1. Vilification of Religion

domestic privacy would disturb public tranquillity and open the door to calumny and vexation.

Modern view: Generally, limits the acts of which penal law may properly take cognizance to the following:

1. Publicly vilifying religion

2. Hindering or obstructing religious ceremonies

5. Destroying or mutilating objects devoted to religious worship

4. Molesting or insulting Ministers of Religion

5. Violating monuments or things in place of worship.

Having premised these general and introductory observations we can now deal with the specific provisions of our law.

Section 161 lays down:

Whosoever by words, gestures, written matter, whether printed or not, or pictures or by some other visible means, publicly vilifies the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion which is the Religion of Malta and its Dependencies, or gives offence to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion by vilifying those who profess such religion or its ministers, or anything which forms the object of, or is consecrated to, or is necessarily destined for Roman Catholic worship, shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term from one to six months".

By Section 162 it is provided that where any of the said acts is committed against any cult tolerated by law, the punishment is imprisonment from one to three months.

The material element of this crime consists in the public vilification, by any of the means mentioned, of Religion directly or by vilifying those who profess it, or the ministers of religion, or anything which forms the object of or is created to or is necessarily destined for worship. The intention of the law here is to protect the religious sentiment in itself, considering it: “come fattore morale per l'individuo e la collettività, e quindi lo tutela non soltanto nelle sue estrinsecazioni esteriori, come esercizio di un

culto o come manifestazione individuale o collettiva dolio fede religiosa, ma anche in ciò che e' l'origino, il fondamento della fede, ossia nella religione in se' e per se'. La religione, invero, ha un contenuto che trascende il patrimonio morale individuale, per assurgere ad intereeoe generale; e', insomma, non tanto un fenomeno attinente alla coscienza individuale, quanto un fenomeno sociale della piu' alta importanza, anche per il raggiungimento dei fini etici dello stato. L'idea religiosa e' una delle idee-forze, dei valori morali e sociali che reggono il mondo". Thus was written in the Ministerial Report on the project of the Italian Code with reference to article 402 corresponding more or less to our Section 161.

The mental element consists in the consciousness and the will to commit the act as an act of vilification; "Basta al dolo la volont di vilipendere […], con la "coscienza della capacità offensiva per la religione "del fatto"231 .

Under the provisions in question the offence is always directed against Religion, i.e., the total of all those principles and beliefs constituting the faith taught by the Religious Authorities. The act may be committed against Religion either directly or by vilifying those who profess it, or its ministers, or the things essentially connected with the cult. But “l'offesa non vuole la presenza del soggetto passive”. Nor where the object of the offence is a minister of religion is it necessary that he shall be at the time in the actual performance of his sacerdotal functions. But it must be emphasised that in every case the law, in these provisions, is concerned not with giving any special or privileged protection to persons or any class of persons, but through such persons, with protecting Religion and the religious sentiment. The 'dolus' of the agent must be to vilify religion not merely the individual against whom the contumely or abuse is directed.

In every case the act is punishable under these provisions only if committed publicly, "perchè il diritto che ha l'uomo a vedere rispectata la propria religione non può essere offeso da atti commessi in privato; per poter dire aggredito il mio culto vi e' bisogno di un fatto esteriore che, manifestandosi ai sensi di molti, porti il culto stesso ad un discredito"232 .

231 Sofo Borghese, "Il Cod. Pen. Ital.", 1955, pg. 515, art. 402-403 232 Carrara, Prog., Parte Speciale Vol VI., para. 8359

Now it will be noticed that, for purposes of punishment, our law distinguishes the case in which the offence is committed against the Catholic Religion from the case in which it is committed against any other cult tolerated by law.

In Malta liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship is ensured by the Constitution (Sect. 53 of the "Malta (Constitution) Letters Patent, 1947"). But the Religion of Malta is the Catholic Religion. The very first legislative business transacted by our Parliament under the Constitution of 1921 was to pass an Act (Act No. I of 1922, Cap. 79) whereby it was declared that "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion is, as it has always been in the past, the Religion of Malta and its Dependencies".

There are those who consider that any such discrimination between the established religion and other faiths is unjustified. "Oggi lo stato non presta "il braccio secolare ad una speciale professione religiosa, "ma tutte le protegge egualmente come naturale espressione della coscienza dei cittadini"233. And in fact, in the Italian Code of 1889 the distinction made in previous codes between the Catholic Religion and other cults was abolished. Such distinction was, however, re-introduced in the Italian Code of 1930, also in implementation of the Lateran Treaty Of the 11th February, 1929, between Italy and the Holy See which, in Article 1 declares the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion to be the only Religion of the State and that "come tale, "e perchè professata dalla stragrande maggioranza degli Italiani, ha diritto a piu’ valida tutela giuridica"234 .

As was stated in the course of the debate on the said Act No. XXVIII of 1933, by which Sections 161 to 163 were added to our Criminal Code, these provisions were modelled on articles 402-406 of the present Italian Code, with certain modifications. But apart from precedent, there is a juridical basis for the provision of a more severe punishment where the crime is committed against the religion of the country, in our case the Catholic Religion which is the Religion of Malta.

This particular question was, in his usual masterly fashion, dealt with by Carrara who distinguished three kinds of government which he described as "intolerant", "indifferent", and "tolerant". An intolerant government affords its protection only to the

233 Maino, op. cit., art. 140, p. 476, 762 234 V. Borghese, op. cit., p. 515

state religion, which it considers as exclusively dominant. Who could have asked Mohammed - Carrara asks - to protect the religion of the Christians or of the Jews? It may be that, in such a state acts of aggression against other cults are punished as common offences when the circumstances give rise to such offences, as for instance, homicide, arson, theft, etc. But direct protection of the right of worship of the followers of such other cults is inconceivable, indeed inconsistent with the political institutions of such governments.

On the contrary, where the State is ’indifferent’, a difference in the degree of punishment of the offence against religious sentiment conditioned to the diversity of the religion in question is impossible, inasmuch as such a State does not protect any religion as such, but protects all religions merely as expressions of the liberty of conscience of the respective followers, and, consequently, it protects them all equally.

It is only in the penal codes of ’tolerant' governments that a distinction as aforesaid can be found. Such a government recognises one religion only as true, and as a civil institution designates it as the religion of the State: other cults are tolerated only in deference to the liberty of conscience which is also a political principle admitted by it. It can, therefore, consistently, give to the state religion a greater degree of protection: This difference, Carrara goes on to explain, "può coordinarsi anche a un principio meramente e strettamente giuridico: dicendo che nelle società siffattamente costituite l'aggressione contro "il culto dominante e’ complessa mentre quella diretta contro gli altri culti e' semplice nel rapporto della sua giuridica oggettività. E' semplica questa, perchè aggredisce soltanto la libertà dei cultori della religione offesa nella di lei estrinsecazione del sentimento religioso. E' complessa quella, perchè oltre allo aggredire ugualmente nei cittadini che professano il culto dominante la estrinsecazione della propria liberta’ di coscienza, offende eziandio una istituzione dello Stato. Ecco come e quando per quali ragioni possa nel reato di oltraggio al culto tenersi come criterio misuratore nel rapporto del suo danno immediato la diversità del culto aggredito"235 . Thus, the public interest of protecting the religion of the country is evidently greater than that of protecting other religions merely tolerated by the State.

235 Carrara, Parte Speciale. Vol. VI, 3312-3320