e) If, being committed on a woman with child, it hastens delivery

regard to the financial loss which may be occasioned to the victim (though such loss is not an essential consideration) owing to the duration of the infirmity or incapacity for the stated period, the injury well deserves to be classified as grievous.

It is to be noted that according to our law the infirmity and the incapacity to attend to one's occupation are contemplated alternatively, not cumulatively. Either is sufficient.

Although our law does not say it expressly, “occupation” means the victim's ordinary occupation. The injury will be grievous if it produces the incapacity of the victim to attend to his ordinary calling or work for thirty days or more, even though during the whole or some part of such time the victim was not totally or absolutely disabled from all kinds of work: the law speaks of “his (the victim’s) occupation” .

(e) If, being committed on a woman with child, it hastens delivery.

If, instead of merely hastening delivery, the injury causes miscarriage, then the punishment is considerably increased (Section 232 (l) (c)).

“Il criterio differenziale e' semplice: nel primo caso si e’ anticipata l'espulsione di un pardo maturo, e quindi si e. prodotto un danno relativamente lieve alla madre e al figlio; nel secondo il danno e. la vita del figlio”411 .

In other words, in the first case, there is merely the acceleration of delivery or premature delivery consisting in the extrusion of a child in such an advanced stage as to be capable of living: whereas in the second case, there is the extrusion of a foetus at a stage when it is incapable of an independent life.

In connection with this particular kind of grievous bodily harm, Italian text writers and commentators discuss the question whether knowledge of the pregnancy of the woman on the part of the offender is a requirement of the offence. Among the welter of contradicting theories propounded by the various writers based mostly on subtleties of distinctions and on provisions of positive law which have no counterpart in our own Code, we submit that in our law such knowledge is not an ingredient of the offence. We have already seen that in respect of the offence of bodily harm generally a specific intent to cause the particular degree of harm actually ensuing is not necessary: a

411 Altavilla, op. cit., p. 40