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NOVEMBER 12 - 18, 2021 POLITICS

5 When Avoiding and Hiding from the Essence of an Issue. Part I

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OP-ED BY VICTOR KIPIANI, CHAIRMAN, GEOCASE

The country is facing many problems, some of which are so serious that even much stronger states than us Georgians are struggling to fi nd adequate responses to them. Many problematic issues, from top to bottom, are raised by our history and national characteristics, whereas others are refl ections of global processes of transformation. These issues can be categorized according to different themes and contents, notably thanks to accumulated knowledge or experience in relevant fi elds, as well as to an analysis of these issues and their systematic nature.

THE DISEASE OF A MONOPOLY OVER AN IDEA

Certain problems can be dealt with rapidly, whereas others might require longer periods of time. Some can be resolved through national efforts, and others only through a proper combination with international resources. But… what could be done (and when?) to tackle the centuriesold fallaciousness of the political culture, the political immorality that is refl ected through hypocrisy when evaluating events? What societal or political undertaking can save us when we prefer to follow current trends instead of properly defi ning our country’s interests, and to replace a thorough analysis of risks and challenges with smug and useless media rhetoric? What could we oppose to the fact that we have been sacrifi cing a pure and professional evaluation for the coquetry and superfi ciality of "winning hearts"?

Which approach is statehood-minded in such cases? What standard of behavior can serve the national interest? An "expert opinion" that aims to gain cheap publicity by blindly following current trends and that benefi ts from a special exclusiveness (for suspicious reasons)? Or developing and adopting new and innovative approaches in order to fi nd proper, rational solutions? I admit that these questions are relatively rhetorical and that it shouldn't be too diffi cult to answer them, but only in theory, since in reality we fi nd it as diffi cult to fi nd answers as we do to take them into consideration when making decisions and carrying them out. We fi nd it diffi cult to such an extent that by doing so we damage the country’s security and undermine its potential to become a competitive national state, and all this against a background of increased internal and external risks.

In this article, I would like to express my own opinion regarding several urgent topics. It seems to me that these topics are often discussed under the infl uence of those stereotypical "pincers" which surpass the ability of critical thinking and freedom of opinion, and that these discussions turn "conclusions" and "evaluations" into useless clichés for practical politics.

I also fully acknowledge the fact that going beyond established stereotypes and clichés threatens to attract "anti", "contra" and "pro" labels; and this is done very adroitly and enthusiastically by those in our country who have spent decades guarding the "Holy Grail" of their analytical thinking and imposing their own "unique and reputable" contribution to Georgia's futile journey around the same circle. But why "futile" when one of the results is clearly achieved? The contribution of these "Guardians of the Holy Grail" to forming public and political opinions has always been and will always be appreciated—and this is how a certain "monopoly over an idea" is formed; a closed, stereotypical approach that hinders the free and unbiased thinking and discussion that development

A "peaceful neighborhood initiative" was recently mentioned, and Tbilisi will hopefully encourage efforts to make this initiative worthwhile in the region. The spirit of this initiative is welcomed, but its details remain unknown. Image source: 112.international requires, causes societal processes to stagnate, renders us spineless and incapable of political modernization, and signifi cantly delays the attainment of a degree of maturity in statehood.

TO JUSTIFY ONESELF?

Before moving to a specifi c topic, one that takes this sad reality I have described into consideration, I will refer to a few passages from my professional career. Again and again, in order to strengthen the credibility of a few and presumably quite disputable opinions expressed in this article, I hope that this small "marketing" insert will somewhat tame the desire to "label" of the "monopolists" mentioned above and will encourage a more thematic discussion.

Over the past thirty years, the law fi rm for which I work has been involved in many large geopolitical and economic projects. Notable examples include advising the critically important Baku-TbilisiCeyhan and South Caucasian pipelines, accompanying the agreement to purchase French-made air defense equipment, acting as a consultant for the US State Department and other Western state or diplomatic institutions, providing legal support to dozens of Western and Asian companies seeking to invest in Georgia, working alongside leading international fi nancial institutions to create often highly innovative fi nancing agreements for various large projects and structuring capital resources, etc. "Presenting my credentials" should also put a stop to any futile questioning of the style and attitude of the analytical organization whose member I am honored to be, particularly as, for those of you who are interested, this questioning will lead you nowhere.

Let us therefore now move to the main message at hand.

SPEAKING OPENLY

There are issues whose discussion requires maximum openness and honesty from all, and especially among the researchers and analysts whose main mission is to thoroughly diagnose problems in order to help politicians make the best decisions in pursuit of the country's interests. Moreover, a non-politicized discussion free of any idées fi xes and media-related factors is as necessary for internal consumers as it is for the actors of processes beyond Georgia's borders. I sometimes have the impression that, in this regard, our partners have greater readiness and desire than certain local politicians or public fi gures have willpower and motivation (and ability, by the way), "pouring out their intellect" on Georgian television talk shows.

Let us discuss this thematically.

THE URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

There have recently been active discussions around the idea of a so-called "3+3" initiative. Interested readers will of course already be familiar with this concept, so I shall neither repeat myself nor shall I analyze in depth the recent comment by the Foreign Minister, who called for a discussion of the idea of Georgia joining various "infrastructural projects", which in turn caused a certain agitation and disagreement, especially against the background of the "3+3" initiative. I will not hide the fact that this comment also dissatisfi ed me personally. It is true that, by adopting a healthy and unpoliticized approach to this comment, its main message could still be read; but objectively speaking, the Minister should have elaborated a little more, as was subsequently done in an offi cial statement by the Ministry.

I will start by mentioning that the government's evaluation of almost any topic is always accompanied by a clear defi nition of "red lines" beyond which actions are incompatible with our country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This time was no exception, and has always been the case, for any past Georgian government, and will always be so, regardless of party allegiances among the members of the Georgian government. The reason for this lies with the civilizational choice of the Georgian people, which will always be refl ected by its government.

It is also worth mentioning a few essential circumstances of current events. In the beginning, we spoke of rearranging the global political system by bringing regionalism to the fore. As we move away from a unipolar or bipolar world (although many are currently discussing a new USA-China bipolar arrangement), regional centers of infl uence are acquiring a renewed gravitational role around the world in the formation of "geopolitical weather". I have repeatedly mentioned the so-called "regional crisscrossing" tendency within the emergence of a new world order and have also discussed the reasons for and the dynamics of its development.

Under these conditions, it is crucial for the sustainable development of the Georgian state to maintain our strategic course without suffering any losses and to build relations with our neighbors (considering existing conditions and possibilities) by adopting intelligible and acceptable rules of the game. And yes, both lines of Georgian foreign policy should be gathered equally at this point: the fi rst being the previously mentioned civilized choice as a main pillar of Georgian statehood and its stability; and the other being the practical embodiment of the truth that serves to minimize the country’s internal and external risks through the adoption of foreseeable and predictable neighborly relations.

The reality is such that, alongside the increase of multivectoral tendencies in the neighborhood, Georgian diplomacy must become more layered. I must, however, repeat that this does not mean either changing the country's main foreign policy course or replacing it with another. The thing is that the main global players fi nd it diffi cult nowadays to unconditionally generalize the "piercing geopolitical" infl uences characteristic of unipolar, bipolar or even multipolar systems, whereas their tactical or strategical cooperation with regional players increases in consequence. In addition to other results, all this is followed by a rearrangement or regrouping of pre-existing regional alliances, as well as by the emergence of new ones, including in some cases relatively amorphous and short-term partnerships. (It is also worth noting that multivectoral politics, both in deed and in effect, have practically become equal to maintaining an active neutrality.)

We, in the South Caucasus, are witnessing precisely such a process. Although the latter has been actively discussed in numerous publications and has given rise to many opinions and evaluations, I believe that every single one of them, while maintaining the impregnability of the "red lines" mentioned above, deserves a calm and emotionless discussion.

After this short review, let us return to the Minister's comment and the Ministry's statement. The unrealized attempt of the former and the unambiguous interpretation of the latter demonstrate that, on one hand, Tbilisi does not discuss the "3+3" format due to its composition, and that on the other it cannot do so due to the negative results of its offi cial membership. The offi cial materials that we currently possess should therefore in theory exclude speculation on this topic, but this exclusion is of course complicated by the abundant desire of political and non-governmental "speculators"(?) in Georgia to establish a monopoly over the manipulation of public opinion as well as to "juggle" with the analytical process.

At the same time, observers and the general public ignored an absolutely fundamental aspect of the Georgian Foreign Ministry's position: the meaning of the country’s function within the modern regional context, i.e. the principal pillar without which a country cannot establish itself in external processes. At fi rst, a country without a function becomes uninteresting, a passive and inactive subject, but it then very soon turns into an object over which regional forces seek to gain and exert infl uence.

Alongside various important issues, Georgia’s functional assignment is that practical benefi t that gives our country a laissez-passer for integration into this new order. It is no coincidence that since the mid-1990s we have joined the process of obtaining this very important permission, and back then this attempt proved to be successful but only for a certain period of time. But like everything else, this too is quite changeable. The speed at which our modern world is being transformed has accelerated, whereas the Georgian Foreign Ministry emphasis on "thinking" was fi rst of all mostly linked to the country’s functional load and emphasized its role in this regard. This is my personal reading of the circumstances, but I hope for greater explanations and efforts to be dedicated to this issue. It defi nitely deserves this, and indeed requires it.

In this respect, when concluding our discussion of the regional question, I would mention signs of a pale but possibly careful optimism of a (frankly speaking forgotten) Georgian activism. A "peaceful neighborhood initiative" was recently mentioned, and Tbilisi will hopefully encourage efforts to make this initiative worthwhile in the region. The spirit of this initiative is welcomed, but its details remain unknown. Although such details would of course be linked to numerous objective or subjective factors and their specifi c nature would be shaped as progress is made, none of us is naïve: we understand the current conjunction and we acknowledge our possibilities. But it is vital to remember that ceaselessly being dynamic and proactive is the very source of our existence as a nation and a state. Moreover, both the good and the bad aspects of Georgia’s historic role also lie in the fact that, more often than not, in order to achieve our own results, we would not only walk our share of the road but also that of others as well.

A Private Solution to Illegal Borderization

PMC company employees secure the site after a roadside bomb in Baghdad, Iraq, in September, 2007. Photo by Ahmad Al-Rubaye/ AFP

BY MICHAEL GODWIN

Private Military Contractor (PMC) companies have made massive waves in the wake of the recent confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From logistics and administration to security and VIP protective services, these men and women have fi lled gaps that are critical to NATO armies in fulfi lling their larger mission. The goal of securing the limit of the Russian incursion, often referred to locally as the administrative border line or ABL, is something where the EU has had limited quantifi able success.

The EU, through their European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), has arguably hamstrung Georgia into bowing before the Russian occupation forces. Heavy limitations on the police presence and a restriction on Georgian military actions has put the nation at a disadvantage. Russia regularly deploys their state security and military forces in the area, even harassing and abducting civilians. Placing the military along the ABL would surely draw the ire and potentially the deployment of more regular Russian forces; however, the quiet emplacement of PMCs is another matter entirely.

PMCs have long been a means with which governments have been able to augment and amplify their forces on military campaigns. Throughout history, the deployment of privatized military detachments has worked to distance the potential socio-political fallout of a situation from the government seeking a solution. Simply put, it is far more palatable for a private corporation to bear the brunt of public outcry than the government themselves.

Recently, Russia has made extensive use of this avenue. Russian private military companies, though technically illegal in Russia proper, have seen combat deployments in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, Central Africa, Afghanistan, and even in internal confl icts in Chechnya. Allegedly, there is even use of these shadowy elements in some South American nations as a furtherance of the Kremlin's doctrine. These companies, headed by some of Putin’s closest friends, are allowed free reign and lucrative contracts with virtually endless state resources to back them. What’s more, they are afforded the shieldwall of deniability and cover of the Kremlin, should anything go awry during operations.

Many of these companies prey on recently retired service members of the military. Returning from contract service to a small town or village with little prospects of real work, they are ripe for recruitment into the ranks of this shadow army, as, for many veterans, leaving the military and that unique lifestyle is particularly diffi cult. Regaining that camaraderie, regimented environment, and military culture is a natural magnet for these men.

However, unlike Western PMC companies that focus on logistic, administrative, and limited defensive use of these assets, Russia sees them as more of a covert means to an end. Deployed in areas where conventional or even special operations forces would be unlikely to go unnoticed, these PMCs are able to maneuver virtually uninhibited from media and international political scrutiny. As the proverbial question goes; if a tree falls in the forest, does it truly make a sound? If Russian mercenaries commit crimes in the Central African jungle, does it truly have any effect on the global stage?

While the press-ganged service of these unfortunate men is largely ignored, it brings into question the idea of their more legitimate use by Georgia. Georgian police and border offi cials have been restrained by much of the EUMM regulations. These regulations, though laid out in good faith, are a stark contrast to their neighbors to the north, who not only ignore any sanctions against them, but actively take part in continually violating national sovereignty. Some in defense and security circles have even come to question the effi cacy of EU involvement in the matter entirely.

Absolving themselves from the binds of political affi liation and the related restrictions, PMC companies operate with a profi t-driven model towards delivering a “product.” This product is aimed at being superior to both competitors in the private sector and their equivalent in the public sector. Given that any mishap could jeopardize their contract, and as such their business, they are vehement in ensuring that their product is fl awless.

This product is territorial sovereignty.

Sourcing talent from not only the Georgian military and law enforcement communities, but also bringing in foreign veterans from Europe and the United States could build a considerable defensive force. Operating outside the EUMM’s ineffective framework, these PMC entities would have the ability to stop and stymie any attempt to illegally disrupt the situation at the occupation line. While restraint must be exercised, something perfectly familiar to these seasoned contractors, they will be well within their natural and legal rights to use deadly force should their lives or the lives of civilians be jeopardized.

Organizing these units would not be dissimilar to that of a military unit. Due to the ease of administration, command, and control, they would largely be dispersed along occupation lines, with local management in larger villages or towns. The regional commands would be divided into a western and central command: the western command assigned the occupation line with the Abkhaz region and the central being along the ABL with Russian-occupied South Ossetia.

Under this command, an infantry regiment would be divided into several operational branches, each with their own logistics, administration, and armed security and stability contract employees. Each branch would have 3-5 armed components of a minimum 10 personnel per component, with patrol routes, a supply offi ce, armorer, administrative offi cer, a public relations contingent, and a combat command offi ce should things along the occupation line become particularly “complicated.”

It must be asserted that these private elements are not an end-all to the matter of borderization. Rather, they are a buffer element between the occupation and invasion force and the might of the Georgian military. In optimal conditions, they will also facilitate the deployment of NATO forces. While silence in privatepublic matters is widely viewed as horrifi c, should a Russian military occupation member disappear from his post or fail to return from his post, as stated, would this make a sound on the world stage? Perhaps only when their members go missing would further deployment of special Russian FSB, GRU, and other military/paramilitary teams be reconsidered.

Armed employees, certifi ed and licensed with the weapon systems they are assigned, would be deployed along the occupation line. As with any sensitive position, these employees would be vetted and certifi ed to be of sound mind and sound body for the applicable assignment. With many of them drawing from the military and law enforcement fi elds, this is hardly a diffi cult task.

Kit and equipment, particular to the individual, may be both partially provided and personally procured, as many in the aforementioned communities desire their own confi guration.

Positioned in both static positions as well as mobile patrols, they would be similar in style to the current EUMM patrols, though far more effective. In addition to their special weapons license, they would also be granted special powers of arrest and authority with a carefully defi ned scope. In an attempt to limit any potential for corruption or abuse of authority due to complacency, every armed contractor would be limited to a maximum of 3 years’ service, or they will otherwise be reassigned an unarmed logistical, administrative, or management role. Any apprehension of offending individuals would be summarily processed and passed on to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs for incarceration and subsequent prosecution.

The individual expense for these contractors would be minimal, the payroll being reduced due to the lower cost of living in Georgia compared with that of Europe and the United States. Supply and materials would be the majority of the overhead costs for the PMC company or companies conducting this operation. In a further measure to reduce budgetary concerns, meals and lodging can be afforded by the military. Amalgamation of the ancillary services between the Georgian army and these private security services would not only serve to alleviate many of the issues with upkeep of such a force, but also possibly forge a cohesive bond between the two entities that may pay dividends in any future confl ict.

Along with special liaison offi ces for government relations, they would be able to procure much of the needed materials from local vendors through a blind bidding process, encouraging and growing the local business environment. In addition, the potential for foreign investment in this Georgian PMC company could draw even more growth for the nation's economy.

However, it is expected that the EU, particularly the EUMM themselves, will provide a spirited rebuttal to this proposal. Being an overly cautious-minded organization, they would most likely shriek at the thought of an armed privatized solution to a job that they have routinely failed to do. Much like any manufacturer of an inferior product, the producer of the inferior product will strive to destroy not only the product, but also the reputation of the manufacturer of the superior item. Despite their expected disapproval, and in much the same dismissive fashion as the Russians, the Georgian government must employ these services to halt the ever expanding occupation.

Other detractors may point to a more legally founded basis for their opposition. Under Chapter VI, Article 22, of the Law of Georgia on Private Security Activities, the use of some security actions may be prohibited if in violation of certain international conventions. It could be argued that the potential of PMC employee defensive actions may degrade the situation along the occupation line. Despite this, much of the other provisions under this legislation reinforce the lawful right of these security contractors to act in good faith and in defense of the innocent.

The Russian puppets in Tskhinvali and Putin’s circles in Moscow will also undoubtedly voice their objection to this project. Despite their repeated use of illegal mercenary groups in various warzones, they cannot stand anything of more legal fl avor being used against them. Any statement by the Kremlin should be met with nothing more than a brief laugh and a quick dismissal. They are worth nothing more.

There comes a point where only so much ground can be given. While many may debate what duties truly lie in the government purview, one that is unarguable is the duty to ensure territorial sovereignty and the safety of the people. The EU has talked highly of the right to this sovereignty, but done very little to enforce this right. It is well within the natural, God-given, and legal right for the Georgian leadership to seek appropriate measures to fi ght this proverbial fi re with like fi re.

The Kremlin, and Putin more specifi cally, rarely react to anything other than raw strength and classical machismo. Only with this style of response will there ever be any chance of restoring the rightful lands of the united Georgian peoples, regardless of their local cultural affi liations and minor differences. A few scoffs and eyes rolled in Brussels and Moscow are more than worth the opportunity to reform the nation and defend the Jewel of the Caucasus.

Reaching out to Youth with a Message of Equality, Inclusion and Education

Human rights, equality and education were at the center of a discussion with youth and civil society as representatives of the Embassy of Sweden to Georgia and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) visited the city of Kutaisi on 5 November.

At the meeting with Kutaisi International University students, UNDP Head Nick Beresford and Head of Development Cooperation/Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Sweden Erik Illes discussed the rapid development of technology as a powerful tool for promoting and protecting human rights and increasing the engagement of Georgian women in STEM education (science, technology, engineering, mathematics), currently hovering at 16%.

The high-level guests also met representatives of the ‘Identoba Youth’ organization and the local LGBTQI+ community. They talked about challenges faced by queer people and their supporters and discussed non-formal civic education as a way to achieve cultural and social change. ‘Identoba Youth’ is among the civil society organizations supported by Sweden and the UNDP to help expand their activities at a time of the pandemic and to respond to the needs of the communities they serve.

“It is inspiring to see all this young energy, creativity and the desire for learning. Young people must have every opportunity to live and study in an equal and safe environment free from discrimination and intolerance. The UNDP remains committed to assisting Georgia to build an inclusive and fair society where every person can fulfi l their potential and no-one is left behind,” Beresford said.

“Education and the respect for human rights are the foundations of a prosperous society. As Georgia’s strong ally in many fi elds of sustainable economic and social development, Sweden promotes the principles of human rights, equality and diversity across all social groups, and especially among youth,” Illes noted.

The visit continued at the Akaki Tsereteli State University, where Beresford and Illes attended a hands-on Covid vaccination session organized by UNDP and Georgia’s National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC) with Swedish government support.

The information and vaccination session was part of the ongoing Vaccines4Life campaign initiated by the NCDC and UNDP in partnership with a range of supporters (Denmark, the EU, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the United Nation’s Joint Fund for Sustainable Development Goals) to help debunk myths associated with Covid-19 vaccines and ensure high vaccine take-up. The campaign is reaching out to wide circles of Georgian society, including vulnerable and marginalized groups, people living in rural areas, and youth.

Georgia Failed to Protect Woman from Gender- and Honor-based Violence, UN Women’s Rights Committee Finds

Georgia’s failure to investigate and prosecute gender and honor-based violence against a woman who was severely beaten by family members in front of her young children, contributed to her death, the UN Women’s Rights Committee has found.

In the Views published on Thursday, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) said it deplored both the failure of the Georgian authorities to arrest and prosecute family members who had beaten the victim, Khanum Jeiranova, and their senseless decision to return her to her relatives. She was subsequently found dead.

The Committee issued its fi ndings after considering a complaint fi led by Jeiranova’s two children, who were 11 and 7 when their mother died.

Jeiranova, an ethnic Azerbaijani and a Georgian national, was accused of having an extramarital affair by her husband’s relatives. On 16 September 2014, three of her husband’s relatives rounded on her, dragged her through the village, and beat her so hard that she lost consciousness several times.

That night, the village governor and police offi cers were called to the victim’s father’s house where they saw her crying and begging for help as her family members wanted her to take a jar of rat poison. They didn’t make any arrest and "shameful" and “dishonorable” behaviour.

“Ms. Jeiranova was a victim of intersecting discrimination related to ethnicity and stereotypical attitudes of the police and judicial authorities,” said Committee member Genoveva Tisheva.

“Had the Georgian authorities adequately protected Ms. Jeiranova against the gender-based violence infl icted on her, she would still be alive today,” she added.

The Committee found that Georgia had failed to provide effective protection and had not taken all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against Jeiranova. It also concluded that Georgia had violated its obligation to investigate and punish those responsible for the assault on the victim and her death.

The Committee urged Georgia to conduct a prompt, thorough and independent investigation into Jeiranova’s death and to prosecute those responsible. It requested Georgia to provide appropriate reparation, including adequate compensation, as well as an offi cial apology to Ms. Jeiranova’s children. It urged Georgia to ensure that all legislation, policies and measures that address domestic violence also include honourbased violence. In addition, it asked the State to strengthen measures to ensure the right to life of women and their freedom from torture, with special attention to communities that are isolated, closed and where honor-based norms apply.

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