koizumi, of the seventeen individual Cabinet ministers who visited the shrine during at least one VJ Day period (not just VJ Day, but also including those who visited a few days before VJ Day), only four of them stopped visiting before they were replaced in a Cabinet reshuffle. Of course, more Cabinet ministers may have shown a change in behavior if they had kept their ministerial position, but it is telling that the fluctuation in number of Cabinet ministers depends on administrative reshuffling. 51
Winter 2016 [147]
Research
international environment, they appear to respond to immediate criticism from South Korea and China. While Koizumi was prime minister, the largest delegation of Diet members (101 members) coincided with his fifth visit during the 2005 Fall Festival, but on his sixth visit on VJ Day 2006, only fifty-six Diet members accompanied him. Yet, even sustained international criticism can be overcome by favorable domestic conditions. Even though Abe never visited during a visitable moment, many Diet members were emboldened to visit during his second tenure, and the number of Diet members who visited regularly reached triple digits. In comparison, before Abe’s re-election, the only time the number of Diet members reached triple digits was the Spring Festival under Obuchi and Mori’s premierships, and Koizumi’s Fall Festival visit. No clear pattern emerges for either Cabinet ministers or Diet members. The lack of correlation may be a result of the anonymity of the position of a Diet member. A visit by one additional Diet member is not nearly as significant as the prime minister or Cabinet minister’s visit. The difference between eighty-nine or ninety Diet members visiting the shrine is insignificant—the headline in South Korea and China will be equally sensational. For Cabinet ministers and Diet members, shrine visits are solely a function of domestic politics. When the country leans conservative, shrine-supporting Diet members are more likely to be elected and select a prime minister who is more conservative and will, in turn, appoint Cabinet ministers who share his ideology. Conclusion In conclusion, the status quo decision for Japanese politicians regarding Yasukuni Shrine visits is to be responsive to anticipated South Korean and Chinese condemnation—and therefore not visit the shrine. Even those prime ministers with a strong preference to visit, such as Obuchi, Mori, Aso, and Noda, refrain from visiting once they attain the position of prime minister. However, this baseline can be overcome by leaders, such as Koizumi and Abe, who have a strong will to visit, are voluntarily “captured” by pro-shrine groups, and are sufficiently popular to withstand domestic backlash. A prime minister who is determined to visit is unlikely to be deterred by changes in the perception of Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China. Yet, Japanese politicians prioritize a “win” in the international arena; the international costs of a visit are rarely perceived to be worth the domestic benefits, so politicians choose to not visit. Even though they are more responsive to domestic than international factors, a “win” in the domestic arena is not worth the negative international consequences of a visit. To answer two questions posed in Putnam’s work, according to these results, domestic politics do matter more than international politics, and central decision-makers do not act as profligate veto players. The changes in perception of Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China have little effect on politicians’ decisions. However, visit-inclined politicians are more likely to visit when they are in a strong domestic position than when they are not—so they are responsive to changes in domestic politics. This supports Putnam’s impression that domestic politics matter more than international politics. Second, even though Yasukuni Shrine visits are an easy way for central decision-makers to act as “veto players” because they can easily circumvent all other [148] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
political and bureaucratic actors, they often do not. Theoretically, this research shows that even if central decision-makers have the opportunity to act as “veto players,” that does not necessarily mean that they will. Because politicians prefer a “win” over a “neutral” outcome or a “loss” in the international arena, they are likely to continue to exercise restraint regarding decisions to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Furthermore, these findings are cause for optimism for the future of Northeast Asian politics; they offer hope that future politicians will also uphold the norm of non-visits. The findings of this study are important, because these findings show that politicians generally recognize the international costs of their actions. As a conservative prime minister who believes in the importance of paying tribute to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine, Abe is unlikely to ever declare that he will not visit; however, he has also exercised more restraint than was predicted by his critics. What is Abe’s successor likely to do after Abe steps down in September 2018? Though it is too early to make definite predictions, two contenders for the premiership are likely to offer Japanese voters a clear choice. On one hand, Inada Tomomi, Abe’s protégé, visited the shrine on VJ Day 2015.52 On the other hand, Shigeru Ishiba, Abe’s rival, is more restrained; he is sometimes described as “more palatable” to South Korea and China because he would not visit the shrine.53 Whether Japanese politicians visit the Yasukuni Shrine or not is an important issue in Northeast Asia’s regional diplomacy. Especially today, “Geostrategic change has turned revisionist sentiment in Japan into a strategic risk.”54 It is difficult to imagine Japan’s relationship with South Korea and China improving unless Japanese politicians show more consideration for neighboring countries’ concerns over how Japan remembers its imperial past. Shrine visits stifle communication between these three countries, making subsequent escalation of disputes and miscalculation during crises more likely. Yasukuni Shrine visits matter because they negatively impact the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, contributing to Japan’s regional political isolation. Japanese leaders can try to compensate by increasing their engagement with other countries around the world—think of Abe’s recent emphasis on “global diplomacy”—but since Japan is inescapably rooted in East Asia, it must squarely confront its relationships with South Korea and China, if only for the sake of its own security. Yasukuni Shrine visits matter to the United States because Japan’s political isolation in the region does not serve U.S. interests. Japan can only be an effective U.S. ally in the region if the nation can communicate and collaborate with South Korea and China. Additionally, the United States could suffer reputational costs if it stands by in silent acquiescence to what victims of WWII see as a rewriting of history. The United States “Abe sends offering to Yasukuni Shrine; three Cabinet ministers visit,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 2015, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201508150042. 53 Julian Ryall, “Shigeru Ishiba set to decline cabinet post and may challenge Shinzo Abe,” South China Morning Post, August 25, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1580620/shigeru-ishiba-setdecline-cabinet-post-and-may-challenge-shinzo-abe. 54 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 100. 52
Winter 2016 [149]
Research
recognizes this danger; the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo issued a rare rebuke following Abe’s visit in December 2013. Furthermore, the United States does not—and should not— seek to play a “referee” role in disputes over history between its ally and the world’s most rapidly growing economy, or, even worse, between its two allies. The conflict over Yasukuni Shrine visits reflects a broader trend in the region: using WWII remembrance as a political tool. It is also reflective of the geopolitical shift; as South Korea and China’s economies develop, their leaders are demanding greater recognition of their peoples’ suffering. As the historical aggressor, this is a fight that Japan would do best to not participate in. Since the legitimacy of the governing elites in both South Korea and China are partially based on protesting revisionist narratives of Japan’s war responsibility, these two countries are unlikely to cease opposition to shrine visits. The only way forward is for Japanese politicians, like Nakasone and Hashimoto, to recognize that the international costs have become too high and that no domestic benefit outweighs those costs.
M. Erika Pollmann received her Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She conducted research on Japan’s politics and diplomacy for Honors in the major, the Ellsworth Bunker Fellowship with the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and the Georgetown-Japan 2020 Initiative. She writes for The Tokyo Report section of The Diplomat.
[150] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Pollmann | The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
References “小渕首相、野中官房長官は靖国参拝見送 (PM Obuchi and CCS Nonaka will forego Yasukuni Shrine worship).” The Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1999. “Abe sends offering to Yasukuni Shrine; three Cabinet ministers visit.” The Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 2015. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201508150042. “Abe’s Yasukuni visit stirs hornet’s nest in Beijing, Seoul.” The Asahi Shimbun, December 27, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201312270076. Cha, Victor. Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. “China attacks Japanese PM’s war shrine visit.” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/12/china-attacks-japanese-pm war-shrine-visit-201312264250918500.html. Deans, Phil. “Diminishing Returns? Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian Nationalisms.” East Asia (2007) 24.3. Eun-jung, Kim. “Seoul cancels defense meetings with Tokyo following war shrine row.” Yonhap News Agency, December 29, 2013. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12 /28/34/0301000000AEN20131228001800315F.html. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi and Kazuhiko Togo. East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism. West Port CT: Prager Security International, 2008. Kwaak, Jeyup S. and James T. Areddy. “South Korea, China React to Yasukuni Shrine Visits.” The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/japanreal time/2014/08/15/south-korea-china-react-to-yasukuni-visits/. Lai, Yew Meng. Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation. London: Routledge, 2014. Landers, Peter and Yoshio Takahashi. “Japanese Minister Visits Controversial Yasukuni Shrine.” The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527 02303873604579496782325799234. Lewentowicz, Steven. “In Response to Yasukuni: The Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take Toward an Unresolved Link to the Past.” Master’s dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization (1988) 42.3: 427-460. Ryall, Julian. “Shigeru Ishiba set to decline cabinet post and may challenge Shinzo Abe.” South China Morning Post, August 25, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/ article/1580620/shigeru-ishiba-set-decline-cabinet-post-and-may-challenge-shinzo abe.
Winter 2016 [151]
Research
Shibuichi, Daiki. “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?” Asian Survey (2005) 45.2: 197-215. Shirai, Yusuke. “An Institutional Approach: Japan’s Prime Minsiter Junichiro Koizumi’s Controversial Visits to the Controversial Yasukuni Shrine.” Master’s dissertation, University of Georgia, 2007. Smith, Sheila. “Abe’s Yasukuni Visit: The Consequences?” Council for Foreign Relations: Asia Unbound, December 30, 2013. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/12/30/abes yasukuni-visit-the-consequences. Smith, Sheila. Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Yoshida, Reiji and Mizuho Aoki. “Abe visits Yasukuni, angering Beijing and Seoul.” Japan Times, December 17, 2013. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/26/national/abes surprise-visit-to-yasukuni-sparks-criticism/.
[152] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Fink | Myanmar’s Post-Election Future
interviews Myanmar’s Post-Election Future: Challenges and Opportunities for Aung San Suu Kyi An Interview with Christina Fink
In November 2015, Myanmar held a landmark, nationwide election in which Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a landslide victory against Thein Sein and the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Though constitutionally barred from becoming president, Aung San Suu Kyi now wields an unprecedented popular mandate. This past December, the Journal sat down with Christina Fink, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, to discuss the 2015 elections, the current political situation in Myanmar, and what the NLD’s victory might mean for Myanmar going forward.
Journal: In your assessment, what accounted for the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) remarkable electoral success? Fink: There are two main reasons. The first is that people were tired of military rule, and they saw Thein Sein’s government as a continuation of military rule. The second reason is the tremendous respect that most people in Myanmar have for Aung San Suu Kyi. They believe that she can really bring change and improvement to their lives. Journal: In September 2014, you wrote an article asking, “How real are Myanmar’s reforms?” In your opinion, does this election indicate that Myanmar is sincerely democratizing, or are these reforms merely tactics to legitimize authoritarian rule? Fink: The 2008 constitution was written by the former military regime, and it established a lot of rights for the military to continue to be involved in politics. What they were trying to do was to create the veneer of democracy while ensuring they would still have a significant degree of power in the political process. This election has allowed the Winter 2016 [153]
Interview
opposition party, the NLD, to take most of the elected positions. But, there are still a number of appointed positions in various parts of the government, which will ensure that the military still has a say in all aspect of politics. Journal: Perhaps you could briefly discuss the extent to which the military maintains control over government processes, including key ministries. Given the military’s considerable influence, what stakeholders will Suu Kyi need to cooperate with in order to achieve her objectives? Fink: The military has control of three ministries in the government: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Border Affairs, and also, perhaps most importantly, the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs has a much bigger mandate than the Department of the Interior in the United States. The police, the prison system, and basically the country’s whole administration at the subnational level are all under the Ministry of Home Affairs. So, if Aung San Suu Kyi does not have a good relationship with the commander-in-chief or with the home minister, then they could subvert government administration at all levels below the central level. That’s one really important power for the military. The military also has control over its own military activities; so, for the peace process, Aung San Suu Kyi can’t really achieve a settlement unless she’s got the military on board. Another important power the military has is in the National Defense and Security Council. It is similar to our National Security Council, but it has more powers than our National Security Council. It is really above the president in that there are eleven members in the Council, and six of them are from the military or represent military interests. That body is able to declare a state of emergency and, theoretically, could do so against the president’s will. The final important power that the military has in the government is that the military holds 25 percent of the seats in the parliament. Amending the constitution requires more than 75 percent of the parliamentarians to vote in favor. So, if Aung San Suu Kyi cannot develop a cooperative relationship with the military, she will not be able to change the constitution. Journal: After the election, Aung San Suu Kyi declared that although she could not be president by constitutional mandate, she would rule by proxy. Does this decision put her “above the law” or more fully in line with the demands of her popular mandate? Why is this outcome acceptable to the NLD and the public? Fink: Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD tried to change the 2008 constitution during President Thein Sein’s administration, because there is a provision in the constitution which specifically prevents her from being able to become the president. What she’s really doing is making a mockery of that provision and a mockery of the constitution as a whole, because the constitution was written in a way to ensure military influence in politics and to prevent her from being able to head the government. Most people who voted for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD did so because they wanted her to lead [154] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Fink | Myanmar’s Post-Election Future
the country. So, for those who voted for Aung San Suu Kyi, it is not necessarily a problem if she’s not the “official” president, but it is likely that she will try to change the constitution so that she could be both the de jure and de facto president. Journal: Now that the NLD holds about 60 percent of the seats in both houses, do you think this will be a rubber stamp parliament for Suu Kyi’s initiatives or will we see the activist parliament continue to flourish? Fink: I think what is so interesting is that under the Thein Sein government, you did have the development of an activist parliament when it was expected that the parliament would function as a rubber stamp. There were some ambitious leaders from the ruling party in the parliament, and they wanted to demonstrate their own power and capabilities by making the parliament an important body in government. That legacy will be there for the next parliament. But, if you look at how the NLD members of parliament operated under the Thein Sein administration, they generally voted as a bloc on any important issues. Under the next administration, I expect that NLD parliamentarians will follow Aung San Suu Kyi’s lead on critical issues. She may also have the parliament investigate “rule of law” concerns and how the government is performing in various areas as a way to push civil servants to be less corrupt, more effective, and more efficient. Journal: In 2013 and 2014, civil society organizations were instrumental in influencing the parliament to change some “peaceful assembly” laws and the Association Bill. Do you expect these organizations to play a bigger role with an NLD-dominated parliament? Since not all organizations are committed to democracy or democratic ideals, is a stronger civil society a positive development? Fink: First of all, a lot of people in the NLD have close personal relationships with people in civil society organizations, particularly rights-oriented civil society organizations. It is likely that they will look to members of civil society who have expertise on specific topics, whether it is the environment or education or the peace process, for information and suggestions about legislation and policy in those areas. But, the NLD will certainly have to think very carefully about how it manages organizations that have agendas that are discriminatory towards certain groups in society. In particular, that means Ma Ba Tha, the Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion. That group supported the passage of four laws under the Thein Sein government that are really meant to discriminate against Muslims and also are discriminatory towards women. Ma Ba Tha will want to see those laws enacted, and there may be other things they would like to see happen. They do have a degree of support throughout the population, so a challenge for the NLD will be to figure out how to be open to civil society, but also how to engage with organizations that are working against an inclusive and diverse Myanmar society. Journal: In the lead-up to the elections, it was reported that Aung San Suu Kyi was “very upset” by the entrenched Islamophobia in the majority Buddhist country. However, she did not make a statement on the stateless Rohingya Muslims. Why do you Winter 2016 [155]
Interview
think Aung San Suu Kyi did not make a statement? Fink: Aung San Suu Kyi acted strategically in that her goal was to achieve a resounding victory in order to propel her party into power. Then they would be in a position to effect policy changes. That said, Ma Ba Tha has been a strong force in Myanmar, and it may be challenging for the NLD to really take on these issues, particularly early in the administration. So, my guess is that Aung San Suu Kyi will continue to take a “rule of law” approach to the issue and potentially, going forward, talk about the restoration of rights for Rohingya Muslims. The 1982 citizenship law needs to be changed. It does not recognize the Rohingya as an indigenous ethnic group. Individuals from non-recognized groups must prove that their ancestors resided in the country from before 1823. Journal: Will the rank and file of her party rally behind this cause? Fink: I think that within the NLD, as well as within the population as a whole, there is a feeling of insecurity and unease during this period of transition—a period in which some people’s fortunes are rising, while other people worry that they are going to lose out. So, this provides an environment in which it is very easy to stoke narrow nationalism. Aung San Suu Kyi alone cannot change that. There needs to be a broader movement that emphasizes tolerance and diversity. Journal: Given the military’s remaining control over security and border issues, is there opportunity for compromise on ethnic issues? Fink: This is going to be a very important issue once Aung San Suu Kyi’s party takes power, but even during the transition period, a lot is happening. Within sixty days after the national ceasefire agreement was signed in October, a political framework had to be established for the ensuing political dialogue. The framework explains what groups of people will be represented in the political dialogue, how decisions will be made, and what topics will be considered. Political talks are supposed to begin within ninety days of the ceasefire accord being signed. The NLD wants to take a leading role, but the military also wants to have significant authority—and then there are also the ethnic minority political parties, ethnic armed groups, and other political parties including the current ruling party. All want to have influence over the process. Aung San Suu Kyi has said that she is committed to a federal union, but specifically what that would mean in terms of both political and economic rights is not clear. Whether the military would go along with that is also not clear. She will have to work with both the military and ethnic minority representatives to come to some type of agreement. Journal: Many in the United States are calling for Aung San Suu Kyi to immediately tackle democratic and human rights related issues such as protecting the persecuted Rohingya or amending the constitution. Will Aung San Suu Kyi be free to focus on these widely publicized issues, or will her voters demand her attention elsewhere?
[156] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Fink | Myanmar’s Post-Election Future
Fink: Aung San Suu Kyi may set free political prisoners, who have been jailed for unauthorized protests and offenses against the media laws. But, I think that her main focus is going to be improving the standard of living for the population as a whole. That means focusing on economics and also good governance, increasing the services that are available to the population, improving service delivery, and reducing corruption. Corruption is something that really hinders people in their everyday lives in Myanmar. Bribes are demanded for virtually every interaction people have with local authorities—to get an ID card, to receive any kind of service, or even to pay taxes. So, reducing these transaction costs—making the government actually work for the people—will be a key priority for her. Beyond that, the peace process is essential not only for bringing about political stability for the country but also for economic development. And then I would say that amending the constitution would be a longer-term goal. Journal: Now that the military has allowed for elections, some are calling for the U.S. government to validate and further incentivize the military by, for example, lifting sanctions. In your opinion, how can the United States best assist Myanmar’s development and democratization moving forward? Fink: That’s a conversation that the U.S. government will want to have with the new government, and the new government may include people beyond the NLD. For example, it may include ethnic minority representatives among others. The goal is to ensure that this government can succeed, that economic prosperity can be realized, that peace can be realized, and that there will be greater political openness in the country going forward. So, what needs to happen is a reevaluation of what would be the best means to support the achievement of those goals.
Christina Fink is a Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She received her Ph.D. in Social/Cultural Anthropology from the University of California at Berkeley. She specializes in development, civil society and ethnically diverse states with a particular regional focus on Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar. In addition, she has worked as a coordinator for the Open Society Institute’s Burma Project and at the National Endowment for Democracy.
Christina Fink was interviewed by Wafi Abdul Manan and Taylor Wettach on December 7, 2015.
Winter 2016 [157]
Interview
ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia An Interview with Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman
Combatting radicalization in the context of growing ISIL authority is a topic of growing importance to Southeast Asia. The Journal interviewed Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, in order to better understand the reemergence of terrorism in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman’s assessment of radicalization in Southeast Asia provides an overview of the ISIL’s recruitment efforts and linkages to preexisting Southeast Asian terrorist groups, as well as explains the religious narrative feeding fringe minorities’ interpretations of Islam.
Journal: Perhaps you could begin by discussing some of the unique qualities or capabilities that set ISIS apart from other terrorist groups. For example, how does ISIS’ objective of establishing an Islamic caliphate differ from the objectives of other terrorist groups? Osman: What ISIS seeks to achieve is not very different from what other Islamist organizations, including non-violent groups, have sought to achieve for many years. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda have sought to establish a caliphate. What is different about ISIS is the fact that this is the first time that an organization has declared the establishment of a caliphate in an actual territory: Iraq and Syria. Unless the international community does something concrete, ISIS can expand their territorial control to other parts of the Middle East, such as Jordan or Lebanon. So, ISIS is different because it has a proper territory, money, and support among some of the more radical fringe groups within Muslim societies. Journal: At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this year, heads of state stressed that ISIS was a major threat for Southeast Asia. In Malaysia alone, the government estimates [158] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Osman | ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia
there are 50,000 ISIS sympathizers. To what extent is Southeast Asia a key recruitment center for ISIS? What regional conditions, such as economic marginalization, ethnic conflicts, or corruption, make alternative actors such as terrorist groups particularly appealing in this region? Osman: It is difficult to analyze this from a general Southeast Asian perspective, but there are some common issues for all countries. The issue of economic marginalization is something that these nations have in common. There are some segments of the Muslim societies in Indonesia, Malaysia, and even in Singapore—one of the richest countries in the world—where Muslim minorities, especially the Malay minorities, are facing economic challenges. But, the number of those who actually turn to violence within this group is low, so economics alone cannot explain the strong support for ISIS. While issues of ethnic conflict and corruption are certainly contributing factors, they cannot be identified as the main sources of discontent. There are larger issues affecting Muslims around the world that can better explain ISIS support in Southeast Asia. There is a need for Muslims to reassess the position of Islam on certain issues in order to deal with the fringe minorities who have interpreted the religion in a certain way. In this regard, the Salafi jihadist-type is one that we need to understand.1 We have even seen some strains of Salafism being coopted into the government. In the case of Malaysia, some Salafi Muslims have reportedly entered the government under disguise and then began religious classes at the grassroots level. I think that the “Salafization” of the way Muslims are thinking about religion in Southeast Asia is important to assess; when I say “Salafization” here, it’s not just actual adoption of Salafism, but also accepting norms that are defined by Salafi thinking. Groups may begin to view, for example, celebrating the birth of the prophet Mohammed as something deviant due to Salafi influence. This group may similarly find their perspective on non-Muslims changing. The peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims has been present for centuries in Southeast Asia, but Salafization of the mind is challenging that. A third issue is the rising anti-Shiite sentiment in Southeast Asia. In fact, the Malaysian state has officially banned Shiite Islam—it is considered deviant. Even in minority-Muslim Singapore, we see significant anti-Shiite fervor. That attitude is problematic because once one starts dehumanizing Shiite Muslims by saying they are deviant, infidels, or hypocrites, it makes it easier for people to be influenced by the ideas of ISIS; ISIS is now arguing that Shiite Muslims are worse than non-Muslims and should be killed, and that people should go to kill Shiite Muslims in Iraq and Syria. That sentiment is very important when trying to understand why ISIS is finding support in Southeast Asia. Journal: You mentioned that it is an important time for Muslims to rethink certain The Salafi jihadi is a conservative movement that falls within the scope of Sunni Islam and adheres to a doctrine known as Salafism. Salafism encourages a fundamentalist approach to Islam, supports the implementation of Sharia law, and rejects bid’ah (i.e., religious innovation). The Salafi jihadi discourse includes several variants that differ on issues such as the war on unbelievers and Muslim minorities. 1
Winter 2016 [159]
Interview
issues, particularly in regard to the Salafization of Islam in Southeast Asia. Are you familiar with any religious leaders, scholars, or groups that you feel are taking on this challenge? Osman: In Indonesia, people are turning to Salafi organizations, in part, because mainstream organizations are not providing for Muslims’ needs—these big organizations tend to be politicized, which affects their image. There are some smaller groups in Indonesia, but they are elite, limited in size, and lack the grassroots network to counter Salafization. The case of Malaysia is more complex. Malaysia is a state that is, to a large extent, anti-Shiite and very conservative in terms of its religious views. Occasionally, some of the traditionalist scholars from the religious bureaucracy come out and criticize Salafism. For example, Malaysia just had the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) General Assembly, and one of the key leaders of the Salafis in Malaysia is now on the central committee of UMNO youth. He spoke critically of traditional Islam during his speech, and the chair of the assembly stopped him. We hear of some examples of discourse, but there is not enough conversation happening. Singapore provides an interesting case of a very developed country with a first-world economy that is still moving out of, in some ways, a third-world-type of political system. In that process, we are seeing the government be very careful not to appear as if they are persecuting the Salafis. The Salafis are being given space—as long as they don’t cross certain boundaries set out by the state, such as actions that might prove problematic for race relations. Besides, many Salafis are non-political; but, non-political Salafis could easily move towards a more political—or even more violent—position. One example of this is Al-Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, which became involved after the New Order regime collapsed in 1998 and ethnic and religious conflicts ensued.2 Al-Laskar Jihad was tolerated by the state for years because they had a very quiet political position. But, within a very short period of time, they easily transformed themselves into a more violent manifestation of their ideology. Journal: Could you briefly discuss ISIS’ recruiting strategy in some of these countries? You have mentioned that it is important not to refer to Southeast Asia as a monolith, but perhaps you could provide some examples from Singapore, Malaysia, or Indonesia. Osman: One example would be ISIS’ formation of a new Malay-based combat unit called Katibah Nusantara. The group is comprised of several hundred fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. There were also some instances of actual recruitment of young Muslims. One recent example was the British Muslim expat living in Malaysia. Apparently, the former al-Qaeda-trained fighter influenced a number of people to go fight in Syria and Iraq. Fortunately, we have not seen many attacks yet, but the biggest worry is that some of these fighters are going to return to Laskar Jihad is an extremist paramilitary group led by Jafar Umar Thalib. The group is known for violent attacks against Christians in Indonesia’s eastern Moluccan Islands. 2
[160] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Osman | ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia. A lot of ISIS’s social media propaganda has also been in Indonesian, Bahasa Indonesia in particular, which is similar to the Malay language. Anyone who speaks Malay would also understand Bahasa, while the Bahasa majority—more than 90 percent of Muslims in Southeast Asia—would also know Bahasa. For now, Internet or social media propaganda remains the most significant means of recruitment. Journal: In your opinion, what should be done to thwart terrorist organizations’ online influence? Osman: I think there’s a need for more grassroots-level activities that bring young Muslims together and acquire their ideas on counter-strategies. I did something together with some friends last year. We formed a network called the Young Southeast Asian Muslim Forum in which we brought together young Muslims from seven countries around the region and conducted workshops. We didn’t call it a “counter-radicalization” workshop, but instead called it a workshop on “positive portrayal of Islam” because, obviously, much of the negative portrayal is related to terrorism. We need more of this type of small-scale work and to think about more operating at the grassroots level. Journal: Do you think that the recruitment efforts you mentioned have focused on recruiting soldiers for the conflict in Syria and Iraq, or on propagating terrorist attacks in Southeast Asian territories? Osman: When we look at people who have gone to join some of these groups, we hear reports of how they have never been trained to fight. They are actually more of a hassle for ISIS and other groups. So, firstly, I think that ISIS’ strategy is to evoke fear in the hearts of governments around the world as their citizens leave to fight in Iraq and Syria. This appears to be a show of strength on their part. Secondly, I think they are building a vanguard of future fighters that could potentially be used around the world. We have recently seen this in the case of France and the couple involved in killings in the United States. We will likely see more of this because it’s so easy for radicalized people to go out there with a weapon and shout, “I’m doing this in the name of ISIS.” Journal: To what extent do you think that ISIS is linking up with or recruiting from terrorist groups already established in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah or Abu Sayyaf ?3 Has ISIS reached out to these preexisting groups? Osman: It seems that many of these preexisting groups have basically pledged allegiance. I am not sure about the extent to which ISIS is reaching out to them—I think Jemaah Islamiyah is an Indonesia-based terrorist group formed in the 1990s to establish an Islamic state across Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. Abu Sayyaf is a terrorist group formed in the early 1990s and based in the southwestern Philippines. 3
Winter 2016 [161]
Interview
it is the other way around. ISIS has become a very strong brand among many of these groups. I recently read that there are nearly thirty groups in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Some of the notorious ones include the former spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir, who currently is in charge of the splinter group Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid.4 And then a number of smaller groups have also pledged allegiance, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Fighters Front.5 It seems that these groups are looking to associate themselves with ISIS—not the other way around. Journal: Malaysia and Singapore are the only two ASEAN nations who have joined the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. What do they hope to achieve as members of this coalition? In your assessment, how should such multilateral institutions work to effectively combat terrorism? What level and kind of cooperation can we realistically expect of regional actors? Osman: Malaysia and Singapore decided to join the coalition because both countries have been responsible members of the international community and contributed in a number of other settings. Malaysia is a part of the UN Security Council and chairmanship of ASEAN, so joining the coalition indicates the type of responsibilities that Malaysia has sought to exercise. In the case of Singapore, the nation has done very well because of its excellent relationship with not just neighboring countries, but also the major powers of the world. Singapore’s successful investments in South America, Central Asia, and elsewhere come with certain responsibilities—perhaps Singapore’s reason for engagement is similar to why certain European countries and the United States contribute significantly to, for example, the United Nations. I think the second reason has to do with intelligence sharing. When governments are part of a global coalition, there’s more that their partners within that coalition are likely to share with them. So, they likely hope to access information that is important in thwarting or preventing attacks in their respective countries. In general, ASEAN has done quite well in terms of intelligence sharing, which we are likely see more of. One example I can cite occurred when one of the key leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah, Mas Selamat bin Kastari, escaped from detention in Singapore and, because of intelligence cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia, the Malaysian authorities detained him, and Singapore managed to bring him back. This kind of information sharing has been significant. Journal: In terms of ASEAN’s efforts, should any significance be attributed to Indonesia’s absence from the coalition? Why might Indonesia opt not to participate in this multilateral effort, despite the fact that segments of its population appear susceptible to radicalization? Abu Bakar Bashir formed the Indonesia-based Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid—a splinter group of Jemaah Islamiyah—in 2008. 5 The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) is a splinter group of the Philippines-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). BIFF broke ties with the mainstream MILF in 2008. 4
[162] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Osman | ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia
Osman: The political considerations are firstly that, during the hotly contested presidential elections in Indonesia, the current president Joko Widodo actually won by a very slim margin compared to what the polls initially anticipated. The key reason was that his opponents were able to galvanize conservative Muslim political parties and civil society groups to successfully portray him as a pro-Chinese, pro-Christian individual seeking to destroy Islam in Indonesia. Throughout the campaign, Widodo was fighting hard to prove to the Muslim populace his credentials as a Muslim. A significant number of Indonesians today believe in some sort of Western conspiracy against Islam, or that many of the Western powers are out to undermine Islam, so I suspect that Widodo was trying to protect his image. If he were to join the coalition, the rhetoric that he is anti-Islam might be again used against him by his political opponents. Secondly, in terms of foreign policy, President Widodo has adopted a fairly nationalist policy; he does not want to be seen as taking instructions from the United States or Western powers. Thirdly, and also related to foreign policy, is that Indonesians view their country as an emerging superpower. So, there is a mindset in Indonesia of “we don’t need to be a part of a coalition, we can handle this problem ourselves. In fact, perhaps you need to join our efforts.” This mindset is quite clear within the Indonesian government. I would also add that I lived in Indonesia for about a year and was surprised at how many people believe, for example, that the Bali bombings were planned by Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). So, we should not underestimate the backlash that any Indonesian president might encounter given the prevalence of this type of opposition in Indonesia. Journal: A fairly widely-read article on ISIS published in the The Atlantic this year asserted that ISIS is “a religious group with carefully considered beliefs,” and that “pretending it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted” is a strategic mistake. In your assessment, is this an accurate statement? Why or why not? Osman: I think the author made some interesting points, but ISIS is definitely not an Islamic group. ISIS represents a particular understanding or interpretation of Islam. So, for us to call it an Islamic group that represents Islamic theologies is, perhaps, incorrect. However, we also need to admit that this is not entirely the creation of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi is quoting some Muslim scholars, many of whom come from Saudi Arabia and had harder views. Many of these ancient scholars, for example Ibnu Taimiyah, held much more puritan. Taimiyah’s ideas were due to his context, for he wrote during a period immediately after the Mongol invasion and he basically saw the destruction of Islam and the caliphate at that time. Naturally, there was a tendency for him to turn to a more radical position. Muslim communities around the world need to seriously assess where these beliefs are coming from within Islam, because these views are not coming from outside of Islam— these views are within the fold of the Islamic religion. When I talk about Islam here, I don’t believe that many Muslims like to argue that there is only one Islam or that all Muslims are of one religious community. Islam practiced in Algeria or Morocco is very Winter 2016 [163]
Interview
different compared to the Islam practiced in South Africa or India or Pakistan. There are many forms of Islam that we are talking about, and they all come under the umbrella of the Islamic religion. Within this umbrella, there are some extremely problematic positions and interpretations of the Islamic religion. Recently in India, 70,000 clerics came out against ISIS with a statement and religious position. I think that clearly is an admission that these views come from within Islam and must be dealt with from that perspective. So, in a way, the author of this article is half correct. Journal: Is using mainstream Islam critical to countering radical Islamist narratives? How might you suggest for this to occur? Are there any successful counter-radicalization initiatives in Southeast Asia that the international community might draw upon? Osman: What we mean by “mainstream Islam” is unclear because it means different things to different people. There are numerous interpretations not just across Southeast Asia but within each of these countries, so we have all sorts of strains of Islam. If we refer to “mainstream Islam” being traditionalist Islam with a strong Sufi influence and historical precedence, then I believe it is important in countering some of these narratives. At the same time, we should not marginalize the more moderate Salafi positions—not all Salafis believe in violence. Yet, there is a longer-term problem that we must consider: we may successfully prevent people from becoming violent, but in doing so we may also mainstream a very puritan and exclusive type of Islam. So, it is problematic when we give too much ground to moderate or non-violent Salafis. I think it has long term consequences on Muslim societies in the region. Journal: You mentioned that traditional Islam has a strong Sufi influence. Is Sufism important for cultivating a more tolerant, moderate, or traditional form of Islam?6 Osman: I think that is one of the ways. The only reason why I am saying this is because that is the kind of Islam that most Muslims in Southeast Asia are familiar with and grew up experiencing. The problem, though, is that this was never positioned as “Sufi Islam,” but was always positioned as simply “Islam.” So, Muslims might say they are not Sufi, but their practices are all similar to those that Sufi Muslims practice. I think the Salafis are trying to define what the “right” Islam is. We are seeing the mainstreaming of Salafi Islam. And, similar to Sufi Islam, Salafi Islam has not been defined necessarily as a religious sect, so people are becoming and thinking like Salafis without even realizing that it is happening—and I think that is more problematic. Although today we are talking about violent extremism, I also think the issue of non-violent extremism must also be dealt with. The problem with Salafism is that it is creating an exclusive mindset that is dehumanizing non-Muslims and Muslim minority sects—and the jump from non-violent to violent becomes easy. Journal: Do you think that even non-violent extremism paves the way ultimately for Sufism is a more mystical brand of Islam wherein Muslims seek to find the truth of divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. 6
[164] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Osman | ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia
the kind of mindset that is required for extremist, violent behavior? Osman: Yes, I think so. When we talk about the 50,000 ISIS supporters in Malaysia, I think the numbers are much higher—we are actually looking at more like half a billion supporters. A large majority of Malaysian Muslims are thinking of Shiite Muslims as deviants. Looking at the younger population—those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five—the numbers are staggeringly high at 95 percent. Many individuals today even believe it is un-Islamic to wish someone a merry Christmas or happy Diwali, so there is a significant shift happening. Journal: How would you assess the various approaches taken by Southeast Asian states in fostering interfaith tolerance, such as the Pancasila framework in Indonesia, Malaysia’s privileging of Islam within a pluralist system, or Singapore’s highly regulated system for religious freedom?7 Do such approaches effectively cultivate religious pluralism in the region? Osman: Of course, it depends on the different contexts of each of these countries. Pancasila has been an important aspect of Indonesian society. Interestingly, some of the Islamic political parties seeking to implement Sharia law have argued that Sharia is in line with Pancasila. So, when we talk about frameworks like Pancasila, it is highly dependent on people’s interpretations. It is important to remember that the first tenet of Pancasila is the belief in the oneness of God—it is not a completely secular framework. Pancasila also regulates religion, so an individual can only be an adherent to six religions; if one falls outside of the six religions, then he or she is breaking the law. Yet, the tradition of a pluralist society has long existed in Indonesia, particularly given the commonality of interreligious and interethnic marriages. For example, just look at one of the presidential candidates in the last election: Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo played to the conservative Muslim gallery, yet his brother is a well-known Christian evangelist. This sort of family setting is very common in Indonesia, which fosters a higher degree of tolerance. I think that the weakest link in Southeast Asia is really Malaysia. Even though Malaysia has not experienced a long history of violent extremism, the state of Islam in Malaysia has become extremely problematic because of the mainstreaming of puritan ideas. In the past, it used to be that certain privileges were given to the Malay community, but now it’s no longer about ethnic privileges. In the latest UMNO General Assembly meeting, we saw religious idioms employed in every single speech. Within UMNO itself, we previously saw people who would strongly say that they disagreed with the implementation of Islamic criminal law. Today, no one would dare question Islamic criminal law—or their political career would probably be over. In fact, UMNO is currently proposing working with the Islamist political party whose main agenda is the implementation of Islamic criminal law. On an intrinsic level, many UMNO Pancasila or “Five Principles” is the Indonesian state philosophy as articulated by Sukarno. The Five Principles are: nationalism; internationalism (humanism); democracy; social prosperity; and monotheism. 7
Winter 2016 [165]
Interview
leaders may continue to be secular, but the utilization of Islam in the political fora is damaging in that it creates an exclusive mindset, which privileges the Muslim identity over the non-Muslim. Nearly 40 percent of Malaysia’s population is non-Muslim, so this mindset is very problematic. In the case of Singapore, given the stronger state hand in dealing with issues, the state has generally been able to curtail violent or non-violent religious extremism. That said, we are beginning to see new trends as Singapore’s political system has experienced a significant democratization process since 2011. As space for public discussion and expression of ideas expands, Muslims are also trying to secure their rights. For instance, regarding headscarves, women in Singapore are not allowed to wear the hijab in certain uniformed professions, such as the police force or even girls going to school in uniform. Today, Singaporean Muslims are arguing that their rights as Muslims—to practice their religion freely—are protected by the constitution. At the same time, the vast majority of Muslims in Singapore are perhaps not ready to give certain communities, such as the LGBT community, equal rights under the state. Beyond the narrative that Singapore is a highly regulated political system, interesting contradictions and contestations are happening in a democratizing Singapore.
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman is Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. He is also the Coordinator of the school’s Malaysia Program and Seminar Series on Muslim Societies in Asia.
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman was interviewed by Anna Scott Bell on December 15, 2015.
[166] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Cha and Kang | The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm
The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm: Regional Alliance Structures and Approaches to Engagement An Interview with Victor Cha and David Kang
An ever more antagonistic and unpredictable North Korea under Kim Jong-un’s leadership serves as a reminder that the intractable North Korea problem is as alarming today as a decade ago. In this interview with the Journal, Victor Cha of Georgetown University and David Kang of the University of Southern California revisit their North Korea debate, exploring approaches to engagement in a much changed environment and—perhaps more importantly—revealing their new research approach vis-à-vis the impossible state.
Journal: Since your last debate, both the United States and North Korea experienced a leadership transition, North Korea increased its nuclear capabilities and continued to conduct nuclear tests, and engagement regarding denuclearization remained unsuccessful. How have events over the last decade validated and/or challenged your engagement strategy arguments from 2005? Cha: I think the bottom line of both of our arguments back in 2005 still holds, which is that—regardless of how bad North Korean behavior is—there needs to be some line of communication or form of engagement. The so-called “package” that was offered in 2005—and even before that in 1994—is essentially the same. If North Korea gives up their weapons, then they receive economic benefits, energy, political normalization, peace treaties, and so forth. So, the extent to which that remains the quid pro quo for the nuclear weapons is part of any engagement strategy. Where David and I might differ is in terms of how one should sequence. For example, should the peace treaty occur in advance of any sort of real denuclearization on their part, or not? But I still think that, in general, we can try sanctions and all sorts of tactics, but there must be an element of engagement attached to these strategies. Winter 2016 [167]
Interview
Kang: There is this phrase, “don’t buy that same horse twice,” but Victor is right. If there is going to be a negotiated settlement or agreement, it is going to be nukes for normalization. Both sides agree that the issue is nukes for normalization, which is the sad part. We don’t have a disagreement about what the issue is and how to solve it—we agreed in 1994 and again from 2005 to 2007. We do not need to have a North Korea agreement. We can wait until North Korea collapses or we can just wait forever, but if there is an agreement, then it is very clear that it will be nukes for normalization. So, I still agree with that basic, core assessment. I think that the real disagreement is over how you stay focused on the issue at hand. One of the issues about the leadership change is that both countries are focused on a lot of other issues right now, so the will and ability to consistently focus on solving the North Korea issue is harder to sustain simply because of other priorities that have come about. Journal: In your previous interview, you argued that the North Korean state can continue indefinitely as a result of these sorts of forces. Do you think that assessment remains relevant today? Cha: Yes, I do. Just look at what is going on today—we have Paris, ISIS, and Syria, as well as Russia and Ukraine. I think if the United States puts their mind to an issue and labels it a top priority, then they can make progress on it and maybe even solve it. That is what it really requires. But North Korea has never risen to that level, and so, for that reason, it always ends up being put on the backburner. In the meantime, North Korea continues to develop new capabilities. One of North Korea’s strategic advantages has always been that it has not been a strategic priority of the United States, and that continues to be the problem. Journal: And what about China? Where do you see Beijing fitting into this, particularly given the leadership changes that we have seen in both China and North Korea since your last debate? Kang: There are theories that China has changed its fundamental strategy towards North Korea, but I am skeptical regarding whether that is actually the case. I think it is clear that China is much more frustrated with North Korea, but have they decided to stop essentially engaging North Korea and allowing continued trade and support for the regime? I do not see a whole lot of evidence to support that. There is a lot more rhetoric, and China is far more likely to visit South Korea than North Korea, but they have not fundamentally changed their strategy on North Korea. And, in a way, that complicates U.S. strategy. Let me put this another way: all the countries in the region know how to play the current game, which is stalemate. Whether it is China, South Korea, North Korea, or the United States, everyone looks good in terms of domestic politics and is able to say “I’m being tough.” And nobody really knows what is going to happen if someone topples North Korea. It is not clear what is going to happen. So, I think all countries are very cautious about changing the status quo. And especially, as Victor said, when it is not a priority, it is very hard to explore how you might move forward in that situation.
[168] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Cha and Kang | The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm
Kang: There is this phrase, “don’t buy that same horse twice,” but Victor is right. If there is going to be a negotiated settlement or agreement, it is going to be nukes for normalization. Both sides agree that the issue is nukes for normalization, which is the sad part. We don’t have a disagreement about what the issue is and how to solve it—we agreed in 1994 and again from 2005 to 2007. We do not need to have a North Korea agreement. We can wait until North Korea collapses or we can just wait forever, but if there is an agreement, then it is very clear that it will be nukes for normalization. So, I still agree with that basic, core assessment. I think that the real disagreement is over how you stay focused on the issue at hand. One of the issues about the leadership change is that both countries are focused on a lot of other issues right now, so the will and ability to consistently focus on solving the North Korea issue is harder to sustain simply because of other priorities that have come about. Journal: In your previous interview, you argued that the North Korean state can continue indefinitely as a result of these sorts of forces. Do you think that assessment remains relevant today? Cha: Yes, I do. Just look at what is going on today—we have Paris, ISIS, and Syria, as well as Russia and Ukraine. I think if the United States puts their mind to an issue and labels it a top priority, then they can make progress on it and maybe even solve it. That is what it really requires. But North Korea has never risen to that level, and so, for that reason, it always ends up being put on the backburner. In the meantime, North Korea continues to develop new capabilities. One of North Korea’s strategic advantages has always been that it has not been a strategic priority of the United States, and that continues to be the problem. Journal: And what about China? Where do you see Beijing fitting into this, particularly given the leadership changes that we have seen in both China and North Korea since your last debate? Kang: There are theories that China has changed its fundamental strategy towards North Korea, but I am skeptical regarding whether that is actually the case. I think it is clear that China is much more frustrated with North Korea, but have they decided to stop essentially engaging North Korea and allowing continued trade and support for the regime? I do not see a whole lot of evidence to support that. There is a lot more rhetoric, and China is far more likely to visit South Korea than North Korea, but they have not fundamentally changed their strategy on North Korea. And, in a way, that complicates U.S. strategy. Let me put this another way: all the countries in the region know how to play the current game, which is stalemate. Whether it is China, South Korea, North Korea, or the United States, everyone looks good in terms of domestic politics and is able to say “I’m being tough.” And nobody really knows what is going to happen if someone topples North Korea. It is not clear what is going to happen. So, I think all countries are very cautious about changing the status quo. And especially, as Victor said, when it is not a priority, it is very hard to explore how you might move forward in that situation.
Winter 2016 [169]
Interview
Cha: I think Chinese officials and academics have clearly been granted license to say all the bad things that they want about North Korea—that has been the primary change in terms of the rhetoric. We have clearly seen, on the diplomacy side, no high-level visits and no major gifts that we know of. Even significant birthdays and dates such as the recent seventieth anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party in October, China has not given any big gifts, which is also new. But whether that translates to a strategic break in the relationship…I think everybody is still skeptical of that. I think everybody agrees that China will now “diss” North Korea in public, not grant them large economic assistance packages, and fail to give them face in public summits. But I do not think anybody really believes that China will cut off the North. I do not think people believe that even Xi Jinping is ready to do that. But, that has not stopped the South Koreans from trying very hard to engage with China—even to the point of creating some discomfort here in Washington for being too friendly with the Chinese—because the South Koreans have this hope of moving the needle on China. But we do not know how successful these efforts will be until the next North Korean nuclear or missile test when the South Koreans have heightened expectations of what China should do. If China fails to meet South Korea’s new expectations, then we will see the China-North Korea-South Korea relationship for what it really is. Journal: Dr. Kang, would you agree with this assessment? Kang: I cannot see any scenario under which the United States is just watching as South Korea and China join hands in the Koreas. There will always be room for the United States. And to go back to the question of the fundamental U.S. strategy, waiting can be a strategy. It is not a particularly active strategy, but the question comes down to, “Do you have the resources?” Does the United States have the resources and the time to make it a strategy when it is unclear whether it will work? I was more optimistic in the 1990s because you could see a path by which it might work—you could see that both sides actually sort of believed it or were willing to be convinced. By now, I think both sides are far more skeptical of each other. I mean, it has been twenty years, so of course they are more skeptical. Here in Washington, I am not sure I could advocate too much. I mean, I still think we should engage North Korea, and we should try and trade with them as much as possible, because that is the American way—making money, right? But as for a major, fundamental shift, I do not see how I could advocate that being the sure path. I still think it is ultimately a long-term path, but nobody now thinks we can really move the needle that much, to use Victor’s phrase. Journal: Let’s shift our focus to Kim Jong-un for a moment. Kim disappeared in September 2014, touching off a storm of international speculation regarding the stability of the North Korean political order. Although the leader reappeared, this event revitalized conversations about what might occur if the Kim regime collapsed. What did this event reveal about how the international community is planning for a potential change in North Korean politics?
[170] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Cha and Kang | The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm
Cha: I do not think anybody is really prepared for major regime change. I think the United States and South Korea may have talked about it at sort of a planning level. But, whether governments are actually prepared for some major political discontinuity in North Korea, I do not think anybody is really prepared for that. We do not have much insight into the Chinese and what sort of preparations they have undertaken, but I cannot imagine that they have done a lot. The problem is that governments are not very good at dealing with these sorts of hypotheticals, unless they are head-to-head war scenarios. For example, the U.S. military has for decades trained for a hypothetical in Taiwan Straits and so has the Chinese military. But something like this, where there is— Kang: It is not clear what is going on. Cha: Right, where it is not an all-out military conflict, but is sparked by a political event. How do you prepare for an event that could go to either extreme of a broad spectrum? The only way would be communication among the parties, and there is not a lot of talking going on. There are conversations between the United States and South Korea, but there really aren’t conversations between the United States, South Korea, and China, and so I do not think people are prepared at all. Journal: Dr. Kang, do you agree? Kang: Sure, but I will make two other points. First, Kim Jong-un’s disappearance shows that North Korea is the gift that keeps on giving, because when anything weird happens we go into a frenzy. So thank you, North Korea. But, more than that, the debate is whether North Korea is stable or not. I tend to come down on the view that North Korea is relatively stable. I mean, Kim has been around for four years now. If the regime was going to be unstable, I tend to think it would have been earlier, rather than by now when Kim has had a chance to fire this guy and realize he trusts that guy. I see the most recent political actions in Pyongyang—such as the recent political purges—as a sign of Kim weeding out the enemies. But, we all debate whether the regime will survive or not. We all hope they would collapse peacefully, but yes, I agree that we are not prepared at all. Victor and I were working on a new book that discusses planning, in which we do two things, because we do not have a plan—nobody has a real plan. First of all, we tried to change the focus away from the German example for Korea and widen it to a much broader universe. The case of Germany is often used as an example for Korea, but it is not actually a good example. There was no bitter civil war between East and West Germany, and the two have much more similar economies than North and South Korea. So, we looked at a wide range of countries that experienced bitter ethnic or civil war strife and what was done to rebuild afterwards. Essentially, we tried to provide more cases of knitting countries together after they undergo real severe problems. For example, former Yugoslavia and South Africa provide an example for transitional justice and human rights. Aside from human rights and transitional justice, there are issues related to refugees, internal migration flows, reforming the economy and education system. Winter 2016 [171]
Interview
And that is barely the beginning; in order to really help North Korea adjust afterwards, one would have to address the environment and many other issues that nobody has even begun to really think about managing or resolving. Cha: Yes, I think we have not continued to debate “Nuclear North Korea” because I think there is a lot more overlap in terms of our viewpoints today than there was in the 1990s. Kang: Right, there is a lot more agreement compared to fifteen or twenty years ago. Cha: I think in the 1990s many believed that with a fledgling nuclear program one might be able to negotiate it away from the North Koreans, but now I do not think people feel that way at all. So I think where our discussion on the topic has moved, (as David has said), has been away from North Korea and toward unification. We did the debate on engagement strategies because we felt like there was no place where you could get the so-called “hawk and dove” perspectives on how to deal with North Korea. We have now moved on to addressing the fact that there is actually not a lot out there on unification, including what unification means and what it would take to accomplish. We did a three-year project together on unification, and this will be our next co-authored book with Columbia University Press. So, as David said, we have moved more in the direction of seeking experts’ best lessons learned on issues like transitional justice, containing health pandemics, and other related problems that are likely to emerge with the collapse of North Korea. Journal: We look forward to seeing it. Let us now shift our focus to the demographics within the peninsula itself. Do South Korea’s younger and older generations view the North Korea threat differently? Does the younger demographic see a larger role for U.S.-ROK cooperation in managing the North Korea threat, or have you seen a shift over time? Kang: I will jump in with this one because I think this is portrayed wrong. Essentially, people are asking the wrong question. I am going to try and run a different survey, actually, in Korea. The question others are asking the younger children—individuals currently in their twenties—is “Do you want unification? Do you want to pay ten percent of your salary forever?” Of course they all say no! So, overwhelmingly, the younger you are, then the less you want unification. But that is the wrong question, and it is the wrong question because it will never be asked. In other words, the question will never be, “South Korea, do you want unification?” Instead, the question will be this: “If North Korea collapses, who gets it?” And the answers are a) China; b) Japan; c) Russia; or d) South Korea. I guarantee you that is the real question—and the question we should be asking now. In answer to this question, South Koreans are going to say “…We’ll take it.” It does no good to say, “Do you want unification?” because the bottom line is that South Koreans do not want to let Japan or China take the North. Ultimately—I think fundamentally—South Koreans all think the North is Korea.
[172] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Cha and Kang | The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm
Cha: Yes, I think that makes sense. Journal: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Are there any last thoughts that you would like to add? Cha: I think it is important to relay that while we are talking about what has happened with regard to North Korea policy since our last debate, we have actually moved on in terms of our research to the subject of unification. There is so little good work done on this in English outside of government circles. Our task is to produce a work that will have scholarly purchase, as well as important practical information for policymakers when it comes to unification. That was what Nuclear North Korea was about. And we hope to do the same with this book. Kang: Right, we are really trying to move the debate forward so we can help make some positive contributions. In particular, no matter how it happens, unification will be difficult, and both South Korea and the United States have done relatively little planning. We hope that this new project will be able to contribute towards thinking about how to envision a unified Korea, and hopefully how to make it happen.
Victor D. Cha is the Director of Asian Studies and holds the D.S. Song-KF Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is also a Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Dr. Cha previously served as the Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. David C. Kang is Professor of International Relations and Business at the University of Southern California, with appointments in both the School of International Relations and the Marshall School of Business. Dr. Kang is also the Director of the Korean Studies Institute at USC.
Victor Cha and David Kang were interviewed by Michael Sliwinski and Kimberly Agarth on November 17, 2015
Winter 2016 [173]
Front cover photo: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2015 in Manila, Philippines.
ALSO IN THIS ISSUE
The Rush for Hydropower: A Product of the Chinese Communist Party’s Legitimacy Concerns Qi Zhang The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine: Explaining Japanese Politicians’ Behaviors M. Erika Pollmann
MORE INTERVIEWS WITH
Christina Fink on Myanmar’s Post-Election Future Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman on ISIS and Islamic Radicalization in Southeast Asia Victor Cha and David Kang on The Changing North Korean Security Paradigm
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Asian Studies Program http://asianstudies.georgetown.edu
ISSN 2376-8002