13 minute read
POLITICS
from Issue #1305
The Graveyard of Empires and NATO’s Exit from Afghanistan
Photo by Mohammed Ismail/Reuters
Advertisement
ANALYSIS BY MICHAEL GODWIN
As NATO begins the withdrawal from Afghanistan, many of those that spent months and years of their lives in its mountains and valleys look back on the abandonment of the larger mission. Politicians, soldiers, even private contracting employees, largely see it as a worthwhile mission to stall the global terrorism threat and force it to fi ght a ground war that it cannot possibly win. By draining their resources, it is a tactic that has pulled most of the vast litany of organizations collectively known as the Taliban out of the shadows and onto the battlefi eld.
However, after 20 years of warfare, the United States and the NATO coalition have opted for a withdrawal. This withdrawal, supported by most civilian and non-military political elites, has drawn criticism from those in the defense and global security sectors. NATO’s combined mission of combatting terrorism and maintaining a Central Asian foothold has been framed to be a “forever war” that had no conclusive end and no defi ned objective. As this is not the case, the withdrawal of forces will have immense repercussions not only for the region, but the globe.
The status in Afghanistan had reached a level of relative calm compared to the initial phases of the confl ict. People had comparative economic freedom, women had achieved a level of near-equivalence in society compared to their male counterparts, and the majority of the combat and death had subsided to a point that NATO casualties were reduced to single digits per year. Hardly something to be considered a war.
Ensuring peace, stability, and positive growth in a nation is something that takes decades. In fact, this is visible in the modern era. In the aftermath of both the Second World War and the Korean War, nations were devastated and civilian populations left with little more than rubble and fl ames. With the presence and support of Allied soldiers and the injection of resources into their crippled nations, South Korea and Germany were able to become the economic successes they are today.
After the Korean War, thousands of American and United Nations soldiers remained in the nation, and some are still there today. Even after the war, the South Korean government was largely seen as a military dictatorship. It required decades of growth and development, some assistance coming from foreign governments, to gain the social and economic successes that are visible today. Despite this, elements of the United States Army numbering over 20,000 are still stationed in the country, as the North Korean threat persists. This positioning with a key ally is vital to ensuring stability in the region and dissuading any North Korean attack.
Similarly, in Germany after the Second World War ended, thousands of Allied soldiers remained in the nation. Despite popular images of a mass exodus and a grand homecoming of troops, many remained behind to ensure stability and facilitate a reconstruction of security and industry. On a larger scale, the Marshall plan was implemented, investing over $13 billion dollars (valued at approximately $114 billion today) in European reconstruction and commercial industries. Like Korea, United States troops inhabit multiple military installations to this day in Germany, Poland, Italy, and various other smaller positions across Europe.
These examples display the safety and security that is provided by the presence of NATO nations in destroyed countries. The subsequent infl ux of economic and social resources ensures that the nation involved has a rigid growth framework and reduces its recidivism into terror and mayhem. As time has shown, where NATO boots go the grass grows green.
However, when these boots leave prematurely, it allows for a total collapse of this framework. As the fi nal moments of American and allied forces in Vietnam displayed, the exit of forces before a nation can stand on its own has terrifying repercussions. Thousands of South Vietnamese attempted, at all costs, to evacuate the country and escape the onslaught of North Vietnamese communist troops. Additional civilians and South Vietnamese soldiers were killed in the action that ensued.
Similar events seem to be on the horizon for much of the Afghan population and military. With the exit of NATO troops, already many civilians are attempting to vacate the country. Those that worked faithfully and diligently with NATO forces in the fi eld and on their bases are fearing for their lives and are fi ling for visas. The Afghan security forces have largely been seen as unready to assume the role NATO once held and effectively combat the enemy.
Opposing them, the Taliban group of organizations are already taking steps to seize the moment and the inevitable power vacuum. Given the most probable occurrence of the buckling of the Afghan government, the assumption of power by the Taliban and their leadership will undoubtedly plunge the nation back into its dark era of Islamic extremist rule. This descent, coupled with the degradation of human rights and any semblance of democracy, can only fuel a resurgence of terrorism.
In addition to this fallout, many of those that served in the embattled country feel that their time spent, as well as comrades lost, were wasted. In discussions with some of the United States veterans of the confl ict, the feeling of having their work reversed so radically has left them feeling disparaged and defl ated:
Sergeant Mykle Shaulis, 10th Mountain Division, Afghanistan 2006-2007: “...We did a lot of work trying to help stabilize the local areas. Now that it’s all gone I feel like it was for nothing and that hurts the soul a little bit.”
Specialist Joshua Powell, 101st Airborne Division, Afghanistan 2010-2011: “I don’t think they’re prepared at all. They lack the national pride, honor, and integrity needed to defend their country against terrorist organizations. A lot of them are corrupt and will take whoever gives them money, including the Taliban.”
Staff Sergeant James Czekalski, 1st Armored Division, Afghanistan 20122013, US Department of Defense Contractor, Afghanistan 2017-2020: “I don’t think they’re prepared at all [to be honest]. So many districts have already fallen at hands of the Taliban. We should’ve spent the last couple years doing with the [Afghan National Army] what we did with the Iraqi army for training...That being said, it’s ultimately up to their government on if they want our help or not. We shouldn’t be imposing our beliefs on them.”
Despite this sentiment, the proverbial die has been cast by NATO leadership as to the future of the Afghan nation. Already, videos, albeit still unconfi rmed, have surfaced of Afghan soldiers and their special operations elements attempting to surrender only to be gunned down. While the videos are harrowing, it shows that the recent attempt by the Taliban to display itself as a responsible government entity is false. The deaths of these soldiers do not ultimately lie on the Taliban, but rather on the NATO commanders who ordered the retreat.
In addition to the surrender of national control to a radical and terrorist organization, the regional concerns will pressure powers like Russia and most importantly China to rethink how they operate in Central Asia. With the Chinese already operating in some capacity, private military corporation or military deployment, in Tajikistan as a border protection force, it’s only a matter of time until this tactic spreads. Neither Russia nor China want this Islamic extremist entity to grow beyond Afghanistan, as it has attempted to do in the recent past. However, the politics of NATO have seemingly already spoken.
While it is all too easy to dismiss a foreign confl ict or peacekeeping operations as too expensive or too wasteful, is it another issue to surrender not only a region but also sacrifi ce thousands of people’s livelihoods for the sake of political expediency. NATO, through its development in the post-Cold War era, not only works as a force for good against the Russian threat, but also for its allies and friendly nations. This includes Afghanistan. The people of this troubled and now overrun nation deserve the protection and guarantee of stability that Germany and South Korea received, and continue to receive to this day.
For Georgia, it should be of concern for the families of the 32 soldiers killed and the 280 wounded in action. This price Georgia paid for NATO is not just a testament to their commitment to the organization, but also proof that the mission cannot be abandoned. It is not on Georgia to take on the defense and security mission in Afghanistan solely, but opposition to a premature withdrawal must be sounded. NATO, with Georgia included, cannot allow the sacrifi ce of so many and the collapse of an otherwise friendly nation’s fl edgling democracy to go silently.
EU Spokesperson: Appointments of Supreme Court Judges Go against April 19 Agreement
BY ANA DUMBADZE
The Georgian Parliament endorsed six Supreme Court judges on Monday, despite calls by the European Union to pause and revise the appointment process to bring it in line with European standards, said Lead Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Peter Stano.
The OSCE Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) recently expressed concerns over the fairness and equality of the nomination process in its interim report, noted Stano.
“The appointments go against key provisions of the 19 April Agreement to pause all ongoing appointments, comply fully with all recommendations made by the Venice Commission, and overall to increase the independence, accountability and quality of the justice system in a broad, inclusive and cross-party reform process. Revising the selection process of Supreme Court judges in line with Venice Commission recommendations before proceeding with appointments, is also a mutually agreed condition for the disbursement of the second tranche of EU macro-fi nancial assistance to Georgia under its current program, which could be negatively affected by this step,” the spokesperson underlined.
“The vote is therefore a missed opportunity for the Georgian authorities to prove their commitment to a genuine and comprehensive reform of the judiciary. These developments carry a risk of damaging judicial independence and public trust.
“The EU is open to further talks at the highest levels to discuss justice reform and the way ahead following these developments, notably in the context of the 19 April Agreement and decisions regarding EU macro-fi nancial assistance to Georgia,” he concluded.
Georgian Parliament approved six of nine Supreme Court judges on July 12: Ketevan Meskhishvili (4 for, 2 against), Eka Zarnadze (5 for, 6 against) and Giorgi Shavliashvili (3 for, 7 against) failed to receive enough votes at the extraordinary plenary session.
The Parliament supported the candidacies of Gocha Abuseridze, Giorgi Gogiashvili, Levan Tevzadze, Revaz Nadaraia, Bidzina Sturua and Lasha Kochiashvili.
Interviews with the candidates for the Supreme Court, nominated by the High Council of Justice, began on July 6 in Parliament.
Civil society and diplomats called on the Georgian Parliament not to elect judges to the Supreme Court until a judicial reform under European Council President Charles Michel’s document is carried out. Based on the April 19 agreement, “all current appointments to the Supreme Court should be suspended and applications for new candidates resumed after the new law enters into force.”
A New Fault-line through Georgia
OP-ED BY EMIL AVDALIANI*
As emotions subside, it is now time to put what happened in Tbilisi into perspective. In a conservative country such as Georgia, antagonism to all the things liberal could run deep at times. Resistance to novelties, especially those sexual or religious, is bound to cause divisions within society. This in turn causes political tensions, deviation from real problems the country is marred in, and possible repercussions for the country’s foreign policy.
We should frame the violence in Tbilisi from a broader perspective. It is a challenge to liberal ideas and ultimately to the liberal world order. The real danger, though, is in a hybridity of the challenge. A country can be democratic, with numerous parties, active election campaigns and other features characteristic to rule by the people’s consent. Nevertheless, a democracy can be illiberal. Power politics can be a dominating feature and have immense pull on a dominant political force. It allows preservation of political power, denigration of opponent political forces, and most of all the use of various methods of using religious and nationalist sentiments to increase or decrease tensions. It happens across Eurasia, and Georgia is no exception. Illiberalism is agile enough in appropriating ideas on state governance and molding them into the illiberal agenda.
Looking at the rise of illiberalism in Georgia, one cannot ignore the pull Russia has on the country. Connecting all internal problems to Russia has turned into mainstream thinking among opposition politicians, NGOs and at times even government fi gures. Exaggeration is commonplace, but when looking at the illiberal challenge from a long-term perspective, it becomes clear where Russia got things right. Moscow had to stop Georgia from becoming a NATO and EU member. It did so in 2008. Now, the process drags on, causing frictures across the very fabric of Georgian society. Belief in the ultimate success of the liberal agenda is being undermined; alternatives are being sought. The hybrid nature of the government is the most plausible development, whilt the next stage could well be a total abandonment of the EuroAtlantic aspirations or worse, an abandonment in essence, but not in rhetoric. Indeed, what seemed irrevocable now seems probable, if not real. Pushback against Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice is growing stronger. Protesters in front of the Parliament in central Tbilisi violently brought down the EU fl ag. Twice. It might seem irrelevant, but the message was all too clear.
The rhetoric of anti-liberal groups has also been evolving. There has been a signifi cant growth in the sophistication of the messages of violent groups. Antipride sentiment evolved into a wider resistance to the Western way of life and Georgia’s western foreign policy path.
To deal with the challenge, Western support is important, but much depends on the Georgian government and the population as a whole. A pushback against radicalism and anti-liberalism should come in the form of a considerable amount of time and resources put into the development of stronger institutions. The latter often falter in Georgia. Urgency in addressing the problem has never been higher than it is nowadays: internal and foreign challenges converge and present a fundamental challenge to what Georgia began to pursue after Eduard Shevardnadze – Western development in the foreign and internal political realms. The complication for Georgia, however, is that in the time of illiberal pushback, the collective West too is faltering. EU and NATO expansion are on hold, and internal differences beset the multilateral institutions on which the liberal order operate. The critical window which Georgia had between the end of the Soviet Union and the mid-2010s is now largely gone. Hopes for a reinvigorated EU and NATO in the South Caucasus are slim, and, unfortunately for Georgia, it does not have enough geopolitical power to pursue a full-scale multilateral foreign policy. Relations with Russia are tied to the issue of illegal Russian troop presence in Georgia’s two regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; more intense ties with China might result in a negative reaction from the US, and the same goes for relations with Iran.
Georgia is increasingly neither in the West, nor in the East, but somewhere in the middle. This brings risks, less security and more uncertainty.
Resistance to novelties, especially those sexual or religious, is bound to cause divisions within society. This in turn causes political tensions, deviation from real problems the country is marred in, and possible repercussions for the country’s foreign policy. Image source: austria.tenzica.com