POLITICS

Are We Underdeveloped, Developed or Developing?

OP-ED BY NUGZAR B. RUHADZE

Americans, Europeans, Russians - they all love Georgia, because it is lovable. Simple, isn’t it? I have noted before that our friendly observant guests might fi nd here something they can’t hit upon in their own lands, but it is not the domestic comfort, public orderliness, standard of living or the overall sophistication that attracts their valuable attention. It is just the Georgian nature of human relationship and a homegrown manner of interpersonal communication. It is fascinating that one extreme of our local life seems to be exceptionally developed and the other only developing. There are some third things that seem to be extraordinarily underdeveloped here, therefore bothersome. What a wonderful set of attractions for a tourist to come and have a look at, and then squeeze a magazine feature out of!

If by any chance the visitors fi nd themselves, for instance, at one of the shipment companies in Tbilisi, called ‘Parcels from America’, they will know that they are in a developed country with postal capabilities and etiquette of the 21st century and beyond. If they go ahead and put on the camera what they have seen in the street-vending world of our capital, they will certainly feel that they have found themselves in a developing country. And if they experience what I personally went through a couple of days ago on my way home from the southwest, they will defi nitely be aware that they were visiting in an underdeveloped part of the world.

I’ve got to tell this story for others to hear to catch a chance to fi nally understand what category of countries Georgia would fall into provided the evaluation was imminent. Imagine a gentleman, quite advanced in years but still enjoying his life to the happiest possible extent, driving a beautiful convertible two-seater at a leisurely speed in wonderful company of a friend, and all of a sudden a huge pothole appears right in front of his nose, impossible to avoid. The vehicle’s right-side front wheel plunges into that unexpected but diabolically gaping sharp-edged hole in the road, the tire bursts and goes fl at. The towing service is then called. The car was damaged, time was lost, the tire was changed, money was wasted, nerves were wrecked, the business that had to be attended to failed, and, most importantly, there was nobody around to blame.

When an accident happens, there must always be some heads around to roll, because there can’t be an accident without a reason to cause it, instigated by a human being. All that we see and witness around is manmade, except what we still call nature. In our case, the national agency whose responsibility is to keep the roads in driving order will not be indicted because they won’t even understand what the fuss is about, and if you still take them to court and win the case, the compensation will be a hundred times less than the actual loss suffered by the owner of the car and caused by the road-service crew. The insurance company will brashly comment that the driver should have opened his eyes wider. The circle is so vicious that you don’t even want to touch it. Isn’t this heartbreaking?

The story above describes an underdeveloped country where roads are dangerous to drive on, and yet in which the sophistication at the human interaction level happens to be at its acme: the passing-by cars would stop and their drivers and passengers would offer their help, trying to tinker with the unfortunate fl at tire with their own tools; some of the perchance driving-through strapping young men would suggest fi xing the tire and bringing it back; somebody would descend with optimistic comments and soothing encouragement. The world would seem angelic, threatened only by the underserviced roads and the people who think you are ill if you try to sue.

So, what kind of a country are we in?

Some Karabakh-Related Aspects of Georgia’s Regional Positioning. Part 1

ANALYSIS BY VICTOR KIPIANI, GEOCASE CHAIRMAN

Afairly broad range of views were stated on implications of the recent Nagorno Karabakh war and its impact on the South Caucasus regional landscape. Our aim is to again address some consequences from Tbilisi’s standpoint by sharing some personal thoughts with respect to various aspects of the post-Karabakj conundrum, including those in relation to transport infrastructure, prospects for a tri-partite format for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as touching on interaction of the regional powers when it comes to certain regional dynamics.

THE AXIS OF THE ISSUE

Georgia’s main political vectors in the South Caucasus are cooperation for peace and stability as well as maintaining good neighborly relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, an approach that became even more prominent during the so-called "Second Karabakh War".

More precisely, we refer to the statement that Georgia’s National Security Council made on the 3rd of October 2020, in which the Georgian side convincingly underlined the need to immediately bring to an end the “hot” phase of the confl ict.

The Georgian government took specifi c measures: it stopped granting permission for military goods to transit through Georgian territory towards Azerbaijan and Armenia, and it offered Tbilisi as a neutral location for negotiations between the two.

From this, we can distinguish two principal issues: 1. Georgia not only demonstrated its attitude towards the confl ict, but also expressed the country’s readiness to participate in the process of normalizing the situation in the region. 2. In this statement, Georgia’s government distinctly explained the importance to the its two largest ethnic minorities of maintaining stability and order.

The National Security Council's statement and Georgia’s policy towards confl icts in general could be summed up as: Tbilisi acted according to the conditions defi ned by the current reality in the region and used the maximum of its abilities due to this reality.

When talking about a possible Georgian component in efforts to normalize the Karabakh confl ict, it is noteworthy that in different mass media, the question of the quality of Tbilisi’s coordination with Western partners has been considered more than once. On this topic, we would like to mention that any similar kind of coordination or communication undertaken by Georgia could only be defi ned by the reality of the current situation in the region and by Georgia’s possibilities.

However, when discussing this specifi c topic, it is important to clearly realize that Georgia’s coordination with the West over issues linked to the South Caucasus should not depend solely upon the dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict.

It is important to remember that the partnership between Georgia and the West originally began as early as the late 1990s, when large transport projects (such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus gas pipelines) were initiated.

Besides this aspect, another relevant issue for further discussion is the objective evaluation of how strong Western interests and infl uence are in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, when we talk about Tbilisi’s efforts to strengthen these interests, we should deliberately underline the fact that the efforts of our Western partners are just as (if not even more) vitally important for any kind of cooperation or coordination in the South Caucasus.

Image source: Jam.News THE TRANSPORT COMPONENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

The 10th of November 2020 agreement over Nagorno-Karabakh and subsequent documents call for new transport corridors on the territory of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Without going into too much detail regarding these projects, in this article we shall discuss whether or not these projects pose any kind of risk to Georgia’s potential for transport and transit.

There have been some pessimistic evaluations, but we believe that this pessimism is to some extent exaggerated when it comes to the potential weakening of Georgian corridors. More precisely, we would argue that:

I. The decision to go ahead with a large transport project cannot be merely the subject of geopolitical discussions at a level of “I want this and I don’t want that”. It is also important to remember any project or initiative must be carried out according to a specifi c investment model. In other words, if a project is not based upon clear and self-suffi cient fi nancial resources, it will be impossible to carry out and might turn into a dubious deal. Without a readiness to provide fi nancial support, managing projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline or the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line solely according to geopolitical calculations would not have been suffi cient.

II. One must also mention the need for trust in the stability of the future operation of these corridors or projects. As a rule, it takes several years to generate such trust, and through a series of complicated processes, the project acquires its characteristic geopolitical and geoeconomic image. Nowadays, one could easily say that the so-called “Georgian transport corridors" have already obtained the signatures they need.

III. Yet certain paragraphs of the agreement on the creation of new transport corridors with the participation of Azerbaijan and Armenia are quite ambiguous and unclear. For example, no interpretation of these paragraphs gives a clear feeling that the implementation of a specifi c transport project is once and for all predefi ned by the signatory parties of the agreement. Guaranteeing the safety of these transport links is equally important, as is the extent to which the Russian Federation can play the role of impartial guarantor.

IV. We will pay attention to certain aspects: transport corridors going through Georgia, through active maritime ports, ensuring the passage of goods to the Black Sea region. An intermodal system such as this, in terms of investments, is no less important since it has a direct impact on the economic component of freight transportation.

V. Finally, one must also mention the two most important elements of the attractiveness of transit corridors passing through Georgia. The fi rst of these is Georgia’s political system itself, which although far from ideal, possesses indisputable advantages in terms of doing business thanks to the transparency, simplicity and legibility of Georgian legislation. In addition to this, what should also be taken into consideration in the big picture is the high level of Georgia’s integration with Western markets compared to its South Caucasian neighbors. And it could even be asserted that such a steady political and economic integration with Western partners is an important question not only for Georgia but would also be in the interests of Baku and Yerevan.

The National Security Implications of Political Turbulence

Photo by Mike Godwin

OP-ED BY MICHAEL GODWIN

Few are unaware of the recent political division taking place, with the epicenter in the capital of Tbilisi. Some have sided with traditionalism and preservation of Georgia’s old ways, the purity of the Orthodox Church, and exclusion of those that wish to disturb that equilibrium. Others have pushed for social change, a movement towards a refi ned European image, and more progressive views on alternative lifestyles. Regardless of the social confl ict happening on the ground, there are more severe penalties if this cultural warfare, as well as the political reactions, continue.

Georgia has many of the common statelevel domestic concerns; education, infrastructure, workers’ rights, among others. However, these are not much different from any Western nations. What makes the internal situation here different is the socio-cultural split that has deepened in the past months, and some would argue even years. Georgia has always been stuck between the Eastern and Western worlds, but it is coming to a head right before the peoples’ eyes.

As a result of this, many outside observers have begun to take a more involved role in commenting and even reacting to the shift. Georgia’s enemies are included in this. Quietly, these enemies are making notes and planning on contingency schemes should the outcome lie in their diplomatic and political favor. The natural culprit in this is the Kremlin.

As has been stated before, Putin's eye on the Black Sea and the South Caucasus have never truly wandered. Instability, even war, in the region has wetted his palate for conquest. This resulted in the eager deployment of “peacekeepers” into the Karabakh region, bolstering of the 102nd Military base and the 988th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in the Armenian city of Gyumri, and the air elements at Erebuni Air Base outside Yerevan. It should be noted that his base houses multiple MiG-29 fi ghters, soon to be replaced with the new Su-30SM, and Mi-24 attack helicopters. It is also a base for Russia’s regional Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program.

The instability in Georgia is slated to cause the Kremlin to focus even further on the politics in Tbilisi. With this division, it’s only natural that Putin will exploit this and drive the wedge further between the two polar entities. Doing this is not particularly diffi cult, as Russia is able to easily incite one side against the other and view them as a threat to the state. Europe is sadly an easy target, as they have had their own internal European Union problems on which to draw.

In times past, it was through blatant street-level propaganda, having to be implemented by planted individuals on the ground in the target area. Connections made, deals conducted, and money exchanged. Now with social media platforms, the ripe exploitation of those willing to drink the digital “kool-aid” of anti-Western ideology is all too easy. As more people begin to resent the move toward specifi c European values, such as acceptance, tolerance, and progressivism, they present themselves as targets of opportunity for the Russian information strategy.

Unity is an easy word to throw out in favor of bringing the nation together to combat a national enemy. However, it’s become apparent that many are not willing to see that enemy as the primary threat. In a move that seems to ignore the transgressions of the Kremlin in their own homeland, they have looked to them as something of a potential brother in the fi ght against what is largely a trivial social issue.

The lure of Russian information tactics online (or rather disinformation) is admittedly a tempting one. With Putin’s bait of reinforced cultural hyper-traditionalism, religious practice and values security, and the expungement of the perceived perversion of certain Western institutions, it’s a magnet for those seeking a return to the proverbial “good ole’ days.” Sadly, the displaced and disparaged citizens in Eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia would plead for those people to reconsider. That is, if they were allowed to speak freely.

Something the Kremin is most assuredly displeased with is the inability to infl uence much of the press in Georgia. Just as a small child may destroy a toy, the philosophy of “if I can’t have it, neither can you” seems apparent. Subtle tactics aimed at removing the press’s credibility and reducing their reach and effectiveness have already taken place. From the nation’s own Prime Minister verbally attacking journalists, to a sitting minister aggressively stealing a microphone (a prosecutable criminal act under normal circumstances) from a reporter, the infl uences from abroad are clear.

Diplomats’ written and published condemnation letters have fallen on deaf ears, and largely have little effect, if any. Even statements from the United States Embassy in Tbilisi are mostly brushed off as a formality and go unheeded. The press, however, has been attempting to garner public support and raise awareness of these socio-political issues. The inability to seize this control is enraging to the politicians that seemingly, willing or unwilling, kneel to foreign (Russian) control.

Putin is not one to allow such alleged insubordination to go unchecked. His indirect and shadowy support of these initiatives to curb the press slowly erodes the ability of these free speech outlets to bolster the democratic institutions that still remain. With recent allegations of wiretapping and illegal monitoring of political opponents and media fi gures, It’s even more important now for free institutions and diplomats to step in as support.

This malfeasance by public offi cials weaponizing national security organizations, if confi rmed to be true, will draw harsh criticism and negative consequences from Georgia’s allies. The United States has already stated that imposing sanctions are on the table and European Union offi cials have come out aggressively against recent actions of Parliament members.

However, it’s not too late for the nation. Georgia has so much promise and has displayed an ability to encourage stability and freedom for its people. As a few members of the government body continue to revert to Soviet-era behavior, it is tear-jerking to see the recidivism. Coalitions of people, the media, and Georgia’s allies must come to the assistance of a faltering but faithful friend. Georgia still deserves a chance, and still deserves a seat at the European Union and NATO table. Spoiling the proverbial side dish doesn't spoil the whole entree.

If you do not stop this destruction, not only me but the entire government team will stop communicating with you. You are simple abusers, - Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili speaking to journalists

Image by Steve Breen/San Diego Union-Tribune

MEP Viola Von Cramon: EU Should Reconsider its Relations with Georgian Gov’t

BY ANA DUMBADZE

MEP Viola von Cramon says she believes the EU should reconsider its relationship with the Georgian government following the breach of the Charles Michel agreement.

At a press conference in Tbilisi on July 30, the MEP said that the April 19 agreement “was and is the basis for the European Parliament to support democracy in the Georgian Parliament.”

“This is not the fi rst case when the Georgian Dream breaks its promise. Breaking the agreement breaks trust and makes the Georgian Dream a force you cannot trust, which is not credible.

“I’m afraid that following the decision of the Georgian Dream to annul the April 19 agreement, Georgia is further away from the European Union than it was three months ago,” she concluded.

The MEP noted that the decision of the Georgian Dream is benefi cial only for the Kremlin.

“The decision of the Georgian Dream is benefi cial only for the Kremlin. It is clear that once trust is broken, we will not be able to get back to normal. Therefore, in my opinion, the EU will need to reconsider its relations with the Georgian government. It is true that the unconstructive actions of the United National Movement and its refusal to sign the agreement gave the Georgian Dream a rather favorable subtext. The people of Georgia deserve politicians who put the interests of the country above everything else. That is why I never supported the boycott and called on all opposition political parties to be faithful to the agreement that was signed and the commitment that was made.

“We need to properly evaluate the opposition parties that have entered parliament. It is the job of the opposition to control the government and not stay out of parliament. In this context, the upcoming local elections have become much more important. The European Union stands by the people of Georgia in their struggle to build a just and democratic state. Therefore, it is very important that all citizens of Georgia exercise their constitutional right to vote in local self-government elections. The EU will do its best to ensure that our observers contribute to the transparent elections,” said Viola von Cramon.

On July 28, the ruling party Georgian Dream offi cially left the April 19 Agreement mediated by Charles Michel.

MEP Viola von Cramon arrived in Tbilisi on the evening of July 28 in response to the decision of the Georgian Dream party to annul the EU Council President’s agreement.

Dugin & Eurasianism - What We Need to Know

ANALYSIS BY DAVID BRAGVADZE, GEORGIAN INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY

Eurasianism is a political movement whose followers believe that Russia belongs to neither European nor Asian civilization, and it is an expression of the geopolitical concept of Eurasia. Russia is actively using Eurasian ideas in the foreign policy arena, especially in its relations with neighboring countries, as it calls itself, the "Near Abroad."

We have heard a lot about Eurasianism. Almost everyone will have heard of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Alexander Dugin and others.

And yet, there are many misconceptions, for example, that Eurasianism is a doctrine borne of Putin’s Russia; that Eurasianism, as the original idea, belongs to Alexander Dugin; that Dugin, as the author of the teachings of Eurasianism, is the main ideologist of the Kremlin, and so on.

To that end, it will be interesting to look at the history of the origins of this political movement, to understand its real content and impact on the present.

THE ORIGINS OF EURASIANISM

Eurasianism, as a political movement, fl ourished in the 1920s, with the Tsarist emigration fl eeing Russia (then Soviet Union) as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Civil War. Among the leaders of the movement were: the famous linguist and historian Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi, philosopher Piotr Savitsky, musician Piotr Suvchinsky, translator and literary scholar Dmitry Sviatopolsk-Mirsky, and lawyer Konstantin Tsugayev.

Eurasianists saw the October Revolution as a logical response to Russian society's attempt at rapid modernization. The opinion was that Russia was not part of European culture, therefore, its Westernization met with natural resistance, which led the country to the end of the Tsarist regime.

Unlike the rest of the White Emigration, the Eurasianists considered the Soviet regime a necessary stage of development and believed that it could transform it into a national, non-European Orthodox state.

Despite their loyalty to the Soviet regime, the Bolsheviks did not intend to tolerate the Eurasianists for long, and did everything they could to discredit them. Thanks to Soviet security efforts, the leaders of the Eurasian movement were successfully discredited; by the beginning of the years, the Eurasian movement had ceased to exist.

NEO-EURASIANISM

Eurasianism returned to Russia in the late 1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable, academic circles began to muse about Russia's new mission. It was at this time that NeoEurasianism was conceived.

According to popular belief, the author of the doctrine of Neo-Eurasianism is the famous Soviet historian, ethnologist and anthropologist Lev Gumilyov. Gumilyov often said he was "the last Eurasianist." His Neo-Eurasianist vision was based on his rather controversial scientifi c theory, according to which the Russian ethnos retained its original appearance during the Mongol occupation (1240-1480) and protected itself from the aggressive infl uence of the West. Gumilyov argued that Russia was more of an Asian civilization than a European one. His view of Western culture and civilization was much more antagonistic than that of Trubetsky and his contemporaries.

Lev Gumilyov's theories have had some infl uence on other Eurasianist authors, the most famous of whom is Alexander Dugin.

ALEXANDER DUGIN

There are many misconceptions about Alexander Dugin in our society. Georgian media often refers to him as "the main ideologist of the Kremlin." The idea is that it is his ideas that determine the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy, which is far removed from the truth. In fact, Dugin's infl uence has always been very limited, both in political and academic circles.

It should be noted that Dugin deservedly enjoys the dubious fame of embroidering Neo-Eurasianism with the most aggressive rhetoric in its history. The Duginian version of Neo-Eurasianism has been hailed by scholars as "a form of fascist ideology in which Russia must create a totalitarian, Moscow-dominated Eurasian empire that will lead to war and ultimately defeat its eternal enemy, the United States and its allies, which will usher in the Golden Age of Global Cultural and Political Anti-Liberalism." Other scholars believe that Dugin's NeoEurasianism has nothing to do with Eurasianism at all.

Alexander Dugin is a philosopher who is constantly looking for a place under the sun. In the 1980s, he was a dissident and anti-communist. In 1988, he joined the Neo-Nazi organization Pamyat (Память). The Pamyat leaders considered the organization to be a "People's National-Patriotic Orthodox Christian Movement." This organization played an important role in spreading Neo-Nazi ideas in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Afterwards, Dugin emerged as one of the authors of the political program of the newly formed Communist Party of the Russian Federation (whose undisputed leader is Gennady Zyuganov).

In 1993, he founded the National-Bolshevik Party, which he led until 1998. The emblem of the party was the fl ag of the Third Reich, except that instead of a swastika in its center, a hammer and sickle were depicted. Infl uenced by the ideas of this party, in 2006, another political force was established in Russia - the National-Bolshevik Front. In 2001, Dugin founded the Pan-Russian Eurasian Movement, and a year later, another party called the Eurasian Party. However, the political parties founded by Dugin have never achieved even a modicum of success.

Although Dugin's infl uence has never been particularly signifi cant, there are still moments of glory in his biography. He was an adviser to the speaker of the State Duma, Gennady Seleznyov. He also consulted with Sergei Naryshkin, who at various times was the head of the Russian presidential administration and the speaker of the State Duma, and currently heads the foreign intelligence service. However, at the time Dugin was working as his adviser, Naryshkin was a Duma deputy.

Dugin is the author of over thirty books and dozens of articles, but two of his most popular works are: The Fundamentals of Geopolitics - Russia's Geopolitical Future, published in 1997, and The Fourth Political Theory, published in 2009.

Dugin came into the spotlight right after the publication of "Fundamentals of Geopolitics". The book soon became a textbook for the Military Academy of the Russian General Staff. Dugin was assisted in writing the book by ColonelGeneral Leonid Ivashov. According to Gennady Seleznyov, the then speaker of the Duma, "the Dugin doctrine should have become an integral part of the school curriculum."

What does The Fundamentals of Geopolitics preach? It shows the way for Russia to become the hegemon of the Eurasian space and regain the "old glory". The main opponents on this path are the United States and its allies. Russia must destabilize US domestic politics, undermine the foundations of its stability, encourage racist groups, and provoke various social and ethnic confl icts. In this way, American infl uence will be signifi cantly weakened, which will create favorable conditions for Russia to establish and control the Eurasian space.

The same paper discusses how Russia should treat different neighboring countries. Finland, for example, must join Russia. One part of it is to be united into the Republic of Karelia, and another part the Murmansk Oblast; Estonia will be included in Germany's "sphere of infl uence". Lithuania and Latvia should be given special status in the Eurasian space; Ukraine should not exist as an independent state because, according to Dugin, it is an anomaly and has no cultural or geopolitical identity; Azerbaijan should be divided into several parts, or handed over to Iran; Iran is a key partner for creating the Moscow-Tehran axis and Armenia should be a strategic base for the functioning of this axis; Georgia should be divided into several parts. Abkhazia and South Ossetia should join the Russian Federation. Georgia should not pursue an independent domestic or foreign policy.

‘The Fundamentals of Geopolitics’ is a large bouquet of Dugin's fascist, chauvinist and Bolshevik views. It may indeed refl ect the sentiments and aspirations of a signifi cant portion of Russian society and political elite, yet its practical realization is unimaginable even under Putin's conditions in Russia. As a result, Dugin himself was disappointed many times.

Most of Georgian society met Dugin during the August 2008 events. During the days of the August War, Dugin "surpassed" himself and uttered one of his most distinctive xenophobic speeches. In this speech, Dugin blamed the Georgian military for killing helpless women, elderly and children with grenades, the genocide of the Ossetian people, a shooting in the back of Russian "peacekeepers", bombing kindergartens, etc. In this speech, Dugin asked another rhetorical question: "And do you think that Georgians are human after all?!", to which he answered "I do not think so. People who act like animals do not deserve to be called human beings." After that, he noted that Georgia attacked Russia and in this situation, there is only one solution - "complete victory", to achieve which, according to Dugin, it was necessary to "fully occupy Georgia and establish a" democratic order" there. To bring Ossetia and Georgia under the Russian protectorate. “Tanks on Tbilisi! That's the only formula for our victory!"

Dugin's hopes were not fulfi lled. The full occupation of the territory of Georgia did not take place. The main "culprit" in this, along with Georgia, was the West. It turned out to be a heavy moral blow to Dugin. The declaration of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetia as independent states was not enough for him, as he demanded the annexation of both territories to Russia and named the Abkhazian and Ossetian "pleas" as the basis. In this famous speech, Dugin referred to the people in power in Russia as patriots, but assessed Russia's "delayed" response as "criminal". After the war ended, he turned to open criticism of the Kremlin.

After the August 2008 war, Dugin began working at the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University. In 2009, he became the Deputy Head of the Department of Sociology and International Relations. In the same year, his book ‘The Fourth Political Theory’ was published. The paper tells us that until now there were three political theories: liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. At the center of liberal democracy is the individual, in Marxism - the class, and in fascism - the nation. As for the fourth political theory, according to Dugin, Dasein is at its center. Dasein is a German word that can be translated into Georgian as "presence on the ground". According to some researchers, this paper laid the ideological basis for the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the events in Donbas. Just then, another moment of glory came for Dugin.

During the occupation of Crimea and the events in Donbas, Russia actively considered the project of creating "Malorossia", which was completely in line with Dugin's ideas. During this period, he was relatively frequently invited to major Russian television stations; however, after the Malorussia project failed, Dugin again switched to criticism of the Kremlin and Putin.

At the same time, he became embroiled in a serious scandal, this time over hate speech about Ukrainians - "Ukrainians must be killed, killed and killed! More reasoning is not necessary. I'm telling you this as a professor," he said. Due to similar statements, Dugin also appeared in the list of persons on whom Western countries imposed sanctions.

After the failure of the "Molorossia" project, Dugin lost his academic position, and his complete marginalization began. Soon, Dugin was being listened to only by the leaders of the "People's Republics" of Donetsk and Lugansk.

DUGIN AND RELIGION

The issue of Dugin and Orthodox Christianity deserves a special mention. In 1968, he was baptized by his great-grandmother in the Michurinsky Cathedral. In 1999, he joined the Starover wing. This religious movement rejects the reforms carried out in the Russian Church in 1652-66 and is separated from the Moscow Patriarchate. With this gesture, Dugin emphasized that he has not lost touch with the indigenous Slavic roots and beliefs, thus trying to strengthen his own conservative image. Nevertheless, in geopolitical matters, he supports the expansionist policy of the Moscow Patriarchate and advocates the concept of an "Orthodox World" of which Russia is, of course, the leader.

DUGIN AND GEORGIA

Dugin's attitude towards Georgia and Georgians can be seen in the already mentioned ‘Fundamentals of Geopolitics’ and his August 2008 speech, so we will not dwell on this issue. In this section, we will talk about his connections with Georgian entrepreneur-politicians and ultra-right groups, chief among them Levan Vasadze, a businessman and now a politician, who has become his Georgian confi dante. In fairness, it should be noted that Vasadze never tried to hide his connection to Dugin.

In addition to personal meetings, he appeared on Tsargrad TV, which was headed by Dugin after its establishment. Tsargrad is fi nanced by the Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. In 2020, due to sanctions against Malofeev, YouTube blocked the channel's content on its own platform.

According to Vasadze, his relationship with Dugin was motivated by patriotic motives and he even managed to convince the hostile Russian imperialist to make a complete u-turn in Georgia’s favor. Probably, to strengthen this sympathy, Vasadze met with his friend on May 26, 2021, on the Independence Day of Georgia, in Moscow.

It is noteworthy that Vasadze was not a guest on Tsargrad, yet Dugin visited the Georgian TV channel Alt-Info, a sharply chauvinistic, ultra-rightist and active disseminator of Russian narratives. On the show, he talked about various issues related to his attitude towards Georgia. In addition to claiming that he loves Georgia and the Georgian nation very much, Dugin also spoke about what kind of state Georgia should be: "orthodox", "conservative", "really independent" state, which will have good relations with Russia and will not have Western or North Atlantic aspirations. There was nothing new in this statement, nor is the attitude that Vasadze claimed has changed evident anywhere. This is exactly what Russia wants from Georgia - not to have an independent policy and to rule a puppet regime that will act according to the directives of its northern neighbor.

Dugin actively responded to the events of July 5-6 in Georgia and shared the posts of members of Georgian chauvinist groups on his Facebook page.

All this clearly shows that Alexander Dugin, who according to a certain part of our society, including the infl uential media, is the "main ideologue of the Kremlin", is today a completely marginalized and bankrupt "intellectual" who is no longer listened to in Russia and is forced to periodically voice his opinions in conversations with Alt-Info and Vasadze.

Consequently, the notion that these marginalized groups operating in Georgia have direct links to the Kremlin and that they could potentially "sort out" relations with Russia is far removed from reality. These groups have no resources to talk to Russia, they are only responsible for carrying out the tactical tasks of the lower-middle-ranking representatives of Moscow, for which they receive the appropriate resources. Some of them do so deliberately, some of them are useful idiots who are doing something benefi cial for Moscow's direct interests. About the same as Dugin writes in his ‘Fundamentals of Geopolitics:’ create discord within the country, bring into action various chauvinist and aggressive groups, and dismantle the foundations of the functioning of the state so that it can no longer concentrate on real problems.