POLITICS

Iran Showing It Is Still a Power to Reckon With

BY EMIL AVDALIANI

For the second year in a row, the South Caucasus is seeing tensions as regional powers scramble for infl uence in a region which is increasingly important energywise and an interconnector between Europe and Central Asia. And for the second year in a row, the West is notably absent. In 2020, Europe and the US were idle at best in addressing the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Now, the West is being distracted from Azerbaijan-Iran tensions, which might have wider ramifi cations for future re-alignment in the South Caucasus.

Iran is motivated in its behavior by the growing Israeli factor in South Caucasus affairs, and especially its growing security and military ties with Azerbaijan. Some reference to extremists near the Iranian borders was also voiced, with a hint toward the alleged dispatch of fi ghters from Syria to Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.

The tensions also followed a growing number of drills held by the Azerbaijani army recently near the strategic Lachin corridor which connects the separatist region to Armenia and the Caspian Sea.

But the real reasons behind the Islamic Republic’s activist behavior in the region could lie in the longterm strategic changes which have taken place as a result of Armenia’s defeat and Azerbaijan’s victory. Iran has been sidelined. Its diplomatic initiatives did not work, and it is being pushed away from the post confl ict environment.

To be sure, Iran has never been a dominant power in the South Caucasus. It has not even, unlike Russia or Turkey, had a true ally. Iran was a part of the calculus of each regional state, but was hardly as feared as Russia or Turkey. Nevertheless, Tehran views the South Caucasus as part of its sphere of geopolitical infl uence based on millennia of close political and cultural contacts.

Forswearing its ambitions in the South Caucasus might not be suicidal to Iran’s ambitions in the Middle East, but it will certainly be harmful enough to impact Iran’s position, prestige, and ties with Russia, and undermine the simple strategic logic of not allowing foreign powers near its frontiers.

No wonder then that Iran ratcheted up tensions with Azerbaijan. First, it served the aim of partially restoring the image of the Islamic Republic in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. But it was also a thinly-veiled threat to Turkey that its growing ambitions, and indeed practical moves made since the 2020 war, threaten Iran’s position.

For Iran, the Turkish moves are disrupting the very foundations of the status quo which was prevalent in the South Caucasus from the 1990s. Ankara is also looking at the Caspian basin and even Central Asian region. To expect Turkey to become a major power there is an overstretch, but it nevertheless worries Tehran, as the agreement signed among the Caspian littoral states in 2018 specifi cally stipulates no external power should be militarily involved in the region.

The Caspian Sea has always been regarded by Iranians as an exclusive zone shared fi rst with the Russian Empire, later the Soviets, and presently the Russian Federation. Other littoral states play a minor role. This makes the Turkish moves in the basin and the recent improvement of ties between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan rather an unpleasant development for Tehran – fewer roadblocks to the Trans-Caspian Pipiline threatens the Islamic Republic’s ability to prevent the project from happening.

This is where Iranian views align almost squarely with those of the Kremlin. Both fear Turkish progress, and the new Iranian leadership could lean strongly toward Russia. Resisting Turkey on its own would be tough, but together with Moscow much easier. Russia might facilitate Iran having a greater voice in South Caucasus affairs as a blocking tool against Ankara.

The Azerbaijani-Iranian tensions, and Tehran’s underlying discontent about Turkey’s resurging position, show the limits of cooperation in the South Caucasus. An increasingly fractured region is being pulled apart by the greater powers around it. This state of affairs essentially dooms the prospects of pan-regional peace and cooperation initiatives. Take the latest effort by Russia and Turkey to introduce a 3+3 platform with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the three larger powers. Existing disagreements will eventually preclude any meaningful progress, especially as Georgia fears being dragged onto the platform and dealing with Russia, which has occupied 20% of its sovereign territory.

Thus, tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan and by extension Turkey will be recurrent. Regional shifts indicate that Iran has to take some kind of initiative, lest it loses completely its position to Turkey and Russia.

Image source: Daily Sabah

Coming Soon

Embassy of Israel & MASHAV Donate Stateof-the-Art Israeli Greenhouse to the Georgian Agricultural Scientifi c Research Center

The Embassy of Israel & MASHAV (Israel’s International Development Cooperation Agency) this week donated a state-of-the-art Israeli greenhouse to the Georgian Agricultural Scientifi c Research Center.

The handover was the fi rst step in implementing a long-term vision of turning the Center into a regional Israeli agro-technology demonstration and training hub for the entire region. Agronomists and experts from Israel, Georgia, and neighboring countries will have the opportunity to share training, knowledge and experience with each other.

The state-of-art greenhouse is equipped with ventilation, fertilization and drip irrigation systems. The next phase will see the introduction of Israeli hydroponics technology (an innovative method for cultivating crops without soil) to the Center.

MASHAV is the International Cooperation Development Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, which was launched in Georgia in 1992, shortly after the opening of the Embassy. To date, more than 1600 specialists from Georgia have received professional MASHAV training - both in Israel and Georgia – in a wide spectrum of disciplines (agriculture, innovation & technology, education, entrepreneurship, healthcare, women’s empowerment etc.).

The handover ceremony was attended by the Ambassador of Israel to Georgia, Ran Gidor, Deputy Minister of Environment Protection and Agriculture, Solomon Pavliashvili, and Deputy Chair of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Committee Khatia Tsilosani.

Next year, both countries will celebrate 30 years of bilateral diplomatic relations, and it is hoped that this agricultural demonstration hub will develop into one of its most outstanding landmarks.

Black Sea Security and Georgian Coastal Defense

A Lekiu-class frigate fi ring an Exocet MM40 during operational exercise Taming Sari. These anti-ship missiles are specially designed to hit and sink enemy vessels. Royal Malaysian Navy photo

BY MICHAEL GODWIN

Much of the legacy of naval warfare is fi lled with the imagery of large, tall, wooden ships dueling with incredible volleys of ship-mounted cannon and musket fi re, concluding with boarding and a clash of sword and spirit. These close range engagements are what made the legends of some of the world’s greatest naval leaders. John Paul Jones, Horatio Nelson, Chester Nimitz, and Karl Dönitz, to name a few, were undoubtable masters of the sea. Now, with new antiship missile (ASM) technology, the shipon-ship combat seen during the times of these aforementioned heroes is something relegated to the past.

Much of Georgian modern naval supremacy in the Black Sea has been consigned to that of a dream. After the elimination of the Georgian Navy in the 2008 August War, the remaining vessels were reformed into a coastal patrol force. The Russian invasion in Crimea and a build-up of their Black Sea Fleet has only been lightly checked by NATO naval patrols coming through to conduct exercises with Turkey and Georgia. Despite this assistance, it is glaringly imperative that Georgia take its naval defense and security seriously.

The Georgian Coast Guard, a branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Border Police department, is charged with the defense of the nation's shores. Sadly, this organization has the inglorious business of fending off any potential incursion. With their inadequate fi repower and vessel numbers, this will most certainly be an effort in vain.

After decades of NATO and Georgian involvement in the Global War on Terrorism, much has been invested in ground combat. Fighting the enemy and their proxy forces in small villages and towns, destroying hostile armor, and scrambling electronic systems during the assault. The strength and will of the Georgian ground defense forces and accompanying popular militia may even halt or at least stall an overland invasion of the country.

However, in the near-future event of further Russian aggression or any other act of naval aggression, it is doubtful that the Coast Guard would be able to resist the onslaught of their Black Sea Fleet. The primary port of Sevastopol contains the core of their attack vessels, and, as of early 2021, this extensive force is compiled, though not exclusively, of: • 1 guided missile cruiser (Moskva) • 5 guided missile frigates (Admiral Grigorovich, Admiral Essen, Admiral Makarov, Pytlivy, Ladny) • 11 missile corvettes (Grayvoron, Ingushetia, Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Vyshny Volochyok, Bora, Samum, R-60 Burya, R-109 Briz, R-334 Ivanovets, R-239 Naberezhnye Chelny, and the R-71 Shuya) • 3 anti-submarine corvettes (Muromets, Suzdalets, Aleksandrovets) • 1 diesel submarine (Alrosa, though she is slated to be transferred to the Russian Baltic Fleet) • 6 minesweepers (Ivan Antonov, Vladimir Yemelyanov, Ivan Golubets, Vice Admiral Zhukov, Turbinist, Kovrovet) • 6 intelligence collection ships (Ivan Khurs, Priazovye, Donuzlav, Stvor, Ekvator, Kildin) • 3 amphibious transport docks (Nikolay Filchenkov, Saratov, Orsk) • 4 naval landing ships (Novocherkassk, Azov, Caesar Kunikov, Yamal) • 4 military cargo ships (Dvinitsa-50, Vologda-50, Kyzyl-60, Kazan-60)

This represents only the forces assigned to Sevastopol, and does not include the additional naval forces assigned to the regional port bases of Feodosia and Temryuk. The Novorossiysk naval base also provides another litany of naval assault and support forces, making the threat all too real for Georgian coastal defense units. To further complicate matters, the garrison of Russian S-400 missile batteries outside of the Crimean regional capitol city makes the Black Sea all that more of a potential fl ashpoint.

All of these combined factors highlight the pressing need for a coastal defense solution that is effective for both the military tasked with national defense and for the Georgian taxpayer. While the dreams of a new Georgian Navy may lie on the distant horizon in restored and updated American and European warships, the near-future solution lies in land-based defense. Coastal artillery batteries and anti-ship ordinance make quite the case in this realm.

Traditional coastal artillery in the form of large-bore guns housed in immense concrete bunkers are mostly relegated to the past. Modern penetrating munitions delivered by both naval and air platforms have overcome this once stalwart defense by rendering the reinforced concrete positions obsolete as well as prohibitively expensive. Georgia, looking at some of the naval tensions in the Pacifi c and Indian Oceans, can gain some valuable insight as well as technologies.

Several of the leading ASM systems used by NATO present themselves as ready and viable candidates for a new coastal artillery unit of the Georgian military. While there is a litany of solutions for land-based ASM systems, two of the most fi tting for application in western Georgia are the RGM-84 Harpoon ASM and the EXOCET MM40 Block 3 Coastal Defense System. These systems, both in use with Georgia’s allied navies, offer a signifi cant strategic littoral deterrent.

The Harpoon missile, named for its historical whale-hunting weapon system, is an older generation in the family tree of ASM platforms. Developed and later deployed during the 1970s, it became the fl eet-wide ASM for both ship-mounted, aircraft-mounted, and land-based platforms. With more modern upgraded versions reaching out to almost 150 nautical miles (172.6 land miles), this platform has been in almost constant use around the world.

The EXOCET missile, manufactured by European defense fi rm MBDA missile systems, has made waves in the ASM fi eld. With a signifi cant operational history, particularly during the Falklands War against the British Royal Navy, these once had a home in the former Georgian Navy. The current version being used across the globe by over 30 navies and air forces has a maximum range of average 110 nautical miles (126.6 land miles).

These ASMs are “over the horizon” capable, meaning that these munitions are able to be delivered to long-range targets that would otherwise be unable to be engaged by traditional artillery or shoulder-fired weapons. This long engagement distance is coupled with their “sea skimming” fl ight technique. This technique involves the ASM fl ying between 2 to 50 meters above the surface of the water, evading the radar and defense systems of the target vessel. When approaching a target vessel at this low altitude, the target ship is often only given under one minute to respond to the threat once detected.

Both of these ASM systems are fully available for coastal batteries, and capable of being organized into the Georgian defense force framework. This implementation is a relatively simple undertaking given the typical complexity associated with the raising of new military units. In addition, the Georgian coast lends itself to a natural defense.

The curvature of the coastline and the strategic location of key cities makes the placement of coastal artillery ASM batteries easy. Each battery would be responsible for a particular sector of the Georgian littoral region. Batumi, Kobuleti, Poti, and Anaklia posts make the eastern Black Sea a “kill zone”, to use the tactical term, of overlapping fi elds of control.

At the battery level, each unit comprises four major components; The radar/sensor unit, the control unit, and 2 missile fi ring units. The radar/sensor unit is tasked with target acquisition and surveillance of the target area. The Control Unit is the overall command element for the combined unit, making fi ring commands, and managing and supervising the combined unit. The 2 missile fi ring units are the ASM components of the combined unit, responsible for upkeep and launching the ASMs. Each missile company has its own organic maintenance detachment for routine repairs and fi eld troubleshooting.

Each combined unit is a vehiclemounted and highly mobile coastal defense asset. Elements maintain 8 loaded and staged ASMs with resupply being handled at the battalion level to ensure ASMs are ready to be reinstalled. Together, these coastal ASM batteries ensure that any circumvention of the overland invasion route by way of the Black Sea would be a fatal decision.

Each battery at the aforementioned locations would be under the leadership of a captain or major, the NATO equivalent of an O-3 or O-4, while the ASM battalion would fall under the equivalent of an O-5, or Lieutenant Colonel. This headquarters would be stationed alongside the coast or as far inland as Kutaisi. These command and control elements would be integrated into the force-wide Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) digital framework. The data gathered from the radar/sensor units would allow command staff to anticipate any littoral threat and react with deliberate prevention and area denial tactics.

A project of this magnitude will surely fi nd its detractors. The breadth, complexity, training and maintenance considerations, and the inevitable cost, will all require deep examination by the nation’s leaders and military experts. Contrarily, the opportunity to partner with European and American defense fi rms further links Georgia with NATO and Western spheres, a positive for all facets of Georgian statehood. All of these will need to be weighed with consideration of the security of the nation, the budget of the total defense framework, and the combined mission that stands against continued aggression and subversion by the Kremlin.

The Choice is Made – Now What?

OP-ED BY NUGZAR B. RUHADZE

Done! Time to have an incisive look at how promising this electoral outcome might be. That the nation is split and totally polarized is not in doubt, and any discussion on the topic has been rendered totally irrelevant. Having prioritized the most salient national issues, the hottest among them seems to be what particular good ensues after the ruling party has won another election, I think the eighth in the row. Another subject of our national headache is how not to let the extant fl agrant animosity between the ruling and oppositional sides ruin the country. And the third problem stuck up our national nose is whether the remainingin-power political force can manage to carry on building the ailing economy so well that we pay off our debts, and don’t borrow more, and let every breadwinner of this nation bring the bacon home without too much sweat and that proverbial pain in the neck.

The opposition is, of course, not prepared to recognize the results of the October 30 municipal elections- such is their nature and their perpetual political tendency! They declared the elections null and void, while the ruling party elatedly celebrated a landslide victory. Who might be the judges in this kind of a public controversy? I call it public because each side has its considerable chunk of the country’s electorate. The opposition has strengthened itself by uniting forces, and although the individual parties, comprising the amalgamated oppositional force, hate each other vehemently, they still want to be together because otherwise they will never see anything even close to victory.

Georgia needs judges to voice the fi nal electoral verdict. The pleasure and honor in that task belong to our valuable international observers, their excellences the ambassadors, accredited in Tbilisi, and to our appreciated western friends who are in the swim of our electoral matters. I have a little observation to make here: none of these professionals should beat around the diplomatic bush as they so often do. Diplomacy has nothing to do with the overstrained situation in this country. They have to make the clearest and the loudest comments on whether the election was fair, free, and transparent or not, and they must do this in such a stentorian voice that the entire world hears it. Auxiliary words like ‘but, though, and still’ make no sense in this particular case of electoral evaluations. The words of the observers must be straight and cutting; their attitude decidedly unhesitant; and their verdict should be fi nal and not subject to further discourse. Anything short of this will ruin Georgia, and the observers’ shoulders will be the only place to put the blame for that ruin. Only having made and heard that judgment will we Georgians be able to embark on a detailed deliberation of the issues mentioned at the beginning of this nervous piece. Otherwise, we will forever be plunged into public chaos, political delirium and economic debilitation. Who needs that? None of the parties – be it the current government, its opposition, or our friends in the West, or in the East either, for that matter.

Georgia cannot and should not waste any more time. We have been wasting it for thirty something post-soviet years. It is very easy to blame the revolutions, irrational changes, governments and various individuals for destroying the future of Georgia, but such incriminations have yet to yield anything good for the nation. We simply don’t let the elected governments rule; never giviving them a respite to think and actually work. My reasonable fear is that, even with our long and bitter experience, we are not ready to give each other a chance. It is so funny that the opposition wants to persuade people that their coming to power would be a panacea that would put Georgia on the right track of development. I can assure both the tellers of the story and the listeners that all of us are made of the same national clay and soul. Our only chance is to fi nally grant a mandate and an opportunity to the elected government.

Dear Observers, please give us that chance. Just say frankly, forthwith, openly, and at full volume – what kind of an election was that?

Opera Soloist Giorgi Todua On a Dream of Returning to His Home in Abkhazia

Continued from page 3

DESPITE A PROMISE FOR YOUR 2018 CONCERT NOT TO GET POLITICAL, DID YOU EXPECT TO HAVE TO TAKE A STAND IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON THE ISSUE RAISED? DID YOU EXPECT TO HAVE THE REACTION THAT FOLLOWED?

When the concert was planned, I decided from the very beginning that I would avoid talking to journalists as much as possible, but, unfortunately, or fortunately, there are moments when specifi c questions are asked which need to be answered.

YOU SAY "UNFORTUNATELY OR FORTUNATELY". IF YOU COULD GO BACK TO THAT INTERVIEW, WOULD YOU CHANGE THE POSITION YOU TOOK?

I have taken this position all my life, and I voice it whenever I have the opportunity to, or when there is a need to do so. Do I regret that interview? There are certain moments I regret in life and others I never regret. But there are specifi c questions that require specifi c answers. You can try to avoid some questions, but when you are asked what you think about a situation, in my opinion, you should answer from the heart.

AFTER THE CONCERT, YOUR UNCLE APOLOGIZED FOR YOUR POSITION. DID YOU HEAR A LOT OF HARSH FEEDBACK ABOUT IT AFTER RETURNING TO RUSSIA?

Of course. I expected it. I read some comments, then got some calls, even from Abkhazia, but I had to adapt to it. There’ll always be people who like your opinion, others who won’t. In my opinion, given the circumstances, this is completely normal. After a while it calmed down, but there were times after when they called me, asked me questions, wrote to me referring to that interview. Even in Russia, I have met many people who supported me in my statement, but there are also people who thought I shouldn’t have done it. I think everyone has a right to their own opinion, and I made my own decision in the moment.

YOU HAVE SAID THAT ARGUING OVER ABKHAZIA, OVER WHOSE IT IS, PREVENTS RELATIONS FROM EVER BEING FIXED. WHAT SHOULD THE MAIN APPROACH BE FOR TALKS TO BE EFFICIENT? WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THIS?

There should always be arguments, but they should be focused. The debate over who owns the land, the territory itself, and the fact that we are constantly shouting about it and saying, "ours" or "yours", can be talked about endlessly. The moment we declare that land is ours, we forget the main factor – the people, both Georgians and Abkhazians, and those who live in Abkhazia today. In my opinion, we need to establish more communication with these people in order to share views, no matter how bad those views may sound for us or for them.

YEARS HAVE PASSED AND NO TANGIBLE STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION HAVE BEEN SEEN. YEARS OF SUCH INACTION ONLY SEPARATE US FURTHER.

If there is inaction, of course, that will separate us. I have been in touch with young Abkhazians and I know the situation in which they have to study, what they are being taught; that they are considered enemies. And this is not surprising, because an unthinkable tragedy has taken place in the country - brothers shot each other, we killed one another, of course, with the intervention of external forces. However, a certain period of time must pass for this to be properly analyzed, for which a relationship is necessary again with the people who live there today. If this relationship does not exist, of course, the existing problem and issue will not be resolved. PERFORMANCES IN RUSSIA ARE OFTEN CONSIDERED TRAITORS TO GEORGIA. IN ONE INTERVIEW, YOU MENTIONED YOU SEE THIS AS RADICALISM. WHAT APPROACH SHOULD GEORGIANS TAKE TO THOSE ARTISTS LIKE YOU WHO PERFORM IN RUSSIA SO AS TO NEITHER FORGET THE OCCUPATION NOR FALL TO RADICALISM?

When an artist performs outside of Georgia, in this case in Russia, how can it be forgotten that part of our territory is occupied? I think more actors, singers, public fi gures, whoever they may be, should come and show their position [in Russia]. It will have more of an impact than staying at home and saying, "I will not leave," "I will not go there," "I will do nothing- I will be at home and shout from here at the top of my lungs that my territories are occupied". When you work and do something for the good of your country, and at the same time you are called an enemy, it is ridiculous, if not a tragedy.

YOU HAVE SAID YOU ARE ALWAYS INTERESTED TO SEE ABKHAZIAN NUMBERPLATES ON CARS IN ST. PETERSBURG, AND THAT YOU TRY TO GET TO KNOW THE OWNERS. WHAT ATTITUDES DO THEY TEND TO HAVE TOWARDS GEORGIANS?

About 4-5 years ago, I was sitting in a Georgian restaurant with my friends. We stayed until late and three young people came in. They sat down a little away from our table, began eating, and were enjoying themselves like us. Then we started singing the Megrelian "Asho Chela". They joined us, and turned out to be Abkhazians. We got to know each other. I won’t say that we had constant contact after that, but we got in touch from time to time. We didn’t talk about the diffi cult political situation between us. We were adults and saw it that we were relatives, brothers and sisters. Anyone who understands this will look at this problem a little differently. Too many Abkhazian friends who have relatives left in other parts of Georgia cannot visit each other for some reason, and the same goes for Georgians, as well.

When communicating with each other, willingly or unwillingly, you also touch on the confl ict. But this is such a delicate topic that you have to approach it so that the relationship that began when you met the person is not damaged right away. In order to make people understand your point of view, you must fi rst get to know to each other. If we go straight to aggression and start arguing about whose Abkhazia is and "why you are there and we are not", then the dialogue will simply not develop. Where there is no dialogue and no relationship, no truth can be found.

TELL US WHAT YOU REMEMBER ABOUT LIVING IN GALI.

When the war started, I was three-anda-half years old. I remember our beautiful yard, the orchard. My grandparents were alive then, and I remember how they cared for us, how we grew up in a warm environment. I remember our relationship with the neighbors. I remember going to kindergarten for the fi rst time. I remember everything well. Years passed and I visited Abkhazia again at the age of 14-15, and saw a completely different picture of what was happening there.

YOU HAVE THREE CHILDREN. HOW WOULD YOU LIKE THE FUTURE TO BE FOR THEM?

They are still young. My eldest son Mate is 4, Ramaz is 3 and Meriko is a year and a half. This year we managed to come to Georgia for about 20 days. I always try to raise them with the Georgian spirit, to teach them how to respect their relatives and elders, to learn about the world in detail. Then, when they grow up, of course, I will talk [about Abkhazia] and try to explain everything. Their mother is Russian, Siberian, but she is very interested in Georgian culture. She studied Georgian reading and writing and is also very interested in us, as a Georgian family, returning to our homeland and moving to Georgia. In my opinion, the biggest step for my children in being Georgian will be for them to study and live there.

DO YOU PLAN TO COME BACK TO GEORGIA IN THE FUTURE? HAVE YOU HAD AN OFFER TO PERFORM HERE SINCE COMPLETING YOUR EDUCATION HERE?

When I fi nished musical school in Russia, I came to Tbilisi in 2005 and met Nodar Andghuladze. It was a real pleasure for me. I was in Tbilisi for exactly eight years, and I realized that the city of my dreams, my country, where I should live and study, and then continue my work, was Georgia. I didn’t want to go anywhere else. Unfortunately, as soon as I got my Master's Degree, I had to go back to Russia. Ever since, I have been thinking every day how to get back to my homeland.

It would be very easy to take my whole family and come to Georgia, but due to the social situation, there are no conditions for me to live there just yet. I’m not a person who looks for luxury, in fact, I avoid it, and I really want to live in Georgia, but so far it just hasn’t worked out. I don’t see any support from the Georgian side, and, to tell you the truth, I don’t ask for it - I consider myself an independent person and I always try to do everything by myself. But unfortunately, my return does not seem to be a realistic possibility just yet.