POLITICS

Mikheil Saakashvili. Photo by Valentin Ogirenko / Reuters The President Who Was Wanted

OP-ED NUGZAR B. RUHADZE

Speaking generally, I hate to see people locked up, although I’m sure some of them belong in a penal institution. The Misha I want to fi gure as the main character of this story recently found his most famous self in one such institution. The guy has served in two very important ranks: President of Georgia and Governor of Odessa, Ukraine. Oddly, and regrettably enough, he is now serving not in the role of a former president but as a regular inmate. Yes, as a regular one, no matter how special he might be on the whole! Why regrettably? Because it’s a bad thing that one of the few presidents of our country is doing time in a mundane reformatory.

Mikhail Saakashvili could not have thought even in his wildest imagination that, on delving into Wikipedia, he might fi nd his name on the list of heads of state and government, who were later imprisoned, sandwiched between the two infamous names of Sa'dun Hammadi and Saddam Hussein, both embossed in history as Iraqi political felons.

Misha was wanted for quite a long time, while he happily trotted the globe and toiled away in countries other than Georgia, ensconced in the most comfortable armchairs in luxurious offi ces and being driven around in top-of-the-line chauffeured cars. It was a little strange that a person indicted and convicted on several counts in Georgia in-absentia felt himself as snug as a bug in a rug in the friendlyto-Georgia Ukraine. It was something that could have triggered a huge political scandal between the two nations, but somehow they managed to maintain mutual calm, friendship and cooperation. The bilateral diplomatic effort in this regard deserves our kudos, of course.

Misha is now sitting in the cooler, and not only that – he is on hunger strike. The entire nation feels anxious and onedge about it, because this is, after all, the former head of state of the country. He boasts both friends and adversaries of various caliber in the streets, on TV screens and on the rostrums and podiums. Nobody needs that much headache, but the headache is right there, at the center of the nation’s structure of problems.

In his own day and term, from 2004 until 2013, Saakashvili did not sit just twiddling his thumbs: He was hyperactive, fully into business, and trying to get marked in history as a great leader. But at the same time, he was doing so much wrong that he fi nally wore away all his initial popularity and ultimately lost the elections. The majority of people decided they didn’t want his presidential services any more: Not only had he lost his good name, but the war with Russia too, and the lands the Georgian people had maintained with unbearable pains ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The acme of his downfall was the prison shots of cruel and unusual punishment of inmates, saying nothing of the bloody breakup of demonstrations and badly beaten fellow-citizens, one of them with a lethal fi nale. And the economic achievements that Misha was so proud of are now going through a professional scrutiny, with the conclusion that many of those successful results might become the subject of further fairer analysis.

As a matter of fact, any leader of any nation leaves a certain wake in the aftermath of his or her activity, and often the legacy has its light and dark sides. This might be true in the case of Misha’s presidency too. And it is also natural that his numerous friends want to boost his strong points, and the multitude of his opponents are inclined to put forward his weak points. But this is all very trivial and does not deserve serious excitement. What needs more of our attention is that someday in this country, we have to learn how to elect leaders who go down in history peacefully and honorably, so that their successors have no reason or desire to disparage their legacy or nurse the idea of their detention for former misdeeds. The concept of such a continuation of the nation’s story being possible is not completely ripe yet, but the hope is that we might master the ropes someday. As the saying goes – live and learn!

Why Did Iran-Azerbaijan Relations Become Strained?

The section of the Armenian-Iranian highway that is controlled by Azerbaijan following the Second Karabakh War is marked in blue. The section of the possible corridor connecting Turkey-Nakhichevan-the rest of Azerbaijan on Armenian territory near the Iranian border is marked in red

ANALYSIS BY ZURAB BATIASHVILI FOR THE RONDELI BLOG

Numerous confl icts have arisen in the Caucasus in recent decades, and today it seems that another new, this time Iranian-Azerbaijani, confrontation has matured in the region, one that will not be confi ned to these two countries alone.

The Iran-Azerbaijan relations, which have become increasingly strained in recent weeks, have seen Iranian military exercises of an unprecedented scale being carried out near the border between the two countries. Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey have in turn responded via military means, leaving many to wonder why Iran-Azerbaijan relations became tense, and why now.

The balance of power in the region has changed signifi cantly since the Second Karabakh War, with Azerbaijan’s victory followed by the stirring up of TurkishAzerbaijani nationalist sentiments both in the Republic of Azerbaijan itself and in the north of Iran, where about 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis live (while the population of Azerbaijan itself, according to offi cial fi gures, is 10 million).

The most recent trigger was the arrest of two Iranian truck drivers by Azerbaijanis on a section of the Armenian-Iranian land route that the Azerbaijani side had regained control of after the second war in Karabakh. According to the Azerbaijani side, the drivers are involved in illegal trade with the separatist NagornoKarabakh. It should be noted, though, that this is the only road connecting Iran and Armenia, which Tehran views as one of the main transport arteries connecting the country to the Black Sea (and Europe), and which is a vital section of the North-South Corridor (Russia-Iran).

Moreover, offi cial Baku and Ankara are requesting access to the road connecting Turkey-Nakhichevan-the rest of Azerbaijan through southern Armenia. While the opening of these roads is envisaged by the Russia-AzerbaijanArmenia peace agreement signed a year ago, the Armenian side has yet to agree to the request.

At the same time, there have been some suggestions in Azerbaijan (including at the highest levels) that the southern part of Armenia (which the Armenian side calls Syunik and the Azerbaijani side calls Zangezur) is a piece of old Azerbaijani territory which, via historical "misfortune," found itself within the boundaries of the neighboring country.

The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, went even further, saying that if Armenia did not voluntarily agree to the proposal to open the corridor, then Azerbaijan would do so itself by force.

Clearly, in the event of such a development, not only would the transport routes connecting northern Iran with Armenia, Georgia, Russia, the Black Sea and Europe be physically blocked, but, from Tehran's point of view, a single Turkish-Azerbaijani arc would thus encircle Iran, possibly further infl ating nationalist attitudes among Azerbaijanis living in northern Iran.

In addition, Tehran is irritated by the frequent conducting of joint TurkishAzerbaijani military exercises. Among them, particularly painful were TurkishAzerbaijani naval exercises in the Caspian Sea and the Turkish-AzerbaijaniPakistani ground exercises near Karabakh.

The Israeli factor further aggravates relations between Tehran and Baku. It is known that Israeli-made drones were actively involved in the Second Karabakh War, and, in Iran, there is th widely held belief that Israeli military units are stationed on the territory of Azerbaijan, an accusation that was openly made by Offi cial Tehran a few days ago. On the other hand, Israel suspects that Iran will soon have nuclear weapons, and experts are increasingly talking about a possible Israeli attack on Iran in order to eliminate Tehran’s chances of developing such weapons.

It was these events that Iran assessed as a direct threat against it and led to its decision to hold a military exercise of unprecedented scale near the Azerbaijani border, which involved four Iranian divisions with a total of 50,000 Iranian soldiers.

The name of the Iranian exercise itself is also symbolic - Tehran named it the "Conquerors of Khaybar." Khaybar is a city in Saudi Arabia where Muhammad defeated the Jews in 628 and which is considered a symbol of Muslim victory over the Jews. In this controversy, too, Tehran accuses Baku of allying with Israel and acting jointly against Iran.

The Iran-Azerbaijan confrontation was soon refl ected on social media, where explicit elements of information warfare, featuring historical and nationalist narratives, were spread.

The Azerbaijani nationalist narrative is "South Azerbaijan is not Iran!"

The Iranian nationalist narrative is "Let's make Azerbaijan part of Iran again!", with many in Iran believing that the territory of modern-day Azerbaijan was taken by Russia 200 years ago, and that it is time to "return" it as the 32nd province of Iran.

Of course, Azerbaijan is not alone in this controversy; it has Turkey’s unambiguous support, and, most likely, that of Israel as well, although these are topics for a separate discussion.

The Iran-Azerbaijan confrontation has its own history, but in this case, the new wave of confrontation was precipitated by a new balance of power formed after the Second Karabakh War. Tehran felt that its positions were weakening, in its estimation leading to an increased level of threat. The close ties between Azerbaijan-Israel and Azerbaijan-Turkey are unacceptable for Tehran, as is the weakening of Armenia's position in the region, which is clearly noticeable after the Second Karabakh War. This standoff does not mean that there will automatically be a direct military confrontation, however, the issue is long-term in nature and this problem can be expected to reemerge many times in this region. This tension shows once again how fragile peace and stability is in the Caucasus, where strong regional actors closely monitor ongoing events and react quickly.

Russia has not yet stated its position on the controversy. However, it is clear that Moscow is closely monitoring the developments and, in all likelihood, believes that the time for their response has not yet come (recall, the Kremlin acted similarly during the Second Karabakh War, where it deliberately held off for a long time). The emergence of a new hotbed of tension in the Caucasus is not in Georgia's interests. Clearly, peace and stability are. However, the capabilities and tools of Offi cial Tbilisi to infl uence current events are limited.

The Turkish-Azerbaijani arc encircling Iran if the corridor is opened

Originally published on the Rondeli Blog. An example of the Azerbaijani narrative

Does ISIS still Pose a Threat to the Region?

Islamic Fighters stage a motorized rally in Syria during the height of their command of the region in 2015. The majority of the fi ghters would go on to be eliminated in a joint NATO-Iraq offensive in the coming years. Source: Militant website via AP

BY MICHAEL GODWIN

Many of the attacks, kidnappings and murders the Islamic State organizations have been infamous for have largely abated. Through a combined NATO, Iraqi, and Kurdish offensive, their former strength has been reduced to a scattering of small camps and safe houses in rural Syria and Iraq. However, forces deployed in the area are still fi nding themselves in the crosshairs of the remaining fi ghters. Since much of the attention has shifted away from the battlefi eld, this has allowed for a steady stream of attacks on both security forces and civilians.

Georgia has largely stayed safe from the extremist threat, with a comparatively small number of citizens being involved. Despite this, there have been arrests of individuals seeking membership and training in the terrorist organization. In addition, reports during the height of the Syrian and Iraqi confl ict found several Georgian citizens within the ranks of the captured and killed fi ghters. With the recent arrest of fi ve suspected recruits in eastern Georgia, it brings the threat of the terror army back into the spotlight again.

The terrorist organization was reported to have attracted over 40,000 recruits from 120 different countries. Through its funding programs of illicit oil sales, smuggling, looting, and extortion, they were alleged to be reaping over $80 million per month at their 2015 height. Once the so-called Islamic State came crumbling down, many of the foreign recruits that had survived were left to fi nd their own way back to their homelands. The homelands of these individuals were largely split into two camps; repatriation and prosecution, or outright refusal.

However, the majority of the approximately 30 Georgian volunteer fi ghters have elected to remain in Iraq or Syria. Georgia being a low-priority target in terms of value, the lack of any real terror network established in the nation, and the heavy-handed repercussions that await them at the border have seemingly discouraged them from returning. Despite these factors, not all have made their new home in the Middle East. Akhmed Chatayev, who fought in Syria against the coalition, is one notable example of one that returned to Georgia only to die in a fi refi ght with police special response teams in 2017.

Although Chatayev was not Georgian himself (being Chechen), he was a leader in one of the many Chechen Muslim extremist groups in the North Caucasus. This reveals another incentive for returning fi ghters to fi nd themselves a home in Georgia. With the country being a key gateway to the Southern Russian region, it has been a travel route for centuries. The terrorist threat in Chechnya and Dagestan has plagued Russian internal security forces for decades, even leading them to attempt to blame Georgia for housing them. As a result, it is highly doubtful these returning fi ghters will attempt to enter Russia, lest they be arrested immediately.

This incident, as well as several others in the Pankisi and Lopota areas, has highlighted the region as a potential hideout. In addition, its low-profi le location could allow it to become the next petri dish for extremist fi ghters looking to evade capture or death. These groups, often working under the name Islamic State - Caucasus Province (IS-CP), operate according to their violent ideology and in much the same ways as their predecessor, the Caucasus Emirate.

While their primary target is often Russia in their push for North Caucasian independence, the natural link between like-minded groups on both sides of the mountain pass is cause for concern. In the wake of the 2015 rise of the Islamic State in Syria, the confederation of insurgent groups in the region openly aligned themselves with their new leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. By supplying personnel and resources to the fi ght in Syria and Iraq, they were also able to grow their own infl uence, attracting in-house talent in the region.

However, after the fall of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, their infl uence waned, and the clashes with Russian security forces further weakened them, as leadership was either apprehended or killed. In addition, Georgia found itself dealing with their multiple associated factions, such as the aforementioned Lopota incident in 2012. This incident, leading to the death of two members of the police special operations group and one Georgian Special Operations Forces medic, underlined these subversive operations.

In the aftermath of the fi refi ght that took place, multiple extremist organizations in the North Caucasus lashed out at Georgia. They published multiple grievances, including claims that Georgia was “betraying and killing the brave sons of the Caucasus” in favor of a Putinist agenda. Russia painted the incident as proof that Georgia was in fact harboring terrorists, and even went so far as to postulate that Georgia was training them as well.

Regardless of the true allegiance of the dead fi ghters, it is clear that there exist separatist and non-state organizations in the region whose goals are perpendicular with those of the nation. While these organizations may title themselves with various labels, they generally fall under the larger IS-CP banner, similar to sister organizations in the Philippines, across Africa, and what is now brewing in Afghanistan. Their presence in the South Caucasus has yet to rise to the level of any of these regions, however, the ground is not infertile for this type of ideology to spread.

Continued accruement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance should be employed. These groups will use any opportunity, such as political division or extreme nationalism, to draw new members. These individuals, disillusioned by the warped vision of the terror group, will easily fall into their trap. As with many things, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Georgia has already sacrifi ced several military and police service members in its bid for safety against the terrorist threat, both at home and abroad. The mainstream elements of the Islamic State in the Middle East may have mostly withered and fallen from the headlines, but their followers are still festering in other corners of the world. The so-called “ISIS'' threat is still a threat. Georgia is not absolved of its duty in combating this group, and its many offshoots, and it’s focus on the internal security situation is commendable, but not complete.

Roll Out the Euro in Georgia as a Tool for its Peaceful Unifi cation with Europe

OP-ED BY GUNTER FEHLINGER, PRESIDENT OF EUROPEANS FOR TAX REFORM*

It is time for Georgia to take on the Euro as currency to show it wants to be an EU Member, to bypass resistance to Georgia’s EU Membership inside the EU, and to make the future of Georgia in NATO and the EU clear to all inside and outside the country. The Euro as a fi rm currency fundament is better economics than the constantly declining Lari.

STUCK IN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP – A DEADEND STREET FOR GEORGIA

EU Council President Charles Michel visited Batumi to witness the formation of the EU Accession Trio, the offi cial pre-EU accession alliance of Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, signed by the three presidents of the three Eastern European countries whose EU future is sadly rejected by the EU; three pro-European countries stuck in the failed Eastern Partnership, a parking place for European nations the EU does not know what to do with, and for whose destiny Russia feels ownership over. As the EU is not ready to grant EU Potential Candidate Status to Georgia, Georgia must adopt the Euro to bypass the deadlock.

THE EURO FOR GEORGIA TO BACK UP THE APRIL 19 AGREEMENT

Charles Michel's presence in Batumi was too much for Russia, so the excellent 19th April agreement was canceled the following week in July, and Michel’s only success in his two years of EU Council Presidency evaporated, as he had nothing to offer for Georgia to back him up and make the deal stick, contrary to the Przino Agreement negotiated by Christian Danielsson for a similar crisis in Macedonia in 2015, where the USA and EU had NATO Membership to offer and the start of the EU Candidate Status. The USA, NATO and EU delivered for Macedonia, and Macedonia got a settlement with Greece, joined NATO in 2020, and is now an EU Candidate Country. But, for Georgia, Christian Danielsson, negotiating for Charles Michel, had nothing to offer to focus minds and make the deal stick. No NATO future. No EU future. No EU Potential Candidate Status, No CEFTA or RCC Membership. Charles Michel sent Danielsson empty handed. A bit here and there, but nothing to bind all sides and the public into a lasting consensus for Western integration backed up by real deliverables. The Euro, for Georgia, is the tool for a European consensus. The currency is what everybody uses daily, for all economic transactions; buying selling, saving and investment, and what stronger symbol, highly visible, can there be for the European future of Georgia?

Gunter Fehlinger is the President of Europeans for Tax Reform NATO AND EU MEMBER GEORGIA – YES, BUT THE EURO FIRST

NATO Membership based on the BRD 1955 model would be possible, but both NATO and Georgia seem unready for the next step towards membership- NATO. Due to concerns about Russia, Georgia does not want to change its approach to reunifi cation. EU Potential Candidacy is stuck due to similar concerns by Western EU Members. And there is no appetite in Brussels to import the next Cyprus style crisis, and no Greece around in the EU to impose Georgia on a reluctant Western Europe. Not even the Balkans’ back door via CEFTA and RCC is being offered to Georgia. So, we are stuck and Georgia is lost?

The EU could back the European consensus up with a concrete offer – the Euro for Georgia. The Georgian Lari, in relation to the USD, was 1.25 in 1996 and is now at 3.45 today. It is not a disaster record compared to Belarus, Serbia, or Ukraine, but it is far from stellar. Interest rates are sky high for SMEs and even war-torn Kosovo, which was allowed to adopt the Euro in 2002, has reached $4,200 GDP per capita, the same as reform superstar Georgia. The $16 billion GDP of Georgia won't impress the 13 trillion Eurozone much, though.

The Euro for Georgia will make a major impact on economic and trade integration of the DCFTA. But most of all, using the Euro will make a major difference for consumers, citizens, voters and taxpayers in Georgia, making it very clear for everybody where Georgia wants to belong and where Georgia’s future lies: inside NATO and the EU, once ready for political integration, but clearly inside the European trading, currency, and value system.

REVERSE ENGINEERING EU ENLARGEMENT – START WITH CURRENCY ADOPTION

In the theory of economic integration, integration anyhow starts with a Free Trade Agreement, and Georgia already has the DCFTA. Then add a Customs Union, as the EU has with Turkey, then the EU Internal Market, then the Currency Union and then the Political Union into which the EU is gradually developing. Georgia’s adopting the Euro is one of the logical next steps, as is joining the CEFTA and concluding an EU Georgia Customs Union similar to what the EU has with Turkey. But the Euro obviously has the bigger symbolic and visibility impact for every single economic transaction done in and with currency. Investment, buying, selling, saving and planning life and future is done in currency, and once done in the Euro, that is hard to reverse and very clear in which world Georgian wants to and will live: in the European World, the American-backed Free World, and not the Russian World. The Georgian dream – joining the West – starts with the Euro.

THE EURO CAN BE DONE FAST AND FLEXIBLY

Unlike the complicated EU accession negotiation and high-stake defense obligation of unclear borders contested by Russia, the Euro can be done quickly. At the push of a button by the National Bank of Georgia, the highly advanced digital payment system can be transferred to the Euro. Contrary to EU and NATO membership, which requires the ratifi cation of each single 27 EU and 30 NATO Members, the unilateral adoption of the Euro needs no consent of the EU Council or the ECB- just a decision from the Georgian Parliament and Government is enough. The support of one of the central banks of the Eurozone, let’s say Estonia, will help, as will passive support to block some potential angry reaction from Brussels or Frankfurt, possibly from Poland and Slovakia, while Lithuania and Latvia will back Georgia in Brussels, as Austria and Germany helped Montenegro and Kosovo to fl oat the Euro in 2002. A measure opposed by many but so successful for Montenegro and Kosovo, but the precedent is set, so let’s do the same for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, and, please, Georgia, lead Europe on that.

THE EURO DOES NOT REPLACE EU OR NATO MEMBERSHIP, BUT PAVES THE ROAD

Sure, the Euro doesn’t replace full political membership in the EU and NATO, but it is a powerful next step, widely visible inside and outside Georgia, and nobody can misunderstand the symbolic signifi cance. And the Euro as currency for Georgia will further intensify and deepen EU-Georgia economic integration and trade and investment links with the EU, and so will accelerate EU membership potential later in the 2020s. EU and NATO Member Georgia will seem so logical; the argument can be made so plausible. “We even have the Euro as currency, so why not join fully in the Political Union, as we are already fully aligned with EU policy and regulation in all aspects, we even have the Euro, so why not allow our politicians to sit, speak and vote in the EU Council, Commission and Parliament?”

RELAUNCHING THE 19TH APRIL AGREEMENT INTO A EUROPEAN PACT FOR GEORGIA BASED ON THE EURO

The current escalation of the ongoing crisis will require a major new EU mediation effort – this time better coordinated with the USA. Let’s not forget that the whole crisis started on June 20, 2019, with the provocation of Sergei Gavrilov’s visit, a Communist MP of Russia, during the Interparliamentary Assembly of Orthodox Countries, visiting the Parliament of Georgia and taking the Chair the Speaker, speaking in Russian, claiming brotherhood between Georgia and Russian after having voted for Abkhazian Independence in the Russian Duma the week prior. All events since then, the jail term for the opposition leader Nika Melia, the protest against the 2020 elections, the violence and clashes leading to the 19th April EU brokered agreement, are the result of that Russian provocation and are clearly related to the Russian roll-back efforts in their former colonial empire.

The Euro, as currency for Georgia, as a symbol of its European future, will have a big enough impact to make the next EU brokered agreement stick

THE CURRENT POLITICAL ESCALATION WILL REQUIRE A SECOND EU MEDIATION EFFORT

Now, with the elections done and the jailing of the former President, clearly there is a need for another EU effort to mediate. What can the EU, backed up by the US, do to make the second effort stick, and not get blocked by a 3rd Russian intervention against it? The Euro, as currency for Georgia, will have a big enough impact on everybody, a symbol of the European future and, yes, that is hard to reverse, actually irreversible, and a big enough thing to make the next EU brokered agreement stick. So, better get ready for the next crisis in Georgia and prepare to roll out the Euro in Georgia as a tool for its peaceful unifi cation with Europe.

*Gunter Fehlinger is the President of Europeans for Tax Reform, ETR, an Austrian economist from Vienna, Austria, and Chair of the Austrian Committee for European Ukraine

Lawyer: Mikheil Saakashvili’s Condition Worsening due to Hunger Strike

BY ANA DUMBADZE

Mikheil Saakashvili’s lawyer, Beka Basilaia, says the condition of the former president of Georgia in Rustavi Prison is worsening due to his hunger strike.

“Saakashvili’s hunger strike is entering a very diffi cult phase. We can clearly see the consequences, he has problems with movement and his legs are swollen,” the lawyer said after visiting Saakashvili in prison.

According to Basilaia, Mikheil Saakashvili’s hunger strike will lead to further deterioration in health and today he is already facing problems.

“It is important to give Saakashvili’s personal doctor Nikoloz Kipshidze the opportunity to visit him, which is vital. The personal doctor knows best what he may need,” the lawyer added.

Despite the deterioration of his health, Saakashvili says he will not stop the hunger strike. As he says in an appeal, which was introduced to the public by lawyer Dimitri Sadzaglishvili, the rally scheduled for October 14 on Rustaveli Avenue should be large-scale. In the appeal, the former president notes that the hunger strike is “one of the tools of his struggle.”

Mikheil Saakashvili has been on hunger strike as a form of protest against the current political regime in Georgia since the day of his arrest in Tbilisi on October 1. His party members and supporters are planning to gather on Rustaveli Avenue on October 14 and organize a rally demanding his release, as they believe that he is a political prisoner of the ruling party Georgian Dream and its founder Bidzina Ivanishvili.