POLITICS

The Georgian Orthodox Church is Undermining Georgia’s Secular Democracy

OP-ED BY WILL CATHCART, FOR THE DAILY BEAST

While dozens of journalists were getting brutally attacked by a lynch mob of religious anti-LGBTQ extremists on July 5, the Georgian Orthodox Church was churning out Kremlinesque nationalist propaganda to galvanize an already violent mob.

“Forget about no violence. You are obligated to be violent. For your homeland. For your country. For holiness,” a priest from the church roared at a crowd gathered in front of the parliament building in Georgia’s capital city of Tbilisi, where a protest against Pride celebrations was taking place. This was nothing short of a battle cry.

The Georgian republic was founded on “Western” aspirations, and year after year, support for Georgia’s EU and NATO aspirations polls around 75%. But at the same time, trust in the Georgian Orthodox Church polls just as well, despite fanatical bishops vying for the throne of the 88-year-old patriarch miring the Church in scandals and intrigue, including allegations of sexual abuse and a murder plot involving cyanide.

This is where Moscow sees an opportunity. Though Russia continues to consume Georgian territory, the 2008 war was a relative failure. So, the Kremlin has pivoted to information warfare, and the Georgian Orthodox Church and its followers are a prime target.

Russian disinformation campaigns have long been carried out through proxy Georgian language outlets and public fi gures masquerading as the sole guardians of Georgian traditional values, spirituality, and patriotism. Their goal? To create panic that the US and EU are waging a war against Orthodox Christianity, and that only Putin can guarantee Georgia's territorial integrity and national identity.

The messaging of these campaigns is often as revealing as it is bizarre. Take the claims that people who live under dictatorial regimes like that of Syria are happier, that NATO-member Turkey is the real threat to Georgian territory, that life was better during the Soviet Union, that Russia has a new superweapon which gives it military superiority, and that “experimental vaccines are tested on Georgians,” in the US-run Luger Lab, a fi xation of Russian media as well.

It’s no wonder that Georgians are confused and angry. Facts, such as Russia’s creeping annexation of Georgian territory, have been dismissed as arbitrary and irrelevant.

The controversial “journalist” Jaba Khubua made a claim in the AsavalDasavali newspaper in 2018 that sums up the Kremlin’s disinformation messaging in Georgia: “During the tenure of [US] Ambassador Ian Kelly in Georgia, the propaganda of anti-national, liberast, homosexual ideology and pro-drug abuse movement reached unimaginable scales, pursuing the ultimate aim of moral and physical genocide of the Georgian nation.”

When the mob of Orthodox “Christians” tore down the EU fl ag in front of Parliament and stabbed a Polish tourist on July 5, it became evident that this was about more than media freedom and LGBTQ+ rights. The same increasingly fundamentalist religious order that claims to defend Georgia’s national identity had undermined its secular democracy, and the effi cacy of those Russian disinformation campaigns was on full display.

But something else was as well. The Georgian Orthodox church has successfully exploited the anger and desperation of those hurting most from Georgia’s faltering economy, particularly in the wake of COVID-19. Georgia is now ranked 20th globally in cases per million. The church has converted rage from Georgia's economic woes into the same creed of ultra-nationalism and “family purity” that Alexander Dugin brought to the Kremlin.

The Kremlin calls it Eurasianism. The message is as simple as it is historically absurd: Pan-Europeanism and Christianity are mutually exclusive, and as such, the EU is exporting homosexuality. With this false dichotomy, the Georgian government has been conned, and is now systematically refusing to protect minorities or to rein in the religious leaders who call for violence against them. It is a repeating cycle that has only grown worse.

On July 11, one of the battered journalists, cameraman Aleksandre Lashkarava, died. Thousands poured into the streets. They gathered in front of the same parliament building where the EU fl ag had been torn down the week before and demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. He refused.

Soon after, US State Department spokesman Ned Price announced that they were monitoring the situation closely and confi rmed that sanctions “for human rights abuses” were a possibility. For a country that is often lauded as a beacon of democratic leadership and reform in the region, this is an astonishing setback.

On the day of the mob attacks, PM Garibashvili made the conscious decision that a minority of his constituents were not worth protecting, despite being provided the capability to do so by the US. Instead, the Prime Minister belligerently claimed without evidence that Pride was organized by the “radical opposition,” along with the former Georgian president.

The Georgian people are fi ercely independent. Their country has been invaded by every empire worth its salt. Georgia’s spirit of independence is the reason that it remains free. This is the great irony of the events on July 5: Those attempting to defend Georgia's national identity and freedom do the bidding of those who want to take it away.

First published on The Daily Beast.

OPINION, Photo by Vano Shlamov/Getty

Does the Current Training Really Prepare the Georgian Army for War?

OP-ED BY MICHAEL GODWIN

It’s no secret that peacetime, while greatly desired, leads to an atrophied and often complacent military force. The endless garrison duties and training exercises are important but can lead to the ever present foe of monotony. Prior to the confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan, many Western militaries had been on a low operational tempo, only occasionally broken up by low-tempo deployments such as the KFOR mission in Kosovo.

With the severe reduction of NATO security forces on their missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, these armies will once again return to their barracks and fi ring ranges. Georgia, with its last contingent having returned to the homeland, will have to begin ensuring that the next inevitable confl ict will not catch them unprepared, this being something easier said than done.

However, this does not simply mean more time spent marching and camping in the fi eld. Rather, it will necessitate a deep examination of what their next confl ict will look like, and what they will need to do to win. Broadly, these most likely can be separated into two categories: defense against Russia and the next foreign NATO operation.

With increased aggression and internal military movements, as well as new brigades being raised, it’s clear the bear is not sleeping. Given Putin’s lust for expansionism, it’s only a matter of time until they return to not just seize their Black Sea mistress, but also end the growing NATO presence in the Caucasus. Strategically, they have the positioning to allow a rapid infl ux of forces to arrive behind the existing troops in the occupied territories. From as close as Vladikavkaz, Grozny, and Stavropol, a multitude of divisions can be in the deployment zone in hours, not days.

Since 2008, the Russian military has seen a series of reforms and nearly uncountable equipment upgrades. Should they come, they will be the same force Georgia faced before, and far more prepared to fi nish what they started 13 years ago. From individual and vehicle weapon systems to advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies, Georgia will see fi ghting in streets, the sky, and most importantly in cyberspace. Electronic Warfare (EW) systems have been added to even Russian company and battalion level units, adding to the complexity commanders will face in the fi eld.

To face this new advanced threat, Georgia has to revise its entire battle plan. Conducting force-on-force training exercises with a near-enemy force will not suffi ce. The recent NATO-led events have been designed to fi t this Cold War model of fi ghting. Georgia will have to take pages from their former enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq to fi ght the enemy in a way they may never have done so before.

Light, asymmetric, and irregular combat training will need to become essential for Georgian servicemembers, particularly to defeat ISR and EW operations. Sabotage, raid, ambush, and information warfare will become the watchwords for the Georgians operating in this environment. Warfi ghters will need to be prepared for fi ghting a very different style, emulating their Taliban counterparts and less their traditional NATO allies. Barbarous as it may be, it will most assuredly be the only strategy to ensure a future for a free Georgia.

One particular book, The Other Side of the Mountain; Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, written by Mujahideen commander Ali Ahmad Jalali and retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Lester Grau and published in 1995, is a resource providing exceptionally valuable insight for Georgian commanders to explore these tactics.

Photo by Pfc. Lloyd Villanueva/U.S. Army

NATO

Georgia’s commitment to NATO and its future ascension is imperative not only for its own sovereignty, but also essential as a partner for global security. As a part of this force for good, Georgia will need to anticipate the next NATO operation, its environment, and its technical and tactical requirements. Planning for this can be diffi cult, but examining the global threat elements show a need for CounterInsurgency (COIN) and aggressive peacekeeping operations that draw the need for both regular and irregular tactics.

Having units that are ready to operate perpendicular to standard battle drills and use a combination of civil affairs and Unconventional Warfare (UW) tactics will be much more valuable in future operations. This fl exibility will pay dividends in future confl icts, as the majority of the adversaries will be non-state actors and insurgent groups led by a fl uid leadership element. The traditional strategy of cutting the head off the proverbial snake does not work anymore when that head regenerates somewhere else.

The old symptoms of victory and defeat no longer apply. There is no grand parade in the capital city of the enemy, with pomp and fl air, and crowds of jubilant liberated civilians. Long-term hybrid confl icts with the aim of stability, peacekeeping and peacemaking, as well as ensuring negative foreign actors (Russia and China) are blocked out from their infl uence. Infrastructure projects and humanitarian assistance packages will take the place of large-scale waves of soldiers and tanks. Georgia, in its NATO involvement, will need to become more sensitive to these subjects.

Georgia’s military has undoubtedly advanced leaps and bounds in the past decade. However, their lessons learned and experiences on the ground in NATO missions should not be left to the wayside. Days and nights spent in the fi eld are valuable, but should not outweigh classroom time spent on the nuances of UW, EF, COIN, and counter-ISR strategy. Whether NATO knows it or not, they need nations like Georgia and Ukraine in their campaign against not only the Russian threat, but for the future of Central Asian diplomacy.

The Georgian Army should advance its education of UW and these other tactics, as this is rapidly becoming the norm. Not just for its special operations elements, but for its regular offi cer and non-commissioned offi cer corps as well. Whether fi ghting an insurgent group in Africa, or against a hybrid Russian force in their homeland, learning to fi ght like the Mujahideen did in Afghanistan in the 1980s will be essential to undermining their enemies’ ability to operate effectively and keep any hold on the battle space. As the old military adage says, “the regular forces have the watches, but the irregular forces have all the time.”

Political Elites and Georgia’s Foreign Policy

ANALYSIS BY EMIL AVDALIANI

To get a real sense of what the internal Georgian crisis is, we need a longer-term perspective. Since the elections, the crisis has been more about inter-party fi ghting than a search for the resolution of the long-term problems associated with the economy and political system. There is also a growing disillusion within wider sections of the public with the political establishment. As the last several elections showed, there is also a gradual drop in support for the governing party, Georgian Dream (GD). General apathy also explains the large abstention rate of voters since the 2016 elections.

The present internal political instability can be related to GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili’s distancing from politics in late 2020, which emboldened the opposition and set the scene for a struggle among various power groupings within GD, a trend that saps energies and the effectiveness of the ruling party. Furthermore, Giorgi Gakharia’s resignation, occasional demonstrations, and opposition parties calling for snap elections all point to continued turmoil and protracted uncertainty in Georgian politics. Gakharia’s successor Irakli Garibashvili, renowned for his harsh rhetoric against the opposition, added to the increasingly polarizing political climate. The opposition and a signifi cant part of the population is openly against his style of rule.

Reasons for the protracted crisis are also rooted in the unstable economic situation: despite the expected GDP growth of 4.3% in 2021, the national currency has slid signifi cantly and is expected to depreciate further against the US dollar. Wages and the level of FDI remain low, and infl ation is on the up, facilitating the outfl ow of the population abroad. This also means that in the long-term, Georgia will be increasingly dependent on infl ows of money sent from Georgian immigrants – a clear sign of a weak economic situation in the country.

These troubles will continue to undermine GD’s third consecutive term and will complicate its bid to remain in power until 2024, the crucial year the next parliamentary elections will be held and the government will make an offi cial EU membership bid, while the results of the 2021 municipal elections may see GD having to hold snap elections.

There is a larger disillusion with the whole political class in Georgia. General apathy with the ruling and opposition forces emanates from the premise that promises made for decades by various political parties to establish a solid base for an independent judicial system in the country have failed to be fulfi lled. What is worse, this failure is usually precipitated by the purposeful maneuverings of a ruling party, whether it is UNM (2004-2012) or GD (since 2012) to extend their hold on power.

But the roots of the internal troubles could be more far reaching. Ultimately, it could be about how detached the political elites of Georgia have become from the ordinary population. The opposition is hurdled by larger antipathy from wider sections of the public. The governing party is also witnessing a sharp decline in the number of its supporters. Long-term economic problems exacerbated by the pandemic make up a major challenge for the Georgian political class. But little has been offered over the past years to salvage the situation.

The vast majority of people in Georgia have come to loathe the entire political class. For many, the recurrent crises are more about the GD-UNM struggle than about democracy and the economic development of the country. No wonder that most people consider their social and economic human rights to have been violated for years, no matter which party is at the helm. This explains the large abstention rate of voters during elections in Georgia: large sections of the population do not see a preferred party with a fi tting program amidst this highly polarized political situation. Additionally, what Georgia lacked throughout its postSoviet independence period was a longterm policy planning to re-boot its fragile economy, heritage of the troubled 1990s, but more shifting attention from inter-party politics towards the needs of the economically poor population.

Democracy is struggling, and it is not only about whether the arrest of the opposition leader was a lawful act or even an urgently necessary move. We deal here with what the Georgian public has been accustomed to since the country regained independence: the belief that the ruling party always stands above the law. This was the case with Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili, and this is the scourge that befell GD, whether it wanted it or not. For ordinary citizens, there has been no break in the near cyclical actions of Georgian political elites in 30 years.

Ultimately, these internal problems are tied into what Russia needs: internal differences in Georgia, weakening of its international standing, and hopes for NATO/EU membership dashed. In the age of reinvigorated efforts for TransAtlantic partnership between the US and Europe, and Washington’s larger support for NATO, Georgia’s woes are a boon for Moscow. It makes sense geopolitically, and the Kremlin watches gleefully how the Georgian parties are ruining the country’s prospects by failing to attain not only deeper Western engagement, but general internal economic development and stability, so vital a detail for being attractive to the outside world.

A larger regional outlook too might shed some light. The South Caucasus is a region housing two small and extremely fragile democracies, Armenia and Georgia. The former took a major hit last year when its dependence on Moscow grew exponentially following Yerevan’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Now, Russia is more capable of backtracking the reformist agenda of the Armenian leadership. Protests are staged, and the ruling PM is weak and challenged. Russia is playing the long game, navigating and killing the last vestiges of Armenia’s independent foreign policy.

External circumstances are converging on Georgia’s internal troubles. The country is not solely experiencing a crisis because of the missteps of certain political parties; we might be dealing here with the wider problem of growingly unfi tting political elites which have become detached from the problems of ordinary people. If democracy-building is about constantly fi nding intra-party consensus, it is also about addressing the needs of the people. The success of this policy could ultimately serve as a backbone of Georgia’s NATO and EU aspirations.

If democracybuilding is about constantly fi nding intra-party consensus, it is also about addressing the needs of the people.

The vast majority of people in Georgia have come to loathe the entire political class. For many, the recurrent crises are more about the GD-UNM struggle than about democracy and the economic development of the country. Source: EUobserver

*Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.

Parliamentary Fact-Finding Commission: 2020 Elections Were Not Rigged

BY ANA DUMBADZE

The Temporary Parliamentary Fact-Finding Commission looking into the October 31, 2020, parliamentary elections has completed its work.

The activities of the commission were evaluated at the last session on Monday July 26, and the conclusion and recommendations of the commission of inquiry were approved.

The draft resolution of the Parliament regarding the conclusion of the Temporary Parliamentary Fact-Finding Commission was approved at the plenary session.

“The shortcomings revealed in the elections are mainly related to technical errors caused by the pandemic and stressful environment, and, in some cases, indifference and low competence of district commission members,” reads the conclusion.

Based on the report, the shortcomings identifi ed as a result of the work of the commission could not have any signifi cant impact on the fi nal results of the parliamentary elections.

“Reports from local observer organizations focus on pre-election pressure, intimidation, voter bribery and the use of administrative resources. However, it was found that the relevant data in the reports, in almost all cases, were not facts, but assumptions, and no evidence was presented,” reads the draft report.

“There is no falsifi cation, there were only small shortcomings,” said Givi Mikanadze, Chairman of the Temporary Parliamentary Fact-Finding Commission. He said the commission had recounted the 20 most problematic districts and received explanations from 38 people.