7 minute read
POLITICS
from Issue #1309
Georgian looking West. Source: expathub.ge ANALYSIS BY EMIL AVDALIANI
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An important part of a country's foreign policy lies in its economic moves. This is particularly true in the case of large states seeking a bigger role on the international arena. For example, China has been implementing the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI), while the US during the Cold War brought in the famous Marshall Plan to help Europe restore its shattered fi nancial strength. Both projects pursue(d) projection of political power through economic means.
Long gone are the days when it was possible to occupy territories solely through military power. Increasingly, as modernity enabled the rise of self-consciousness and nationalism among small states, it has become diffi cult to rely on repressive measures. A policy of active economic initiatives targeting one ethnic group inside the country or a separate state has thus gained additional importance.
Looking at the last 30 years of GeorgianRussian relations, there has been almost everything one could imagine: from cordial talks to wars to a full-scale economic embargo. More negative than positive, but well illustrative of the limits of Russia's foreign policy.
True, Georgia has not been economically that important to Moscow as, for example, Ukraine, Kazakhstan or Belarus, but Russia is always interested in infl uencing Tbilisi. Still, Georgia is a vital transit corridor between west and east, as well as north and south. Moreover, without Georgia, it will always be diffi cult for Russia to effectively control the restive North Caucasus in the long run.
The Russian political establishment failed to see that a major reason in Georgia's shift to the West in the early 2000s was a shattered post-Soviet economy and no help from Moscow. Russia was not perceived as an enemy when the Rose Revolution was about to happen in 2003. There were simply no concerted efforts from the Russian side to lure Georgia economically.
True, Russia on its own was experiencing turbulent times and was much selfabsorbed with internal problems when Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999. Even when Russia became fi nancially stable by the late 2000s, no viable longterm economic vision was offered to the former Soviet countries. The announcement of the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) did not produce the expected results, nor did it stop Ukraine from drifting away from Russia in 2014.
Again, Russian political thought failed to recognize that Kyiv's choice to move closer to the European Union was based on the latter's economic attractiveness. As no brotherly relations with Russians could stop Ukrainians' drift to the western economic space, much less surprising is the Georgians' eagerness to join the European market.
Simply put, Russia has not been attractive enough. Even those countries which are economically close to Russia simply have no other alternative. Take, for example, Armenia, a large proportion of which is not enamored of Russia, but is entwined in the Russian economy because there is no other option. The same goes for the Central Asian states, which still prefer the Russian economy to the Chinese market (though even this trend, based on Central Asia's cultural and historical closeness with Russia, started to shift and the region's economic relations with China now thrive).
When it comes to choosing between Western and Russian economic spaces, even those culturally closest to Russia still choose the West. The roots of this problem for Russia are the country's inability to build powerful state institutions and a thriving economic space with opportunities for peaceful development across the former Soviet territories.
What is troubling is Russia's failure to understand the source of the country's weakness – a need for rapid restructuring of economy to yield higher industrial and technological results. On the rare occasion high level politicians openly discuss this, it usually ends with no specifi c results.
It can be argued that for the last 30 years, Russia has not pursued a consistent economic policy towards Georgia. Investments were occasional, while other political decisions only further hampered bilateral relations. The case of Georgia's "defection" to the West well refl ects how less attention is paid nowadays in Russia to economic components in the country's foreign policy. There are even hints that Moscow now prefers military moves to economic ones.
Even from a strategic point, one can say that Russia simply has not got a foreign policy towards Georgia, except for militarily preventing the country from joining NATO and the EU. No long-term approach of economic, cultural or other components has been formulated. As a result, by 2003, it was already late to reverse the existing trend in Georgia, while a similar process is now seen in Ukraine.
*Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.
From Russia with Love
OP-ED BY NUGZAR B. RUHADZE
Right before the 13th anniversary of the 2008 RussoGeorgian war, there came a message from Moscow to Tbilisi, full of kind wishes to restore ties and go back to the erstwhile friendship and mutual cooperation between the two feuding countries, despite the history of intermittent exchanges of love and hatred over the last two hundred years. Does Russia really mean what it suggests? Of course it does! Yet, the genuine stuffi ng of the declared goodwill is that for such reparation, Russia wants Georgia to put up with the new geopolitical reality, ‘new’ meaning that Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain on the run. Both were unilaterally recognized by Russia as independent states in retaliation to America’s recognizing Kosovo’s independence against the Russian stand.
How regrettable that our miniature Georgia should lose its historical lands as a consequence of muscle fl exing between geopolitical giants. This is the way our planet is managed today, of which Georgia happens to be a victim.
The very moment the Russian proposal was refl ected in the news, the US Embassy in Tbilisi replied with strong and angry statements that Russia must fi rst withdraw its forces from Georgian territory if it wants to restore relations with Georgia, once again calling on Russia to reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Imagine the level of irritation in the Kremlin at hearing these words! But for us Georgians, not much has changed as a result – the longstanding status quo remains as fi rm as a rock. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the caravan that keeps rolling on, nonchalant to the loud warnings of various levels and strength.
Russia, although it has plenty of insurmountable problems of its own, still resorts to cynical comments about Georgia’s attempts to westernize itself and its current geopolitical orientation focused on integration into Euro-Atlantic polit-economical structures. This is seen throughout Russian media, as well as in the comments of Russian offi cialdom. One could say that Russia wants Georgia back not in prewar form and content, but as it is now – truncated, frustrated and on its knees. Georgia has the full support of the West, but the western shoulder seems to be more ephemeral than real. We are certainly using a lot of western economic help, thanks to which we are not ‘dying of hunger,’ but the essential problem of our territorial integrity remains unsolved, and nobody seems capable of making any forecast about the future. Meanwhile, Russia is not yielding, keeping a rigid grip on the lands she has snatched from us.
Incidentally, some wicked thoughts pop up at times in my confused head: what was grabbed by force must be taken back by force. But Georgia cannot afford anything of that sort. We are totally in the hands of big players in the game. If, against any odds, they clash to establish justice, the confrontation will take place on our territory, so we will once again be victimized for no good reason.
Georgia has gotten tired of being a loser. Georgia needs impetus to reinvent itself as a productive builder, but the incentive is not even looming on the horizon. Georgians are gradually getting used to the fact that our long-suffering lands have been devoured by post-soviet shakes and quakes, and the way to get them back is hopelessly blurred. We cannot depend on Russia’s will to reconstruct our country, unless we turn our back on the West and embrace Russia’s recent offer. If we want to continue with our western friends and allies, they will have to immediately marry us into their rich and mellow family before we get gobbled up by some unexpected geopolitical vicissitude and the grown appetites of those who still have an eye on our beautiful lands. None of these is happening, and Georgia remains clenched between the relentless jaws of that horrible status quo, which already accounts for several generations, coming and going, and becoming ever more insensitive towards our territorial pain in the neck.
Georgia has gotten tired of being a loser, but the impetus it needs to reinvent itself as a productive builder is not even on the horizon. Source: fpri.org
