Georgia's European Dream

PERSPECTI VESON A NATI ON I N TRANSI TI ON

GEORGIA’S EUROPEAN DREAM

PERSPECTIVES ON A NATION IN TRANSITION October 2015

From February 16-20, 2015, a group of undergraduate students enrolled in POL359Y1 (Enlarging Europe) at the University of Toronto embarked on a week-long research trip to the Republic of Georgia in order to interview academics, activists, experts, officials, practitioners, and stakeholders. The writing of their academic papers was conducted in March. Prior to this trip, these students conducted extensive preparatory work to research their topics, prepare a background brief, and to arrange interviews. This collection of papers represents the product of these efforts, and the students hope that you will enjoy reading this book.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research trip and the following in-depth studies on the Republic of Georgia would not have been possible without the generous contributions and support from the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies and its Director Randall Hansen at the Munk School of Global Affairs, Dean David Cameron at the University of Toronto Faculty of Arts and Science, and Mary-Priscilla Stevens and Deborah Shaw at the International Programs and Partnerships Office. Furthermore, we would like to thank the following individuals who made invaluable and unique contributions to our research.

Alessandro Savaris Alex Shprintsen Alexander Antonenko Alexander Latsabidze Andro Barnovi Ana Nemsitsveridze-Daniels Anna Dolidze Anna Natsvlishvili Anna Rekhviashvili Aydin Acikel Benson Cheung Bondo Kupatadze Boris Iarochevitch Buba Kudava David Khostaria David Managadze Eka Chitanava Eka Tsimakuridze Elene Chkheidze Elene Gvilava Erekle Urushadze

Eugene Slonimerov Eva Pastrana Evgenia Jane Kitaevich Father Ilia, Svetitskhoveli Cathedral Gavin Slade George Abulashvili Gigi Gigiadze Giorgi Bobghiashvili Givi Mikanadze Gizo Chelidze Irakli Kobalia Irakli Maracharshvili Ivane Chkhikvadze Ivane Menteshashvili Janos Herman Joachim Puhe John A. Graham Joseph Alexander Kakha Shengelia Karina Melikidze Ketevan Daukaevi

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Koba Turmanidze Lasha Bakradze Levan Kakhishvili Levan Ramishvili Levan Tsutkiridze Liana Garibashvili Liza Tavdumadze Lynne Viola Maia Kipshidze Malkhaz Saldadze Malkhaz Toria Mari Ioseliani Mariam Rakiashvili Matthew Light Mikheil Mirziashvili Natia Mestvirishvili Nika Jeiranashvili Nino Antadze Oliver Reisner Otar Kakhidze Paata Gaprindashvili Paul Rimple

Peter Kabachnik Rati Asatiani Rusudan Chanturia Ryan Grist Sopho Verdzeuli Sopo Japaridze Sukru Bogut

Tamar Barabadze Tamaz Gamkrelidze Tamta Mikeladze Tato Khundadze Teimuraz Antelava Thomas Weir Tina Gogheliani

Tina Zurabishvili Tinatin Bochorishvili Tsate Batashi Vazha Salamadze Vano Chkhikvadze Zurab Eristavi

Finally, a special thank you to Robert Austin, Daria Dumbadze, and George Nikoladze for their unyielding support, commitment, and leadership. This trip has developed not only our research skills, but also our understanding of the broader world around us. From the bottom of our hearts, we thank you.

- Kendall Andison, Misha Boutilier, David Kitai, Madeline Klimek, Matt Korda, Sonia Liang, Zoe Smale, Danijela Stajic, Emily Tsui, Elizabeth Tudor-Bezies

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Please do not reproduce any parts of this book without permission from the respective author.

Publisher: Robert Austin Authors: Kendall Andison, Robert Austin, Misha Boutilier, David Kitai, Madeline Klimek, Matt Korda, Sonia Liang, Zoe Smale, Danijela Stajic, Emily Tsui, Elizabeth Tudor-BeziĂŠs Copy Editors: Sonia Liang and Emily Tsui Design Editor: Emily Tsui Printed by Sunview Press Limited, Toronto, Canada Published in October 2015 Funding for this book generously provided by the University of Toronto Faculty of Arts and Science and the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs.

ISBN: 978-0-9948377-0-7 eBook ISBN: 978-0-9948377-1-4

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword 7 Dr. Robert Austin Assessing the Influence of the EU on Civil Society Development in Georgia Sonia Liang

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In Pursuit of Justice: An assessment of the transitional justice efforts of the Georgian Dream government Matt Korda

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Flowing Towards Success: A review of Georgia’s Energy Community candidacy Emily Tsui

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European Integration and Regionalism in the South Caucasus: A South Caucasus identity Danijela Stajic

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Citizens of Georgia?: The role of the EU in the integration of national and religious minorities in Georgia Elizabeth Tudor-BeziĂŠs

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The Underused Potential of Sustainable Development:An analysis of Georgian environmental policy in the international context Kendall Andison

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The Battle for LGBT Rights in Georgia: From legal reform to social change Misha Boutilier

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Enlarging Europe: LGBT issues as a decisive wedge in Georgia’s relations and diplomacy with the EU Zoe Smale

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Remembering the Soviets: An examination of Georgian memory and the Soviet era Madeline Klimek

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Preserving Heritage in Tao-Klarjeti: Sticking points of history and identity in Turko-Georgian cultural relations* David Kitai

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*Please note that this paper was produced as part of an independent study project, HIS499Y1. However, the author travelled with the ICM students and provided valuable advice for their research. The author is also an alumnus of the ICM Georgia program, having participated during the 2013-14 academic year.

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FOREWORD Dr. Robert Austin

It is a real pleasure for me to make a few remarks about this book and the extraordinary work of a group of undergraduates at the University of Toronto. But first, some context is in order to better understand the wider purpose of this collection.

I have been teaching at the University of Toronto for more than fifteen years. When I arrived at the University there was not an extraordinary amount of international opportunities for our undergraduates in particular. For me, as a specialist on a region, getting to the region is a must. At the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (CERES) and the University more generally, we developed more and more opportunities for our students to get to the field for research, exchange, language study or internship.

This book is the outcome of a week-long field trip to Georgia in February 2015 that was funded principally by the Office of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science at the University of Toronto and partly by my home academic unit, CERES. The trip is part of the International Course Module Program that allows me, and several of my colleagues, to include a field trip in one of our undergraduate classes. The students compete for a place based on Professor Robert Austin is a specialist on East Central and Southeastern Europe in historic and contemporary perspective. In the past, Austin was a Tirana-based correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; a Slovak-based correspondent with The Economist Group of Publications; and a news writer with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Toronto. Austin has written articles for The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, Southeast European Times, Orbis, East European Politics and Societies and East European Quarterly along with numerous book chapters and two books published separately in Tirana and Prishtina. He has lectured widely in Europe and North America and was a Guest Professor in 2009 – 2010 at the University of Graz’s Centre for Southeast European Studies. His most recent book, “Founding a Balkan State”, was published with the University of Toronto Press in October 2012. At CERES, he coordinates the Undergraduate European Studies Program, the Hellenic Studies Initiative and the Hungarian Studies Program.

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a research proposal. A committee selects the winners and we begin intensive preparation. Our goal is to arrive totally informed, as close to expert level as possible.

The papers that follow are the result of that research. The reason we are publishing them is that collectively they make a great contribution to our understanding of what is happening in contemporary Georgia. As important, they are emblematic of what is possible when a group of students spends two months in pre–departure planning through intensive study and then hits the ground running when they arrive.

This was not my first trip to the field with undergraduates.

While it was our second trip to Georgia, for the preceding 7 years, I had taken my students to Kosovo. In both cases, Georgia and Kosovo, our goals were similar: we wanted to understand the impact of the European Union (EU) and Europe. The students thus chose research topics based on that general idea.

Research in Georgia has proven to be extremely valuable on a number of levels. Most importantly, the students found an extraordinary number of people, from all aspects of society, willing to talk to them. Special thanks to the various ministries, diplomats, civil society actors, and citizens who engaged my students. Wherever we went, we were welcomed.

What stands out about Georgia, at least at that moment in time, was that Georgia’s government is really serious about Europeanization and seriously engaging with the Eastern Partnership program (EaP) of the EU. Georgia was the best partner in fact. You could feel it and diplomats from the EU and elsewhere confirmed that. I have spent most of my career in the Balkans where the political elite talks about Europe and the need to be in Europe but really does little beyond that.

The Balkan political elite was rarely willing to make the tough decisions to ensure a place in the EU. In Georgia, the enthusiasm for a European future is real. What the Georgians cannot fix is their geography that ensures that whatever happens, Russia will 8

have a say, not least because they occupy two parts of Georgia. Can there be a democratic and European Georgia that sits next to an authoritarian Russia, a dictatorship in Azerbaijan and the neitherhere-nor-there state of Armenia? This is a big question. I think some of the papers below hint to a hopeful future for Georgia.

The papers look at various issues that are of critical importance to Georgia’s European dreams. Our first chapter, by Sonia Liang, assesses Georgia’s vibrant civil society and its impact on the Europeanization process. Matt Korda looks at transitional justice after the departure of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and the arrival of a new Georgian government. Georgia got a kind of transitional justice after Saakashvili took power in the Rose Revolution in 2003 but it needed an entirely different approach when the Georgian Dream coalition ousted Saakashvili’s United National Movement in 2012. For many observers, Saakashvili’s main achievements were to fill Georgia’s prisons and lay the foundations for an authoritarian state.

The papers by Emily Tsui, Danijela Stajic, Elizabeth Tudor-Bezies and Kendall Andison address complimentary but different aspects of regional integration. Emily looks at energy, which is probably the key reason that the EU is interested in Georgia, while Danijela wonders if the Caucasus can ever be a region and assesses whether or not it makes sense to develop a regional approach. The paper by Elizabeth explains just how diverse Georgian society is, what Georgia has done to protect minorities, and how decisive the EU has been in the process. Kendall offers an examination of the role of environmental policy in the new Georgia.

We have two papers, one by Misha Boutilier and the other

by Zoe Smale, that address the issue of LGBT rights. When we were in Georgia, it was in the process of implementing the new anti-discrimination law and the issue of LGBT rights was right at the center of Georgia’s political debate. For some, the EU human rights agenda is moving too fast for a society where the Church plays such a fundamental role. For others, the possibility of visa liberalization and 9

another step towards Europe and away from Russia was welcome at any price.

Our two concluding papers at first glance seem outside the main theme of the book. But they are not. Madeline Klimek reminds us how importance understanding Georgia’s Soviet past is to its future. David Kitai tells the story of the Tao-Klarjeti, the issues of identity and the relationship between Georgia and Turkey.

Collectively, the papers offer readers a picture of Georgia still in transition with a very unclear outcome. Making Georgia one of the very few post–Soviet success stories remains possible but not assured.

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ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN GEORGIA Sonia Liang 1. Introduction

Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has turned its path firmly westward and sought closer economic, political and civic cooperation with the European Union (EU). In evaluating the impact that the EU has had on strengthening social networks, this paper will examine whether cooperation with the EU has created an opportunity structure for civil society organizations in Georgia to grow. A strong and active civil society plays a vital role in a country’s democratic consolidation1 and in ensuring that governments are responsible to their people. Civil society organizations act as partners in the political decision-making process and are a voice through which citizens can critique and shape government policy.

To properly analyze the strength of civil society in Georgia today, several factors must be considered: the way Georgia’s Soviet past has shaped social networks, the relationship civil society actors Putnam, Robert D. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy 6:1 (1995), 67.

1

Sonia Liang is a fourth-year student pursuing a double major in Political Science and English Literature with a minor in European Studies at Trinity College at the University of Toronto. Her research interests include European integration, comparative politics, and democracy development.

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have with the government and how the shift in power from the United National Movement to the Georgian Dream coalition in the 2012 parliamentary elections affected this relationship, and the key role the EU has played in shaping Georgian policy in the past decade. In particular, the effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF) and the National Platform — which made official the role of civil society in EU-Georgia relations2 — will be evaluated. Alternatives to the National Platform will also be examined, for example the Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary, a group which brings together civil society organizations independently of the EU.

Georgia faces major challenges today in the realm of civic participation: while it has a vibrant NGO sector that helps drive forward Georgia’s EU agenda, this part of civil society is in fact quite disconnected from the larger population and is often perceived to be furthering foreign interests, not those of concern to the average Georgian.3 Namely, the focus of civil society is primarily on good governance, minority rights, and rule of law, whereas the primary concerns of the population are about poverty and unemployment.4 Yet, despite this disconnect and the fact that most of the population is not civically or politically engaged, support for EU integration in Georgia remains overwhelmingly high, at over 80 percent.5 Examining these contradictions and the implications they have for Georgia’s way forward, this paper will attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the state of civil society in Georgia today.

Rommens, Thijs. “The Eastern Partnership: civil society in between the European and domestic level: the case of Georgia.” East European Politics 30:1 (2014), 55.

3 Irakli Kobalia and Levan Tsutskiridze, interview by author. Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 17, 2015.

4 Vazha Salamadze, interview by author. Civil Society Institute. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 20, 2015.

5 “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia.” Caucasus Research Resource Centers and Eurasia Partnership Foundation. 2011.

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2. The Structure of Social Networks in Pre-Soviet Georgia

To better understand the nature of social networks in Georgia, one must consider the impact of its Soviet legacy but perhaps more importantly, also consider the deeper social structure that shaped Georgian traditions before the Soviet experience. Koba Turmanidze, president of the Caucasus Research Resource Centres (CRRC) sees focusing on Georgia’s Soviet past to explain the nature of social networks as an easy way out: to fully understand the reasons for low levels of civic engagement in the contemporary context, one must first examine the traditional social structure that characterized Georgia before the Soviet period. Before becoming part of the Soviet Union in 1921, Georgia was a feudal society that relied heavily on paternalistic patron-client relations. Unlike in Northern and Central Europe, where the profound social change that accompanied the Industrial Revolution led to the creation of strong horizontal ties, Georgia in the 18th and 19th century was still a rural country with little experience in self-organization.6 It did not have the same tradition of establishing craftsmen’s organizations, electing city councils, or otherwise establishing forms of local self-governance. Instead, inter-personal interactions “enmeshed in kinship, clan and ethnic structures”7 were the sources of social capital, and power relations remained extremely hierarchical. Personalized ties and connections of kinship thus dominated societal interactions, with bureaucratic networks and professional organizations taking a back seat. This legacy of strong informal networks and weak institutions is still alive in Georgian society, as can be seen by the influence of individuals like former President Saakashvili and former President Ivanishvili in shaping the political agenda. Strong personalities and elite networks often influence policy more than any institution, party, or ideology.

Reisner, Oliver. Interview by author. European Union Delegation to Georgia. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 16, 2015.

7 Aliyev, Huseyn. “Post-Communist informal networking: Blat in the South Caucasus.”

Demokratizatsiya 21:1 (2013), 92.

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While professional associations started to develop in the late Tsarist period, Georgia’s Sovietization in the 1920s brought a halt to this tradition of self-organization, which only truly restarted after Georgia’s independence in the 1990s.8 3. Georgia’s Post-Soviet Transition and the Rose Revolution

The authoritarianism that characterized Georgia’s Soviet years had a lasting impact on civil society, and “left citizens weary and distrustful of political participation, which made it difficult for groups to mobilize support.”9 With Soviet governments stifling free speech and cracking down on civil society organizations, trust in Georgia’s institutional framework – like in many other post-Soviet countries – was low, and political pluralism close to non-existent.

The disappearance of Soviet political structures upon Georgia’s independence in 1991 created a power vacuum, with the new republic’s early years marred by secessionist conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, civil war, radical nationalism, and economic crisis.10 This was the environment in which Eduard Shevardnadze became president in 1992 following the ousting of Zviad Gamsakhurdia — Georgia’s first elected president — in a military coup. While Shevardnadze established basic state institutions and began building connections with the international community,11 institutions were still weak and held hostage by organized crime groups, corruption at all levels was rampant, and civil society was disorganized and had difficulty mobilizing support.

While civil society organizations remained relatively weak, under Shevardnadze’s rule they were on the whole left alone from state persecution: the government was not responsive to public Reisner, Oliver. European Union Delegation to Georgia. 2015.

Laverty, Nicklaus. “The Problem of Lasting Change: Civil Society and the Colored Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.” Demokratizatsiya 16, no. 2 (2008), 147.

10 Dolidze, Anna. “The Rise and Fall of a Colour Revolution.” Transatlantic Academy (2013), 60.

11 Ibid.

8 9

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demands, but neither did it shut down free speech in the manner that was common in Azerbaijan, Armenia or Russia. This meant that some non-state actors gradually gathered more support and, when Shevardnadze’s government came under fire for its blatant attempts at vote-rigging in the 2003 parliamentary elections, civil society played a crucial role in organizing protests and mustering public outrage. With these events culminating in the peaceful Rose Revolution, several groups, including the student movement Kmara and the Liberty Institute, were instrumental in this moment of political transformation. Kmara’s key aims were to reduce citizen apathy and encourage engagement in civil society after years of heavy-handedness by the state.12 Having a national reach — it incorporated student groups from across the country — it was “structured in a highly horizontal fashion to frustrate regime attempts of repression and stimulate autonomous action,”13 and relied on non-violent protests to oppose Shevardnadze’s regime.

Heavily influenced by Otpor, a Serbian dissident group, Kmara’s tactics included using “humour and mass entertainment to sustain mobilization and assault political apathy.”14 As Nicklaus Laverty observed in 2008, this created an atmosphere “more akin to a carnival than a political demonstration.”15 The cultural politics Kmara employed played a vital role in gradually mobilizing opposition towards Shevardnadze’s regime. The pressure exerted on the government by civil society groups, together with the significant growth of reformist opposition parties like the United National Movement (UNM) and the rising popularity of Mikhail Saakashvili, former Minister of Justice and one of the most prominent figures in the opposition movement, ultimately forced Shevardnadze to resign on November 23, 2003. This peaceful change in power ushered in a new era for Georgia, now led by its new charismatic, pro-Western, neoliberal President: Mikhail Saakashvili.

Laverty, The Problem of Lasting Change, 148.

Ibid., 149.

14 Ibid., 155.

15 Ibid.

12 13

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4. Georgia Turns West: the Saakashvili Years

When Saakashvili came to power after the Rose Revolution as the leader of the UNM, he turned Georgia in a decisively proWestern direction, actively seeking integration with both European and Euro-Atlantic structures.16 Achieving drastic reforms that took Georgia from a near failed-state to a post-Soviet success story, Saakashvili’s UNM administration put Georgia’s economy back on track, attracted huge amounts of foreign direct investment, undertook extensive police reform, created a miraculously functional and non-corrupt public administration and virtually eliminated petty corruption.17 Considering the rampant rentseeking that crippled Georgia in the 1990s and early 2000s, this was a huge accomplishment. The new business-friendly Georgia that emerged after the Rose Revolution — oriented towards the West and the neoliberal policies of the United States in particular — while not a full democracy, certainly allowed more pluralism and had more effective public infrastructure than any of its neighbours in the South Caucasus.

However, along with this rapid progress, Saakashvili’s time in power was also marked by several worrying developments.

While cracking down on petty corruption remains one of his most impressive accomplishments, he achieved this in a profoundly brutal fashion, introducing strict criminal justice policies that led to a 300% increase in the prison population between 2003 and 2010.18 During his time in power acquittal rates dropped to under one percent19 and the judiciary was firmly under the control of political actors. By the end of the UNM’s rule in 2012, Georgia’s incarceration rate per capita was the third highest in the world — de Waal, Thomas. Georgia’s Choices: Charting a Future in Uncertain Times. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, 3.

17 Ibid., 6.

18 Slade, Gavin. “Georgia’s prisons: roots of scandal.” OpenDemocracy. 24 Sept 2012. Web. 19 de Waal, Georgia’s Choices, 25.

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behind only the United States and Rwanda.20 This zero-tolerance policy, combined with the rise of inequality and unemployment despite Georgia undergoing a period of impressive economic growth,21 led to the UNM becoming increasingly unpopular.

Characterized by a top-heavy governance style that concentrated power among a small group of elites, the UNM became more and more hostile towards its political rivals and disconnected from the desires of the Georgian population. Cracking down on opposition parties and civil society members alike, NGOs like the OSGF, Georgian Young Lawyers (GYLA), and Transparency International Georgia all expressed intense frustration at the lack of transparency22 at the end of the UNM’s nine years in power.

5. Initial Contact with the European Union

While Saakashvili’s regime grew more repressive throughout the years, the message during his time in power was consistently pro-Western. Leaning rather towards American neoliberalism than European concepts of social democracy,23 Saakashvili in addition to nurturing a relationship with Washington also sought to firmly anchor Georgia within the framework of the EU. In the early years of Saakashvili’s rule, the EU sought to extend its influence into the democratizing post-Soviet sphere and into its southern neighbourhood, establishing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as the framework for its foreign policy in 2004.24 This was a way for the EU to establish closer economic and political cooperation with countries on the periphery of its borders, and thus to export its institutional framework, respect Slade, “Georgia’s prisons: roots of scandal.” 2012. de Waal, Georgia’s Choices, 25.

22 Chkhikvadze, Vano. Interview by author. Open Society Georgia Foundation. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 19, 2015.

23 Ramishvili, Levan. Interview by author. Liberty Institute. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 20, 2015.

24 “Political and economic relations between the EU and Georgia.” European External Action Service. Web. 20 21

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for rule of law, and market economy principles into countries formerly characterized by personalized politics, weak institutions, and economies held hostage by thieves-in-law. The process of supporting democratization in its neighbourhood and thus transforming the region’s economic, political and institutional structure is a key aim of the EU, and one where civil society plays a vital role. Georgia’s relations with the EU were formalized as early as in 1996 upon the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),25 which provided the framework for economic, cultural and political cooperation between Georgia and the EU. During Saakashvili’s time in power, these relations intensified significantly, first through the ENP and subsequently through the Eastern Partnership.

However, the EU’s early relations with Georgia, both under Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, neglected to engage civil society actors in a significant way; with no mention of their role in the PCA, the introduction of the ENP in 2004 also failed to include civil society “as partners in a watchdog or monitoring function.”26 Rather, the ENP was primarily aimed at increasing economic integration and mobility, with the main dialogue between the EU and partner countries occurring between the political elite, and not with civil society actors.27 The ENP provides a framework for the establishment of bilateral ties between the EU and its eastern and southern neighbours, all without opening the prospective for these countries’ membership in the EU.

Cooperation under the framework of the ENP was initially assessed as having a negative impact on civil society development.28 The reason for this is twofold; first, it was the result of civil society’s exclusion from the EU integration process and second, it can be attributed to the relationship Saakashvili’s government had with civil society actors following the Rose Revolution. With Rommens, The Eastern Partnership, 56.

Ibid., 57.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 54.

25 26

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many leaders from for example Kmara and the Liberty Institute becoming members of parliament under Saakashvili, civil society as a whole became less autonomous and its capacity to hold the government accountable decreased. With the leaders of many civil society organizations co-opted by the new government,29 they were effectively prevented from playing their crucial role in Georgia’s democratic transition: holding the government accountable.

Toward the end of his time in power, Saakashvili had become completely closed to dialogue with civil society.30 6. The Launch of the Eastern Partnership and the Civil Society Forum (CSF)

Only when the Eastern Partnership was launched within the framework of the ENP at the Prague Summit in May 2009 was civil society included as a meaningful partner.31 Here, their role was officialized through the creation of the CSF, a regional body bringing together the six EaP countries: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Each country has its own National Platform that recreates the CSF at the domestic level and aims to put pressure on the government, increase leverage through cooperation, and strengthen links with other NGOs. However, reports concerning the effectiveness of the CSF and Georgia’s National Platform are mixed: on the one hand, the platform unites almost 140 different civil society organizations, representing about 80% of the NGOs in Georgia working on the topic of EU integration.32 “It is one of the strongest platforms that exists in Georgia and a powerful partner in policy dialogue with the EU”33 Light, Matthew. Interview by author. University of Toronto. Toronto, Canada. Jan 16, 2015.

30 Chkhikvadze, Open Society Georgia Foundation. 2015.

31 Iarochevitch, Boris. Interview by author. EU Delegation to Georgia. Tbilisi, Georgia. Feb 18, 2015.

32 Gigiadze, Gigi. Interview by author. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tbilisi, Georgia. Feb 17, 2015.

33 Reisner, EU Delegation to Georgia. 2015.

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says Oliver Reisner, attaché to the European Union Delegation to Georgia. Members of the Platform include the biggest and most influential NGOs in the country such as the Civil Society Institute, Transparency International Georgia, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), and also membershipbased organizations like the Teachers’ Union “Education and Universe” (which represents about 30,000 union members) and the GYLA (which represent over 600 lawyers).

On the other hand, many of its members see precisely the size of the Platform to be a limit to its efficiency; coming to consensus is difficult, taking action is slow, and it produces little to no research and policy work. “Instead, their actions are limited to producing statements”34 says Anna Natsvlishvili, president of GYLA. And even these actions are limited by its heavy structure; Natsvlishvili in particular remembers that after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris in January, it took the Platform almost four weeks to issue an official statement condemning the attack. “While it’s relevant to show your position, it’s not news anymore,”35 she says.

The fact that their response rate is so slow encumbers its ability to efficiently respond to new draft laws and policies. Also, the question often comes back to how representative it is: with the majority of the population not engaged with civil society organizations, the problem is particularly severe in rural areas. NGOs there are often smaller, underfunded, and less effective. This problem of low engagement outside of urban centers is further exacerbated by the fact that the Platform unites disproportionally more Tbilisi-based NGOs than ones working in other areas of the country. Echoing Natsvlishvili comments on the limits of the Platform, Ivane Chkikvadze, EU Integration Program Manager at the OSGF and the CSF’s Country Facilitator for Georgia, says that “the capacity of this forum is already exhausted. It’s high time to do some kind of Natsvlishvili, Anna. Interview by author. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Tbilisi, Georgia. Feb 20, 2015.

35 Ibid.

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refurbishment, some kind of renovation to it.”36 7. The Rise of the Georgian Dream

As examined above, the ability of the Platform to play a democratizing role depends both on its internal efficiency and on its relationship with the administration. Under Saakashvili, dialogue with civil society actors became increasingly closed.

When the Georgian Dream coalition, backed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, unexpectedly won the 2012 parliamentary elections and then after a brief period of cohabitation fielded a successful candidate in the 2013 presidential elections — President Giorgi Margvelashvili — this signified a moment of major change for Georgia. Whatever the shortcomings of the UNM, they can at least be praised for laying the foundation necessary to secure a democratic, peaceful transfer of power.37 However, the democratic credentials of the new Georgian Dream coalition government remain a matter of debate. The coalition is made up of an assortment of small parties with widely differing ideological orientations and origins, with members ranging from promarket liberals, to nationalists with xenophobic and homophobic rhetoric, to pro-Western actors, to former members of the Shevardnadze administration.38 There were many positive signs when the Georgian Dream first came to power: it was relatively open to cooperating with the National Platform and civil society organizations, and there were high hopes among the population that they would deliver on their promises of social responsibility and restoration of justice. However, “now the honeymoon is over,”39 says Vazha Salamadze, Director of the Civil Society Institute, a sentiment echoed by most civil society actors. The government’s Chkhikvadze, Open Society Georgia Foundation. 2015.

Samadashvili, Salome. “A change of government and the future of EU–Georgia relations.” European View. no. 1 (2014), 62.

38 Natsvlishvili. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Assocation. 2015.

39 Salamadze, Civil Society Institute. 2015.

36 37

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relations with civil society members, while still fairly good, have deteriorated since 2012, with bodies like the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs becoming increasingly closed. Others, however, are more open to consultation with NGOs, for example the parliament, the judiciary, and the State Ministry on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.40 8. Unaccountable Figures: the Problem of Personality Politics

Ultimately, one of the greatest obstacles to the relationship between civil society and the Georgian Dream coalition is the disproportional influence exerted by one individual on government policy - former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. While Ivanishvili is officially outside of politics, he is still widely regarded as the de-facto leader of the Georgian Dream.41 The fact that he, as a private citizen, still sets the agenda and shapes government policy from outside the realm of political accountability, is hugely problematic. “It’s a one-man’s show,”42 says Salamadze. This problem of individuals shaping policies, not parties, is one that pervades Georgian politics. The UNM, too, was held together by one personality — Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili has been described as “an autocrat of an almost Stalinist bent who paid lip-service to democracy in order to secure support in the west.”43 Looking at the political landscape in Georgia, CRRC president Turmanidze says, “it now mimics a two-party system. But these two camps [the Georgian Dream and the UNM] are still centered around individuals. It’s not about being liberal or conservative, it’s about whether you dislike Misha or Bidzina.”44 Urushadze, Erekle. Interview by author. Transparency International Georgia. Tbilisi, Georgia. 18 Feb 2015.

41 Ibid.

42 Salamadze, Civil Society Institute. 2015.

43 Nodia, Ghia. “Georgia’s Election: Lesson and Prospect.” OpenDemocracy. 15 October 2012. Web. 44 Turmanidze, Koba. Interview by author. Caucasus Research Resource Center. 19 Feb 2015.

40

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These deeper structural problems expose the fragility of rule of law and democracy in Georgia. As Georgian Ambassador to the EU Salome Samadashvili wrote following the change in power, the strength of personalities “makes it clear that political parties, an important attribute of a pluralistic democracy, are still very weak in Georgia.”45 When these key individuals act in a way that is fundamentally illiberal, this can destabilize the entire system. For example, at the beginning of 2015, Ivanishvili issued statements attacking the heads of Georgia’s three biggest NGOs - Transparency International Georgia, ISFED, and GYLA - which have been widely condemned by civil society as a threat.46 He also set up a new NGO, ‘Citizen,’ that monitors the actions of other NGOs and of media outlets.47 Actions such as these expose the pervasive influence of Ivanishvili in Georgia and create tension between the government and civil society actors. On the whole however the environment that NGOs operate in is fairly good; speaking to Erekle Urushadze at Transparency International Georgia concerning these attacks on the organization’s director, he said “those were quite unpleasant comments, but to put it in perspective: this is basically as bad as it gets in terms of government attacks on NGOs.”48 9. How Representative is Civil Society?

Among the concerns about the National Platform’s effectiveness and the issue of individuals influencing the government’s relationship with civic actors is a deeper question about the strength of civil society in Georgia. To what extent is civil society reflective of the country’s population? GYLA and the Teachers’ Trade Union are amongst the biggest membership-based Samadashvili, A change of government and the future of EU-Georgia relations, 61.

“NGOs Slam ‘Informal Ruler’ Ivanishvili’s ‘Threatening’ Remarks.” Civil Georgia. 2 Feb 2015. Web. 47 Chkheidze, Elene. Interview by author. International Centre for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Tbilisi, Georgia. 18 Feb 2015.

48 Urushadze, Transparency International Georgia. 2015.

45 46

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groups on the Platform, but many of the NGOs it represents have few members, and on the whole they are very disconnected from ordinary citizens.49 Many civil society organizations do not in fact have a large base among the population, and are perceived to represent foreign interests, not taking up the issues that are of real concern to the people.50 “90 percent of NGOs here are working on human rights, media freedom, data protection, and transparency.

But for the people, the top issues are poverty and unemployment,” says Turmanidze. The Caucasus Barometer Project run by the CRRC shows that in 2013, most people (54 percent) thought the most important issue facing the country was unemployment.51 By contrast, only 2 percent thought that political instability and lack of peace respectively were the most pressing issues.52 With most civil society organizations being funded by external actors like United States Agency for International Development, The Swedish International Development Agency, or the OSGF, they are often seen as an elite group detached from ordinary citizens that speak about concerns that don’t originate from the people. “This is a huge problem for modernizing societies everywhere,”53 says Turmanidze.

“Georgia is changing very quickly, and people have different speeds of adapting to change.”

This disconnect between citizens’ economic concerns and the NGO community’s political concerns mean that many Georgians perceive NGOs as foreign agents of the United States and Europe, pushing forward an agenda that does not arise from a demand among the population and that ignores the more pressing demands of financial wellbeing. Expressing frustration at this disconnect, Natsvlishvili says, “the problem in Georgia is that the mainstream is also very vulnerable - people think well, ‘I’m not gay, I’m not Muslim, I’m not a Black immigrant or a victim of domestic Reisner, EU Delegation to Georgia. 2015.

Natsvlishvili. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Assocation. 2015.

51 Caucasus Barometer 2013 Georgia.

52 Ibid.

53 Turmanidze, Caucasus Research Resource Centers. 2015.

49 50

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violence, I’m just an ordinary white-skinned Christian peasant and I’m dying of hunger and no one is talking about my problems’ — they don’t fit into the traditional European vision of who needs more protection.”54 The emphasis on minority rights that is part and parcel of Georgia’s EU ambitions has been accepted more as a necessary evil on the road to Georgia’s Western alignment than as something desired by the country itself, and musters little enthusiasm among political parties and citizens alike. Attitudes towards integrating religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities are ambivalent at best and downright hostile at worst, as can perhaps be most clearly exemplified in the brutal crackdown on the May 17th gay rights protest.55 The Anti-Discrimination Law passed in 2013, while showing the positive steps that the Georgian Dream is taking toward embracing EU norms and values, has been poorly implemented and is on the whole considered to be imposed on Georgia from outside,56 rather than arising from a desire within the country itself to protect vulnerable groups.

10. The Radical Backlash

The fact that NGOs are some of the strongest advocates for these vulnerable groups in the absence of popular or political support — especially when it comes to gay rights — has provided fodder for radical groups to discredit their actions in the name of protecting Georgian national identity. With both radical NGOs and anti-Western political parties emerging on the Georgian political scene, the rhetoric that pervades their dialogue is that the West — through its promotion of minority rights — is imposing alien values on the Georgian mind,57 and that EU integration is a threat to their traditions and religious beliefs. “In the past few years, we Natsvlishvili. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. 2015.

Savaris, Alessandro. Interview by author. Council of Europe. Tbilisi, Georgia. 16 Feb 2015.

56 Chkheidze, International Centre for Social Research and Policy Analysis. 2015.

57 Kobalia and Tsutskiridze, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. 2015.

54 55

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have seen the emergence of ‘uncivil’ civil society,”58 says Urushadze at TI Georgia. This includes religious fundamentalists who attack NGOs working on LGBT rights, pro-Russian organizations, and nationalist groups. Low political participation and lack of trust in the government, in politicians, and in the democratic process make many people, particularly youth, vulnerable to radical ideas.

This backlash against Western values also means that anti-Western political parties are gaining traction. Both Nino Burjanadze’s Democratic Movement - United Georgia and The Alliance of Georgian Patriots gathered surprising amounts of support at the local elections in 2014, making it into local councils nationwide.59 Considering the falling support for the Georgian Dream coalition and the vehement dislike for the UNM still harboured by a majority of the population, this rising support for illiberal parties and organizations is a source of worry for many NGOs. “If you add up their numbers, they’re quite significant. And if support for them continues to grow, it’s going to cause serious danger to Georgia’s democratic EU orientation.”60

However, many remain hopeful that Georgia’s EU plans will stay on track. While pressure from outside is not enough for Georgia to transition into a full democracy, closer ties to the EU and deeper institutional linkages are a crucial factor in Georgia’s long-term political transformation. Georgia is in a difficult geopolitical situation, with Russia as an aggressive neighbour to the north, Azerbaijan closed to democratic progress, and Armenia in a vulnerable economic and political position. Combined with the weakness of its institutions, the instability of its neighbourhood may mean that foreign leverage in the form of EU integration is precisely what Georgia needs; “Georgia’s vulnerability to foreign leverage is the factor that gives us hope that we will slowly move towards a more democratic system,”61 says Urushadze. Thought Urushadze, Transparency International Georgia. 2015.

Kobalia and Tsutskiridze, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. 2015.

60 Ibid.

61 Urushadze, Transparency International Georgia, 2015.

58 59

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of in this sense, the fact that there are so many pro-EU NGOs in Georgia can be interpreted as a condition to Georgia’s political development, not a threat to it as many radical organizations argue: EU assistance is instrumental in helping to improve the country’s institutional infrastructure.62 However, EU linkages with civil society and political parties will need to be mirrored by support from below to ensure Georgia’s successful transition.

11. Initiatives to Increase Civic Participation

The disconnect between civil society and wider groups of citizens is one that many organizations are trying to bridge.

While many NGOs have a fairly narrow support base among the population, there have been attempts to increase engagement at the grassroots level and address this gap between people and civil society. Smaller professional NGOs, while not necessarily representative of wider interests, have launched fairly successful campaigns to increase civic engagement and provide political education in various regions. For example, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), which works on the premise that a strong multi-party system is a precondition for democracy and thus works to strengthen political parties, has ‘Democracy Schools’ running in four regions of Georgia, an intense training and education program aimed at training political party members, civil society actors, local government representatives, media groups, and students.63 Alumni from the Democracy School program can apply to NIMD for funding after completion of the training, and also have the opportunity to interact with the political party leadership at debates that NIMD organize every year. Many have gone on to run for political office — for example in the local elections in 2014, over 30 candidates from Democracy Schools aparidze, Sopo. Interview by author. Adviser to the Prime Minister on Human Rights and Gender Issues. 20 Feb 2015.

63 Kobalia and Tsutskiridze, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. 2015.

62 J

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ran for office, 15 of them women.64 Initiatives run by GYLA, the International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis (ICSRPA), Transparency International Georgia, and the Civil Society Institute have also worked at promoting local engagement and improving the economic conditions of the rural population.

These include projects to train community leaders and create a relationship between them and local governments65 (CSI’s Public Advisory Councils project), working with the young members of political parties and NGOs in democracy promotion projects66 (the ICSRPA in connection with the United Nations Democracy Fund), and working on alleviating poverty through education about state healthcare initiatives67 (GYLA). There have also been encouraging signs of volunteer organizations emerging at the grassroots level, for example advocating to protect public parks in Tbilisi, working to promote labour rights, or mobilizing in protest of large-scale disruptive infrastructure projects, like the building of dams.68 However, on the whole civic participation remains low.

12. Alternatives to the National Platform

Addressing this tradition of weak civic participation is one of the focal points in the EU’s relationship with Georgia. However, the question remains whether bodies like the National Platform can truly bring civil society actors together in a meaningful way.

Many organizations who are part of the National Platform, for example Transparency International Georgia, GYLA, ISFED, and the OSGF, see smaller groups of NGOs as being more effective in achieving results, in particular the Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary which was established in 2011. Anna Natsvlishvili, president of GYLA, says that the Coalition, rather Kobalia and Tsutskiridze, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. 2015.

Salamadze, Civil Society Institute. 2015.

66 Chkheidze, International Centre for Social Research and Policy Analysis. 2015.

67 Natsvlishvili, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. 2015.

68 Urushadze, Transparency International Georgia. 2015.

64 65

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than the National Platform, “is the main body through which civil society actors are represented in Georgia.”69 Led by a 9-member steering committee, the Coalition is made up of 34 NGOs and works primarily on judicial issues, criminal justice, and property rights. It is smaller and more focused than the National Platform, and through its thematic working groups, it effectively evaluates national legislation and prepares sets of recommendations that it presents to members of parliament and ministry representatives.

Working in consultation with political actors on issues ranging from reform of the Prosecutor’s Office, to the nomination of a new Chairperson to the Supreme Court,70 to how best to reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary is probably the most effective civil society organization in Georgia working on issues of rule of law and judicial reform. “In the Coalition we really have the capacity to work in detail, in a very comprehensive way. This is the kind of research and policy work that is not done in the National Platform,”71 says Natsvlishvili. Not only do most NGOs consider the Coalition to be more effective than the National Platform (whose size and unclear internal regulations72 make it clumsy), it is also thought of as more representative: “this is an issue-based coalition, and it’s more naturally grown than the EU-driven National Platform,”73 says Vazha Salamadze, Director of the Civil Society Institute.

13. The New Civil Society Platform (CSP)

The limits to the effectiveness of the EU-driven National Platform make it clear that top-down efforts to strengthen civil Natsvlishvili. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. 2015.

“President Meets NGOs as He Launches Consultations over New Chair of Supreme Court.” Civil Georgia. 15 Jan 2015. Web. 71 Natsvlishvili. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. 2015.

72 Ibid.

73 Salamadze, Civil Society Institute. 2015.

69 70

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society cannot in themselves address issues of civic engagement without being matched by bottom-up civic initiatives. And yet, despite the shortcomings associated with the Platform, rather than looking at how to make this body more effective and representative, what is instead on the agenda as part of Georgia’s obligations under the Association Agreement that it signed in September 2014 is the creation of another EU-driven civic platform, as stipulated in Article 412. This article states: An EU-Georgia Civil Society Platform (CSP) is hereby established.

It shall be a forum to meet and exchange views for, and consist of, representatives of civil society on the side of the EU, including Members of the European Economic and Social Committee, and representatives of civil society on the side of Georgia, including representatives of the national platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum.74

Speaking to Boris Iarochevitch, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to Georgia about the new platform, he says the CSP is “totally confusing” and “not a very good idea.”75 There is disagreement between the EU and civil society members over its final composition: the EU wants a third of the platform to be made up of civil society NGOs, a third to be made up of professional organizations, and a third to be made up of trade union members, while NGOs are negotiating to have a larger proportion of their members represented.76 Ultimately, there is concern that this new body will do little to address the shortcomings of the current platform and will instead create unnecessary overlap: Salamadze from the Civil Society Institute says, “we already have one platform, which works but has difficulties; and now we are establishing more platforms. I don’t understand the rationale behind it. It “Association Agreement” Official Journal of the European Union 261, no 4. (2014): Article 412.

75 Iarochevitch, EU Delegation to Georgia. 2015.

76 Ibid.

74

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seems to add another layer of bureaucracy.”77 Others are hopeful that the CSP will be invaluable in monitoring and implementing the Association Agreement, and that its structure will address the current platform’s limitations: “we have a number of very effective organizations who are not members of the existing Civil Society Forum and National Platform. So the CSP is a possibility for us to create an unbiased and factive new platform,”78 says Deputy State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Mariam Rakviashvili. The form and function of the new platform is still unclear, however, and the question remains whether EU-driven initiatives are truly effective in addressing deeper issues of civic participation in Georgia.

14. Conclusion

Ultimately, while civil society organizations in Georgia play a crucial role in holding the government to account and have been instrumental in Georgia’s democratic transformation, they are still hampered by several weaknesses. Civil society, like other sectors, has benefited from closer integration with the EU, but nevertheless the ability to change things from above remains limited. Demand for change needs to grow organically from below in addition to being imposed from above to be effective in the long-term. While EU-driven initiatives like the National Platform and the new civic platform created under the Association Agreement can help increase dialogue between civil society and political actors, they do little to address the underlying issue of low civic participation.

Not only is a majority of the population not represented by civil society organizations, there is also a disconnect between the overwhelmingly political agenda of NGOs and the largely economic concerns of the population. Few NGOs work on issues related to poverty, and those who do are smaller, regional organizations with 77 78

Salamadze, Civil Society Institute. 2015.

Rakviashvili, State Ministry for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. 2015.

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limited means. “If you look at the broader scale of how civil society works, stronger, more resource-rich groups are mostly focused on human and political rights, not economic rights. These two sets of rights are not on equal footing,”79 says Natsvlishvili. Considering the economic vulnerability of the population — 89 percent of Georgians have no personal savings,80 and 14.8 percent live under the poverty line81 — there is a great need for NGOs and bodies like the National Platform and the Coalition for a Transparent and Independent Judiciary to broaden their focus to include poverty reduction initiatives.

The fact that a majority of the population remains disengaged and largely distrustful of political parties, government institutions, and politicians, is something that will not change overnight.82 Increasing the level of trust in a society and changing relations from a vertical power structure to an horizontal one, thus allowing for the wider dispersal of social capital,83 happens slowly, over a long period of time. The mindset in Georgia remains fairly authoritarian, as can be seen by the country’s trust ratings: it’s the Orthodox Church, the army, and the police that are the most trusted institutions, while trust in politicians and political parties is extremely low. Likewise, while Georgia is firmly oriented towards the EU and is adopting a more pluralistic approach to political organization, “there is still a lot of Soviet-style governance practiced today, even if the content is pro-Western,”84 says Reisner from the EU Delegation. Information-sharing among ministries is minimal, nepotism and elite corruption is still a problem, and while the current government is less authoritarian than the previous administration, this is less because of the Georgian Dream’s democratic virtues and more because they have been unable to Natsvlishvili. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. 2015.

Caucasus Barometer 2013 Georgia.

81 “Georgia: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines.” The World Bank World Development Indicators, 2012. Web. 82 Turmanidze, Caucasus Research Resource Centers. 2015.

83 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 70.

84 Reisner, EU Delegation to Georgia. 2015.

79 80

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consolidate power to the same extent as the UNM.85 In the end, while the EU can help push Georgia in a more democratic direction through its attempts to strengthen civil society and encourage political pluralism, this needs to be matched by deeper social change and increased participation at the local level for Georgia to become a full democracy.

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Chkhikvadze, Vano. EU Integration Program Manager at the Open Society Georgia Foundation, Country Facilitator for Georgia for the Civil Society Forum. Interview by author. Personal interview.

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Empowerment of NGOs during early democratization.”

Democratization 16, no. 2 (2009): 898-921 Iarochevitch, Boris. Deputy Head of the European Union Delegation to Georgia. Interview by author. Personal interview.

Tbilisi, Georgia. February 18, 2015.

Japaridze, Sopo. Prime Minister’s Adviser on Human Rights and Gender Issues. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 20, 2015.

Kobalia, Irakli and Levan Tsutskiridze. Program Manager for Education and Reforms, Representative in South Caucasus at the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 17, 2015.

Laverty, Nicklaus. “The Problem of Lasting Change: Civil Society and the Colored Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.”

Demokratizatsiya 16, no. 2 (2008): 143-162.

Light, Matthew. Assistant Professor of Criminology and Sociolegal studies at the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs. Interview by author. Personal interview. Toronto, Canada. January 16, 2015.

Lomsadze, Giorgi. “Georgia: Political Crisis Prompts Speculation About Ivanishvili’s Political Role.” EurasiaNet.org. 13 Nov 2014.

Web 12 Jan 2015. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70911 Natsvlishvili, Anna. President of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, 34

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Georgia, February 20, 2015.

Nodia, Ghia. “Georgia’s Election: Lesson and Prospect.”

OpenDemocracy. 15 October 2012. Web. 17 January 2015. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ghia-nodia/georgias-electionlesson-and-prospect Putnam, Robert D. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy Vol. 6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78.

Rakviashvili, Mariam. Deputy State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Interview by author. Personal interview.

Tbilisi, Georgia. February 17, 2015.

Ramishvili, Levan. Chair of the Liberty Institute. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 20, 2015.

Reisner, Oliver. Attaché and Project Manager at the European Union Delegation to Georgia. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 16, 2015.

Rommens, Thijs. “The Eastern Partnership: civil society in between the European and domestic level: the case of Georgia.” East European Politics Vol. 30, no. 1 (2014): 54-70.

Salamadze, Vazha. Director of the Civil Society Institute. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 20, 2015.

Samadashvili, Salome. “A change of government and the future of EU–Georgia relations.” European View. Vol. 13, no. 1 (2014): 59-66.

Savaris, Alessandro. Deputy Head of the Council of Europe, Georgia Office. Interview by author. Personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia. February 16, 2015.

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Slade, Gavin. “Georgia’s prisons: roots of scandal.” OpenDemocracy.

24 Sept 2012. Web. 10 March 2015. https://www.opendemocracy. net/gavin-slade/georgias-prisons-roots-of-scandal Sordia, Giorgi. “Challenges of Minority Governance and Political Participation in Georgia.” Caucasus Analytical Digest Vol. 64, no. 9 (2014): 2-5.

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23 Jan 2015. Web. 16 Feb 2015. http://transparency.ge/en/post/ general-announcement/joint-statement-civil-society-and-mediaorganizations-regarding-bill-incitement-of-hatred “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia.” Caucasus Research Resource Centers and Eurasia Partnership Foundation. 5 December 2011. Web 13 March 2015. http://www.crrccenters.org/ “Most important issue facing the country” Caucasus Barometer 2013 Georgia. Web. 10 March 2015. http://caucasusbarometer.org/ en/cb2013ge/IMPISS1-withoutdkra/ “New Interior Ministry Appointed” Civil Georgia. 26 Jan 2015.

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European External Action Service. Web. 9 March 2015. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/political_ relations/index_en.htm “President Meets NGOs as He Launches Consultations over New Chair of Supreme Court.” Civil Georgia. 15 Jan 2015. Web. 10 March 2015. http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27972 “TI Georgia’s Executive Director sues Guram Adamashvili and Giorgi Khaindrava for defamation.” Transparency International Georgia. 5 Feb 2015. Web. 19 Feb 2015. http://transparency.ge/en/ post/general-announcement/ti-georgia-s-executive-director-suesguram-adamashvili-and-giorgi-khaindrava-for-defamation

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IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE EFFORTS OF THE GEORGIAN DREAM GOVERNMENT Matt Korda

It is the inherent nature of political transition that the actions and policies of a succeeding government are shaped in response to those of its predecessor. It is both standard and sensible for the incumbent administration to define itself in relation to its forerunner, to a certain extent. However, even a cursory examination of Georgian politics reveals the remarkable degree to which the fragmented Georgian Dream coalition, in power since October 2012, is bound together by a common dislike of its predecessor, the United National Movement (UNM), rather than through shared political values or visions. The inherent link between these two political powerhouses has catapulted the need for transitional justice to the very top of the priority list, as Georgian Dream attempts to historically define itself as the administration that ended the polarizing nine-year administration of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and delivered a “restoration of justice” to victims of systematic torture, property seizure, and dubious imprisonment. However, despite some successful efforts Matt Korda is a fourth-year undergraduate student at the University of Toronto and a Junior Research Fellow for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s “A View From Ukraine” program. He plans to graduate this year with a major in European Studies and minors in History and American Studies. An aspiring Kremlinologist, his interests lie primarily with Russia, as well as with Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

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to depoliticize various ministries, the efforts of Georgian Dream have been extremely limited thus far due to the sheer logistical complexity of the problem at hand, a distinct lack of both political will and vision, and pressure from the international and local communities. Utilizing a thorough examination of primary and secondary resources, in addition to personal interviews conducted in Tbilisi with relevant governmental and civil society representatives, this paper seeks to assess the progress of Georgian Dream in its efforts to achieve transitional justice.

1. A justification for “transitional justice”

In order to establish a qualitative and quantitative framework for assessing transitional justice endeavours, the term itself must be defined and its strategies delineated. This task is not a simple one, as the sheer variety of situations necessitating transitional justice constantly warrants individual and imaginative approaches. This paper will utilize the United Nations’ official definition of transitional justice, which is represented as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”1 These processes and mechanisms described above vary with regards to specific implementation and objective; however, Dr. Laura Davis, the specialist on transitional justice for the Civil Society Dialogue Network, lists the four most common elements of this daunting undertaking as “criminal justice,” “truth seeking,” “reparations,” and “reform of public institutions.”2 This paper will assess the progress of the Georgian Dream coalition with regards to these four cornerstones of transitional justice, approximately three years after the change in government. In “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice,” United Nations (March 2010), 3, accessed 17 March 2015.

2 Dr. Laura Davis, “The European Union and Transitional Justice,” Civil Society Dialogue Network (2014), 3, accessed 17 March 2015.

1

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recent years, the European Union (EU) has significantly elevated the importance of transitional justice as a condition for European integration, specifically as a result of the successful implementation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). A successful transitional justice project indicates to the international and local communities that a country’s police, judiciary, prosecutor’s office, and interior ministry are both independent and functioning in accordance with international standards. For Georgia, an aspiring EU member state, the issue of transitional justice is a top priority for both its European ambitions and its victimized citizens. Although the term “transitional justice” is, in itself, a partisan label, this paper will utilize it frequently and the argument for such usage hinges upon the subsequent comprehensive and critical analysis of the successes and failures of the 2004-2012 UNM administration.

After Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Georgian inheritance was devastated by civil war and rampant corruption, with state capture by “thievesin-law” encouraged and abetted by former President Eduard Shevardnadze. These powerful mafiosi, or vory,3 manipulated the rapid deterioration of the previously-centralized Soviet corruption mechanism in order to bleed the state dry. For over a decade, Georgian citizens were systematically robbed by the police, the vory, and the dysfunctional government, with the state financing itself by auctioning off government positions. Georgia historian Donald Rayfield notes that “‘an ambassador’s post cost 100,000 dollars, a district governor’s 50,000, a traffic policeman’s 5,000.’”4 These fees were but a small price to pay for the purchase of power, which would allow these corrupt officials to amass small fortunes by means of larceny, property seizure, and civil asset forfeiture.

Gavin Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment: The Prevalence and Causes of Human Rights Abuse in Georgia’s Prisons (Tbilisi: Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2014), 13.

4 Peter Pomerantsev, “Revolutionary Tactics: Insights from Police and Justice Reform in Georgia,” Legatum Institute (June 2014), 4, accessed 2 January 2015.

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Between 1991 and 2003 corruption permeated all aspects of Georgian culture, with Georgians recognizing that bribery, repression, and extrajudicial killings were detestable conventions of everyday life. The system of state capture strengthened itself over time as the influence of the wealthy and powerful vory had an immense effect upon the Georgian youth. As Nika Jeiranashvili, Human Rights Project Manager for the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), explains, “if you asked young people in those times what they wanted to do in the future, they would say ‘I want to become a thief-in-law.’”5 An inferiority complex undermined the nation, and Georgians began to pessimistically view their country and culture as inherently corrupt. Former President Shevardnadze himself once famously declared: “we are a failed state.”6

When Mikheil Saakashvili and his UNM party came to power after the 2003 Rose Revolution, his team of extremely young, idealistic government ministers sought to destroy the qurduli samkaro,7 the “thieves’ world,” through a rapid sequence of radical and extensive police and ministerial reforms. Within two years, Saakashvili successfully and creatively replaced the infamously corrupt police force with polite, professional, and protective role models, drastically reduced the sizes of both the police force and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), and waged a transformative war on petty corruption.8,9 These reforms allowed the Georgian population to establish a newfound confidence in their government and in themselves. The inferiority complex which had previously entertained notions of inherent Georgian corruptness had been broken, and public trust in the police force soared.10 Nika Jeiranashvili (Human Rights Project Manager, Open Society Georgian Foundation), interviewed by Matt Korda, Misha Boutilier, and Zoë Smale at OSGF Offices, Tbilisi, 19 February 2015.

6 Pomerantsev, “Revolutionary Tactics,” 5.

7 Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 8.

8 Pomerantsev, “Revolutionary Tactics,” 7.

9 Gavin Slade, Reorganizing Crime: Mafia and Anti-Mafia in Post-Soviet Georgia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, December 2013), 82.

10 Ibid, 84.

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Although the Georgian public welcomed the success of these initial reforms, there was significant international concern emanating from officials within the United States, Canada, and Italy,11 who feared that human rights and civil liberties could be breached by the newly-empowered police force in its unyielding quest to “[clean] our streets of this rubbish,”12 in the words of Saakashvili himself. This international apprehension was not unfounded: in 2006, Saakashvili’s government adopted a policy of “zero tolerance,” which advocated for a ruthless “‘win at all costs’”13 mentality aimed directly at the mafiosi. Zero tolerance established a policy of “mandatory custodial sentencing,” which prescribed a prison sentence for even the most minor crimes.14 The growth of police and prosecutorial power undermined the weakened judiciary, resulting in the acquittal rate of Georgian courts plummeting to 0.1% in 2009.15 Between 2003 and 2010, the prison population escalated by 300%.16 Elene Chkheidze, Executive Director at the International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis, expresses how “it was not logical” for citizens guilty of petty crimes to be handed seven- to ten-year prison sentences.17 Ms. Chkheidze further notes that plea bargaining and property seizure were widespread methods of reducing the longevity of a prison sentence, but these assets were not delivered to the state, but rather into “private pockets.”18 OSGF cites the official prison population in 2011 as 24,114 convicted persons19 for a modest Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 14.

Gavin Slade, “Georgia’s prisons: roots of scandal,” openDemocracy (24 September 2012), accessed 2 January 2015.

13 Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 17.

14 Ibid, 17.

15 Ibid, 17.

16 Ibid, 17.

17 Elene Chkheidze (Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students at ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi, 18 February 2015.

18 Ibid.

19 Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 17.

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national population of approximately 4.5 million.20 However, Givi Mikanadze, Senior Project Officer for the joint Council of Europe (CoE) and EU programme entitled “Human Rights in Prisons and Other Closed Institutions,” cites a more realistic estimate of 56,000, if one includes offenders serving probationary sentences.21 “It’s unbelievable,” he remarks, further quipping that “either the whole nation [exhibited] criminal behaviour, or the legislation was [too] strict.”22 In 2010, Georgia’s incarceration rate was the fifth-highest in the world,23 and by 2012 it would rise to third-highest of all major countries, behind only the United States and Rwanda.24

It is essential to understand the unique role of the Georgian prison system in the consolidation and longevity of the qurduli samkaro in the decades preceding the Rose Revolution, as this reveals much about the future treatment of prisoners under the Saakashvili administration. Undue Punishment: Abuses Against Prisoners in Georgia, a report published by Human Rights Watch in 2006, explains that throughout the Soviet period, prison was used as a “‘criminal academy’” through which new vory were inducted, initiated, and instructed.25 For almost a century, prison hierarchies were extremely strict and governed by the vory and their deputies,26 known as “beholders.”27 “They could do whatever they wanted,” explains Mr. Jeiranashvili. “It was better living […] inside prison than outside, for them.”28 The state capture of 1991-2003 would World Bank, 2010-2014: Population, total (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (producer and distributor)), accessed 18 March 2015.

21 Givi Mikanadze (Senior Project Manager, Council of Europe and EU programme entitled “Human Rights in Prisons and Other Closed Institutions”), interviewed by Matt Korda at CoE Offices, Tbilisi, 16 February 2015.

22 Ibid.

23 Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 17.

24 Slade, “Georgia’s Prisons.”

25 Jane Buchanan, Undue Punishment: Abuses against Prisoners in Georgia, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006), 10, accessed 17 March 2015.

26 Ibid, 10.

27 Michael Vardzelashvili, “‘The prison scandal:’ to be continued?” Georgia Times (27 May 2013), accessed 18 February 2015.

28 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

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have been impossible if not for the strength and brotherhood of the qurduli samkaro, fortified and sustained within the Georgian prison system. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili was determined to break the will of the vory and return control of the prisons to the prison guards; however, these guards had no experience, education, or methodological training for overseeing prison life or keeping order without the help of the vory.29

On September 18th 2012, two weeks before the October 1st parliamentary elections, several videotapes were distributed to Georgian media sources, depicting brutal torture of inmates at Gldani prison No. 8 in Tbilisi. As intended by the opposition, these videos had an immense influence upon Georgian voters.

The election resulted in UNM and Saakashvili conceding to the newly-elected Georgian Dream, a coalition of parties led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia’s richest man and Saakashvili’s fiercest political rival. Subsequent investigations of UNM prison conditions resulted in widespread allegations of torture, with thousands of current and former prisoners coming forward to present their stories and claim restitution. A study undertaken by OSGF, in which 1,199 current and former prisoners were interviewed, found that 75% of respondents claimed to have experienced physical torture, including beatings, cell overcrowding, and withholding of medical treatment, while 84% of respondents claimed to have experienced psychological torture, including verbal insults, limitation of sleep, and threats of rape and death.30 By these interviews alone, it is clear that this torture was widespread, systematic, and occurred in a number of prisons across the country. Another OSGF report, entitled Hope Abandoned: Personal Testimonies from Georgian Prisons, details the prison experiences of Nugzari, a 37-year old former inmate of four different prisons, who was beaten so severely that he went blind in his right eye. “Personally,” he expresses, “I didn’t think of myself as a human being in there. I was nothing, and Ibid.

Practices of Torture and Inhuman Treatment of Prisoners in Georgia (2003-12): Survey Report (Tbilisi: Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2014), 9-12.

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I could see no future.”31

It is at this point that one must return to the term “transitional justice;” the preceding sections of this paper have endeavoured to provide a justification for its use. It is clear that the administration of former President Saakashvili established a number of successful and transformative national reforms, which generally improved the quality of life for Georgian citizens. As Matthew Bryza, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, describes, Georgian governance before Saakashvili was so ineffective that it “‘almost did not exist.’”32 On the other hand, it is also clear that the Saakashvili administration is guilty of a number of human rights abuses, and the victims are legally entitled to restitution. The remainder of this paper will address the successes and limitations of the Georgian Dream government in providing transitional justice to its citizens, and will thoroughly examine the challenges associated with this formidable task.

2. A can of worms

Although the six (previously seven) parties of the Georgian Dream coalition do not share a significant number of political visions, the fragmented and fragile coalition has kept itself relatively intact through its two raisons d’être: a common abhorrence for UNM and Bidzina Ivanishvili’s incalculable fortune. As Dr. Oliver Reisner, Project Manager at the European External Action Service, explains, “without [Ivanishvili’s] personal wealth, this Georgian Dream coalition would not have survived.”33 When Georgian Dream became a political reality in 2012, public expectation was extremely high: victims of the previous administration Hope Abandoned: Personal Testimonies from Georgian Prisons (Tbilisi: The Georgian Center for Psychological and Medical Rehabilitation of Torture Victims, 2014), 20-21.

32 Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 13.

33 Dr. Oliver Reisner (Project Manager, EU Delegation to Georgia), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students at Hotel Victoria VIP, Tbilisi, 16 February 2015.

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demanded transitional justice, and were led to believe that it would be achieved. Sopo Japaridze, the Prime Minister’s Advisor on Human Rights and Gender Issues, recalls that “when Georgian Dream came into power they promised that the justice would be restored.”34 Otar Kakhidze, legal partner at BGI Legal and former Deputy Minister of Justice, emphasizes Ivanishvili’s personal role in guaranteeing compensation to those who lost property and monetary assets during the Saakashvili administration. “Ivanishvili said […]: ‘I will pay for mortgage loans,” he explains, “‘I will pay your debt,’ and that’s how he got votes.”35 Georgians placed exceptional trust in Ivanishvili, then Prime Minister, to utilize his immeasurable wealth and influence to provide restitution, exact ministerial reforms, and punish the guilty members of the previous government. Anna Natsvlishvili, chair of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), explains that “many people who lost children during police raids in those years told me they didn’t even hire a lawyer when prosecutors [from the new government] reopened their cases,” further stressing that “‘this showed a high level of trust, and the state does not have the right to let these people down once again.’”36 Unfortunately, as Koba Turmanidze, President of the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in Tbilisi, remarks, “expectations were much higher than what was possible to deliver,”37 and many Georgians have come to the tragic realization that the government has, in fact, let them down once again. The sheer complexity and magnitude of the undertaking which Georgian Dream has pledged to the citizens of Georgia is inconceivably daunting, and has led to a depletion of political will Sopo Japaridze (Prime Minister’s Advisor on Human Rights and Gender Issues), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, State Chancellery, Tbilisi, 20 February 2015.

35 Otar Kakhidze (Lawyer, BGI Legal), interviewed by Matt Korda, BGI Legal Offices, Tbilisi, 20 February 2015.

36 Salome Asatiani and Robert Coalson, “Specter of Police Abuse Still Haunting Georgia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (5 February 2015), accessed 5 February 2015.

37 Koba Turmanidze (President, Caucasus Research Resource Center Georgia), interviewed

by Matt Korda and Sonia Liang, CRRC Offices, Tbilisi, 19 February 2015.

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and widespread international and domestic criticism. A number of barriers stand in the way of achieving transitional justice, many of which are products of the previous administration, and none of which have discernible solutions.

In its exit from power in 2012, Saakashvili’s UNM administration left behind a complex legacy of thousands of Georgian citizens seeking restitution, yet simultaneously providing no comprehensive statistics or evidence of criminal culpability. Under Saakashvili, the internal prison monitoring system, known as the National Preventative Mechanism (NPM), was existent, yet inactive.38 Nika Jeiranashvili points out the absence of accurate and official medical records in prisons, and poses a simple, yet unanswerable question: “In 2013, how do you investigate when someone was tortured […] in 2006?”39 In some cases, the physical manifestations of torture, such as Nugzari’s blindness, remain transparent; however, in many others, the bruises have since faded and have left only psychological scarring.

Anna Natsvlishvili elaborates that this lack of official record also extends to civil asset forfeiture. “Some businesses were taken away from businessmen in very clandestine situations,” she states, “in prisons, in corners of a dark street by […] illegal involvement of law enforcement officials.”40 Without proper documentation, thousands of these former victims have been left without a legal framework for demanding restitution, and as a result, the Georgian Dream government has been unable to conceptualize a concrete methodology of providing it. “It’s a mess; it’s a legal mess,”41 remarks Erekle Urushadze, Project Manager of Transparency International Georgia’s research projects on anti-corruption reforms. He explains that there exists a general governmental consensus that these Molly Corso, “Georgia: Prison Reforms Falling Short – Activists,” EurasiaNet (22 October 2013), accessed 16 March 2015.

39 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

40 Anna Natsvlishvili (Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, GYLA Offices, Tbilisi, 20 February 2015.

41 Erekle Urushadze (Project Manager, Transparency International Georgia), interviewed

by Matt Korda and Sonia Liang, TI Georgia Offices, Tbilisi, 18 February 2015.

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victims must be compensated, but “it would be like opening a can of worms,” because “if you start reviewing some of the judicial decisions, where do you stop?”42 Shortly after Georgian Dream came to power, the “Commission on the Miscarriage of Justice” was created with the purpose of investigating previous charges and establishing a framework for restitution; however, Ms. Japaridze explains that without the ability to conceptualize a methodology of providing compensation, and a lack of funds with which to guarantee payment to all 20,000 citizens seeking restitution, this commission has been shelved indefinitely.43

The lack of official documentation, coupled with Ivanishvili’s promise of using his immense wealth to build the houses, pay the mortgage loans, and clear the debts of the victims, has also opened the possibility of false claims for restitution. Mr. Kakhidze suggests that it is likely that many former and current prisoners fabricated accounts of torture in the hope that they would be rewarded with compensation or amnesty, in accordance with Ivanishvili’s previous promises. “It is impossible to verify,” he states, “as a lawyer and an observer […] I remain skeptical.”44 Mr. Kakhidze, the lawyer of former President Saakashvili, maintains the controversial view that the torture was neither widespread nor systematic. He concedes that isolated incidents of torture, such as “welcome beatings,” did occur within specific prisons; however, he contends that the influential 2012 videotapes, filmed by leading torturers Vladimir Bedukadze and Boris Parulava, were commissioned by the Kremlin and encouraged by Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream, who subsequently acquitted both men under somewhat dubious circumstances.45 He also maintains that the most viral of the videos, depicting sexual abuse of an inmate with a broom handle, was faked in order to influence public opinion in Ibid.

Japaridze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

44 Kakhidze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

45 Ibid.

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the months leading up to the parliamentary elections.46 Without any evidence or official documentation, it is impossible to know the truth regarding these widespread allegations of torture or asset seizure; it is easy to be influenced by one side or the other, as both arguments are certainly plausible. Amid this labyrinth of conflicting reasoning and opposing theories, it is easy to see how the task of establishing a “restoration of justice,”47 as Georgian Dream calls it, is truly a formidable one. In a meeting at GYLA headquarters in Tbilisi, Ms. Natsvlishvili expressed her dismay at the lack of both conceptualization and implementation of transitional justice procedures: “I have to say, with huge sadness, and regret, and disappointment, that practically nothing has been done to address these massive human rights violations. The state has no vision, has no policy, no criteria, nothing.”48 As a result, she explains, the notion of transitional justice has become “very marginal […] and some people would even laugh about it.”49

Shortly after the 2012 parliamentary elections, Georgian Dream, amid immense public pressure, released approximately 14,000 inmates and 200 political prisoners in a mass amnesty50 which reduced the total number of Georgian prisoners to its 2005 levels.51 The amnesty was initially welcomed by the public and various civil society organizations, as Mr. Urushadze explains that there was a general recognition that “a lot of the people who were in jail at that time did not really pose an immediate threat to society,” further explaining that there existed “reasons to believe that some people were convicted wrongfully.”52 As well, a large number of Georgian citizens were eager to receive their friends and family from prison, as many Georgians commonly share the perception that “everyone had someone in their family who was in prison for Ibid.

Urushadze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

48 Natsvlishvili, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

49 Ibid.

50 Kakhidze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

51 Slade, et al., Crime and Excessive Punishment, 17.

52 Urushadze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

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that time.”53 However, the supportive tide of public opinion shifted drastically when it was discovered that the amnesty procedure would be devoid of both rehabilitation and critical selection procedures. Although the majority of these prisoners, convicted of minor and petty crimes, likely would have been released under proper judicial oversight, there was a significant number of violent offenders who should not have been released, especially without the appropriate rehabilitation and integration procedures. Labeling it a “disaster,” Mr. Urushadze explains that this lack of thorough case examination was the reason behind GYLA’s formal withdrawal from the amnesty process.54 Inquiries into recidivism statistics yield no results with Georgian Dream, as a distinct lack of transparency within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor’s Office validates Mr. Turmanidze’s admission that “quality of information doesn’t exist.”55 Although there are no official recidivism statistics from the 2013 general amnesty, Mr. Jeiranashvili details the OSGF’s hypothesis of a “nine-month period,” which explains that a significant number of former prisoners were likely to reoffend within nine months of being released. He cites a lack of rehabilitation, probation,56 and integration services, coupled with the Georgian patriarchal mentality, as crucial factors in returning the average former prisoner to criminal activity with the intent of providing for his family.57 As well, a significant number of former prisoners had spent nearly a decade in a tortuous state prison, and returned to society with no job, no shelter, and no outside relations.58

Packaged with the euphoria of having friends and family returned was a profound sense of apprehension over the likelihood of an increase in crime. However, without the release of official and Chkheidze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

Urushadze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

55 Turmanidze, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

56 Kakhidze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

57 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

58 Japaridze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

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accurate crime statistics after the 2013 amnesty, it is impossible to know whether the crime rate truly did increase, and this lack of transparency reflects the polarization and partisan nature of the issue itself. Ms. Japaridze, a prominent advisor to the Prime Minister, believes that the crime rate did not significantly increase,59 while Mr. Kakhidze, the lawyer of former President Saakashvili, states that “after 10:00 PM it was not safe to walk,” and cites a drastic spike in armed robbery.60 Mr. Jeiranashvili logically believes that the perception of fear has been largely embellished by the superior media capabilities of UNM in order to discredit the efforts of Georgian Dream;61 however, Mr. Urushadze remarks that current Prime Minister Garibashvili, then-Minister of Internal Affairs, was himself wary of the amnesty as he believed that his ministry would have to cope with the inevitable increase in crime.62 In response to the recent murder of a Varketili policeman by a released ex-convict on April 4th, Mr. Garibashvili acknowledged the problem of recidivism in a press conference on April 9th: “‘I promise everyone, who [has] been pardoned or released [from jail] as a result of amnesty by our government, but who failed to appreciate such [a] humane act taken by the state, that the state will be merciless to all those persons who do not give up their criminal activities.’”63 Bidzina Ivanishvili downplayed the Prime Minister’s statement, expressing that only 6% of prisoners released in the general amnesty have returned to crime;64 however, Mr. Jeiranashvili remarks that “he would not trust the official statistics,” due to the distinct opacity of the MIA and Prosecutor’s Office.65

The lack of official documentation also brings forth another monumental barrier to transitional justice: the inability to punish Ibid.

Kakhidze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

61 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

62 Urushadze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

63 “PM: ‘No Mercy’ for Amnestied Ex-Convicts Turned Repeat Offenders,” Civil Georgia (9 April 2015), accessed 9 April 2015.

64 Ibid.

65 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

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the guilty parties. Bereft of incriminating evidence, the Georgian Dream party has been faced with a colossal moral conundrum, addressed in a meeting with Erekle Urushadze: “So the question is, if you believe that some of the former officials were involved in some abuses but you can’t really find evidence strong enough for a conviction, do you just give up, for the sake of rule of law […] or do you try to somehow manipulate the system?”66 This question challenges the priorities of democracy itself, asking Georgian Dream to make the impossible choice between two of its essential pillars: the wishes of its people and the legal framework by which they are held accountable. Regardless of the outcome, a state cannot make such a choice and remain nominally democratic. Mr. Urushadze says that after the change in government “the majority of people wanted the former officials punished,” adding that “there was not a widespread regard for rule of law.”67 Amid this political pressure, Georgian Dream has recently been highly criticized by the international community, particularly by leaders in the United States, the EU, and NATO, for a number of indictments, detentions, and arrests of former government and current UNM members.

By February 2014, after only sixteen months in office, charges had been laid against 35 UNM members, and 6,000 more had undergone various methods of interrogation.68

As with any arrests of former government officials, these indictments have an inherent air of political motivation about them, and the proceedings have been watched closely by international observers. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in a press conference that “we are not going to interfere with these judicial processes, but it is crucial to avoid even the perception that these judicial processes are politically motivated.”69 In order to assure the international community Urushadze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

Ibid.

68 Pomerantsev, “Revolutionary Tactics,” 11.

69 Marita Antidze, “NATO warns Georgia against political persecution of ex-officials,” Reuters (27 June 2013), accessed 2 January 2015.

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that these arrests have not been made in an attempt to paralyze their political opposition, Georgian Dream must be extremely careful to follow strict judicial procedures; however, thus far they have noticeably fallen short of expectations, with many of their charges against former officials conducted in a manner which Mr. Urushadze describes as showing “very strong signs of political revenge.”70 “There is a proper way to proceed with investigations,” he continues, “and it is clear that the Georgian Dream government did not follow all those due procedures on a number of occasions.”71

In an article published in Tabula magazine, Mr. Kakhidze cites the extensive and unusual application of pretrial detention, reports of forced or coerced testimonies, negative evaluations of prosecutors’ evidence, accusations of unwarranted police intimidation, as well as the irregularly rapid pace of investigations as indicators of political motivation. Typically, the arrest of a senior government official is a two- to three-year process; however, many of the arrests made by Georgian Dream have occurred within a short span of only twenty days. A particularly damning admission comes from the mouth of Ivanishvili himself, who publicly stated in 2012 that the detainment of former government officials would stop if UNM stopped “‘the rhetoric of deception and violence.’” This open declaration of the arrests hinging upon the conditionality of UNM’s behaviour indicates that these charges certainly include a degree of political motivation.72

One notable case is the arrest of Gigi Ugulava, former Tbilisi mayor and close ally of former President Saakashvili, who has been famously accused of embezzlement, illegal asset forfeiture, and participating in the break-in and seizure of opposition network Imedi TV in November 2007.73 His case recently fell Urushadze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

Ibid.

72 Unless otherwise indicated, this section cited from Otar Kakhidze, “The Perception of Selective Justice,” Tabula Magazine (27 January 2013), accessed 3 February 2015.

73 “Former Tbilisi mayor must stay in detention longer than maximum term,” Democracy & Freedom Watch (16 March 2015), accessed 16 March 2015.

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under immense scrutiny from international and local watchdogs for the court’s questionable extension of pretrial detention past the maximum nine months, which was due to expire in April 2015.

Referring to the March 15th extension verdict as a “farce”74 and a “rape of the constitution,”75 Ugulava and his supporters staged a walkout from the Tbilisi courtroom, which he then condemned as “Ivanishvili’s puppet.”76 In September, Ugulava was sentenced to 4.5 years in prison immediately after the Constitutional Court ruled in his favour that the extension of his pretrial detention was ‘unconstitutional.”77 The United States Embassy in Georgia expressed concern over this ruling, publishing a statement “encourag[ing] the government of Georgia to take steps to strengthen the Rule of Law and avoid any perception it may be engaging in a campaign of politically-motivated justice.”78

On July 28th, 2014, similar charges were filed in absentia against former President Saakashvili himself, regarding his role in the seizure of Imedi TV and ordering the unlawful deployment of troops to brutally disperse a protest in downtown Tbilisi on November 7th, 2007, in addition to embezzlement of state funds.79 Georgian Dream has also stated that he is wanted for questioning with regards to the death of former Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania in 2005.80 Ms. Chkheidze is skeptical of the latter accusation, expressing that while he certainly deserves prosecution for his genuine crimes, Georgian Dream’s denunciations for acts that he did not commit delegitimizes the justification for their original Ibid.

“Ugulava’s Pre-Trial Detention Extended,” Civil Georgia (15 March 2015), accessed 15 March 2015.

76 “Former Tbilisi mayor must stay in detention longer than maximum term,” Democracy & Freedom Watch.

74 75

Ugulava Found Guilty of Misspending, Sentenced to 4.5 Years in Prison,” Civil Georgia (18 September 2015), accessed 6 October 2015.

78 “U.S. Embassy ‘Concerned’ over Re-Qualified Charges Against Ugulava,” Civil Georgia (15 March 2015), accessed 15 March 2015.

79 “Court Orders Pre-Trial Detention for Saakashvili in Absentia,” Civil Georgia (2 August 2014), accessed 2 February 2015.

80 Chkheidze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

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charges.81 On July 29th, the day after Saakashvili’s charges were levied, Jen Psaki, Spokesperson for the United States Department of State, responded to the ruling by stating that “commitment to the rule of law means both that everyone must comply with the law in a democratic society and that the legal system should not be used as a tool of political retribution.”82

The complexity of establishing transitional justice in a fair and neutral manner necessitates a precarious balancing act on the part of Georgian Dream. As such it is important that the actions of the government are monitored, such that it does not overstep its democratic boundaries and lose sight of its commitment to the Georgian people. However, it is equally necessary that the international watchdogs recognize the unique and troubling situation with which the government has been forced to cope. As Ms. Chkheidze explains, the notion that Saakashvili must be brought to justice is “really supported by the Georgian population.”83 Therefore, one must pose the following uncomfortable question: is it undemocratic not to hold him accountable for his past actions? A crucial tenet of any democratic system is the establishment of just such a procedure.

Ms. Natsvlishvili expands further upon this notion: “For me, Europe has a value because its philosophy is very clear and very precise: the state needs to be orientated around human rights.” She questions the priorities of the international community, believing that its commitment to these principles has been usurped by a preferential desire to maintain a depoliticized rule of law. “Isn’t it strange,” she inquires, “that in a country which has so many victims of human rights violations […] the discourse and the focus is on allegedly politically motivated detentions of ten officials, and […] not about what should be done with these rights and with these people?” “They rarely ask these kinds of questions,” she protests.

Ibid.

Jen Psaki, “Criminal Charges against Former Georgian President Saakashvili,” Embassy of the United States: Georgia (29 July 2014), accessed 5 February 2015 83 Chkheidze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

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She acknowledges the legitimacy of these international challenges and agrees that Georgian Dream must improve the quality of their investigations in order to satisfy these watchdogs, but “don’t forget about these poor people,” she pleads.84 3. Defeating the “monster”

Due to the inherent complexity of the previously-examined issues and Georgian Dream’s distinct lack of will to conceptualize politically and morally acceptable solutions, the theatre of transitional justice which contains the single largest potential for success is ministerial reform, specifically within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Corrections. This is also the arena which has seen the furthest improvement since 2012. Under the Saakashvili administration these departments were highly politicized, opaque, and interconnected: the Interior Ministry was frequently called a “monster,”85,86,87 there was no active system of independent monitoring within penitentiaries, and during the campaign for the 2012 elections, Georgian Dream’s official platform bluntly stated: “Today the Prosecutor’s Office is not independent. It is under [the] claws of the President and the Government and it is fully controlled by the Minister of Justice.”88 Since 2012, the Georgian Dream government has made partial progress in depoliticizing certain ministries, most notably within the judiciary; however, the success of these reforms must not be overstated, as these ministries largely retain their pre-2012 opaque and politicized natures, and as a result Unless otherwise indicated, this section cited from Natsvlishvili, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

85 Japaridze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

86 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

87 Boris Iarochevitch (Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi, 18 February 2015.

88 Concept of the Reform of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia: Fair and Effective Prosecution (Tbilisi: European Choice of Georgia, 2014), 7.

84

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there remains a consequential amount of work still to be completed.

Georgian Dream’s greatest achievement in ministerial reform centres around the judiciary. As previously examined, the courts under Saakashvili’s administration were highly politicized: for an absolute majority of judges, it was common practice to wholeheartedly accept all motions proposed by the prosecution, often without providing suitable or substantive reasoning for doing so, thus entirely deflating the role of the defence. An investigatorial report by GYLA noted that “the initial monitoring period [October 2011–September 2012] did not reveal a single case when the judge made a decision that differed from what was requested by the prosecution.”89 Since the October 2012 elections, two waves of constructive reforms have significantly enhanced the judiciary’s independence,90 and GYLA has noted that these developments have markedly decreased the leverage of the Prosecutor’s Office upon the Georgian courts. Immediately after the October 2012 elections, the percentage of judges who overruled the prosecutors’ motions and opted for bail over imprisonment surged from 0% to 27%. In August 2014, the most recent monitoring period, this percentage rose to 34%.91 Statistics for the monetary sums of bail imposed by judges in lieu of the amounts requested by the prosecution follow a similar pattern, jumping from 0% to 22% immediate after the elections, and in August 2014 climbing to 55%.92 Similarly, the percentage of unsubstantiated imprisonment decisions presented by judges steadily fell from a high of 74% in early 2012 to 16% in early 2014.93 Although these successes are notable, especially when considering the disturbing lack of judicial independence characteristic of the Saakashvili administration, it is important to recognize that public trust in the Georgian court system still Tinatin Avaliani, “Results of Three-Year Trial Monitoring Project: Initial Problems, Changes in Trends, and Existing Challenges,” Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (2014), 7, accessed 20 March 2015.

90 Japaridze, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

91 Avaliani, “Results of Three-Year Trial Monitoring Project,” 8.

92 Ibid, 9.

93 Ibid, 9.

89

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remains extremely low, with only 10% of respondents to a 2014 CRRC survey considering the courts to work “well” or “very well,”94 and only 37% of respondents stating that they trust the court system.95 This lack of trust stems from the highly-politicized appointment, promotion, and dismissal structures that remain within the Prosecutor’s Office; the distinct lack of transparency within the Prosecutor’s Office and related ministries; the noticeable lack of personnel turnover within the Prosecutor’s Office after the 2012 elections; and the absence of an independent monitoring mechanism for investigating the transgressions of lawyers and judges, in addition to the recentness of the 2012 elections and the stigma that remains from the ministerial politicization of the previous administration.

In order to decrease the politicized nature of the Prosecutor’s Office, Georgian Dream has recognized the need to reform the procedures which govern the appointment and dismissal of the Chief Prosecutor. Until recently, this office was controlled nearly in its entirety by the Prime Minister with a distinct lack of parliamentary or opposition oversight, and without any necessary experience or prerequisites required for appointment.96 On September 18th, Parliament passed a reform bill into law which amends the selection and election process for Chief Prosecutor; however, the bill has come under fire from opposition parties and civil society organizations like the Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary, who argue that the “goal of the draft law – to depoliticize the system – has not been achieved.”97 Sopho Verdzeuli, a lawyer at the Human Rights Education and “Attitudes to the Judiciary in Georgia: Assessment of General Public, Legal Professionals and Business Leaders,” Caucasus Research Resource Center (May 2014), 4, accessed 2 January 2015.

95 Ibid, 5.

96 Natsvlishvili, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

97 “The Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary Statement on the Adoption of Amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office by the Parliament of Georgia on the Third Reading,” Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary. (28 September 2015), accessed 6 October 2015.

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Monitoring Centre (EMC) in Tbilisi, notes the importance of the initial round of candidate selections in evaluating the depoliticization process. “We think that the very first nomination [of Chief Prosecutor candidates] is very important,” she explains, as an unbalanced system will facilitate the selection of a candidate favourable to the ruling party.98 In a public statement made on September 28th, the Coalition criticized the new law for failing to meet this basic criterion for depoliticization. “According to the adopted draft law, the Parliament approves a candidate by a simple majority vote, which a ruling party can ensure.” They further note that “this power is not balanced by the selection process” because the Minister of Justice leads the selection committee, known as the Prosecutorial Council.99 Ms. Verdzeuli emphasizes that an alternate proposal was being debated, in which candidates would initially be nominated by the President before a Parliamentary selection.100 This rejected proposal would have allowed the appointment of Chief Prosecutor to be relatively distanced from the whims of the ruling party. The opportunity for concrete reform was on the table, and the government chose not to seize it.

The depoliticization of the Chief Prosecutor’s appointment would have been a significant milestone in the establishment of transitional justice through ministerial reform; however, looking forward, it is also necessary for the government to undertake a wider campaign of internal reform within the Prosecutor’s Office, as this is one of the most opaque and politicized ministries in Georgia.

Controls must be implemented in order to strengthen the roles of individual prosecutors and enhance their job security, which in its present state is nearly non-existent. Prosecutors can easily be fired for losing a case, but are not disciplined for breaking the law.101 This Sopho Verdzeuli (Lawyer, Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre), interviewed by Matt Korda, EMC Offices, Tbilisi, 20 February 2015.

99 “Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary Statement,” Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary, 28 September 2015.

100 Verdzeuli, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

101 Ibid.

98

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state-sponsored impunity allows supervisors to use past records of criminal malfeasance to hold leverage over their prosecutors. “They are […] marionettes of the system,”102 states Ms. Natsvlishvili. As a result of this unlawful system, there is very little public trust in investigations in which the accused is a member of the Prosecutor’s Office or the police.103

For this reason, EMC, in conjunction with a number of other non-governmental organizations, has called for the parliamentary establishment of an “Independent Investigative Mechanism” with the purpose of strengthening the capacity to conduct investigations into crimes committed by law enforcement or prosecutorial officials.104 The proposed legislation has been thoroughly examined by Prof. Manfred Nowak, former UN special rapporteur on torture, who has recognized it as an extremely advanced and innovative proposal for investigating law enforcement.105 On a similar plane, OSGF has advocated for a sister mechanism to establish independent monitoring within penitentiaries to function alongside the NPM, which is presently constrained by the limited number of yearly visits, the necessity of advance notice before entering prisons, its meagre media privileges, and the rigid legal framework within which it operates as part of the Ombudsman’s Office.106 Unfortunately, neither model has been particularly well-received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor’s Office, or the Department of Penitentiaries, with the government implying that current internal investigative measures are sufficient in order to ensure political independence.107 Mr. Jeiranashvili, however, believes that this response is inadequate: “Unless we have this Independent Investigative Mechanism […] the torture will continue.”108 “We cannot become Canada just like that,” Ibid.

Verdzeuli, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

104 Ibid.

105 Nika Jeiranashvili, e-mail message to author, 18 March 2015.

106 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

107 Nika Jeiranashvili, e-mail message to author, 18 March 2015.

108 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

102 103

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he remarks, estimating that it will be at least ten or twenty years before Georgian ministries are fully depoliticized.109

Mr. Jeiranashvili’s approximation is, unfortunately, quite reasonable, given the present dispersement of former MIA officials and UNM party members throughout the current government.

Although Georgian Dream has actively attempted to remove prominent former officials from power, the government has not yet managed to fully complete lustration efforts for mid-level officials and many still retain their pre-2012 posts, especially within the Prosecutor’s Office and the MIA.110 This leads to an obvious conflict of interest during prosecutions of former government officials, and has contributed greatly to a lack of public trust in these types of investigations.111 This notable personnel problem extends itself throughout the government, with the ominous presence of former MIA officials present within the highest ranks of nearly every ministry, including the Ministry of Agriculture,112 Ministry of Defence,113 Ministry of Corrections,114 and Ministry of Justice.115 The current Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, is himself a former Interior Minister,116 and the current Interior Minister is a former prime ministerial bodyguard.117 Mr. Jeiranashvili notes the historical precedent for this phenomenon as a by-product of Soviet influence. “Ministry of the Interior: they are the ones who ruled the country, and they still are,” adding that “everywhere, [the MIA] have their own people to make sure things go according to the way they want them to go.”118 This problem is significantly exacerbated due to the distinct lack of transparency and parliamentary oversight Ibid.

Verdzeuli, personal interview, 20 February 2015.

111 Ibid.

112 “Otar Danelia,” Government of Georgia (2014), accessed 19 March 2015.

113 “Mindia Janelidze,” Government of Georgia (2014), accessed 19 March 2015.

114 “Giorgi Mghebrishvili,” Government of Georgia (2014), accessed 19 March 2015.

115 “Alexander Tabatadze,” Ministry of Justice of Georgia, accessed 19 March 2015.

116 “Irakli Garibashvili,” Government of Georgia (2014), accessed 19 March 2015.

117 “Vakhtang Gomelauri,” Government of Georgia, (2014), accessed 19 March 2015.

118 Jeiranashvili, personal interview, 19 February 2015.

109 110

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regulating the actions of the MIA. “It’s still a monster,” states Boris Iarochevitch, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to Georgia. “It’s a huge, repressive apparatus.”119

Although the success of Saakashvili’s reforms led to a general eradication of petty corruption, with the Chief Prosecutor declaring in April 2006 that there was “not one thief-in-law left in freedom,”120 the historical legacy of the vory has survived and adapted to embed an exceptional degree of nepotism within Georgian culture, permeating businesses, civil society organizations,121 and most worryingly, the government.

“It’s the Georgian mentality,” explains Ms. Chkheidze, further expressing that the government does not understand that nepotism fundamentally breaches the principles of a meritocratic democracy.122 “They are explaining it to us like this,” Ms. Chkheidze elaborates, “‘If you have a good acquaintance, or a good family member, why [bother] hir[ing] someone else?’”123 This opinion is echoed most vehemently by former Prime Minister and de facto ruler Bidzina Ivanishvili, who overtly exerts his influence on the government from behind the scenes. Ms. Chkheidze comments that “Georgian Dream is not a party at all. It stands only on one person,”124 with Ivanishvili’s influence undermining the authority of current Prime Minister Garibashvili. The centralized nature of the government, coupled with the influence of nepotism upon Georgian society, has enabled Ivanishvili to confer high-ranking ministerial positions upon his close acquaintances, “whose democratic credentials are very much in question,”125 comments Iarochevitch, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

Gavin Slade, “Georgia’s war on crime: creating security in a post-revolutionary context,” European Security 21.1 (2012): 45, accessed 19 March 2015 121 Chkheidze, personal interview, 18 February 2015.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Irakli Kobalia & Levan Tsutskiridze (Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, NIMD Offices, Tbilisi, 17 February 2015.

119 120

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Irakli Kobalia, Program Officer at the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. This nepotistic and centralized authority structure is a significant barrier for transitional justice, as proposals for democratic and decentralizing ministerial reforms are often met with government stonewalling and minimal success.

4. Concluding Remarks: rhetoric vs. reality

“In the beginning, you assess the party based on your future expectations,” explains Koba Turmanidze, “now you assess them based on their past performance.”126 When Georgian Dream entered the government in 2012, expectations for transitional justice were astronomically high, and were encouraged and inflated by Bidzina Ivanishvili himself. Georgians demanded punishment of the guilty parties, restitution for previous human rights abuses, and widespread ministerial reform. However, this exaggerated political rhetoric would prove to be the campaign’s undoing. The innate complexity of the issues at hand, coupled with an unfortunate inability to conceptualize pragmatic solutions, has led to widespread public disillusionment with Georgian Dream. A National Democratic Institute (NDI) poll conducted in August 2014 reveals that Georgian Dream has dropped in general approval rating by 19% between November 2013 and August 2014, although Georgian Dream still remains a significant 31% above its fiercest opponents, the United National Movement.127 Amid the growing Georgian economic crisis, Georgians are still voting for the party led by the country’s richest man. They still place faith in Ivanishvili to utilize his unfathomable wealth to lift the country out of economic and social poverty, and they remain thankful to Georgian Dream for bringing the brutality of the Saakashvili administration to an end. However, these colossal expectations are slowly becoming undermined by a general sense of defeat, as the Turmanidze, personal interview 19 February 2015.

Kristina Wilfore, “Public Attitudes in Georgia,” National Democratic Institute (August 2014), 24, accessed 20 March 2015.

126 127

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Georgian public reluctantly begins to understand that there are no foreseeable remedies for restitution and that transitional justice efforts will remain indefinitely stagnated, as a tragic reflection of the government’s lack of political will and internal centralization.

The government must prove to its citizens that it is serious about establishing a restoration of justice; it must continue to collaborate with civil society and the international community, and must be willing to make the necessary democratic concessions in order to depoliticize its ministries. The Georgian Dream is currently stuck in limbo, with neither the government nor its citizens able to establish a legitimate sense of closure. Only a concerted effort to establish democratic transitional justice will allow Georgian Dream to rouse the country from its collective nightmare.

Bibliography “Alexander Tabatadze.” Ministry of Justice of Georgia.

Accessed 19 March 2015. <http://www.justice.gov.ge/Page/ index?code=150215ce-60e4-4e5f-bd5f-3f1f7dfb9c70> “Attitudes to the Judiciary in Georgia: Assessment of General Public, Legal Professionals and Business Leaders.” Caucasus Research Resource Center. May 2014. Accessed 2 January 2015. <http://www.crrc.ge/uploads/files/research_projects/JILEP_ CRRC_Final_Report_30July2014.pdf> Concept of the Reform of the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia: Fair and Effective Prosecution. Tbilisi: European Choice of Georgia, 2014.

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maximum term.” Democracy & Freedom Watch. 16 March 2015.

Accessed 16 March 2015. <http://dfwatch.net/former-tbilisi-mayormust-stay-longer-in-detention-than-maximum-term-34341> “Giorgi Mghebrishvili.” Government of Georgia. 2014. Accessed 19 March 2015. <http://government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_ id=ENG&sec_id=124&info_id=2171> “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice.” United Nations. March 2010.

Accessed 17 March 2015. <http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_ Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf> Hope Abandoned: Personal Testimonies from Georgian Prisons.

Tbilisi: The Georgian Center for Psychological and Medical Rehabilitation of Torture Victims, 2014.

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Georgia (2003-12): Survey Report. Tbilisi: Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2014.

“Ugulava’s Pre-Trial Detention Extended.” Civil Georgia. 15 March 2015. Accessed 15 March 2015. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=28132> “U.S. Embassy ‘Concerned’ over Re-Qualified Charges Against Ugulava.” Civil Georgia. 15 March 2015. Accessed 15 March 2015. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28130> “Vakhtang Gomelauri.” Government of Georgia. 2014. Accessed 19 March 2015. <http://government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_ id=ENG&sec_id=124&info_id=200> Antidze, Marita. “NATO warns Georgia against political persecution of ex-officials.” Reuters. 27 June 2013. Accessed 2 January 2015. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/ukgeorgia-nato-idUKBRE95Q0WQ20130627> Asatiani, Salome, and Robert Coalson. “Specter of Police Abuse Still Haunting Georgia.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 5 February 2015. Accessed 5 February 2015. <http://www.rferl.org/ content/georgia-specter-police-violence/26831875.html> Avaliani, Tinatin. “Results of Three-Year Trial Monitoring Project: Initial Problems, Changes in Trends, and Existing Challenges.”

Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. 2014. Accessed 20 March 2015. <http://www.ewmi-jilep.org/images/stories/books/GYLA/ Court_Monitoring_Reports_SUMMARY_GYLA_ENG.pdf> Buchanan, Jane. Undue Punishment: Abuses against Prisoners in Georgia. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006. Accessed 17 March 2015. <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 67

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georgia0906webwcover_0.pdf> Chkheidze, Elene, Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi.

18 February 2015.

Corso, Molly. “Georgia: Prison Reforms Falling Short – Activists.”

EurasiaNet. 22 October 2013. Accessed 16 March 2015. <http:// www.eurasianet.org/node/67659> Davis, Laura, PhD. “The European Union and Transitional Justice.” Civil Society Dialogue Network. 2014. Accessed 17 March 2015. <http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/ Civil%20Society%20Dialogue%20Network/Policy%20Meetings/ Transitional%20Justice/EPLO_CSDN_TJ_BackgroundDocument. pdf> Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

Japaridze, Sopo, Prime Minister’s Advisor on Human Rights and Gender Issues. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students.

Personal interview. State Chancellery, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

Jeiranashvili, Nika, Human Rights Project Manager, Open Society Georgian Foundation. Interviewed by Matt Korda, Misha Boutilier, and Zoë Smale. Personal interview. OSGF Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

Kakhidze, Otar, Legal Partner, BGI Legal. Interviewed by Matt Korda. Personal interview. BGI Legal Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 68

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2015.

Kakhidze, Otar. “The Perception of Selective Justice.” Tabula Magazine. 27 January 2013. Accessed 3 February 2015. <http:// georgiaonline.ge/articles/1359316127.php> Kobalia, Irakli, & Levan Tsutskiridze, Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students.

Personal interview. NIMD Offices, Tbilisi. 17 February 2015.

Mikanadze, Givi, Senior Project Manager, Council of Europe and EU programme entitled “Human Rights in Prisons and Other Closed Institutions.” Interviewed by Matt Korda.

Personal interview. CoE Offices, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

Natsvlishvili, Anna, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

Pomerantsev, Peter. “Revolutionary Tactics: Insights from Police and Justice Reform in Georgia.” Legatum Institute. June 2014.

Accessed 2 January 2015. <https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/ docs/default-source/publications/georgia_transitions_a4_2014web. pdf?sfvrsn=0> Psaki, Jen. “Criminal Charges against Former Georgian President Saakashvili.” Embassy of the United States: Georgia. 29 July 2014.

Accessed 5 February 2015. <http://georgia.usembassy.gov/newsevents/dc2014t/29072014saak.html> Reisner, Oliver, PhD, Project Manager, EU Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Hotel Victoria VIP, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

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Slade, Gavin, Iago Kachkachishvili, Lela Tsiskarishvili, Nika Jeiranashvili, and Nino Gobronidze. Crime and Excessive Punishment: The Prevalence and Causes of Human Rights Abuse in Georgia’s Prisons. Tbilisi: Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2014.

Slade, Gavin. “Georgia’s prisons: roots of scandal.” openDemocracy.

24 September 2012. Accessed 2 January 2015. <https://www. opendemocracy.net/gavin-slade/georgias-prisons-roots-ofscandal> Slade, Gavin. “Georgia’s war on crime: creating security in a postrevolutionary context.” European Security 21.1 (2012): 37-56.

Accessed 19 March 2015.

Slade, Gavin. Reorganizing Crime: Mafia and Anti-Mafia in PostSoviet Georgia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, December 2013.

“The Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary Statement on the Adoption of Amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office by the Parliament of Georgia on the Third Reading.” Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary.

28 September 2015. Accessed 6 October 2015. <http://www. coalition.org.ge/en/article248/> Turmanidze, Koba, President, Caucasus Research Resource Center Georgia. Interviewed by Matt Korda and Sonia Liang. Personal interview. CRRC Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

“Ugulava Found Guilty of Misspending, Sentenced to 4.5 Years in Prison.” Civil Georgia. 18 September 2015. Accessed 6 October 2015. <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28580>

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Urushadze, Erekle, Project Manager, Transparency International Georgia. Interviewed by Matt Korda and Sonia Liang. Personal interview. TI Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

Vardzelashvili, Michael. “‘The prison scandal:’ to be continued?”

Georgia Times. 27 May 2013. Accessed 18 February 2015. <http:// www.georgiatimes.info/en/analysis/91011.html> Verdzeuli, Sopho, Lawyer, Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre. Interviewed by Matt Korda. Personal interview.

EMC Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

Wilfore, Kristina. “Public Attitudes in Georgia.” National Democratic Institute. August 2014. Accessed 20 March 2015. <https://www.ndi.org/files/NDIGeorgia_August-2014%20survey_ Public-Political_ENG_vff.pdf> World Bank. 2010-2014. Population, total. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (producer and distributor). Accessed 18 March 2015. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

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FLOWING TOWARDS SUCCESS A REVIEW OF GEORGIA’S ENERGY COMMUNITY CANDIDACY Emily Tsui CFO to CEO: “What happens if we invest in developing our people and then they leave?”

CEO: “What happens if we don’t, and they stay?”

– Poster in Vano Chkihikvadze’s Office, February 19, 2015 1. Introduction

For a country of five million people occupying an area of 69,700 square kilometers, the Republic of Georgia’s geostrategic importance as having the world’s greatest undeveloped hydroelectric potential at a key energy hub greatly supersedes its initial appearance.1 The European Union (EU), keen to diversify its energy sources and develop better relations with neighbouring states, represents a critical opportunity for Georgia to help realize its potential.2 Indeed, Georgia’s recent candidate status to “Georgia Country Profile.” European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. September 3, 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015.

2 Tamaz Gamkrelidze, World Wildlife Fund Georgia, Interviewed by Kendall Andison, Personal Interview, February 16, 2015: Tbilisi.

1

Emily Tsui is a fourth year undergraduate student at the University of Toronto, pursuing a specialist in International Relations, minors in Political Science and Business German. She is interested in sustainable energy development, Arctic issues, German history and military security. In her third year, she served as President of the Association of Political Science Students.

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the European Community (EnC) is an important step towards improvements in its hydroelectric development projects. This paper will show that Georgia’s path towards membership in the Energy Community will result in greatly positive benefits in its hydroelectric power sector to be realized through improvements in investment environment, energy security and energy efficiency.

Yet, the potential success of this project is hindered by a lack of statistical information, public support, and resistance to the losses that existing investors will incur, and this paper will show that these barriers can be overcome to maximize the benefits through consistent political support, increasing the visibility of the EU, and policies to assist the transition towards a more open energy market.

However, it is impossible to separate Georgia’s EnC project with its wider goal of membership to the EU as this objective permeates all areas of government and civil society. Its declaration that “Europe started here”3 is indicative of its commitment to Europeanization. While policies that work towards the EnC will align the Georgian energy sector closer to the EU, and ultimately be a good thing for Georgia’s EU aspirations, this paper will also argue that Georgia cannot be overly optimistic that the EnC membership will be a driving force for its greater goal of EU integration. This is fundamentally because of Georgia’s security situation with Russia in light of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine beginning in 2014.4 Through personal interviews, policy documents and secondary sources, this paper will piece together a more comprehensive picture of what Georgia stands to gain from membership in the EnC, barriers to realizing these benefits, and the extent to which the EnC membership will affect its EU integration goal, to ultimately show that Georgia’s candidacy to the EnC is a crucial opportunity for the country to achieve significant gains in order to improve its hydroelectric “Europe Started Here-Welcome to Georgia!” YouTube video, 0:01, June 6, 2010, accessed March 24, 2015 4 In-Depth Review of Energy Efficiency Policies and Programmes: Georgia, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels, 2012, 13. Accessed February 7, 2015.

3

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potential.

2. Methodology and Limitations

The information for this paper was largely obtained through personal qualitative interviews obtained between February 16-20, 2015 in Tbilisi. These interviews were conducted with representatives from a variety of government ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Energy, government-affiliated organisations, such as the Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission (GNERC), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Training Centre, international organisations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and non-governmental organisations including the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF).

Questions posed to these individuals focused on EU-Georgia energy relations, Georgia’s hydroelectric potential, challenges to development, and energy security in Georgia. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed by the individuals in this paper are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisation they represent. Due to confidentiality reasons, not all information received from these interviews can be attributed to individuals from certain organisations. To complement these interviews, policy documents released by the European Commission (EC), OSGF, and Green Alternative on Georgia’s candidate status to the EnC were reviewed. Secondary works on EU-Georgia energy relations by political scientists Tracey C. Germain, Stephen Padgett, Roman Petrov and others also helped to shape the conclusions drawn in this paper.

Limitations to the conclusions reached in this paper include language and the complexity of technical regulations. Due to the author’s inability to speak Georgian, interviews were limited to 74

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those who could speak and understand English, which excluded an in-depth review of the impacts of the EnC on the ordinary Georgian energy business investor. Although the author aims to remain as objective as possible in her evaluation, there is an obvious European narrative that occurs as those who know English are generally in support of the EU project. Furthermore, the author’s background as an undergraduate student in international relations is limiting in her ability to understand the nuances in energy economics and comparative regulatory frameworks. As a result, this paper will stray away from analysing the details of these regulations, and instead will focus on the greater political, legislative, security and environmental aspects of Georgia’s candidacy to the EnC. Furthermore, due to the multifaceted nature of energy resources, this paper will focus exclusively on the development of hydroelectric power, and will limit discussions on pipelines.

3. Background

The hydropower potential of Georgia’s 26,000 rivers5 is colossal and if properly harnessed, could generate significant income and power for the country. Currently, hydropower production is limited to 7.2TW/h annually with a 0.4 TW/h transmission loss.6 Despite only about 300 of those rivers to be actually considered of consequence for hydropower production, Georgia’s total yearly potential is estimated to be 32 TW/h.7 This is said to be considerably higher than that of Norway or Canada, which are some of the world’s biggest hydropower producers. 8The electricity generated from hydropower supplies almost 92% of Ibid, 65.

Giorgi Tushurashvili, “Energy Strategy and Energy Policy Developments for the Promotion of Clean Power Generation in Georgia” (presentation, Energy Community, February 2013), slide 6, accessed February 7, 2015.

7 Ibid, slide 17.

8 “Country Profile: Georgia (2012),” REEEGLE, 2012, accessed February 10, 2015.

5 6

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Georgia’s electricity needs with the remaining 8% being supplied from natural gas.9 The level of energy produced is seasonal, with significant energy produced during the winter when energy demand is low, and energy imports occurring due to peak demands in the summer due to insufficient water flow.10 Through developing its existing capacity and investing in new hydropower plants (HPPs) in reaching towards its potential in electricity generation, Georgia could improve its economy from exporting some of its excess energy during the winter months, and limit the amount of electricity that is imported in the summer.11 However, difficulty in attracting foreign investment, an unstable security situation due to its proximity to Russia, and lack of effective legislation in promoting a competitive and energy efficient energy market are all barriers to achieving this goal. The European Union, through the EnC, stands to be a growing partner to Georgia to help close this gap.12

There is presently a large demand following the unstable security crisis in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and Ukraine from the European Union to meet its reliable and sustainable energy needs, and Georgia’s recent candidate status in the Energy Community is a step towards participating in the EU energy market. Beginning in 1999 with Title VI and Article 56 of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, Georgia has been actively engaging with the EU to develop its renewable energy sources.13 Energy relations between the countries have progressed In-Depth Review, Energy Charter, 66.

“Georgia Country Profile,” European Bank, 149.; “Georgia’s Hydropower Potential: Giving water the green light,” Bank of Georgia Research, June 28, 2012, accessed June 10, 2015. 9.

11 Ibid, 153.

12 Elene Chkeidze, Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. ICSRPA Offices: Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

13 Title VI of the agreement outlines areas of co-operation in energy, and Article 56 defines the main principles for bilateral energy co-operation. Khatune Didbaridze, “Renewable Energy in EU – Georgia: Legal and Regulatory Perspective,” Master’s thesis, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University – Institute of European Studies, 2011, 38.

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positively, with a 2008 Eastern Partnership Agreement signed when the issue of energy security was high on both agendas.14 From 2007, Georgia was an observer to the EnC, and in February 2014, negotiations for membership in the EnC were launched as Georgia became a candidate.15 The EnC is an international organisation that promotes multilateral co-operation and the treaty creating it was entered into force in July 2006 with goals of building a “stable regulatory and market framework in order to: attract investment in power generation and networks, create an integrated energy market, enhance the security of supply, improve the environmental situation, and enhance competition at regional level.”16 It operates based on states signing treaty commitments to binding rules, based on the standards established by the EU energy acquis communautaire (acquis), and compliance to these obligations is monitored by centralized institutions of the EnC.17 The organisation is comprised of nineteen EU members acting as participants, eight contracting parties, three observers, and one candidate – Georgia.18 Padgett describes the EnC as being part of the second circle of co-operation with the ultimate goal is to develop a “pan-European energy community” that extends beyond the internal energy market to promote diversification.19 In its hydropower sector, action taken by Georgia towards the goals expressed by the EnC is much needed in order to grow its potential and overcome the Ibid, 39.

Ana Stanič. “New Horizons: Opportunities and Challenges.” Investor.ge, June 1, 2011, 26, accessed February 10, 2015.

16 “Energy Community Facts in Brief.” Energy Community. October 7, 2014. Accessed November 17, 2014.

17 Stephen Padgett, “Energy Co-operation in the Wider Europe: Institutionalizing Interdependence,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 5 (2011): 1069, accessed February 7, 2015.

18 Roman Petrov, “Energy Community as a Promoter of the European Union’s ‘Energy Acquis’ to Its Neighbourhood,” Legal Issues of Economic Integration 38, no. 3 (2012): 5.

Accessed March 3, 2015 19 As described by Padgett, the first circle is the internal EU market, the second circle consists of EnC members and those who are willing to integrate, and the third circle consists of the countries beyond the EnC. Padgett, “Energy Co-operation,” 1066.

14 15

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barriers. Even if the EnC does not directly contribute to Georgia’s broader goal of integration, aspiring to join it through adherence to the EU energy acquis may indirectly help Georgia’s goals in the future by improving bilateral economic, diplomatic, and security relations. However, through Georgia’s recent signing of the Association Agreement in June 2014, it has taken the responsibility of implementing related European energy legislation.20

When discussing investments in the energy sector and HPPs in Georgia, it is also important to recognize that the vast majority of investments are foreign initiatives as there is limited financial capital within the country. Co-ordination between the EBRD, USAID, and other development agencies and foreign investors is the backbone of energy investment in the country.

As will be mentioned, harmonization between the Georgian investment market and the international community will help outsiders understand opportunities for development better.

4. Benefits from EnC Membership a) Improve investment environment

Investments are needed if Georgia wishes to develop its economy and hydropower potential, and integration with the EU energy acquis increases the attractiveness of Georgia’s energy sector to foreign investors. Although there are currently over sixty prospective investment projects in HPPs, much more work needs to be done to attract further foreign investment through investing in an effective market model and simplifying the complex regulatory process.21 Establishing norms in compliance with the competitive European market environment is a strategic way to do so.22

The development of electricity is more amendable to the “On the Process of Georgia’s Energy Community Membership Accession,” World Experience for Georgia, November 3, 2014. Accessed February 7, 2015.

21 “Perspective Projects [sic].” Ministry of Energy. Accessed March 24, 2015.

22 “Georgia’s accession to the European Energy Community: Policy Paper,” Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2014, 10. Print.

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market model, as power generation can be transported across the grid infrastructure and is less reliant on the source of production’s location.23 Through national legislation, Georgia has managed to significantly improve its investment environment to promote this model over the last decade. HPPs constructed after 2008 are fully deregulated as an attempt to facilitate direct investment to Georgia.24 However, follow up actions are still needed on the regulatory side to accompany this progress. Mariam Ioseliani, Director of the International Relations Department at GNERC, suggested that an ideal regulatory framework with less licenses and permits to deregulate the energy sector and better develop the market model may help to facilitate greater investment.25 Moving towards this market model will be a by-product of Georgia’s alignment of its energy policy towards the EU. Mariam Valishvili, the Deputy Minister of Energy in Georgia, indicated that the signing of the EnC “will help to liberalize their energy markets in line with the acquis.”26 This is a co-requisite, alongside the associated increased transparency and stability which comes with a market model, for attracting qualified investors.

Furthermore, the lack of legislation and the complexity of regulation are the most frequently cited obstacles to investment.

Ad hoc amendments to controversial and non-transparent energy legislation implemented in the 1990s deter good industry practices.27 Green Alternative argues that despite strong efforts on behalf of the Saakashvili government28 which introduced Padgett, “Energy Co-operation,” 1071.

Mariam Ioseliani, International Relations’ Department Director, Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission, Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, February 19, 2015: GNERC, Tbilisi.

25 Ibid.

26 Mariam Valishvili, “Main Messages,” in “Benefits and Challenges of Energy Community Membership for Georgia,” Conference Report, Ilia State University: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Print, 21.

27 Giorgi Mukhigulishvili, “Georgia’s Energy Sector in View of EC Membership Prospects,” in “Benefits and Challenges of Energy Community Membership for Georgia,” Conference Report, Ilia State University: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Print, 46.

28 President Mikheil Saakashvili was the President of Georgia from 2004-2013. He is 23 24

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sweeping reforms to crack down on corruption, including in the energy sector, opportunities for corruption in the energy sector still exist.29At the low level, petty corruption can occur during the payment of energy bills between citizens and the company.30 However, this problem is generally easy to detect and has largely been successfully rooted out of the system. Yet, opportunities for elite corruption are created when weak legislation does not enforce stringent oversight mechanisms during the process of signing agreements between public agencies and companies.31 To prevent this problem from occurring, Georgia should pass stricter legislation that encourages oversight in line with EnC membership principles and open up markets to more aggressive competition.

To achieve this, there must be sufficient government willpower to commit to this. As well, adherence to the EU best practices principles to create a clear market structure will create feed-in tariffs that will be bought by the governments to incentive investors and signal to investors of the positive market climate.32

The importance of aspiring towards the EnC cannot be understated in relation to improving the investment environment.

In fact, one of the most frequently cited incentives for EnC participation is access to financial assistance, as participation is seen as a method to bypass conditions attached to loans.33 In response to the question of “Why invest in Georgia?”, George Abulashvili, Director of the Energy Efficiency Centre and Key Expert in the Covenant of Mayors Program in Tbilisi, states that There is a political mandate in the IFIs to invest in Georgia…a political mandate that this reason has to be

regarded by some as a “hero” who was able to eliminate the rampant corruption in the post-Soviet era. Bigg, Claire. “Mikheil Saakashvili’s Polarizing Legacy.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 24, 2013. Accessed June 10, 2015.

29 Tushurashvili, “Energy Strategy,” slide 2.

30 Ibid, slide 2.

31 Ibid, slide 2.

32 Alexander Antonenko, RES/EE Policy Expert, INOGATE Caucuses, Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, February 16, 2015: INOGATE Regional Office, Tbilisi.

33 Padgett, “Energy Co-operation,” 1073.

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developed. In this stage, the most important argument of why [invest] in Georgia because it is part of the region, and if the region needs to be developed, then Georgia needs to be developed as well. But Georgia itself has to develop itself to make energy investment more attractive. Political location neutralizes all efforts for now. We have Russia…a single gunshot from Russia will kill any investment in Georgia.34

This demonstrates that Georgia still has much work ahead to show to foreign investors that the country has more to offer than simply a feeling of political goodwill among investors. Given its complex geopolitical situation, the opportunity for Georgia to stabilize its investment environment and attract further investment is vital in light of challenges to its energy security.

b) Improve energy security

One of the greatest barriers in attracting foreign investment to Georgia is the security situation in the region especially with respect to Russia, but membership to the EnC aims to improve the energy security situation in Georgia and the EU. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the Enguri/Vardnili HPP problem,35 and conflict in Ukraine have all served to highlight the importance of energy diversification for the EU and Georgian energy supply.36 The EnC stresses the need to do this in order to counter sudden energy disruptions, and Georgia’s ability to do so is important in the broader regional context.37 Georgia is tied into a wider network of international economic security as it acts as a strategic hub for oil and gas transit from Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia to George Abulashvili, Key Expert, Energy Efficiency Centre, Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, February 20, 2015: EEC Office, Tbilisi.

35 The Enguri/Vardnili HPP control is located in Russian-occupied territory while the dam and reservoir are on territory controlled by the Georgian state.

“Country Profile Georgia,” REEGLE. 36 Tracey C. German, “Pipeline Politics: Georgia and Energy Security,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009): 358, accessed February 10, 2015.

37 “Security of Supply,” Energy Community, accessed March 25, 2015.

34

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Turkey and Europe, and exports its excess hydroelectric power to the surrounding countries.38 As a result, it serves both the Georgian and European interest to develop closer ties to ensuring the security of supply and improving dialogue. To do so, Stephen Padgett argues that the best way to satisfy the security needs of both the consumer (the EU) and the producer (Georgia) would be to internationalize the market.39 The EnC is one way to achieve this, through facilitating the development of relevant infrastructure in its hydropower sector to increase production in Georgia, and thereafter, increase exports to Europe and other countries.40 This would allow the circumvention of Russia’s supply networks, especially as the South Stream pipeline is now in jeopardy due to the conflict in Ukraine.

An OSGF report states that one of the potential benefits of Georgia joining the EnC is that “the EU will have to respond adequately to Russia’s actions on Georgia’s occupied territories.”41 While this phrasing is vague, it must be clarified that an EU response will not be a military one as the ongoing precedent of Ukraine demonstrates. Instead, other tangible benefits and “soft security” protection could include an increase in funds spent on security forces by European states to protect their investments in Georgia, and a reinforcement of infrastructure to prevent vulnerability due to climate changes or terrorists. Georgia could also reinvest profits reaped from the increase in hydroelectricity production in order to promote the development of more HPPs, therefore increasing the security of its own supply domestically.

Membership in the EnC will not solve problems of energy security as will be mentioned later, but will help to mitigate its effects through strengthening Georgia’s economic situation.

38

German, “Pipeline Politics,” 345.

Padgett, “Energy Co-operation,” 1071.

“Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part,” European External Action Service, 2014, 4.

41 “Georgia’s accession to the,” Open Society, 12.

39 40

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c) Improve energy efficiency and the environment

Despite these important energy security consideration, where the EnC really stands to have an effect is on Georgia’s energy efficiency standards by encouraging it to follow Europe’s green framework. Since the Georgian Dream party took power in 2012, there was a move to reduce energy prices which stimulated the demand for energy without a corresponding move to improve environmental regulations.42 One way to resolve this increased demand for energy and the call to build a sustainable future for Georgia is through energy efficiency. This would represent a shift towards responsible and sustainable development and allow Georgia to capitalize on its renewable energy source production in meeting Europe’s 20/20/20 climate change goals.43 Green economic development, of which investment in HPPs is a channel, will increase the gross domestic product of a country.44 Within the EU and beyond, there is a commitment to providing funds for the development of renewable energy from organisations such as EBRD and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) which makes investing in Georgia’s hydroelectric sector more appealing.45 Furthermore, Alexander Antonenko, a policy expert at INOGATE, stated that joining the EnC will develop a clear structure and targets in renewable energy, allowing for the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in an easier and more accountable manner.46

Furthermore, damages that large HPPs will have on the environment aim to be mitigated through membership in the EnC. Non-governmental organisations like the World Wildlife Fund and Green Alternative argue that losses in biodiversity and impact on the population through relocation and changes in agricultural resources are significant consequences.47 Currently, there seems Antonenko.

“The 2020 Climate and Energy Package.” European Commission. Accessed March 24, 2015.

44 Abulashvili.

45 Antonenko.

46 Ibid.

47 Gamkrelidze.

42 43

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to be a conscious effort to try to mitigate Georgia’s disruption of the environment which has progressed as local populations lobby the government to prevent this from occurring.48 All proposed projects have to undergo an environmental assessment conducted by the Ministry of Environment to determine whether or not the project can be accepted.49 As well, projects that work with outside organisations like USAID, EBRD, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) all focuses more facilitating the investment in constructing small- and medium- scale HPP.50 These plants are more cost-effective than the large HPPs and minimize disruptions to the environment.51 However, this focus on environmental responsibility seems to be brought in on the European side and is not a priority by the Georgian government, as Gigi Gigiadze indicated that attracting energy investments will follow this plan: “When it comes to the environment, the first thing is economics, and the second thing is environmental issues.”52 Membership in the EnC will hopefully increase awareness in the government that the two are not mutually exclusive, but instead must work together if Georgia’s HPP is to be sustainably developed.

It will aim to promote an EU standard of environmental practices, and reduce the number of future large HPPs as their impacts as destructive. Through greater integration with the European community, it is hoped that the pressure to be environmentally responsible will spillover in the construction of the HPP sector.

The Covenant of Mayors Program is evidence that developing energy efficiency relations with the EU will benefit Nino Antadze, Team Leader Environment and Energy Portfolio, United Nations Development Programme, Interviewed by Kendall Andison and Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, United Nations House Georgia: Tbilisi. February 20, 2015.

49 Liza Tavdumadze, Head of Investment Projects Department, Ministry of Energy of Georgia. Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, Ministry of Energy: Tbilisi. February 20, 2015.

50 Ioseliani.

51 Abulashvili.

52 Gigi Gigiadze, Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Tbilisi. February 17 2015.

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Georgia’s economy and sustainable future. This program began in Brussels as part of the 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package that aims to support municipalities to meet or exceed the EU 20% reduction in CO2 emissions and to promote energy efficiency technologies.53 Elene Gvilava from the Energy Efficiency Centre Georgia stated that “cities are one of the [greatest causes] of CO2 emissions.”54 At the same time, they also represent the best opportunity to control damages from the environment. By working with the Covenant, a Sustainable Energy Action Plan was enacted for 2011 in Tbilisi that created specific and measurable targets.55 In achieving them, Tbilisi’s success in the program include installing energy efficient outdoor lighting in parks, insulation schools, retrofitting a residential building block, and retrofitting kindergartens schools to develop energy efficiency at a local level.56 The EnC is similar to this program in that it also provides for identifiable goals that the country can strive for improving the energy efficiency of its hydropower sector. Karina Melikidze, Director of the Sustainable Development and Policy Centre, highlighted succinctly the challenges that the government faces in meeting its energy goals, in that “policy, even if it is well written, will be dead without workable mechanisms.”57 There is currently no national energy efficiency action plan in Georgia, and the implementation of the acquis will call for specific measures including the labeling of energy consumption on energy-related products and promotion on energy efficient construction.58 By Elene Gvilava, Energy Efficiency Centre, Interviewed by Kendall Andison and Emily Tsui, Personal interview. Energy Efficiency Centre: Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Liana Garibashvili, Energy Efficiency Centre, Interviewed by Kendall Andison and Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, Energy Efficiency Centre: Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

57 Karina Melikidze, Director, Sustainable Development Action Plan Centre, Interviewed

by Kendall Andison and Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, SDAP Office: Tbilisi. February 19, 2015.

58 Manana Kochladze, “Off Balance: The Georgian Energy Sector and the Contradictions in EU Policy and Practice,” CEE Bankwatch: Tbilisi, March 2013, 4. Accessed February 10, 2015.

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having concrete targets, the government could strive to achieve a more efficient demand for electricity. The renewable energy production from HPPs will be a positive force in developing sustainability.

5. Barriers to realizing these benefits

Although Georgia stands to benefit significantly in the ways outlined above, lack of statistical information, maintaining public support for the EU and resistance to the losses that existing investors will incur are all considerations that will impact the extent to which the EnC will positively impact the country. However, working to reduce these barriers through smart public policy decisions will help to ensure that Georgia maximizes the benefits accrued from this process. a) Lack of statistical information

Data and statistics are the building blocks of determining the viability of investment which helps to bring investors to the country. Up until late 2014, Georgia had not updated its energy statistics for over a decade.59 These statistics provide information about the energy balance of the country, which analyzes the use of energy resources in detail.60 It also represents “the best tool for the local or global policy planning.”61 These statistics help the government overcome challenges in trying to come up with effective action plans to develop its hydroelectricity potential that fits the reality of the current energy environment, as identifying areas to target and creating metrics of success are difficult without updated information.62 While this recent 2014 statistical report is Abulashvili.

“Monitoring Report on the Implementation EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan,” Green Alternative: Tbilisi 2013, 19. Accessed March 3, 2015.

61 “Energy Balance of Georgia,” National Statistics Office of Georgia: Tbilisi 2014. Accessed March 23, 2015.

62 “Monitoring Report,” Green Alternative, 5.

59 60

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welcome, it will be important that the Ministry of Energy and the National Statistics Office maintains its momentum and continues to work with the private sector in providing them with the information that they will need to develop the country.63 Statistics should also expand beyond energy balance information, as data is especially needed to review the current state of infrastructure because much of the electricity grid could use repairs and upgrades.64 This information is useful for investors to make accurate estimations for cost and will improve the perception that Georgia is an investor-friendly country. Demands for updated statistics will grow with the expansion of the Georgian energy market, and it is recommended that revised statistics are made on a yearly basis and made publicly available. These statistics should be made in accordance to the energy acquis rules on energy statistics in order to open doors for joint projects in renewable energy.65

Maintaining support for the EU will be another challenge in persuading the public that the EnC project and the goal of Europeanizing the country are worth the significant political and financial investment. Currently, support for the EU is very high as approximately 80% of the population agree that the Europeanization project is worthwhile.66 There is also consensus inside parliament and all political parties agree. However, Boris Iarochevitch notes that this support cannot be taken for granted and regardless of the level of support, the EU must be delicate on balancing its relations with Georgia and Russia.67 The EnC project “Energy Statistics: INOGATE Helps Georgia Develop Its First Complete Energy Balance.” EU Neightbourhood Info Centre. January 6, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2015.

64 Zurab Eristavi, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, February 20, 2015: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi.

65 “On the Process of,” World Experience.

66 Mariam Rakviashvili, Deputy State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group, Personal Interview, February 18, 2015: Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Tbilisi.

67 Boris Iarochevitch, Deputy Head of the European Union Delegation to Georgia, European Union Delegation to Georgia, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group, Personal Interview, February 18, 2015: European Union Delegation Head Office, Tbilisi.

63

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is largely managed by top government officials and high level stakeholders such as the EBRD and USAID. Yet, it will have many positive effects for the ordinary citizen, such as promoting the security of their supply of energy, reducing costs, and economic spillover effects like increased employment and standards of living from the construction of HPPs. These benefits should be conveyed to better to the public, and the Deputy State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Mariam Rakviashvili stressed the need for an improvement of the visibility of EU support.68 Relaying the benefits of the EnC project needs to become more accessible in order to maintain public support for the membership. As well, the government has noted that advances in environmental sustainability ultimately require public participation in order for them to be successful.69 In reaching EnC targets, it is important to have the public believe that their individual choices in promoting energy efficiency will not only save them money, but is a wise choice in reaching encouraging their politicians to stay committed to their European aspirations and the prospect of the benefits this will bring.

There will be costs that the EnC project will bear on certain investors that may result in resistance from these corporations.

Contrary to Mr. Gigiadze’s insistence that the EnC will bring “only good” to the country, changing the market structure will make the environment more competitive and remove some of the monopoly that companies have on transmission.70 Investors from countries where state-owned energy monopolies dominates, like Azerbaijan, Russia, or China, will not be in favour of Georgia’s move towards EnC membership as it is perceived to restrict some of their power.71 Furthermore, the regulation of energy transit according Rakviashvili.

“Monitoring Report,” Green Alternative, 4.

70 Antonenko.

71 Mykhailo Gonchar, “Ukraine, Energy Community and the EU: Expectations and Results,” in “Benefits and Challenges of Energy Community Membership for Georgia,” Conference Report, Ilia State University: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Print, 28.

68 69

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to EU directives is expected to result in significant income losses generated from transit fees to both the state and corporations that have stakes in grid infrastructure.72 Mariam Rakviashvili notes that these investors have pre-existing relations with the country and that the contracts that have been signed years ago have long-term obligations that cannot easily be changed, even if the goal is to join the EnC.73 As well, Ambassador-at-Large Zurab Eristavi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that changes in regulations caused by the EnC will promote the sharing of information among big corporations, creating tensions among the companies which are used to a more secretive and protective environment.74 Therefore, the new EnC regulations may result in resistance from these investors. It is important to ensure that new legislation enacted that is in line with the acquis incorporates respect for the existing investors, and a transitory mechanism such as compensation is provided to these investors. Actions that are taken to encourage their continued participation in the investment of the Georgian hydroelectric sector will serve to benefit both parties.

6. The EnC and Georgia’s European Aspirations

As noted briefly above, a discussion of the EnC is not complete without looking at Georgia’s broader objective of integration with the EU. The goal of EnC is to create a market that is aligned with the EU to facilitate better energy co-operation.

Indeed, the EnC is a channel through which diplomatic relations between the two countries will occur through co-operation in meeting the requirements set out by the acquis.75 Asides from the benefits for Georgia mentioned, EnC membership will promote stronger political support from the EU to Georgia as greater Mukhigulishvili, “Georgia’s Energy Sector,” 47.

Rakviashvili.

74 Eristavi.

75 “Commission launches negotiations with Georgia to join the Energy Community,” Press Release, European Commission: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Accessed February 7, 2015.

72 73

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financial interest will be created.76 The EU also stands to gain from Georgia’s relations with the EnC, as Oliver Reisner of the European External Action Service notes that this will help the EU achieve its strategic interest in having “a stable, economically prosperous neighbourhood.”77

Although membership in the EnC will result in mutual benefits accrued by Georgia and the EU, it cannot pave the path towards EU membership.78 One of the biggest obstacles to achieving this is an unchangeable variable – Georgia’s geographic proximity to Russia.79 Elene Chkheidze, the executive director of the International Centre for Social Research and Policy Analysis, stated rightly that “the best thing in Georgia now is that we are independent from Russia in the energy sector.”80 However, in moving forward, this independence cannot eternally be taken for granted. After Russia unexpectedly shut off its energy supply to Georgia in 2006, the country and investors have been haunted by the unpredictability of Russia’s actions in Georgia’s occupied territory and Russian foreign policy.81 Therefore, hydropower presents an opportunity towards energy independence in Georgia, and building on this potential may provide Europe with a chance to expand its renewable energy in its efforts to develop energy security for Europeans. HPP projects in recent years have been excluded to Georgian-occupied territory because of the unpredictable political situations in the Russian-occupied territories. However, despite the EnC poising to increase European investments and the country to receive the safeguards guaranteed through protecting this investment, Georgia must understand the limitations that the EnC will provide towards its energy security.82 The EnC does Mukhigulishvili, “Georgia’s Energy Sector,” 46.

Oliver Reisner, Attache, European Union Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group. VIP Victoria Hotel: Tbilisi. February 17 2015.

78 Gonchar, “Ukraine, Energy Community,” 27.

79 Padgett, “Energy Co-operation,” 1084.

80 Chkheidze.

81 Ibid.

82 Gonchar, “Ukraine, Energy Community,” 27.

76 77

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not have any influence in cases of security crises, and there are many unresolved problems with security and mutual aid.83 Boris Iarochevitch, the Deputy Head of the EU Delegation in Georgia, paints a realistic view of their involvement in the country:

The EU should be clearer why we are supporting Georgia.

I think basically it is because of energy. We have to be very clear- it’s the southern gas corridor. We need to diversify not only our supply routes but also supply sources when it comes to the EU. We have to be clear. And some people ask us, why are you giving 100 million euro a year to Georgia, just like that. So I say that on one hand we should be clear that you may have a European prospective, that’s why you are helping you, and also we need to be clear that we are helping you because you are important strategically, not because you are Georgia. Because in Europe, citizens are absolutely not concerned by Georgia, of course it is so far away, but definitely it is very important hub for energy, but also for transport, the corridor for the silk road; China is building railways and roads and so on to connect to itself to central Asia to Europe bypassing Russia and Georgia is key if you look at the map and that is why it is very important. We will not fight for Georgia, it’s clear that we are not fighting for Ukraine and we will never fight for Georgia. And we try to keep the status quo here in terms of security and what is important is the energy corridor, the pipelines.84

If even energy security, which is claimed to be the driving force for EU support in Georgia, cannot be a catalyst for military security, it becomes highly unlikely that actions will be taken to protect the territorial sovereignty of Georgia. The onus to do so would occur if Georgia became a member of the EU. As there is no way to change this factor for the time being, the benefits received from membership in the EnC will not spill over towards the integration project.

83 84

Ibid, 31.

Iarochevitch.

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To overcome the unchangeable obstacle of Russia, it is therefore in Georgia’s best interest to work as rapidly as possible towards EnC membership and to reap the many positive economic and political benefits associated with it. While it is impossible for Georgia to receive a guarantee on its territorial security, membership in the EnC will stimulate investment to help increase its hydroelectric power potential. By increasing the number of HPPs in Georgia, Georgia’s electricity supply becomes more stable should an attack or a disaster threaten the functionality of one of its plants. This will serve to not only assist Georgia’s domestic energy security, but also acts an opportunity for the EU through the diversification of its energy sources.

7. Conclusion

This paper has shown that Georgia’s candidacy to the EnC provides a critical opportunity for the country to improve its hydroelectric potential, and that this opportunity would be best seized through directly addressing barriers to success through building on the energy sector’s statistical information, maintaining public support, and minimizing financial losses to existing investors. Furthermore, it was also shown that the path from membership in the EnC to closer EU integration is significantly hindered by its geographic proximity to Russia. Georgia must be realistic in their integration aspirations, and the EnC should not be regarded as a way to lead to EU membership.

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“Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part,” European External Action Service, 2014, 4. http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/ assoagreement/pdf/ge-aa-preamble_en.pdf Bigg, Claire. “Mikheil Saakashvili’s Polarizing Legacy.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 24, 2013. Accessed June 10, 2015. http://www.rferl.org/content/saakashvili-mixed-legacy/25146918. html.

“Commission launches negotiations with Georgia to join the Energy Community,” Press Release, European Commission: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Accessed February 7, 2015. http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-14-170_en.htm “Country Profile: Georgia (2012).” REEEGLE. January 1, 2012.

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“Georgia’s accession to the European Energy Community: Policy Paper,” Open Society Georgia Foundation, 2014. Print.

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“Georgia’s Hydropower Potential: Giving water the green light,” Bank of Georgia Research, June 28, 2012, accessed June 10, 2015. 9. http://www.energy.gov.ge/projects/pdf/pages/Elekroenergiis%20 Sektoris%20Mimokhilva%20Da%20Eksportis%20 Shesadzleblobebi%2014%20geo.pdf German, Tracey C. “Pipeline Politics: Georgia and Energy Security.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009): 344-62.

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Gigiadze, Gigi. Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students.

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Giorgi Tushurashvili, “Energy Strategy and Energy Policy Developments for the Promotion of Clean Power Generation in Georgia” (presentation, Energy Community, February 2013), slide 6. Accessed February 7, 2015. https://www.energy-community.org/ pls/portal/docs/1910181.PDF 95

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Gonchar, Mykhailo. “Ukraine, Energy Community and the EU: Expectations and Results,” in “Benefits and Challenges of Energy Community Membership for Georgia,” Conference Report, Ilia State University: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Print, 28.

Gvilava, Elene. Energy Efficiency Centre. Interviewed by Kendall Andison and Emily Tsui. Personal interview. Energy Efficiency Centre: Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

Iarochevitch, Boris. Deputy Head of the European Union Delegation to Georgia, European Union Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group, Personal Interview. February 18, 2015: European Union Delegation Head Office, Tbilisi.

In-Depth Review of Energy Efficiency Policies and Programmes: Georgia, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels. 2012. Accessed February 7, 2015. http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ Publications/Georgia_EE_2012_ENG.pdf Ioseliani, Mariam. International Relations’ Department Director, Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission. Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview.

February 19, 2015: GNERC, Tbilisi.

Kochladze, Manana. “Off Balance: The Georgian Energy Sector and the Contradictions in EU Policy and Practice.” CEE Bankwatch: Tbilisi, March 2013. Accessed February 10, 2015. http://greenalt. org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Georgian_energy_sector_web. pdf Melikidze, Karina. Director, Sustainable Development Action Plan Centre. Interviewed by Kendall Andison and Emily Tsui, Personal Interview. SDAP Office: Tbilisi. February 19, 2015.

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“Monitoring Report on the Implementation EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan.” Green Alternative: Tbilisi 2013. Accessed March 3, 2015. http://greenalt.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ENP_AP_ Monitoring_2013.pdf Mukhigulishvili, Giorgi. “Georgia’s Energy Sector in View of EC Membership Prospects,” in “Benefits and Challenges of Energy Community Membership for Georgia,” Conference Report, Ilia State University: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Print.

“On the Process of Georgia’s Energy Community Membership Accession.” World Experience for Georgia. November 3, 2014.

Accessed February 7, 2015. http://www.csdialogue.eu/sites/default/ files/statement_on_the_process_of_georgias_energy_community_ membership_accession.pdf Padgett, Stephen. “Energy Co-operation in the Wider Europe: Institutionalizing Interdependence.” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 5 (2011): 1065-087. Accessed February 7, 2015. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14685965.2010.02168.x/epdf.

“Perspective Projects [sic].” Ministry of Energy. Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.energy.gov.ge/investor.php?id_ pages=19&lang=eng.

Petrov, Roman. “Energy Community as a Promoter of the European Union’s ‘Energy Acquis’ to Its Neighbourhood.” Legal Issues of Economic Integration 38, no. 3 (2012). Accessed March 3, 2015: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179151 Rakviashvili, Mariam. Deputy State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Office of the State Minister of Georgia 97

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on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group, Personal Interview. February 18, 2015: Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Tbilisi.

Reisner, Oliver. Attache, European Union Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group. VIP Victoria Hotel: Tbilisi. February 17 2015.

“Security of Supply.” Energy Community. Accessed March 25, 2015. https://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_ HOME/AREAS_OF_WORK/Instruments/Security_of_Supply.

Stanič, Ana. “New Horizons: Opportunities and Challenges.”

Investor.ge, June 1, 2011, 26. Accessed February 10, 2015. http:// www.ealaw.eu/static/pdf/investorge_ana_stanic.pdf Tavdumadze, Liza. Head of Investment Projects Department, Ministry of Energy of Georgia. Interviewed by Emily Tsui, Personal Interview, Ministry of Energy: Tbilisi. February 20, 2015.

Valishvili, Mariam. “Main Messages,” in “Benefits and Challenges of Energy Community Membership for Georgia.” Conference Report, Ilia State University: Tbilisi, February 20, 2014. Print.

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND REGIONALISM IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

A SOUTH CAUCASUS IDENTITY Danijela Stajic

The South Caucasus, encompassing the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, is exemplified by its precarious position between the East and West as the region is in perpetual disharmony and abounds in contradictions. Famously acting as a bridge between “the Black and Caspian seas, Europe and Asia, Russia and the Middle East, Christianity and Islam,” the region itself is not quite sure where it belongs.1 The people in the region are divided by language, ethnicity, religion, tradition, and more.

Yet they share a common past and interestingly, also subscribe to the same cherished principle of hospitality. Hostility and conflicts persist, casting a dark shadow across the region, and ancient feuds invade and consume the present. However, as one of the leading actors in issues regarding good neighbourly relations and regional co-operation, the European Union (EU) became very actively engaged in the South Caucasus in the post-Soviet period, introducing numerous initiatives to promote genuine regional Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.

1

Danijela Stajic recently graduated from the University of Toronto with a double major in European Studies and German Studies and a minor in Spanish. While Danijela’s interests in politics and international affairs are diverse, she seeks to expand her knowledge of Europe by deepening her awareness and understanding of the history, politics, culture and languages of the region. She intends to pursue a Master’s degree in European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies.

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co-operation. As a fundamental element of EU foreign policy, regional co-operation is based on the belief that establishing a framework for cross-border co-operation will benefit all parties involved, as can be seen from the dynamics of co-operation in the EU itself.2 Accordingly, the EU has shown a distinct preference for approaching the South Caucasus as a single entity and promoting regional co-operation through initiatives engaging all countries in the region, as opposed to creating relationships with individual countries.3 Led by its own experience regarding regional cooperation, the EU appears to view the co-operation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and their incorporation into a single distinct region as logical.4 Upon examination of the region’s role in a wider context, taking into account geopolitics, history and connections to the rest of the world, it is obvious that many dichotomies persist. It is therefore possible to argue that the idea of a ‘South Caucasus region’ is only a political construct imposed on the three states and driven mainly by the EU.5 Yet, a regional identity coupled with a shared history and an inclusive crossborder co-operation framework has the potential of reinforcing the sense of common ground in the South Caucasus. Considering that a sense of identity and belonging is dictated by various factors including geographical proximity, common historical legacy, political ideology, and more, countries seek to represent and define themselves as nations, by promoting “values, symbols, myths, memories, and traditions that constitute and are specific to a nation.”6 Therefore, when talking about a regional identity, one should focus on what these countries share and how the specific Licínia Simão, “Region-building in the eastern neighbourhood: assessing EU regional policies in the South Caucasus,” East European Politics, 29, no. 3 (2013): 237-288, 273.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. 274.

5 De Waal, The Caucasus, 1.

6 Kornely Kakachia, “European, Asian, or Eurasian?: Georgian Identity and the Struggle for Euro-Atlantic Integration,” Georgian Foreign Policy the Quest for Sustainable Security, ed. Kornely Kakachia, Michael Cecire (Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013), 41-52.

2

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set of circumstances they find themselves in can unite them, overcoming inter-ethnic conflicts and clashing foreign policy orientations and merging them into a single region and into an overarching regional identity, while allowing the coexistence of multiple national and regional identities.

Uniting Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, is the idea of a South Caucasus region and common identity, rooted in the region’s historical legacy. While these countries remain culturally different, use different languages, and practice different religions, according to a representative from the office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus in Tbilisi, there is an understanding among them of a community, where they consider themselves to be the “Caucasus people,” based not on their religious affiliation and a sense of ethnic kinship, but rather on a shared history.7

In the 16th century, the area located between the Black and Caspian seas south of the Caucasus Mountain range, currently known as “South Caucasus,” was caught between the Ottoman and Persian empires that competed for dominance in the region. This led to a partitioning of the region between the two powers — what is today Georgia was under Ottoman control, while the remaining territory was claimed by Persia.8 In the 17th century, the territory of Armenia was also surrendered to the Ottomans, but already in the 18th century, the influence of both empires began to decline.9 During this period the Russian Empire, under Catherine the Great, took the opportunity to expand its dominion towards the South, for the purpose of securing control over the trade routes connecting Europe and Asia and, more importantly, creating a buffer zone which would prevent invaders from the South from entering Russia proper.10 Georgia and Armenia both accepted Russian EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

8 Tracey German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus: Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives?, (London: Ashgate, 2012), 19.

9 Ibid. 20.

10 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, (Richmond, England: Curzon Press, 2001), 31-32.

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domination, believing Russia would offer them protection.11 The Russian Empire annexed Georgia in 1801, extended its dominion to Armenia, and took over the northern Azerbaijani khanates.

During this time, Russia engaged in policies that sought to alter the ethnic composition of the region — offering protection to the Christian Armenians and Georgians while creating the conditions for the departure of the Muslim Azerbaijanis.12 Russia additionally introduced a concept of regional co-operation based on trade between the ethnic groups. It was therefore during this period, when these territories came under the control of Tzarist Russia, that they began to be treated as a single entity, a region called “Transcaucasia.”13

After the signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828, Transcaucasia was officially placed under Russian control — Russia did not annex the territory, but rather established colonial rule over it.14 The South Caucasus only served a strategic purpose and did not obtain province status in the empire.15 The subsequent discovery of oil in the region increased its importance for advancing Russia’s economic interests.16 During this time, a sense of unity and first initiatives for co-operation began to emerge in the region itself.

These initiatives were mainly the result of the mutual efforts of the three largest ethnic groups, namely Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians. One of their first attempts at integration was the creation of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, composed of representatives from three ethnic political parties, which aimed to disassociate Transcaucasia from the Russian Empire and establish its independence.17 This initiative was ultimately abandoned, but, Ibid. 33.

Ibid. 34-35.

13 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 20.

14 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 26.

15 Ibid.

16 Syuzanna Vasilyan, The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’. (working paper., Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales: Área CEI y Países Bálticos, 2006), 6.

17 Ibid.

11 12

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nevertheless, an alternative strategy soon emerged, when the Transcaucasian multiparty Sejm formed to seek independence of Transcaucasia from socialist Russia.18 Before long, Transcaucasia was confronted with numerous internal as well as external difficulties. The Sejm was facing war with the Ottoman Empire as a result of territorial disputes, which exacerbated tensions between the ethnic groups within the Sejm — Azerbaijani representatives pressed for a conciliatory attitude towards the Ottomans, which was instantaneously rejected by the Armenians.19 These tensions, coupled with the fact that Transcaucasia lacked a strong governing structure, led to the disintegration of the Sejm.20

The ethnic groups, however, introduced yet another form of integration — they established a Federative Republic of Transcaucasia, with Tbilisi as its capital.21 Once more, territorial disputes and diverging alliances of the three ethnic groups — Georgians entered into an alliance with Germany, and Armenia and Azerbaijan remained pro-Russian and pro-Ottoman respectively — contributed to the collapse of this initiative.22 As a result, the Transcaucasian Federation disintegrated and the South Caucasus countries declared independence in 1918.23 With three new countries appearing on the map, territorial disputes between them needed to be settled. But before this issue could be addressed, the region was absorbed by Bolshevik Russia.24 Once again under the authority of Moscow, Transcaucasia became a single entity, and Moscow accordingly pursued policies aimed at consolidating the region on political, social, and economic levels.25 Moscow proposed the establishment of a federal union, where Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would collaborate in areas related to security, Ibid.

Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 147.

20 Ibid.

21 Vasilyan, The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’, 6-7.

22 Ibid.

23 De Waal, The Caucasus, 64.

24 Ibid. 67-70.

25 De Waal, The Caucasus, 71-74.

18 19

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economy, and foreign policy.26 The three republics therefore formed a Federal Union of Soviet Socialists Republics of Transcaucasia (FUSSRT). FUSSRT joined the Soviet Union as a single entity, only to be broken down into its constituent parts.27

Despite the disintegration of the FUSSRT, the Soviet economic system, based on central planning, ensured that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia remained connected — in order to maintain a balance, goods and services were redistributed among the three republics.28 Armenia’s economy revolved around its welldeveloped industrial sector; the industrial capacity of Azerbaijan was based on its oil and gas reserves; and Georgia’s economy largely depended on tourism and agriculture.29 The system established by the Soviets created interdependence between these countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia emerged as independent states. Having declared independence, these three states were faced with the same problems as a result of the antiquated Soviet-style system, including a lack of ability to compete in the open market and a rapid and poorly managed privatization process.30 However, instead of seeking to establish a co-operation framework for the purpose of collectively solving common issues, for which they have been the beneficiaries of EU’s support and assistance, these three countries decided to pursue different paths. While focusing on the consolidation of their national identities, historical narratives promoted by the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian governments diverge significantly, promoting identities that focus on distinguishing oneself from one’s neighbours, and simultaneously failing to include an overarching regional narrative and a concept of a regional identity.

Aiming to “expand the zone of ‘prosperity, stability and Ibid.

Ibid.

28 Vasilyan, The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’, 9.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid. 12.

26 27

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security’ that its citizens enjoy,”31 the EU has offered the countries in the South Caucasus numerous opportunities for co-operation and integration. The initiatives originated in the West have aimed to foster genuine regional co-operation, but have been unsuccessful so far.32 The South Caucasus has historically been divided along cultural, linguistic, and religious lines, which explains why the idea of a “South Caucasus region” and a “South Caucasus regional identity” is often contested. Nevertheless, the trend of treating these countries as part of a single entity emerged after the expansion of Russian influence in the region. The policies pursued by Moscow were the essential driving force for binding the countries in the region together. Although originally introduced by Russia, the idea of regional co-operation and region-building in the South Caucasus, based on geographical proximity and shared history, legitimizes the continued treatment of this region as a single entity, considering that their shared circumstances created “common patterns of interaction and [forged] a common identity.”33 Furthermore, emerging from the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus countries have faced similar challenges, which could be addressed more adequately if these countries combined their efforts and cooperated more cohesively. Instead, the dominant narrative in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as they try to “transform [their] past into history,” remains the “nationalist narrative,” according to Dr. Oliver Reisner, a representative of the EU Delegation in Tbilisi.34 Dr. Reisner added that the governments in these countries do not have any interest in the interaction of cultures, but are rather concerned with legitimizing their statehood.35 Nevertheless, the frameworks for multilateral co-operation established by foreign German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 140.

Mirziashvili Mikheil, (Black Sea Peace-Building Project, Crisis Management Initiative: Project Manager), interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 18, 2015.

33 Simão, “Region-building in the eastern neighbourhood,” 276.

34 Oliver Reisner, (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: Project Manager), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, group interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

35 Ibid.

31 32

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actors, most notably the EU, although not fully utilized by the countries in the region, have established a platform for dialogue and rapprochement.

As a result of its geostrategic significance, the South Caucasus has throughout history served as a battlefield for regional powers.36 The relatively small countries in the South Caucasus region are surrounded by significantly larger neighbours: Russia, Turkey and Iran. Among the three South Caucasus countries, Armenia is landlocked and shares borders with Turkey and Iran; Azerbaijan has access to the Caspian Sea and borders on Russia and Iran; and Georgia has access to the Black Sea and borders on Russia and Turkey.37 The competition of these regional powers continues, and each is seeking to establish its supremacy and eliminate the influence of others.

The largest neighbour of the South Caucasus region is Russia, having played an important role in the region since the 19th century, mainly as a “colonial master.”38 Russia’s position as the dominant power in the South Caucasus remained unchallenged until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nevertheless, Russia has managed to maintain its ties to the region and claims that these countries belong to its sphere of influence. Building on its historical connection to the region, the economic and political links between Russia and the South Caucasus remain strong, as the traditional Russian foreign policy, based on maintaining outposts in the region and manipulating the political developments in these countries expanded to include also an economic presence particularly in the energy sector.39 Moscow is a powerful and dangerous player in the South Caucasus and its dominance and constant interference has continuously obstructed the establishment of regional co-operation Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 18.

German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 2-5.

38 Stephen Jones, and Levan Kakhishvili, “The Interregnum: Georgian Foreign Policy from Independence to the Rose Revolution,” Georgian Foreign Policy the Quest for Sustainable Security, ed. Kornely Kakachia, Michael Cecire (Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013), 22.

39 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 89-90.

36 37

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and integration between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. After the declaration of independence of these countries, the territorial disputes, which were not previously resolved, came to the fore. This gave rise to separatist movements in three territories — Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.40 The conflicts between Georgia and its two separatist territories and the involvement of Russia, together with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, threaten the security in the region.41 Among the three, however, it is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that has been the largest obstacle to the establishment of a trilateral regional co-operation framework. Even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Moscow has maintained a military presence in the South Caucasus. Until late 2007, Soviet-era military bases were maintained in Georgia. In addition, Moscow has kept military contingents in Armenia, and until recently, also in Azerbaijan, while keeping a substantial number of troops and military equipment stationed on the border between North and South Caucasus.42 Although Tbilisi has succeeded in removing Russian troops from the territory of Georgia, after the 2008 war, Russia established military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.43 Mikheil Mirziashvili, a representative from the Black Sea PeaceBuilding Project, identified Russia as an actor that is not interested in a quick solution of the conflicts in the South Caucasus.44 By maintaining the status quo and fomenting distrust among the conflicting parties, Russia has played a role in the development of these regional conflicts. The prolonged status quo and absence of communication, elevates Moscow’s position and creates a dependence of the conflicting parties on Russia, according to Mr. Mirziashvili, who also pointed out that in addition to recognizing Vasilyan, The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’, 8.

Ibid.

42 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 90-91.

43 Ibid. 92-96.

44 Mirziashvili Mikheil, (Black Sea Peace-Building Project, Crisis Management Initiative: Project Manager), interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 18, 2015.

40 41

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the de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, during a certain period, Russia also played a role in prolonging the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh by selling weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.45 Russia has therefore sustained the animosities that exist between the three countries in the region, thereby obstructing the potential establishment of a regional co-operation framework and creating aversion among them to a sense of regional identity.

In addition to Russia, Iran and Turkey have also sought to establish their domination in the South Caucasus.46 Like Russia, both of these countries have a historical affinity with the region and presently their policies towards Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are primarily driven by economic interests. Iran has pursued a broad foreign policy in the region offering support for territorial integrity of the South Caucasus countries and their economic development and advocating integration and regional economic co-operation based on religious identity and shared history and culture.47 Despite the ideological basis of its foreign policy, Tehran has generally used a practical approach — its principal ally in the region is Armenia, but it also maintains a relationship with Georgia, primarily in the energy sector; whereas its relationship with Azerbaijan is somewhat complicated due to the competition between the countries for the leading role in the region’s energy sector, but also due to the differences between their Persian and Turkic identities and Azerbaijan’s relationships with Turkey and Israel.48 Turkey, on the other hand, has been involved in close co-operation with two South Caucasus countries, namely Azerbaijan and Georgia, in energy and transportation sectors. This co-operation revolves around several infrastructure development programs — the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum (BTE) gas pipeline, as Ibid.

Simão, “Region-building in the eastern neighbourhood,” 277.

47 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 128.

48 Ibid., 129-133.

45 46

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well as the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway.49 These projects are multilateral and their advancement requires cooperation between the countries in the region. Although Turkey’s close relationship with Azerbaijan is also based on a common ethnic and religious identity, its ties to Georgia have been solidified through trade and economic relations.50 Turkey has also played a role in providing Georgia with military assistance in an effort to counter Russian influence in the region.51 For both Azerbaijan and Georgia, Turkey is one of the principal trading partners, and the co-operation of these countries primarily in the energy sector — delivering oil and gas to the West — has yielded numerous benefits.

Nevertheless, the failure to include Armenia undermines the impact of these projects. The development of closer diplomatic ties between Ankara and Yerevan remains thwarted as a consequence of genocide claims — Armenia has accused Turkey (heir of the Ottoman Empire) to have pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing against its Armenian population in 1915 — and Azerbaijan’s disapproval of a rapprochement between the two countries, because of the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.52 Although Turkey has repeatedly expressed an intention to play the leading role in the development of regional co-operation in the South Caucasus, this remains unfeasible due to the frictions that persist in its relationship with Armenia.53

The complex constellation of geopolitical interests can be understood by looking at the rivalry between competing regional actors. Although Russia, Iran, and Turkey have maintained their influence in the South Caucasus, they have not succeeded in establishing good relations with all three South Caucasus countries, Udo Steinbach, “Turkey’s Policies in Its Historical Hinterland,” The South Caucasus 2021: Oil, Democracy, and Geopolitics, ed. Fariz Ismailzade, Glen E. Howard (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2012), 156.

50 EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

51 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 308-310.

52 Ibid. 77, 302.

53 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 124.

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which has limited their prospects of establishing an absolute supremacy in the region. As opposed to pursuing the development of a regional co-operation framework, Russia has even stood in the way of building sustainable peace and security in the South Caucasus. Using its military strength and political influence, Moscow has prolonged the status quo of the unresolved conflicts in the region, thereby preventing regional identity-building and regional co-operation. All things considered, the South Caucasus has continued to serve as a battleground on which these three powers compete for influence. The rivalry among them, therefore, prevails over the need to establish a regional co-operation framework and promote a sense of a common regional identity.54 Consequently, according to the Deputy Head of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, Dr. Ryan Grist, different external pressures that the countries in the South Caucasus experience, continue to pull them in different directions.55 Accordingly, Armenia is pursuing an alliance with Russia and has recently joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU); Georgia has defined for itself a different, decisively pro-Western path; while Azerbaijan is trying to keep a balance between both, maintaining its position because of its oil and gas reserves.56 Regional co-operation initiatives are therefore undermined by the fact that each state has allied with different regional powers, which also leads to ambiguity of what is meant under ‘region,’ as indicated by a representative from the office of the EUSR for the South Caucasus in Tbilisi. The understanding of the notion of a ‘South Caucasus region’ changes depending on the perspective of the parties involved. For example, Baku would prefer a region to consist of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey when talking about “regional co-operation.”57 Azerbaijan Ibid.

Ryan Grist, (Deputy Head of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM)), interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 21, 2015.

56 Ibid.

57 EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

54 55

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also often “looks across the Caspian Sea;” Armenia, on the other hand, “tends to look north — to Georgia, but most particularly to Russia;” and finally Georgia is engaging with Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey.58 It is therefore difficult to define a regional approach, as the notion of ‘region’ in the South Caucasus is very fluid and the complexity of the relations among the South Caucasus countries as well as their neighbours, result in diverging concepts of regional identity, conflicting security strategies, and incompatible approaches to regional co-operation.

In addition to the role played by the regional actors in the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia co-operate with the EU, based on geographical and cultural proximity and partnership in areas of common interest — mainly energy and infrastructure.59 The EU, however, is the leading actor encouraging regional dialogue in the South Caucasus. As can be seen from the various initiatives revolving around regional co-operation, the EU has shown a preference for a comprehensive regional approach, offering assistance and support to the region, as opposed to individual countries.

The 2007 enlargement of the EU saw the accession of Bulgaria and Romania and brought the EU closer to the “volatile South Caucasus,”60 but the development of the EU initiatives began in the early 1990s, shortly after Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union. The EU became actively involved in the region, offering these countries economic assistance and humanitarian aid.61 Surely it would be misleading to assume that the EU has an intention to expand into the South Caucasus. This was confirmed by Dr. Reisner, who stated Ibid.

Amy Verdun, and Gabriela E. Chira, “The Eastern Partnership: The burial ground of enlargement hopes?,” Comparative European Politics, 9, no. 4-5 (2011): 448-466, 456.

60 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 140.; Kornely Kakachia, “The Lost Empire: Iran’s Cautious Return to Georgia,” Georgian Foreign Policy the Quest for Sustainable Security, ed. Kornely Kakachia, Michael Cecire (Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013), 136.

61 Vasilyan, The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’, 15.

58 59

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that “the South Caucasus region has geostrategic importance for Europe,” which is why it receives a “large amount of attention, that by far exceeds its economic potential and political relevance.”62 The EU’s strategic interest is to have a stable and prosperous neighbourhood, and promoting regional co-operation has been one of the central elements of EU’s foreign policy, based on the premise that replicating its own framework for economic, social and political co-operation and integration and applying it into the neighbouring regions will encourage region-building and resolve regional conflicts.63 The primary drivers behind the EU’s policies in the South Caucasus are building sustainable and lasting peace and security in the region for the purpose of preventing the expansion of regional conflicts into EU territory.

The EU first approached the region by offering Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs) in the 1990s. The PCAs established the political and legal framework for the relations between the countries in the region and the EU in areas of trade, investment, and economic and cultural co-operation and mainly aimed to provide assistance to these countries in their efforts to strengthen democracy and promote economic development.64 In 1991, the EU launched the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, aimed at strengthening the capacity of those countries emerging from the Soviet Union in the fields of market economy and democracy, by providing technical assistance and information exchange.65 The TACIS program also encompassed the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program, which was to promote the establishment of closer trade and economic links by developing the region’s transportation infrastructure.66 Oliver Reisner, (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: Project Manager), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, group interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

63 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 139.

64 Simão, “Region-building in the eastern neighbourhood,” 278.

65 Ibid.

66 Vasilyan, The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’, 16.

62

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Development of road, rail, and telecommunication routes, coupled with the establishment of a single tariff system, was intended to offer rehabilitation to the regional economies and also bring them closer to establishing a regional co-operation framework.67

Numerous European companies became involved in the region, looking to gain access to the energy resources of the Caspian. The EU, therefore, initiated the Inter-State Oil and Gas Europe (INOGATE) program, for the purpose of securing the interests of these companies.68 The aim of the INOGATE program was encouraging investors and financial institutions to become more engaged in the region, and also securing Europe’s energy supply.69 Because of the legacy of the Soviet rule, the region’s economy remains poorly developed and constitutes a relatively small market. Nevertheless, the engagement of transnational capital in gas and oil projects in the South Caucasus and the option of a diversified access to the growing Asian market constitutes an important component of the EU’s foreign policy.70 Within the region, oil and gas production in Azerbaijan has benefited Georgia significantly, as oil and gas pipelines and transportation routes traverse its territory — Georgia has entered into co-operation with Azerbaijan and Turkey on the construction of the BTC and BTE pipelines, as well as the development of the BTK railroad.71 However, the EU, as an external actor actively promoting regional co-operation, aims to establish a framework that would not exclude any particular country from the outset. An elaborate pipeline or transit system would only be stable and contribute to a reemergence of a regional identity if it is all encompassing, which demands the resolution of the ongoing conflicts.

The EU’s growing interest in the South Caucasus is also evident in the appointment of a Special Representative Ibid.

Ibid. 17.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 115.

67 68

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(EUSR) for the South Caucasus in 2003, to represent the EU and promote its interests and policies in the region. The mandate of the EUSR also involves promoting regional co-operation in an effort to achieve stability through capacity building and conflict resolution.72 In 2004, the EU included Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aimed to cultivate more dynamic relationships between the EU and those neighbouring countries which did not have a membership prospect.73 Based on a commitment to shared values — democracy, rule of law, and protection of human rights — and effective implementation of political, economic, and institutional reforms, the ENP provides the South Caucasus countries with the possibility to develop a deeper co-operation with the EU in areas related to politics, security, economy and culture.74 Additionally, the ENP’s aim is to enhance regional integration and cross-border co-operation and prevent conflict.75 Furthermore the EU adopted the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative in 2008, which aims to assist its eastern neighbours — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine — and bring them closer to Europe.76 The EaP involves both a bilateral and a multilateral dimension. The bilateral dimension refers to the relationship between the EU and a partner country through political association, economic integration, mobility, energy and transport co-operation, and economic and social development; whereas the multilateral dimension involves expanding the relationships between the participating countries within the framework for regional co-operation.77 Through the EaP, the EU has offered its eastern neighbours a path towards further integration into the Ibid. 142.

Kakha Gogolashvili, “The South Caucasus: The European Future,” The South Caucasus 2018: Facts, Trends, Future Scenarios, (Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013), 333.

74 Ibid.

75 German, Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus, 142.

76 Ibid., 145.

77 Verdun and Chira, “The Eastern Partnership”, 453-460.

72 73

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EU, assistance in maintaining regional security, and promotion of democratic reforms and economic development.78

Mr. Mirziashvili, however, expressed skepticism regarding the question whether the ENP and the EaP have the potential to deliver all-inclusive regional co-operation in the South Caucasus, because these programs do not have a conflict resolution mandate.79 As opposed to a mechanism for conflict resolution, the EU uses the concept of “discussion.” “In terms of Georgia’s conflicts, before 2008 there were clearly understood conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia. After 2008, an asymmetrical paradigm emerged — Georgians typically see these conflicts as conflicts between Georgia and Russia; the Abkhaz and the Ossetians see themselves as part of that conflict paradigm, as individual entities; whereas Russia claims the role of peacekeeper and is, by definition, not party to these conflicts.”80 Unlike the situation in Nagorno Karabakh, which is a recognized conflict, in Georgia there is a lack of clarity when it comes to conflict resolution. According to a representative from the EUSR’s office in Tbilisi, as a result of the peculiar set of dynamics within the region, the South Caucasus countries become more susceptible to external influence which limits the EU in its mechanisms for achieving effective regional co-operation.81

In order to engage in a transformation of the region, it is necessary that these countries are willing to cooperate. In the case of Georgia, the Euro-Atlantic trajectory provides a great impetus for reform and interest in regional co-operation. The EU negotiates and tries to find a consensus solution between the participants, but as a result of their diverging positions and interests, co-operation is difficult to achieve. In order for the EU to Ibid.

Mirziashvili Mikheil, (Black Sea Peace-Building Project, Crisis Management Initiative: Project Manager), interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 18, 2015.

80 EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

81 Ibid.

78 79

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have leverage in the region, it is necessary that the South Caucasus countries are interested in approximation to Europe.82 The success of the EU’s regional co-operation initiatives has been undermined due to the fact that, unlike Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been largely “passive with respect to EU integration.”83 The interdependency between the countries in the South Caucasus can offer a common ground for bilateral co-operation, but as a result of the “conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the political situation surrounding the region,”84 a positive development is not likely to occur in the near future. In the case of Georgia, while its population does appreciate the South Caucasus, they also consider themselves part of the regional identity of Europe. Armenia and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, are not decisively pro-European at the moment.

However, after careful consideration, one must acknowledge that Armenia, in particular, finds itself in a precarious position. On the topic of the recently made decision to turn down the Association Agreement offered to Armenia by the EU, a representative from the EUSR’s office in Tbilisi indicated that “it was not that Armenia is not European, it was that Yerevan was in a difficult situation and chose to abandon the Association Agreement” — although one may also argue that Yerevan “did not particularly have a choice.”85 In the case of Azerbaijan, which often claims it shares interests and values with Europe, a closer examination of the country raises questions in terms of how compatible Azerbaijan and Europe are.86 But talking principally, anyone can be in a union and be involved in a wider regional co-operation framework, if there is a will to look in that direction. Looking at the EU, a shared identity and the willingness to participate in regional co-operation efforts can, by default, bring these countries together.

Ibid.

Ibid.

84 Mirziashvili Mikheil, (Black Sea Peace-Building Project, Crisis Management Initiative: Project Manager), interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 18, 2015.

85 EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

86 Ibid.

82 83

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The initiatives introduced by the EU into the South Caucasus, however, are primarily based on Europe’s interests in energy and geopolitics. The eastward expansion of the EU has exposed Europe to the instability of the region. Vulnerable to foreign influence and seeking above all to consolidate their position both in a regional and wider context, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia cannot avoid being confronted with the hegemonial ambitions of external political actors, which are to some extent intertwined. As one of the most influential external actors involved, the EU has attempted to resolve the instability in the South Caucasus, resulting from a complex ethnic composition of the region and the multitude of the external actors involved, by encouraging integration and regional co-operation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The region’s significance to the EU, however, is primarily “geopolitical and not cultural.”87 The priorities and main goals of the EU’s approach in the South Caucasus are outlined in various agreements and action plans, however due to the fact that the EU’s programs do not involve the promotion of an overarching regional identity, the relationships between the countries in the region have not been remarkably transformed. Within this context, the emphasis, with respect to a regional framework, not only falls on the question of access to strategic resources, but also on the distribution of roles among regional actors and the different paths of socioeconomic development of each state according to their position in the region.

Throughout its history, the South Caucasus has been the battleground for regional and global actors, and despite the fact that the idea of a South Caucasus identity endures in the world of academia, the region has never been known to project a fully coherent picture. Alongside the Christian Armenia and Georgia, whose traditions can be traced to antiquity, numerous other ethnic groups populate the region. For this reason, the South Caucasus Oliver Reisner, (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: Project Manager), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, group interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

87

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becomes an interface between different worlds and its heterogeneity interferes with the development of a shared identity.88 In an effort to promote their own national interests and corresponding foreign policy priorities, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have primarily sought external co-operation structures, instead of looking to establish such a structure amongst themselves. As stated by Dr. Reisner, the ways in which these countries behave and select their partners and allies is deeply connected to their identity — the way they see themselves, their traditions, and their history and how they want to be perceived by others is all “related to identity and identity is something that can be manipulated, instrumentalized, and is changeable.”89 That is precisely what Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have done in the past and what they continue to do today. Projecting a distinct national identity, disassociated from the identities of their neighbours, allows the countries in the South Caucasus to represent themselves as unique.90 “To some extent, identities create opportunities and constraints for foreign policymaking, and can also help frame relations between countries.”91

Each country depends on others in order to find reassurance of its own identity, mainly by emphasizing the differences that divide them and linking their national narratives to countries other than those in the region itself. These countries are trying to legitimize their own identity while also seeking to join a wider community, albeit one that exists outside of the South Caucasus region. Armenia is fundamentally a Russian client state, Wolfgang Kaschuba, “Old and New Europe: Representations, Imaginations, Stagings,” Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States, ed. Tsypylma Darieva, Wolfgang Kaschuba (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2007), 35.

89 Oliver Reisner, (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: Project Manager), interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, group interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

90 Jörg Baberowski, “Representations of the National on the Fringes of Europe,” Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States, ed. Tsypylma Darieva, Wolfgang Kaschuba (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 342.

91 Kakachia, “European, Asian, or Eurasian?”,41.

88

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Azerbaijan fosters a feeling of cultural and ethnic kinship with Turkey, and Georgia is restlessly trying to strengthen its link to Europe.92 Consequently, a genuine regional co-operation and an understanding of a shared regional identity between the three countries has largely been undermined by the fact that they are all looking outwards, away from the region and towards external actors, rather than towards each other. While their main focus has been the solidification of their national identities, the South Caucasus countries have also been quite pragmatic when choosing their allies and partners in their immediate neighbourhood.

Within the region, Armenia has maintained its relationship with Georgia, while its relationship with Azerbaijan has been corrupted by the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, because the political elites as well as the populations of these countries have been deeply influenced by this conflict. As the Yerevan governing elite is dominated by Armenians from the Karabakh region and Azerbaijan is ruled by the so-called Nakhichevan clan, the identities of both nations have been shaped through the prism of the Karabakh conflict.93 Neither party is ready to compromise â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the status quo serves both Yerevan and Baku, and the ordinary population is ready for a war. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, like Armenia, has continued its co-operation with Georgia, which therefore occupies an advantageous position, cultivating relationships with both of its South Caucasus neighbours. Georgiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationship with Christian Armenia (and similarly with Russia) is, however, worse when compared to its relationship with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which are both Muslim countries.

The bilateral co-operation between Georgia and Azerbaijan, which relies on Georgia to transport oil and gas to Europe, and between Georgia and Armenia, which caught between Azerbaijan and Turkey, has no open border and uses Georgia to access the Black Sea and Russia, establishes a framework of interdependency Ryan Grist, (Deputy Head of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM)), interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 21, 2015.

93 De Waal, The Caucasus, 125-128.

92

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in the region.94 This interdependency offers a common ground for multilateral co-operation and a concept of regionalism, but due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, co-operation is prevented between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and development is unlikely to occur in the near future. Because of security concerns and a strained relationship with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia refuses to abandon its co-operation with Russia. However, as an alternative to the hegemonial projects of other external actors in the South Caucasus, the EU’s approach involves co-operation in areas of trade, economic approximation, and also geopolitics and considerations of security policy. Most importantly, the EU’s approach is unique because of its use of “soft-power.”95 The European project in the South Caucasus is specific to the region, contains a large civil society component, and sets forth a lengthy process for approximation to fundamental features of European society — welfare state dimension, ability to fulfil the conditions for joining the European community, economic criteria, etc. — but fails to promote a concept of regional identity.96 Nevertheless, the geopolitical dimension occupies a primary position — EU’s engagement in these countries is focused primarily on securing the energy supply in the form of pipeline projects for supplying oil from the Caspian to Europe, and building sustainable and lasting peace and security. As an external power that is not seeking to dominate the region, the EU should strengthen its role as an advocate of intercultural dialogue and a common regional identity.

With regard to fostering a vision of a shared community, little has been included in the EU’s strategies for promoting regional cooperation to suggest that these countries will be able to tackle the existing obstacles under current conditions, even with international EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

95 Haydar Efe, “Foreıgn Polıcy of the European Unıon Towards the South Caucasus,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3, no. 17 (2012): 187-199, 193.

96 Syuzanna Vasilyan, “‘Moral power’ as objectification of the ‘civilian’/ ‘normative’ ‘EUlogy’: the European Union as a conflict-dealer in the South Caucasus,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 17, no. 3 (2014): 397–424, 400.

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help.97 An all-encompassing regional co-operation framework between these countries will only be possible once a comprehensive context of a region and an understanding of regional identity is solidified. If the countries in the South Caucasus lack a mutual framework of orientation, which is fundamentally connected to the development of a regional co-operation and integration mechanism, the relationships between them will remain fraught.

Inter-ethnic conflict and incompatible foreign policy orientations in the South Caucasus stand in the way of building sustainable peace and security in the region. This also prevents the reinforcement of a regional identity and the establishment of an inclusive regional cooperation framework. This, however, does not mean all hope is lost.

There is still much the EU can do, simply by modifying its approach to the South Caucasus, to improve the ties that bind the Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, in order to generate peace and cultivate prosperity for all people in the region.

Bibliography Babayan, Nelli. ““Fear or Love Thy Neighbour”? The EU Framework for Promoting Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus.” Journal of Contemporary European Research. no.1 (2012): 40-56.

Baberowski, Jörg. Representations of the National on the Fringes of Europe. Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States. Edited by Tsypylma Darieva, Wolfgang Kaschuba. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2007.

Cheterian, Vicken. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics. New York: Columbia University Press, EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative, interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype), February 24, 2015.

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2008.

Cornell, Svante E. . Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. Richmond, England: Curzon Press, 2001.

De Waal, Thomas. The Caucasus: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Efe, Haydar. “Foreıgn Polıcy of the European Unıon Towards the South Caucasus.” International Journal of Business and Social Science. no. 17 (2012): 187-199.

EUSR for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia: Regional Office Representative. February 24, 2015.

German, Tracey. Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus: Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives?. London: Ashgate, 2012.

Grist, Ryan. Deputy Head of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM). February 21, 2015.

Ismailov, Eldar, and Vladimer Papava. “A new concept for the Caucasus.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. no. 3 (2008): 283–298.

Jones, Stephen, and Levan Kakhishvili. The Interregnum: Georgian Foreign Policy from Independence to the Rose Revolution. Georgian Foreign Policy the Quest for Sustainable Security. Edited by Kornely Kakachia, Michael Cecire. Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013.

Kakachia, Kornely. European, Asian, or Eurasian?: Georgian Identity and the Struggle for Euro-Atlantic Integration. Georgian 122

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Foreign Policy the Quest for Sustainable Security. Edited by Kornely Kakachia, Michael Cecire. Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013.

Kakachia, Kornely. The Lost Empire: Iran’s Cautious Return to Georgia. Georgian Foreign Policy the Quest for Sustainable Security.

Edited by Kornely Kakachia, Michael Cecire. Tbilisi: KonradAdenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013.

Kaschuba, Wolfgang. Old and New Europe: Representations, Imaginations, Stagings. Representations on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian States.

Edited by Tsypylma Darieva, Wolfgang Kaschuba. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2007.

Kirvalidze, Ana. “A Common Future and a Common Identity: The Transformation Process of Political and Social Identities in the South Caucasus Countries.” Journal of US-China Public Administration. no. 12 (2013): 1160-1173.

Gogolashvili, Kakha. The South Caucasus: The European Future.

The South Caucasus 2018: Facts, Trends, Future Scenarios. Tbilisi: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2013.

Mikheil, Mirziashvili. Black Sea Peace-Building Project, Crisis Management Initiative: Project Manager. February 18, 2015.

Reisner, Oliver. Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: Project Manager. February 16, 2015.

Simão, Licínia. “Region-building in the eastern neighbourhood: assessing EU regional policies in the South Caucasus.” East European Politics. no. 3 (2013): 237-288.

Steinbach, Udo. Turkey’s Policies in Its Historical Hinterland. The South Caucasus 2021: Oil, Democracy, and Geopolitics. Edited by 123

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Fariz Ismailzade, Glen E. Howard. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2012.

Vasilyan, Syuzanna. “‘Moral power’oas objectification of the ‘civilian’/ ‘normative’ ‘EUlogy’: the European Union as a conflictdealer in the South Caucasus.” Journal of International Relations and Development. no. 3 (2014): 397–424.

Vasilyan, Syuzanna. The Policy of ‘Regional Co-operation in the South Caucasus’. Working paper., Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales: Área CEI y Países Bálticos, 2006. http://edoc1. bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_ derivate_00001901/The Policy of Regional Co-operation.pdf.

Verdun, Amy, and Gabriela E. Chira. “The Eastern Partnership: The burial ground of enlargement hopes?.” Comparative European Politics. no. 4-5 (2011): 448-466.

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CITIZENS OF GEORGIA? THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL & RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN GEORGIA Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés 1. Introduction

Georgia is currently undergoing a major transformation in many aspects due to its association with the European Union (EU) and European institutions. This includes the inclusion, integration and protection of Georgia’s national (ethnic) and religious minority groups. The EU’s increased relations with Georgia are positively affecting Georgia’s treatment of its minority groups, as it has increased the number of laws and institutions created to guarantee, protect and aid national and religious minorities. However, there are still major issues within Georgia in properly integrating its minority groups, including the lack of implementation of these laws, the lack of political will to address issues of discrimination, and the major role of the Orthodox Church in hindering any progress in minority integration. This paper will begin with current minority rights legislation in Georgia, and then it will focus on the successes and issues facing national and religious minorities.

Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés is in her fourth and final year of her Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and European Studies at the University of Toronto.

Her interests include European Union foreign relations, peacekeeping, and the EU enlargement process in Southeastern Europe. In the summer of 2015, she will be completing an internship at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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2. Minority Rights Legislation in Georgia

Georgia today has a variety of national and religious minorities. The biggest national minority group is the Azeri population, who compactly live the Kvemo Kartli region, making up 45% of the population of that region.1 The second largest national minority group in Georgia is the Armenian population, who compactly live in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region and make up 54.6% of the population in the region.2 The largest religious minorities are the Muslim community, who make up 9.9% of the population, the Armenian Apostolic Church community, which makes up 3.9% of the population, and other traditional religious groups in Georgia such as Catholics and Jews.3

Georgia currently has numerous legislative measures to protect both religious and national minorities. The Georgian Constitution guarantees equality for all citizens, stating under Article 14,“Everyone is free by birth and is equal before law regardless of race, colour, language, sex, religion, political and other opinions, national ethnic and social belonging, origin, property and title, place of residence.”4 The Constitution also guarantees protection against national and ethnic discrimination, stating under Article 38,

Citizens of Georgia shall be equal in social, economic, cultural and political life irrespective of their national, ethnic, religious or linguistic belonging. In accordance with universally recognised principles and rules of international law, they shall have the right to develop freely, without any discrimination and interference, their culture, and to use their mother tongue in private and in public.5

The Government of Georgia’s Office of the State Minister

Government of Georgia, “Ethnic Groups in Georgia: Census 2002.” 2002.

Ibid.

3 ECRI Secretariat. ECRI Report on Georgia (fourth Monitoring Cycle). Rep. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2010. 25.

4 Constitution of Georgia. August 24, 1995. Art. 14.

5 Ibid, Art. 38.

1 2

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for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, in order to address the implementation of the state policy towards national minorities, implements the National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration and Action Plan (NCAP).6 The latest Action Plan was for 2009 until 2014, so it recently expired and as mentioned by a member of the Ministry, they are “in the process of elaboration of a new strategy and Action Plan” and “it will be presented in the upcoming months” of 2015 to NGOs and experts and then “introduced to the Government for adoption.”7 The Office also prepares an assessment document of the NCAP, which “was very important for getting the results of the policies that have been implemented” and uses those findings to prepare the new Strategy and Action Plan.8 The NCAP is seen as a step in the right direction for Georgia, since the Government supports it, it is very clear, it created greater cooperation between government ministries, and it expresses the political willingness of the government that this issue is high on their agenda.9 The NCAP and its assessment documents are translated into two national minority languages, Armenian and Azeri.10 This is meant to help inform national minority populations about their rights and what is going on in the country.11

Another important law that has been stressed by all NGOs and government agencies is the legislation on “Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination,” also known simply as the “AntiDiscrimination Law,” which was adopted in 2014.12 The law is meant “to eliminate every form of discrimination” and “to ensure equal rights” to all citizens of Georgia, irrespective of: “race, skin colour, language, sex, age, citizenship, origin, place of birth or Tina Gogheliani, Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés, personal interview, Tbilisi, Georgia, 20 Feb. 2015.

7 Ibid.

8 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

9 Rusudan Chanturia, United Nations Association of Georgia, Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés, personal interview, Tbilisi, 19 Feb. 2015.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination. 2 May, 2014. Art. 1.

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residence, property or social status, religion or belief, nations, ethnic or social origin, profession, marital status, health, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, political or other opinions, or other characteristics.”13 Georgia also signed and ratified important international legal documents protecting minorities. Georgia ratified the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 2005, which committed Georgia to protecting its national minority population.14 This Convention also protects minorities’ rights to education and the right to speak their language, while also having the right to learn the official language.15 Other important documents that Georgia has adopted are the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and Georgia, which was recently signed in 2014.

These documents reaffirm the EU’s commitment to Georgia and include provisions that obligate Georgia to protect and integrate minority groups.16 Currently, the Government is working towards visa-liberalisation between Georgia and the EU, which would be a big step for Georgia towards EU integration.17

Finally, Georgia also ratified the United Nations (UN) International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1999.18 This Convention affirms Georgia’s international obligation to advance its minority population and prohibit all forms of discrimination.19 In addition to this commitment, in 2010, Georgia “reported under the Universal Ibid.

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe.

Feb. 1995. Preamble.

15 Ibid, Art. 14.

16 Association Agreement, European Union. 30 Aug. 2014. Preamble.

17 Mariam Rakviashvili, Deputy State Minister for European & Euro-Atlantic Integration, University of Toronto ICM Students, Group interview, Tbilisi, 17 Feb. 2014.

18 Bunafsha Gulakova, Nino Khurtsidze. “Evaluation of EU support to the integration of minorities in Georgia.” Oct. 2014. 5.

19 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, United Nations, 4 Jan 1969, Arts. 1 & 2.

13 14

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Periodic Review to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)” and “received 163 recommendations of which 96 were accepted instantly, 5 were immediately rejected and 62 were set aside for later examination.”20 Therefore, based on current legislation, Georgia is on the right track in protecting and integrating minorities.

3. National Minorities

Georgia has made some progress in integrating and protecting the rights of national minorities, particularly in the field of higher education. The Government of Georgia, in order to address the issue of language barriers affecting national minorities’ access to higher education, established a quota system in 2010 to support national minority entrants.21 This quota system gave national minorities the option to take general skills tests required for higher education in Armenian, Azerbaijani, Ossetian or Abkhazian languages.22 The person taking the tests is only allowed to write one test in their native language and the outcome of this result determines whether they must take a Georgian language preparatory program.23 After completing this yearlong program, students could transition to a bachelor’s program at a university.24 In addition, the quota system ensures that universities allocate 5% of admissions for Armenian and Azerbaijani students, and 1% for Ossetian and Abkhazian students.25 However, based on the results from the 2010-2013 entrance exams, 27.8% of Armenian and Azerbaijani applicants failed the general skills exam, with significantly lower results than those from the Georgian and Russian-speaking applicants.26 According to assessments of the Bunafsha Gulakova, Nino Khurtsidze, 5.

Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

22 Natia Gorgadze , Shalva Tabatadze.”Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Quota System in Georgia.” 2013. 8.

23 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

24 Natia Gorgadze , Shalva Tabatadze, 9.

25 Ibid, 8.

26 Ibid, 10.

20 21

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quota system, this “underlines the problems of quality of general education in non-Georgian schools,” which are funded by the state.27 However, despite this statistic, “the number of entrants with ethnic minority background as well as enrolled ethnic minority students at the Georgian Institutions of Higher education has significantly increased.”28 The best results come from the Azeri population. Between 2010-2013, the numbers of Azeri entrants tripled, from around 300 to over 1,000 students.29 However, the Armenian entrants do not have the same success rate.30 The Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality answered that it was perhaps the proximity of the Azeri population to Tbilisi.31 Kvemo Kartli, a region with a large Azeri population, is closer to Tbilisi than Samtskhe-Javakheti, which makes it more feasible for the Azeri community to travel back and forth in one day. This makes it easier for them to access universities in Tbilisi than it would be for the Armenian community.32 Therefore, the quota system is a good practice by Georgia in solving the issue of access to higher education, since it is directly linked to employability, and thus, integration.33 However, there is still only a small number of minorities in the higher education sector, but hopefully this will change over time.

In addition to education, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been connecting young people from different ethnicities in Georgia through summer schools and exchange programs.34 Inter-regional exchanges bring young people from Western Georgia to one of the national minority regions of Kvemo Kartli or Samtskhe-Javakheti, and vice versa, where they Ibid.

Ibid, 17.

29 Ibid, 9.

30 Ibid.

31 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

32 Ibid.

33 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

34 Ibid.

27 28

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participate in a homestay.35 This has been a successful project, since it builds tolerance and friendship, and it also demonstrates to the majority population that national minorities are similar to them, only with some different traditions.36

While there have been successful projects, national minorities are still facing many obstacles towards national integration, including language barriers, lack of political participation, and migrant issues. One of the major issues that still have not been resolved is the language barrier between national minorities and the Georgian majority. The national minorities with the biggest language barrier are the Armenian and Azeri populations.37 Other minorities such as the Ossetians, Abkhazians and Russians have a good command of the Georgian language and integrate well in Georgian society.38

During the Soviet era, the Armenian and Azeri communities living in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli were isolated and were only taught the state language (Russian) and their own language of Armenian or Azeri.39 After Georgian independence, there were no real efforts in educating Georgian to these communities since there were no resources, and because of this, these communities remained isolated.40 Today, teaching Georgian as a second language has become a priority of the NCAP.41 This includes the “Teach Georgian as a Second Language” program, which assigns qualified Georgian language and literature teachers to the non-Georgian language schools in SamtskheIbid.

Ibid.

37 Fernando Garcés de los Fayos. “Minorities in the South Caucasus: New Visibility amid old frustrations.” European Parliament. June 2014.18.

38 Levan Kakhishvili, Tato Khundadze. Caucasian House. Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. personal interview. Tbilisi. 19 Feb. 2015.

39 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

40 Oliver Reisner. European External Action Service. University of Toronto ICM Students, Group interview, Tbilisi, 16 Feb. 2015.

41 “Assessment Document on the Implementation of the National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration and Action Plan for 2009-2014.” Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality., June 2014. 64.

35 36

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Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Kakheti in order to teach students Georgian.42 However, there was the issue of not being able to find enough qualified teachers who knew the minority languages.43 While some national minorities have started to learn Georgian, there is still a major lack of knowledge of the language in these areas, since towns with a majority population of Armenians or Azeris will only speak Armenian or Azeri.44 According to the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, only 30% of national minorities can understand Georgian.45 As there is no one in the government controlling this issue currently, many national minorities are not properly learning Georgian.46 In addition, there has been a decline in non-Georgian language schools. According to the 2009 Law of General Education, there are supposed to be 234 non-Georgian language schools and 170 nonGeorgian language sectors in the country.47 However, according to the latest assessment of the NCAP, there are only 213 non-Georgian language schools and 77 non-Georgian language sectors.48 This is particularly worrisome for the Russian-speaking minority community, who have had their schools cut by one third, from 135 schools in 2009, to 52 in 2013.49 This demonstrates that while the Georgian government has laws to protect linguistic rights of national minorities, implementation is not up to par.

One major issue behind the language barrier is the Georgian governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lack of signing and ratifying the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML). Georgia has committed to signing and ratifying the ECRML, but so far, no action has been taken in fulfilling this commitment.50 The Ibid.

Rusudan Chanturia,19 Feb. 2015.

44 Ibid.

45 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

46 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

47 Assessment Document on the Implementation of the NCAP 2009-2014. 42.

48 Ibid, 43.

49 Ibid, 44.

50 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

42 43

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government is reluctant to ratify the ECRML because they are afraid that it will give national minorities an incentive to create separatist movements in their regions.51 Also, the Georgian government is having issues with selecting the languages in which Georgia will commit to in the ECRML.52 The Council of Europe is currently focusing on this issue, with the aim to convince the Georgian government to ratify this important document.53 In sum, despite government projects, there seems to be either a problem with implementing projects and laws aimed at eliminating the language barrier, or there is simply a lack of political will to do so, as seen with the ECRML.

Another major issue facing the national minority community is the lack of participation of national minorities in the Georgian government. National minorities are represented by the Council of Ethnic Minorities in the Public Defender’s Office, and consist of all types of national minorities, including small populations of national minorities who live in Georgia but are not well represented in Georgian society.54 The Council ensures that all national minorities have their voices heard and advocates their issues regarding the treatment of national minorities to the Government of Georgia.55 While issues are brought up to the government, there are still issues with how the government is responding to them.56 The government is not adequately responding to issues of ethnic discrimination and while there are laws that prohibit such discrimination from occurring, there has not been any action by the Government in effectively implementing such laws and prosecuting those who are committing such crimes.57 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. European Centre for Minority Issues. David Kitai, Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal Interview. 20 Feb. 2015..

52 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

53 Alessandro Savaris. Council of Europe. University of Toronto ICM Students. Group Interview. 16 Feb. 2015.

54 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Eka Chitanava. Tolerance and Diversity Institute. Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal 51

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In terms of legislative representation, minorities are poorly represented. According to a briefing from the European Parliament, in the 150-member Georgian Parliament, there are only three Armenians and three Azeris representing the national minority community.58 This also harms the needs of other national minorities, such as the Ossetian, Russian and other small minority groups. Since they do not get any representation in government, their issues are ignored.59 There is also no political will to increase the number of national minorities in the Georgian government, since the current government knows that the minority population will vote for these representatives over the government’s own.60 In some cases, the ruling party coerces the national minority communities into voting.61 In addition, very few national minorities occupy senior positions in the government, and there has never been an ethnic Armenian or Azeri governor in the SamtskheJavakheti or Kvemo Kartli regions.62 This clearly demonstrates the lack of political will to allow national minorities to govern using their own civilians and demonstrates how the government of Georgia needs to give more mid to high-level positions to national minorities. Over the years, political participation of minorities has not increased.63 Regional or territorial political parties are prohibited in Georgia under the Law on Political Unions of Citizens in order to “prevent secessionist movements in regions which are densely populated by minorities,” but the major parties of Georgia do not include nor tackle minority issues while in office or during elections.64 Therefore, this demonstrates how the law is repressing national minorities from participating in Georgian democracy, and Interview. 17 Feb. 2015.

58 Fernando Garcés de los Fayos,20.

59 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

60 Elene Chkheidze. International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. University of Toronto ICM Students. Group Interview. Tbilisi. 18 Feb. 2015.

61 Levan Kakhishvili, Tato Khundadze. 19 Feb. 2015.

62 Fernando Garcés de los Fayos,20.

63 Elene Chkheidze. 18 Feb 2015.

64 Fernando Garcés de los Fayos, 20.

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due to this, there is a general sentiment among national minorities that they have been abandoned by the central government.65 According to NGOs and state ministries, Georgian political parties need to pay attention to national minorities and get them involved in public office.66

Lack of communication and access to information from the government helps to explain the lack of participation. One example of this is the communication of the Government to national minorities about the EU. According to the Deputy State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, the government is creating tailor-made messages about the benefits and challenges of EU integration to all groups, including national minorities.67 However, NGOs and the EU disagree with this comment and indicate that “a very low awareness” among minorities about the EU.68 Therefore, there is a contradiction between the government’s communication policies and the realities of what is actually being communicated to national minorities. This is harming Georgia’s integration efforts with the EU, since national minorities are unaware of the EU’s benefits for Georgia and due to this lack of communication by the government, they have become weary of EU integration efforts.69

Political representation also reverts back to the language barrier between national minorities and the Georgian majority.

According to Georgian law, in order to participate in government, the citizen, regardless of their ethnic heritage, must know the Georgian language.70 This is a major issue since many in the Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions do not know the language.

Local Armenians and Azeris run their local municipalities, even though they do not know Georgian, but they work there anyways, Alessandro Savaris. 16 Feb. 2015 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

67 Mariam Rakviashvili, 17 Feb. 2014.

68 Boris Iarochevitch. EU Delegation to Georgia. University of Toronto ICM Students.

Group Interview. Tbilisi. 18 Feb. 2015.

69 Ibid.

70 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

65 66

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which shows a discrepancy between what the law says and how it is implemented.71

Finally, another big issue surrounding national minorities is related to migrant workers. According to the Council of Europe, a pressing issue for Georgia is the law that bans dual citizenship.72 This has been particularly affecting the Armenian community, as many originally have either Armenian or Russian passports in addition to their Georgian one.73 Due to high unemployment rates, especially in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, many Armenians migrate to Armenia or Russia for seasonal jobs and then return to Georgia.74 However, Armenians have their Georgian passports revoked now due to the new citizenship law, which makes these workers leave Georgia every three months.75 This is creating tensions within the Armenian community in Georgia and causes a major citizenship issue for the country. Before the quota system for higher education was introduced in Georgia, there were also a lot of young minorities migrating to Armenia or Azerbaijan for higher education, since they already knew the language.76 This created an exodus of young people in Georgia, since those who would gain an education in Armenia or Azerbaijan often would not come back to Georgia.77 This in turn created tensions between the Georgian majority and national minorities. The quota system has helped resolve this issue slightly, but there are still many who leave Georgia for better education, so the government should do more to resolve this issue once and for all.

The issue of dual citizenship is viewed mostly through a security lens. According to the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the fact that Russia is giving Ibid.

Alessandro Savaris. 16 Feb. 2015.

73 Ibid.

74 Giorgi Lomsadze, “The Caucasus Concerned over Born-Again Russians.” Eurasianet.org.

April 23, 2014.

75 Oliver Reisner. 16 Feb. 2014.

76 Rusudan Chanturia, 19 Feb. 2015.

77 Ibid.

71 72

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Armenians Russian passports is causing concerns that there are political motives behind it, especially since Russia is also providing Russian passports to the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.78 This is causing a fear that the regions of Georgia with a majority of national minorities will want to break away due to Russian influence.79 Another ethnic group seriously affected by the security lens is the Meskhetian Turk population that is currently trying to be repatriated to Georgia.80 There have been laws and projects with the Council of Europe in repatriating this minority group, but so far there has been a serious lack of implementation, due to a lack of political will and the fears that it will cause a security issue for Georgia.81

The EU is affecting Georgia’s policies of integrating minorities by using the visa-liberalisation agreement as leverage to make the government of Georgia address and further include its national minority population in Georgia’s social, political and economic life.82 Georgia is trying to show that they are a good, European country in order to get the visa-liberalisation agreement.

In order to demonstrate this, the government is adopting reforms and new laws, such as the Anti-Discrimination Law.83 The Council of Europe noted how it was not the public who pushed for the AntiDiscrimination Law; rather, it was the Council of Europe and the EU.84 Thus, the only reason why the Anti-Discrimination Law was even introduced was because of Georgia’s relations with the EU.85 The EU is in turn, pushing for more minority rights because they do not want minorities from Georgia coming to the EU seeking asylum.86 While the EU is influencing the Georgian government, Irakli Kobalia & Levan Tsutskiridze. 17 Feb. 2015.

Ibid.

80 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

81 Ibid.

82 Alessandro Savaris. 16 Feb. 2015.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Levan Kakhishvili, Tato Khundadze. 19 Feb. 2015.

86 Boris Iarochevitch. 18 Feb. 2015.

78 79

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the EU itself has very vague criteria in integrating minorities, and their influence in actually affecting how Georgia is integrating its national minority population is hard to evaluate.87 4. Religious Minorities

A worrying trend is the increase of violence towards the Muslim community in the Adjara region over the past few years.

The Council of Europe has noted that in 2013-2014, there was an increase in intolerance towards the Muslim population in Adjara specifically, but also other areas of Georgia in which they inhabit.88 According to the Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), religious freedom deteriorated in Georgia and the number of offences committed on the grounds of religious intolerance has skyrocketed over the last two years.89 In 2012, there were around 11-16 cases, but in 2013 and 2014, the number of cases rose to 50-60 cases.90 According to the TDI’s report on religious discrimination, there were several episodes since 2013, “when the population of Samtatskaro and neighbouring villages obstructed the Muslim community to conduct the worship through verbal abuse, blockade of the road and threats.”91 What is worrying about this trend is that is not just Orthodox civilians mistreating the Muslim population, but it is also members of the local government who are not trying to prevent violence towards the Muslim community.92 There was a case in 2013 in a village called Chela, where the minaret of the local mosque was removed.93 During this case, members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs used extensive force to remove the minaret as well as physically and verbally abusing representatives of Levan Kakhishvili, Tato Khundadze. 19 Feb. 2015.

Alessandro Savaris. 16 Feb. 2015.

89 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

90 Ibid.

91 “Study of Religious Discrimination and Constitutional Secularism.” Tolerance and Diversity Institute. 2014. 46.

92 Ibid.

93 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

87 88

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the Muslim community who were trying to protect the mosque.94 In this case, the direct perpetrators of violations against the Muslim community were public officials.95 There was another incident in Kobuleti, a town in Adjara, where Muslim students were trying to move to a new boarding school, and the local Orthodox population responded by blocking them and nailing the head of a pig to the door of the boarding school.96 The main issue behind these incidents is that they are happening due to the lack of investigation of these events.97 In a few cases, investigation brought to court but investigation was either terminated or not initiated.98 This lack of investigation is causing more incidents of religious intolerance to happen.99 Therefore, even though Georgia’s constitution guarantees the rights of religious minorities, this is not properly implemented in society. It is even more worrying to see that public officials are involved in committing violence towards religious minorities and this is an issue the EU needs to investigate.

There is a lack of investigation because there is a lack of political will to investigate public officials and the majority Georgian civilians.100 Public officials are quite biased and are more willing to aid the Orthodox Christian community more than religious minority communities.101 This is seen with a case where Jehovah’s Witnesses were trying to build a house of worship in a Georgian village.102 Their request for constructing the house was illegally terminated by the local municipal government.103 It was terminated because of a complaint from a local Christian man who was living near the proposed construction site and stated that Ibid.

Study of Religious Discrimination and Constitutional Secularism. 47.

96 “Scene of religious controversy in Kobuleti,” Human Rights House. 16 Oct. 2014.

97 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

98 Study of Religious Discrimination and Constitutional Secularism. 50.

99 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

100 “Assessment of the Needs of Religious Organizations in Georgia.” Tolerance and Diversity Institute. 2014. 14.

101 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

94 95

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it would damage his building.104 However, local authorities never investigated whether this statement was true and instead were motivated to terminate the construction permit because of the protests by the local Christian population.105 Therefore, there is no political will within the local municipalities to protect the rights of the religious minorities living within their constituencies.

These incidents are also happening because of how the Georgian population views religious minorities, mainly through the traditional, Orthodox and security lens. According to the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), there has been an increase in violence towards religious minorities because of the belief that in order to be Georgian, civilians must be Orthodox Christians.106 Therefore, to Georgians, the religious minorities are regarded as foreigners. They perceive security threats stem from mainly the Muslim community, especially with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).107 This is due to the fact that there have been some radical Kists, a Chechen subethos in Georgia, who have left Georgia and became prominent soldiers for ISIS.108 Another reason why the Muslim community is viewed as a security threat is because of Turkey. Turkey is currently setting up religious foundations and schools in Adjara, which is creating a fear within Georgia that Turkey is trying to gain more influence in Adjara, maybe in order to gain it as Turkish territory.109

The government, in order to address these issues of religious intolerance and to align with EU regulations, recently created the State Agency for Religious Issues.110 This state agency was made under the auspices of the Prime Minister and focuses solely on religious issues.111 While this was a step in the right direction for Ibid.

Ibid.

106 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

107 Alessandro Savaris. 16 Feb. 2015.

108 Ibid.

109 Oliver Reisner. 16 Feb. 2014 110 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

111 Ibid.

104 105

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ELIZABETH TUDOR-BEZIĂ&#x2030;S

the Georgian government, many NGOs state that this body is unnecessary.112 According to the Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), the state agency is not helpful for religious minorities because state officials never consulted with representatives from religious minority groups when setting it up.113 One representative body in particular is the Council of Religions, which is under the auspices of the Public Defender and represents all religious minorities in Georgia.114 There is also a Tolerance Centre under auspices of the Public Defender of Georgia. As a result, most issues pertaining to minority rights should be able to be addressed under these two bodies.115 In addition, this agency is not needed since all of the issues concerning religious intolerance can be solved through current legislation, but it is simply the lack of political will that is preventing these issues from being solved.116 Therefore, this state agency is not needed and instead, local NGOs promoting religious minority issues believe that the state agency was actually created to regulate religious organisations and intimidate them from publicising their grievances.117

The government also has on the table in parliament a bill that would punish statements inciting religious feuds, also known as the hate speech bill.118 This bill would punish those who make any statements that would incite religious feuds or violence due to religious, ethnic or racial backgrounds.119 The Orthodox Church is supporting this bill, but NGOs fear that this bill could be used against religious minority critics of the Orthodox Church.

Instead, they also cite, it is just another law that is covering up the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lack of implementation of current legislation.120 This Ibid.

Ibid.

114 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

112 113

115

Study of Religious Discrimination and Constitutional Secularism. 15.

Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

117 Ibid.

118 Tina Gogheliani, 20 Feb. 2015.

119 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

120 Ibid.

116

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is a fear among NGOs because the Orthodox Church has been trying to pass this type of law since 2013, when more people began to criticise the role of the Orthodox Church after priests attacked LGBT protesters during their 17 May 2013 demonstration.121 This push for this law is seen then as a way for the Orthodox Church to attempt to legally suppress those who criticise them based on their actions towards minorities. The Orthodox Church also played on fears of the Muslim community about the increase of Islamophobia following the Charlie Hebdo shootings in France, and chose that timing to push for the law to be tabled.122

While the government has been creating laws to comply with EU standards, the Orthodox Church is not helping with religious tolerance, and this is causing some major issues within social acceptance of religious minorities. The Anti-Discrimination law, which is meant to help religious minorities, was watered down due to the Orthodox Church disagreeing with various articles.123 This includes the fact that the Public Defender’s Office is in charge of overseeing the implementation of the law, however it cannot “impose any penalties or obligatory measures” regarding those who violate the law.124 This is a change from the original draft of the law, which created an Inspector who would “investigate allegations of discrimination…as well as refer cases to criminal prosecution authorities for further action.”125 The watering down of this law is worrisome for religious minorities because it is not clear who is in charge of prosecuting discriminatory acts, or even if these acts will be investigated. Another act that watered down the law is the clause that states, “none of the articles of the law should be interpreted contrary to the 2002 Constitutional Agreement between Georgia and the Georgian Orthodox Church.”126 This means that measures Ibid.

Ibid.

123 Irakli Kobalia & Levan Tsutskiridze. 17 Feb. 2015.

124 “The Georgian Authorities Should Not Water Down the Country’s First Anti-Discrimination Bill” Amnesty International 24 April 2014.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

121 122

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such as the Orthodox Church’s state funding cannot be overturned, despite the obvious discrimination demonstrated towards religious minorities.127 Therefore, even though the Anti-Discrimination law is supposed to be a big step towards EU integration, the alterations of the law by the Orthodox Church caused it to be ineffective towards advancing the rights of religious minorities. In addition, statements from the Orthodox Church can range from promoting tolerance, to very discriminatory statements on how to treat minorities.128

Another big issue for religious minorities is the unequal funding of religious institutions and the repatriation of religious buildings. The Orthodox Church and the Georgian state signed a constitutional agreement, which committed the state to give 25 million Georgian Lari (GEL) to the Orthodox Church each year.129 In addition to state funding, the Orthodox Church also receives money from local municipalities.130 The problem with this agreement was that no similar funding was given to other religious organisations and that the Orthodox Church spending is not transparent, meaning that no one knows where this state funding goes.131 In 2014, the Government announced that they would fund four other religious organisations, issuing 3.5-4.5 million GEL to the Catholic, Jewish, Armenian Apostolic and Muslim institutions.132 The issue with this state funding is that it only goes towards four religious organisations and it is not even close to matching the amount of funding the Orthodox Church receives from the state.133 The current constitution is also discriminatory since it gives the Georgian Orthodox Church such a privileged Ibid.

Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

129 Levan Kakhishvili, Tato Khundadze. 19 Feb. 2015.

130 “Assessment of the Needs of Religious Organizations in Georgia.” 71.

131 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

132 Giorgi Lomsadze “Georgia Diversifies Funding for Religion” Eurasianet.org. 28 Jan. 2014 133 “Assessment of the Needs of Religious Organizations in Georgia.” 68.

127 128

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position in the state and official legal status.134 Therefore, while the Government has made a good step towards addressing this inequality, a lot more needs to be done, which could include either proportionally funding each religious institution, or not funding any religious organisations whatsoever. This would mean obtaining either enough political will to change or eliminate the agreement within the constitution, but based on the majority of the population’s support of the Orthodox Church, such a feat would be near impossible.

Another issue linked to this is the restitution of property that belonged to religious institutions but was seized by the Soviet government. After the fall of the Soviet government, religious organisations were permitted to apply for restitution of their previous buildings.135 However, this process has been severely delayed or stopped sometimes by the Orthodox Church and now, religious minorities “face systematic difficulties in gaining construction permits for buildings intended for both religious and non-religious purposes.”136 On many occasions, the Orthodox Church will also apply for the restitution of the same building, which freezes the entire process, or else the Orthodox Church will win the case.137 In Tbilisi, a case exactly as such is occurring between a building that used to be a major Armenian Apostolic Church, and the Orthodox Church, who wants the property.138 The Orthodox Church is currently in control of the property but nothing is happening with the property. Now it is locked up, in total disrepair, and there is no hope of the situation being resolved in the near future.139 A similar case is happening between the Muslim and Orthodox institutions. The Muslim community is in the process of restitution for a mosque that was used as a library during Soviet Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

“Assessment of the Needs of Religious Organizations in Georgia.” 18.

136 Ibid, 87.

137 Eka Chitanava, 17 Feb. 2015.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

134 135

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times.140 However, the Orthodox Church also laid claims to the land, stating that before the mosque, there was a church.141 Now, nothing is being done with the building and there has been little political action in addressing the issue.142 The government has not been effective in restitution issues and due to a lack of political will to address the issue, many buildings under dispute are left abandoned and destroyed.143 The EU has not been actively involved in working with the religious minorities, but it has noted the rise of religious intolerance towards them and has encouraged the government of Georgia to work towards integrating them further in political, social, and economic life under the ENP, EaP and AA.144

A final worrisome note for both national and religious minorities is that because Georgian society is still very conservative and committed to the Orthodox Church, minority rights and more tolerant views are still lacking in society.145 This intolerance is especially seen with the rise of radical parties in Georgia.146 According to the NIMD, some radical parties like the Alliance of Georgian Patriots have been gaining traction, rank high in public opinion, and have enough popularity that they are in the national government.147 This amounts to the radicals having around 10% of the popular vote, and there is a fear now that this popularity might rise over the course of the next election period.148 The rise of radical parties is worrisome because many are anti-EU, anti-West and against minority rights.149 A lot of them are pro-Russian and believe that minority rights are against traditional Georgian values, which “Assessment of the Needs of Religious Organizations in Georgia.” 34.

Ibid, 35.

142 Ibid.

143 Giorgi Bobghiashvili. 20 Feb 2015.

144 Association Agreement, European Union. 30 Aug. 2014. Art. 349(e).

145 Alessandro Savaris. 16 Feb. 2015.

146 Irakli Kobalia & Levan Tsutskiridze. 17 Feb. 2015.

147 Ibid.

140 141

148

Ibid.

Vano Chkhikvadze. Open Society Georgia Foundation. Sonia Liang, Emily Tsui, Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal Interview. 18 Feb. 2015.

149

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are based on Christianity.150 If they gain more popularity, this can harm not only minority rights, but also Georgia’s path towards EU integration.

5. Conclusion In conclusion, the EU’s increased relations with Georgia are positively affecting Georgia’s treatment of its minority groups, as it has increased the number of laws and institutions created to guarantee, protect and aid national and religious minorities.

However, there are still major issues within Georgia in properly integrating its minority groups, including the lack of implementation of these laws, the lack of political will to address issues of discrimination, and the major role of the Orthodox Church in hindering minority integration. The EU has ensured that Georgia is taking good steps toward minority integration; however, in order for integration to be complete, the EU needs to continue pushing the government to make substantial changes in how both the government and society treats minorities. If this pressure is focused and consistent, Georgia will have a good chance at not only properly integrating minorities, but also for the minorities will finally start to feel like they are Georgians.

Bibliography “Assessment Document on the Implementation of the National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration and Action Plan for 2009-2014.” Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality. June 2014.

“Assessment of the Needs of Religious Organizations in Georgia.”

Tolerance and Diversity Institute. 2014.

150

Irakli Kobalia & Levan Tsutskiridze. 17 Feb. 2015

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Association Agreement, European Union. 30 August 2014.

Giorgi Bobghiashvili. Project Coordinator. European Centre for Minority Issues. Interviewed by David Kitai & Elizabeth TudorBeziés. Personal Interview. 20 February 2015.

Rusudan Chanturia. Deputy Chief of Party, USAID’s “Advancing National Integration” Project.

United Nations Association of Georgia. Interviewed by Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal interview. Tbilisi. 19 February 2015 Eka Chitanava. Project Manager, Tolerance and Diversity Institute.

Interviewed by Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal Interview. 17 February 2015 Elene Chkheidze. Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Group Interview. Tbilisi. 18 February 2015 Vano Chkhikvadze. EU Integration Field Manager. Open Society Georgia Foundation. Interviewed by Sonia Liang, Emily Tsui & Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal Interview. 18 February, 2015 Constitution of Georgia. 24 August, 1995.

ECRI Secretariat. ECRI Report on Georgia (fourth Monitoring Cycle). Rep. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2010.

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe. February 1995.

Fernando Garcés de los Fayos. “Minorities in the South Caucasus: New Visibility amid old frustrations.” European Parliament. June 2014.

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Tina Gogheliani. Head of Civic Integration Unit. Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality.

Interviewed by Elizabeth Tudor-Beziés. Personal interview. Tbilisi.

20 February 2015 Natia Gorgadze, Shalva Tabatadze.”Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Quota System in Georgia.” 2013.

Bunafsha Gulakova, Nino Khurtsidze. “Evaluation of EU support to the integration of minorities in Georgia.” October 2014.

Boris Iarochevitch. Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Group Interview. Tbilisi. 18 February 2015 Levan Kakhishvili, Tato Khundadze. Project Researchers & Coordinators, Caucasian House. Interviewed by Elizabeth TudorBeziés. Personal interview. Tbilisi. 19 February 2015 Irakli Kobalia & Levan Tsutskiridze. Programme Officer, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Group Interview. Tbilisi. 17 February 2015 Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination.

Government of Georgia. 2 May, 2014.

Giorgi Lomsadze “Georgia Diversifies Funding for Religion” Eurasianet.org. 28 January 2014 Giorgi Lomsadze, “The Caucasus Concerned over Born-Again Russians.” Eurasianet.org. 23 April 2014 Government of Georgia, “Ethnic Groups in Georgia: Census 2002.”

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2002.

International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, United Nations, 4 January 1969.

Mariam Rakviashvili. Deputy State Minister for European & EuroAtlantic Integration. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Group interview. Tbilisi. 17 February 2014 Oliver Reisner. European External Action Service. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Group interview. Tbilisi, 16 February 2015 Alessandro Savaris. Deputy Head, Council of Europe. Interviewed

by University of Toronto ICM Students. Group Interview. 16 February 2015 “Scene of religious controversy in Kobuleti,” Human Rights House.

16 October 2014 “Study of Religious Discrimination and Constitutional Secularism.”

Tolerance and Diversity Institute. 2014.

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THE UNDERUSED POTENTIAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AN ANALYSIS OF GEORGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT Kendall Andison 1. Introduction

Ketevan Daukaevi, a young masters student studying nature resource conservation at Ilia State University in Georgia, claims that most of her colleagues who have studied abroad in Europe formed similar conclusions about the discrepancy between their experience there and their life at home: â&#x20AC;&#x153;They see a better life, and they see on what that better life is built. And one of the concepts of course is caring about the environment.â&#x20AC;?1 At first glance, this comment may appear to be a simple reflection of youthful idealism.

Yet her statement provides an important insight: countries, such as Georgia, which are still struggling to develop their economies, have yet to witness the full introduction of post-material issues such as environmentalism.

In western countries, decades of economic stability Ketevan Daukaevi, Masters Student, Ilia State University, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

1

Kendall Andison recently completed her fourth year at Victoria College at the University of Toronto. She majored in Political Science with a double minor in History and European Union Studies. She is presently working for the non-profit organization Fresh Roots, and the Indigenous Health and Research Garden at the University of British Columbia. She is presently Chair of the Vancouver Youth Food Policy Council. She plans to return to school in 2016 to pursue a Masters Degree in Urban Planning with an emphasis on sustainable city planning.

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provided the circumstances necessary for post-materialist discussions.2 Ronald Inglehart defines post-materialism as a “value orientation that emphasizes self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical security.”3 This definition raises the important question: is there a place for environmental protection, which has been typically understood as a post-materialist concern, in a country where economic security has yet to be established?4 As this paper will present, the state of environmentalism and environmental policy in Georgia is wholly underdeveloped.

However, the international community has helped to ameliorate the situation, and furthermore, it can be understood to have a strong impetus to continue to help Georgia overcome the challenges it faces because of shared benefits that could be yielded from the sustainable development of Georgia’s natural resources, in particular hydropower. The paper will support this position by first presenting a summary of both the historical and economic context of Georgia by which the following arguments will be placed, before progressing to provide a description of both its environment and the state of environmentalism in the country. The paper will then explain the challenges that Georgia faces in implementing progressive environmental policy: socioeconomic difficulties; absence of political will and education; and the enduring impact of the Soviet legacy. Subsequently, the paper will elaborate as to how the few existing successes in the environmental sector can largely be attributed to international relations.

In particular, the emphasis will be placed on the involvement of the European Union (EU). The paper will explain the specific benefits of these developments. Finally, the paper will make the case that, given the international community’s awareness of the direness of the environmental situation confronting the world in 2015, and given the lack of capacity held Ronald Inglehart, “Postmaterialism, Philosophy,” in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, accessed March 6, 2015.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

2

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by developing economies to help, the international community must support countries rich in natural resources such as Georgia to develop sustainably. Otherwise, the present successes regarding environmentalism will eventually come to serve as a reminder of the achievements that could have been garnered with further assistance.

2. Historical and Economic Context

Georgia spent the majority of the 20th century under communist rule until the collapse of communism and the declaration of its independence in 1991.5 Initial attempts to reform the economy were difficult. By 1993, the gross domestic product (GDP) was 80% below what it was pre-independence.6 In the decades following, Georgia has made great attempts to recover and develop economically.7 While there have been some successes, the transition to a functioning liberal market economy is far from complete. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID): “…out of around 4.2 million Georgians, about 1 million are “poor” or unable to afford necessities. About 400,000 of these are “extremely poor” or unable to meet basic food requirements.”8 This poverty is felt most acutely in rural regions, where it averages almost 50 percent.9 There is still a great challenge in creating both jobs and jobs of high quality.10 The international context in 2015 is likely to pose further challenges to Georgia’s economic development in the immediate future. According to the International Monetary Fund, as a result of the crisis in Ukraine “Georgia Country Profile: Overview,” BBC News, November 5, 2014.

NATO, Parliamentary Assembly, “170 ESCEW 07 E rev 2 – ECONOMIC AND POLITCAL TRANSITION IN GEORGIA,”2007, accessed March 18, 2015.

7 Ibid.

8 The United States of America, U.S. Agency of International Development, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, Fiscal Year 2013-2017, July 2012, accessed March 5, 2016.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

5 6

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and the recession in Russia, Georgia’s economic growth will likely lower to 2% for 2015.11 3. The Geography and Environment of Georgia

Georgia is a Southern Caucasus country located along the Black Sea between Russia and Turkey.12 It is rich in several natural resources, including, but not limited to: copper; manganese deposits; iron ore; hydropower; and, timber.13 In particular, Georgia is exceptionally rich in water resources.14 In total, it has 26,060 rivers with a total length of 59 thousand kilometers.15 Its geographic position has drawn the attention of the international community.

This is due to its geopolitical relevance in the energy sector. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) explains: “Georgia provides a critical land corridor for the transit of Caspian oil and gas to the West.”16 The United States of America has invested heavily in a pipeline that transports oil from Azerbaijan to Europe.17 Boris Iarochevitch, the Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to Georgia, claims this is the reason that the EU has given as much attention and fiscal support as it has to Georgia. He asserts that the EU supports Georgia because of its strategic relevance in securing sources of energy that avoid relying on Russia. 18

“IMF Assessments on Georgian Economy, Hit by Severe External Shocks,” Civil.ge, March 4, 2015.

12 The United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency, “Georgia,” in The Worldfactbook (Washington: The United States of America, 2013), accessed March 15, 2015.

13 Ibid.

14 Georgia, The Ministry of Environment, “Natural Resources-Water,” accessed March 20, 2015.

15 Ibid.

16 NATO, Parliamentary Assembly, “170 ESCEW 07 E rev 2 – ECONOMIC AND POLITCAL TRANSITION IN GEORGIA,”2007, accessed March 18, 2015.

17 Ibid.

18 Boris Iaochevitch, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview, Delegation to EU Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

11

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4. State of Environmentalism in Georgia

Due to the character of Georgia’s geography and environment, the country’s natural resources and environment as a whole should be considered part of a broader picture of the country’s economic health and international relations.

Unfortunately, Georgia is greatly lacking in both the presence of an environmental movement and environmental protection. As Tamaz Gamkrelidze, a representative of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in Georgia, maintains: “No one talks about sustainability. People operate on financial figures.”19 This statement not only underlines his belief that there is an absence of an environmental discussion in Georgia, but it also reflects his understanding that environmental concerns are subservient to economic interests. There is also a low awareness of, and, correspondingly a lack of care for, environmental issues among the public at large.20

This lack of environmentalism is evident in Georgian policy and governmental approaches to climate change and the environment. A report done by a Georgian environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), the Green Alternative, explicitly states: “concrete steps towards developing a strategy for sustainable development in Georgia are not being made.”21 According to one of Ilia State University’s environmental experts, Irakli Macharishvili, the government’s approach to the environment is in fact highly problematic. He cites the example of the commission of sustainable development. He asserts that while the commission has been in operation since 2000, and is supposedly being headed by the Prime Minister of Georgia, they Tamaz Gamkrelidze, World Wildlife Fund, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

20 Elene Chkheidze, Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview, ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

21 Green Alternative, Opportunities and Potential of Green Economy Development in Georgia, 2014, 9.

19

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have never held a session.22 This assessment of environmentalism at the government level is further supported by Macharashvili. He asserts that the lack of governmental policy is a major challenge, and provides several examples to illustrate his point: â&#x20AC;&#x153;We have no energy efficiency legislations. There are no economic stimulations for the development of alternative energy sources. Almost nothing in solar energy.â&#x20AC;?23 Overall, it appears that a lack of protection and sustainable development oriented policies is an issue that crosscuts all environmental related sectors.

Within the government, part of the problem is the remaining presence of corruption. As Maracharashvili underlines, conflicts of interest are still a large problem, with many individuals working for the Ministry of Energy possessing a personal fiscal stake in the hydropower business.24 He claims that the present Minister of Energy holds interest in a minimum of three hydropower companies. The Minister was supposed to have sold his shares before taking the position, and he claimed to have done so. Yet, when the university investigated the issue, they discovered that he had decided to sell his shares to his father. Furthermore, the deputy minister, Mrs. Mariam Valishvili, is a director of DOT Energy, and the owner of the company used to be the Minister of Energy.25 Georgia is unlikely to see truly progressive development on key environmental issues, such as sustainable energy, when government officials are financially invested in the outcomes of the associated industries.

5. The Challenges Facing Georgia in Developing Environmentalism a) Socioeconomic Difficulties Irakli Maracharshvili, Professor, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

22

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There are many reasons why the state of environmentalism in Georgia is so alarming. The primary reason being the socioeconomic difficulties the country is currently grappling with.

This functions on two separate levels. Firstly, it affects political will, as politicians are too preoccupied trying to remedy the economic and social problems facing the country to turn their attention to environmental issues. As Gamkrelidze highlights: “The standard of living in Georgia is low. The government thinks about betterment of the medical situation, social tension, increasing salaries, and this is normal, because we don’t have enough money to fix all these problems.”26 Secondly, socioeconomic struggles leave the country bereft of the economic instruments necessary to implement meaningful change. Ms. Liana Garibashvili of the environmental NGO, the Energy Efficiency Centre, when discussing the primary challenges her organization faces in introducing environmentally friendly programs, stated that the main barrier is the present lack of financial instruments.27 b) Education and Expertise

A key issue facing Georgia in developing environmentalism is the lack of education and expertise on the subject. In reference to the presence of environmental experts and activists in Georgia, the Program Coordinator of the Forest and Natural Resources Sciences and Management department at Ilia State University, Dr. Joachim Puhe, summarizes the problem succinctly, saying: “there are too few people.”28 He is speaking to the notion that, ultimately, there are just not enough people in Georgia who are familiar and knowledgeable about the importance of environmentalism.

He underlines that this is unlikely to change in the immediate Tamaz Gamkrelidze, World Wildlife Fund, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

27 Liana Garibashvili, Head of Analytical-Information Department, Energy Efficiency Center, Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

28 Joachim Puhe, Program Coordinator, Forest and Natural Resources Sciences and Management Department, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

26

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future because the enrolment in environmental programs at the university level is vastly lower than in the more traditional fields of law and business.29 Dr. Karina Melikidze, the Director of the Sustainable Development and Policy Center, explains that there is also a necessity to increase education of the public at large on the subject. This is because public knowledge is a necessary precondition for public support.30 This lack of education not only affects support for environmental programs, but it also has ramifications for the technical capacity of the country to address environmental concerns. As Melikidze attests, the lack of viable data in the environmental sector poses a great challenge.31 The information needed to properly assess environmental damage is not available.32 Maracharashvili is also of the opinion that there is a fundamental lack of technical capacity in Georgia.33 He attests that outdated methodology is still used in conducting environmental assessments.34 c) Soviet Legacy

Compounding these problems is the challenge presented by the legacy of the Soviet system, which has left a political culture based on personal connections.35 Puhe attests that the length of the Soviet system has left Georgia devoid of the necessary political culture to implement change. He argues that the customs and traditions of the group still take priority, which makes it ever the more difficult to introduce a discussion on post-materialist issues.36 Ibid.

Karina Melikidze, Director, Sustainable Development and Policy Center, Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 19, 2015.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Irakli Maracharshvili, Professor, Interviewed by Kendall Andison, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

34 Ibid.

35 Boris Iaochevitch, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview, Delegation to EU Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

36 Joachim Puhe, Program Coordinator, Forest and Natural Resources Sciences and 29 30

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Iarochevitch’s assertions support this assessment of Georgian political culture. He claims that in his experience, Georgian political culture is still very much oriented around groups and friends, which is bad for accountability. Ultimately, while political culture is difficult to measure or quantify, it is worthwhile to note that personal interest still plays an important role in determining policy in Georgia. After all, progressive environmental policy is unlikely to be implemented if a bureaucratic system is inefficient and allows for the personal interest of individuals to dominate.

6. Small Successes in the International Context a) The European Union

As Christoph Knill and Jale Tosun explain in their writing on the EU’s influence on environmental policy, there is still little scholarly research on whether the EU alters policy in countries that are not formally undergoing the accession process.37 Yet, discussion with government officials and sector experts render it apparent that Georgia’s relationship with the European Union is currently one of the country’s primary driving forces of change in the environmental sector. This operates on two levels: policy alignment, and the sponsoring of environmental initiatives.

In 2013, Georgia signed an association agreement with the EU.38 This association agreement covers numerous environmental regulations and requires Georgia to harmonize its own legislation with that of Europe.39 While it is still early in the stages of implementation, it appears that the agreement will, Management Department, Interviewed by Kendall Andison, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

37 Christoph Knill et al., “ Hierarchy, Networks, or Markets: How Does the EU Shape Environmental Policy Adoptions Within and Beyond its Borders,” Journal of European Public Policy 16, 6 (2009): 9.

38 Georgia, The State Minister of Georgia, “Georgia-EU Cooperation,” accessed March 14, 2015.

39 Gizo Chelidze, Head of Environmental Policy, Ministry of Environment, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, The Ministry of Environment, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

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and to some degree already has, positively influence Georgian environmental policy through the process of alignment.40 The head of environmental policy at the Ministry of Environment, Gigo Chelidze, explains that the environmental policy division will soon be renamed the sustainable development and EU integration policy division.41 He claims that the Ministry of Environment is fully committed to harmonizing its legislation with that of the EU. He acknowledges that this is a highly complicated task because of the all-encompassing nature of the agreement. Ultimately, he believes it will be a source of good because it commits the government to set targets in all environmental fields: Almost all of our sectoral units are covered by the association agreement. We have two big chapters: one is called environment, the other is called climate change. In addition, we have a chapter on sustainable development under the DCFTA part of the agreement. So it means that almost all of the activities under the ministry are covered by the association agreement. This means we have some identified targets that are not only approved by the ministry, but by the government of Georgia. By signing the association agreement the Georgian government once more took responsibility for all issues covered by the association agreement.42

He cites further benefits, saying that it has encouraged further coordination between the different ministries because several of the EU directives involve intersecting issues that require the involvement of multiple ministries.43 Furthermore, in the two years since the implementation of the agreement, the budget of the Ministry of Environment has almost doubled.44 He also notes that, in spite of the agreement still being in such early stages, some changes have already been put in place. In January 2015, Georgia, with the assistance of an EU twinning project, introduced a new Ibid.

Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Gizo Chelidze, Head of Environmental Policy, Ministry of Environment, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, The Ministry of Environment, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

40 41

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waste management code.45 On a personal level, he believes that the approximation of EU legislation will be good for Georgia because these policies have “…already been checked, and tested in EU member countries. They have already seen benefits, and revised their own directives several times.”46 This includes the financial viability of the policies, as they have already been deemed profitable.47

Environmental stakeholders outside of the government are also hopeful about the potential benefits of the association agreement. Gamkrelidze believes it is one of the best things to have happened to the development of environmentalism in Georgia. He argues that the popularity of the idea of joining rkthe European Union will force the government, at least to some degree, to pursue the environmental obligations of the association agreement. Maracharashvili evidences this support by stating: “All environmental organizations want to push for the implementation of the association agreement.”48 The belief that the association agreement provides one of the best sources of hope for the environmental movement in the upcoming years is widespread.

The positive impact of the EU’s role is not limited to policy alignment. The EU also provides technical assistance, and sponsors educational programs. Knill and Tosun state that one of the ways EU agreements can assist in the development of environmentalism is by creating a mechanism of information sharing. They state that the EU “…may principally trigger domestic policy change in member states as well as neighboring countries by the fact that it provides an institutionalized infrastructure for the exchange of information and policy learning.”49 In the case of Georgia, Ibid.

Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Irakli Maracharshvili, Professor, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

49 Christoph Knill et al., “ Hierarchy, Networks, or Markets: How Does the EU Shape Environmental Policy Adoptions Within and Beyond its Borders,” Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 8.

45 46

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Chelidze attests to the technical assistance provided by the EU.50 The EU has assisted the Ministry of Environment in introducing a roadmap for the implementation process of the association agreement’s environmental chapters. They helped select a German lawyer to assess present legislation, and develop a strategy for implementation.51 The EU also helped to design and implement demonstration programs, which are meant to help both educate the public and illustrate to public officials that environmental regulation can be cost neutral or profitable.52 The paper will elaborate upon a successful example of this, the Covenant of Mayors Program, in the next subsection. b) Covenant of Mayors Program

The Covenant of Mayors is an EU program designed to help cities reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through the implementation of renewable energy technology and the promotion of energy efficiency.53,54 Tbilisi was the first city in the Caucasus region to join, and since then, seven other municipalities have joined.55 As Melikidze highlights, several concrete measures have already been taken under this program through the assistance of NGOs. Kindergartens have been retrofitted with energy efficiency technology, energy efficient lighting has been put in place in a public park, and an old Soviet apartment block has been retrofitted with energy efficiency technology.56 While these changes are minor, they must be examined in the context of a country that is almost devoid of environmentalism. They represent both concrete Gizo Chelidze, Head of Environmental Policy, Ministry of Environment, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, The Ministry of Environment, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 “The Covenant of Mayors,” The Covenant of Mayors, accessed March 12, 2015.

54 Liana Garibashvili, Head of Analytical-Information Department, Energy Efficiency Center, Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

55 Ibid.

56 Karina Melikidze, Director, Sustainable Development and Policy Center, Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 19, 2015.

50

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change and an increase in visibility. Furthermore, many of these changes are designed to be profitable, because the degree of energy conserved is meant to outweigh the cost of the initial changes.

Therefore, they also serve as a great opportunity to educate public officials about the financial viability of progressive environmental changes.57 c) Bilateral Relations with European Union Member States and International Sources of Funding

While the EU has been highly influential in shaping the new course of environmental policy in general, a key component of the international dimension of Georgian environmentalism is funding from specific EU member countries and international banks.

According to both Puhe and Gamkrelidze, funding from Germany has been integral to implementing all environmental initiatives.58,59 Puheâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position at the university, for example, is entirely funded by the German government.60 Nino Antadze, the Environment and Energy team leader for the UNDP, emphasizes the importance of the governments of Finland, Sweden, and Norway in funding her work in Georgia.61 Chelidze claims that the Ministry of Environment would not be able to function properly without the fiscal support it receives from the German, Dutch, Austrian, and Swiss governments, as well as USAID, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the German banking company KfW.62 These examples do not offer a complete picture of Ibid.

Tamaz Gamkrelidze, World Wildlife Fund, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

59 Joachim Puhe, Program Coordinator, Forest and Natural Resources Sciences and Management Department, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

60 Ibid.

61 Nino Antadze, Team Leader, Energy and Environment Portfolio, United Nations Development Program in Georgia, Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview, UN House, Tbilisi, February 19, 2015.

62 Gizo Chelidze, Head of Environmental Policy, Ministry of Environment, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, The Ministry of Environment, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

57 58

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the funding of all environmental programs and policies in Georgia.

They do, however, illustrate the degree to which environmental efforts are tied to funding from the international community.

This is particularly relevant considering, as previously discussed, socioeconomic difficulties are one of the main barriers in the development of environmentalism in Georgia.

7. The Benefits of Increased Environmentalism a) Potential Renewable Energy Contributor

It is widely recognized that the globe is in need of a transition from the burning of fossil fuels to sustainable energy sources.63 Due to the richness of its water resources, Georgia has the potential to become a renewable energy contributor for both itself and surrounding countries.64 Yet, as the World Bank highlights: “Currently, only 12 % of Georgia’s hydropower potential is being utilized.”65 Hydropower is a form of renewable energy with several advantages, as Bill Dampier writes: “…it is a fully mature technology with high levels of reliability and mechanical efficiency; and there are substantial unexploited reserves.”66 Due to the economic constraints facing Georgia, attempts to develop hydropower do not involve the steps necessary to make the hydropower plants sound sources of renewable energy.67

Hydropower in Georgia is not being looked at through an environmental lens, and does not correspond to the principles of sustainable development. Richard A. Matthew and Anne Hammill explain that sustainable development aims “…to reduce poverty Justin Gillis, “ A Tricky Transition From Fossil Fuel,” The New York Times, November 10, 2014.

64 Ketevan Daukaevi, Masters Student, Ilia State University, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

65 The World Bank, “Georgia: Overview,” The World Bank, last modified January 21, 2015.

66 Bill Dampier, “Hydropower: Untapped Resource and Environmental Hazard,” Ambio 10, no. 5 (1981): 252, accessed June 5, 2015.

67 Irakli Maracharshvili, Professor, Interviewed by Kendall Andison, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

63

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and improve the welfare and security of the world’s poor while protecting the natural resources and ecosystems that development practices often overexploit and damage.”68 The WWF is presently trying to construct a guideline for how to develop hydropower sustainably. Gamkrelidze claims that the government is only concerned with generating as much income as possible from hydropower. He contends that the problem with this approach is that “if done improperly, ecosystems will not be able to provide the same services to people in the long-term …”69 Maracharashvili also insists that there is a total lack of environmental assessment in the hydro sector. He states that there has been little improvement since the Soviet period, and that eventually the present approach to construction will exhaust the country’s rivers.70 Therefore, the long-term benefits are being undercut by the desire for short-term economic gain.

The USAID states that part of its aim in investing in Georgia is to “…lower energy costs and allow Georgia to sell green energy on global and regional energy markets.”71 If this aim is successful, it would be to the benefit of both Georgia and the international community. It would both make Georgia more fiscally self-reliant, and correspondingly, less in need of financial aid. Additionally, it would provide access to a long-term source of clean energy. b) Economic Health

While it is obvious that the introduction of environmentalism profits the environment, what are not typically discussed are the economic benefits of certain environmental Richard A. Matthew et al., “ Sustainable Development and Climate Change,” International Affairs 85, no. 6 (2009): 1118, accessed June 5, 2015.

69 Gamkrelidze, Tamaz, World Wildlife Fund. Interviewed by Author. Personal Interview.

16 February 2015.

70 Irakli Maracharshvili, Professor, Interviewed by Kendall Andison, Personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

71 The United States of America, U.S. Agency of International Development, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, Fiscal Year 2013-2017, July 2012, accessed March 5, 2016, 39.

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initiatives. In the short-term, the adoption of energy efficiency policies has demonstrated the immediate benefit of saving money.

As a report done by Green Alternative highlights, introducing energy-effective measures will make it “possible to reduce energy consumption by approximately 25 percent while enhancing energy intensity, reducing dependence on imported fuel and moreover, it will save several hundred million US annually.”72 With regard to the country’s long-term economic health, the richness of the country’s natural resources requires that development be conducted in a way that does not exhaust them. This is integral to future economic success. As USAID underlines, “Environmentally sound management of Georgia’s natural resources…will ensure predictable and long term inputs for economic growth, including energy supply, tourism and agriculture.”73 Georgia has a great potential to benefit from its natural resources. Yet, this must be done in a way that’s healthy for the environment so that these industries can remain profitable in the long term.

8. The Underused Potential of Sustainable Development: An Argument for Increased Responsibility

The environment is an inherently global issue. As Aron Buzogany and Oriol Costa explain: “environmental policy has a more than obvious cross-border character that makes it prone to international cooperation.”74 Within the framework of international cooperation, a question that is frequently raised in debates surrounding the protection of the environment and the prevention of future climate change is often some variant of the phrase: Green Alternative, Opportunities and Potential of Green Economy Development in Georgia, 2014, 11.

73 The United States of America, U.S. Agency of International Development, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, Fiscal Year 2013-2017, July 2012, accessed March 5, 2016, 39.

74 Aron Buzogany et al., “Greening the Neighbourhood? The Environmental Dimension of the ENP in Morocco and Ukraine,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14 (2009): 531.

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“who should shoulder the cost?”75 As this paper has illustrated, Georgia, due to the economic realities facing the country, has great difficulty in developing environmentalism and fulfilling international environmental obligations. It would be possible to blame the absence of political will for this difficulty. Yet, to do so would truncate a singular component of what is really a more holistic issue. Any absence of political will is typically tied to the belief that developing the economy should be the priority. While many environmentalists would challenge this belief as shortsighted, it is understandable why a politician might be more pressed by the immediacy of solving economic challenges, particularly when the country is still grappling with high rates of unemployment.76

While the capacities to address climate change vary, the future of the environment is a shared problem. The effects of climate change do not, and will not, recognize borders. Deciding how to address the discrepancies in capacity is integral to charting a proper course of action. In reference to the upcoming global climate change conference in Paris, the New York Times writes that “unless the world can agree on a formula for how to divide the cuts in heat-trapping carbon emissions that scientists say is required to avoid dangerous levels of warming, Paris will be deemed another failure.”77 What this statement so insightfully underscores is the fact that, unless the international community reaches a consensus on how to divide responsibility for how to protect the environment, it will be unable to make meaningful progress on the issue.

This conclusion, that it is imperative to reach a way of dividing responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, leads inevitably to this question: do countries with developed economies The Associated Press, “Who Pays? Who Cuts Emissions? 5 Issues for UN Climate Deal,” The New York Times, February 12, 2015. The New York Times. The New York Times, 12 Feb. 2015. Web 18 Mar. 2015.

76 The United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency, “Georgia,” in The Worldfactbook: Georgia (Washington: The United States of America, 2013), accessed March 15, 2015.

77 The Associated Press, “Who Pays? Who Cuts Emissions? 5 Issues for UN Climate Deal,” The New York Times, February 12, 2015.

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have a responsibility to assist those that are still in the process of developing their economies? An examination of the case study of Georgia renders it apparent that the answer should, in fact, be “yes.”

Georgia simply does not have the economic instruments available that are needed to implement environmental policy. International support has the demonstrated potential to help Georgia overcome economic limitations. While Georgia is only one country, the dilemma it faces is in many ways reflective of a broader problem.

On this subject, the New York Times writes: “…most developing countries need money and technology to grow their economies in a cleaner way than today’s rich countries did for decades before the impact of carbon pollution was understood.”78 This statement supports the assertion that developing countries are in need of help in implementing environmentally sound policies. It goes further to underline that rich countries were not burdened with adjusting their policies to accommodate the environment when they were developing economically, because they were doing so at a time when the implications of climate change were not yet known.

The study of Georgia provides several important insights into the international dimension of environmentalism. Due to its unique geopolitical situation in the energy sector, it has been the recipient of high levels of international attention.79 This attention includes fiscal assistance, some of which has been directed at the environmental sector. It is because of this fact that Georgia is symbolic of the potential of international involvement to assist developing economies in fostering environmentalism and environmental policy. While the country is still in the earliest stages of this process, it is demonstrative of the benefits of increased involvement from other countries.

At the same time, it is also symbolic of the unrealized potential of developing countries rich in natural resources to Ibid.

Boris Iarochevitch, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview, Delegation to EU Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

78 79

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contribute positively to the global environmental situation.

Countries across Europe are recognizing the need to convert to renewable energy sources.80 As previously established, Georgia has much potential to be a contributor of renewable energy due its rich water resources.81 Yet, as of now, this potential is wholly underdeveloped.82 Without proper intervention from the international community, in the form of both technical and fiscal assistance, this is likely to remain the case in the foreseeable future.

This is unfortunate, to say the least, as the electricity from Georgian hydropower could be exported to surrounding countries.83 Therefore, while Georgia’s position is unique, as a case study, it lends much support to the argument on behalf of international intervention for developing economies. This is because it demonstrates both the necessity and the potential benefits of support from the global community.

9. Conclusion

Georgia is in some ways typical of a developing country: the environment is pushed aside because of the weight of economic concerns. Yet, its position is also unique in that it has massive amounts of water resources that have yet to be properly developed.

Furthermore, it is the recipient of high degrees of international attention because of its geopolitical position. These two key components, when studied together, make a compelling case for international intervention. This paper established that Georgia does not have the capacity to implement positive change on its own. Nevertheless, the international community is helping Georgia overcome this absence of capacity. This international attention Justin Gillis, “ A Tricky Transition From Fossil Fuel,” The New York Times, November 10, 2014.

81 The World Bank, “Georgia: Overview,” The World Bank, last modified January 21, 2015.

82 Ibid.

83 Ketevan Daukaevi, Masters Student, Ilia State University, Interviewed by author, Personal interview, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

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has produced small but noticeable positive changes in the sector of environmentalism. Therefore, the country is representative of the potential benefits of future international involvement in the environment of developing economies. This could lead one to conclude that western developing countries ‘should’ increase their involvement. However, if one considers the precarious situation bracing the globe, it becomes apparent that it is not that they ‘should’ but that they ‘must.’ In the case of Georgia, increased involvement could mean the creation of a mutually beneficial clean energy source. Georgia may just be a small country in the Caucasus, but it is one that is emblematic of how a more comprehensive international approach could leave us all with a ‘greener’ world.

Bibliography Antadze, Nino. Team Leader, Energy and Environment Portfolio, United Nations Development Program in Georgia. Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview. UN House, Tbilisi, February 19, 2015.

The Associated Press. “Who Pays? Who Cuts Emissions? 5 Issues for UN Climate Deal.” The New York Times. February 12, 2015.

BBC News. “Georgia Country Profile: Overview.” November 5, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17301647 Buzogany, Aron and Oriol Costa. “Greening the Neighbourhood?

The Environmental Dimension of the ENP in Morocco and Ukraine,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14 (2009): 525-545.

Chelidze, Gizo. Head of Environmental Policy, Ministry of Environment. Interviewed by author, Personal interview. The Ministry of Environment, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

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Chkheidze, Elene. Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interview by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview. ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

Civil.ge. “IMF Assessments on Georgian Economy, Hit by Severe External Shocks.” March 4, 2015. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=28103 “The Covenant of Mayors.” The Covenant of Mayors. Accessed March 12, 2015.

Dampier, Bill. “Hydropower: Untapped Resource and Environmental Hazard.” Ambio 10, no. 5. (1981): 252-253.

Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4312705.

Daukaevi, Ketevan. Masters Student, Ilia State University.

Interviewed by author, Personal interview. Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

Gamkrelidze, Tamaz. World Wildlife Fund. Interviewed by author, Personal interview. Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

Garibashvili, Liana. Head of Analytical-Information Department, Energy Efficiency Center. Interviewed by author and Emily Tsui, Personal interview. Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

Georgia. The Ministry of Environment. “Natural Resources-Water.”

Accessed March 20, 2015. http://moe.gov.ge/index.php?lang_ id=ENG&sec_id=42.

Georgia. The State Minister of Georgia on European and EuroAtlantic Integration. “Georgia-EU Cooperation.” Accessed March 170

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14, 2015. http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/en/eu/cooperation.

Gillis, Justin. “ A Tricky Transition From Fossil Fuel.” The New York Times. November 10, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/ science/earth/denmark-aims-for-100-percent-renewable-energy. html?_r=0.

Green Alternative. Opportunities and Potential of Green Economy Development in Georgia. 2014.

Iarochevitch, Boris. Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview. Delegation to EU Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

Inglehart, Ronald. “Postmaterialism, Philosophy.” In Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed March 6, 2015.

Georgia. The Ministry of Environment. “Natural Resources-Water.”

Accessed March 20, 2015. http://moe.gov.ge/index.php?lang_ id=ENG&sec_id=42 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun. “ Hierarchy, Networks, or Markets: How Does the EU Shape Environmental Policy Adoptions Within and Beyond its Borders.” Journal of European Public Policy 16, 6 (2009): 873-894.

Maracharshvili, Irakli. Professor. Interviewed by author, Personal interview. Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

Matthew, Richard A., and Anne Hammill. “Sustainable Development and Climate Change.” International Affairs 85, no. 6 (2009): 1117-1128. Accessed June 5, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/40389007

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NATO, Parliamentary Assembly.“170 ESCEW 07 E rev 2 – ECONOMIC AND POLITCAL TRANSITION IN GEORGIA.” 2007. Accessed March 18, 2015. http://www.nato-pa.int/Default. asp?SHORTCUT=1171.

Puhe, Joachim. Program Coordinator, Forest and Natural Resources Sciences and Management Department. Interviewed by author, Personal interview. Ilia State University, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

The United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency.

“Georgia.” In The Worldfactbook. Washington: The United States of America, 2013. Accessed March 15, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html.

The United States of America. U.S. Agency of International Development. Country Development Cooperation Strategy, Fiscal Year 2013-2017. July 2012. Accessed March 5, 2016. http://www. usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/GeorgiaCDCS.pdf The World Bank. “Georgia: Overview.” The World Bank. Last modified January 21, 2015. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ georgia/overview.

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THE BATTLE FOR LGBT RIGHTS IN GEORGIA FROM LEGAL REFORM TO SOCIAL CHANGE Misha Boutilier

On May 17, 2013, a popular mob led by Georgian Orthodox priests broke through police cordons to violently disrupt a protest by 50 gay rights activists in Tbilisi, wounding 28 people. Then Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili condemned the violence and the police did create a protective corridor, but the main perpetrators went unpunished by the judiciary. When European Union Special Adviser on Human Rights in Georgia, Thomas Hammarberg, made modest suggestions for improving lesbian, gay, transgender, and queer (LGBT) human rights in the aftermath of the May 17 incident, a group of Georgian conservative intellectuals denounced him in a statement entitled “Respect Our Traditions” for trying to impose a decadent Western ideology to supplant Georgian cultural traditions.1 The mob violence highlighted a fundamental tension in Georgia’s European Union accession process. The European Union Cristina Maza, “Georgia Is a Terrible Place to be Gay,” Balkanist, May 24, 2014, accessed March 22, 2015.

1

Misha Boutilier is a first-year J.D. student at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Misha holds an Honours B.A. with high distinction in international relations and history from the University of Toronto. He is the recipient of the Governor-General’s Silver Medal for graduating with the highest standing in Arts at the University of Toronto. Misha currently serves as the Director of Graduate Research at the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

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(EU) insists on the protection of LGBT rights, yet popular attitudes and powerful social and political forces within Georgia resist this.

This essay will argue that the pressures of EU integration accelerated the historical development of the LGBT rights movement in Georgia and produced public battles between the Georgian Orthodox Church and the state that forced the issue of LGBT rights out into the open. The result has been an improved legal framework for LGBT rights that may bear fruit in the future, but the failure of government and the NGOs to educate public opinion means that the result of increased visibility will likely be social polarization and continued intolerance and violence because the underlying traditional homophobic attitudes remain unchanged. This essay will begin by outlining the development of the LGBT movement and Georgia’s legal framework on LGBT rights prior to 2013, as well as the development of the Church during this period. It will then analyze the chain of events that led to the May 17 demonstration and the passage of the AntiDiscrimination Law. Next, the essay will assess the state of Georgian public opinion and the domestic and external factors behind continued homophobic attitudes. Finally, the essay will consider why the government and NGOs have failed to spread liberal values on the LGBT issue to the bulk of the population, as well as the negative impact of the failure of NGOs to engage with the Church.

In order to understand the contemporary situation of LGBT people in Georgia, it is necessary to examine their status during the Soviet period. While the Soviet Union initially abolished the Tsarist criminalization of homosexuality, Stalin re-imposed this ban in the 1930s and from then until the Soviet Union’s collapse consensual homosexual relations remained a crime punishable with up to five years in a labour camp. Homosexuality was seen as a taboo and a form of sexual perversion that ran counter to the official socialist morality that tried to restrict sexual expression to heterosexual

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marriage.2 As Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials remembered, during the Soviet times discussion of homosexuality in public was taboo. It was excluded from literature and the media.3

At the same time, there was relative tolerance for LGBT persons as long as they remained in the closet. Soviet authorities and the general public were well aware that certain leading artistic, ballet, and musical figures were gay, but did not take any effort to expose or punish them unless they were suspected of politically subversive activity.4 For instance, Father Ilia of the Georgian Orthodox Patriarchate’s Svetitskhoveli Cathedral reported approvingly that Georgian artistic figures during the Soviet period who were widely known to be gay were highly respected and accepted by society, since they did not openly display their sexual identity.5 The police also generally left gay men in relative peace as long as they were not seen to be pursuing underage boys. At the same time, living in the closet imposed real hardships on LGBT people. As some Soviet gays told the Washington Post in 1989, their lives were impoverished because they were forced to pursue gay relationships in total secrecy from society.6 In short, during the Soviet period LGBT people could live without serious interference as long as they lived in the closet and kept their sexual identity out of the public square, a double standard that society at large apparently accepted.

The legal framework governing LGBT issues did show some modest signs of progressive change following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The government of President Eduard Shevardnadze Ben De Jong, “‘An Intolerable Kind of Moral Degeneration’: Homosexuality in the Soviet Union,” Review of Socialist Law 4 (1982): 341-345; David Remnick, “In Age of Glasnost, Homosexuality Still Taboo in Soviet Union,” The Washington Post, March 9, 1989.

3 Interview with Diplomatic Training Centre officials, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, February 17, 2015.

4 De Jong, “Homosexuality in the Soviet Union,” 346, 351.

5 Interview with Father Ilia, Georgian Orthodox priest at the Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview, Mtskheta, Georgia, February 20, 2015.

6 Remnick, “Homosexuality Still Taboo.”

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decriminalized homosexuality in 2000, but took few additional steps.7 The United National Movement (UNM) government of Mikhail Saakashvili did make modest reforms to improve LGBT rights. For instance, it prohibited firing employees on the basis of sexual identity in amendments to Labour Code of Georgia introduced in 2006, and planned to combat LGBT discrimination in the education system in the 2011 Draft of State Policy on Youth.8 The 2005 Law on General Education also included a general prohibition on discrimination in education.9 There was some action from judicial and independent bodies during this period too. For instance, in 2008 the Constitutional Court ruled that sexual identity was covered under the Constitution’s ban on unjust discrimination even though it was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution as a ground for such discrimination.10 Likewise, the Public Defender of Georgia became outspoken on LGBT issues towards the end of Saakashvili’s tenure.11

Yet on the whole, the Saakashvili government did little to address LGBT issues. Numerous stakeholders, including the Executive Director of the LGBT rights NGO Identoba, Anna Rekhviashvili, and the Human Rights Focal Point at the EU Delegation to Georgia, Eva Pastrana, said that the UNM had done absolutely nothing on gay rights.12 According to Rekhviashvili, the Ana Natsvlishvili, Study on Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity – Legal Report: Georgia, COWI and the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2011, accessed March 22, 2015, 8.

8 Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity in Georgia: Monitoring of Implementation, Tbilisi, 2012, accessed March 22, 2015, 112-113 9 Stephen Jones, Georgia: A Political History since Independence, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2013), 212; Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation, 113.

10 Natsvlishvili, Study on Homophobia, 8.

11 Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation, 117.

12 Interview with Anna Rekhviashvili, Interim Executive Director of Identoba, interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview, Identoba’s office in Tbilisi, Georgia, February 18, 2015; Interview with Eva Pastrana, Human Rights Focal Point, European Union Delegation to Georgia, interviewed by Zoe Smale, personal interview, EU Delegation 7

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UNM perceived the issue as politically toxic, and so Saakashvili and his ministers avoided both homophobic and pro-LGBT remarks.13 As a 2012 report by the Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group (WISG) stated, Saakashvili “has never made any explicit statement or action for the protection of LGBT people.”14 The pro-LGBT reforms that the government did pursue had numerous loopholes and gaps. For example, the Labour Code did not prohibit discrimination in the hiring process, and the Ministry of Education refused to look into bullying of LGBT youth in the school system.15 The UNM showed little inclination to quell hate speech in the media against LGBT people, and failed to discipline those responsible for the police brutality exhibited in the 2009 raid on the Tbilisi office of the Inclusive Foundation, Georgia’s first LGBT rights organization.16

In addition, the government never pursued policies specifically designed to address LGBT issues. Instead, pro-LGBT measures were usually buried in much larger bodies of legislation on labour codes and health care in order to keep them out of the public eye.17 According to lawyer Tamta Mikeladze of the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC), this approach generally succeeded in keeping LGBT issues on a low profile during the UNM period.18 In summary, as the 2012 WISG report concluded, the progressive actions of the Saakashvili government were isolated responses to European pressure, and did not reflect any real commitment to eliminate discrimination against LGBT people.19 Nor did the Saakashvili LGBT reforms filter down to office in Tbilisi, February 19, 2015.

13 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

14 Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation, 98.

15 Ibid, 112-113.

16 Ibid, 103-105.

17 Ibid, 97.

18 Interview with Tamta Mikeladze, Lawyer at the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre, interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 20, 2015.

19 Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation, 97.

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the level of the average citizen, reflecting the superficial nature of modernization under the UNM that was identified by Dr. Oliver Reisner, an official at the EU Delegation to Georgia and a historian of Georgia.20

Despite the lack of substantive progress, the period following the Rose Revolution was one of considerable growth for the Georgian LGBT rights movement. As one Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said, the “European” conception of LGBT rights was imported into Georgia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.21 The issue particularly grew in prominence following the 2003 Rose Revolution that opened more avenues for Western influence. The Heinrich Boell Foundation organized the first public discussion on LGBT issues in 2005, and held a series of events on this topic in subsequent years.22 The Georgian LGBT community also developed its own NGOs for the first time. This began with creation of the Inclusive Foundation by Paata Sabelashvili in 2006, but it collapsed due to internal strife after the 2009 police raid.

A leading lesbian activist who had been attached to the Inclusive Foundation subsequently founded WISG, while Paata’s friend Irakli Vacharadze created Identoba and grew the organization through adept management and attracting foreign grants.23 At the same time, the LGBT issue did not gain very high visibility. As Boell Foundation EU Programme Coordinator Ana NemsitsveridzeDaniels and EMC lawyer Mikeladze reported, prior to May 17, 2013, NGOs that did not focus specifically on LGBT rights were reluctant to openly discuss the issues. This left Identoba and WISG Interview with Dr. Oliver Reisner, Project Manager, European Commission Delegation to Georgia, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, Hotel VIP Victoria, Tbilisi, February 16, 2015.

21 Interview with Diplomatic Training Centre officials.

22 Silvia Stöber, “Georgia: Between Modernity and the Middle Ages,” Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, July 11, 2013, accessed March 22, 2015.

23 Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation, 103; Interview with Ana Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Malkhaz Saldadze, respectively EU Programme Coordinator and Program Coordinator, Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, interviewed by author, personal interview, Boell Foundation Tbilisi office, February 19, 2015.

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as the only Georgian NGOs pursuing the LGBT rights agenda.24 The first International Day Against Homophobia (IDAHO) march only took place in 2012, and it faced harassment from Orthodox counter-protestors whom the police failed to restrain.25

Running parallel to the development of a Georgian LGBT rights movement was the rapid growth in power and influence of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). The Church was brutally repressed and nearly extinguished during the Stalinist period, but it did begin to enjoy a revival starting in the 1960s and 1970s as the Soviet Union allowed cultural nationalism in Georgia to flourish.26 Still, it was the collapse of the Soviet Union that allowed the Church to emerge as a major political actor. Georgia’s first President Zviad Gamsakhurdia explicitly appealed to Georgia’s imagined heroic past of Christian kings who rid the country of foreign elements, and equated the Church with Georgian nationhood itself.27 Though Gamsakhurdia’s regime was short-lived, he tapped into a deep vein of religiously-based ethno-nationalism that persisted and even grew in strength after his death. As Mikeladze pointed out, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the GOC was the only functioning social institution and the only institution with connections to Georgia’s pre-Soviet past. Patriarch Ilia II was able to use these assets to develop a nationalist discourse to build up public trust in himself and the Church.28 Georgia’s standard of living fell dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ordinary people were troubled by the growing insecurity and instability. As Reisner and Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) Chair Anna Natsvlishvili argued, many citizens thus found the stability and solidity that the Church offered reassuring and the Church became the main marker of Georgian identity.29 Popular trust in Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze; Interview with Mikeladze.

Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, The Council of Europe’s Recommendation, 109.

26 Jones, Georgia: A Political History, 227.

27 Jones, Georgia: A Political History, 58-59.

28 Interview with Mikeladze.

29 Anna Natsvlishvili, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, GYLA Offices, Tbilisi, February 20, 24 25

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the Church is extremely high, and Patriarch Ilia enjoys an approval rating of around 90%.30 The result was that the Church gained millions of poorly-educated converts, and began to invest massively in the construction of new churches, seminaries, and religious education programs in order to indoctrinate the new faithful.31

Yet for all its growing strength, the Church actually saw itself as embattled and was poorly adapted for Georgia’s transition to modernity. As Georgian journalist Salome Asatiani points out, Patriarch Ilia and most senior clerics were all installed during the Soviet period and were fundamentally shaped by it.32 Thus, scholar Charles Fairbanks demonstrates that the Church looks back nostalgically on the imagined Soviet past and is resentful of modernizing social changes that seem to undermine its position.33 This is borne out by the interview with Father Ilia, who looked back to the Soviet period’s exclusion of gays from the public square and compared it favourably with the current openness and visibility of LGBT people in Georgian society.34 In fact, as the Open Society Georgia Foundation’s Human Rights Program Manager Nika Jeiranashvili pointed out, the historical and spiritual traditions that the GOC represents seem poorly adapted to the new world of globalization and competitive business.35 In the words of the Council of Europe’s Deputy Head of Office, Alessandro Savaris, the Church ultimately feels it cannot accept many elements of Western 2015.

30 BBC News, “Thousands Protest in Georgia Over Gay Rights Rally,” May 17, 2013, accessed March 24, 2015.

31 Charles Fairbanks, “Weighing What We Do for Democracy in the South Caucasus: The Complex Case of Georgia,” in South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014), 74-75; Interview with Mikeladze.

32 Salome Asatiani, “Georgian Society at a Crossroads of Values,” in South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014), 81-82.

33 Fairbanks, “Complex Case of Georgia,” 70-71.

34 Interview with Father Ilia.

35 Interview with Nika Jeiranashvili, Human Rights Program Manager, Open Society Georgia Foundation, interviewed by author, Zoe Smale, and Matt Korda, personal interview, Open Society Georgia Foundation office, February 19, 2015.

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modernity because they are corrosive to perceived Georgian values. These values are poorly defined but usually seem to entail discrimination against minorities.36 Yet according to Mikeladze, the Church’s embrace of nationalism makes it problematic to attack European integration since this would be seen by many of its nationalist faithful as pro-Russian and thus unpatriotic.37 This tension leaves real divisions within the Church, a fact that was noted by a senior Ministry of Justice (MOJ) official and Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) Program Officer Irakli Kobalia.38

Just as the LGBT movement and the Church grew in strength during this period, so did the EU’s engagement with Georgia. Georgia joined the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, signed an Action Plan with the EU in 2006, and became part of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009.39 Still, interviews with EU officials revealed that Saakashvili’s commitment to the EU was weak because he favoured a laissez-faire free market over the EU’s regulated social market model.40 Saakashvili in fact favoured NATO integration over EU integration, but Georgia’s crushing defeat in the 2008 war with Russia removed the possibility of NATO membership and left EU integration as the only real option for the Georgian Dream coalition that succeeded Saakashvili.41 The EU has been a generous donor to Georgia over Interview with Alessandro Savaris, Deputy Head of Office, Council of Europe Georgia Office, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, Council of Europe Georgia Office, Tbilisi. February 16, 2015.

37 Interview with Mikeladze.

38 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Justice of Georgia, interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview, Ministry of Justice office, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015; Interview with Irakli Kobalia and Levan Tsutskiridze, respectively Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, NIMD Offices, Tbilisi, February 17, 2015.

39 Jones, Georgia: A Political History, 253.

40 Interview with Reisner; Interview with Boris Iarochevitch, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

41 Adrian Brisku, “Shaping Bridges: Perceptions of Western Engagement in the South 36

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the past decade, and through the EaP offered an Association Agreement that gave Georgia privileged access to the European market while requiring Georgia to adopt a series of economic, political, and human rights reforms.42 The EU also offered Georgia visa liberalization provided that it met a number of benchmarks.

One of these was passing an Anti-Discrimination Law and properly implementing it. As the Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to Georgia Boris Iarochevitch said, the EU insisted on the passage of the law because it wanted to ensure that visa liberalization did not lead to Georgians claiming refugee status in Europe.43 The EU further insisted that the law explicitly protect LGBT people, since they could otherwise claim refugee status in the EU.44

The result was that when the fragile Georgian Dream coalition took control of Parliament in 2012, it was faced with a tense situation in which the EU and the Georgian LGBT lobby confronted the Church. Georgian Dream itself was split on the issue. As Asatiani wrote, Georgian Dream is “a heterogeneous and eclectic entity,” and contained liberal parties such as the Free Democrats and Republicans, as well as more conservative actors like the Conservative Party and Industry Will Save Georgia.45 The coalition also had close connections with the GOC, and had used the GOC to claim ideological authority during the election campaign.46 The coalition was thus split on the issue of LGBT rights. Many members have made homophobic statements, such as the leader of the Conservative Party who called homosexuality Caucasus,” in South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014), 55; Ivliane Haindrava, “Georgia’s Political Trajectory Before and After the 2012 Election,” in South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, (Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014), 66.

42 Interview with Reisner; Jones, Georgia: A Political History, 253-254.

43 Interview with Iarochevitch.

44 Interview with Pastrana.

45 Asatiani, “Crossroads of Values,” 84.

46 Interview with Mikeladze.

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an illness.47 Staff members of former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili have also made homophobic comments and were not publicly rebuked.48 Nevertheless, Georgian Dream had taken power on a platform designed to improve the standard of living of the average citizen, and saw the EU and its social market model as the best way to achieve this.49 Ivanishvili was thus determined to take risks to ensure good relations with the EU even if this meant taking an unpopular stance on LGBT rights, a fact noted by numerous stakeholders who labeled EU integration as the key to his position on LGBT rights.50

The battleground was the small protest march organized by Identoba on the occasion of the IDAHO on May 17, 2013. Identoba had made a bold move. Indeed, both Pastrana and Reisner saw the protest march as premature given the reality of widespread societal homophobia.51 Aware that Orthodox activists would be staging a counter-protest, Ivanishvili said publically that “sexual minorities are the same citizens as we are…The society will gradually get used to it.” He further committed the government to protecting the LGBT protestors’ right to assemble against the Orthodox counterdemonstrations.52 Even if Ivanishvili only spoke out thanks to EU pressure, this should not distract attention from the fact that in the words of Asatiani his remarks were truly “unprecedented” and marked the first time that a prominent Georgian politician had publically challenged homophobia.53

It is also clear that elements of the Church leadership perceived Ivanishvili’s remarks as a direct challenge to their authority. During the previous decade, Saakashvili had used the carrot of state patronage and the stick of threatened state Interview with Kobalia and Tsutskiridze.

Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze.

49 Interview with Reisner; interview with Iarochevitch.

50 Interview with Rekhviashvili; Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze.

51 Interview with Pastrana; Interview with Reisner.

52 Civil Georgia, “PM Comments on Planned Gay Rights Rally,” May 14, 2013, accessed March 23, 2015.

53 Asatiani, “Crossroads of Values,” 84.

47 48

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persecution to restrain the GOC from openly opposing his modernization project. His removal from power lifted these restraints, and left the GOC free to release the aggression that had built up against Saakashvili’s modernization projects.54 Patriarch Ilia II issued a statement on May 16 that labeled the IDAHO march “as a violation of the majority’s rights and as an insult to their traditions,” using the language of nationalism to frame the Church’s opposition to the march and blaming the government for allowing it to occur.55

The Church thus used the counter-protests to showcase its political power and dominant position in Georgian society. As Identoba’s Rekhviashvili noted, the protests were planned by clerics with high positions in the Patriarchate who effectively mobilized local parish networks through sermons and door-to-door calls to achieve a massive popular mobilization.56 The official second in line to the Patriarch even opened the barricades at the protest.57 In particular, Bishop Iakob of Bodbe and Tsurtaveli spearheaded the protests and in a sermon at Tbilisi’s Holy Trinity cathedral directly following the protests he laid down a bold challenge to the state: You know very well that the United National Movement required two and a half months to gather five thousand people [for its April 19 rally] and then boasting: ‘how many people we gathered’. Today people came into [streets] on their own initiative... Several millions would have come [into the streets] if needed.58

Bishop Iakob thus highlighted the strength of the Church’s grassroots networks compared to the narrow reach of the former UNM political elite, and warned the Georgian Dream of the consequences of disregarding its wishes.

Interview with Mikeladze.

Civil Georgia, “Georgian Church Calls for Gay Rights Ban,” May 16, 2013, accessed March 24, 2015.

56 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

57 Interview with Mikeladze.

58 Civil Georgia, “Patriarch Calls for Calm After Orthodox Groups Thwart Gay Rights Rally,” May 17, 2013, accessed March 23, 2015.

54 55

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For some, Georgia’s response to the protests was a cause for optimism. EU Human Rights Focal Point Eva Pastrana expressed her optimism about Georgian public opinion and noted that even many Georgians who held homophobic attitudes had been appalled by the violence.59 Likewise, she saw it as a major step forward that the government had tried two of the priests involved in the violence. She further argued that the government was sincere in its desire to protect the LGBT protestors but had simply failed to anticipate the scale of the counter-demonstration, a claim echoed by Reisner.60 Others have argued that the Church itself ultimately rejected violence, citing Patriarch Ilia’s condemnation of all violence.61 Natia Mestvirishvili of the Caucasus Regional Resource Centers also emphasized that many priests criticized the actions of their fellow clerics and said that any violence was against Christianity.62

Yet these positive indicators were far outweighed by the overall Church response, the weak state response, and the wave of violence that followed. While the Patriarch belatedly condemned violence, Bishop Iakob initially refused to condemn the violent behaviour of priests and said only that “they are also humans.”63 Rekhviashvili further pointed out that the prominent clerics in the Patriarchate who had directed the protests were not disciplined, but instead gave prominent homophobic speeches after the protests.64 As a senior MOJ official admitted, the government decided to spin out the legal proceedings against the two priests to avoid a damaging confrontation with the GOC.65 Despite the assertions

by Pastrana and Reisner that the police tried their best but lacked the capacity to stop the violence, a strong consensus emerged Interview with Pastrana.

Interview with Pastrana; Interview with Reisner.

61 Civil Georgia, “Patriarch Calls for Calm.”

62 Interview with Natia Mestvirishvili.

63 Andrew Roth and Olesya Vartanyan, “Slow Response by Georgians to Mob Attack on Gay Rally,” New York Times, May 19, 2013, accessed March 23, 2015 64 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

65 Interview with senior MOJ official.

59 60

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in the interviews with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels, Jeiranashvili, Rekhviashvili, and Elene Chkheidze of the International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis that rank-and-file police officers shared the same homophobic attitudes as the protestors and thus did not feel that they had to protect them from violence.66 Perhaps the most telling sign was the increase in violence against LGBT people that followed the May 17 protests, which took the form of a witch-hunt against those perceived to be transgressing traditional gender norms.67

If the May 17 events had brought the issue of LGBT rights into the public arena, the confrontation over the AntiDiscrimination Law that took place in spring 2014 further heightened its profile. The government was eager to pass the law and begin its implementation in time to be eligible to achieve visa liberalization at the May 2015 Riga Summit, since it and key EU officials saw visa liberalization as a way to show the public that European integration brought tangible benefits.68 The MOJ was responsible for drafting the law, and according to a senior official it pursued a technocratic, depoliticized drafting process that sought to base the law on similar legislation in the United Kingdom, the EU, and Georgiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Eastern European neighbours. Eva Pastrana actually thought the law overoptimistic, but the senior MOJ official explained that the MOJ drafted it this way because they anticipated it would be watered down by the political process regardless.69 Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze; Interview with Jeiranashvili; Interview with Rekhviashvili; Interview with Elene Chkheidze, Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi, February 18, 2015.

67 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

68 Interview with Mariam Rakviashvili, Deputy State Minister, Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European & Euro-Atlantic Integration, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, State Chancellery of Georgia building, Tbilisi, February 17, 2015; Interview with Gigi Gigiadze, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, February 17, 2015; Interview with Iarochevitch.

69 Interview with senior MOJ official; Interview with Pastrana.

66

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Nevertheless, in the words of the senior MOJ official, it would have taken Georgia 20 years to pass the law if left to its own devices.70 This is reflected in comments by Savaris, who noted that there was almost no societal pressure for the law and that the government introduced it almost entirely because of pressure from the EU.71

The government did seek to engage the Church early on in the process to minimize the political fallout. As the senior MOJ official and Deputy State Minister for European & Euro-Atlantic Integration Mariam Rakviashvili emphasized, the Georgian government was conscious of the extended and damaging political battle with the local Orthodox church that Moldova had previously experienced when passing a similar anti-discrimination law.72 The MOJ thus opened a formal channel to the Patriarchate using a Deputy Minister, while the EU delegation lobbied the Patriarchate informally.73

Yet despite the government’s best intentions, a public battle was exactly what resulted. Deputy State Minister Rakviashvili claimed that the government’s ability to reach a consensus and cooperate with the Church on the law was key to its passage.74 This is assertion is flatly contradicted by the damaging confrontation between church and state that the law produced. While Patriarchate officials initially showed signs of cautious engagement, including having a Church-affiliated lawyer submit comments on the law to the MOJ, the Church subsequently decided to oppose the law in principle.75 At the Easter service in 2014, a leading Orthodox priest warned that the passage of the law could precipitate massive civil disobedience.76 The senior MOJ official interviewed suggested that Interview with senior MOJ official.

Interview with Savaris.

72 Interview with senior MOJ official; Interview with Rakviashvili; See RFE/RL’s Moldovan Service, “Church Pressures Moldova’s Government to Repeal Antidiscrimination Laws,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 21, 2013, accessed March 23, 2015.

73 Interview with senior MOJ official; Interview with Pastrana.

74 Interview with Rakviashvili.

75 Interview with senior MOJ official.

76 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

70 71

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it is more likely that the Church officials the MOJ was negotiating with lost out to radicals in an internal Church power struggle than that the Church was simply double-crossing the government.77 Other interviews support this hypothesis. For instance, both the EU’s Iarochevitch and the NIMD’s South Caucasus Representative Levan Tsutkiridze saw Patriarch Ilia himself as a moderate figure capable of compromise but argued that the grassroots Church and factions in the hierarchy were actually much more radical.78

Despite its best intentions, the government thus found itself in a battle with the Church, and it ultimately prevailed. Mikeladze described the confrontation as a direct struggle between Patriarch Ilia and Ivanishvili. Even though Ivanishvili was no longer prime minister by 2014, as the head of the Georgian Dream coalition he personally lobbied each MP in order to get the law passed.79 Despite strong public opposition from the Church and clerics who made political threats against MPs, the bill passed by 115 votes to 0 on its third reading.80 EU officials successfully insisted on the retention of sexual identity as a grounds of discrimination by telling the government that the EU could not recommend visa liberalization if this was not included.81 Indeed, the law’s inclusion of sexual identity as a grounds of discrimination contrasts favourably with Moldova, where this provision was struck from the law before it was passed.82 It is thus that Mikeladze terms the passage of the law a major victory for the secular state over the Church.83

Yet the government made major substantive and rhetorical concessions to conservative forces to secure the bill’s passage.

It eliminated both proposed fines for violations of the act and a Interview with senior MOJ official.

Interview with Iarochevitch; Interview with Kobalia and Tsutkiridze.

79 Interview with Mikeladze.

80 Civil Georgia, “Anti-Discrimination Bill Adopted,” May 2, 2014, accessed March 23, 2015.

81 Interview with Pastrana.

82 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

83 Interview with Mikeladze.

77 78

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new inspectorate with a quasi-judicial oversight function.84 The EU ultimately acquiesced in the watering down of the law on the grounds that a weak law was better than no law at all.85 Also telling were the arguments that many Georgian Dream MPs made to defend their votes in favour of the law. As Rekhviashvili noted, many of these arguments were frankly homophobic.86 Another trend was that MPs defended their votes in terms of Georgia’s compliance with EU demands, rather than protecting Georgian citizens from discrimination. This trend was noticed by both Tsutskiridze and Iarochevitch, both of whom noted that blaming the EU for unpopular legislation was a dangerous step that could discredit European integration in the eyes of public opinion.87

It is still too early to tell whether the government will implement the Anti-Discrimination Law effectively. As Pastrana admitted, most political actors were so focused on securing the law’s passage that little attention was devoted to how it would be implemented until it was passed.88 According to the senior MOJ official, 24 petitions have been submitted to the Public Defender’s Office so far, but none of the cases have progressed through the system yet.89 Pastrana facilitated the formation of a NGO coalition to work with the Public Defender’s Office on the implementation of the law, and both she and Nemsitsveridze-Daniels identified the Public Defender of Georgia and the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Human Rights and Gender Equality Issues Sopho Japaridze as pro-LGBT figures within the government.90 Certainly, there are numerous flaws with the enforcement mechanisms of the law.

Numerous stakeholders also noted that the rank-and-file officials of many government ministries also hold homophobic attitudes, Interview with Pastrana; Interview with senior MOJ official.

Interview with Pastrana.

86 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

87 Interview with Iarochevitch; Interview with Kobalia and Tsutskiridze.

88 Interview with Pastrana.

89 Interview with senior MOJ official.

90 Interview with Pastrana; Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze.

84 85

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complicating the process of implementation.91 Yet as Identoba’s Rekhviashvili emphasized, the law could be functional with only slight amendments if the government shows the political will necessary to enforce it.92 Ultimately it is premature to judge whether or not the law is being and will be effectively implemented.

What is undeniable though is that the public confrontations between Church and state over the May 17 violence and the AntiDiscrimination Law expose deeply homophobic public sentiments that legal reforms have to date failed to alter. For instance, the Caucasus Regional Resource Centers’ Tbilisi office conducted a survey of 542 Tbilisi residents via face-to-face interviews several weeks after the May 17 incident while popular memories were still fresh and emotional.93 The results were telling. To cite just a few of the statistics, 49% of those polled thought a good citizen should never respect the rights of sexual minorities, 50% thought that it was acceptable to be physically violent toward people or groups that threatened national values, and over 43% of people thought that the main result of May 17 was either “defending the dignity of Georgians” or “ending the homosexual propaganda.” Interestingly, 57% of those surveyed believed that the clergy involved in the violence should not face criminal justice, and 57% also believed that a successfully organized IDAHO demonstration would have endangered Georgia in some way.94 A 2013 report by Identoba following May 17 also showed that 88% of Georgians think that homosexuality is never justified.95

The data also suggests that greater visibility of LGBT people Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze; Interview with Jeiranashvili.

Interview with Rekhviashvili.

93 Interview with Natia Mestvirishvili, Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator, Caucasus Regional Resource Centers, interviewed by author, personal interview, CRRC Tbilisi office, February 19, 2015.

94 Caucasus Regional Resources Centers Georgia, “Public Opinion and the May 17th Events in Tbilisi: CRRC Survey Results,” September 25, 2013, provided to author by Natia Mestvirishvili, Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator at the CRRC. 95 Identoba, Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in Georgia, submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, September 2013, accessed March 23, 2015.

91 92

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and social exposure to them will not lead to greater tolerance but instead social polarization and a rise in intolerance. While it is easy to assume that more LGBT people coming out will reduce homophobia, the data instead indicates that people with preexisting illiberal attitudes become more homophobic than they were before if they encounter a LGBT person.96 Interestingly, people who share liberal values and personally know LGBT people are less homophobic than those who share liberal values and do not know LGBT people personally.97 This suggests that exposure to LGBT people only intensifies a person’s value predispositions, but does not fundamentally alter them. According to Mestvirishvili, the result is that increasing the visibility of LGBT people without sustained efforts to encourage the spread of liberal values will produced a polarized situation. She thus recommends that before the visibility of LGBT people increases, the government should encourage the spread of liberal values.98

Mestvirishvili’s analysis of the statistical data is borne out by anecdotal evidence from many other stakeholders interviewed.

Rekhviashvili reports that youth opinion is becoming polarized and that there are increasing numbers of both homophobic and LGBTfriendly youth.99 Likewise, Nemsitsveridze-Daniels noted that many young people are becoming seemingly close-minded in their homophobia and are less responsive to appeals for tolerance.100 These statements are significant since according to the CRRC data young people are more likely than elderly people to know LGBT people.101 It is also confirmed by the increase in violence against LGBT people that has followed the May 17 violence and the AntiDiscrimination Law’s passage. As Rekhviashvili emphasized, families had previously ignored signs that their children were Interview with Mestvirishvili.

Caucasus Regional Resources Centers, “Exploring Homophobia in Georgia, Part 4” November 2014, accessed March 22, 2015.

98 Interview with Mestvirishvili.

99 Interview with Rekhviashvili.

100 Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze.

101 Caucasus Regional Resource Centers Georgia, “CRRC Survey Results.”

96 97

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LGBT. Yet in the past two years, thanks to the public visibility they have begun to identify their LGBT children as LGBT, which often leads to family confrontations.102 Indeed, Mikeladze attribute the upswing in violence to the increase in the visibility of LGBT people.

103

Of course, it is likely that Russia is using indirect influence and soft power to inflame homophobic elements of Georgian society. While no stakeholder produced direct proof of Russian manipulation of the LGBT issue in Georgia, most believed that Russia was manipulating the situation and produced strong circumstantial evidence in support of their claims. For instance, the senior MOJ official noted that the Soviet era connections between the GOC and the Soviet security services were still present and could be used by Russia.104 When Rekhviashvili conducted an investigation into the online campaign of death threats against former Identoba Executive Director Irakli Vacharadze, she found that there was a surprisingly well-organized, coordinated, and effective online campaign that was able to incite a mob almost instantly. She suggested that it had the hallmarks of an operation by Russian intelligence, a suggestion that is supported by the general pattern of Russian manipulation of websites and social media in Eastern Europe.105 Tsutskiridze of NIMD noted that Georgian radical parties parrot Putin’s rhetoric and policy on LGBT rights, and repeat the Russian claim that European integration is synonymous with the loss of traditional values.106 Indeed, Father Ilia’s comments on the dangers of gay propaganda to children paralleled the Russian position neatly.107 In June 2014, the Guardian even reported that the Eurasian Institute, a Russian Interview with Rekhviashvili.

Interview with Mikeladze.

104 Interview with senior MOJ official.

105 Interview with Rekhviashvili; Dalibor Rohac, “Cranks, Trolls, and Useful Idiots: Russia’s Information Warriors Set Their Sights on Central Europe,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2015, accessed March 24, 2015.

106 Interview with Kobalia and Tsutskiridze.

107 Interview with Father Ilia.

102 103

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front organization with a Tbilisi office, had tried to bribe a sex worker to stage an IDAHO rally to provoke a repeat of the May 17 violence.108 Russian manipulation of the LGBT issue in Georgia is also consistent with Russia’s broader mobilization of conservative values to support its foreign policy in its near abroad, as noted

by Melik Kaylan and Anne Appelbaum.109 Indeed, the interviews showed that both Georgian government and EU officials took the threat of Russia using LGBT rights as a lever seriously.110

Yet ultimately Russian influence on the specific issue of LGBT rights is limited and should not distract from the deeper domestic roots of Georgia’s homophobia problem. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and Deputy State Minister Rakviashvili both said that the LGBT issue was a weak lever for Russia given Georgian public opinion’s bedrock commitment to European integration.111 Perhaps this is a dubious claim since EU officials tend to see Georgian public opinion’s commitment to European integration as fragile.112 Yet Iarochevitch himself saw Russian influence over Patriarch Ilia and the GOC as relatively minor, noting that ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and its Georgian counterpart are actually rather limited.113 In any case, the principal obstacle to progress on LGBT rights is not Russia but the conservative attitudes of Georgians themselves, attitudes that Russia likely exploits but certainly did not create.

As Nemsitsveridze-Daniels emphasizes, homophobia is thus deeply rooted in traditional social attitudes.114 In the blunt words of Pastrana, “Radicals will be radicals in every country,” with Josie Le Blond, “Georgian Pro-Russia Group ‘Planned Fake Pride March to Scupper EU Deal,’” Guardian, June 26, 2014, accessed March 24, 2015.

109 See Anne Appelbaum, “Russia’s Anti-Western Ideology Has Global Consequences,” Washington Post, March 28, 2014, accessed March 22, 2015.; Melik Kaylan, “Kremlin Values: Putin’s Strategic Conservatism,” World Affairs (May/June 2014): 9-17.

110 Interview with Pastrana; Interview with Iarochevitch; Interview with Rakviashvili.

111 Interview with Diplomatic Training Centre officials; Interview with Rakviashvili.

112 Interview with Pastrana; Interview with Iarochevitch.

113 Interview with Iarochevitch.

114 Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze.

108

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or without Russian influence.115 This should not blind us to the role of Russian influence. As Pastrana and Rekhviashvili both emphasized, the blending of foreign and domestic elements make Georgia’s homophobia problem especially complex.116 Instead, it only underlines the need for the EU, the Georgian government, and NGOs to pursue a public education, communication, and outreach strategy that will change the public attitudes that give Russia room for influence.

Yet the state of the education system in Georgia suggests that it is failing to address the underlying problem of illiberal attitudes. The Saakashvili government’s 2005 Law on General Education did attempt to modernize the curriculum to incorporate critical thinking and improve training of teachers, yet the reform met strong resistance from conservative administrators and teachers along with the Church.117 In fact, teachers are often deeply conservative and inculcate those values in their students. A recent survey showed that 47% of primary school teachers think that the law should punish people who are LGBT.118 NemsitsveridzeDaniels reported that there were no signs of progress in making the education system in Georgia more liberal, and linked this to the total absence of sexual education in the school system.119

Likewise, the inability or unwillingness of NGOs to communicate effectively with the public undermines their ability to spread liberal values. Stakeholders such as GYLA, the International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis, and the EMC agreed with Reisner that Georgia’s NGO community was basically part of the political establishment and was disconnected from the vast majority of the population.120 The assessment of Tamta Mikeladze is sobering: Interview with Pastrana.

Interview with Pastrana; Interview with Rekhviashvili.

117 Jones, Georgia: A Political History, 212.

118 Caucasus Regional Resources Centers, “Exploring Homophobia.”

119 Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels.

120 Interview with Natsvlishvili; Interview with Chkheidze; Interview with Mikeladze; Interview with Reisner.

115 116

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The other problem is that usually NGOs, they are not working on society at all. There is not any grassroots instrument…they are not working on public awareness effectively in society, there is not even public discussion, et cetera. So the NGO sector becomes very closed …we are perceived as the powerful actors who are going on some agenda which is not very actual for the people.121

As this quote indicates, NGOs suffer from the twin problems of poor communication strategy and poor public image. The former was noted by Asatiani, who faulted NGOs for using “NGO language” that was designed for foreign and elite audiences and was inaccessible to the ordinary citizen.122 In addition, there is a deeply ingrained public perception that NGOs are working on issues that affect the rights of minorities of all kinds but not the imagined ordinary citizen. Heterosexual ethnic Georgians who are Orthodox Christians do not fit the European definition of a vulnerable group, but in fact they often do suffer from economic hardship and social deprivation.123 Coupled with this resentment is a widespread public perception that NGO criticism of the May 17 violence is hypocritical, since prominent NGO leaders were silent or in some cases even actively complicit in the brutal state dismantlement of demonstrations under Saakashvili.124

Given the inability of NGOs to communicate effectively with the populace and the failure of the education system to inculcate liberal values, it is unsurprising that the public discourse has been dominated to a large degree by homophobia. It is striking that though the EU and the government both attempted to develop a communications strategy for the Anti-Discrimination Law that emphasized its benefits to ordinary Georgians, these efforts were overwhelmed by the wave of homophobia such that lawmakers felt compelled to justify their votes in favour of the law in Interview with Mikeladze.

Asatiani, “Crossroads of Values,” 83.

123 Interview with Natsvlishvili.

124 Interview with Natsvlishvili; Interview with Mikeladze.

121 122

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homophobic terms that cast blame on the EU.125 The conservative homophobic arguments have real staying power since they appeal to deeply ingrained homophobic notions that are continuous with both the Soviet period and Georgia’s imagined pre-Soviet past. As Nemsitsveridze-Daniels noted, because Georgians see homosexuality as a disease, by extension they believe that children can be contaminated with it by contact with LGBT people or proLGBT ideas. This view was perfectly expressed in the interview with Father Ilia. He said that during the Soviet period the society was very tolerant of LGBT people because they did not try to spread their lifestyle to others, but reacted to the increased visibility of LGBT people today by emphasizing the need to protect Georgian children from LGBT propaganda.126

The failure of the NGO community to engage the public is coupled by its failure to constructively engage the Church. As Fairbanks emphasizes, the NGO community has tended to treat the Church as an implacable enemy, an enmity that the Church admittedly reciprocates.127 This enmity was expressed by certain stakeholders, especially Savaris, Rekhviashvili, and Tsutskiridze, who characterized the Church’s position on European integration as basically insincere and cast it as a negative force in Georgian society.128 Yet many NGO stakeholders interviewed criticized NGOs’ failure to engage with the Church and emphasized the need to find ways to engage with it. Nemsitsveridze-Daniels said that the Boell Foundation’s new LGBTI Soldaten Network would prioritize starting a dialogue with the GOC and would avoid antagonizing it.129 Similarly, GYLA’s Natsvlishvili noted that no serious effort had been made by NGOs to start a dialogue with the Church, but suggested that this should be done since the Church’s wide range of social networks would be a valuable resource for NGOs to tap Interview with Pastrana; Interview with senior MOJ official.

Interview with Father Ilia.

127 Fairbanks, “Complex Case of Georgia,” 71-72.

128 Interview with Savaris; Interview with Rekhviashvili.

129 Interview with Nemsitsveridze-Daniels and Saldadze.

125 126

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into.130 As Fairbanks correctly states, ultimately it is in the interest of both the West and Georgia to help the Church adapt itself to the modern world and serve as a cooperative partner to civil society and government.131

Moreover, despite the difficulties of engagement with the Church, engagement has produced positive results for the EU and the Georgian government in the past. Certainly, as GYLA’s Natsvlishvili noted, the Church can be difficult to engage with and is not very open.132 Yet engagement has produced positive results for both the EU and the Georgian government. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gigi Gigiadze highlighted the positive roles that the Church has played in Georgia’s foreign policy, while Iarochevitch emphasized how the EU’s positive contacts with the Patriarchate had resulted in a vital endorsement by Patriarch Ilia of European integration.133 As Pastrana emphasized, Hammarberg’s personal relationship with Patriarch Ilia that dated back to the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War allowed him to exercise a moderating influence in the aftermath of the May 17 violence.134

In conclusion, the pressures of EU integration accelerated the historical development of the LGBT rights movement in Georgia and produced two public battles between the Georgian Orthodox Church and the state that forced the issue of LGBT rights out into the open. The result has been an improved legal framework for LGBT rights that may bear fruit in the future, but the failure of government and the NGOs to educate public opinion means that the result of increased visibility will likely be social polarization and continued intolerance and violence because the underlying traditional homophobic attitudes remain unchanged.

The EU is currently in the process of evaluating Georgia’s progress in implementing the Anti-Discrimination Law. While the EU Interview with Natsvlishvili.

Fairbanks, “Complex Case of Georgia,” 75.

132 Interview with Natsvlishvili.

133 Interview with Gigiadze; Interview with Iarochevitch.

134 Interview with Pastrana.

130 131

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did not grant Georgia visa liberalization at the May 2015 Riga Summit, it is possible that the EU will give Georgia a favourable assessment in the future given the intense commitment of the Georgian Dream government to achieving this goal. Still, even if visa liberalization is achieved in the future, this should not be the occasion for the Georgian government to declare “mission accomplished” on the issue of preventing discrimination against LGBT people. Creating an environment in which LGBT people will be free from intolerance, discrimination, and violence will require a major educational and public messaging effort to inculcate liberal attitudes in the population and counter the homophobic messages that are being spread by the Church, Russia, and conservative groups that reinforce deeply-rooted homophobic attitudes.

Bibliography Appelbaum, Anne. “Russia’s Anti-Western Ideology Has Global Consequences.” Washington Post. March 28, 2014.

Accessed March 22, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/anne-applebaum-russias-anti-western-ideology-hasglobal-consequences/2014/03/28/b96fd172-b6a6-11e3-8cc3d4bf596577eb_story.html.

Asatiani, Salome. “Georgian Society at a Crossroads of Values.”

In South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, 79-85. Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014.

BBC News. “Thousands Protest in Georgia Over Gay Rights Rally.”

May 17, 2013. Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-22571216.

Brisku, Adrian. “Shaping Bridges: Perceptions of Western Engagement in the South Caucasus.” In South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, 48-58. Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation 198

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South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014.

Caucasus Regional Resources Centers Georgia. “Public Opinion and the May 17th Events in Tbilisi: CRRC Survey Results.”

September 25, 2013. Provided to author by Natia Mestvirishvili, Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator at the CRRC. Caucasus Regional Resources Centers. “Exploring Homophobia in Georgia, Part 4.” November 2014. Accessed March 24, 2015. http:// crrc-caucasus.blogspot.ca/2014/11/exploring-homophobia-ingeorgia-part-4.html.

Chkheidze, Elene. Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi.

February 18, 2015.

Civil Georgia. “Anti-Discrimination Bill Adopted.” May 2, 2014. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=27192.

Civil Georgia. “Georgian Church Calls for Gay Rights Ban.” May 16, 2013. Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=26062.

Civil Georgia. “Patriarch Calls for Calm After Orthodox Groups Thwart Gay Rights Rally.” May 17, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26071.

Civil Georgia. “PM Comments on Planned Gay Rights Rally.” May 14, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=26055.

De Jong, Ben. “‘An Intolerable Kind of Moral Degeneration’: 199

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Homosexuality in the Soviet Union.” Review of Socialist Law 4 (1982): 341-357.

Diplomatic Training Centre officials. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi.

February 17, 2015.

Fairbanks, Charles. “Weighing What We Do for Democracy in the South Caucasus: The Complex Case of Georgia.” In South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, 69-78. Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014.

Father Ilia. Georgian Orthodox priest at the Svetitskhoveli Cathedral. Interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview, Mtskheta, Georgia, February 20, 2015.

Gigiadze, Gigi. Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi.

February 17, 2015.

Haindrava, Ivliane. “Georgia’s Political Trajectory Before and After the 2012 Election.” In South Caucasus at a Crossroad: Thorny Realities and Great Expectations, eds. Salome Asatiani, Nino Lejava, 61-68. Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office, 2014.

Iarochevitch, Boris. Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi.

February 18, 2015.

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Identoba. Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in Georgia. Submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, September 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.ilga-europe.org/content/ download/29463/182353/file/identoba%20report%20on%20 human%20rights%20in%20Georgia%20-%20INT_CCPR_NGO_ GEO_15206_E%20-%20September%202013.pdf.

Kaylan, Melik. “Kremlin Values: Putin’s Strategic Conservatism.”

World Affairs (May/June 2014): 9-17.

Kobalia, Irakli, and Levan Tsutskiridze. Respectively Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. NIMD Offices, Tbilisi. February 17, 2015.

Jeiranashvili, Nika. Human Rights Program Manager, Open Society Georgia Foundation. Interviewed by author, Zoe Smale, and Matt Korda, personal interview. Open Society Georgia Foundation office, February 19, 2015.

Jones, Stephen. Georgia: A Political History since Independence.

London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2013.

Le Blond, Josie. “Georgian Pro-Russia Group ‘Planned Fake Pride March to Scupper EU Deal.’” Guardian. June 26, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/26/ georgian-pro-russia-group-planned-fake-pride-march.

Maza, Cristina. “Georgia Is a Terrible Place to be Gay.” Balkanist.

May 24, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2014. http://balkanist.net/gayrights-arent-getting-better-in-georgia/.

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Mestvirishvili, Natia. Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator, Caucasus Regional Resource Centers. Interviewed by author, personal interview. CRRC Tbilisi office, February 19, 2015.

Mikeladze, Tamta. Lawyer at the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre. Interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview. Tbilisi, Georgia, February 20, 2015.

Natsvlishvili, Anna. Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. February 20, 2015.

Natsvlishvili, Ana. Study on Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity – Legal Report: Georgia. COWI and the Danish Institute for Human Rights. 2011. Accessed March 22, 2015. http://www.coe. int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf.

Nemsitsveridze-Daniels, Ana, and Malkhaz Saldadze. Respectively EU Programme Coordinator and Program Coordinator, Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office. Interviewed by author, personal interview. Boell Foundation Tbilisi office, February 19, 2015.

Pastrana, Eva. Human Rights Focal Point, European Union Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by Zoe Smale, personal interview. EU Delegation office in Tbilisi, February 19, 2015.

Rakviashvili, Mariam. Deputy State Minister, Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European & Euro-Atlantic Integration.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. State Chancellery of Georgia building, Tbilisi. February 17, 2015.

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Reisner, Dr. Oliver. Project Manager, European Commission Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. Hotel VIP Victoria, Tbilisi. February 16, 2015.

Rekhviashvili, Anna. Interim Executive Director of Identoba.

Interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview.

Identoba’s office in Tbilisi, Georgia, February 18, 2015.

RFE/RL’s Moldovan Service. “Church Pressures Moldova’s Government To Repeal Antidiscrimination Laws.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. June 21, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-gay-church-rightsdiscrimination-laws/25024061.html.

Remnick, David. “In Age of Glasnost, Homosexuality Still Taboo in Soviet Union.” The Washington Post. March 9, 1989.

Rohac, Dalibor. “Cranks, Trolls, and Useful Idiots: Russia’s Information Warriors Set Their Sights on Central Europe.”

Foreign Policy. March 12, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2015. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/12/cranks-trolls-and-useful-idiotspoland-czech-republic-slovakia-russia-ukraine/.

Roth, Andrew, and Olesya Vartanyan. “Slow Response by Georgians to Mob Attack on Gay Rally.” New York Times. May 19, 2013.

Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/ world/europe/georgian-officials-react-slowly-to-anti-gay-attack. html.

Savaris, Alessandro. Deputy Head of Office, Council of Europe Georgia Office. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, personal interview. Council of Europe Georgia Office, 203

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Tbilisi. February 16, 2015.

Senior official. Ministry of Justice of Georgia. Interviewed by author and Zoe Smale, personal interview. Ministry of Justice office, Tbilisi, February 20, 2015.

Stöber, Silvia. “Georgia: Between Modernity and the Middle Ages.”

Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus Regional Office.

July 11, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2015. http://www.boell.de/de/ node/277535.

Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group. The Council of Europe’s Recommendation to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity in Georgia: Monitoring of Implementation. Tbilisi, 2012. Accessed March 22, 2015: http://women.ge/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ CM_REC20105GEORGIA_ENG_www.pdf.

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LGBT ISSUES AS A DECISIVE WEDGE IN GEORGIA’S RELATIONS, AND POTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE, WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION? Zoe Smale

As part of the European Union Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and a member of the Eastern Partnership, the Republic of Georgia is truly an exception when it comes to Europe’s eastern neighbors.1 Situated in the South Caucasus region – bordering Russia to the north and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey to the south – Georgia has remained steadfast in its unwavering aspirations for eventual European integration, something that distinguishes it from fellow Eastern partners such as Moldova and the Ukraine.2 Once part of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Georgia regained its sovereignty in April 1991 in the wake of the USSR’s collapse.3 A population Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

2 Reisner, Oliver, Project Manager to European Commission Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Hotel VIP Victoria, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

3 Delegation to the European Union to Georgia. “Political & Economic Relations.” Delegation to the European Union to Georgia. Online. Internet. Accessed March 23, 2014.

1

Zoe Smale is a recent graduate from the University of Toronto with a double major in History and African Studies. Currently working at the Munk School of Global Affairs, Zoe intends to work abroad in the coming year with an NGO before pursuing graduate studies. Zoe’s primary focus has been on the “Global South” and the fundamental dynamics of the development process – political, economic, and social factors that promote and inhibit development. However, a research trip to Georgia, which she recently partook in, has widened the geographic scope of her interests.

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that traditionally had strong cultural and historical ties with its Western neighbors, the opening of the Eastern bloc allowed for the restoration of relations between the European Union and Georgia starting in 1992.4 Wedged between two polarizing ideological political powers, Georgia’s post-Soviet period has been witness to a growing desire for Western dialogue and European integration – a desire that is held by over 88 percent of the population who see it as a tool for resolving major international and domestic problems.5

While the European Union has made it clear that its membership will not be enlarged in the next five years, the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) in June 2014 and the EU-Georgia Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP), undertaken in February 2013 has allowed for the flourishing of EU- Georgian relations.6 These are initiatives that Georgian officials believe will aid them in their long-term strategic plan towards European integration.7 Yet despite the successful adaption and implementation of new legislation that Georgia was obliged to enact as conditions to these agreements, the country still faces some considerable challenges. These challenges include, among other things, three principal concerns: first, security threats and the geopolitical fragility that stem from the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the dominance of Russia in all spheres (economic, political and military), the threat of radicalized Islamic states, and the conflict in Ukraine and Crimea; second, its poor economy; and, third, a very influential and vocal patriarch.8

While there is significant support for close relations with 4 Ibid.

5 CRRC. “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia.” CRRC. December, 2011.

Accessed March 22nd, 2014. and Morari, Cristina. “European Integration of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova: Evolution and Prospects.” Seventh Framework Programme.

January 1st, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2014.

6 Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

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the EU by the general public, the implementation of EU mandated reforms has not been without contention and social tensions. One significant distinction between EU values and those of Georgia has been the question of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, an issue that has been at the forefront of public discussion and debate as a result of the anti-discrimination law that was passed by the Georgian Dream Coalition in May 2014. This new legislation was designed to ensure the elimination of all forms of discrimination in order to protect people of race, color, language, gender, age, citizenship, native identity, birth, place of residence, property, social status, religion, ethnic affiliation, profession, family status, health condition, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, expression, and political or other beliefs.9 While two thirds of the population directly benefit from the anti-discrimination law, the inclusion of LGBT people in the document has become a flashpoint upon which those opposed to sexual minorities can construct a discourse that frames the new legislation as “the greatest indecency.”10

The deeply rooted homophobic undercurrents that run through Georgian society pose obvious problems for the European Union. In accordance with the provisional guidelines of the Council of European Union To Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Lesbians, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Intersex Persons,11 the European Union and International Human Rights Law on anti-discrimination, and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, LGBT people are identified as a segment of Antelava, Teimuraz, Minister for Public International Law, Ministry of Justice. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Ministry of Justice Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

10 Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

11 Foreign Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg. “Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons.” Council of the European Union. June 24, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2014.

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society deserving of equal rights and protection against the fear of harassment.12 The Georgian Orthodox Church’s resolute opposition to these European values contravenes the Visa Liberalization Law, the Associations Agreement, and the Copenhagen Criteria – benchmarks that are required of all prospective EU countries.

Although homophobia is often presented as a problem that only affects LGBT individuals, the spread of homophobic attitudes is a signal of intolerance and ignorance – heralding the possibility of these issues preventing the country’s political, economic and social development.13 Notwithstanding the importance given to social and human rights values by the EU, it is unlikely that LGBT issues form a critical deal breaker for EU integration. As Anna Natsvlishvili, Chair of Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association (GYLA), said, while people who identify as LGBT may be “one of the most vulnerable groups in the Republic of Georgia, they’re certainly not the only, nor the most.”14 Rather, it seems far more likely that the success of Georgian amalgamation with the European Union would be adjudicated on geopolitical, economic, and resource (specifically energy) considerations.15

Nevertheless, the effective implementation and promotion of LGBT rights is more than just symbolic and remains a top priority for the EU given that cases of intolerance towards sexual minorities in Georgia are several times higher than those of intolerance towards ethnic and religious minorities.16 As Europe Regional Office. “The European Union and International human Rights Law.” Europe Regional Office. Accessed March 22, 2014.

13 Mestvirishvili, Natia, Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator, Caucasus Regional Resource Centers. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Misha Boutillier. Personal interview. CRRC Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

14 Natsvlishvili, Anna, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

15 Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

16 CRRC. “The May 17th Events in Tbilisi Revisited.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 17th September, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

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Thomas Hammarberg, European Union’s Special Adviser for Legal and Constitutional Reform and Human Rights in Georgia, has written, regardless of how “deep-rooted and complex the issues may be, [these complexities] cannot be an excuse for not addressing [LGBT rights] at all.”17 As recent statistics from the 2011 Caucasus Barometer illustrate, “the level of homophobia in Georgia is much higher than most European countries, scoring much closer to African countries with 88 percent of the population claiming that homosexuality can never be justified.”18 Addressing the prevalence of homophobia in Georgia is vital. Therein lies a fundamental paradox: the desire to move toward joining the EU has created legislative pressure to adapt anti-discrimination laws, but transformation of the entrenched socially-conservative values of the majority of Georgians cannot keep pace with those political reforms. All political parties know they cannot be elected if they are supportive of LGBT rights because they are aware of the sway that the Church holds over the overwhelming majority of the population. Additionally, the openly hostile anti-gay declarations of the Russian government, which still holds some influence over Georgia, supports the general homophobic views of the people.

Essentially, while the anti-discrimination legislation has been pushed forward at accelerated speeds to help meet the criteria for VLAP, and in turn improve EU- Georgian relations, societal perceptions of LGBT people have generally remained unchanged.19

Apart from international pressures for more liberalization of LGBT rights, domestically, several civil society forums and NGOs have begun to advocate for improved rights. Leading initiatives including IDENTOBA and Women’s Initiatives Hammarberg, Thomas. “Georgia In Transition: Report on the human rights dimension: background, steps taken and remaining challenges.” Eastern External Action Services.

September 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

18 CRRC. “Exploring Homophobia in Georgia: Part 1.” Social Science in the Caucasus.

10th November, 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

19 Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

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Supporting Group (WISG), have become increasingly active in their efforts for promoting and advocating the rights of sexual minority groups.20 On May 17th, 2013, the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHO), a peaceful protest attended by just over three dozen gay rights activists, was violently attacked by a mob of angry people led by representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church, including Basili Mkalavishvili.21 The mob, which numbered in the thousands, injured 17 people, 12 of whom were hospitalized.”22 Paul Rimple, an American freelance journalist based in Tbilisi, Georgia since 2002, witnessed the scene and described the events as the most terrifying experience of his life. “I’ve been to many war-torn countries before,” he said. “I never felt more endangered for my life than on May 17th, 2013.”23 He describes watching the women beside him get hit in the head by a brick, and the turning over of a yellow bus that was being used to evacuate the (peaceful) protestors.24 “The events of May 17th, 2013 were an embarrassment for the entire country,” remarked Nika Jeiranashvili, Human Rights Program Manager at the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF).25 The violence that was witnessed was discouraging for many international and domestic human rights activists as well as a setback in European relations who condemned the bloodshed as a symptom of “an ineffective [police] response to organized and violent homophobia.”26 While it is arguable that the government’s deployment of 200 police officers Tabakela. “Situation of transgendered people in Georgia.” Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group. 25th February, 2015. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

21 CRRC. “Georgian youth: EU aspirations, but lacking tolerance.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 9th March, 2015.

22 Ibid.

23 Rimple, Paul. Freelance Journalist. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Betsy Hotel, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

24 Ibid.

25 Jeiranashvili, Nika, Human Rights Program manager at Open Society Georgian Foundation. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale.

Personal interview. OSFG Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

26 RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. “Antigay Protesters Disrupt Georgian Rights Rally.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. May 17th, 2013.

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to protect about 100 activists showed their good intentions, the fact that many police stood by idly rather than actively protecting these citizens illustrated the authorities’ complicity in emboldening antigay protesters. Moreover, it demonstrates a deeper, symptomatic problem: that homophobic beliefs among the general Georgian society is so deeply embedded that even police and government officials may actively participate in violence against gays or be inactive in its prevention.27

For many, including Eva Pastrana, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission, Elene Chkheidze, Executive Director at International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis (ICSRPA), and Anna Dolidze, former President of the GYLA, the decision to mount a gay rights demonstration was premature.28 While the level of violence that occurred could not have been anticipated by anyone, the call by Patriarch Ilia II for the cancellation and prohibition of the IDAHOT rally was reason to suspect that they would face retaliation. He denounced it as an “encouragement” of “anomaly and disease,” and that the rally would be “a violation of majority rights.” He went on to say that the demonstration was “an insult” to Georgian tradition.29 Nevertheless, what happened did reap positive results to an extent. While there has been a spike in hate-crimes towards LGBT groups since the riot in May 2013, these events have promoted more open and public dialogue on issues of sexual minorities.30 Rekhviashvilli, Ana, Head of Identoba. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Identoba Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

28 Dolidze, Anna, former President of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Pre-Nup, Toronto.

16 January 2015; Chkheidze, Elene, Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

29 Light, Matthew. Assistant Professor of Criminology, Munk School of Global Affairs.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Munk School of Global Affairs, Toronto. 16 January 2015.

30 Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the 27

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Unlike the previous political administration of Saakashvili, who was considered to be two-faced because of his more liberal and tolerant dialogue with foreign countries, domestically he was often passive and tacitly tolerant of homophobia. Under the new Georgian Dream administration, the government has been forced to more sincerely address issues with regards to LGBT groups within the domestic political stage.31 Though Bidzina Ivanishvili’s public comments would seem modest by Western standards, he has spoken on behalf of gay rights stating, “sexual minorities are the same citizens as we are.”32 Such an unvarnished pronouncement in the Georgian context is fairly remarkable.

These sentiments, however, are certainly not held by Georgian society as a whole, even among some sitting in official positions. Transitioning such a society towards more liberal ideologies needs strategic planning. Georgia in Transition, a document prepared in September, 2013 by Thomas Hammarberg, was a report aimed at addressing the issues of minority group rights in Georgia. The recommendations in this report were created to serve as the basis for Georgia’s human rights strategy and human rights action plan. These were formulated to help ensure that when visa liberalization would be passed, citizens would be unable to seek asylum or declare themselves as refugees because of government discrimination and hate acts.33 In the report, Hammarberg addressed the May 17th demonstrations, dedicating a section to minority groups and the issues of sexual minorities.

He stated, “it should be understood that the issue [of LGBT rights] is not about so-called propaganda for a certain lifestyle but about ensuring basic rights to all human beings.”34 While Hammarberg’s EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

31 Stöber, Silvia. “Georgia: Between Modernity and the Middle Ages.” Heinrich Böll Foundation. 11th July, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

32 The Economist. “A gay rights rally under attack.” The Economist. May 20, 2013. Accessed November 12, 2014.

33 European Commission: Press Release. “Georgia: one step closer to EU visa liberalization.” Europa. 29th October, 2014.

34 Hammarberg, Thomas. “Georgia In Transition: Report on the human rights dimension:

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comments were instrumental in fostering further discourse on these issues, his remarks did not go unopposed. On October 14th, 2013, the Georgian newspaper Kviris Palitra published an open letter from members of a broad spectrum of the Georgian elites. This letter, entitled “Respect our Traditions!”, accused the United States and Western Europe of attempting to impose a perverse ideology, equating the rights of sexual minorities with the rights of national and religious minorities.35 “We are sure that equating practices of sexual perversion with the representatives of religious and ethnic minorities of any country, including, in recent years, the United States and Western Europe, is an artificial, deliberately imposed ideology that has nothing to do with the age-old rules of life that are common to human society.”36 The advocacy of LGBT rights, they wrote, was foreign in origin and is not compatible with Georgian tradition.37 Moreover, they accused the EU of being hypocritical, given that they were silent during the events of May 26th, 2011 when, under Saakashvili’s regime, peaceful demonstrators were killed (it should be noted that similar human rights violations occurred in 2007 and 2009).38 “[The EU did] not stand up to the gross violation of the right to life and the brutal mutilation of hundreds of people in 2011, but instead, this year, [they] have struck with lightning speed in defense of those propagandists of sexual depravity amongst whom there wasn’t a single person harmed as a result of the discord.”39 background, steps taken and remaining challenges.” Eastern External Action Services.

September 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

35 CRRC. “Tradition vs. Sexual Minority Rights in Georgia.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 20h November, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

36 Pravoslavie. “Respect Our Traditions! An open letter to European Union Representative, Thomas Hammarberg.” October 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

37 CRRC. “The May 17th Events in Tbilisi Revisited.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 17th September, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

38 Natsvlishvili, Anna, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

39 Pravoslavie. “Respect Our Traditions! An open letter to European Union Representative, Thomas Hammarberg.” October 2014.

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The signatories of the Open Letter are but a few of the many who feel this way. A survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in 2011 – the first quantitative study to be done on homophobia in the country – indicated that 37 percent of Georgians think that protection of LGBT people’s rights is “not important at all,” and another 15 percent think that protection of LGBT people’s rights is “not important.”40 Curiously, when asked if sexual minorities should have the same rights as everyone else, 60 percent said yes. However, about half (49 percent) agreed with the statement that a good citizen should never respect the rights of sexual minorities. Only 16 percent said a good citizen should always respect their rights.41 Additionally, within Georgian society, only 51 percent of the population believes that a person is born homosexual, and as many as 46 percent of the population believe that homosexuality is a ‘lifestyle.’ As such, there is a large faction of the population that adopt the view that LGBT persons should be able to change their sexual orientation.42 Moreover, sixty-five percent of respondents replied that a good citizen should always respect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities; yet, when asked about the respect of sexual minorities, only 16 percent of the population felt they should.43

The Church is an instrumental player in understanding the issues surrounding LGBT rights in Georgia. Actively positioned against LGBT people, the Church has an important clout in influencing the mindset of Georgian society. The Church categorically believes that homosexuals defy Georgian values. In a country that has seen constant and, at times, rapid changes in its CRRC. “Tradition vs. Sexual Minority Rights in Georgia.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 20h November, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

41 CRRC. “The May 17th Events in Tbilisi Revisited.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 17th September, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

42 Mestvirishvili, Natia, Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator, Caucasus Regional Resource Centers. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Misha Boutillier. Personal interview. CRRC Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

43 CRRC. “Exploring Homophobia in Georgia: Part 1.” Social Science in the Caucasus.

10th November, 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

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political makeup over the course of centuries, the Church is seen as providing the only consistency.44 Consequently, the influence of the church, by Western standards, has played a disproportionally important role in Georgia. Faced with such challenging political and economic issues, Georgians look toward the Church for support and guidance.45 Regardless of whether individual Georgians are actively religious followers of the Church, religious nationalism is overwhelming. With a powerful Orthodox Church vocally reasserting traditional values in opposition to greater LGBT rights, violent attacks towards the LGBT community persist and are rampant. Amongst government officials and progressive sectors of the civil society, there is consensus that the greatest barrier to LGBT rights is the Church.46 An IDENTOBA activist, Ana Rekhviashvilli, commented that “the Orthodox Church is posing the greatest barrier to increased tolerance towards sexual minorities.”47 “In fact,” she said, “the Orthodox Church’s stance is in many ways influencing and brainwashing young Georgians who would actually be more likely to be tolerant of LGBT people…

As a result, a significant number of young Georgians are now less tolerant than the older generation.”48 In a country where the head of the Church, Patriarch Ilia II, has a public approval rating of over 97 percent, any condemnation of homophobic pronouncements is likely to go unheeded.49 Georgia remains a socially conservative society whose values and respect for human rights appears to be at odds with Western European attitudes. The result creates Natsvlishvili, Anna, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

45 Ibid.

46 Stöber, Silvia. “Georgia: Between Modernity and the Middle Ages.” Heinrich Böll Foundation. 11th July, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

47 Rekhviashvilli, Ana, Head of Identoba. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Identoba Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

48 Ibid.

49 Maza, Cristina. “Georgia is a Terrible Place to be Gay.” Balkanist. May 24, 2014. Accessed November 13, 2014.

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tension between Georgian and Western political philosophies.

With the church popularly seen as the most trustworthy institution in Georgia, the church is essentially a central political actor.

Subsequently, no political party or ruling government is likely to go against Orthodox values. It would simply be “political suicide.”50 Discriminatory acts against LGBT people by the Georgian Orthodox Church place the judiciary and political authorities in an untenable position, as no one “would want to arrest a priest.”51

It is too early to determine whether that situation is changing since the introduction of the new anti-discrimination law.

Church officials continue to make public comments to the effect that homosexuals are “defects,”52 whose “lifestyle should not be propagated,” given their “divergence from the right path.”53 With the majority of the public believing that “homosexual propaganda is a divergence,” and that “man was created for women, and woman for man”, it seems unlikely that this legislation can be effectively implemented or enforced.54 In essence, it is difficult in the Georgian mindset to understand the notion of pluralism, or that it has any need to embrace a heterogeneous society (or that one could be anything other than a threat). In many ways, the intolerance of diversity is also a legacy of the Soviet era wherein the absence of democratic rights and supremacy of individual (human) rights meant minorities could be mistreated or subjugated.55 Jeiranashvili, Nika, Human Rights Program manager at Open Society Georgian Foundation. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale.

Personal interview. OSFG Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

51 Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

52 Anonymous, Clergy, Georgian Orthodox Church. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, Mtskheta, 20 February 2015.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Reisner, Oliver, Project Manager to European Commission Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Hotel VIP Victoria, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

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To understand EU-Georgian relations, it is important to understand the context of the Association Agreement and the ENP. The EU-Georgia Association Agreement is an outcome of the EU’s ENP, launched in 2004.56 The ENP was designed not as an agreement to further European enlargement; but as a way to promote the approximation of EU values and principles.

The Association Agreement is an extension of the ENP, and a new generation of the AA is focused on Eastern Partnership countries. It is aimed at providing long-term foundations for future EU-Georgia relations, “without excluding any possible future developments in line with the Treaty on European Union.”57 The Association Agreement serves as another formalized step of building the relationship, not as the ultimate step before membership.58 On a technical level, the numerous agreements and associations represent a very bureaucratic part of structuring closer EU affiliation, and help define the many criteria and objectives needing to be met before Georgia (or other countries) can be considered as a candidate for EU membership. Thus, the signing of the Association Agreement and the commitment to the Visa Liberalization Agreement are considerable feats, ones that have been instrumental in laying the ground for “spectacular” political, economic and social transformations aimed at intertwining Georgia’s society, economy and government structures with those of the European Union.59

The signed Association Agreement Act creates a framework for co-operation aimed at deepening political and economic relations between Georgia and the EU’s Internal Market of more European Union External Action. “ EU-Georgia Association Agreement: “What does the Agreement offer?” EEAS. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

57 Ibid.

58 Reisner, Oliver, Project Manager to European Commission Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Hotel VIP Victoria, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

59 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. “Statement of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum on the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and Visa Liberalization Process.” Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. January 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

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than 500 million consumers. It is a concrete way to activate the potential of EU-Georgian relations focusing on economic recovery and growth, governance and industrial sector cooperation. These core undertakings include enhanced cooperation in 28 key sector policy areas defined by common values, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the rule of law, free market economics, a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), enhanced cooperation in foreign and security policy, and Justice, Freedom and Security (JFS).60

In tandem with the AA, Georgia has been making good progress concerning EU-Georgia visa facilitation, and readmission agreements entered into force on March 1st 2011. These developed out of the Mobility Partnership that began between the EU and Georgia in 2009 and aimed at enhancing cooperation between the EU and Georgia in regards to facilitation of migration, prevention of illegal immigration, as well as asylum and international protection.61 Successful implementation of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan would be very important as a symbolic milestone. It would result in lower visa fees for all Georgian citizens travelling to Europe. In many cases, the fees would be waived for broad categories of visa applicants such as children, pensioners, students, people visiting family members living in the EU, people in need of medical treatment, economic operators working with EU companies, athletes, participants in cultural exchanges or journalists.62 It would also allow for an acceleration of procedures for assessing visa applications and sets the obligation of issuing multiple-entry visas with long period of validity for certain categories of frequent travelers.63

The Visa Liberalization Action Plan is tailor-made for each European Union External Action. “ EU-Georgia Association Agreement: “What does the Agreement offer?” EEAS. Accessed March 22nd, 2014 61 Migration Commission. “EU-Georgia Visa Dialogue Action Plan on Visa Liberalization.” Migration Commission. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

62 European Commission: Press Release. “Georgia: one step closer to EU visa liberalization.” Europa. 29th October, 2014. Accessed March 24th, 2014.

63 Ibid.

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partner country and is structured around four basic principles: 1) document security, including biometrics; 2) integrated border management, migration management, asylum; 3) public order and security; and 4) external relations and fundamental rights.

The implementation of these benchmarks would be in two phases: during the first phase, the legal and institutional framework would be established; the second phase would be devoted to the effective and sustainable implementation of the relevant measures.64 EU-Georgian Action Plan converges with this and effectively implements key objectives under EU legislation on public procurement (e.g. transparency, non-discrimination, competition and access to legal recourse).65

How does the Visa Liberalization Plan relate then to the issue of LGBT rights? One of the key policy benchmarks defined under the document External Relations and Fundamental Rights: Citizen’s Rights Including Protection of Minorities was the introduction of the anti-discrimination law. This law is a key component to Visa Liberalization by ensuring that those who travel from Georgia to the EU could not be eligible to claim refugee status due to discrimination or persecution based on sexual orientation.66 Drafted at the Ministry of Justice under the supervision of Tea Tsulukiani, this particular bill was highly controversial given the incorporation of LGBT rights. Despite insurmountable support for Visa Liberalization, the issue of LGBT rights became a wedge between Georgians’ desire for EU relations and their determination to uphold traditional Georgian values.

In an attempt to alleviate those concerns, the Ministry of Justice engaged closely with many levels of civil society and the Church in the hopes of coming up with a substantive document that would be Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. “Conference on the Implementation of Visa liberalization Action Plan.” Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

65 EEAS. “EU/Georgia Action Plan.” EEAS. 10th December, 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

66 European Commission: Press Release. “Georgia: one step closer to EU visa liberalization.” Europa. 29th October, 2014. Accessed March 24th, 2014.

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agreeable to all parties.67 Nevertheless, much of the debate on the anti-discrimination law focused on LGBT related issues, and many clergy from the church actively spoke out against this legislation.68

Thus, the Ministry of Justice was forced to be strategic in its approach to writing the bill. It created a first draft that it knew would be considered too innovative and too liberal or forward thinking.69 As Teimuraz Antelava, the Director for Public International Law at Georgia’s Ministry of Justice, explained, they knew that the final bill, after inevitably being watered-down, would not result in a completely useless document.70 Unfortunately, though the final anti-discrimination law meets the minimum requirements of the EU, it has satisfied no one – neither the Church nor progressive sectors of Georgian society.71 The legislation also faces both technical and political challenges with regards to its implementation.72 Although the bill that was finally adopted unanimously – much to do with the back channeling that was going on with the former wealthy prime minister Ivanishvili73 – transition provisions and enforcement mechanisms that had been in the original document have since been rejected.74 Effective implementation of the law remains a distant objective75

Time is also now a factor working against the success of the Antelava, Teimuraz, Minister for Public International Law, Ministry of Justice. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Ministry of Justice Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

68 Anonymous, Clergy, Georgian Orthodox Church. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, Mtskheta, 20 February 2015.

69 Antelava, Teimuraz, Minister for Public International Law, Ministry of Justice. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Ministry of Justice Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

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anti-discrimination legislation. The law was passed in May 2014, and took effect in July 2014. The EU has promised the allocation of 1.5 million euros for the implementation of reforms (a million of which is to go directly towards the anti-discrimination law), and the Georgian government has committed 150,000 euros.76 Unfortunately, disbursement of the money has been held up in the bureaucratic process, and this impacts the successful implementation of the legislation.77 Nearly a year later, little real change can be seen, but an assessment of the implementation process (stage two) has to be presented at the upcoming Riga Summit (the fourth meeting of the Eastern Partnership) as a precondition to the ratification of the Visa Liberalization Plan.78 The timeline for the process appears now to be unrealistically short for a successful implementation, hence it is unlikely that Georgia will realize their ambition to achieve Visa Liberalization in Riga.79 While the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, has congratulated Georgia on “show[ing] remarkable commitment by putting in place the required legislative changes […], an important step in the process that will bring Georgia closer to its goal of a visa free regime with the EU,” many remain skeptical that the Visa Liberalization will be successfully passed.80 Even if the Council‘s conclusions on the implementation phase of Georgia’s Action Plan on Visa Liberalization is positive, it still needs to get the approval of all 28 European state members.81 Ibid.

Ibid.

78 Mikeladze, Tamta, Civic and Political Rights Program Director at Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. EMC Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

79 Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

80 European Commission: Press Release. “Georgia: one step closer to EU visa liberalization.” Europa. 29th October, 2014. Accessed March 24th, 2014.

81 Antelava, Teimuraz, Minister for Public International Law, Ministry of Justice. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Ministry of Justice Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

76 77

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A delicate balancing act lies ahead in the coming months: both Eva Pastrana and Boris Iarochevitch from the European Commission of Georgia acknowledge that there is a need for some degree of approval by EU members if Europe relations are to remain warm leading up to the next elections. A positive outcome of the Riga Summit will give a push to Georgia’s pro-European parties.82 As described by NIMD officials, Irakli Kobalia and Levan Tsutskiridze, Georgia is in the process of becoming a democracy, and as that process advances, its supporters will be targeted to attacks from Russian interests that are opposed to greater Westernization within its sphere of influence.83 Ana Rekhviashvilli, from IDENTOBA, identified this as a particular concern given that Russian influences are suspected to have a hand in inciting hate crimes against LGBT people as a way of exacerbating tensions between Georgian and European values.84 “Georgia is at the crossroads,” so ensuring that they remain on a European trajectory is essential.85

While Georgia is the most advanced country with respect to implementing the Association Agreement, this is no guarantee of integration given the long queue of other countries in line for entry into membership with the European community. Moreover, there is a growing split amongst current EU nations whether further enlargement is desirable. This is due to the disequilibrium of economic development and a fear that it will create dependency Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

83 Kobalia, Irakli, & Levan Tsutskiridze, Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. NIMD Offices, Tbilisi. 17 February 2015.

84 Rekhviashvilli, Ana, Head of Identoba. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Identoba Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

85 Kobalia, Irakli, & Levan Tsutskiridze, Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. NIMD Offices, Tbilisi. 17 February 2015.

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of those countries with poorer economies, such as Georgia.86 Resistance to the signing of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan is a symptom of this fear of over-dependency. Moreover, with such a limited timeline for successful implementation of the antidiscrimination legislation, the benchmarks required for the signing of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan may not be achieved in time for the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga, to be held the 21st and 22nd of May.87

To return to the earlier question of whether the implementation of laws protecting LGBT rights in Georgia is a deal-breaker in the broader movement toward integration with the EU, the answer seems to be “no”. Even member states of the EU themselves continue to struggle with LGBT rights, so there is a likely sympathy for the difficulties in dramatically transforming social attitudes overnight.88 The stigma attached to LGBT people in Georgia is not dissimilar to other post-Soviet countries that have been granted EU membership. Hungary is an example. Thus, the likelihood that the EU will be more flexible with regards to LGBT issues seems probable. In the grander scheme of things, it is likely that LGBT rights will not be the central determining factor for European integration.89

Nevertheless, progress can and needs to be made to help dismantle the negative discourse surrounding homosexuals. There is a need to encourage Georgian society to become more pluralized – that is, to accommodate different interests and opinions.90 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. “Statement of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum on the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and Visa Liberalization Process.” Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. January 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

87 Ibid.

88 Anonymous, Clergy, Georgian Orthodox Church. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, Mtskheta, 20 February 2015.

86

Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission.

Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview.

Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

89

Savaris, Alessandro, Deputy Head of Council of Europe. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. CoE Offices, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

90

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Fostering better discussions on LGBT rights at the grassroots level and within educational systems is a key place to start.91 Engaging legal professionals, lawyers, and other government officials to increase their knowledge with regards to European LGBT standards is significant.92 More attention and funding should be given to projects such as the Heinrich Böll Foundation which is working on a multi-faceted public awareness campaign, including public service announcements/social advertising, promotional materials, public discussions, the production of documentary films on LGBT issues, and the consistent advocacy and endorsement of the longterm strategy document.93 As Anna Natsvlishvili from GYLA also suggested, exploring ways to engage with and use authorities within the Church to promote more open discussion (though certainly a difficult task) is also key.94 And finally, better institutional mechanisms need to be implemented for working and dealing with the Orthodox Church and patriarchy, in addition to trying to create a larger separation between politics and religion.95 The root cause of social tensions around LGBT rights is not the result of the EU integration process, but an unintended consequence that will only be addressed by a willingness of the Georgian people and institutions to embrace a more pluralistic society.96

Saldadze, Malkhaz, Program Coordinator for Democratization, and Scholarship Program at South Caucasus Regional Office of the Heinrich Boell Foundation. Interviewed

by University of Toronto Student Misha Boutillier. Personal interview. Heinrich Boell Foundation Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

92 Savaris, Alessandro, Deputy Head of Council of Europe. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. CoE Offices, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

93 Heinrich Böll Foundation. “Solidarity Network for LGBTI in Armenia and Georgia.”

Heinrich Böll Foundation. 24th Febuary, 2015. Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

94 Natsvlishvili, Anna, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

95 Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

96 Ibid.

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Bibliography Anonymous, Clergy, Georgian Orthodox Church. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale.

Personal Interview. Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, Mtskheta, 20 February 2015.

Antelava, Teimuraz, Minister for Public International Law, Ministry of Justice. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Ministry of Justice Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

Chkheidze, Elene, Executive Director, International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. ICSRPA Offices, Tbilisi.

18 February 2015.

CRRC. “Exploring Homophobia in Georgia: Part 1.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 10th November, 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.ca/search?q=lgbt.

CRRC. “Georgian youth: EU aspirations, but lacking tolerance.”

Social Science in the Caucasus. 9th March, 2015. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.ca/search?q=lgbt.

CRRC. “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia.”

Social Science in the Caucasus. December, 2011. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://www. crrc.ge/uploads/files/research_projects/ EU_Report_FINAL_ Jan25.2012_ENG.pdf.

CRRC. “The May 17th Events in Tbilisi Revisited.” Social Science in the Caucasus. 17th September, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.ca/search?q=lgbt.

CRRC. “Tradition vs. Sexual Minority Rights in Georgia.” Social 225

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Science in the Caucasus. 20th November, 2013. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.ca/search?q=lgbt.

Delegation to the European Union to Georgia. “Political & Economic Relations.” Delegation to the European Union to Georgia. Online. Internet. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://eeas. europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/political_relations/ index_en.htm.

Dolidze, Anna, former President of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students.

Personal interview. Pre-Nup, Toronto. 16 January 2015.

Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. “Statement of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum on the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and Visa Liberalization Process.” Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. January 2014. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://eap-csf.eu/assets/files/Chisinau/Resolutions/STATEMENT_ Moldova_Visa_Liberalization_Process.pdf.

The Economist. “A gay rights rally under attack.” The Economist.

May 20, 2013. Accessed November 12, 2014. http://www.economist. com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/05/gay-rights-georgia.

EEAS. “EU/Georgia Action Plan.” EEAS. 10th December, 2014.

Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/ action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

European Commission: Press Release. “Georgia: one step closer to EU visa liberalization.” Europa. 29th October, 2014. Accessed March 24th, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-141206_en.htm.

Europe Regional Office. “The European Union and International 226

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human Rights Law.” Europe Regional Office. Accessed March 22, 2014. http://www.europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ EU_and_International_Law.pdf.

European Union External Action. “ EU-Georgia Association Agreement: “What does the Agreement offer?” EEAS. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/pdf/quick_guide_ eu_ge_aa_en.pdf Foreign Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg. “Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of All human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons.” Council of the European Union. June 24, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2014. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_ data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/137584.pdf.

Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. “Conference on the Implementation of Visa liberalization Action Plan.” Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http:// police.ge/en/shss-s-organizebit-savizo-rejimis-liberalizatsiissamoqmedo-gegmis-implementatsiastan-dakavshirebulikonferentsia-gaimarta/7458.

Hammarberg, Thomas. “Georgia In Transition: Report on the human rights dimension: background, steps taken and remaining challenges.” Eastern External Action Services. September 2013.

Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ georgia/documents/virtual_library/cooperation_sectors/georgia_ in_transition-hammarberg.pdf.

Heinrich Böll Foundation. “Solidarity Network for LGBTI in Armenia and Georgia.” Heinrich Böll Foundation. 24th Febuary, 2015. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://ge.boell.org/ en/2015/02/24/solidarity-network-lgbti-armenia-and-georgia.

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Iarochevitch, Boris, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to Georgia.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

Jeiranashvili, Nika, Human Rights Program manager at Open Society Georgian Foundation. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal interview.

OSFG Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

Kobalia, Irakli, & Levan Tsutskiridze, Program Officer & South Caucasus Representative, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students.

Personal interview. NIMD Offices, Tbilisi. 17 February 2015.

Light, Matthew. Assistant Professor of Criminology, Munk School of Global Affairs. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Munk School of Global Affairs, Toronto. 16 January 2015.

Maza, Cristina. “Georgia is a Terrible Place to be Gay.” Balkanist.

May 24, 2014. Accessed November 13, 2014. http://balkanist.net/ gay-rights-arent-getting-better- in-georgia/.

Mestvirishvili, Natia, Regional Research and Outreach Coordinator, Caucasus Regional Resource Centers. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Misha Boutillier. Personal interview. CRRC Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

Migration Commission. “EU-Georgia Visa Dialogue Action Plan on Visa Liberalization.” Migration Commission. Accessed March 22nd, 2014. http://migration.commission.ge/files/vlap-eng.pdf

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Mikeladze, Tamta, Civic and Political Rights Program Director at Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale.

Personal Interview. EMC Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

Morari, Cristina. “European Integration of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova: Evolution and Prospects.” Seventh Framework Programme. January 1st, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2014. https:// eupreacc.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/pdf11.pdf.

Natsvlishvili, Anna, Chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. GYLA Offices, Tbilisi. 20 February 2015.

Pastrana, Eva, Human Rights Program Manager at the European Commission. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal interview. Delegation of the EU to Georgia Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

Pravoslavie. “Respect Our Traditions! An open letter to European Union Representative, Thomas Hammarberg.” October 2014.

Accessed March 22nd, 2014.

Reisner, Oliver, Project Manager to European Commission Delegation to Georgia. Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. Hotel VIP Victoria, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

Rekhviashvilli, Ana, Head of Identoba. Interviewed by University of Toronto Students Misha Boutillier and Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Identoba Offices, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. “Antigay Protesters Disrupt Georgian Rights Rally.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. May 17th, 2013.

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Accessed March 23rd, 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/georgiagay-rights-protests/24988972.html Rimple, Paul. Freelance Journalist. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Zoe Smale. Personal Interview. Betsy Hotel, Tbilisi. 18 February 2015.

Saldadze, Malkhaz, Program Coordinator for Democratization, and Scholarship Program at South Caucasus Regional Office of the Heinrich Boell Foundation. Interviewed by University of Toronto Student Misha Boutillier. Personal interview. Heinrich Boell Foundation Offices, Tbilisi. 19 February 2015.

Savaris, Alessandro, Deputy Head of Council of Europe.

Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students. Personal interview. CoE Offices, Tbilisi. 16 February 2015.

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REMEMBERING THE SOVIETS

AN EXAMINATION OF GEORGIAN MEMORY AND THE SOVIET ERA Madeline Klimek

How do Georgians remember the Soviet period? This question, posed at a round table discussion in the Republic of Georgia, provided varied and emotional answers. One man recalled the 1972 World Hockey Series between Canada and the Soviet Union. Georgians cheered for the Canadians, as they wanted to see the Soviets lose. (They did). Another man, working within the Foreign Ministry’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization division, called the Soviet period the “Dark Era.” His comments also led him to mention the Nuremberg Trials.1 Perhaps in his mind, the most heinous of crimes facing justice had to be mentioned even if the logic of his argument was unclear. Despite differences between individual memories and experiences under Communist rule, the view of the Soviet period as oppressive and freedom denying is at the forefront of Georgian memory.2 In contrast, many Georgians Group meeting with members of the Training Centre for Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by Georgia International Course Module Participants (ICM) and author, personal interview, Ministry of Foreign Affaris, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 17, 2015.

2 Oliver Reisner, European External Action Service (EEAS), interviewed by Georgia ICM 1

Madeline Klimek graduated from the University of Toronto in 2015, with an Honours Bachelor of Arts in History and International Relations. She is currently pursuing a Master’s degree from Columbia University and the London School of Economics in International and World History. Her current interests include Holocaust studies and post-World War II foreign relations.

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view the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, positively as he is a source of Georgian pride.3 This paper argues that Georgia requires a reevaluation of its Soviet past. This reexamination should include ideas such as collaboration within the Soviet system and a new understanding of how Stalin’s legacy affects government and society today. This reassessment can be achieved partly by expanding educational initiatives that have already begun by nongovernmental organizations and certain individuals. However, little European support exists for these cultural reevaluations, as the European Union (EU) is focused primarily on Georgia’s political and economic reforms.

This paper is divided into three sections. First, an exploration of how the narrative of occupation and victimhood was influenced by the largely anti-Russian Presidents of Georgia after the fall of the Soviet Union; the impact of the Georgian-Russian War in August 2008 on this narrative; and an illustration of how the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Tbilisi typifies Georgians’ memory of Soviets oppression. The second section examines the positive view that many Georgians share in regards to Joseph Stalin, symbolized by the Joseph Stalin Museum in Gori. Furthermore, this section will illustrate how Stalin’s legacy affects modern Georgian society as traces of Soviet and Communist influence can be found in Georgian politicking and governing style. The final part of this paper considers the demand for educating Georgian citizens about the Soviet period. It will also demonstrate the lack of European concern regarding the cultural aspects of European integration, as the EU is focused predominantly on the functioning of the Georgian economy.

Georgians’ view of the Soviet period as a conquest and subjugation was largely formed in an official narrative espoused by participants and author, personal interview, VIP Victoria Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 16, 2015.

3 Lasha Bakradze, “Georgia and Stalin: Still Living With the Great Son of the Nation,” in “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2013): 49, accessed January 18, 2015.

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the state and its anti-Russian politicians in power. In a post-Soviet country, the state “engages in mythmaking.”4 In essence, this means that the state will often use history to redefine what being Georgian means.5 Both former presidents Zviad Gamsakhurdia (19911992) and Eduard Shevardnadze (1995-2003) framed Georgia’s Soviet experience as an occupation.6 President Shevardnadze once said, “[O]n 25 February 1921, Russia conquered the Republic of Georgia…. the national struggle against the occupiers was so heroic that we should transmit every detail of these events to our descendants. This is the duty of the present independent state.”7 Oliver Reisner, a member of the External European Action Service, explained that although the dominant memory of the Soviet period in Georgia is one of victimhood, this view is disingenuous.

In a Soviet regime, the lines between victim, perpetrator, and collaborator become blurred. For instance, one of the only ways to benefit within the Soviet system was to be a party member. This is participation within the broader structure of political repression.8 Therefore, although the narrative of victimhood is partly true in some cases, it does not capture the complexity of Georgian life under Soviet rule.

President Shevardnadze’s comments as noted in the previous paragraph seem insignificant compared to the reforms that President Mikheil Saakashvili (2008-2013) put through in regards to Georgian “mythmaking.” Although President Saakashvili was the figurehead of the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” a movement that supposedly broke with the previous governments’ history of Malkhaz Toria, Professor at Ilia State University, interviewed by author, personal interview, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 18, 2015.

5 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview.

6 Malkhaz Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” in The Making of Modern Georgia, 1918-1920, The first Georgian republic and its successors, edited by Stephen F. Jones (New York: Routledge, 2014), 318-319.

7 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 319.

8 Oliver Reisner, personal interview.

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corruption and crime in Georgia, President Saakashvili continued and bolstered the view of his presidential predecessors that Georgia was occupied between 1921 and 1991.9 Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) government took a path that made a concerted effort to place Russia in a negative light as a “historical aggressor” and “occupier.”10 Additionally, the UNM’s use of Russophobia allowed “popular sentiment behind government policies.”11 In addition to using the anti-Russian narrative as a political tool, President Saakashvili attempted to rebuild the national historical narrative from top to bottom in an effort to rid the Soviet Union in Georgian “mind and souls” by “destroy[ing] every possible link with the Soviet past and dismiss its legacy at all levels.”12 The Georgian Parliament building was moved to a new location in 2012. It was a controversial action, as the site was originally a World War II memorial for the 300,000 Georgians who died in the conflict as Red Army soldiers. It was also a very expensive project costing nearly $45.3 million.13 Overall, chiseling away the hammer and sickle on the old parliament building on Rustaveli Avenue was simply not enough for President Saakashvili. There had to be a clear symbolic break with the Soviet past (Figure 1). Delineating Georgia’s national history from its Soviet one was also seen in the renaming of streets and removal of all Soviet statues.14

Luke Harding. “Leader of Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Faces Strong Opposition in Elections.” The Guardian UK, September 30, 2012. Accessed June 10, 2015.

10 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 316.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 320.

13 G.E., “Georgia’s new parliament, an expensive folly or an investment in the future?,” The Economist, June 14, 2012, accessed March 20, 2015.

14 Originally sourced from G.E., “Georgia’s new parliament An expensive folly or an investment in the future?,”; “Georgia passes law to destroy Soviet-era monuments and street names,” The Telegraph, May 21, 2011, accessed March 20, 2015.

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Figure 1: An example of physically removing Soviet symbols on the old Georgian Parliament Building on Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi. There used to be the hammer and sickle insignia in the middle of the bas-relief.

The effort to transform Georgia’s history of the twentieth century resonated well with European leaders as it paralleled one of President Saakashvili’s main foreign policy concerns: integrating Georgia into the European Union.15 As President Saakashvili said alongside former President of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, “the radical reforms that we [the UNM] launched since 2003 […] had one purpose - the European transformation of Georgia, turning our ancient European nation into a modern, democratic, European state…our road, our final destination is Europe.”16 Under President Saakashvili, there was no other path other than the one leading to Brussels, which looked firmly away from all things influenced or purportedly tainted by the Soviet past.

In 2005, President Saakashvili introduced a program called the “patriots’ camps” to further Georgian nationalism and Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 320-321.

16 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 321.

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anti-Russianism. For eleven days in the summer, students learn about Georgian culture.17 As harmless as familiarizing the young about Georgia’s rich and deep history may be, it is the way the information is presented that is controversial. Professor Malkhaz Toria at Ilia State University argues that in the camps, the view that Russia is “barbaric” and Georgia is “civilized” is clearly espoused.18 In essence, there is a weighing of cultural values that is prejudiced towards Georgia. Historian and professor, Lasha Bakradze, is very critical of these summer camps because he sees them as a place where “false values” are instilled, paradoxically, through “Soviet style” indoctrination.19 Overall, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Georgian state and its subsequent governments created a historical discourse that framed the period between 1921 and 1991 as one of suffering and suppression of freedom.

Although the Georgian government played a large role in perpetuating the idea that Georgia was purely a victim in the Soviet period, the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 also contributed and solidified this view.20 After a period of Russian troop buildup along the border of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008, Georgia attacked the Russian troops and a five-day war commenced.21 Many Georgians were displaced and became refugees within their own country.22 Over 200,000 internally displaced persons still exist in Georgia as a result of the breakaway regions’ original attempts at independence and the 2008 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 324.

18 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 324-325.

19 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 325.

20 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 331.

21 Matthew Light, Professor at the University of Toronto, lecture and discussion, The University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, January 16, 2015.

22 Charles King, “The five-day war: managing Moscow after the Georgia crisis,” Foreign Affairs 87.6 (November-December 2008), accessed March 15, 2015.

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war.23 Although Russia had supported Abkhazia and South Ossetia during their earlier attempts of independence, August 2008 marked a turning point in relations between the two neighbours. This war indicated Russia’s “attempt to bypass established channels of conflict resolution and unilaterally change the boundaries of another […] state.”24 The war also provided President Saakashvili the political opportunity to continue the narrative of occupation and annexation of Georgia by a larger, aggressive, and more powerful neighbor to the north that is “hostile to Georgian aspirations to join Europe.”25 Professor Bakradze agrees with the premise that current Russian aggression will continue the narrative of Georgian victimization.26 This is because, as Professor Toria argues, this model of persecution and occupation is still relevant for today’s geopolitical situation, and therefore, it will remain unchanged.27

Although the war in 2008 was fought with the traditional soldiers and guns, the conflict can be viewed as more than a conflict over land and pursuit of global influence. Indeed, the war can be viewed as a clash between two “post-Soviet nationbuilding projects,” rather than simply a geopolitical conflict.28 In an interview with Dr. Malkhaz Toria, he asked one to ponder the Russian nation-building project and compare it to Georgia’s own endeavours in this respect. The pageantry at the opening ceremonies of the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2012 is a good example of how Russia – particularly under President Vladimir Putin (2000-2008, 2012-) – views its past. There was a clear emphasis on the Bolshevik Revolution and Soviet period as a glorious time in Russian history.29 Overall, Professor Toria argues “The World Factbook: Georgia,” CIA, accessed March 15, 2015.

King, “The five-day war: managing Moscow after the Georgia crisis.”

25 Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 322.

26 Lasha Bakradze, Professor at Ilia State University, interviewed by author, personal interview, Giorgi Leonidze State Museum of Literature, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 20, 2015.

27 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview.

28 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview.

29 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview; Video recording available at https://www.youtube.

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that this presentation showed that a Russian national project does not exist because its leaders are stuck in an “imperial paradigm.”30 Russia did not attempt to change its history to reflect the new global situation after the dissolution of the USSR. Rather, Russia wishes to restore its former empire and global influence in some way. In essence, the collision of the post-Soviet nation building projects in Russia and Georgia aided the war in 2008. Georgia’s anti-imperial and anti-Russian project clashed with the expansionist and proimperial Russian dialogue.31 The war was a contestation of values and meaning of the two states post-Communism.

One of the largest symbols of Georgian victimhood during the Soviet period is the “Museum of Soviet Occupation” in Tbilisi.

Opened on May 26, 2006, it was a project “encouraged” by the UNM government.32 To borrow a term created by Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson when describing similar spaces in Moscow, the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Tbilisi is a “Co-opted/Glorified Site.”33 This means that it is a space in which “political leaders have chosen to expand considerable resources on redefining and reincorporating [it] into prominent public view since 1991.”34 For President Saakashvili, the Museum of Soviet Occupation was a place where the UNM could redefine history into a shape that paralleled its anti-Russian narrative and where the theme of victimization became part of official national discourse.35

When walking into the Museum of Soviet Occupation, one is greeted by darkness and emptiness. It is a relatively austere com/watch?v=bKhuvril8Rs, pay particular attention to 1:52-2:07.

30 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview.

31 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview.

32 Ivane Menteshashvili, Professor and Doctor of Sciences (World History), interviewed by author, personal interview, The Museum of Soviet Occupation, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 18, 2015.

33 Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 2002 (92.3): 530, accessed January 26, 2015.

34 Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow,” 530.

35 Malkhaz Toria, personal interview.

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space due to the lack of physical objects. The exhibit is made up entirely of pictures, photocopies of documents with a brief description – but no translation of the documents themselves – and an accompanying simplistic history of the Soviet period. One object that is present is a machine gun from the 1920s that would have been similar to the one used to kill anti-Bolshevik Georgians in the 1924 uprising. The machine gun is pointing to a cattle car where the rebels were supposedly killed. The cattle car is punctured with “real” bullet holes.36 From the very beginning it is clear that the exhibition is entirely about the victimhood and the oppression of the Georgian people during the long Soviet period. Professor Bakradze aptly recognized that the museum is too “black and white” and there is the feeling throughout the exhibit that somehow Georgians “were not involved in this.”37 That is, Georgians somehow kept their hands clean from the communist system and no collaboration existed.38 As previously noted, it is untruthful to say that the Russians were the only ones involved in the Soviet system of governance between 1921 and 1991.39

The exhibit’s theme of victimization is also at odds with the reality of life under Soviet rule, particularly after Stalin’s death and the end of the purges. Compared to other Soviet Socialist Republics, Georgia was quite wealthy. Because of Georgia’s “warm and pleasant” climate, it could grow foodstuffs other republics could not, such as citrus fruit and tea.40 Therefore, people had access to goods that were not readily available to many others and Georgian suppliers also had a captive market within the Soviet bloc.

Georgia was also a holiday destination for the Soviet elite, especially along the Black Sea coast. With such wealth compared to others republics, Georgia was also gripped by corruption and organized Toria, “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project,” 329-330.

37 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

38 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

39 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview. Note: Oliver Reisner and Professor Bakradze agree on this point.

40 “The World Factbook: Georgia,”; Matthew Light, lecture and discussion.

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crime.41 These facts cannot make the claim that economic wellbeing compensated for the lack of political freedom, but wealth certainly made life more tolerable. The Museum of Soviet Occupation does not mention the relatively stable and comfortable existence many Georgians had.

I had the opportunity for an official tour of the Museum of Soviet Occupation. My tour guide was Professor Ivane Menteshashvili.42 Although his enthusiasm for the exhibit was appreciated, Professor Menteshashvili also used the narrative of victimhood and occupation. When pushed for more critical analysis of the exhibit, he used quotes from famous literature that had very little to do with anything. However, after the diatribe of the Soviet Union ended, there was a breakthrough moment. He also believes that there are “two faces” to the Soviet regime; mainly, that amongst the repression, there was also a flourish of Georgian culture between 1921 and 1991.43 That may be true, but from the exhibit itself, there was no sense of growth or any type of success in Georgia during that time. One would not know about the “two faces” unless specifically told.

Although the Museum of Soviet Occupation appears irredeemably one-sided, not all is lost as there are ways a state can represent and confront a history that is terrible or uncomfortable, but in a honest way. A very good example of how a country can overcome its dark past is Germany’s effort to reckon with it initiation and involvement in the Holocaust.44 Over time and in their own ways, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic made efforts to understand and integrate the Nazi period into national discourse, commemoration, and education. In unified Germany, there are Holocaust memorials Matthew Light, lecture and discussion.

Ivane Menteshashvili is a Doctor of Sciences in World History. The author would like to thank Mr. Menteshashvili for offering his time as a tour guide through the Museum of Soviet Occupation.

43 Ivane Menteshashvili, personal interview.

44 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

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and museums dedicated to exploring and understanding National Socialism. In essence, Germany struggled and continues to grapple with coming to terms with its initiative and complicity in the Holocaust. But Germany must also reconcile its own narrative of victimhood – as millions of Germans in Eastern Europe were forced to migrate to Germany after the end of WWII – with its criminality.45 Germany continues to work towards a national narrative that can “capture the complexities of individual lives and ‘mass fates’ by exploring how during the Third Reich it was both possible to suffer and to cause suffering to others.”46 Georgia would be wise to take into consideration the way a state can frame a national narrative that is both honest and understanding, rather than settling for a one-sided representation.

Part of this new historical record should include a reexamination of Joseph Stalin. This is not only because of Stalin’s importance in the history of the Soviet Union and his origins in Georgia, but because of the positive associations Stalin evokes for many Georgians, and how his legacy effects Georgian government and society today. However, before the second section of this paper begins, a brief biography of Stalin’s relationship with Georgia is necessary for context.

Stalin was born in Gori, Georgia, circa 1878 under the name Joseph Dzuhghashvili. Stalin lived in poverty despite his father being employed as a cobbler. His early life was an unhappy one as his father was violent and often beat his wife and family.47 Robert Service argues that, “like many who have been bullied in childhood Joseph grew up looking for others whom he could bully.”48 Stalin attended religious schools in his early life and was extremely bright, Robert G. Moeller, “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany,” The American Historical Review (1996) 101 (4): 1008-1048, accessed March 20, 2015.

46 Moeller, “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 1048.

47 Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 13-17.

48 Service, Stalin: A Biography, 19.

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getting top grades while in the Gori Spiritual School.49 In 1894, Stalin left for Tbilisi, to attend a Spiritual Seminary. He dropped out of school before he completed his education.50 It is not entirely known why Stalin decided to leave the seminary, but while he was in Tbilisi, Marxist thought was circulating in the city and Stalin became increasingly interested in it.51 Most likely, Stalin “lost his religious faith and was beginning to discover a way of interpreting the world in Marxism.”52 Stalin’s attention was also increasingly focused on Russia, and by 1917 Stalin was amongst “the first senior Bolsheviks to reach the Revolution.”53 The rest, as they say, is history.

With the invasion of Georgia in 1921 by Russian troops, Stalin returned to Tbilisi and was greeted by an unfriendly crowd calling him a “traitor” or asking him “why have you destroyed Georgia?”54 For many Georgians, the return of the Russians to the Caucasus after the fall of the Tsarist Empire brought back anti-Russian feelings, and they questioned whether the Bolshevik Revolution had really “brought any change.”55 Stalin speaking as “the voice of Moscow” was similar to “as if a member of the British Cabinet censured a Dublin audience, with long memories of British imperialism, on the ‘hydra’ of Irish nationalism.”56 Overall, Stalin wanted to suppress Georgian nationalism when Georgia had declared independence only three years earlier in 1919.57

However, by 1956, the mood was much more positive towards Stalin and traces of the modern Georgian perspective on Service, Stalin: A Biography, 20, 30-31.

Service, Stalin: A Biography, 32, 41.

51 Service, Stalin: A Biography, 40-41.

52 Service, Stalin: A Biography, 41.

53 Alex De Jonge, Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union, (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1986), 100.

54 De Jonge, Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union, 167.

55 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 239.

56 Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, 239.

57 Thomas De Waal, The Caucuses: An Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 72-73.

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him can be seen. Nikita Khrushchev’s (1953-1964) denunciation of Stalin, in his “Secret Speech” – also known as “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” – during the national 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, brought forth protests in Tbilisi by March 1956. Some Georgians felt that they were now being blamed for Stalin’s crimes.58 But moreover, Georgians “had learnt to be proud of the stupendous role which [Stalin] had played for so long in Soviet and in world affairs.”59 Pride in Stalin is a feeling that persists in Georgian society.

In 2013, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published statistics on Georgians’ opinion of Stalin: 45% of Georgians view Stalin positively.60 Furthermore, less than one third of Georgians agree that Stalin was an “inhuman tyrant, responsible for the deaths of millions of innocent people.”61 A different survey recorded that “elderly, poor men from rural areas have the most positive associations with Stalin, while young, wealthier women from the cities judge Stalin negatively.”62 The same survey noted that age was the most important determinant for how Georgians view Stalin.63 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers’ (CRRC) study on attitudes towards Stalin in the Caucasus contextualizes the positivity Georgians hold towards him compared to Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Armenians hold the most negative views of Stalin overall. But most shocking is the statistic that 22% of Azerbaijanis Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia, (London: Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2012), 369.

59 David Marshall Lang, A Modern History of Georgia, (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1962), 265.

60 Thomas De Waal, “Introduction,” in “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2013): 4, accessed January 18, 2015.

61 De Waal, “Introduction,” in “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion,” 9.

62 Alexi Gugushvili and Peter Kabachnik, “Stalin is dead, long live Stalin? Testing socialization, structural, ideological, nationalist, and gender hypotheses,” Post Soviet Affairs (2014): 27, accessed January 7, 2015.

63 Alexi Gugushvili and Peter Kabachnik, “Stalin is dead, long live Stalin? Testing socialization, structural, ideological, nationalist, and gender hypotheses,” 27.

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do not know who Stalin was; in comparison, only 5% of Georgians do not know him.64 Clearly, some Georgians carry different convictions regarding Stalin compared to their regional neighbour.

This attitude is most clearly seen at the Joseph Stalin Museum in Gori. It is a mark of Georgia’s pride and respect for their most famous son.

The Stalin Museum is a place where excessive enthusiasm and reverence for Stalin once resided. The museum’s construction began in 1950, three years before Stalin’s death. Unfinished by 1953, construction continued and the museum opened under Khrushchev’s tenure in 1955.65 Situated in the centre of Gori, the huge limestone structure is church-like as it dwarfs many of the surrounding buildings (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The colonnade of the Joseph Stalin Museum in Gori, Georgia.

Resting beside the museum is the eighty-three ton train car, which Stalin used to travel and invite heads of state for conversation “Nostalgia for Stalin in Georgia: Between Respect and Unjustifiable Actions,” CRRC, last updated April 17, 2013, accessed February 18, 2015.

65 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview. Note: The decision to open the museum during de-Stalinization is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is an interesting future research topic.

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and diplomacy. Kept in Moscow’s central train station after Stalin’s death, the car was later donated to the Museum.66

The Museum has a decidedly sacred aura around it. It is a grand building meant to subdue talking and no one speaks loudly throughout the museum. Entering the main staircase, one is greeted at the top by an imposing statue of Stalin. If one pays for a tour, the guide leads you through the corridors. The primary, and not entirely unwarranted, purpose of the museum is to give one a pictorial version of Stalin’s life. However, when one moves past the revolutionary phase of Soviet Russia and Stalin’s involvement in it, one is greeted with a watered down version of his crimes and destructiveness. The defeat of Nazi Germany is central to the museum as well. As much as there should be due credit to the massive losses the Red Army suffered during World War II, there also needs to be a balance between the victory and the suppression that came after the war. The museum’s grand finale is the display of Stalin’s death mask, his original Kremlin desk, and his personal gifts and clothes.

In addition to the one-sided and propagandized version of history that the museum provides, the marble structure over Stalin’s childhood home is an additional reminder to the citizens of Georgia of his enduring presence. This original one room wooden house is covered with a huge marble colonnade inlaid with the red star, and hammer and sickle insignia on the stain glass roof. It is, for all intents and purposes, a shrine to Stalin (Figure 3).

66

The Joseph Stalin Museum, official guided tour, Gori, Georgia, February 19, 2015.

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Figure 3: The limestone structure built over Joseph Stalin’s original childhood home near the Joseph Stalin Museum. The ceiling has a red stain-glass star, and hammer and sickle insignia. Note the bell tower on the right side of the picture; that is part of the Joseph Stalin Museum.

It is important to note that the Ministry of Culture and Monument Protection of Georgia continues to provide funding for the upkeep of the Joseph Stalin Museum, although not enough money to fix the building’s central heating.67 Funds also come from the admission ticket sales of approximately 100,000 visitors each year. Chinese tourists, in particular, make up much of the total figure.68 These tourists also have the chance to buy a Stalin pin or magnet in the gift-shop to bring home – another source of income for the museum.

The Joseph Stalin Museum is a controversial place for Georgians. One receives multiple opinions as to whether to go see it at all; many Georgians told me that it was not worth seeing Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

Discussion with students of Gori, interviewed by author and translated by Daria Dumbadze, personal interview, Gori, Georgia, February, 19, 2015. Note: Author wishes to thank Mr. Andro Barnovi for setting up this meeting.

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because, as I sensed, the monument is a source of embarrassment.

For the citizens of Gori, the museum continues to be divisive.

The following notes on a brief discussion with two university students should not be considered a complete picture of what Gori’s citizens, as a whole, think of the museum. However, their insights were helpful in setting up general feelings towards the site.

The young male student interviewed did not want to know about Stalin at all. He preferred to brush away that history. He currently knows nothing about Stalin and wishes it to remain that way. He avoids the museum out of protest. A young female student took the opposite view. It is unknown whether she has ever entered the museum, but she wants to understand Stalin and know more about him. She believes that history should not be hidden away. It must be approached and understood no matter how dark it is.69 Clearly, the Joseph Stalin Museum invokes intense feelings of dislike, but it also stands as a reminder to some of Georgia’s place within world history as it produced one of the 20th century’s most diabolical figures.

There are limited options as what to do with the Joseph Stalin Museum. One could let it go to ruin, but that would be hiding from the past. But it should not remain as it is forever.

Professor Bakradze has a very innovative idea that could help reinvigorate the Joseph Stalin Museum, but in a way that could educate rather than propagate. Because the Stalin Museum remains original, that is, the exhibit has not changed since the fall of Communism, it can be useful in a certain way. With the creation of a “parallel exhibition” one could show how history was propagandized for Stalin’s use.70 The parallel photographs, descriptions, and explanations would show what is wrong with the one-sided nature of the exhibit as it presently stands.71 Although the Joseph Stalin Museum may be a “monument of stupidity and ‘primitivity’” to modern eyes, it can be used as a way to travel back Discussion with students of Gori, personal interview.

Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

71 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

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to the Soviet era, and for a small moment, experience the type of information Georgians were given during that time.72 “Timetravelling” back to the Soviet era is possible if the museum remains the same.73 But along with this experience, a more balanced representation of history can be presented. This initiative could provide an honest representation of Stalin’s impact on Georgian and world history.

Clearly Stalin evokes differing opinions in Georgian society, but he also remains an influential figure in Georgia.

Bondo Kupatadze, an Associate Professor at Ilia State University argues that Stalin’s legacy can be seen in modern day Georgia in four ways. First, Stalin ended the notion that there was private property. The “peasant mindset,” – meaning, one has to work for one’s livelihood – was destroyed.74 As a result, it was difficult in the 1990s for Georgians to overcome the idea that collectivization was over and a competitive and private market replaced the previous economic system. Georgians were used to working for the state’s benefit rather than their own.75 Second, the idea that the state is there to provide everything to citizens is hard to change. There is a lack of initiative and creativity within the private sphere to provide for oneself.76 Third, even though Georgia’s opposition successfully took power in 2012, many political decisions are still “made behind closed doors,” rather than being part of public political discourse.77 Backroom deals are a remnant of Soviet politics that can be seen in modern day Georgian politicking. For example, President Saakashvili came to power during the “Rose Revolution” within a broader revolutionary environment and spirit. But, President Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

Bondo Kupatadze, Associate Professor at Ilia State University, interviewed by author and translated by Daria Dumbadze, personal interview, Ilia State University, February 19, 2015.

74 Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

75 Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

76 Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

77 Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

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Saakashvili was not officially the people’s elected choice.78 In addition, former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s (2012-2013) influence in Georgian politics cannot be underestimated. The fact that there is an unelected and affluent private citizen influencing Georgian policy is a characterization of Soviet politics.79 Finally, Georgian society respects and resonates with a strong leadership personality, evidenced by the fact that Georgian society considers the Georgian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch, Ilia II, the most trustworthy figure in society.80 Indeed, 94.2% of Georgians believe this.81 Overall, Professor Kupatadze brings to light the reasons why Stalin remains, in a sense, alive as remnants of his policies initiated during the Georgian Soviet period continue in present Georgian society and government.

Despite Soviet societal and governmental footprints within Georgia, the future of the state resides in the hope for a membership agreement with the EU. Approximately 80% of Georgians would vote yes to EU membership if a referendum were held.82 88% of Georgians also believe that “Georgia [should] be in the EU.”83 However, the numbers towards a general democratic future, without the EU as a consideration, are considerably lower in Georgian society. Only 62% of Georgians believe that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.”84 And only half of Georgians would not “like to live and work in a country ruled by Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

80 Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

81 Ivan Watson, “Patriarch Ilia II: ‘Most trusted man in Georgia,’” CNN, last updated April 26, 2010, accessed March 21, 2015.

82 CRRC and Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia,” published online December 5, 2011, accessed March 13, 2015, http://www. crrccenters.org/, 22, see Table 14.

83 CRRC and Eurasia Partnership Foundation, “Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia,” 22, see Table 15.

84 Caucasus Research Resource Centers (2013), “ATTDEM: Attitude towards democracy (%) - Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset Georgia,” retrieved through ODA, accessed January 26, 2015.

78 79

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a person like Stalin.”85 Professor Bakradze argues that this data illustrates that “Stalin is still an important symbol but one without strong political content” as respect for him reflects Georgia’s cultural conservatism rather than its future political trajectory.86 However, learning the value of democracy through increased understanding of the Soviet past and how it lingers in Georgian society is necessary if Georgia wishes to enter into a friendlier relationship with Europe and the West. The data shows that there is still work to be done in educating the Georgian population on the true nature of Stalin’s socio-political impact.

Educating Georgians about their Soviet past has been pursued by non-governmental organizations such as the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), and private individuals. Professor Kupatadze was hired by NIMD to educate Georgians about Stalin and the Soviet period. Kupatadze saw a real need for these types of programs, especially for those thirty-five years old and above. This is because under the Soviet educational model, the type of historical education they received was very different than the one children receive now, which creates a divide in the historical knowledge of the population.87 Professor Bakradze also sees the necessity for educating Georgians about their past, as he calls the curriculum on Soviet history in schools “primitive.”88 In addition to the unrefined version of Soviet history that is offered in schools today, the Soviet period of Georgia is taught in the last term of the school year. As a result, teachers often do not fully explore the era because of time constraints.89 Bakradze also ran an initiative to increase knowledge of the Soviet era. He offered a tour of Tbilisi called “The Topography of Terror.” This was an educational tour that went through the streets of Tbilisi “Nostalgia for Stalin in Georgia: Between Respect and Unjustifiable Actions.”

Bakradze, “Georgia and Stalin: Still Living With the Great Son of the Nation,” in “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion,” 53.

87 Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

88 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

89 Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

85 86

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and focused on the history behind certain locations. In essence, Professor Bakradze was trying to bring attention to what really happened in Tbilisi during the Soviet period.90 He also gave the citizens of Tbilisi a source of historical knowledge that competed with the state narrative by creating a new and critical approach to Georgia’s Soviet history.

Despite the NIMD and Georgian individuals doing what they can to raise awareness and the educational level of Georgians in regards to their Soviet history, Europe is doing very little to aid this process. The Council of Europe (CoE) recently did an educational and commemorative project on the Holocaust to bring attention to human rights abuses. When asked whether such an educational project on the Soviet period had been initiated by the CoE, its representative in Georgia, Alessandro Savaris, said that no such enterprise had been undertaken. Mr. Savaris said that there was no particular reason for this; the “authorities themselves are quite proactive in that sense. If you visit the museum of Soviet Occupation […] so there is no need to remind them of those things.”91 It is unknown whether or not Mr. Savaris had ever visited the Museum of Soviet Occupation, but if he had, it would be clear to him that the information is presented in a way that is antithetical to the European Parliament’s resolution of April 2, 2009, on European conscience and totalitarianism. The resolution recognizes that “Europe will not be united unless it is able to form a common view of its history, recognises Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and Communist regimes as a common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate on their crimes in the past century.”92 As previously discussed, the Museum of Soviet Occupation is not an honest representation of Georgia’s Soviet past, largely due Lasha Bakradze, personal interview.

Alessandro Savaris, Deputy Head of the Council of Europe, interviewed by Georgia ICM participants and author, personal interview, Council of Europe’s Georgia Office, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 18, 2015.

92 “Texts adopted, Thursday, April 2, 2009 - Brussels, European conscience and totalitarianism,” European Parliament, last updated December 8, 2009, accessed March 14, 2015.

[Note: author’s emphasis].

90 91

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the political nature of the project.93 However, as the European Parliament clearly stated, “parties cannot claim to be objective.”94 This means that the UNM could not create an exhibit that was a frank representation of the Soviet era. Overall, the Museum of Soviet Occupation needs to be redesigned to meet European research and representational standards.

Although the EU officially espouses an interest in the cultural aspects of its member states and neighbourhood policy associations, the EU is predominantly interested in the economic and judicial reform of Georgia. Speaking with Boris Iarochevitch, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation in Georgia, he listed many problems the EU faces in regards to potential Georgian membership. Rule of law is a primary concern.95 Although the Georgian Dream has made some gains in this area, it is not reassuring given the amount of UNM members on trial at the behest of the Georgian Dream coalition.96 In addition, Mr. Iarochevitch called the Ministry of the Interior a “huge oppressive apparatus” which needs to be scaled down and reformed.97 But overall, the poor economic situation of Georgia is the primary obstacle for EU integration. Currently, the EU gives $100 million for technical and financial assistance, plus an addition $50 million to the agricultural sector.98 Within this context of economic distress and inadequate judicial reform, the EU is paying little attention to the way that Georgian political parties frame historical discourse and the memory of the Soviet past.

This paper has covered a wide array of topics pertaining Bondo Kupatadze, personal interview.

“Texts adopted, Thursday, April 2, 2009 - Brussels, European conscience and totalitarianism.”

95 Boris Iarochevtich, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation, interviewed by Georgia ICM participants and author, personal interview, EU’s Georgia Office, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 18, 2015.

96 Boris Iarochevtich, personal interview; Olesya Vartanyan, “Georgian Opposition Leader Ordered Jailed Until Trial,” New York Times, July 5, 2014, accessed March 14, 2015.

97 Boris Iarochevtich, personal interview.

98 Boris Iarochevtich, personal interview.

93 94

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to the Georgian memory of Soviet history. It has established that Georgians view the Soviet period between 1921 and 1991 as an occupation. This was driven by state initiatives to frame the narrative in this way, but also the 2008 war with Russia perpetuated the theme of victimhood. The largest symbol of Georgian victimization is the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Tbilisi. It is a one-sided exhibit that is entirely focused on the death and destruction that the Soviets wrought on Georgia with no mention of collaboration or the favourable elements of Soviet life. This paper has also examined the relatively positive opinion many Georgians hold of Joseph Stalin. The physical manifestation of this is the Joseph Stalin Museum in Gori. Although the museum is largely Soviet propaganda, there is the possibility of using the exhibit to show how under the Soviet regime, history was one-sided and used for political purposes. Beyond the museum, Stalin lives on in the socio-political context as remnants of his policies remain.

Understanding this will be key to further democratic reforms in Georgia. Finally, the need for programs that can educate Georgian society on its Soviet past is pressing. However, the EU is doing little to help in this endeavor, as its focus is on Georgia’s economic problems. With this in mind, the EU would be wise to take heed of Jean Monnet’s words: “Si c’était à refaire, je commençerais par la culture (If I were starting over, I would begin with culture).”99 Georgia, in many ways, is reinventing itself after seventy years of Soviet rule. It is perhaps time to “begin with culture.”

Bibliography Bakradze, Lasha, Professor at Ilia State University. Interviewed by author. Personal interview.

Giorgi Leonidze State Museum of Literature, Tbilisi, Georgia.

February 20, 2015.

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 701.

99

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Bakradze, Lasha. “Georgia and Stalin: Still Living With the Great Son of the Nation,” in “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2013): 47-54. Accessed January 18, 2015.

The Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook: Georgia.”

CIA. Accessed March 15, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/gg.html.

Caucuses Research Resource Centers. “Nostalgia for Stalin in Georgia: Between Respect and Unjustifiable Actions.” CRRC. Last updated April 17, 2013.

Accessed February 18, 2015. http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot. ca/2013/04/nostalgia-for-stalin-in-georgia-between.html.

Caucasus Research Resource Centers (2013). “ATTDEM: Attitude towards democracy (%) Caucasus Barometer time-series dataset Georgia.” Retrieved through ODA. Accessed January 26, 2015. http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb-ge/ATTDEM/.

Caucuses Research Resource Centers and Eurasia Partnership Foundation. “Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia.”

Published online December 5, 2011. Accessed March 13, 2015. http://www.crrccenters.org/.

De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union. London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1986.

De Waal, Thomas. “Introduction.” In “The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2013): 3-6. Accessed January 18, 2015.

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De Waal, Thomas. The Caucuses: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin: A Political Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Discussion with students of Gori. Interviewed by author and translated by Daria Dumbadze. Personal interview. Gori, Georgia, February, 19, 2015.

European Commission. “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.” Last updated July 9, 2012. Accessed March 13, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/ terms/accession-criteria_en.htm.

European Parliament. “Texts adopted, Thursday, April 2, 2009 - Brussels, European conscience and totalitarianism.” European Parliament. Last updated December 8, 2009. Accessed March 14, 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-// EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0213+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. Forest, Benjamin, and Juliet Johnson. “Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 2002 (92.3): 524-547. Accessed January 26, 2015. doi: 10.1111/1467-8306.00303.

G.E. “Georgia’s new parliament, an expensive folly or an investment in the future?” The Economist, June 14, 2012.

Accessed March 20, 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/ easternapproaches/2012/06/georgias-new-parliament.

Group meeting with members of the Training Centre for Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interviewed by 255

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Georgia International Course Module Participants (ICM) and author. Personal interview. Ministry of Foreign Affaris, Tbilisi, Georgia. February 17, 2015.

Gugushvili, Alexi, and Peter Kabachnik. “Stalin is dead, long live Stalin? Testing socialization, structural, ideological, nationalist, and gender hypotheses.” Post Soviet Affairs (2014): 1-36. Accessed January 7, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2014.940697.

Harding, Luke. “Leader of Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Faces Strong Opposition in Elections.” The Guardian UK, September 30, 2012.

Accessed June 10, 2015.

Iarochevtich, Boris, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation.

Interviewed by Georgia ICM participants and author. Personal interview. EU’s Georgia Office, Tbilisi, Georgia. February 18, 2015 The Joseph Stalin Museum. Official Guided Tour. Gori, Georgia.

February 19, 2015.

Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. *King, Charles. “The five-day war: managing Moscow after the Georgia crisis.” Foreign Affairs 87.6 (November-December 2008): 2-11. Accessed March 15, 2015.

Kupatadze, Bondo, Associate Professor at Ilia State University.

Interviewed by author. Translated by Daria Dumbadze. Personal interview. Ilia State University. February 19, 2015.

Lang, David Marshall, A Modern History of Georgia. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1962.

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Light, Matthew. Professor at the University of Toronto. Lecture and discussion, The University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, January 16, 2015.

Menteshashvili, Ivane. Professor and Doctor of Sciences (World History). Interviewed by author. Personal interview. The Museum of Soviet Occupation, Tbilisi, Georgia. February 18, 2015.

Moeller, Robert G. “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany.” The American Historical Review (1996) 101 (4): 1008-1048. Accessed March 20, 2015. doi: 10.1086/ ahr/101.4.1008.

Rayfield, Donald. Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia. London: Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2012.

Reisner, Oliver, European External Action Service. Interviewed

by Georgia ICM participants and author. Personal interview. VIP Victoria Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. February 16, 2015.

Savaris, Alessandro, Deputy Head of the Council of Europe.

Interviewed by Georgia ICM participants and author. Personal interview. Council of Europe’s Georgia Office, Tbilisi, Georgia.

February 18, 2015.

Service, Robert. Stalin: A Biography. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004.

The Telegraph. “Georgia passes law to destroy Soviet-era monuments and street names.” The Telegraph, May 21, 2011.

Accessed March 20, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/europe/georgia/8549052/Georgia-passes-law-todestroy-Soviet-era-monuments-and-street-names.html.

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Toria, Malkhaz, Professor at Ilia State University. Interviewed by author. Personal interview. Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia.

February 18, 2015.

Toria, Malkhaz. “The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008: Historical analogy as a memory project.” In The Making of Modern Georgia, 1918-1920, The first Georgian republic and its successors, edited by Stephen F. Jones.

New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp. 316-335.

Vartanyan, Olesya. “Georgian Opposition Leader Ordered Jailed Until Trial.” New York Times, July 5, 2014. Accessed March 14, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/world/europe/georgianopposition-leader-ordered-jailed-until-trial.html.

Watson, Ivan. “Patriarch Ilia II: ‘Most trusted man in Georgia.’”

CNN. Last updated April 26, 2010. Accessed March 21, 2015. http:// www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/23/georgia.powerful. patriarch.ilia/. *Page numbers correspond to physical journal, via online access there are no page numbers.

Note: All pictures are the author’s.

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PRESERVING HERITAGE IN TAO-KLARJETI STICKING POINTS OF HISTORY AND IDENTITY IN TURKOGEORGIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS David Kitai 1. Introduction

From the 8th to 16th centuries, Georgian kingdoms controlled the western borderlands between Anatolia and the Caucasus. The territory, known in Georgian as Tao-Klarjeti, housed the medieval development of Georgian Orthodoxy and served as the base from which the Bagrationi dynasty unified Georgia.

Hundreds of important churches, monasteries, and castles were built in Tao-Klarjeti. Many of these sites are still standing, in various state of ruin.

Tao-Klarjeti is now a part of Turkey. In 2006 the Georgian and Turkish governments began negotiating the terms of religious heritage restoration on both sides of the border. After nine years, no meaningful agreement between the two parties has been achieved.

Georgia and Turkey are close partners and strong allies, yet they cannot reach agreement on a relatively minor cultural issue. This paper will show how both Georgia and Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s approaches to the David Kitai is a recent graduate in History from the University of Toronto and Victoria College. In 2014 David participated in the first U of T ICM to Georgia where he developed a deep interest in Georgia, specifically the history of Georgian national identity. Under the supervision of Professor Matthew Light, David completed an independent study project studying Georgian history and identity.

With support from the Undergraduate Research Fund he was able to return to Georgia in February 2015 to conduct research for this project.

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negotiations are coloured by their own senses of ‘historic mission’ in the region. By turning Tao-Klarjeti into an issue of history and identity, Turkey and Georgia have made heritage preservation efforts on both sides of the border into a sticking point.

Difficulties have arisen out these negotiations’ attachment to identity and history in Turkey and Georgia. This attachment has seen relatively extraneous issues introduced to an otherwise simple discussion of heritage preservation. Georgian Scholars and, more importantly, the Church drive Georgian interest. Those groups see Tao-Klarjeti’s ecclesiastical history as integral to Georgian culture and, at the same time, are unwilling to accept the restoration of Islamic sites in Georgia as a compromise. Turkey sees itself as the historic champion of Georgia’s Muslims and wants new mosques and madrassas built in Georgia to serve that community. The Church, however, is unwilling to accept the expansion of Muslim sites. They have used their influence in Georgian society to derail the negotiations. The Church’s hard position against Turkish conditions has turned Tao-Klarjeti into one of the few sticking points in Turkey and Georgia’s otherwise strong relationship.

In demonstrating how this issue became so problematic, this paper will begin by broadly outlining the history of TaoKlarjeti and the central role of the Church in Georgian society as background. From there, this paper will explain how Georgian scholars and the Georgian Church have propagated an ecclesiastically focused narrative of Tao-Klarjeti’s history. In turn, this narrative has governed Georgian policy towards TaoKlarjeti and given the Church immense influence over Georgia’s Ministry of Culture on the issue. Subsequently this paper will examine discrimination against Georgian Muslims and how that issue has driven Turkey to push for the construction of Muslim infrastructure at the negotiations. Finally, this paper will examine the process of the negotiations themselves to show that the Church’s intransigent stance against the expansion of Muslim sites has turned the churches of Tao-Klarjeti into such a difficult issue.

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Historical background for this paper has been taken from published English-language sources. Media reports about the restoration projects are also used. Those reports, however, do not address why this issue remains so difficult to resolve. This paper therefore relies on a series of interviews conducted with key stakeholders in Tbilisi from February 16th to 20th 2015. The stakeholders include Georgian scholars, Turkish and Georgian government officials, and NGO representatives. Though this paper deals with both Georgia and Turkey it focuses more heavily on Georgia. That is because the central research for this project was conducted in Tbilisi and the majority of stakeholders interviewed were Georgian experts.

The region discussed herein currently comprises parts of the Artvin, Ardahan, Kars, and Erzurum provinces in Turkey. In keeping with contemporary Georgian scholarship it will be referred to in this paper as Tao-Klarjeti. The Georgian Autocephalous Orthodox Church will, in this paper, be referred to by some variation of the Church, the Orthodox Church, or the Georgian Orthodox Church. The governing body of the Church will be referred to as the Patriarchate.

2. Background: History of Tao-Klarjeti and the Church in PostSoviet Georgia

Before we can adequately discuss contemporary efforts to restore Tao-Klarjeti’s historic monuments, the region’s medieval history must be outlined. From the 8th to 11th centuries, TaoKlarjeti played an integral role in Georgia’s sovereign and ecclesiastical history. Relatively stable, Tao-Klarjeti became a refuge for Georgian sovereignty and a nursery for the medieval development of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Georgian kings of Tao-Klarjeti constructed imposing fortifications in the region while Georgian priests built flourishing monasteries and churches there such as Oshki, Ishkhani, and Khandzta.

Though its borders shifted over time, Tao-Klarjeti broadly 261

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comprised the southern part of the territories otherwise referred to as Samtskhe or Meskheti.1 In the 7th century, Arab invaders depopulated the Eastern Georgian Kingdom of Iberia. Many Georgian aristocrats, along with their subjects, fled upriver along to Kura into Tao-Klarjeti.2 One such aristocrat, Prince Ashot of the Bagrationi dynasty (died 830) settled at the fortress of Artanuji in Tao-Klarjeti.3

From Artanuji, Ashot consolidated Tao-Klarjeti into his own feudal kingdom.4 Ashot was the first of his dynasty to be legitimized with the Byzantine title of Kuropalates in 813.5 Ashot’s Tao-Klarjeti was, according to David Lang, the base of “patriotic resistance to Saracen rule.”6 Lang asserts that under Ashot, Georgian aristocrats, priests, and refugees helped build “a new, national state” in Tao-Klarjeti.7

Ashot’s descendant, Davit Kuropalates of Tao-Klarjeti (died 1001) used his position to unify Georgia’s fractured petty kingdoms.8 Davit used Byzantine favor to position himself as the most powerful ruler in Georgia.9 Without an heir, Davit adopted his nephew Bagrat in 975 AD. Bagrat already had dynastic claims to the thrones of both Abkhazia and Kartli.10 In 978 Bagrat inherited the Kingdom of Abkhazia, in 1000 he was made Kuropalates of TaoKlarjeti, and in 1008 he was named Bagrat III, King of Georgia.11 Valeri Silogava and Kakha Shengelia, Tao-Klarjeti, (Tbilisi: Caucasus University Press, 2006), 10.

2 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 28-29.

3 David Marshall Lang, A Modern History of Georgia, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962), 28.

4 Silogava and Shengelia, Tao-Klarjeti, 10.

5 Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia, (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 64-65.

6 David Marshall Lang, comp. Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956), 134.

7 Ibid., 135.

8 Silogava and Shengelia, Tao-Klarjeti, 10.

9 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 32.

10 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 69.

11 Ibid., 71.

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Bagrat’s rule began the so-called ‘Bagrationi Golden Age’ when Georgia’s political power reached its zenith under rulers like Davit IV and Queen Tamar.12

As mentioned above, the fortress of Artanuji was the first Bagrationi capital of Tao-Klarjeti.13 The nearby fortress of Ardahan is mentioned in Georgian folklore in connection with K’art’los, the mythical father of the Georgians.14 The fortress of Panaskerti, in the late 10th and early 11th centuries frequently hosted the court of King Bagrat III, who died there in 1014.15 Though some castles were also used as Armenian, Seljuk, and Ottoman bases they still represent a physical link to narratives of Georgia’s Bagrationi history. The castles can be seen as the embodiment of Georgia’s survival and reunification after the Arab invasions.

Protected from invasion, the region became the centre of Georgia’s 8th and 9th century ecclesiastical development. In those years, the Georgian Autocephalous Orthodox Church only existed in Tao-Klarjeti. Abkhazia, the other kingdom spared invasion, was ecclesiastically subservient to Constantinople.16 Donald Rayfield asserts that the region was made, during the 8th and 9th centuries, into the center of Georgian culture.17

Priests and Monks from Central Georgia, like the legendary St. Grigol Khandzteli, fled Arab rule to Tao-Klarjeti. In his introduction to the hagiographic Life of St. Grigol Khandzteli David Lang writes that St. Grigol came to Tao-Klarjeti to “help in Georgia’s national revival by mobilizing the spiritual forces of the nation against the Muslim overlords.”18 St. Grigol and his disciples Robert W. Edwards, “The Vale of Kola: A Final Preliminary Report on the Marchlands of Northeast Turkey,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 41 (1988): 126.

13 Robert W. Edwards, “The Fortifications of Artvin: A Second Preliminary Report on the Marchlands of Northeast Turkey,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 40 (1986): 172.

14 Ibid., 177.

15 Robert W. Edwards, “Medieval Architecture in the Oltu-Penek valley: A Preliminary Report on the Marchlands of Northeast Turkey,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 39 (1985): 32.

16 Buba Kudava, Director, National Center for Manuscripts, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal interview. Tbilisi. February 17 2015.

17 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 64.

18 Lang, Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints, 134.

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built a number of monasteries, which, according to Buba Kudava, also functioned as cultural centers and scriptoria.19 Kudava, director of the national center of manuscripts and the leading historian of Tao-Klarjeti, asserts that the rich manuscript production of these churches assured Tao-Klarjeti’s place as Georgia’s spiritual and cultural center in the 8th and 9th centuries.20 The work done at these monasteries lends itself to the idea, discussed below, that Georgian Orthodoxy ‘saved’ Georgian culture during periods of invasion.

From the 9th to 11th centuries, Tao-Klarjeti experienced a massive burst of Church construction. Under Davit III, key monastic centers like Oshki, Khakuli, and Parkhali were built.21 By the end of his reign, Davit’s territory housed some 300 churches and monasteries.22 The style of church architecture developed in Tao-Klarjeti became commonplace throughout Georgia after unification. Most of the master builders and monks working on church construction after 1000 AD came from Tao-Klarjeti.23 After unification, Georgia’s Kings also built churches at Mount Athos and Jerusalem.24 Most of the monks sent to these sites were trained in Tao-Klarjeti.25 As we shall discuss below, the contemporary Georgian Church is seen as the heir to the cultural achievements of medieval Tao-Klarjeti and the owner of the region’s heritage.

In addition to Tao-Klarjeti’s history, an adequate discussion of its heritage sites cannot be conducted without first understanding the role of the Church in modern Georgia. The Church is the most popular institution in Georgia, able to exercise considerable political influence. Dr. Thomas Wier, a historical linguist at the Free University Tbilisi, notes that the Church plays a more prominent role in contemporary Georgian society than 19

20

Kudava.

Kudava

Silogava and Shengelia, Tao-Klarjeti, 10.

22 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 69.

23 Kudava.

24 Kudava.

25 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 69.

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it did before the Soviet period. This is because it was one of the few “national organizations” that survived Soviet rule.26 Despite Soviet atheism, the Georgian Patriarch Ilia II has been in power since 1977. He has occupied a prominent role through periods of considerable political turmoil for Georgia. Many Georgians perceive the Patriarch, and his Church, as a bastion of stability.27 Surveys conducted by the Caucasus Research and Resource Centers support this. 81% of Georgia’s total population is Georgian Orthodox. 72% of the same group surveyed say they completely trust the Church.28

As mentioned above, the Church is also very well financed, with a budget of $12.5 million USD coming every year from the Georgian government. In comparison, $2 million is allocated to support Georgia’s Jews, Muslims, Catholics, and Apostolic Christians.29

Crucially, the Georgian Orthodox Church plays a defining role in modern Georgian national identity.30 Ilia Chavchavadze, the leader of Georgia’s 19th century nationalist movement, built the idea of Georgian identity on three ‘pillars’: language, territory, and religion.31 According to Dr. Oliver Reisner, a historian of late Tsarist Georgia, religion took third place in Chavchavadze’s view.32 After the breakup of the USSR, however, Georgian Orthodoxy and Georgian national identity have become more closely interconnected than at any other point in history.

The German anthropologist Chris Hann has proposed the reason why Georgia, and other Post-Soviet states, have become so Thomas Wier, Professor, Free University Tbilisi, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal interview, Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

27 Ibid.

28 “Caucasus Barometer 2013 Georgia,” Last Modified Feb 27, 2013.

29 Inga Popovaite, “Georgian Muslims are Strangers in their own country.” Open Democracy, March 5 2015.

30 Kudava.

31 Oliver Reisner, Attache, European Union Delegation to Georgia, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Group, VIP Victoria Hotel: Tbilisi. February 17 2015.

32 Ibid.

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religious. In his view, post-Soviet religiosity stems from the fragile legitimacy of successor states like Georgia. In order to consolidate their rule, newly independent republics sought to integrate religion into “a nationalist vision of the past.”33 Hann’s colleague Mathijs Pelkmans asserts that when the Georgian nationalist movement began to gain influence in the 1980s it propagated the idea that Georgian nationality and Georgian Orthodox Christianity are one and the same.34 The Church echoed this sentiment with slogans like “a Georgian is Orthodox by nature and way of life.”35 Georgian nationalists and the Chuch have cooperated, since before 1991, to create a consolidated view of Georgian identity closely tied to Georgian Orthodoxy.

The post-Soviet Orthodox nation building project has been a success. Religion has become the basis of ethnic identity in Georgia, according to Giorgi Bobghiashvili, an associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues.36 Thomas Wier asserts that the contemporary level of religious influence in Georgian identity has no precedent, even in Chavchavadze’s movement.37 In 2012, the institute for Policy Studies Tbilisi published a study in which 93.4% of those surveyed identified as Georgian Orthodox and almost two thirds said Christianity, not nationality, was the basis of their identity.38 The development of Orthodox-Georgian identity has helped strengthen a sense of Georgian-ness among the majority of Georgian citizens. However, as we shall discuss in Section 2, it has made Georgian identity considerably more exclusive, painting other faiths as ‘un-Georgian.’

Popular and rich, the Church functions as an independent Chris Hann, ed. Religion, Identity, Postsocialism: The Halle Focus Group 2003-2010, Halle: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2010. 14.

34 Mathijs Pelkmans, Defending the Border: identity, religion, and modernity in the Republic of Georgia, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 110.

35 Ibid.

36 Giorgi Bobghiashvili, Project Associate, European Centre for Minority Issues, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal Interview. February 20, 2015: Tbilisi.

37 Wier.

38 Popovaite, “Georgian Muslims are Strangers in their own country,” March 5 2015.

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actor in Georgian politics, capable of shaping policy agendas, according to Kornely Kakachia, a professor of International Relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University.39 Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Gigi Gigadze, agrees with this view, stating that the church functions as an influential political actor because it enjoys such high levels of support.40 Ana Natsviashvili, director of the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, claims that open criticism of the Church has become a serious taboo in Georgia.41 The Church’s considerable influence and popularity has proven crucial in the creation of a narrative, which prioritizes the ecclesiastical heritage of Tao-Klarjeti and allows the Church to define Georgia’s interest in the region.

3. Georgia’s Interest, Scholars and the Church

Although Tao-Klarjeti is rich in sites of monarchical and ecclesiastical history, Georgian historians have propagated a narrative that emphasizes the region’s churches over its castles.

That narrative determines Georgia’s understanding of the region’s historic value. As the heirs to that history, the Church can shape Georgia’s priorities in negotiations with Turkey over these sites.

In showing how the Church and Georgian Scholars have defined Georgia’s interest in Tao-Klarjeti, this section will examine why Georgian scholars emphasize the value of the region’s churches over its castles. Using that question, this section will outline the idea, accepted by both the Church and mainstream scholars, that the Georgian Church in Tao-Klarjeti ‘saved’ Georgian culture and identity. Finally, this section will show how that narrative allows the Church to define Georgia’s interest in Tao-Klarjeti.

Kornely Kakachia, Professor of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal interview, Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

40 Gigi Gigiadze, Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interviewed by University of Toronto ICM Students, Personal interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Tbilisi. February 17 2015.

41 Ana Natsvlishvili, Director, Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Interviewed by David Kitai. Personal interview. Tbilisi. February 20 2015.

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According to Tinatin Bochorishvili, deputy director of the grantmaking Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation, no government grants have been given to scientists researching the castles of Tao-Klarjeti. The Rustaveli Foundation has, however, provided grants to numerous scholars studying ecclesiastical sites.42 Buba Kudava, as well, acknowledges that among Georgian scholars the Churches are simply seen as more important.43 Three international conferences on Tao-Klarjeti have been held in 2010, 2012, and 2014. Of the total 213 papers presented at the conferences 63 focus directly on the region’s ecclesiastical heritage while only 10 deal with royal history.44 Stakeholders surveyed provided reasons as to why these sites are the focus of so much study.

Paata Gaprindashvili, deputy director of the National Institute for Cultural Heritage Preservation of Georgia, claims that the government’s focus is not exclusively on ecclesiastical heritage. Instead, the Georgian Ministry of Culture has prioritized sites in the worst states of repair. Churches like Ishkhani and Oshki, according to Mr. Gaprindashvili, were in the most crucial situation.45 Iskhani, however, was the first site successfully restored through Turko-Georgian cooperation. That monastery had been partially converted to a mosque in the Ottoman period and was better preserved by local Muslims as a result.46 Moreover, no other stakeholder raised the issue of physical condition.

Tinatin Bochorishvili, Deputy Director, Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal Interview, February 17, 2015: Tbilisi.

43 Kudava.

44 Irma Beridze, et al. ed. 3rd International Conference Tao-Klarjeti: Abstracts of Papers, (Tbilisi: National Centre of Manuscripts, 2014).; Buba Kudava, ed. International Conference Tao-Klarjeti: Abstracts of Papers, Tbilisi: National Centre of Manuscripts, 2010.; Buba Kudava, ed. 2nd International Conference Tao-Klarjeti: Abstracts of Papers, Tbilisi: National Centre of Manuscripts, 2012.

45 Paata Gaprindashvili, Deputy General Director, National Institute for Cultural Heritage Preservation of Georgia, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal Interview, February 18, 2015: Tbilisi.

46 Tsate Batashi, Professor, Free University, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal Interview, February 19, 2015: Free University, Tbilisi.

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According to Dr. Thomas Wier there is no institution in Georgia willing to finance a study of Tao-Klarjeti’s castles. The Church, on the other hand, is very well financed. The Patriarchate enjoys a concordat with the government guaranteeing roughly $12.5 million US per year, as well as significant private donations.47 Tinatin Karosanidze, dean of international relations at the Free University Tbilisi, asserts that the Patriarchate is the key player on this issue.48 Levan Kakhishvili, a researcher at Caucasian House, notes that the Church uses its considerable resources to push for the study and preservation of Georgia’s ecclesiastical legacy in TaoKlarjeti.49

Three Georgian historians of Tao-Klarjeti offered the view that Tao-Klarjeti’s churches are more valuable than its castles as cultural artefacts. Dr. David Khostaria, head of the Medieval Department at the George Chubinashvili Centre for Heritage Preservation, notes that the churches of Tao-Klarjeti are more perceptibly Georgian in their architectural style. Castles, on the other hand, lack any “distinguishing national features.”50 Kakha Shengelia, President of the Caucasus University, notes the rich medieval frescoes still visible in the churches of Tao-Klarjeti.51 Buba Kudava highlights the rich architectural legacy of the Tao-Klarjeti churches as the first Georgian churches of their particular style.52

Those scholars subscribe to a narrative that presents the Church as the medieval saviour of Georgian culture. Shengelia explicitly asserts that the Church “saved the Georgian people Wier.

Tinatin Karosanidze and Rati Asatiani, Director and Associate, International Relations Department, Free University Tbilisi, Interviewed by David Kitai. Personal interview, Tbilisi. February 16 2015.

49 Kahishvili.

50 David Khostaria, Head of Medieval Department, George Chubinashvili National Research Centre for Georgian Art History and Heritage Preservation, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal interview, Tbilisi. February 19 2015.

51 Kakha Shengelia, President, Caucasus University, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal interview, Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

52 Kudava.

47 48

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and Georgian culture.”53 A Georgian Orthodox Priest, Father Ilia, echoed Shengelia stating that the Church prizes TaoKlarjeti’s monuments because they preserved Georgian Orthodox Christianity at a time when Georgia was surrounded by the hostile Islamic world. From these sites, Christianity “shaped and saved Georgian identity.”54 This narrative, which equates Georgia’s ecclesiastical and cultural heritage, demands a scholarly emphasis on the churches of Tao-Klarjeti and, as we shall discuss later, explains why sites of Islamic heritage in Georgia are understudied.

This narrative, which weds Georgian culture to Georgia’s ecclesiastical heritage, is espoused in ecclesiastical histories taught at Georgian schools. According to Karosanidze, Georgian educators see Georgian Orthodoxy as an integral part of Georgia’s history.55 Levan Kakhisvili, a policy researcher at Caucasian house, agrees with this assessment, noting that hagiographies including the Life of St. Grigol Khandzteli have been mandatory subjects of study since the Soviet period. Kornely Kakachia, a professor of International Relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, asserts that Georgia does not have a strong school of revisionist history.56 Without revisionists, the narratives taught in schools are rarely challenged. Instead, historians tend to work within existing paradigms.

Because of the educational emphasis on this ecclesiastical narrative, Georgians grow up learning about Tao-Klarjeti as part of a narrative that places Georgian Orthodoxy at the center of Georgia’s history and culture. The Patriarchate uses its popularity and influence to propagate that narrative which, in turn, governs Georgia’s interest in the monuments of Tao-Klarjeti. The Patriarchate has used its jurisdiction over a territory beyond the Shengelia.

Father Ilia, Priest, Georgian Orthodox Church, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal Interview, February 20, 2015: Mtskheta.

55 Karosanidze and Asatiani.

56 Kakachia.

53 54

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borders of Georgia, to press the issue.57 On the 17th of October 2002 the Holy Synod of the Georgian church nominally restored Tao-Klarjeti and Lazica to the jurisdiction of the Georgian church. Bishop Teodore of Akhaltsikhe was named Archbishop of Akhaltsikhe, Tao-Klarjeti, and Lazica.58

Bishop Teodore, on behalf of the Church, advocates directly to the Georgian Ministry of Culture on the issue of Tao-Klarjeti.59 Gaprindashvili states that all government activities on these properties are undertaken with the agreement of the Patriarchate.

That is because, according to the terms of the concordat, the Patriarchate owns all Georgian ecclesiastical heritage sites. In the eyes of the Georgian government, the Church even “owns the heritage” of ecclesiastical sites outside of Georgia, including the Churches of Tao-Klarjeti. As such, the Ministry of Culture consults directly with the Church as it works to preserve the sites.60 The Church’s position as the “owners” of this heritage stems, in part, from its immense political influence. More crucially, however, mainstream Georgian historiography presents the Church as the legitimate bearer of Georgian culture throughout the nation’s turbulent history. Negotiations, therefore, are undertaken on the Patriarchate’s behalf. As such, the leadership of the Georgian Church is empowered to define, and alter, Georgia’s negotiating stance vis-à-vis Turkey on this issue.

4. Turkey’s interest, the Situation of Georgian Muslims

Understanding the Georgian Church as the ‘saviour’ of Georgian culture has problematic connotations for Georgian Muslims. In the Post-Soviet era, Georgian identity has been wed to Georgian Orthodoxy. In this view, Islam is seen as a ‘historic enemy’ of Georgia, despite a Muslim minority comprising Karosanidze and Asatiani.

Silogava and Shengelia, Tao-Klarjeti, 11.

59 Gaprindashvili.

60 Ibid.

57 58

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roughly 10% of Georgia’s population. Turkey sees itself as the historic protector of Georgia’s Sunni Muslims. As such, the Turkish government, and Turkish private enterprises, are working to improve Georgia’s inadequate Islamic infrastructure.

In negotiations over Tao-Klarjeti, Turkey is pressing for the reconstruction and restoration of Ottoman Mosques in Georgia.

This is nominally done as a question of Turkey’s heritage. Turkish interest is largely driven, however, by a desire to improve the difficult situation Georgian Muslims currently find themselves in.

In demonstrating that Turkish interest focuses on the needs of Georgian Muslims, this section will begin by outlining how PostSoviet Georgian identity has excluded Georgia’s Muslims. From there this section will examine the difficult situation facing Muslim Georgians today, before finally discussing why Turkey is using TaoKlarjeti to press for better Islamic infrastructure in Georgia.

The majority view that Orthodoxy is the only ‘Georgian’ religion has created a number of problems for Georgia’s Muslim community. Georgia is 10% Muslim.61 Though this includes a number of Azerbaijanis and Kists it also includes a population, largely concentrated in Ajaria and Samtskhe-Javakheti, of several hundred thousand Georgian speaking Muslims.62 Because PostSoviet Georgian identity is tied to Orthodox Christianity, Georgian Muslims are not considered to be ‘real’ Georgians. This view was articulated in 1994 by the Ajarian writer Pridon Khalvashi in his novel Is it Possible for a Muslim to be Georgian? The book concludes that Islam is incompatible with Georgian-ness because it preaches submission.63

As discussed above, mainstream historiography presents Georgia as a “Christian island in a stormy sea of Islam.”64 In this view, Islam is understood as the “historical enemy” of Georgia.65 “Caucasus Barometer 2013 Georgia,” Last Modified Feb 27, 2013.

Bobghiashvili.

63 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 109.

64 Ibid., 108.

65 Ibid., 109.

61 62

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The Arab invasions and Christian ‘resistance’ in Tao-Klarjeti are integrated into this narrative, which stretches into the present day. According to Natsviashvili, that narrative, propagated by the Church, portrays Islam as “against national identity” and opens Georgian Muslims to discrimination.66

Giorgi Bobghiashvili claims that Georgian Muslims are the religious group most discriminated against in Georgia. 67 Arguably the most famous recent incident took place in the Ajarian town of Kobuleti where a pig’s head was nailed to the door of a madrassa.68 The planned installation of a minaret in Chela, in the SamtskheJavakheti region, has also been met with widespread protests from local Christians and Orthodox Georgians in Tbilisi.69 One Ajarian woman described that she was fired from an NGO because her boss was uncomfortable working with a woman in a hijab.70

Even in Muslim regions, there are very few mosques. Of the 172 Madrassas and 158 mosques in pre-Soviet Ajaria, all but one were demolished during the Soviet days.71 Mosques are now being rebuilt, often with Turkish support, but there are far from enough to serve all Georgian Muslims.72 Moreover, the Supra, one of Georgia’s main social customs, requires the consumption of alcohol.

Georgian Muslims are unable to participate in these feasts, which are viewed, by many Orthodox Georgians, as a distinguishing feature of Georgian identity.73

Leading Turkish figures, such as Mehmet Gormez President of the Presidency of Religious affairs in Turkey, have repeatedly decried the situation Georgian Muslims find themselves in.74 While Natsvlishvili.

Bobghiashvili.

68 Natsvlishvili.

69 Bobghiashvili.

70 Popovaite.

71 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 106.

72 Ibid., 116.

73 Popovaite.

74 “Turkish Religious Official Visiting Georgia,” Democracy and Freedom Watch, September 13, 2014.

66 67

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the Georgian press and Patriarchate have claimed there are more than three hundred mosques in Georgia, Muslim leaders have noted that most Muslim prayer sites in the country are private residences used for Friday prayers.75

While mosque construction is always a contentious issue in Georgia, churches and seminaries have been constructed in many Muslim Georgian villages without major public debate.76 Based on these reports, the Turkish government sees a real threat Muslim life in Georgia. The situation facing Georgia’s Muslims has prompted the Turkish government, and many Turkish citizens, to intercede in Georgia, financing mosques, madrassas, and other cultural institutions.

Turkey sees itself as the historic protector of Georgia’s Muslim community. The difficulties that community now faces have coloured Turkey’s view of Georgian Orthodoxy and served to complicate Turko-Georgian cultural relations. Turkey’s contemporary role in Georgia originated in 1921 when, during the Soviet invasion of Georgia, Turkish forces moved to take Ajaria, which had been a part of the Ottoman Empire before 1878.77 In the 1921 Treaty of Kars Ajaria was given to the USSR as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) of the Georgian SSR.78 Turkey only agreed to this handover because of Soviet guarantees that Ajarian cultural, economic, and religious autonomy would be preserved.79 Ajaria’s autonomous status was unlike any other ASSR in the Soviet Union as it was based on religion, not nationality, and the protection of a foreign power.80

In the Post-Soviet period, Turkey has acted to preserve Muslim culture in Ajaria. Turkish businesses have converted homes into mosques and madrassas in Ajaria and Samtskhe-Javakheti, “Kobuleti, where Muslims are not welcome,” Democracy and Freedom Watch, October 4, 2014.

76 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 117-119.

77 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 191.

78 Pelkmans, Defending the Border, 7.

79 Ibid., 103-104.

80 Ibid., 7.

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another region with significant Muslim communities.81 As well, the Turkish government has allowed Georgian Muslims to study at Turkish madrassas, often with financial support from Turkish citizens.82 Turkish intercession in Georgian Muslim life is driven by a desire to meet the religious needs of local Muslims. Those actions, however, have added a new dimension to the distrust of Islam in Georgia. Georgians have grown apprehensive about the many Turkish companies financing construction of Muslim sites.83 The madrassa in Kobuleti, mentioned above, was the property of a private Turkish enterprise.84 Grants financing the Islamic education of Georgians in Turkey have raised fears of an Islamic resurgence among young Ajarians.85

In engaging with Georgia on the issue of Tao-Klarjeti, Turkey has demanded the reciprocal restoration of Islamic sites in Georgia such as the Aziziye Mosque that once stood in Batumi.

This condition is based, nominally, on the idea that Ottoman heritage sites in Georgia should be restored in exchange for Georgian sites in Turkey.86 This approach, however, is complicated by the lack of a comprehensive inventory of Islamic heritage sites in Georgia. While Georgian scholars have produced exhaustive studies of Tao-Klarjeti, few Turkish or Georgian historians have studied Muslim heritage in Georgia.

Ottoman heritage in Georgia clearly does not carry the same historic weight for Turks that Tao-Klarjeti has for Georgians.

Turkey’s motivation is not to preserve Islamic sites for their own value. Rather, Turkey is pressing to restore sites like Aziziye because it would expand and protect Islamic infrastructure in Georgia, better serving the needs of Georgia’s Muslims.

Post-Soviet conceptions of Georgian identity have created “Kobuleti, where Muslims are not welcome,” October 4, 2014.

Karosanidze and Asatiani.

83 Reisner.

81 82

84

Kakachia.

Karosanidze and Asatiani.

Aydin Acikel, Deputy Head of Mission, Turkish Embassy Tbilisi, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal Interview, February 19, 2015: Turkish Embassy, Tbilisi.

85 86

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an adversarial view of Georgian Muslims among Orthodox Georgians. Turkey, which sees itself as the historic protector of Georgia’s Muslims, has acted to preserve Islamic culture and Islamic infrastructure in Georgia. This has, in turn, heightened Muslim-Orthodox tensions in Georgia. Nevertheless, the Turkish government is using the issue of Tao-Klarjeti to press Georgia’s government to help in the expansion of Georgia’s Islamic infrastructure. By making the Georgian government accept these terms, rather than rebuilding mosques through direct Turkish investment, Turkey is working to ensure that the long-term protection of Georgia’s mosques and madrassas is tied to Georgia and Turkey’s strong diplomatic relationship.

5. Reciprocity and the Ecclesiastical Roadblock, Negotiating Heritage Preservation in Tao-Klarjeti

The pre-eminence of ecclesiastical heritage in Georgia’s understanding of Tao-Klarjeti has made restoring the region’s churches a priority of the Georgian government. Turkey, driven to improve Islamic life in Georgia, wants to see Ottoman mosques rebuilt and restored in Georgia to serve Georgian Muslims. The Church, however, has used its considerable influence to prevent the growth of Islamic infrastructure in Georgia, thereby complicating efforts to restore the sites of Tao-Klarjeti on the basis of reciprocity.

The slow, difficult nature of these negotiations shows how TurkoGeorgian cultural relations lag behind the two countries’ close strategic and economic partnership.

To show how the issue of Tao-Klarjeti has become a sticking point, this section will begin by briefly outlining the strong partnership between Turkey and Georgia and how difficult cultural issues complicate that relationship. This section will primarily explore negotiations between Georgia and Turkey to show how the conflicting interests outlined throughout this paper have made TaoKlarjeti into a problematic stumbling block in cultural relations 276

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between the two countries.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Georgia have enjoyed strong economic and strategic relations. For Turkey, Georgia is a crucial transit zone for the Azerbaijani hydrocarbons driving Turkish growth.87 Along with Azerbaijan, Turkey is Georgia’s largest trading partner.88 Turkish investment, though occasionally contentious, has driven much of Georgia’s economic growth.89 Deputy Minister Gigadze describes the Turko-Georgian relationship as a “close partnership.” He notes that Turkey provided crucial support after Russia embargoed a number of Georgian products.90 Acikel echoes this view, stating that the Turkish government sees Georgia as a close friend and ally.91 Kakhishvili notes that more problematic cultural issues are secondary to strategic and economic interests in Turko-Georgian relations.

Because they are more contentious, issues like Tao-Klarjeti are rarely discussed.92 Georgian wariness towards Turkey and Turkish culture has served to complicate the two countries’ cultural relations.

CRRC polls show that Georgians retain a great deal of cultural aversion to Turks and Turkey.93 The Patriarchate has played a role in this view, driving public wariness about Turkish support for the spread of Islam in Georgia.94 Any requests to expand Islamic infrastructure in Georgia are treated with suspicion by the Church.

Moreover, when agreements are reached on Muslim sites they are usually met with demonstrations by Orthodox Georgians. This was the case in 2012 when plans to rebuild the Aziziye Mosque in Kornely Kakachia and Michael Cecire ed. “Georgian Foreign Policy: the quest for sustainable security,” Tbilisi, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013, 115, 118.

88 Ibid., 119-120.

89 Ibid., 118.

90 Gigadze.

91 Acikel.

92 Levan Kakhishvili, Research Associate, Caucasian House, Interviewed by David Kitai, Personal interview, Tbilisi. February 18 2015.

93 Kakachia and Cecire “Georgian Foreign Policy,” 116.

94 Kudava.

87

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Batumi were announced.95 Any attempts to restore Georgian sites in Tao-Klarjeti through reciprocation with Turkey, therefore, must overcome the considerable opposition of the Church, which, as we have discussed, steers the Georgian agenda on this issue.

Since 2006, the Georgian and Turkish ministries of culture have negotiated the restoration of Georgian sites in Tao-Klarjeti.96 Because of disagreement between Turkey and the Patriarchate, negotiations have proven to be a slow and difficult process. Initial negotiations, however, resulted in tentative agreement between both culture ministries. The Georgian party, according to Kudava, began negotiations by requesting the restoration of three sites: Ishkhani, Oshki, and Khandzta.97 Turkey, in exchange, requested the restoration of the Akhmed mosque in Akhaltsikhe and the reconstruction of the Aziziye mosque in Batumi.98

In 2008 the negotiating teams wrote a memorandum of understanding which recognized “immobile sites of cultural heritage.” They agreed, in the memorandum, to conduct an inventory of Georgian and Ottoman heritage sites on both sides of the border. They also agreed to begin the renovation of specific churches and mosques.99 The arranged plans, however, have not been implemented and the memorandum was never signed by either state’s ministers of culture. The negotiations were stalled after the Georgian Church came out publically against the construction of Mosques in Georgia.100 Public pressure forced the Georgian minister to cancel signing the agreement.101

Recalling the Church’s stance against Mosque construction in Georgia we can see why the Patriarchate pressed for the rejection of this deal. The fact that the Georgian government made such a “Planned Mosque in Batumi focus of popular unrest,” Democracy and Freedom Watch, April 2 2012.

96 Gaprindashvili.

97 Kudava.

98 Acikel.

99 Gaprindashvili.

100 Kudava.

101 Ibid.

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sudden turnaround, however, is indicative of just how influential the Church is in Georgia’s cultural affairs. Through the various means at its disposal, the Georgian Church was able to adversely complicate aspects of Georgian foreign policy towards one of its closest allies. After the breakdown of negotiations, however, unilateral restoration projects on both sides of the border prompted renewed negotiations, recognizing that reciprocity is the only way to achieve a satisfactory outcome.

Because of the disagreement, Turkey unilaterally initiated the restoration of Iskhani.102 According to Karosanidze, no Georgian experts were consulted during these initial renovations.103 David Khostaria, who surveyed the site, claims the restorations were conducted incorrectly, with crude errors that would not have occurred if Georgian scientists had been consulted.104

A similar issue occurred on the Georgian side of the Border.

In 2011, the Ahmadiyya mosque at Akhaltsikhe was restored, in accordance with Turkish requests. The project, however, was seen as a pet tourism project of then interior minister Vano Merabishvili.

105 When experts noted remaining Christian symbols, which make the site unusable for Muslim prayer, Merabishvili refused to “allow anyone…to remove crosses from the mosque.106 In both cases, unilateral restoration efforts left the parties dissatisfied. Only through reciprocity, and consultation with Georgian and Turkish experts, can these heritage sites be successfully restored.

In 2012, before the Georgian elections, Georgia and Turkey restarted negotiations. They came to a tentative agreement to co-operate on restoring Iskhani. In exchange, a new Aziziye mosque would be built in Batumi.107 In April 2013 Metropolitan Teodore asked for a halt to the restoration of Ishkhani until Ibid.

Karosanidze and Asatiani.

104 Khostaria.

105 “Renovated Rabati Castle.” Georgian Journal, September 6 2012.

106 “Vano Merabishvili proposes Culture ministry to announce moratorium on Rabati project.” Georgian Journal, April 5, 2013.

107 Acikel.

102 103

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Georgian experts could be brought in. Along with Buba Kudava, he expressed serious concerns over Turkish restorations including the destruction of frescoes.108 Two days later, Georgian experts were given licence to consult on the restoration of the Iskhani monestary.

109 Turkey’s concession over Ishkhani was given despite the Georgian Government, once again, cancelling plans to restore the Aziziye mosque.

After the 2012 election, the Georgian Dream government, which has close ties to the Church, told Turkey that building the Aziziye mosque was impossible. They claimed the name of the mosque, which honours an Ottoman emperor, would be unacceptable to Georgians. When an offer was made to change the name, the Georgian government still refused to allow construction.110 Turkey, in agreeing to the restoration of Ishkhani, lost face over this turnaround. Turkey has committed that in future negotiations it will not lose face again.

The Georgian and Turkish governments are still negotiating over other heritage sites with some success. Georgian experts are currently providing surveys and measurements of Oshki and Khandzta, which are planned for restoration.111 Though the 2013 agreement has guaranteed protected status for those sites, their restoration plans have not been finalized.112 It is unlikely that they will be finalized until Mosque construction begins in Georgia.

Reciprocity, therefore, remains a central, and somewhat problematic, dynamic of Turko-Georgian negotiations. Gigadze states that Turkey and Georgia are now in “constant consultation” over Tao-Klarjeti. The two countries are co-operating on the principle of reciprocity.113 Acikel seems to agree with Gigadze, “Restoration halted at Georgian Monestary in Turkey,” Democracy and Freedom Watch, last updated April 11 2013.

109 “Turkey allows Georgian Specialists in Monestary Works,” Democracy and Freedom Watch, last updated April 13 2013.

110 Acikel.

111 Gaprindashvili.

112 Gigadze.

113 Ibid.

108

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saying that Turkey is willing to cooperate on the restoration of Oshki.114 However, Turkey cannot appear weak in these negotiations and therefore requires the reciprocal reconstruction of a mosque in Georgia.

It should be noted that while Turkey refuses to allow churches like Iskhani to be re-consecrated, it wants to see functioning mosques built in Georgia.115 This stance may explain why Turkey sees the Church as unwilling to recognize the necessity of reciprocity in this process. By defining the terms of reciprocity as the restoration of non-functioning Churches for the reconstruction of functioning Mosques, the Turkish government has managed alienate the Church, which wants Tao-Klarjetiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Churches returned to functionality and is deeply opposed to new mosques. However, it is important to note that few, if any, Georgian Orthodox Christians live near these sites.116 Conversely, on the Georgian side of the border the large Muslim population is clearly underserved.

Issues of Cultural Heritage remain one of the most problematic points in Turko-Georgian relations, largely because the Church exercises so much influence in Georgia on this issue.

Kudava notes that the Church has acted as a roadblock in relations with Turkey.117 Stakeholders surveyed tended to admit that the present state of cultural relations between the two countries lags behind their strategic and economic cooperation. Most stakeholders laid the blame for these problems squarely at the feet of the Orthodox Church.

The process of restoring heritage sites on both sides of the border shows how difficult the Georgian Church has made these cultural relations. While both parties accepted the principle of reciprocity, in 2008 and in 2012, the Church acted to force a change from Georgian negotiators. At the same time, the Church has driven Georgiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interest in these monuments and presses Acikel.

Gaprindashvili.

116 Ibid.

117 Kudava.

114 115

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the state to successfully restore them without giving concessions to Turkey. By steering the state towards such a hard stance, however, the Church risks alienating Turkey and driving a wider cultural rift between the two states. The strategic partnership between Turkey and Georgia is unlikely to be challenged by these problems. Nevertheless, the Church’s intransigent opposition to the construction of Muslim sites in Georgia has managed to turn a relatively small issue into one of the few difficulties in Turkey and Georgia’s otherwise strong relationship.

6. Conclusion

For two states that enjoy such a meaningful diplomatic partnership, the restoration of a handful of ecclesiastical monuments should not pose a significant problem. The underlying forces driving both Turkey and Georgia’s stance on the issue of TaoKlarjeti, however, have turned the issue into a sticking point. Both states have approached the negotiations with a sense of historic mission. This approach has seen otherwise extraneous, and far more contentious, issues of history, identity, and religious freedom incorporated into the conversation.

In Georgia, mainstream history understands Tao-Klarjeti’s churches as the nursery of Georgian Orthodoxy, from which Georgian identity was saved from foreign invaders. Through this narrative the Patriarchate has positioned itself as the owner of Tao-Klarjeti’s ecclesiastical heritage and therefore as the key player determining Georgian interest on the issue. Turkey, as well, perceives itself as the historic champion of Georgia’s Muslim community. As that community faces renewed persecution, Turkey has used Georgian requests for restoration projects in Tao-Klarjeti to push for the expansion of Georgia’s Islamic infrastructure. State parties have agreed, on two occasions, to this reciprocal arrangement. The Georgian Church, however, remains unequivocally opposed to any new mosques or madrassas 282

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in Georgia and has exercised its influence on the issue to derail negotiations. Some restoration has been achieved and talks are still ongoing. Resolution of this issue, however, has been painfully slow for both sides.

Ideas of national legacy and historic duty have heightened the importance of heritage preservation in Georgian and Turkish eyes. Increased importance, however, has not served to simplify the issue. By attaching historic weight and nationalist connotations to the negotiations, both parties have entrenched themselves and made compromise less likely, as compromise would involve a revision of their perceived historic mission.

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