17 minute read
POLITICS
from Issue #1332
Georgia is Not Doing Enough: Ian Kelly on the Russian Threat and What It Means for Georgia
INTERVIEW BY VAZHA TAVBERIDZE
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Idon't think US support will be affected, but I would pay very close attention to what European leaders are saying, and I think Georgia needs to really step up its diplomacy with Brussels, Berlin and Paris, - former US Ambassador to Georgia and the OSCE, Ian Kelly, told RFE/ RL, commenting on the possible impact of the critical situation in Ukraine on Georgia and its increasingly forlornlooking Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV SAYS THEY HAVE NO PLANS TO INVADE UKRAINE. WHY DON'T WE BELIEVE THIS?
We don't believe it because if they don't have plans to invade Ukraine, why are they setting up exactly the kind of force that they would need to invade Ukraine? What we're seeing now are the enabling assets like medical facilities, logistical units, all the kinds of things that you would need to support a large over-theborder force. If they really aren’t going to invade Ukraine, why are they spending so much on resources? And there are still more forces moving in, there's a buildup going on. We can't know what their intentions are, but their statements in the past, to put it mildly, have not been entirely truthful. We have to look at what the capabilities are, and assume what their intentions are.
IF NOT INVASION, WHAT?
Well, that's the big question. I think there's a large menu of options that Putin can choose from - this is not just a force at one point of the border: He has forces arrayed from the north east and the south; basically, the kind of force that can easily divide Ukraine in two. And then you have all these voices in Moscow who are hell-bent on regime change in Kyiv.
I HESITATE TO TRY AND GUESS WHAT'S ON PUTIN'S MIND, BUT IF YOU LOOK AT EVERYTHING THAT HE’S TRYING TO DENY, AND THE UKRAINIAN’S WITH THEIR WESTERN ORIENTATION, IT SEEMS PUTIN WANTS TO SUBORN UKRAINE TO RUSSIA.
I don't think he wants to necessarily annex Ukraine, but he certainly wants to be sure that he has a regime in Kyiv that isn't going to integrate with Western institutions; one that instead, will integrate with Putin's Eurasian institutions, as Belarus and Kazakhstan have, for example. He was happy with the regime that was in Ukraine until 2014, under Yanukovych, so I think that's more the kind of model regime he's looking for.
THERE WAS ALSO A BILL INITIATED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE DUMA THAT DONETSK AND LUHANKS SHOULD BE DECLARED INDEPENDENT. HOW LIKELY IS THAT TO HAPPEN?
As I say, Putin has a menu of options, and I think that many people are concerned that he has really put himself in a corner now, where, unless he takes some kind of action, he's going to appear weak. President Biden said he expects him to move in, and I agree. I think he'll feel obligated to do something militarily. You know, I'm not a betting man. But I would bet that he does something. THEN BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. THE EXTENT OF THAT CONFUSION WAS BIG ENOUGH TO LEAD US TO ASK HOW THAT PRESS CONFERENCE ACTUALLY REFLECTS THE US POLICY AND STANCE.
Former Ambassador of the US to Georgia, Ian Kelly. Source: trend.az
I think that the President was thinking out loud, which is very dangerous when the cameras are rolling and you're the president. There are allies who are looking for ways not to have the gas shut off, for example. Central Europe, in particular, relies almost completely on Russian gas. So he was simply answering the question in his own head, about the diffi culty of having a package of what we call “massive and painful” sanctions if it is just a small incursion. His mistake was thinking out loud what we know. So, I don't think it's really a refl ection of the policy, it's a refl ection of reality. The defi nition of a gaffe is a government offi cial speaking the truth. He was speaking the truth about the situation, that what kind of package it could be, the pain it could infl ict, could very well depend on the size of the military action by Putin. The reason his comment caused such consternation is because it appeared to, and I don't think this is what he meant, but it appeared to say that if Putin chooses on just a minor incursion, there would not be serious consequences. But I think in the United States, there is bipartisan support for very painful sanctions.
UKRAINE SEEMS UNHAPPY WITH THE FACT THAT THERE MIGHT BE LAYERS OF WESTERN RESPONSE, IF ANYTHING HAPPENS. SO WHAT DO WE TELL PRESIDENT ZELENSKY?
You know, I think it's not so much what we tell him, it's what we do for him. We have been working with a number of European nations to provide the kind of defensive weaponry that Ukraine would need to repel a Russian invasion. You have the US providing anti-tank systems, anti-aircraft systems, the UK is, the Baltic states are, the Czech Republic too. The thing is deeds, not words, when it comes to Ukraine.
REGARDING THE WEST’S THREAT OF “UNPRECEDENTED SANCTIONS” - THERE ARE QUITE PERSISTENT VOICES WHICH CLAIM THAT RUSSIA HAS ALREADY BUILT ITSELF UP AGAINST POSSIBLE SANCTIONS, SO IT WON’T DEFLECT PUTIN TO INCREASE THEM.
That's a very fair point, and it's a concern that all of us have. Putin knows what his sovereign wealth fund and strategic reserves are. That's one of the reasons we have to be concerned that sanctions are not going to deter him. Putin has been able to exploit this idea of the West trying to undermine Russia, that they want to destroy Russia with sanctions, and he's exploited that politically, to rally the nation against aggression from the outside.
I think the message we're sending, or at least I hope we're sending, to Russia, is that this is not 2014. The reason Crimea was such a triumph for Putin in 2014 was because it was bloodless. The Ukrainians did not fi ght back- there were no Russian casualties in the annexation of Crimea. This is a fundamentally different situation. If he goes in now, obviously, it's all Russian troops, and there will be casualties. So it's not going to be the same kind of triumphal atmosphere, because young Russians are going to die.
DO YOU THINK PUTIN WILL SHY AWAY FROM SPILLING RUSSIAN BLOOD TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES?
The very short answer is no: I don't think he will. I think it'll be something of a limiting factor on what he does in terms of scale and the length of any military action, but he was certainly willing to spill Russian blood in Georgia in August 2008.
SPEAKING OF GEORGIA - WHAT IMPACT IS ALL THIS GOING TO HAVE? WHERE DOES IT LEAVE GEORGIA WITH ITS ASPIRATIONS OF GETTING OUT OF THE KREMLIN’S BACKYARD?
They're never going to get out of that backyard, I’m afraid. But what we hope is that they can get away from the hegemonic, imperialistic designs that Russia has on the South Caucasus, not just on Georgia. If you look at some of the recent pronouncements from Washington and Moscow, the good news is that Anthony Blinken, the Secretary of State, whenever he talks about the unacceptability of Russia's demands that post-Soviet states not be allowed to join NATO, he always says, “we will never close the door to Ukraine.” And Georgia is always mentioned, and that's good news. The bad news is that Russia also mentioned Georgia when they said it is unacceptable for post-Soviet countries to join NATO. I don't think there's any possibility that the US would reduce its military cooperation with Georgia - Georgia can be confi dent that the United States will not reduce its presence there.
If there's an invasion of Ukraine, it's going to affect everybody in Europe. And it'll affect Georgia just as it will the international community. And, of course, Georgia, is a heck of a lot closer to Ukraine than the United States is. It's going to really affect a lot of issues related to trade. Depending on the size of any kind of military action, obviously, the Black Sea is going to be affected, trade routes will be affected. But I don't think Putin is interested in a multi-front war, and I don't think Georgians should be concerned about further military actions.
As for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, I don't think it would affect it in terms of US support. But I would pay very close attention to what European leaders are saying about it, and I think that Georgia needs to really step up its diplomacy with Brussels, Berlin and Paris.
IS WHAT GEORGIA IS DOING TODAY NOT ENOUGH? IS THERE MORE ROOM FOR MANEUVER?
No, it’s not enough. Georgia could be doing a heck of a lot more, and I, frankly, am a bit disappointed that Georgia has not been more active diplomatically. I don't believe the Prime Minister has yet called his counterpart in Kyiv. That's extraordinary. I don't understand why the PM or President haven't reached out to Kyiv and said, “we will stand with you.” It's disappointing to any friend of Georgia to see Tbilisi keeping its head down in this way. Why? I mean, it shares a common goal with Kyiv. Why isn’t Georgia saying that? Why isn’t it asking Zelensky what it can do to help?
I think it's an attempt to not draw attention to itself. That is one approach, but it’s not the kind of approach that a country should take when a strategic partner like Ukraine is under threat of military aggression. And I don't agree with that approach. That's a big mistake, staying silent. Keeping your head down actually encourages aggression from the Kremlin. Speaking out, offering help, being very visible in supporting Ukraine's Western orientation, that is a deterrence to aggression. So I would really hope that Georgia at least offers help. It’s not hard to do. I just don't understand why they haven't come out and said, “What can we do? You are our partners; you are being threatened by Russian aggression as we are. What can we do to help you?” I haven't seen it, and I don't understand why.
LAST WEEK, THE WEST REBUFFED RUSSIA’S “SECURITY DEMANDS” IN NO UNCERTAIN LANGUAGE. YET, NOW FM LAVROV CLAIMS THAT THEY ARE EXPECTING A WRITTEN RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON AND NATO. TO WHAT END?
The reason Russia gets to send those demands in the fi rst place is that NATO has not issued or made that long overdue Membership Action Plan for Ukraine, instead accommodating Russia's vision that its security depends on its neighbors’ insecurity. As to what end, there are two possibilities. One is there'll be something on the paper which Russia will package as a victory. And the other is that Russia will say, “Behold! This is a Western ultimatum and gives us no choice but to respond with force!” Putin doesn’t really mind the difference between “Pravda” and “Istina”, as long as he can twist the former to sell as the latter to Russians.
IF THIS SCENARIO WERE TO MATERIALIZE, WHERE DOES IT MAKE MOST SENSE FOR RUSSIA TO STRIKE – WHAT WOULD BE THE PRIORITY TARGETS?
Edward Lucas. Image courtesy of Vytautas Magnus University INTERVIEW BY VAZHA TAVBERIDZE FOR RFE/RL
The fears in the West can probably be summed up in the statement of the Polish Co-Chair at OSCE’s last meeting: “This is the closest we’ve been to war with Russia in the last 30 years”. It is a sentiment that resonates with British journalist, author and analyst Edward Lucas, who spoke to RFE/RL to offer his insights on the ongoing West-Russia standoff and looming war in Ukraine.
“In the end, I feel very angry and disappointed that my warnings over the last 15 years have not been listened to,” Lucas says. “Not just me, but people from the Baltic States and from other countries in the region have been complaining since the 1990s that Russia was going in the wrong direction. Nobody listened, and now we face a really serious European security crisis and the possibility of war.”
WHY DO YOU THINK IT TOOK SO LONG FOR THE WEST TO WAKE UP?
The question is – Have they really woken up yet? There’s an idea that it’s all the result of NATO expansion or a failure to have a working dialogue with Russia. I think at least half the West is still asleep. We already have 14,000 Ukrainians dead because of the West's complacency, naivety and greed. And I've a fear that that that number is going to go up.
PLEASE ELABORATE IN WHAT ASPECT THE WEST WAS NAÏVE TOWARD RUSSIA.
We assumed that the old Cold War was completely over and there wouldn't be a new one. And we didn't understand that a Chekist is still a Chekist, even if he doesn't have a hammer and sickle on his shoulder. And so that was a serious, serious mistake. And we didn't understand that Russian Imperialism is still Russian Imperialism, even if Russia is weak. So that was the naiveté. And the complacency was that we said “yes, there is a problem, but we can deal with it. We just need a bit more dialogue, maybe slower expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe, but there's nothing serious.” The greed was that we thought we could continue to make money out of it. That, in a way, is the worst thing we did. Lenin said “When it comes time to hang the capitalists, they will vie with each other for the rope contract.” And Vladimir Putin has put that into practice: He's given us a great deal of rope, and we've tied a very effective knot.
THE “LET’S HAVE DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA” MOTTO THAT SO MANY WESTERN LEADERS ARE STILL KEEN ON – WHAT WOULD BE RESULTS OF SUCH A DIALOGUE?
I'm very much in favor of dialogue and of negotiations, but you have to have your own objectives very clear and know what it is you're willing to concede and what it is you're not willing to concede. If a mafi osi comes knocking on your door and says, “I want you to give me your business,” the response should not be “Okay, let's negotiate.” You should say, “I'm calling the police.” And this is this is what we failed to do. We should treat Vladimir Putin like a Tony Soprano from The Sopranos series – I found that series to be a very useful guide to Russian thinking, because the product is really very similar to Vladimir Putin.
NEWS IS THAT THE UK JUST PROVIDED UKRAINE WITH ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. WHAT IS THE UK STAKE IN THIS CONFRONTATION AND THE EXTENT OF ITS INVOLVEMENT?
The UK takes the Russian threat seriously, and supporting Ukraine is one of the principles of our strategy. I'm pleased about this. We've done quite a lot and I wish we'd done it earlier, but what we need is all European countries doing this. And I would like to see, in an ideal world, Mr. Scholz, the German Chancellor, together with President Macron, declare “we are on the side of Ukrainians, and we are not going to allow them to be intimidated, we're not going to allow any divide and rule game played in Europe,” and so on and so forth. But I fear it’s just wishful thinking on my part. If anything, the German government is pursuing the opposite approach of saying “we won't send any weapons because we don't want to escalate the situation.”
But of course, by doing that, they actually guarantee that things will get worse.
THERE WAS NEWS THAT CANADA ALSO DEPLOYED A SMALL CONTINGENT OF SPECIAL FORCES OPERATORS TO UKRAINE. IS THIS A SIGN THAT THERE IS MORE TO COME BOTH FROM THE UK AND CANADA?
No disrespect to Canada, but I don't think Putin will say, Oh, my goodness, the Canadians are coming, we have to change our plans! What we need is a major, immediate NATO reinforcement of the Baltic states, a snap NATO exercise, to show that NATO is ready to defend its members. We need strong bilateral support for Ukraine. And I would say the EU should accelerate its talks with Ukraine for Ukrainian membership. If I was running the EU, I would hold an emergency meeting of the European Council and issue a major political declaration saying we want Ukraine in the European Union as soon as possible, and I’d really speed up negotiations to send a signal to Putin that everything he does is counterproductive; that if you try and pull Ukraine away from the West, the West responds appropriately. But as I say, this is merely what I think should happen, not what I think will happen. There are many options, and one possibility is they do something less that we fear. And then we would be so grateful that they haven't done what we really fear, that we don't mind what they've actually done- for example, some new arrangement in Belarus which will be very threatening for Ukraine and turn Belarus into an extension of the Russian Federation, at least in military terms. That could be one would-be result, at which many in the West would say “thank goodness, we didn't get a war.” Or Russia might try and secure the water supply in Crimea, which would be a major benefi t for them if they can get hold of that canal. Or they might try and do something in the Sea of Azov or try and take Mariupol. They might end up formally incorporating the DNR and LNR into the Russian Federation. Putin’s got the initiative, he can choose. He's like a pianist staring at a keyboard and thinking what to play. What we should be doing is taking the keyboard away from him, rather than waiting to see what tune he chooses.
THE WEST IS THREATENING “UNPRECEDENTED” SANCTIONS. HOW “UNPRECEDENTED” DO THEY NEED TO BE TO ACTUALLY MAKE PUTIN CHANGE HIS MIND?
I don’t think it should be just about sanctions, but about showing that we're willing to defend ourselves: The of accelerating Ukraine's accession to the EU, a big military reinforcement to the Baltic region, something in the Black Sea, and bilateral military assistance to Ukraine. And I'd also suggest that we make a very speedy offer to Finland and Sweden to get into NATO. Sanctions against Russia are okay, up to a point, but in the end, I don’t think they're decisive. We could have an embargo, refuse to buy Russian oil, gas or coal, but that's diffi cult. There's not much political appetite for that, because Europe is very short of gas already.
YOU MENTIONED THE EU SHOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD MEMBERSHIP ACCESS TO UKRAINE, WHILE NATO SHOULD PROVIDE A MAP TO KYIV. WHERE DOES ALL THIS LEAVE GEORGIA?
I think Georgia is in a very diffi cult position, that it’s lost its reputation as an outpost of democracy, rule of law, media freedom and so on in the Caucasus, and there's been a lot of very justifi ed concern about the way things have been going in recent years. So, I think that Georgia’s gone down the agenda. And I feel very sorry: Georgia hasn't gone down my agenda; I have many Georgian friends, and I care very much about what's happening there. But I think that the internal situation is not helping the country’s foreign policy, and when we talk about NATO and EU hopes, I think the danger is that Georgia is less of a priority than before. Many people in the West might say that Georgia has already for a long time been under Russian infl uence and it hasn’t got either the symbolic nor the strategic importance it once had, but I don't want to talk down Georgia's chances. I would certainly campaign very hard for Georgia to be treated as a case.
IS GEORGIA ITSELF CAMPAIGNING HARD ENOUGH TO BE INCLUDED?
To put it crudely, Georgia's got to get its act together- I'm not sure that Mr. Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream party fully realize the serious harm the damage to their reputation and these political shenanigans we’ve been seeing have been doing to the country's reputation. A major overhaul would be needed for Georgia to be taken seriously.
