POLITICS

FEBRUARY 18 - 24, 2022 POLITICS

5 Russia’s Shift from “Greater Europe” to “Greater Asia”

ANALYSIS BY EMIL AVDALIANI*

When Russia instigated war in Ukraine in 2014 and pushed Kyiv to the West, analysts pointed out, quite rightly, that Russia without its western neighbor would become more of an Asian power. With the country’s borders more in Asia than in Europe, it was argued, Moscow would inescapably focus more on the Middle East and China. The latter would become Russia’s primary ally in global politics, but there would also be fears that Beijing would overshadow Moscow’s role in their bilateral relations. In other words, analysts believed Russia would turn into a Chinese appendage that provided energy resources to the Asian giant.

Years have passed, and there have been some interesting twists in the tale. Russian analysts and many in the West have started to develop the idea that the “Ukraine problem” and the ensuing deterioration of relations with the West freed Russia from its Euro-centrist views on foreign policy. For the fi rst time since Peter the Great, Russia would initiate the “de-Europeanization” of its geopolitical outlook and once again be truly Russian in terms of the way it conducted its foreign relations. In this analysis, Beijing is viewed as a facilitator for Moscow.

Because the two countries share a desire to limit US infl uence across Eurasia, there is indeed a sympathy among the Russian political elites for the idea of growing and formalizing Russia-China relations beyond the current level. Some even hesitantly approve of an alliance.

This juggling of ideas about Russia’s foreign policy since 2014 is intriguing, but it obscures a crucial development: Russia is slowly being turned into an Asian power. Many might fi nd this assertion farfetched and claim that Moscow now has more avenues through which to project its power across the Eurasian landmass. This “new diversifi cation” idea misses the simple fact that Russia has always had a diversifi ed foreign policy. Moscow was heavily involved in the Middle East for centuries. This applies not only to the Ottoman Empire of the 18th-19th centuries, but also to Russian interests in Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan (if we consider it as separate from Central Asia), northern China, the Korean Peninsula, and elsewhere. This was true during the time of the Romanovs as well as during Soviet times. The idea that Russian foreign policy since the Ukraine crisis has become more diversifi ed does not correspond to the reality of the past two centuries.

What we are seeing today is declining Russian political clout in eastern Europe. There might be talk of Russia’s pipeline geopolitics (often successful), successful annexation of Crimea, and thwarting of Ukraine’s, Moldova’s, and Georgia’s NATO/EU aspirations, but the ultimate success of all those measures remains open to question. The West is much more powerful than Russia in terms of economy and soft power, while Russia has been antagonizing its neighbors.

Russia is becoming more Asia-focused (including the Middle East) not because of a Kremlin master plan but because playing the China card is inevitable and because that is the region where Moscow can place itself.

About ten years ago, the Russian political elite was enthusiastic about the prospect of creating a greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok. This would have been a more or less unifi ed economic space extending all the way to the borders of China. Putin himself publicly advocated this idea. A few years later, Russia’s vision completely changed. In geo-economic terms, Putin’s greater Europe idea was gradually replaced by the concept of a greater Asia from St. Petersburg to Shanghai.

In 2014, China displaced Germany as Russia’s number one trade partner, but Russia is only tenth among China’s trade partners. China has also replaced Germany as Russia’s biggest supplier of machinery and equipment.

It is commonplace in Russia for grand geopolitical ideas to shift. A decade ago, Russians envisioned closer political and economic relations with Europe. Now many think about near-strategic cooperation with China, while still others think about being independent of China.

Moscow will maintain relations with Europe. Many military, security, and economic problems across Europe can only be solved with Russian participation. But there are economic and cultural shifts that limit Russia’s projection of power into Ukraine, the Baltic States, and even the South Caucasus. Russia has a freer hand in Central Asia, through military moves in the chaotic Middle East and Africa. This illustrates how Russia, without Ukraine and the Baltic States, now has more frontiers in Asia than in Europe.

It has become fashionable among Russia analysts to point out how in the past two decades under Putin the country regained much of its internal strength, which resulted in foreign policy successes. In fact, what has been more pivotal within the context of Russian history is that the Russian political elite in the past 20 years has been seeking the country’s new place in Eurasia.

This development was easily foreseen. After losing large swathes of formerly Soviet territory, Russia was forced to fi nd its place in 21st century Eurasia. Moscow would like to portray itself as independent, but it isn’t. Unable to accommodate itself with Europe, Russia has little choice but to turn to Asia.

After losing large swathes of formerly Soviet territory, Russia was forced to fi nd its place in 21st century Eurasia. Moscow would like to portray itself as independent, but it isn’t

Image source: Mladen Antonov/AFP via Getty Images

*Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.

Christoph Lanz on Berlin and Moscow’s Uneasy Relations

Continued from page 1

It’s a German-Russian project, but the US President says “forget it” because the German Chancellor doesn’t have the strength to even speak out the name of the pipeline in the press conference, which, from my point of view, has to do with his internal party problems in the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats have a long history of closer ties to the Russians than any other current party.

WOULD GERMANY AND SCHOLZ BE WILLING TO TOE THE WASHINGTON LINE WHEN IT COMES TO NORD STREAM 2?

If something happens around Ukraine regarding the sanctions, I’m 100% confi dent that we will not start to operate Nord Stream 2, that’s for sure. If the German government decides differently, if Putin starts a new aggression against Ukraine and we don’t touch Nord Stream 2, this means he managed to successfully divide Europe. Nord Stream 2 isn’t just a pipeline anymore, it’s now a symbol too. GERMANY HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR ITS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS STANCE ON UKRAINE – WHAT IS IT WITH THE GERMAN THINKING THAT DIFFERS WITH THE REST OF THE WEST?

We have our share of “Putinverstehers,” such as the crazy former chancellor Schroder, whose behavior is disgusting. But even if we have these Putinverstehers, most in Germany are in favor of Ukraine and its sovereignty. Also, we don’t want a war within Europe. That might be, by the way, our problem in that confl ict. Timothy Snyder, an American historian, says that Russia will always try to gain back their “blood lands”, their sphere of infl uence – Ukraine is one of these countries, and so is Georgia. When he was in Berlin, he said that we have to become aware of the real intentions of the Russians. And then he said, “You know what the question is? It’s are you ready to fi ght for those or not?” We are not, and this is the problem. WEAPONRY TO UKRAINE? BECAUSE THAT’S ONE STANCE THAT GERMANY HAS SEEN A LOT OF CRITICISM FOR. ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT BERLIN’S OFFICIAL LINE OF EXPLANATION CENTERS ON NOT DELIVERING WEAPONS TO TENSION ZONES – YET BERLIN HAS SEEN RECORD WEAPONS SALE REVENUES IN THE LAST YEAR, AND HAS BEEN SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO COUNTRIES LIKE EGYPT. WHY THE DOUBLE STANDARDS?

I would say that while the Ukrainian President was a former comedian, he’s now the president and a politician, whereas the German government and politicians behave like comedians now by sending helmets to Ukraine. It’s ridiculous. I personally think we should not start to send millions of weapons, but I think it would be a good sign of solidarity to send a limited amount, whatever kind of defense-oriented weapons they may be. And I’m not the only one who says that in Germany. Around one fi fth of the population thinks the same. THE ONLY DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION THAT RUSSIA SEEMS TO FAVOR – AND WHICH BERLIN AND PARIS WOULD PROBABLY BE CONTENT WITH – MAKES KYIV VERY UNHAPPY. THE MINSK AGREEMENTS AND ITS STEINMEIER FORMULA ATTACHMENT MAKES UKRAINE WORRY IT WILL LEAD TO FEDERALIZATION AND A DE-FACTO VETO ON THE COUNTRY’S WESTERN COURSE. ARE KYIV’S FEARS JUSTIFIED?

It’s not that I want to push any conspiracy theories, but you have to remember that Steinmeier was a very close ally of Gerhard Schroder. He served as Chief of Staff of the Chancellery for six years during Schroder’s tenure. And he belongs to the “old boys” network of the Social Democrats. I don’t think he followed our ethics and our principles when he made such a proposal. So I would say Kyiv’s fears are justifi ed. I can really understand that people in Ukraine are irritated by Germany today, I met with a Ukrainian friend of mine, and when it came time to say goodbye to her, I said I felt very embarrassed by the German government’s behavior. I apologized, and said I wished her country all the best. And it wasn’t easy for me. But that’s all you can say.

AND FINALLY – YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS RT VS DEUTSCHE WELLE STANDOFF THAT THE KREMLIN SEEMS TO BE ALL TOO TRIGGERHAPPY ABOUT?

The confl ict around Deutsche Welle and Russia Today is another stone in the mosaic of the tensions between Germany and Russia. That’s really a tough, asymmetrical reaction – rolling out big cannons after a little incident. I see it as a pure provocation, but what should our answer be? Should we kick out the Russian journalists because of that? I don’t think that would be clever. Our policy is that, unlike Russia, we really have press independence. And we really respect the freedom of opinion, maybe sometimes even too much. We should demand the return of Deutsche Welle, because they had a running license – unlike Russia Today – and the Russian state just took it away. But in one and a half, two years from now, Deutsche Welle will open up an offi ce in Moscow again.