The Counterfeit Revolution: The Uncensored Story of the Marcos Regime in the Philippines by Gianfranco Toledo

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION Martial Law in the PhitiPPines

i,. 'irr' :'

i,, 1," l

REI.IBEN R. CANOY

ffiffitr Manila, Philippines 1980

'1 I I

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This book is dedicated to the memory of sincere, honest and independent men: my father, Mariano Canoy, and rny father-in-law, Pedro Torralba.

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CONTENTS

Foreword

I 6

would rather have a govenment run like hell by Filipinos than a govemment nrn Iike heaven by

Americans.

hesident Manuel L. euezon

29 36 53

6s 78 89 101

Prelude to a New Order The Ecology of Illartial Law Oplan Sagittarius The C.LA. Syndrome The Movement for a Free Philippines The Divided Opposition The ABC of Human Rights Memo to Media: The World is Flat Church vs. State The New Oligarchs

r2l

Land Reform Blues Alternatives in f)eveloPment t46 The Marcos Constitution 158 Barangganic Government t66 Facade Democracy 178 The Puppet Parliament 187 The Mindanao War' 202 Reformist or Revolutionary 212 The Other President 223 The Question of Succession 231 Towards the Kingdom of Maharlika 238 An Agenda for Nonnalization 132

fr !,

...

."1

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FOREWORD

irrr;rll. tlcprivcd countries known in the jargon of development as emergIt it ,1,, I'r1, ,,1 'l('vrlol)iltg, tJte search for political institutions and economic systems

,,rrl,l l,"rl lrrll'ill tltc promise of a better life has often been a painful process-' r,,nllr,nlr'rl, irt rttany cases, by indescribable human suffering dnd the loss of basic

ihrl d,

lt'r.rlrrrrrq .lr,l virlucs that all civilized societies cherish. | ' rr lr('lrfi lcss obviously repressive, less bloody than the coups and revolutions tirql lr,rvr 1,rrrr ;rpal'1. some nations in Africa, Central and South America, and Asia, lh' '1,,, llrirllon ol ntartial law in the Philippines has been touted byitsperpetrators ae !r !ilrl,Irr crPr:rience in peaceful political change, without parallel in the entire

*rrlrl

ffir

l'ri,qtrh,rrl lit:rrlinand E. Marcos, the man who brought this about, calls it a "*lpnr,t rrrlh rrvohrlion" or sotnetimes "a revolution from the center" - one staged k1 llre 11,,v,,rlrrrt'rrl ilsclf in order to abolish poverty, injustice and inequality. I lri' ,lrop;rliorr of extraordinary powers that Marcos justified as a democratic Ftelr lai' lr llr(, niune of "constitutional authoritarianism" might have served as a |;1r,,lsrl l,rr tlrr' lcirtlcrship of other developing countries confronted with the same frlrrlrft-11qq llrrrl llrc lrilipino nation was said to be facing tn lgT2,but for the fact that sf 15,1 rrlltlrl yr;rrs ol'rnartial rule conditions in the Philippines have, instead of improvlllg,

1,,,,

ilr1I, w(,t((' than eVef.

rmvllrinl',, martial law, Philippine style, stands as a reproof to all Third Wrrrl,l L,rrrlrrr wlto claim that a strong, authoritarian government - really a euphemlsri lnr rlrr trrlorship - is the answer to poverty and underdevelopment, and that if perrph' rr,,rrrt ,rlrrrrrtl:rnl rice they must be willing to forfeit their freedom. I lr,,llth rl hus become increasingly clear that his New Society never got off the ginur'l lnrilrrt'r lack of credibility and the moral strength that all reform movements tFrprlrr,. Mrrr'os still boasts of resounding successes in political, social and economic rElnlns rrrrrl rk:vclopment. With the complicity of the controlled media, he has renrler.trl ll rxlrcrrrcly difficult for most Filipinos to distinguistr between reality and lllttcl,,rt

lirr this book was born out of a personal

need to keep that reality into the circumstances and the possible reasonsbehindthe decluoltorr ul rulltial law. Given the restrictions and constraints that operate in an drtlhrllilrl;ur rcgime, it has not been easy to secure the materialsonwhichmuchof ilty vh,wr rrrrrl c0nclusions are based. lhrl irr ;rbrrormal situation, it seems, has the effect of bringlng out the best in lrelgrlr'. rrrrrl I :rrn deeply grateful to those brave souls who went outof theirwayto I

lrr. irlr:;r

lrl rtF.lrl. lry

grrobing

jurrvlrlr, llrr. confidential information and suppressed publications that constitute the llt'clr llrrrl lrorrcs of this book. For obvious reasons, it would be the height of inrlisr rtlhru lo rrrt:rrtion them now. For the time being, therefore, I must acknowledge llr,lr trrrrrlrilrrrlion in a general way, wit}t the promise that in the more fetcitous days wlrlt'lr cnrrrrot lre too far off, they will be cited by name. vu

Through the months that I was quietly at work, my wife, Solona, and my children * Rhona, who did the final typing, chet and his wife, Maria Teresa, Marc and Donne * proved to be a great source of encouragement. Not once did any of them try to diszuade me from a project that others regard as unprofitable andhazardous.

Instead, their sincere and spontaneous reactions to the manuscript in progress my belief in the necessity of questioning and examining the murky aspects of martial law and the Marcos regime, so that Filipinos would be able to decide intelligently whether the New society is truly worth the sacrifice they have been, and are being, asked by Marcos to make. I cannot end without expressing my profound gratitude to sincere friends in the media profesion and in the govemment whose insights, judgments and skills have enriched and enlarged the dimensions of this book. . For its inegularities and deficiencies, however, I must claim full respirnsibility.

confirmed

REI.IBEN R. CANOY

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Manila, Philippines

September 1980

Martial Law in the Phflippines

Second Edition 1981

vlll

PRELUDE TO

C,opyright, 1981

by REI.JBEN R. CANOY

NBW-ORDER

HEN Ferdinand Edralin Marcos, sixth President of the Third Republic, placed the Philippines under martial rule on 21 September 1972, his action was hclieved by most Filipinos to be the last recourse open to a democratic leader who wanted to save the country from ruin and destruction, Months beforg that fateful rlecision, Manila, the nation's capital, had become the scene of increa$ing riots and tumultous demonstrations. As the Philippines appeared to drift inexorably towards anarchy and civil disorder, the President Seemed called upon to invoke his extra' ordinary power under the Constitution - the power either to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to declare martial law in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.

On 21 August 1971, three hand grenades were hurled at a gathering of'thou' slnds who had been drawn to a political rally by the opposition Liberal Party at l'laza Miranda. The square, fronting the historic Quiapo Church in Manila's down' town area, had long been revered by Filipino liberals as their Hyde Park. It became a symbol of free speech and democracy when President Magsaysay, ever sensitive to public opinion, began putting major government policies to the test by asking: "Can lhis be defended at Plaza Miranda?" On that bloody August night, the leaders of the Liberal Party lay in agony lrllong the wreckage of their stilled oratory. But as often happens wheir violence (x:curs as an offstroot of politics, it was the innocent bystanders who suffered the

rrrost. A score of those who had come to listen and be entertained by another opponition blast against the Marcos administration were themselves killed by a blastof a rlil'fcrent nature. Some eight dozen were wounded. Their screams replaced the rlrident voices of the fallen speakers, among the most seriously hit of whom were Scnators Sergio Osnefla Jr. and Jovito Salonga. Todaybsmefla, who lives in exile in the United states, is a cripple with shraprrels still lodged in various parts of his broken body, while Salonga is minus one cyc. Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing hobbles about on an artificial foot, his ankle

All Rights

Reserved

lrlving been srnashed by a grenade fragment. But in a very real and tragic sense, the biggest caqualty was Plaza Miranda it' rcll'. To erase that gruesome incident from public memory, this once'famous market' pltcc of ideas, where Marcos had also begun his journey to Malacafiang Palace in l()(iS, has been tuined by his wife - as Governor of Metro Manila - into a flearrrnrkct for the city's peddlers, hawkers and sidewalk venclors. Few, however,,ale lluhlc to forget what happened then. Within hours of the Ptaza Miranda bombing, Marcos zuspended the privilege rrl' thc writ of habeas corpus, and just as quiokly student demonstrators took to the rlrcots to demand its immediate restoration. By this time, campusactiYistswereno

lrlpicr the pebbles in the shoe that irritated the academic community. Their ranks 1,,,.i i,,rreused tremendously, and their marches and rallies had become more massive.

Bq{:

Prelude to a New

THE COUNTERFFIT REVOLUTION Evidently, tfuough the series

of "demos" that

began in the

frst months of the

seventies which the students commemorate as "The First Quarter Storm," the youth sector had been transformed into a political force that could not be mollified with

the old rhetorics. Government reaction - or over-reaction - to some of these demonstrations clearly showed that Marcos failed to understand the nature of student unrest. In one incident, fully armed troopers fired indiscriminately at a group of young marchers, killing four and wounding hundreds of others, but instead of intimidating the students, this show of force made them more defiant and contemptuous of authority. During the first week of February 1971, students barricaded themselves inside fie University of the Philippines campus, and proclaimed t}re area a "mini-republic" - the Diliman Commune. Leftist wags put up signs naming the campus as "stalin Univenity" and over Abelardo Hall they painted the legend: "Dante Hall," Commander Dante then being the commander-in-chief of the communist New People's Army. It took seasoned troopers of the Metropolitan Command, all in battle gear and heavily armed, to clear out the campus and demolish the U.P. "mini-republic." The next month, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., the strongest contender for the

presidency were elections held in 1973, shook the rafters of Congress with his accusation that Marcos had channeled P26-million earmarked for essential public services to his favored congressmen. More protest demonstrations followed. Meanwhile, trouble was brewing for Marcos at another public forum: the l97l Constitutional Convention was embroiled in a heated debate over a proposed provision introduced by Cebu's delegate Napoleon Rama banning President Marcos from a third term. A signatory of the proposed ban, TV newscaster and convention delegate Jose Mari Velez, announced to his colleagues in the press and radio: "If our resolution passes, that will be the end of Mr. Marcos and his wife." By then, however, Marcos had perfected his plan of putting an end to effective opposition and neutralizing his p<.rlitical opponents instead. Senator Aquino tried to jump the gun on Marcos by exposing "Oplan Sagittarius," which he described on the floor of a stunned Senate as a detailed, step-by-step program for the military takeover of the country under martial law. The inevitable and obstreperous student demonstrations rose to fever pitch. A caucus of mayors of cities and suburban towns comprising the Greater Manila area denounced any planned martial law as "evil and oppressive." Said Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing: "We shall accept martial law only over our dead bodies. The situation is serious, but not serious enough to justify martial law." Added San Juan Mayor Joseph Estrada: "We're all trembling with rage here." One of the country's worst floods, caused by the most destructive typhoon in years, presaged the imposition of martial law by a month. Entire towns and villages i4 Central Luzon remained under water for weeks when the Laguna Lake rose by twrc meters and,.sverfloweo its shores, in undating hundreds of villages and laying waste the Vast ricb ficlds of Laguna, Bulacan and Pampanga provinces. The importation of more than 400,000 tons o1'rice from Thailand, Taiwan and Japan became a matter of national survival as the prices of prime commodities soared

Orcler

lry .)5')i,. Also a$ a result of the floods, the duck industry was wipetl out, and the * doubled. Manila's potholes had lrllcr. ol' lrulut - that incubatdd cluck-egg delicacy lilnwr to the size of cauldrons, bringing traffic to a viitual standstill at peak hours. l\.lrrrr rlrrtlcnt riots and demonstrations followed to protest spiralling prices, and in tlrr, l,rte ol worsening economic conditions the corruption and inefficiency of the Nl,rr, r,s governrnent also came under heavy attack by the youth, the media and the l', rlrt l( :rl rlpptlsitiort. I t rvas thought to be a sign of the times that a l9-year-old Filipino named Jesus (,)rrirrcs slrould stow away on a Swissair flight to Tokyo, and be discovered * still alive .rrrtl slrorl in his worn rubber sandals * at the Haneda airport. The genteel middle. l,rrs lirnrilics were thjnking of shipping their cirildren to the comparative calm of tlrr' provinces. The affluent ones considered migrating to Australia, Canada or the Ililite (l States. liarly in September 1972, !oe's Department Store in downtown Manila was .,lrirtlcrccl by a bornb. Several evening shoppers were injured and the lone fatality - a wont;ln lay unidentified in the morgue for a week. Similar explosions of varying illcnsity rocked Manila City Hall, damaged two Meralco power stations in Pasay and liolbcs Park, and broke the water main in San Juan, Rizal. Bornbs shattered the t,rcllrrrgcs of the government telephone system in Quezon City, and the Quezon City llrrll itself was shaken by a powerful blast, but none was hurt in these explosjons rvlriclr sccmed designed to frighten rather than kill, The New People's Army and leftist terrorist attacks were readily blamed for llrc srrries of bombings throughout Manila and its populous suburbs. Two months lrriol to these incidents; defense authorities claimed that the NPA had attempted to rrrrlorrtl a large shipment of explosives and firearms off the motor launch Caragatan n( l)igoyo Point in Isabela province. Subsequent events, however, pointed to a congressman - a known Marcos prolcgi whom the military would detain upon the declaration of martial law * as the rrrtrstcnnind of the gun-smuggling activity in Isabela.

Never at a loss for public statements", senator Aquino said: !'The terror is

the bombings are truly the doings of the NPA. But if someone else was hclrind the terrorism, like, say, the army, then who would contain the violence?" Aquino reiterated this and several other charges in his last privilege speech in llrc Senate. Addressing the Senate President, he cried: rrlrnageable

Mr. Marcos has decided to zero in on the Senate and the Liberal Party. our people are well aware that the Senate has been the last strong-

hold of dissent. Here. even the senators of the Nacionalista Party not yet fully succumbed to Malaca-frang's dictates. And

so here,

have

in the Senate. Mr. Marcos has decided toJry his met'

tle.

we allow ourselves to be cowed and terrorized like the Con'Con if we now abdicate our role as the conscience of our people, if

delegates,

THE COUNTERFEIT

helude to a New Order

REVOLUTION

;] I

for an uneasy and temporary convenience, decide to, bend our knees before the gods of the Pasig, then I say: the Filipino,

w0,

exchange

people are doomed..

am seeing the collapse of our economy, of our monetary system, as the price that must be paid to perpetuate this family t see the people in the hills. Their'armed ranks are swelling, choos. ing a life of the hunted out of sheer despair our students and the young are out on the streets - in protest

against the stifling environment.-

.these communal sufferings, Mr. President, so that one man and his wife can perpetuate themselves in power! Mr. President, allow this humble representative to reiterate his commitment to the cherished ideals of our just and democratic society designed for us by our founding fathers. To Mr. Marcos I say this: I am ,guirtt you, yes;against the Republic,':! yI fidelity is to the Consti-

All

my loyalty, - and while I refuse you government' the Republic, people, the the

tution, not to your administration

grve

it unswervingly to

Andinbehalfofourpeople,agon2edandterrifiedastheyare,I ask you: do not mistake their disillusion for rebellion and their frustra' tions for subversion. call off, Mr. Marcos, your campaign of fear against them.

do not believ.e in Communism, Marxism, or any other ism repug. nant to our own Filipinism, I love and owe allegiance to our Republic - and to no other.

] , '

Butifthissituationprevails,ifMr'Marcospursueshissubversion of our fundamental institutions, even our form of government - to keep trirnr.tr in power - then I pray to God: that He give me the strength to resist the embraces of the forces of darkness' ' I pray to God that our people be imbued not only with patience

but with courage. I-et us tell the students not to be afraid of getting anested for exercising their right to dissent, because there will be no

concentration camp big enough to contain our fighting young. Let us tell the housewives not to panic and give up hope, but rather take heait and courage in the thought that even the worst tyrant has an end.

And finally, let us ask ourselves in this

fight?

sense: Shall we give

in or

was Saturday moming, 23 September 1972, when the nation felt the effects of u p*tiO."tiul proclamation dated 2l September and numbered 1081. It was Sa1 turday moming when, languishing in a cell at Camp Crame, Sen. Benigno-Aquino Jr. woke up to the sad realinatior that the people he had expected would fight were not

in the sireets manning barricades but nervously awaiting the next television or radio announcements in their shuttered homes'

Scven years later, at the end

of a long prison spell that would

rrothing, Aquino was to say bitterly to a friend: rrr

lscllculated the people."

seem

to be for

was right about Marcos, but I

The Ecology of Martial Law has been found and is now being pumped out in increasing quantities by mtllti' national companies to whom Marcos has extended "service contracts" - a legal tlcvice to circumvent the Constitution, which precludes the exploitation of natural

THE ECOTOGY OF MARTIAL LAW

by aliens. With morq than sixty fine natural harbors, countless ooves and inlets, bays and Irrrg sandy shores that are among the most beautiful and unspoiled anywhere, the I'lrilippines possesses one of the longest'coastlines in the world - ty". that of the and t rrrited States. This puts a severe strain on a naYy that depends on a few decrepit inventive' extraordinary Filipino's obsolescent patrol boats, kept afloat only by the

rr's()urces

ll U

Y his own admission,

Marcos knew that great risks were involved in his decision to place the entire Philippines under Martial Iaw. None of his predecessors had ever hard to invoke the extraordinarl' constitutional powers inherent in the president as commander-in.chief of the Armed Forces, for fear of provoking the charge of dictatorship. Manila's outspoken press was specially watchful of developmenis that would indicate a trendltowards authoritarian or one-man rule, and Marcos felt

certain that the declaration of martial law would not go unchallenged by the political opposition, the militants and radicals, the clergy, the students and media. Anticipating such a move, the media had become increasingly hostile to the administration, In one of many broadsides against Marcos, the philippines Free hess said in an editorial:

ings

or to impose martial law on the Filipino people and rnakc htutrscll'

dictator for life? . . . What advantages could the Filrpino people cxpcct to derive from the establishment of a Marcos dictatorship over them?. . A dictatorship rnay provide security for its immediate beneficiaries hut that security cannot last unless ihe people .emain indefinitely suhmissive and do not rise in rebellion. He who would ride the tiger of dictatorship and those who would go along with him, must be Drepared t<r ride the tiger ibrever. But will the Filipino people allow tl.rem to do so till the end of time? The answer to dictatorship is revolution, with all the destruction of life and pro.perty that revolution entails.

. ,

Marcos was, however, confident that even if ma;ority of them 42 million Filipinos were to oppose martial law, history and geography would be on his side. There had been numerous revolts through more than 300 years of spanish and 5d years of American colonial rule - but none had been successful in overthrowing the central goverffnent, mainly because of the country's island geography. For the same reason, not all of the Philippines - the southern region in particular had come under the full control and domination of the colonizers. of the 7,70t7 islands that comprise the philippine archipelago, two-thirds are too small or too insignificant to merit being named. The 1000 islands that are inhabitecl, hoiirever - especially the eleven targest where 95/6 of the country's population have chosen to live - abcund in natural resources flouristring under edenic hothorrse conditions that Dr. Jose Rizal, the Philippines'national hero, once blamed for the Filipino's proverbial indolence. i Besides being highly fertile and arable,these favored isles contain rich deposits oi'ceal, iron, silver, gold, chromite, manganesc, nickel, and copper, overlaid uy one of the densest forest covers in Asia. In the sea of Palawan, southwest of Maniia, oil ,

ingenuity. Aside from attracting illegal fishermen from nearby countries - particularly tlrc Japanese and Taiwanese poachers who come undetected in modern trawlers c,luipped with sophisticated fishing gear, to catch the choicest ofover one thousand ,p..i., of food nsn *rat have been identified in the islands'teeming rivers and waters the long Philippine coastline also affords a haven for smugglers and gun'runners wl,u supply u*i io the communist New People's Army in the north and the separa'. risr Moio National Liberation Front in the south. With a total land area of 116,200 square miles, the Philippine archipelago is slightly larger than Creat Britain, and smaller than Japan. Its northemmost island_is r,i miles southwest of Taiwan, while the island farthest to tlre south is a mere 15 plan to take a vaca' rrriles from the shores of Bomeo. When Muslim Filipinos say they Manila. not Borneo, in Jesselton mean lion "in the city," they The Philippines has two pronounced seasons - the wet and dry. There is -an irlrundance of rain throughout the islands but its distribution over the yearvaries for tlil'l'erent sections. Westem Luzon, for instance, has a dry season in what would be winter dnd spring in the United States and otler temperate countries, and a wet scitson in their summer and fall. In the eastern part of t}te country, there is hardly rrrry dry season, though there is more rainfall coinciding with the winter months than irr the summer abroad. Still other parts of the land hav6 a short dry season during rrcss and

lwo or three months of the Year. Violent typhoons - the Pacific version of the Atlantic hurricanes - are com' 1t()tr occurrences, their paths usually cutting obliquely across the northern and cen' trll regions and always heading in a northeasterly directionfromthePacificocean wlrcrc all typhoons begin their destructive journey. ,tlthough the various regions are often reckoned in terms of the principal diadivisions: lr.cls, the Philippines is conveniently sectioned into three large geographical a cluster I.rrzor.r, the largest, most populated and most developed island; the Visayas,

ol' luiriy Uig and populouslslands; and Mindanao, the second largest island which typil'ics th;sharply contrasting character of the land and the_ p.9ql..Here Muslim from one ,u,,1 Chrlrtiu, filipinos live side by side and yet are distinctly different Here, practices' social and Irrrolltcr not only in religiOn but in matters of attire, food eleva* (Mt' Apo, peak too, may be fqund the country's highest rnountain TIh tigtr of 9,610 feet) and one of the world's two deepest trenches ltheSurigaoDeep, rrrrrasuring 34,578 feet at its.lowest

ooint).

_r,I,ffi

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The luar of the Frea, author Robert Taber suggests as an ideal setting for guerrilla warfare "a country that is more rurar than ,ruu-n, *oun#ius rather than flat, thickly forested rather than bare, with . UrO;;;, ;;;;;r#il;,i

preponderously agricultural rather than irdustrial.,, The description could well apply to the Philippines.

In Northem r-tzon,the Bicor peninsula at its southern tip, and the isrands of Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Samar, ana'fUiraunao, the terrain especially ,,ln i, ili,Yi requirement of being abie to "afford both natural concealment and obstacles to hinder the movement of miritary transport mountain and swamps *h.r; ;;;k;;;l trucks cannot go, woods and thick brush that provide cover from aeriat ouservation and attack, forests from which to strike safelyandquickry. communi-

tlrrilctl Statcs the following year. The American gunship. U,S,S.,Maine, had

;ffiffi;;ns

l.*

*i,

;;ig.;;;;;;;il;;

but with disastrous results. In

j:l:r:l::r'.\ l* spices and other oiiental goods thar *r* ;-isl,i;;; * 1T cenrury Europe, Magellan had succeeded in perzuading I

iuii, of spain to

undervv'ite an expedition to estabrish a new trade route to the East. March 1521, he arrived in the archiperago that later spanisrr colon2ers -,In would name in honor.of-I(ing philip, and was killed in battle in i,Iactan Island by pnyr'rapu, a warrior'chief who drove the invaders ur.t to ;trh bamboo spears and bladed weapons. The Philippines finally became a colony

lt.i, ,fi,

.il;

r57 r,and for three centuries t},ere-,

spanish conquistadores and administrators'pluna.rJ

rrJ..pffio'-th.

land1,|Jren1meofGod(throughCatholicism)andcouitry(Spain). lhroughout this 30Gyear period, the oppressed Filipinos staged approximately

rr lrc

towed.

liorn Kawit, Cavite, where he had the first Philippine Republic on 12 June 1898. 'l'his fu the day that Filipinos now observe as Freedom Day, not the zlth of Julywhen tho U.S. granted the Philippines full political independen ce m 1946. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris and subsequent agreements in 1898, S;ruin ceded her prized territories to the United States - the Philippines, Cuba,

200 revolts in vain attempts to ihrow off "the spanish yJke,,,out-trrrr.'irrr;;;; sporadic local and at b-est regional uprisings, with the inhabitants of one region completely unaware of bloody upheaveals in another. They were also pathetiilly

been

Such an "armada," the newsmen realaed, could never have posed a threat to tlre tl.S. West Coast, unable as it was even to sail out of Manila Bay on its own llcurrr and they si'id so in their dispatches. But the American politicians were deterrrrirrcrl lo make the one-sided incident look like a major engagement of the war, and llrey played it up as a hard-won victory. Dewey was praised as a naval herb - to be Irorrorcd with a promotion to Admiral upon his return. In or<ler to increase the pressure against the Spanish forces in Manila, Dewey rierrt l'or Aguinaldo in Hongkong and within two weeks the Filipino general was back rrrr l)lrilippine soil, reorganizing his former rebel troops. The Filipinos belieyed that llrc Arncricans would back them up in their fight for independence, but Dewey, in rr frlirtcment for posterity, denied that he had ever promised them anything. When the Spanish garrison in Manila finally decided to surrender, the AmeriI'orbade their Filipino allies to enter the city. This led Aguinaldo to conclude crrrrs llrll tlrc U.S. had no intention of supporting the cause of Philippine independence. lrr tlisgust, he withdrew to Malolos, the capital towh of nearby Bulacan province,

,rr"l#

king Hrilip

..l

j.l ,,

,,:l

;idJ;irir...r*.

hlowrr rrp in the Cuban harbor of Havana - whether by accident,or design, no one krrows ttl this day. In any case, it provided the U.S. with a good excuse to declare wirr on Spain and to send the American naval fleet under Commodore George De. . ,ii wr.y. llrcn in Hongkong, to Manila. Anrcrican journalists covering the celebrated "Battle of Manila Bay" were tlrrrnblirun<led to discover that the dreaded Spanish Asiatic Fleet was nothing more llurrr u stlrry collection of seven veritable leaking tubs - Spanish Admiral Montojo's rrnrtrrrrored flagstrip, lhe Reina CYistina, and six other vessels. Three of these were 'j urttlc of wood, badly worm-eaten at that, and a fourth, though armored; needed r I

,riil;;*"r

illnorgunizcd native-bolo versus Spanish-musket affairs that eventually ended in the prrhlic lrnngings of the hapless insurgents, many captured by their own people hired rulrrr,rt:tnilries by the colonial government. As part of their policy of divide an<i rule, tlrSlrnrrilrclsmarlesuretopittheFilipinosagaiflst each other-usingP'ampangos ' 1,, ,grrt.ll l rcvolt by the Tagalogs, or Visayans to {ight the Ilocanos - a policy that M,rrt',rs has adopted in Mindanao, where troops from Luzon are beingused tofight lrr' Mrrslirn scparatists. It was not until the last decade of the lgthcenturythatadegreeof unitywas I lclricvtrd hy the Filipino rebels who sparked the Revolution of 1896 against Spain. l'lrr. poorly-armed Filipinos, however, could not overcome Spanish military superhrlily, lly the terms of a negotiated peace pact signed in Biak-na-Bato in'"I897, the yorrrrg (loneral Emilio Aguinaldo and his staff agreed to go to Hongkong 1, s;1e. 'l'hoir hopes were revived with the outbreak of hostilities betweenSpain and the

il;;;;

Law g

cations. . ." ";hEi;ry Though much of the country clearly offers a territorial advantage to any who might have wanted to oppose Marcos odth ur*, when he.declared martial law, the Philippines' archipelagic riut. tr,, rc"* isolation and detachment that the "r yT:'nd.rc, ever'present sea creates in the Filipinr-rr*n"',tr]l"r*r.. as they did in colonial times against a revorution on a truly national scare. Despite dre fact lhat mooem facilities now lirk most of the islands, there has been no .h.rg, in the people;;;;;l;;;;;;rfitll; The average Filipino is tlrus inclined to strun public or austiact affect him in.a.strongry persorar way orupp.. to ""ur.rl'rni,Lji", his interests. scratched, stay clear of U".Ooo ttuckets: ,o an oft_quoted proverb ^"^,,^I".;rL19 that arso serves as a simpre philosophy for the cornmon folk. Indeed, the attitude *r"t tt.'pulti.-#r, dop,.o to the cautious type of mar, .. tial law that Marcos imposed tuus on. of watchful waiting ,rd Only those who suffered th9 loss their peisonaf freedom or properties, and those 9f with deep poliiical and ideologicat commitments, dared to speak ug#u order. It fs dangerols businesslhoweu.r, to typ..rrt "r,a docfle creature. the Filipino as Centuries before, Marcost namesake _ the portugu;* Magellan tried to subjugate a group of natives

lf".'. ft:

The Ecology of Martial

,,,t,

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Puerto Rico

for the sum of $20-million which was euphemisticary calred a ,,wi pride treaty ufilred a demand uy ffi;ffi;t;"AXr;:.lrJrr[1?.Trh

;1ff#fl,i"#?**1;;,#:^y:trr po*rrnr

s *;i##JTilr

'o*'J3,' Most #;-y"q*::::*.::: i:r ry;iirl;,l" or the ph,inpin.'.i1' ,ri;;ov gal asis for annexing,r,. ,t1fffl;T*"*:*:k"',1,11 J*dr. ar; ;;,##, !

il;#;

;,""

out

there !

-,ilffi#ffixl'r'#:i;::#; u,ii ,1,ira",# rreaty orparis

another. The Filipinos tumed on the

.;1,^lr

--: ;ri *o

foltowe d seven followed *..r., yea^ of bitter L;+r^taking place in Batangas and Samar

the u.s. now had

;'#:}ffi ';l; llill,ll,:

er.i",ans as their new enemy, and tht

;;;;:"*h ii:r"#rT ;,::TI, #orf

Batangas, the civilian popuration was herded rike cattre into crowded concentration camps where cholera, took a heavy toll in human rives. The poputation or But*gu, dropped from 3r2,r92 rg97 to 257'715 in 1903, Bowing to zuperior forces, Gen. Miguel Malvar surrendered in February t9os. iut

dysenteryJJ;;;;il;;#;*_,,

A-;;

soirr" rrrr"r,

llLiil';: t:

*# ;:J*:ffi

*'r'

i.n,

"u's';'Jio

*r-uer

t'u united

orafriinatdo,s war.time

states and subsequentrv'

sama" the phirippin-e'American war raged with unprecedented fury. -. Led by a Bicolano'general, vicente-tykban, tr,. p.opil resisted stubbomly, unt:l

effi:'i:: or viuages and ;iiffiff crops,

ther than

*d :l*: ":i:::,.,i-": " T: ..r;il;ilir";;i

Jacob

the Ameri_

smith, ordered the burning

"iHi,#:t :ii:fi#:

fi:*:

of fus .ourtryr*"luirr, ttsr iuru *a ure' die, uen' Gen. Lukb' Lukban raised the white flag of surrender, see thousands

Untit the middle

thirteen

dierl a-"i.., ,Jat* q*g . Edu.ri, tiemFilipinos with a krag,, the-mo;;; ffi ;ffi#; r zarnboanga,, ,ifi;;;..

"The troubie with you, Firipinos," a BBC writer once told me in Londori, .ts that after fifty years o..{ro[v*roa, become riarf-baked Americans.,, yet ;ou-;; these were the same Filipinos *rr" airo"irrrd-u.s. ,,ur.ho"a *rr*-u'*rr;;";; American regisrators i" ,r,r i.ir rsi,r, y.*, ahead of Alaska,

H#:r

Hawaii and

As a rezurt of an American-oriented school rystem, which was run frst by soldiers:tumed-teachers a1d ov *i"Ln.ies and professional educators later who 'anived in large numbers, Engrish

i, *iorrv,p.ten

throu^ghouilil;.#il;;

rr:rl by Filipinos.

lndeed, two of the most priceless legacies that the Americans left behind are llrc cxperience in the republican form ofgovernrnent, and a language that has served ;rri ir trnifying element in Filipino national life, besides preparing Filipinos for partir'lpirlion in world affairs. Throughout the length and breadth of the archipelago, English has brought lrrli.llrer a people who speak as many as 87 different airtr.tr. ii* or th. *;;;; lorgrcs - Tagalog, visayan, Bicol, pampango, nocano and pangasinan are of ihe urrrrc Malay origin, with derivatives from the polynesian, chinese, Arabic, Indian and

Slirrrish languages.

The Philippines, in fact, has been aptly described as an oriental melting pot with the tongues and the blood-strains of the European, American, Indian, fuabian, {'hincse, Persian, spanish and other races mingled with the predominantly original

Mirlay stock to produce a beautiful people whose daughters consistently clairn-the I i rrc I ight at international beauty pageants. The rezult might have been different had the Malays not come to these islands irr great migratory waves that began in 200 B.c. For the frst men in this part of the w.rld !vs1r the Aetas, a Negroid people who stood no more than four and a half feet tttttl were believed to have come by land from Central Asia during the Paleolithic Pe riod. Even today, small colonies of Negritos, as they are now called, are still to be Iirund in t}re mountains and rain forests of the philippines.

The possibility that they could be descended from tre stunted, kinky-haired lboriginal tribes of Asia became real in 1925, when elephant fossils wereldiscovered ;rt the site then occupied by the Fort william McKinley Military Reservation (now lfurt Bonifacio) in the outskirts of Manila. The fossils lent credence to the ,.landbridge theory," which holds that before the world's seas and oceans rose to thelr Prosent levels, the Philippine archipelago had once been connected to the great Asian

Filipino

schootchiliren ?f -l?M,e.r"iJ"r, taughr to sing "The star-spangled BannJr-;Ja; H,ilipiin. nrtiora-*trremwere in Engrish, at f:*s ceremonies they witnessed the raising of two flags, on either side 30 of the, same pole' For four decades from the earry througlitir, ]i:rro# ,ruo, ; became mesmerized uv -rg2os sp"[lri"riy*""d,H;; -cam. 1. gamorous of what they knew about Mother America f* tf,rlilur. ,"..rn. ,_J

Author *on wolfe, in his book Litt!1. Bro-wn Brother, praces the Filipino death toll at 600,000 mostry civilians. necutting that the ,..orlJJ-pr,flippine popu_ lation at ttrit time *T *:; 8p00i,;;;;ry out of every ". during ttrat terrible period rrr* the rifle then in use and ,,oh, referring to the rebellious Moros

Iaw

lrllilrirro children have been bom into at least two languages-theirparents,tongue nlrl linglistr, and on the streets it is not unusual for acligaiettevendororflow".[iri ln rlrurk a smattering of English. lrr the 1935 Constitution English is prescribdd as one of three official langlir11r'ri. the second being Spanish, and the third a language called pilipino which is l,,r',,',1 on the Tagalog dialect and still in the process of development. The framers of tlr" 1973 Constitution tried to drop both Spanish and English as official languages, I'rrl tlocided to retain Englistr when they found it was still the language -ort ir.I r, r

prorir..I

Ecolory of lllartial

conlinent by a causeway of rock, over which the tiny black Aetas crossed. when this bridge sank beneath the sea, the next wave of migrants the Indons, l Mongoloid people with caucasian strains - came in boats between -200 B.c. and 1400 A.D., the period recorded in history as the golden age of the Shri-visayan and Madjapahit empires in the Malay peninsula. Although it has never been clear whether they left their homeland as immigrants in search of a better life or, as political refugees seeking asylum elsewhere, wave after wave of Malays, the subjects ofthese two cmpires, arrived in the Philippines and settled in the fertile lowlands. They drove the former migrants farther up the hills who in tum pushed the Aetas deeper into the

.'rrr ,

l^2 ,

THf COUNTERFETT nnvOrutroN

forests. As they came in large, outrigger boats cdledbahnghay.r which carried *frorc families or villages, their new settlements came to be knofr isoato"snii..ra barangay. Ninety percent of today's Filipinos ur. stock, with an admixture of other racial sirains. Ethnically speaking, th.."i;.;;tlr"; tJ -L is no one who ean be called ..pure Through pestilence oroughi, poverty and strife, pragues and martiar ru*. resiliency of the Eilipino has enablid him to survive witfr-amuzilg n. iJ , often compared to the bamboo, which easily bends with the wina "".r. This flexibility is greafly enhanced by an earthy sense of humor that carries delicious and exquisite overtones of the ribald and mildly lewd, and is at its best in adversitv. Inevitably; some of the most devastating jokes born during rhr occupations, and now during martial law, are at the expense of those in fower. This Filipino penchant for humor is surpassed only by his hospitality, which can be a vice instead of a virtue. During the annual to*n n.rta, lt for a family to go heavily into debt to be able to tender . feast for relative$,rf4iends or even total strangers. BeforeCatholicmorality took root

I il

f"*. il a.r""ro"Ji;fi;i;.r.-lal"":il ---'o' --'- il Filip;;.,' ,t *j il tlt il ' uut"nie.;;;. il I I sp;;;;;l;;;i; I I il i r;;;;;;;; I *..iy r";;;;;;;;;ffi il il in this country, historians record that in some early communities true native hos- I pitality required the head of the house to offer not onty a lavish r*ilbrt;;;; ,il I fairest of his daughters for the esteemed guest to sleep with. ru.rJg ,'i***, il the host was likely to share his own wife. il However, Spanish Catholicisrn and the centuries-old influence of Castillian il machismo have changed all that. Today some Filipino men will beat their wives, il not because the women have actually been unfaithful but simply to warn them I ' against cuckolding their husbands at some future time. Notwithstandine the omis- il sion of sexual amenities for a welcome lodger, Philippine hospitality "..*ui"r u, I ' generous and delightful as ever. .n i Foreigners on short,visits to tlte country cannot help but be overwhelmed by il I I the s-niling Filipino. Yet this silme man witl fly into a murderous rage o"., *t.t , ,il , the Westerner would ordinarily dismiss as an insignificant slight or provocation, an ' lL unpaid bet of fifty centavos, uiirty look in a restaurant, a snide r.#[";;;;il; il in'laws at a wedding reception. There has been an attempt to explain this irratioril il nature as the Malaygene reasserting itself, for is not amoi aMalay word? The possibilil ity is intriguing, but the better explanation may be that among Orientals it is cer- I , tainly not irational to seek redres or revenge for a personal affront. ,il Indeed to right a wrong even an imagined one is considered a matter of ,il lronor. And when honor (which really means face n the context of native values) is il at stake, the Filipino will go to extremes. For the most trivial reasons, many lives and il fortunes have been lost in barrios, beer halls and marketplaces. t The Spaniatrds and Americans had much to say about the honesty of the Fili"il ipino people;trrougr, they did not always agree. Magellarl's fust contaciwithmena- " f tives'was supposed to have been made when they stole a small dinghy off his ship. lil In a pique, he christened their isles "Las Islas Ladrones" later established to be part il of the Marianas group and not the Philippine archipelago. But intheirlettershome, il the earliest American missionaries and schoolteachers had more ediffing story to ,r, t

The Ecology of Martial Law

'lcsc

Thomasites (as the lirst American educators who arrived on board the steamer,

Suttlo Tomas, wele called) spoke glowingly of Filipinos who would brave rough rrrorrntain trails under a driving rain, just to retum a book or umbrella left by an ulrrront-rninded teacher. Along with Dr. Jose Rizal - whom the Americans chose to hrrlkl up as the country's natidnal hero for his advocacy of non'violence during the rlvulution against Spain - George Washington had also become a hero to the irn' prt:ssionable young natives who were taught the virtue of honesty through the ,r1",cryphal tale of the cherry tree. Tlrrough the dark and fearsome days of the second World War, however, steal' irrli l'Klm the hated Japanese oc,cupation forces became a viltue. In the- cities.and Filipino boys lrrwrrs where the enemy maintained depots for war materials, intrepid parts which truck spare away carting warehouses, worrltl break into well-guarded scorned, being Far from Japanese. unsuspecting the to tlrry would then sell back publicly beheaded and caught were #ho ones the especially tlrcsc youthful thieves

wirrning to others - were idolized as unsung heroes of the resistance movement. 'n l)oprivation brought about by colonial conquests and the Amerlcan war against llrr, .lupanese has been blamed for the corruption of a people that had been known lor llrcir basic honesty. In his call for a cultural revolution to complementthepoli' lirrirl rcvolution against colonialism, Apolinario Mabini urged his countrymen-to_rid

llrcilrsclves of vices, "most of which were inherited from the Spaftiards-"Andwhen become a cor' Mrrrcos lamented on the 6th anniversary of martial law that "we have shamSfu-l co1; this have caused to thought are that influences the alien rrtlrt rriltion," ha'1 paid who traders gfuosts of Chinese evoking mind to quickly came ,liiiorr t.uiltslruw, tong, or grease money to lubricate a business deal, spanish officials whose nilir;rlurc on a document could be obtained only for a price, and the American expodemocracy to rr,,rrls ol Tammany Hall politics - that deplorable aspect of American wlrre lr liilipinos were inevitably exposed. patchwork Slrowu on its colonial aberrations, the Filipino culture is essentially a

by impassable tlcsigrr o[ strange and exotic quilts, each a slice of time imprisoned cannot Filipinos of rrrorrntain rangei and the ubiquitous seas. Even the most blasd taboos, beliefs, practices, lrt.lp but n.)u*.I at the rich diversity of customs, traditions, of a live carabao u1,"cclr and manners of their own people - such as the partitioning

the nailing of religious penitents to the cross irr tlrc rice terraces of Ifugao "ountry; into the ocean rrrr 6..d Friday in Pamplnga; the throwing of newly born infantS meant them God whether lry llrc lladjaos, the sea-farinfgypsies of Sulu, to determine or the fue' sisters; and brother t,, liuc or iie itrrougtr their timety rescue by older will pregnancy that who believe ,lirrrr,c ol the barren women of Obando in Bulacan, embers' burning on occrtl within thirty days of stepping ceremonially llut there runs through this rainbow-colored fabric of divergencies a common political and ecotlrrr,irrl ol.values that forms the warp and woof of Filipino social, are circum' relationships ways, rr.rrric life. In various subtle and imperceptible compadrazco and kinship the and r,t,rilrctl by the utang nd. loob or debt of gratitude, rv\tctn both of which are considered the strongest of native values that govern simple ,;u,'ryr,liry transactions as well as enterprises of great moment'

Itr

ti l

14 '

The EcologY of Martial

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Tlrough the compadrazco system,tle sponsor becomes acompodre-lite a 'bo-father" of, ttre baptized child -with all the obligations that such a role en for thil pu{pose, then, the family usually chooses ,-high gor.*,,rr,;rn.irr, * fluential politician, a wealthy businessrnan or landlord, oi sinpty a friend rrorn'*r, favors or help may later be sought either by the chili or tri, ,tarrr. one has to be Filipino to fully appreciate the extent to which this system and the value of

na loob influence his judgments and actions. In less sophisticated communities, for example, one does

not necessarily vote for the most competent or qualified candidate for elective office, but to, or a person whom one owes an utang na /ooD. Neither is it in proper form ^ "oipiii. to fire a lazy factory hand whose father claims a similar relationship with the manager or

employer..Nordoes one - no matter how serious the grievance challenge a"landlord or political paton who may be a godfather to one of his sons. In a society whgre favors-owedLo given and p.^o;J;;ilionsrrips matter a great deal, has-enabled Marcos to assume the role of the country,s T{iul law sup:em: He is thus in a position to prevent a widespread conspiracy .godfather. against his regime, simply by exploiting the sense of obligation and gratitude oi-iltary leaders and a legion of entrenched political brokers. For with the concentra; tion of government powers in his hands, no one else can satisfy their insatiable demands for jobs sinecures, government loans,timber and mining permits, favorable court judgments, stay of arrest, search and seizureorders,reprieies ;;;;r;;;;

money. The'gamble that Marcos took in attaining this powerful position has been face, tiously_regarded by some as proof in itserf thai he rightly deserves t" -pines, being a nation of inveterate gamblers. The idea is not entirely preposteiouso considering the Filipino's weakness flr making a bet. The national pastime^isusually placing.money olalmost any kind of game or corttest: jai-alai,lue.teng (a numben game),basketball, mah-jong, dama or nafive checkers, chess, sipa o, nuti", football played with a rattan ball, half-a-dozen varieties of card games, cockfights and the - - - --e most popular of all says Roberto Montalban, a Bukidnon rancher who loves horse fights: .ilf it moves,,the Filipino will bet on it." of all Presidents, Marcos was the fust to exploit this g,ambling instinct in a creative way. Though the government is officiafly ,grinrt regallzed g;6irrg, ttr lr.s issued a decree granting a monopoly to his friends and the relatives of his wife to operate casinos in Manila and all major philippine cities. Ostensibly, these establishments are intended to encourage international tour-l isrn; but since they opened, gsTo of the patrons have been Filipinos. citing the cor-r *p.tiog influence o-f these casinos on the youRg, who are often allowed io get in,, various church and civic groups have asked for their clozure. Marcos, however, i tt-uint adamant, probably for the reason that he does not wish to deprive his friends, of a virtual money machine. One other reason is that gambling constitutes a rich source of funds for political impact projects that are obviously for show and cannot 'be undertaken with tax money without risking public displeasure.

il;;;hlfi-

politics.

law

From gambling revenues, Mrs. Marcos has been able to construct a P250'mil" t]rat critics say is a fonn lfurrr Universiiy of Life - an instifutidn of "instant learning" body of the university student ()l' rctaliation against the recalcitrant factrlty and of candidates for the of a for putting her at the bottom

rrl llrr: Philippin-es, ry1veV sports complex to be rrrrlilled pori of UP President. Likewise, a proposed P9-billion which the Marcos competition ,,,,,,,pleted in time for another international athletic

g,,vcrnment wants to host, will come from gambling' their At the end of the Second World War, however, Filipinos had to suppress busi' serious the to resources and nporting instinct in order to devote their energies had explosives American liberation, of In the battle rrrrss

of national reconstruction.

Japanese, in retreat, It,velled Manila and most of the large provinci?l cities, while the tlle whatsoever American bombs policy, buming lriltl resorted to a "scorched earth" nrul artillery shells had one in thirty The population was decimated by at least one million persons: the Japanese' period between the in peristred lrilipinos. soldien anO civilians, had half a cen' in time second the for Thus, of the Americans.

missed.

;;-a^;t,ir.

t **

on the Fili' lury, foreign invaders had inflictetl tragedy of cataclysmic proportions

,""t''ill'L.

tving, it was not so easy. The countryside laybanenand fallow, and In th: struggle for lrlnic necessities - food, clotting, strelier, medicine - wete scarce' than unenflurable rhore considered aestitute t. Y.u, lrlrysical survival, which the goo"ds, djsblack'market of dealer husfler, turned itnutf, tn" impoverished Filipino and general chandler. ltllcr of cheap whiskey, t,ude, in surplus articles and scrap iron, to tlrc thousands of war-weary American servicemen'

SogreatwasthedestructioncausedbyboththeAmericansandtheJapahese

believed that in grant' ttrut intelfrgent men like the late Sen. claro M. Recto actually United States was motivated irrg carly p-otiti"rt independence to the Philippines, the of dollars that a for' rrot by altruistic consiierations but by a desire to save billions ,,,u, .Llony needed for rehabilitation.

Throughthosehardandignominousyears,Filipinosnonethelessremained *A tfr.yi.frrsed to listen to the nationalist plaint that tlre making, in which Filipinos t'lrilippines had been involved in a war not of its own moral responsibility'" a had lr[rl bcen impressed as colonials, and that America 91:

ntuunchly proAmerican

was at that time pouring on its former enemy, extended by u's' lupiln. It was the wrong time for anyone to say that the huge loans generosity, America's of not hilrrks and financing in"stitutions wbre manifestations, perPhilippines the keep to lr[t of her self.interest and that these were designed her apron-strings' to the infant republic ;rotually in debt, thereby tying politics with the rris in#penae"nce in 1g46, the Filipino embraged rrroro aid

to a prostmte ally than it

savoring urrcontrolled pasion

of freedom and oratory, his grrnrblinginstinct,andhisegalitarianspiritfoundexpressionandfulfillmentin

rlatnocratic institutions.

an adolescent lover. His love

process of electing officials br the art Politics eventually became more tlan the fiesta, a grand circus government: it ev#ed i"io a regular celebration, a national

i l

THE COUNTERFETT REVOLUTION

,.,f

- as some would have it - the biggest industry in the phirippines. As such, ious,liee ,n,"n"in #;#;;d was _ H":li.:j:l'.:lig., an abnormal way 1ny11ion1, "ri, - probably ttr";;;;;;r.##;'#;o',ffi;ffiffi; and

OPLAN SAGITTARIUS

3,:,"i:r,:*:";*.::::l-1lete::rirelaledandphirippinedemocracy

PROCLAMATION 1081

;,';ff 'il:"JJJ"il :f ^.li:y.::llTg11,:,*r.."i,hs;drd;ril,'*ffi of, by and rorlhe p.oprr, ,,**ll l:rr*::,

.t;

. . . I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, hesident of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Article VII, Section 10, ParaSraph (2) of the Constintfion, do hereby place the entire Philippines as in Article I, of the Constitution under martial l41o orrd, in niy capacity ss theit Commmder-in-Qief, do hoeby commnnd the amted forces of the Philtppines, to rnaintain law and order throughout the PhilWines, prevent or suppress all form of hwless violmce as well a8 any act of insunection ir rebellion and to mforce obeldience to alt the laws and decrees, otders and regthtions promutgated by me persotwlly or Won mydirectian... DONE in the City of Mwtih, this 21st of September, in the year of

"on".-.o;itJ#;ffi,"^

;#ii;ffil; I',fl::i::,T"?::::*.*.':::-*0,i,'ii"';;;.r#ffi u,".n[ro;'*,;,#;;t'it,*:

H-";

:::::.:#:t underdevelopment:i:':lTjiiylil r"::.v, and economic stagnation.

ff.*:::*:,,Y:::::ll:fu,,.naint

of the phlippines during this period

is grun and unsettling. One official account states that:

,u... . .:u,

g" In:^T.".i::,r11': and, economic

the country strugsting against

.l"ffi'#li ;r;J;;; potiticJ*ffiffi;ffii;

stalemate u;;rer,, :1::,:: Tl,j1.i me antime, ecoromic generalty .1l "r[,'.r," unseen, vise upon

:#:f "fl'jl::: I

*":tn 11lll ry"y Tr :o..,rI: ro.m r *e,e a,i*J r ir"r,;

.,1::.

or dienation-# ;^;1,::::::.:'il-,:::::l ately, the phirippin", o ir,"' :::,:1.:j:.1 _rtim disintegration. " "r'

ii"-:

ff J'Jf

?flT*

.3:**.: *

;.;ilffi

gr.background that Marcos"n.,ii# took his oath

:l: -i::1,,r: ^ll.*^ ffi; :Ion his rT:1:i-r.,ncements much mind. ;1

uno

ffi ru,

..,;

il;i;;;

ffi #"H ;'"ffi; ;ffii;

our Lotd, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

;l XI

GENERAL ORDER NO,

. . . I, FERDINAND

president of the

":H;T'ilTililfl : ffi;f ,il lT;'ffi as

by virtue of

E. MARCOS, hesident of the Philippines,

the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-

of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim I shall govem the nation and direct the operation of the entire Go,v-

in-Chief that

emment... DONE in the City of Manila, this 22nd day of September, in the ' year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two,

With the stroke of a pen, Marcos set in motion the awesome machinery of rrrrrrtial law and one-man rule which had been secretly and meticulously assembled in nr'r:orrlance with a plan code-named SAGITTARIUS. Senator Benigro Aquino Jr., who Irrrrl warned of an impending martial law take-over in a privilege speech, did not really know all that much about Oplan Sagittarius. His friends in the Arrned Fsrces had rritrrraged to leak some peripheral data tc him, but he never had a '?nililary copy" in lrlr lrands. A1l he had was a general idea of the plan deftly reconstructed from

information by his rympathizers in the military. However, this meager rctlraft was sufficient to give him an outline of the structure by which martial la'w grk'ccnreal

wun

lo he implemented. What was Oplan Sagittarius'l Says an officer who had a part

in its making: "It was the master plan of a rrrrrlli-faceted operation for the declaration of martial law the apparatus, the r,t'ltcnte. the mechanism of martial law itself. Sagittarius also provided the legal basis lirr Proclamation 1081, by enumerating the conditions and situations that *rd. *"r-

OPlan

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

tial law a necessiiy. It contained a detailed account of the places targeted for mili take'over such as airports, shipping ports, communication networks, transporta networks, the mass media, the grrns and afimunition, tre loose firearms of citu'enry. oplan sagittarius also named the special units that were to impl the initial take-over, with the backing of the entire Armed Forces of the phili

rrlhyRafaelSalas,alawclassmatewhowasMarcos'Executivesecretaryin1966 theUnitedNationsPopulationFund trrrr luter quit to ur.rp,?. po*i-of Oit..torof

of Customs' then Secretary of i\r trvities. Enrile's ntu iri *u'u' a Commissioner of a born politician(he is charisma lrrrlicc, and, finally, of'O"f.n,t, Lacking the organ2a' I

c;;;;;;

law, several {ask forces had already gone through a minute-by-minute ory n-ln of the asigned tasks. Although 2l September 1972 was the official date on proclamation l0gl, it was o4fY two days later _- a Saturday - when the Filipino people woke up a try under martial law. That morning, in cagayan de oro citv in Norrrtri,irr,1inaun.o, " "*n, I chanced u-pon Gen. vince castro on his wayto the Del Monte pineapple plantation, to play golf, I told him the news, which had been communicated to me a_ former media colleague in Manila. He looked incredulous, then he Iaughed ano saii tfat even martiar lawn' * was going to keep him "Tot lottrlr.s ' that day._obvio,sly, not all the generals were tord oi the secret plan. It has become axiomatic that president.Marcos is one man who never teleqr.+r his.next moves "plays it cloge to his chest," as the sayinggoes -andconr oucrs afiairs ot state, government, or politics on a need-to-know basis. As september rd, he had become strangely more secretive, An editorial writer for ]1. 3gr19*t PACE Magwine (a Philippine news patterned Newsweek) I+,tote in its last issue: ^n",

military

' - more prisoner'than '"n,,i::r:: president Macapagal, craiming io have been told by Marcos himfinal shape rrll, says that amonf tf'""'tif'" help-ed-put Oplan- Sagittarius-in 'ltlht *."?d r.r*ained

pontt Enrili' Generals Ro1"o wcrc Defense srrrr,?,i-iuu'' /rrgalaandlgnaciopo,ttheArmy,FidelRamosandTomasDiazoftheConstabu' Ruiz of the Navv, Fabian

";;; ;t fromiis;"rf;;;

Admiral Hilario tilry, Jose Rancudo ** "irh.;r;;i;., Authority, {fredo. Montoya of the security Vcr of the National Intelligence and Gatan of the Constabulary. (As a forMlnila Metropolitan Comm-and, and Romeo wl..asfeo t1 Tarlac, home province, -Sen. !at1n rrrr:r provincial commander of Aquino's Jr' while he was Benigno Aquino order on ricrvc the Arrest, seur"t and Seizure

lrttcndingaSenatecommitteemeetingattheManil"Hilton,onthe.ni$iof22

i.,',i.*u.,

ii"-'id

Discerning newsmen covering the palace have obserued that presi, f, dent Marcos is no longer as candid as he used to be. whereas befor.e, he would look an inquiring reporter straight in the eye when answering questions, Mr. Marcos now Iets his eyes wander around, making what hJ

says

wi_th the

that Marcos himsel{.would call the "september 2Isf Movement,,, Malacaffang palr denizens were totally unaware that three weeks before the imposition oi

**tty

h.-"arily blends in

;-;;;;

In a governrnent obsessed with secrecy, oplan sagittarius was the best secret of all. Marcos cronies and golfing companions were taken aback that it h pened so soon or that it had liappened at all. outside or trre srnau

.,,w, to be abrasive *;;;;-f;d1,

something he had never been' rtrr, ,rd is often *or"r.rr-i* u profr*rionar soltlier, consequences of martial law, the as i'he risks as well Having decided Eryil9 as Martial Lly-Ad' appointins l\lurcos entertained no second thoughts about faittrless man could have and ornbitiort a position so powerful that an rrrrilistrator eight months of martial first the in r,r1c, over the governmert io, ti.r.rf. Indeed, meetings held at camp cabinet th, or., l,rw it was the defcnse-;rriri *r," presided even as Marcos country' the governed he ,\lirrinaldo. To all intents-and purposes; piesident t"tri"a the sandbagged walls of Mala'

ever the need arose."

Sagittarius l9

les convincing.

1g72.)

Tothisdistinguistredlistofhigh.rankingofficerswhomMarcosacknowledges i'Septr*U., firi Movement," a military.-source .fs .s the originuf ,,,e*U.r, of his this' and Victor Osias, but others dispute irtlded the names of Generals Rafaeilleto lltlintingoutthatthesubsequentappointmentoflletoasPhilippineAmbassadorto io' his refusal to go along with martial law' lran was, in fact," f";;i;;;ilt" was ever made'of the draft To prevent any possible leak' no-carbon copy wrote in hand' The only copy was ,l'proclamation 1081,'*ii.t fnf.t os and Enrile Taguiam' typed by Marcos'private secretary, Simplicio of forefnowledge a had *t'o tiuifiun' of tfr.

r,* rrlrdo Cojuangco, a t""it One

outside camp Aguinaldo, the defense headquarters, the belief is that Sagittarius was conceived by Marcos and his Defense Minister, lr* i"i..'B?r# It is probably more corect to credit them for refining and implementing it. yr1f, the,military had devised contingency prans ior variois ,*.rg.i"y ovet t. ,i*u. tions. These plans were essentially the sarie, t *ara down from one commana to the next. lVhen Marcos came to power in 1965, Oplan Sagittart", _ b;;;#;;.;; n4me already in existence. All it needed was a few changes to zuit new condilvaf

was Tarlac Gov' Ed' His deep involvement in Sagittarius to "contain" Aquino by enzuring

of Aquino?s wife' precautions-taken the rrray have been part of tllatTarlacprovince_tr,.*nutor,sbailiwick-wouldimmediatelycomeunder tightpolitica]controlthemomentmartial,tu**u,declared.Peoplewhoacknowlrevolutionary thus be prevented from starting a cdged Aquino as thelr i.ua., *orrto

Luzon and the entire nation' l'irc that could well enguf Centrat had become a th-an.anyone in the Liberal Party more By this time, Aquino as a jourthe Huks with previous dealings symbol of tte oppoJiion. Because of his leaders' he negotiatoi fo. th. *rr.r,d.. of dissident .alist and then as and discovered had agents Inteilig.rrce was under close surveillance by the military

tions, and the task fell on his defense minister. Before-coming tolhe government, Defense Minister Enrile had been a higtly. paid retained counsel of some of the country's largest .orporutionr. H" *r, recruit-

";;;;;;.;i

{

?it

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

OPlan

penetrated his safe houses and were sending used typewriter ribbons and carbon an-army laboratbry to find out hoiv much Aquino jo knew of opran sagitlulttl tarius. Tests showed, however, trrat an he had was, in ;rr"" ,*i*..]u .titt or.tt.., of the exercise and its code name. The tirnetable, the participatug units, the target areas and target personalities remain"d weU-tept secrets. But then not even the officers who worked on it knew everything about the plan. It had been divided into three sectionr, with Marcos and inrile personary handling the constitutional and legar aspects-L tr,ri. concern to establish the regi_ tlma:y of the martjal law government. the generals and their staffs concentiated on thedetails of implementation, whilea team O.[r* vision prepared the General orders that "f Marcos was to pulr out of a . handy kit", when tlre time came.

rrlcntators continued their ritual attacks against President Marcos and his First Lady; lhc usual muggrngs and purse-snatchings, petty thievery and hold-ups filled police lrkrtters throughout tlre country; wealthy debutantes aped their parents, knack for ,stentatious consumption; a young mother was reported to have strangled her onevcar-old baby because she could no longer stand its incessant cry for food; brawls rrr beer gardens and cabarets occupied the attention of the local peace officers. In far'away cagayan de oro city, we were hosting'a "barrio fiesta" for delelirrtes to the Kiwanis Club National Convention, and martial law wds the motif of the tr:lcbration. Placards and signs strung up on the walls bore satirical messages like; "tlnjoy yourselves. Martial law will soon be here!"; "Eat all you can: byorderof tlre Martial Law Administration." Little did anyone reaTae thathours before Marcos

my mind, what makes martial law, '?hirippine style,,,unique and distinctive is neither its "smiling gu+]v'l nor the regime's astute poricy of respecting the limits of the Filipino's threshold of political tolerance (Marcos

llrcir editors and copy writers told to go home. Radio and television,stations

il*;;;;;;

the enforcement of excessively h*i, ;p*"ti"rl ter-lf 9 uT"l"l., that characterized its "; imf lementation.

h;ffi#;:

has often relented on

;;;;;;r;;r";;il;il;:

"idffi;;i*rr.

of the Armed Forces of the philippir.r, ,r*n ffl.;an m .t**rri"rr;;r#il,; positions in the hands of Ilocano officers. B.d htr;;;'ffiil;

ffi.ffi IHff ff '

The man

H:,

rho;gh;*o-

nuid o,

screening

c"r. puiiun-il

of the most

;;;;;g

generar of the Presiflntial security command, and Director General of the National Intefiigence and security Authority. The NISA is often adverted to as the rrrrr**, iii, but there is a substantid d#ference u.r*"rn-,rr"r" two inteiligence agencies. while tlre American cIA ooerates outside and is wholry independent of the u.s. Armed Forces, vrc r's NISA func tion s w i t b i n the rnilippine'rn-iriiil ffi ;r,rn; r.

intelligence officer, his power cannot be ignored. In the words of a junior officer, '{he president cannot afford, notto trust ver

oirr..,anti-riot squads of the :F3d-1V,22 September 1g7-2,*"r. auv m.. Manila Police Deparhnent andthe constabuiary Metioporitan commano made ready for still another expected student Oemonstratior; *ort radio

,;;rr*;;;

com-

were

ordered off the air and padlocked. Past midnight, already Saturday morning but well

And the "flust priority" target personalities * the men expected to oppose rnartial law - were swiftly rounded up by teaffis of arresting officers. In the first wave were Senators Benigno Aquino, .Iose Diokno, and Rarnon Mitra and publishers Joaquin Roces (Manila Times), and Teodoro Locsin (ebilippines Freepress). AntiMarcos delegates tc the Constitutional Convention * Jose Mari Velez, Vol,taire Garcia, Napoleon Rama and their colleagues - were also roused from their sleep and

dependabre

All provincial constabulary commanders, though organizationany under the direct command of Gen' Fidgl Ramrii;;;; Marcos rerative), are ..deputized,,to course their intelrigence reports straight to Generar ver. This octopus hold of every branch of the service endows vrr *iil-* o]irisci"nce that no otiler mifitary commander possesses. Although rr. rd*prrorrry".nrirr,ur^ a lo*, profile as behooves an

magazine publishing houses were being shut down,

streets:

paisanos or

to defend the country and up-

;il ; ;;;; ;","* ; *,*",,oya, to

".ffJfiMarcos turned for the to whom

candidates was his own Irocano cousin,

In Manila, newspaper and

before dawn, the student radio station at the University of the philippines kept. ." But that, loo, was eventually silenced by a team of Metrocom troopers who unceremon-' itlusly drove the student announcers out of the shrdio. The domestic and international airports were secured by military, as were the port areas north and south of Manila harbor. Roadblocks were set up at arterial highways and main metropolitan

f*,

'tompatriots," trese Ilocano officers,

lrad given the green light to Oplan Sagittarius.

lrroadcasting a cryptic message: 'Martial law, martial law, martial law. ,

what had been critic,ed by Marcos Ilocanization of the miritary,, was actually the first step in the eventual "r..the activation npp*i,ryt:ly gne year before^martial law was imposed, Marcos, as commander-in.chief

Sagittarius 2l

hauled to Camp Crame.

"vhat

To the credit of the military, the entire "pick up operation" was conducted in some detainees later gratefully recalled as "a civil2ed manner." Senator Diokno

politely asked his arresting officers if there was time for coffee. His rnilitary escort roplied that they had all the time in the world. coffee was served to all of them, while the senator's wife packed a few personal effects in a suitcase. What stunned - and delighted - the citizenry was the inclusion, among the Iirst priority detainees, of cong, Roque Ablan and some Ilocano political figures who ,:

wcre reputed to be presidential favorites. Here, itseemed,werethebeginnings of a sincere, non-partisan reform movement. The Filipino people would n6t have any rluarrel with that. There was even a rumor that the military had insisted on arresting the President's brother-in-law, kyte Gov. Benjamin 'Kokoy" Romualdez, but this lurned out to be wishful thinking on the part of those who were for a revolutfonary purification of the government. Of Manila's more than half a dozen newspapers, only one was permitted to rcsume publication - the Daily Express, which jocular readers promptly dubbed the I

,y 22

THE COUNTERI.'EIT REVOLUTION

' "Daily Suppress," It was through this daily and a television station, both owndo by ' Robgrtg Benediclo, i law crassrnate of Marcos, that tl,e martiar lawauthogties com. mulicated to a dazed public the series of presidential Decreer, rorr6 ornstruction and General Orders .tntended to create order out ofchaos.,, Among the first orders was the disarming of the citizens * from Aparri, f* up, no$,. to Mindanao in the south which timerv move, against the criminals, tootrnlads and personal btdvguards and the rebels and dissidents. By Marcos' Jwn "f yielded more estimate, the campaign than 650,000 frearms a, types, *;f"O.g ..anti-aircraft guns, artillery, rocket .of launchers,

,vlryuooy-*et;.j';; ;";;;;rir*#r";

heavy and tight automati.

*"rp*r,'r.rn"r.a.*r,-r;;r;slpfusticated ex_ plosives, and the latest in assault rifles and zufmachine gun;.,, Th; ai;, rr"rJJ, *r, to establish a gun-less society and thus minimize, if not totally viEvrvq -- '-r eradicate, crime and

violence.

In reality, however, his

decree was meant to render the population incapable

of going against the martial law regime. Thousands of licensei gun-hotaur, ,i,,1rgry surrendered tfteir frearms to the constaburary, berieving tt rt ti" gu* would be reafter being dury registered. since ttre c.imina elements **, u.i"Jffi;; lymed they coUld - and later did harass the defenseless citizens. considered 'lrntouchables" fikewise b";; government was being purged of the "notoriously undesirable,,,

-lad

A;J] *;-il;;';. erased

doubts about his sincerity and determination to bring about a new era of peace and progress. the absence oftanksandsoldiersin the streets _ o.rpi _In * night when patrol cars prowled the urban neighborhoods for curfew violators] an atmosphere of normalcy prevailed. A dusk'to-dawn curfew curbed

the activities

philander-

ing husbands and juvenile delinquents and it was among the apolitical womenfolk that martial law found its most enthusiastic adherents. But beneath this facade of iormalcy, fear haunted the citizens. In the first few weeks, tt.y *rnt about their business in a brisk and purposeful manner, never straying too far fiom home or work, and whenever possible, avoiding contact with the +ilitary. For deqpite Marcos' assurance that only the lawless and the criminal need be afraid of rnartial law, tlrere had been cases ofsoldiers forcing haircuu i*gi"i.ri youths and tearing mini'skirts as a warning to immodest women -"rin a zearous attempt td enforce the moral standards of a reformed society. zuch a.climate, rumors flew. And the most terrifying was that in areas decr- . In lareo as 'Juez de cuchillo" or forbidden zones anyone .outa1. shot for no reason. And when none of these horrible 'things o."rrrra, in their sight, the people not onry 'Nr* heaved a sigh of grbat relief but joinrd ; tirs"g hosannas to ,rr. i".irtv. Indeed, a majority of the people wtro, ulety a month before, had sworn tlrat could impose martial law "only o"., ou, dead bodies,, were now unas}ramedJt{arc9s Iy endorsing Marcos'reform progfirms. A writer who had nothing but the worst opinion.of the__Marcos administr;tio; was inspired to send a letter to"a rrieno in America, saying: "\ile arc truly fortunate in that we're watching the most significant chaptei I

Sugittarlus

Irr |hilippine history from a ringside seat. corrupt officials will be jailed; police lrl,uors will be empty; influence peddling, as well as society pages with their idolatry

lcrsonalities and pictorials glorifying eonspicuous conzumption, will now be a llrtrrg oIthe past. A more equitable redistribution of the country's wealth will follow, ,rrlrl rrtrsterity will become a way of life with the rich and since the First Lady has

,llr'rr

assured us

that

l'lrilippine millenium!'?

'mass follows class'

a religion

of the pgor. we are entering

However, brilliantly conceived oplan sagittarius had been, Marcos knew that c:ould pull it off only with the unquestioning zupport of the Arrned Forces. To x('curc this he had to win the general staff, the division and field commanders, and

lr.

llrc chiefs of the various services. In the months preceding the declaration of martial lirw, a secret suffey was made of the attitudes of the top officers iri the different icrvices. Ninety-eight percent of those interviewed thought that political and social c.ntlitions had deteriorated to a point where martial rule had become necessary. In

lrrllying to Marcos, military professionals sincerely believed that they were saving the Itr:public, upholding the constitution, and taking orders from their Commander-in('lrief, who was a duly-constituted official At the personal level, there were many who felt that the time had come to "liberate"the Armed Forces from the clutches of the old politicians, more particu. larly the members of congress and the Senate to whom they had to pay uroigrifi"d obeisance either to ensure passage ofthe AFP budget or advance their careers. col. Romeo Honasan, a retired Huk fighter under president Magsaysay who rrow rirns the sprawling, veterans-owned industrial estate in northem Mindanao, recalls that resentnent against certain types of politicians had always run high in military circles. "By declaring martial law," he says, '?resident Marcos gave the Armed F'orces a new status and a dignity that had been denied them by past administra-

still, the people trusted Marcos'promise that criminarity would be a thing of big-time slnugglers and criminal syndicate members _

.fu p*t. News reports.that heretofore

Oplnn

tions." As the security arm and politicat underpinning of the regime, the military is understandably the most favored sector of the government. '"They've never had it so good " is the common plaint of disgruntled elements who feel that Marcos is overdoing the grant of salary increases, living allowances, quarters and clothing allowances and other fringe benefits not usually available 1o employees or officials in the civil service. Extension of the tours of duty of retirable field officers appears to be the rule rather than the exception. with the increase of manpower from 45,000 n 1972 to more than 100,000 tn 1,979, opportunities for a career in the military as well as prG motions - especially in the battle areas of Mindanao and samar have also been enhanced. To maintain an army of this size obviously requires a lot of money. The national defense budget of less than a billion pesos n l97z has now swollen to a staggering sum of nearly P6-billion - the biggest item in the National Appropriations Act.

{

Aside from the benefits that Marcos generously showers on the military estab. lishment - usually on the occasion of a patriotic observance or the anniversary of a service branch - high-ranking officers also enjoy a number of "unofficial" perqui.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

It is widely believed that having been a soldier himself, Marcos reads the milillry mind better than anyb'ody. '?recisely for this reason he was easily able to gain lhc support of the Armed Forces," says'one informant. "He was once part of the

sites that compensate for the loss of status and income with retirement. The observation has been made that when a civilian official retires, he stays retired, but when a senior officer leaves the army, he merely sheds his uniform for more distinctive mufti as an ambassador, an action officer of the Ministry of Human settlements, or the manager of a govemment corporation - a far cry from the old days when a

organization and knew how its members would react. He was confident that the prol'cssional soldier would not question the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, espet'itlly one who had been elected by the people. Besides, he was declaring martial lal lrr accordance with the Constitution, and every soldier swears allegiance to that." This basically democratic and populist orientation has its roots in the history ol' the Philippine Army, which owes its character and traditions from the Americans. When Gen. Arthur MacArthur was named Military Governor of the Islands in 1900, hc founded the famed Philippine Scouts as a division of the U.S. Army. Later, during the Philippine Commonwealth era, his legendary son, Douglas, became the archiloct of a then non-existent Philippine Army. From MacArthur's time to the present, American influence over the Philippine

soldier simply faded away.

The Bulletin Today probably had this new situation in mind when it sadly noted the quiet passing of an old soldier on whom martial law had failed to smile:

It is news when a retired general, former Chief of pC and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed For0es, dies in a rented accessorin (cheap aparknent). In our time, such a man, to die under those circumstances, is a hero.

There are other considerations that move us, belatedly, to pay high

rnilitary establishment has remained decisive. The cream of its officer corps are graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, which is pattemed in every detail

tribute to retired Brig. Gen. Nicanor Garcia.

our man who

has covered the Armed Forces for many years recalls that Garcia had the distinction of having been Chief of pC twice. The double stint may be attributed largely to his honesty. In 1963 the Defense Press corps cited him for integrity, honesty, and calmness

irlter West Point - including its dress parade uniforms, curricula, and the use of "rnistah" in addressing fellow-cadets. Quite a number of those occupying sensitive, high-echelon posts have been to U.S. army schools for specialized training, Aside from this, the Philippines looks to the United States for substantial funding of the Armed Forces. ln 1969-72, the AFP received a reported total of $80.6 rnillion in military aid. This amount rrvas more than doubled after martial law was

underfre....

But honesty exacted a price. . . Gen. Garcia had one failing: he neglected to...provide for his own ' future.'i He retired from the service without the ben;fit of any extended tour of duty. Thereafter, he remained poor. . . .

one of the reasons, though, why retired officers are better off now than treir counterparts in the pre-martial law era is that, freed of political interference, the system of promotions within the Armed Forces has by and large operated well. Many career officers are retired at a youthful age and, because of theirleadership qualities and management skills, easily find jobs either in the private sector or the civil government. And if worse comes to worst, there is always a place for them in the philippine veterans Development and lnvestment corporation, which operates a railroad, an industrial estate, an electronics company and a conglomerate of trading, financing and manufacturing firms. Marcos claims that despite martial law, the principle of civilian supremacy prevails. But this is like saying that there is no censorship of media in the New society. The psychological fear of the authority and might of the Armed Forces is so penasive that in practice, civilian officials usually bend to the wishes of the local -ilitury commander. without giving orden or commands the defense establishment can and often does * compel the government to act in a certain way at the national and Iocal levels. And when Marcos insinuates, as he does on certain occasions, that there are matters he cannot decide without frst "consulting the military,,, it is an admission that he acknowledges the power of tlose who have made it possible for him to remain President beyond his constitutional tenure.

rlcclared - prezumably to enable the Marcos government to meet the zupposed com' rrrunist threat - to $166.4 for 1973-76. With the sryning of the revisedPhilippirie' ti.S. bases treaty, the United States is committed to providing, over a period of five ycars, the following amounts of "security assistance":

Military assistance Foreign Military Sales Credits Security Supporting Assistance

: : :

50 million

$250 million $200 million

American support has clearly enabled Marcos to expand the AFP to its pre' scnt size. This is why his political foes, here and abroad, accuse the United States of backing "a dictatorial regime" and persistently urge U.S. Congress to cut military aid to the Philippines altogether, charging t}at such aid is being used to "deprive the lrilipinonation of their human rights, and further oppress them." Their argument is based on the simplistic political syllogism that since the Marcos government obviously owes its continued existence to the Armed Forces, and since the latter is, in many ways, dependent upon the United States - therefore, only the U.S. can call for a change from an authoritarian to a democratic form of government. Even if this form of logic were valid, much would still depend on how the officcrs and members of the Armed Forces perceive the Marcos regime. As long ab they lccept the idea that the martial law government is truly constitutional - a line he Marcos has nothing to worry about. But if, on thc lras been assiduously cultivating

ffi

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Oplan

other hand, its legitimacy cannot be defended further because the dangers he originally invoked no l0nger exist, or thut -;; the opposition craims the dar

were never real or imminent, having been conjureO Uir'ftr*."r petuate

In the Interim National Assembly, eight

i*ur"Al" *f,liril;r,ilr"#lrT;5:.

n,, ,IJiL*:,_T:::_,:ry*"l.ytl.ft:.aid had always been the main prop of the shah's government.

tinue to suffer "preventive imprisonment" - often beyond the term provided for their crimes. Still, Marcos refuses to fill the hundreds of vacancies in the country's

*nn *"i1,IJrilr',lt1

Courts of First Instance.

,rrn, ormoney to equip and moderni l?:t,ffi his armed 1:::1,j:,f:esiediremena"y, rorces.'Besides .uring *i. ff;il

ffi;ir;"ffiHil#"r:'il#,: i:,.:^o_yqi,J,n.-b.,,

were predged to die forhim. li3:Tl?:*l unit i3""..:1i:t.: that rescued him in rssr r,o-'"ffiffi;ffiilil"ffii::#-*

1,.#:this

$:r*::',:t:":r,

|1r:,11.-.:,T

bv the indep_endent and younser orficers,

ff":::**,::'::'":':1gql'!.id^.*;6;"?o;ilrTJJ;'ffiH':TH; :#: ::1,::'-,y..I :1,1'.:"**'na'. *a .our;';.; ;;

;;';ffi;;:ITffi ji*T:'-1Y':,:;i,";;.;;J;'"il;:*'-#ilffi :; il'il1'.")::l::: ;:-;",'#,';:;'r:#;; HH:itfff ::,,',".,3'^llli,3g1*,.;h;;;ffi flowirs ir, ,r,.'."-rr, ff]ToThfffjTwildly with the demonstrators

"ifi:-

that

In his most recent study of Third world countries, Gunnar Myrdar ph,ippinls .rv *rri be

;;;trr*;;;;:rd;s#urities

declares

Tlr-""{r

{qcos,

..smiling

martial law,,: repression rcPressron of oI

courd provoke the peopre

i,io turire action to 1,:111"^ protect themselves as from an enemy. - To keep the miritary on his side and prevent its coaguration into contentious factions, Marcos has deftry tried to minim2e professionar ,irrtrirr. iince promotions and assignments are constant sources of possible trr"tir, rrc rr", _-J"il.ru"rrrt to fiil --- ^ up vacancies, both in civfl and military sectors of government.

*:,3iry"::::"1l:*:,

corruption and

behind

This is also how he has managed to deal with the ticklistr problem of choosing a successor to the AFP Chief of Staff, who should have been retired years ago. Unable to fathom the secret of his longevity, yourger officers call Gen. Romeo Espino "The Last Holdout," not realizing that he is there because of his unswerving loyalty to Marcos. As commander of the Philippine Army, Espino had been the director of the ill-starred Jabidah project, which Sen. Aquino exposed on the Senate floor. The secret plan to train a Moro special force purportedly to "destabillze" the Malaysian state of Sabah in North Borneo, then as now the bone of territorial contention be'

Eduardo Martelino.

that could make a big difference: Iranis, according io on, western diplomat who was once posted in feheran, are prone to settle their differences through direct and open confrontation, while Filipinos would rather do so in a roundabout way, employing intermediaies in the person of a compadreor godfather precisely to avoid a collision with the adversary or authority. Though passionate in his beliefs, the Firipino is srow to react to publi. .rur.r. His patience is proverbial, and if he can go about pursuing his private interests with the least interference from the government, he is willing io make * u[o*ur., for trre petty

*::*:t|:

loyal.

the _the in the social, political and economic conditions of both countries. Myrdal, however, misses one vital point

day-today abuses of officials.

The reason is obvious: by appointing one, he disappoints a dozen others, by keeping the position open all the aspirants are kept ever hopeful and

whereas

tween the Philippine and Malaysian govertments, frst came to light when several Moro youths from Sulu wete fished out of the waters off Cavite. They told of cruel and inhuman treatment received at a training cirmp on Corregidor Island. As far as a Senate investigating committee could glean, the project was tlre brainchildof Col.

celebrate the fall ofthe peacock Thron..

the

their replacements, which he is empowered to do by his own decree. In thg judiciary, a similar situation exists. For years now, the dockets of Philippine courts have been clogged by thousands of unresolved criminal and civil cases due to lack ofjudges. As a result, those accused who cannot afford to post bail con-

,t,ffi*g to answer the question, which H',*fl,:ll.:::i}l;1}g, be answered onlv in ,re test, the rran ."p";;'of,;;;;-T#HTl,lk.Ii'i,li u,t*u., tr,. fu;';;'h;,"J# i"opr. u.., , ;'#j"*:t IT"l,:".::f""T1,-,i imminent in the fal of a...i._'lio, *.

owing to tlre death

1989 elections. Even thougtr large regional constituencies have been deprived of "representation'n in parliament, Marcos stubbornly resists political pressure to name'

without

of ,r,.

seats remain vacant

of two members, and ttre resignation of six others who ran for local office in

I'rlr"ex.or, ,o himsell.T--n_-"-y:rl,rne rnilitar|,"rii i.'i*.a ;rh ; il. ;,irrr_r. How many would then g.ntirr" to up;iiffi;'ffiffi;;ffiillprr.ry

t9?B,uttrntio,

Sagittarlur l?

one-time military attachd in Wastrington, D.C. who gained some prominence for proposing, in a book, tlte creation of a Pan-Malaysian federation consisting of the Philippines, Malaysia; and Indonesia, Martelino conceived the Jabidah expeditionary forde, which he proposed to base in Simunul Island in the Sulu group. This exotic island is famous for its fair-skinned gids, probably the descendants of l8-century Dutch or Englistr sailors on their way to the Spice Islands, or Dutch women captured by Moro pirates. Martelino could not resist marrying one of the local belles and the publicity given to the colorful Muslim weriding rite drew attention to the mysterious activitY. It was plain to a curious public that a project of such magrritude and daring, and fraught with serious diplomatic implimtisrt, could not be undertaken without clearance at the highest govemment levels. But Espino and tlose under him al-rsorbed the shock for M4rcos, sparing him from international embarrassrnent.

Loyalty, however, is not the only reason for the general's staying power. [n many instances, Marcos has strown no compunction about discarding a person whose usefulness has come to an end. But it is believed that Espino's retirement as Chief of

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

staff might trigger a ,ufly for his_coveted post between two key military figures:

Fidei Ramos Marcos is able to postpone a probrem that "r,r,"pi. could undermine men around him.

$:l;jy:,:,1^,:*:^I,:l i1g",

ny;;;; ilr*;;

ft. srrn"_g Forces, there are indications despite his *+ty,not.a, are satisfied with the present that stare of affairs.:

As for the unity

.?.1

:t::::":1,::::,rT A system designed to maintain a poriticar regime in power ir"rituoty u.reds a favored: sector within the estabrishment, and u*ongih. idealistic .**r, orLrr, ,il;;,"*-

bat soldiers, res€ntunent is particularly strJng against those who hav6 enriched themsehes in office, or have been abre to rr.,Lr'prorrtotions and choice assignments, through politicar pon. corumnist Jesus Bigornia-of the Buletin

THE CIA SYNDROME

;;i#T#

r;;;;";^;;;;;;,

fD ARTLY because of its much publicized role in political intrigues in other Third .F World countries and partly b".uur. of its paii activities in the Philippines it' self many Filipinos believe that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency encouraged

Marcos to declare martial law before communists - or other groups hostile to American interests - could overthrow or replace his friendly Sovernment. Valid or not, this suspicion looms large in the public mind and will probably persist for a long tii'ne to come.

glance, it may seem a barely tenuous notion. How, for example, could the United States promote the termination of a democratic system it has introduced as a colonial power and nurtured for fifty years? How could the champion of liberty and human rights help establish an authoritarian government? American intervention, on the other hand, has long been acknowledged as a reality of Philippine political life, and in the view of the average Filipino, Marcos o, uny other iresident for that matter would never have dared to make such a

At frst

If "steak commandos" abound in the United states, ..swivel chair commanders" are likewise prentifur in the Armed Forces of the philippines' safe.fr93 bu,ets coming outofthemuzzresofreber rifles, the lat-

ter not only rive in the bosom of their fam,ies wh,e working in crean and comfortable offices, they are.also sped up the fromotion ladder by mere closeness with trose in authority. so strikingry different is their good fortune from the state that soldiers committeiio batfle must put

up with, itis causing widespread demorarization. And when erements of 9e Philippine Army or the philippine constabulary ,,Jirgu. or even desert to the enemy, the-military estabiishment woutd do better protecting its flanks. I It should] remember and heed what the combat soldier

is saying.

Disenchantment with the regime may not be rimited to the rank-and_file in the Armed Forces alone. In one television interview three years after he declared martial law, Marcos suddenly digressed to talk about the disgruntled elements in the AFP. Referring to unnamed top brass, he chuckred somewhat deprecat-"rebellious" ingly and said: 'Now, I don't know what's on the minds of these grn"rrir, but I,m sure that if they go ahead witli theii prans, they'll onry meet *ith fuiiure. . .,, As nothing has occurred by way of another oplan sagittaiirr, ,r* generals

must have changed their minds

or have chosen to enjoy a comfortable retirement.

move'without at least consulting the U.S. government and assuring himself of

sup-

port in the form of sustained economic and military assistance' A week after the declaration of martial law, I paid a call on Ambassador Henry Byroade at the u.S. Embassy in Manila. A fun-loving diplomat who often ignored protocol and security, Byroade enjoyed making unscheduled trips to the provinces. bne of his favorite watering spots was the soutlem city of Cebu, which had been chosen aS afl 'oR & R" or rest and recreation area for American GIs from Vietnam

he and teemed with nightclubs, beach resorts and pleasure spots. Aside from this, would he there, From counted Mayor Sergio Osmefla Jr. among his intimate friends. who was then fly down to Cagayan de Oro to visit his son, aPeaceCorpsVolunteer kiln for village potter5' helping - our city set up a cooperatirreByroade raised both hands in mock despair and lVh", I entered his office, ..I know what you're thinking - but we had nothing'to do with it, nothing at said, all!" He then volunteered the information that like everyone dlse, the Marcos declara' tion had caught him entirely by surprise. He had learned about martial law in the dawn hours of Z2 September, when the State Department asked him for details' of Defense Minister Enrile himself claims that the Americans were never aware Byroade's.successor, But effect. put into oplan sagittarius, or when it would be in an article Ambassador William Sullivan, was to contradict this when he disclosed on the Marcos saw Byroade that Seryice published by the United States Information he filed a Marcos, President with talked had eve of ,nurtiut law and "right after he be put would law martial that be a chance might cable in which he thought that there in November or earlY December." I am more inclined to believe, however, that the American diplomatic mission be a temporary knew about Marcos' plan and approved of it, convinced that it would has never Embassy The communism." of the"threat meet to emergency measure

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The C.I.A.

lacked for friends in Malaca.flang palace. Byroade, in particular, had nearly unrestric. ted access through Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor and other philippine military and civilian high officials who frequented the Ambassador,s residence a Forbes Park. AII were known, in a kind oflongue-in-cheek fashion, ..America, as

boys."

As soon as martial law was declared, Melchor flew to the united states for t sole purpose of holding a press conference in waslrington D.c. where he tried to ir tify what Marcos had done in terms of land reform and redistributi", ;i;;;;: subject dear to the hearts of American liberals and democrats. rnor, *t u.! rJ

with the difficulties that such affairs entail could not but suspect Department'sponsored visit, which involved Byroade at the Manila end. miliar

it as" a Statq

while it may be patently unfair, in the absence of hard evidence, to name the U.S' ambassador as a Marcos accomplice, significance has been attached to the fact

that in the Middle East countries where he had previously been posted there had also been radical political changes blamed on u.S. intervention, His protests that .,we

had nothing

to do with it" -

referring to martial law in the philippines

thus

sounded false, especially in the face of the Nixon administration,s policy of supporting dictatorial governments sympathetic to the U.s., and increasing evidence of cIA

covert activities around the world. A Time magazine report in 1979 categorically said that thb Nixon administration approved martial law in the Philippines at least after the fact.

Throughout its 3S-year history, the centrar Intelligence Agency has had three fundamental missions: intelligence-gathering and analysis, counter-intelligence (often described in euphemistic terms as "the protection of its own integrity',), and political intervention,

the three, this last activity has made the Agency one of the most

feared and distrusted of American instrumentalities operating on foreign soil. Its special operations division - long known as the Directorate for Plans (DDp) been behind or involved in the installation of the shah of lran, the Bay of pigs had invasion in Cubq the vast turmoil in Chile, several attempted assassinations of poii

tical leaders like Fidel castro, Patrice Lumumba, and Ngo Din Diem of South vietnam (some of whom eventually were killed) and countless other acts of political corisequence, known and unlnown. The DDp is said to be responsible chiefly to the President of the United States whenever clandestine intervention in the internal affairs ofanother country is called for. The intervention could take any form from involvement in acoupd'etatar revolution, to the election or plain assassination of America's political enemies. Thus on l0 August 1962, in the tense period preceding the cuban missele crisis, the story is told that Robert S. McNamara suggested at a meeting in Secretary of state Dean Rusk's office that perhaps tlte solution to the "castro problem" was to kill him. The proposal created such a furor at this meeting that the participants which included Edward R. Murrow, then Director of the US Information Agency and cIA Director John McCone - quickly voted it out of order and stricken off the record. rater, Mccone reportedly called up McNamara to say that he was appalled by the idea and that he wouldn't stand "for any more of it.,'

Syndrome 3l

But the plan to "terminate Castro - with extreme prejudice," as the intelli' House had been secretly working 1,,.rrr.c jargon has it, did not end there. TheWhite Mongoose,"_th€ project "Operations Code-named ,,,, ,, ,"ha*a to get rid of Castro. the State Department after days Two G. Lansdale. \!,ri lrcaded by General Edward the agency's liaison requesting CIA to the 1r.(.liltg, Landsdale addressed a memo of programs, "includingliquidation t,, Mongoose to draft a number of anti-Castro Ir',rr It't

S."

Although Lansdale has gone on to play larger roles in the highly specialized Irlltl of clandestine intervention, his work in the Philippines in the early fifties ex' hiding under every bed in Malacaflang' lrlrrins why Filipinos suspect a CIA agent yearswas in throes of social and political ferment. In Ma' the Srrrrtheast Asia in those l;rysia, vietnam andthe Philippines, communist-backed insurgency movements were orr the rise. The Hukbalahaps were virtually knocking on the doors of Manila and rvt,ro spreading their operations to Panay Island and the Bicol region. it was Lansdale's job to coordinate with the Armed Forces of the Philippines trr tlre fight against communist forces in the area, and this brought him close to Raayoung, inexperienced congressman whom President Quirino had r.lrosen as befense Secretary. Lansdale believed, as did many others, that social irrctluities and government corruption provided a fertile soilforsubversionand revo' lrrtion, and that the Quirino administration was no longer capable of coping with tlrc situation, being'itself the cause of mass discontent. The presidential election x:lrcduled in November of 1953 presented an opportunity for a peaceful change of rrrrn Magsaysay

It,rrdcrship.

of a President who could restore cona leader who would not hesitate to important, equally lirlcnce in government and, the decision was made to remove Once islands. in the protect American interests Lansdale saw in Magsaysay the makings

()uirino and put Magsaysay

in his place, a high-powered media campaign

was

llunched. What had been originally conceived as a clandestine operation took on the tlirnension and color of a full-blown American build-up for the defense chief' Soon Magsaysay, through the initiatives of the CIA, was on the cover of 'l'ime and other important intemational magazines, as the man who broke the back of the communist rebellion in the Philippines. Although he had never been known to be an interesting speaker, invitations to address prestigious forums began to pour in. For if he were to dislodge a veteran political figure like Quirino, it was necessary to project Magsaysay not only as an anti-communist figlrter but a man of large ideas capable of leading a nation. Here his image-makers irad a problem, for Magsaysay was far from articulate. Worse, he had formed no opinions on international issues. llut the CIA could, and did, provide the solution. In mid.1953, an invitation was arranged for him to deliver the keynote address at the world conference of the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City. Lans' dale had Magsaysay virtually locked up in a hotel room in Los Angeles for several days so he could memorize - or learn 1s yssalize - a speech in Spanish. His per' formance was a resounding success. No one zuspected that he had acquired his Spa' nish ovemight with the aid of a language instructor and a tape recorder.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The C.I.A Syndrome

that ensued was typically Ameflcan in tone and vigc were_treated to slick radio jingtes and patriot :::^ff :TljT:,Iiltpinovoters marches. Children in thb streets sang .,Magsaysay is my Guy,r, while older fi danced io_the "Magsaysay Mambo." pranted news photos shlwed this, former m,echanic, leaping over. fences and slogging across muddy ditches to shake the h a yitinS_ peasant, Suyq a simple-meal with a worker,s fr"ily, ;, having .of. hair trimmed by a village barber. pins, stickers, scarves and hats n""oroirr. ,"ri,ri looking oddly like the left-overs of a Democratic or Republican convention. Il the_ excitement, no one thought to ask where he had gotten all the mc ^ the hoopla. supporiers assumed that the rogistics to fund 't".r, 6ring ,"pplied by

,^- ,In.*:I..1Ir:Tp"Cn

;;;;r;;;;;;

r#.

urgruvr;r; of Agricultureflg Assista.,ton Community Oev.fopm*r, ,rrr..*.,i. But another l:::d.*tial organ2ation in which the cIA, through iu.roa.,-*I* ;,IJlt involved was the Magsaysay-for-president Movement. outwa;dly, trr. upru *rJirieli as an independent political group charged with conecting non-party ,"i;, fo;- M"gi saysay, who was running under the Nacionalista banner. Unknown ,"

*^-L^-^

.L - r.nr the

MPM, T...n!:^, objective.

headed by Col. Eleuterio Adevoso, fruO i,

iuri

,rr, ;;;'#;; "ili: -,

ln the 1949 election which brought Elpidio euirino to power, the Nacionalis_l tas,had accused the Liberals of winning through vote-buying, fraud ana ,;;;;.tr.. only the_statesmanstrip and patriotism of the tate Jose p.'L#.i, trrr'xp candidate forP:esident, hadpreventedi violent afternath, especially in rris rrome pr*ir.. batangas where political passions had reachcd an "-r explosive level. Should Quirino and the Liberals again resort to foul means to ensure his reelec-,

tion, the MPM

wa s to immediately conv-ert itsef ; zation. At a given signar, tc be broadcast *orro tut.r over militarr- i'isiallations and armories throughout th. country-----"'' As a meeting at the Del Monte pineapple prantation in Bukidnon where this broached by Adevoso to some uinaanao readers, the reaction was one - of "' incredulity. Then congressrnan Emmanuer pelaez could not concear his "Gentleinen," he said, 'Jrou are talking revolution!,, "gri"i"* Adevoso calmly replied, ,.yes, Manny, we are _ and if you find the subject . unpleasant, you may leave." pelaez decided to stay but remained tense and silent for the rest of t}re evening.

;;; ;;i;; ;r;J;',"t"r*;;;;;"r..;J;;;;;"*;;;l,it

4* yl,

Lansdale had been part of the contingency pranning but was carefur not to of the secret briefings. Nevertheriss, trre cm **.irr.a ,..y on everybody's mind through the erection period. since the a;iri"o had be"irirg 'hnspeakalle villain" as a resurt of .r.uu propaganda .--..mirg him of all kinda of chicanery including the purchase of a ps,00o bea ana ana a lota-plateJ chamber pot American support of Magsaysay was regarded be present at any

::ir tlr

i".i

uy naifinos u, u.or-

t{r lltc cause of democracy and freedom, and not aS foreign intervention tll'uirs of the Philippines. *h* lntr,rrrnl *r l v!,r rtn(:c. the changing of the guards in Malacaflang Palace has been attribute;l trr tlrr. irrlluencc or machinations of supposed agents of the Central Intelligence 4g*1, 1. l,tlrpirrq politicians themselves are to blame for this popular notion. Be' r4|* rrl tlrr. M:rgsaysay experience, presidencial makers deemed it essential to pro' fcr t llr,,lr r rrrrtlitlutcs as sure winners by claiming American support. Irr li)(r5, whcn Marcos was rumored to be America's anointed one,.Finance qF' 1.t,ty ltulirro llechanova, President Macapagal's personal public relations adviser, l;irrl',| tlrr. ('()ulrtry with an American who was vaguely introduced as a political i*r!liq;,1 lk' soug,ht to create the impression, especially in the provincial areas, that r,trtrirry t,r tlre claims of the Marcos cilmp, Macapagal stillhad tlre confidence of

*tilrirtlll

American government through Lansdale. In his memoirs,Lansdale,h"';;;;.;r*l any direct participation in the elections. He insists that all he did was ," rr.ip that tJre vqting would be fair, free and orderry, through the formation "rrrrd; of the tional Movement for Free Elections (NAMFRET) with Jaime Ferrer and Rar

llr" It 'r povt,rt[nent. hr,orr observers of U.S. involvement in Asia believed then that Marcos was ls a strong but democratic leader to supplant Macapagal. The latter had h*ltitc rirll,.r scvere attack by the Nacionalistas for instituting "one'man rule" and it *r1 11i,s1r.rl llrat, given a second term, he would become the Philippines' fust dictal,,r I lir rrrrc tcn yean later, the tables would be turned: Macapagal denounces Marcos frrr rrnr tfy llrc same thing in a book entitled Democracy in the Philippines and, *.rlrrrlrl llrirl an ASSO - Arrest, Search and Seizure Order - has been issued against Irlirr, qr,r,hr political asylum at t}te residence of the U.S. Ambassador, a stone's throw Irrrrrr lrtr lrorrrc in plush Forbes Park. But Marcos takes no action. The controlled pre* r ir I tr' rr lcs the former President and he retums home, a non'hero.) llrrsc who prezume to know how the CIA operates cite the positive coverage *f rr r ll,rrl,lcnder by the major U.S, media as one of the "indicators" of American ;*rllil, *l rlrppgrt. They point to the treatment given to Air Marshal Nguyen Kao Ky liclll' lrl bccame Premier of South Vietnam, Indonesia's Suharto, and Magsaysay. ll ,rlp wcrc to believe this, then Marcos must have been a CIA "client" in 1965, for 6rt nrrly tlrrring the election but shortly thereafter, he received a press build-up that ril lrlrtllgrpirrc President had hitherto enjoyed. Iir cover stories and feature articles, Motr or wlrs portrayed as an authentic war hero in the mold of Audie Murphy, reci' prlerrl ol. llrc U.S. Congressional Medal of Honor, and one whom the U.S. could de' i,ur,,l ,,,, lo preserve democracy with his very life in this part of the world. ( )rr bccoming President, Marcos was invited to address a joint session of the Alrr,rttnrr Congress. By dramatically recounting how he had strared a foxhole with o qr'arrrl Arnerican soldier in the last days of Bataan and how this boy, felled by a leplrresc sniper's bullet, was to die in his arms, he left his audience enthralled and r nrrvtlt:ctl heyond doubt that here was a man who would heroically stand by Ame' irr*lrrF rcrrr,'tl

rlr,r evt,rr rrnder the most trying circumstances.

lrr giving him this high honor, the U.S. Sovernment encouraged further suspi' r lnrn tlrut it indeed had much to do with Marcos' becoming President of the PhilipI lttut.

Wlrut the exponents of the so-called "media indicator" principle cannot aderlrrrlrly cxplain is the paradox of why, despite U.S. zupport, the Marcos regime is

'1t

to relentless attacks by the major American media. The concerning this are varied and intriguing. when the Carter administration embarked on a worldwide hu. ,O::"n:]1r-^tl

l I ,i

1;ll,

11,l,;

i'l

THE couNTERFErr REVoLU.noN

The C.I.A.

being zubjected

l:i",i:

*H,"TrnjXHi::: i,:.

diwowar

n,' il;;.K,,

*;; ;;i#;T,il:

*:*i*",lj,,j1"flT.gl::1i"^,it,courd,*,n.,.,i;;;#'",,*,;ffi;Jl; from criticism in the philippirr, *itt ouiil;;il;r;;ffi:

nted to weaken Marcos,posiffiy:::*T *:^y.l^i::.:l:;:uy_.;il.,t ,eminoing r,im tr,.orgr, #;r::rt:;

li""r,,T^*:,*:::fl^,1*:,"*ltiations,

#;:i:#;:"T11:x#:"tgr:-t*';F;:iF;J,,i;u''i"'""##r'#:ilil: ing the leadership of the fmtippines-a, u .li.it rtut". while all these are in the realm of specuration,

trlJ-*h:,

the-thorny

bases

question was

finily

Syndrome

lrllrl $py systern to monitor their meetings and to report on activities that would

lrrrlh nlc significant changes in the mission's attitude tpwards his government,

Suspected of conspiring with the opposition on one hand and coddling the Mril,'os regime on the other, U.S. Embassy officials bemoan the fact that by trying tr, ttuy in the middle they may have succeeded in alienating both sides. Saysapolillr al ol'l'icer: 'l[e're damned if we do, and damned if we don't." What he does not r,,,rllrc is that, like many of his colleagues, he too is suspected of being an agent of tlrr, ('lA and part of the U.S. plot to maintain Marcos in power-ortoremovehim wlrnrr his usefulness has come to an end or if, he becomes unmanageable. It is all prrrl ol tlrc syndrome.

is nonetheress significant settrefl in March 1979 tothe obvious

of the united states, and after Marcos praised America ..a as dependathereby stating in clear ana unmistakable -terms just where he stood on _b.1" flv" the iszue of Russian hegemony in Asia *o tr,e Middre East I satisfaction

,""J ,iilg, ;.,;d;;

began to come his way.

In April 1980, Marcos received an invitation to

address the annuar convention

#Il*;",ffi : ;j*#",:;T1"::::l1l.3ll*:,la"o-,-iu-ii"n;1,,_#ff tr. m".oiu o*;;;;;;;; ffi""#'H;H:";.T. *H:T,,lIl: ,:yI j:'.*'r{i'1*,p",'ririi'r,^ffi ff ,il#; :"r*.:?#,':I1'**"0:1":.T"'-1r: ,.,toquestiontr,.a-rri.'-iruffi;fi ,?;#::fff ';:lX# ::*tT9,r"T,::,f and in the U.S. itself. Y:t;Y*:*11," 3o j::"1.1^1'f

been the obj^ect of bitchv comments bv American co-

d;,;;;:;r^ffi ;; ;':;ffi ;;il,Jt;;:'d*nffi H"'T'il: Tllxx::3::.'T:f.1'J.,y'f 13.0,^rl*,9:,-ryf 1,:llh.san.ranc-i-,col#A;;':;;ffi iffi :ilff H:ill: ;;;ilf ffi ["#, lffJ*T".#,*"y:i:yeserefugees.,,F;;;;;;;,;;;ffi this failed to materialize. *:::::

"#ff

:gextravasance*a"r,u,i"i,ffi

award

*t*:,n1|1*

*"I::.:

foJ a

{w guvr_i, Manita, the state Deparrment,sj

*ry:i*"I_1,1':*jt-1",',:lsecretaryro,ruiil*#r*rffi ;."ffiff il "J;d:

il;11'j""i::'Tll*l;:-yi-'i1i,il1il;;;;,fi;'ffi d#ffi ffi f,t'"1:1_:n_':::g:.,Th'.phlippinesNewsd;;;;}'J*;,,#ffi.i;]ilJ1*1P; ,.t.Yrr^T..:,l.llrlll.u'f u"ine*rrrr;A;;#;inff;dil::.1 ,l^y*j:^lT:""*. dr,gyi1i. *,,*,.*pi",ffiil*;ffi; there ,*;,il,f, :ff.x

;,Tl*:? j.*::*I,::,,'tarnished*"s".4#;;;ffi

I;ll*T"::*X

#;'"_1

:"i'*j,

lo"li",f ,#

;{ ;"*oi *.",",,iiT#Hffiil1:j

::TlJy"Tf to take a dim i,:I1.._rTryinestoshowtrrat,"rn"au"',:r,i,;;";;#:ffi view of martial law.

In the face of this denial, both opposition and government quarters in the phil_ ippines think that American or cIA - intervention may be inevitable, though no one is willing to guess how or when this win occur. r, ,rr.

i"p" being chosen as a possibre presidential replacement, ambitious Filipino politicians"f take turns in ingratiating themselves to_u-s. Bmburry oin.irtr, trrereuy mission with an excellent source of political information. Marcos, ro. rri, purr,',nurnr*s an effi-

d"iJ;;a*

t.' '.:

\,tr

,l 1,,

't) :

comrption under your tyranny. That tyranny lies naked before the

THE MOVEMENT FOR. A FREE PHILIPPINES

N 28 september

1979, Former senator Raul Manglapus, president of U$based Movement for a Free phirippines, wrote the iollowing retter: ri

Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos Manila, Philippines

Dear Mr. Marcos,

Your controlled pres

are inviting me to go home.

has been saying in banner headrines that you

This is not the fust "newspaper invitation" that you have sent me. In october 1976, your newspapers headlined an invitation to me and my group to go home and participate in one of those mock referenda you have b-gen holding about once ayeat. you said Uriuo.u possib-le opposition participation in the referendum discussions. we cabled you trrat if you were sincere in your desire to have all .. possible^opposition participation in the referendu*, you strould first refg-ase Aquino_ and the other poritical prisoners, so that they -senator might also participate. Then we would go home. of course you ignored our cabre. For trre whole exercise had onry been intended to give the world Bank delegates then meeting in rrr*iru the impression that you were practicing demicracy. Tlds time there is no referendum to which to invite me. you are asking me to go hune and "see for myserf." It is your tired old line trrat anyone who has not beel home during martial law has no right to ,p.rr. out against it. I remind you of your own Foreign Ministei, carl,os p. who during lvorld war II made a name for himsetf, and made a .Romllo' lot of writing books and making speeches ,ju.i uu ,rr" tiri"o lnoney, States denouncing Japanese atrocities in ttri philippines. He neve, saw those atrocities. He never spent a day in a Japanese-occupied territory. But he felt entitled to denounce the rapanese, ?or Aflied krtelligence was supplying him with reliable information on their terrifying treatrnent of the Filipino people. Today we need no foreigr inteilige,ce agents to ten us what you doing to our prostrate nation. International human rigrru

yo,,r;;;il,

it for myself. You say you gve me your word th:it I shall haye safe and out of the Pffippines if I should accept your invitation,

cyes of the world, and I need not go home to see

passage

if your

word was worth more than your deb4uched Philippine peso. Your whole

political career has been one of trickery and deception, and when you installed yourself as dictator, your deceptive spirit roamed uncontrolled. You contrived your owri artificial crisis in the Manila area and tricked many world observers into believing that you had no choice but to declare martial law. You invoked the 1935 Constitution and tricked the Armed Forces of the Philippines into believing that you were declaring martial law ordy for a short period to restore law and order.

Malacaffang Palace I

The Movement for a Free Philippines

the world media, the church, even the official reports oitfr. "g*.i.r, ri.S. Orpartment of State, have all conlirmed the tortuie, the injustice, the

You imprisoned important Constitutional Convention delegates, and then bribed and manipulated the Convention into passing a tran' sitory provision which made you dictator, deceiving the foreigrr media with the term "constitutional authoritarianisrn." You tricked the very political prisoners who were already at your mercy,

You tricked Eugenio Lapez, Jr. and Sergio Osr-nefla III into ending their hunger strike in 1974 with the promise that they and all tlrose detained without charges would be released, and then refused to release them, so lhat Lopez and Osmefla had to make their dramatic escape in 1977.

You tricked Senator Aquino into sigrring a petition for amnesty in 1978 on the promise that you would indeed release him, and then, as his family waited with great expectation outside his cell, you cruelly reneged on your promise on the transparent excuse that you did not want to appear to be bowing to U.S. pressure. You tricked many Filipinos into believing that you would hold truly free elections in 1978 and then, after the people had erupted into an explosive noise demonstration of zupport for the opposition on the rr. of thr elections, you inzured the victory of your ticket with frauds of such proportions that even your own police machinery could not hide them, anO you were roundly denounced by the international press. Even aB your newspapers headline the invitation to me, they are sefinlizfng that infamous bookForf'very Tear A Victory, which you paid 1964 in an attempt to dis' an American a huge zum of money to write of your political career. fake character the hyperbole guise with false that you are ready to the world you to announce time At the same can find a better leader." people Filipino the 'oany time that step down despots, that of to coilrmon errot more one You have committed

believing your own propaganda.

Yoti inzult our race when you ask the world to believe that the

B]'!*ilp!!i:T5.1,14,,-:'.:*7

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION Philippines, the nation that produced RLal, Bonifacio, euezon, Osrrrr: .o.*..uf with anyone better than you, whr

Y:::n:l-.:,1:1,1o* started your potiticat career by urLg .orri;i;';;;;r,rt poutila ,irJ, *r,o

*,X:::'":lT:1

r"r.ii";J,r.

have

expos.d foi foisting 26 fake war1i::,:,tui medats til il "" fo, enriciling yourself d1"us9 claims, as a Conqressma *19. l+:.*ur through intenention in the rmpoJ

,"Y::3r,:1nator,.fro.m

been ;;;;;'dil,"rJ#JHffi a;;;i tffi;ff H.[::#, innocent

p*r*t, t

Isabela, and,

white s tt1.l9r, being a major beneficiary in the Stonehill ,r*AA,'f* irr,il tiolalizins comrption so affectivpry during your L

incumbency as consti tutional President and then as diciator, tri"i yorr wife is no, ,"trd ,'l possibly the '.richest woman in the world,, by a prestigiou, arr.f.rll publication, thus ranking you, since you, mi*sl of your wife's riches, as the biggest tfrief in tfre worlO. There are many numUei of Filipinos, in anO out of prison, wh . stand out today, brilliant,.of.nrglgn teaOerstrip, unscathed by tion that tainted, arthough it did not totuu-ilnrr".terize, the corru1 the difficu dlmocracy urr*. hr"iar law. ro mention 111:::*t few,.there ^r$npry are Aquino, Tafiada,Oiotno, iA-orrg, and Rbdrigo. These are, in every sense, better leaden than you. In fact, if the round figure of 47 millton Filipino population

;ffi;ffi#"1;

,rl ,i

were to be regarded as precise rrfrrrrrr, tt.r. * *, 46,999,99g Filipinoi who are better than you, for ryrrt1 ,o td;;" can lay'claim a1-rruurj been a worse disgrace to our nation it * you *a you, uuJ.i*, ;;r*n You invite me to come home and in tfr, ,"rn. brrrth;;;;;;; r:r' paid propag;;;il.-;ncocted ,uout *.. roLi ,*:."|1'^ til_ charge ,jrT"O_Io, m1 with proclaiming myself the president_in.exile christian sociar Movem.nt (csrr7)--oirrich :.f.-ftu we founded in the Philippines in l96s and whose iaeologiJ cadru no* are at the foreront

of the_resistance to your dictatorslrip. . .You-ulso impute to me somJvague act of malversation of contri_ buted funds in the u.S., an obvious viiauon iil;r.b#rr.rrr; charges which you have, with d;rd;;;;s'rter.y, "i,h; area pino diplomats who have dared to aefegt iro1n ,fp foreign "g*nriiiii]. service andl have joined the Movement for a fr* pfrrfrpp.es (MFp) r./' the

of which ur wruurl I ilII \r'[ #i.: PfeSident lVhy do you confront me now with this contradictory posture _

**.f,:,.:1",: Because

vention earlier

tic

,1d,I tr,. :;,-ti.,-G;;;,;d

l,T:n you are panicking at the decisio, tlis month, to.support

JTr"orri,"rf

aggressively tfrc gro*ing

_*;

;;:;:

Or;"_"

re-volutionary forces in the-ihilippi.r. trr.ruse you are running scared at the prospect that the worrd is comin glo realaethat the alternative to you need not be chaos, as you have"so insistently warned, but viable, credible, popular democratic ior.rr.

The Movement for a Free

philippines

Only yesterday, you fued one more panicky round in your propaganda offensive against me. You told the Filipino people in freshnewspaper headlines that I have struck up an alliance with the New people's Army (NPA) and the Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF).

You are counting on the aversion among our people to the

god-

of the MA's Maoist ideolory, and on the historic mizunder. standing between christian and Muslim Filipinos, to whittle down the

less content

burgeoning credibility of the democratic forces in our country. We stand in admiration of the driving commitnent of the NpA to fight your dictatorship. But we can never accept the NpA's version of a dictatorship of the proletariat. As for the MNLF, we have more than once announcdd publicly tlat, purzuantto a 1978 MFp convention resolution, we have establistred contact with its leaders. we sympathiae with the historic aspirations for justice and autonomy of our brother and sis-

ter Muslim Filipinos whom you drove to rebellion with your duplicity. They have aszurred us that they do not seek secession. The prompf restoration of our democracy wi[ bring them true autonomy and end the bloody conflict in our Soutl. The Philippines is my country. To return to it, I do not need your invitation nor your guarantee. I will go home in my own time. The democratic forces in the Philippines have begun to strike for freedom. These forces are with the people and their cry is public justice. Their enemy is not the Armed Forces of the philippines, whose officers and rnen remain overwhelmingly steadfast in their commitment to freedom. Public justice is to be dealt only to those officers and men who joined yoll in amassing extorted wealth and abusing the people. Their enemy is not tlre business community. Public justice will

dealt only to those businessmen who have prostituted themsehes to you and in the process enriched themselves at ttre expense of the people. Their enemy is not the media. Public justice will be meted out only to those who have debased their noble calling and profited by articulating your lies and pretensions. I join the forces of democracy in rallying all Filipinos to the cause of public justice. So, Mr. Marcos, stop bothering with invitations to me. Instead, start looking for someone to invite you elsewhere. For your day is coming and you will need that invitation very badly. Get that invitation and accept it now. Heed this advice, forif you do not, soon t}re forces of freedom shafl fight their way to your palace gates, lrnd you strall then find no escape from the judgment of the people. And the blood ofthe innocent shall be upon yourhead. Sincerely,

Raul S. Manglapus

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Moverhent for a Free Philippines 4l (lrr this last point, valencia was right. of the top 1,000 corporations doing l,rratrrrrm in the Philippines as of 1976,31 were wholly-owned by foreigrers and in,,irl,'!r,rlcd abroad. Their investnents totalled p2,27s-mtllion, with 90.6% cornng lr,,rr .'5 American corporations such as Bnsite Limited, Edward Keller, Getty oil,

The letter was tvpically Manglapus, and if

it failed to spark the revolution tr t fir's; for seven years it served 9U at Iea least 1".-* 9;* remind his ::::_".,:,::;;13 countrymen that woras hlve ,fi;;r been his principar *r.ronr. .l the youthtul nimslapus _ in his fifties he stiu sr

il;

!"G - is considerrairr-"Fri"r?#;T:Ji'"H;ffi

,rrTi""jl:y,l:::1Tit coltege brusrr cut

ff":I.

with fiery

statements

s1;1q1':'111 l'olephone, coca cola Export, citibank, Bank of America, Esso, Burroushs, l,,rrr,' lrrsrrrance. ln 1974, of $79.83-million repatriated as profits, eamings and divirl+,rr,l'i lry ft:reign business, Americans accounted for $56.71-million or 7l% of the

manifestos, he has been waging a sustained ver "n; ui*'1 o .*iv. or this, and his comrades : have been : ::":by "YT::', : dubbed columnist Teodoro valencia as the .and

;,.

gr"

{

-fl ;

ffi ';.'T*,*

dilt[ilil]-

llrrt the columnist was mistaken about the Americans who had joined Mang" lol'rrlrr the Honululu demonstration, According to Sen. Jovito Salonga who was in ll,rrvrrii tt that time, they were college professors and students of the East.West I .rrtrr of the University of Hawaii; whose organization - "Friends of the Filipino

do no-t have to suffer hunger

*a o"piuuti* in tr,, infested forests of Mindanao, orface the risk opposing the Government. A former member of the Philippine senate and a one.time candidate for

:"trSi::":;::b.:1iyh,

"rj#*"*irlil:ffi;il;1*:jl

I't','ph."

had coalesced with the MFP. Although many readers think so, Valencia is neither a spokesnan nor a trial lrrtllrrrtt for Marcos. Heregardshimself as an independent and outspoken columnist lrttl who, like most Filipino writers, has no choice but to occasionally praise Marcos lhc New Society. Nonetleless, by attempting to second.guess Marcos and inter'rrrrl l,rr,tlrrH lris actions, Valencia has gained a reputation of being something of a palace Irrstrlcr. 'fo some extent, this is true. He is probably the only Filipino joumalist who r arr [rck up the phone at odd houn and personally check things out with Marcos. lk'lnpi close to Malacafiang, it is considered significant that he believes,asothersdo, thrrt lhc U.s. govemment is trying to browbeat Marcos by merely dangting Mangla-

:*11":1"-rT:-1,T.T.,ao,'pop,ii,i;;;;;;;;#;#:#llTffi; ilffi il::Hil:;ff T, fifi llilT*"Y*:l'r"y::li:llt-iJ,j-ffi rva s decr d. il ; ; ;; ;i,,";fi .;;il#, i|" y, J #flf :"r :l "y3_ I I r'".,,, ;JJ,".'#. Xfi['rf',x: :"-': :fl"J1:,::t,"..r,T, grapusmade^aaecisionil;;ffi ffi#H::, f"i:':,11',:-:1'l-ry:,:^Yfe Movement f*; ;;;; ptuilpii*:"ffi: ?ffi J 1::::,j l:l:: l.c3,. .ft dol y.1'- prompted by the assurance that are

arrangements wourd

and children to follow.

P:l T:I

*$. ,r]

;;'

o, ,n.u.'iJi'rXl

rilas presumed that they had slipped out

of the coun

s*. ;-i;;-;;: ffiJr, ffi #; *::]*,11',.Y;Y;,-9',11*,I;:: b ackd oor,, wtu,r, * ririfi ;; ;#ilr,i. ;il;,:,# rii#fl *:":*. i::.. Illtry. ",t -*,,i,, r,,u,i .i]i ;#T;ffiil i# l?:l* i"^:1?* I T:. *, 1:T. ;i,,, r",l"^,*.:r:T rru e or. not, ; iG ;;; J, ri,,r*itffiffin 9rA. fl"I?#:l"f "i ; ;; ,; ;;',-ffi #il;:"::'f i,::: H'j'li.Y:*T::.:: i 1T 1':: Y, ti a back-up potitical ngure sl,o;o b

,T1,:: latter.

r, ur*.".,

pua ()vcr his head.

l,argely because he affects an accent peculiar to those who have been educated lrsuil-run schools, Manglapus, like former Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor arrrl sen. Benigno Aquino Jr., is also regarded as "America's boy' - the catch-all ;'lrrrrrc applied to govemment officials and prominent Filipinos who are known to rrrrrhrllin a close and intimate liaison with the U.S. business and diplomatic com-

,..r"* i"*iJ;'TffirilJtt;

Teodoro valencia, who writes a corumn for the pro-Matcos Daily Express and, is known for his strong anti-American uir*r, ioiO-r;;;;';il;;;il;;.r#;; at the Manila overseas press club in April r9g0, .,Thr., is no doubt that the Ameri. cans are zupporting Mangrapus. In Hawaii, did you know that rr, ,rnt"o a large auditorium at the sheraton Holer to hold a meeting? And when he and his friends staged a demonstration against president Marcos in fiont of the Governor,s Mansion, we noticed that he had some blond demonstrators. I understand, that in America, there are hecklers for hire and these *.r, thu orus Mangrapus had with him in Hono-. lulu' You know, it takes a lot of money to *, un organizationlike the Movement for a Free Philippiries and Manglapus is not getting that from the Filipinos ov€rs'os.; so where is all that money coming from, I you? Aad do you know why the 1sk Americans keep him? Jhey are using trim'to ior., Mur.o, *r'^poririo, of weak_r sohe \T ill protect their interest, hr.. and, by the way, ,rrc a-.ri.u ;irr..*. 1ery, erwrwot in the Philippines is primar,y economic, ,ot fJiti.a o. *ititury:i

rrrrrrrily in Manila. As President Magsaysay's Foreigrr Secretary

in 1954-1957,

Manglapus contri-

lrulorl rnuch to strengthening Fil-American relations and was higlrly esteemed in U.S. ,Slrrlc Departrnent circles for ensuring that Philippineforeignpolicyreflected that of tlrt' tlnited States. It was a time when detente was a dirty word and the lines were rr)l yct drawn between the First, Second or Third Worlds but simply between the |'orrununist East and the Democratic West. More recently, however, Manglapus has been singng a different tune, and rrnl what could have brought this about has aroused the curiosity of many. In a letter t.'l'hne shortly after the magazine ran a report on 29 September 1979, describing tlrc l'lrilippines under Marcos as "the powder keg of the Pacific," he blamed U.S. militnry zupport for martial law conditions in the country strange words coming Iroru a man whom ultra-nationalists had even called an "American lackey," and wlrorn Marcos had zurely referred to when he warned against certain groups seeking Arrrcrican zupport for the overthrow of his regime. The case of Manglapus dramatizes only too well the folly qf forgetting that in f

,tt

Aa .tL

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Movement for a Free Philippines

lrprrq jrn(l lris bnnd of expatriates are doing their fighting in absolute safety and com' l,,it. lcrtving thc "locals" exposed to the risks of opposition or rebellion. And in tr ir ilscll, thousands of Filipinos prefer to remain uninvolved, fearing tltat revo

their foreign relations, countries are essentiall, grid:d by-serf-interest, not by gr that Marcos wourd not yierd certain vitar points that the u.s. i::*_l;'arent

:J#';,,X'ffi,jii,?r];l';,1 gou.,,-l'n'tffi#",:ffi::t##i#: iillL?L*'"?i'J'i'J-5':,:'":::*i Mrs. Marcos off to iussia,,. pru."tl;;iil"fr.:|ffirjf:;i:m:r#: $:ii:"y. being appried on him by

between Moscow and Man,a *a, u.ro.G-' iJ'ruuu.rn.,g "" sources, to sound Russians on the possibility of an u.m, dr"l.

Upon her

retum,,Tl:

y:*o, *T;

^1r,,r 1r:tivities Irrli,rrrrrv

off

H ## ;ilTiir:.:1,"i:

shr

,*."fli,..j",i.'?#,1,yj; os u d the K f:::::";i:lr;rng.to aan g B ;;;;.; : ;, ";"rr4 se

bat

arow them to pusrr him around

ffiX 1,ff the

I i"rt yrmrfiili

rnterim :':i.:ffi;;##:*::* ed i-", ix-:r.::l;u',,!,, ;i*s ?;;;; ffi il'l#r' " ilffi Nationar e,,,*ul

;r:l#*:o In

re s or u

#:'#T"*J'tr

these circumstances, Manglapus was a convenient counterfoit, una througil

# it-'*

ffi :1 l,*,';;

il:xH".:T:Jff

ii1 ;i,'$;{

**x:tl,".l

"l,n

Ame

rii

.l*o'r"n'r""'*'";'t;:;."#;ffiffi*:tyfl*?ffi

But alr that *re Americans really wanted was to soften Marcos and when he caved in * probably after'.G ;;;';is position ,;i; ;;;;; precarious 'inallv Ite went too far - an.i aireed ir

;";;il;;'tur",

uo..rent thar president carrer r:ould now cite as a major achievr*.nt oi-ti, udrrnirtrution, Mangrapus found himself the odd man out. io rur., *..'*,."t r,i"*orra r,ru. ttr'"oorri'Jr Marcos more than madl ro himself,,, yp r". r,J iriri n,*r,r, by running: .*rh ry"-Jr**-.rt

;,',',il;.* ilj $i'it #f ^f;.:;H : }|lI.;;,;;;;:'"::;,:',:-' -o;';,:;;,i.ffi

e ti,, t,

tr,.,.pr.i",..

rvie tnarnl,

was a.great and dependabte ally andl

tJrat when the siiuation

wouli u. q." ,Jig;t beside rhis has made her. ,.u, Mangrap,, _il."i,*,lpines ,jilil,jil opposed to the regime - a poor suitor. For wirh Marcos;;;;#rerove-seat,as it were, professing his readinesi ," or"i..,"ori.ncan political and economic interests in the philippines, there wourd be n" ,r.a-i". ttre-u.s. ," r"*.

il::l i J tr,iT,,l 1, ff . j;ilr,Tr.xy

;;;;rl wouro

ff#ffif"iti,H,i:*:l of governg,oup

u",",i"'.rr"rge J*Lotr*, ",,rv

Such a possibility cannot be iriscounted. Since the Movement for a Free phil. ippines has not rea,y succeeded,

up to this point, in ra,ying Filipinos in the phirip courd be pre'empted uy ttr. o;;;[;",r, a]temative. propaganda, there is great Fanneo byMarcos, awarenr* uro no .ru, org.." of ."r*il.r, that Mangpines'

associations abroad might lead

reprisals

or retaliation

llrosc wlro have joined the Movement are themselves deeply divided on the lr ol'whcther to bring down the Marcqs regime by lobbying against the U.S. F',r,rrr!r{. rrntl military aid to the Philippines while an authoritarian govern:nent re' 1ldtll in l)ower, or supporting a revolution by the radical and student elements H lr,, lr,rvl not flagged in their figlrt against Marcos. { )ilicially, the Movement for a Free Philippines has committed itself to armed rpv,hrtrol. It is cunently appealing'for contributions from overseas Filipinos to buy rrrtlttirry wcapons and equipment to be sent to unidentified rebel groupsinthePhil' tl1r111p,, 'l'hc MFP was obviously driven to this position because of the "renewal of vlrvr" hclwccn Marcos and the U.S. Govemment in 1979, when agreement on tlte

,pt!1nn,

;il.'" ffi ucanung, hint of the regime,s ;ilT save a fili:im::fifi Ttffx*:]"y,::F;1 attitude ,;;;;r;:",;':r.L:iff:T#1ffil'j, Am eric an dignitaries when see #::: ourhonorguards ;',;;::"", ::r3.1 tr :: :,r"" o|-"I*,s-ffiffltff thel at i::-" the airport;r;;;;'il -01*n"*es M arc

lp,rlrrrrt rt'lirlivcs at hotne.

praises for t}le U.S.S.R. and had n, the u.s. as in ..a state or

and physicar decay,,' and ffi',1?J:I1'":::*::,'f1:,ii":^il;.";;bed carter r. ; t;;;;;ffi;ffi

rrrlltt,rry hlses pact was linally reached.

lrr thc beginning, Manglapus had hovered between being a "dove" and a 'lr;rwk," content with following the lecture circuit to arouse American democratic er,nuntcllls against the "dictatorship of Marcos." He wrote for prestigious and widely' 1,',1,1 Pt,riotlicals and.magazines. testified before U.S. legislative bodies, and sought 11'r trngs with influential Wastrington leaders to denounce human rights violations in tlrr, l,ltilippines, rampant graft and corruption, despotisln, extravagance and the I'utitc llilnlut of abuses reported by the world press, and to wam against continued I I :r nrilitary assistance to the Philippines on the ground that it was being used by N'l,rrr'os to rnake his rule pemlanent and to oppress the Filipino people. Murcos was sufficiently worried about this one-man psycho-war to dend Mrs. lU.rr,,rs to Washington to beard the U.S. congressmen in their dens. The confronta' n,lu wlrich took place on 26 July 1978 proved to be a disaster. Mrs. Marcos had ltopc(l to disamt the representatives with her much-vaunted charms, but though she rltrl rrranage to win a few to her side, the majority could not be so easily persuaded' 'l'hcre are conflicting stories about this meeting which she initiated with the lrrlp ol' her cousin, Ambassador Eduardo Romualdez. The Philippine News Agency rrp()rt(.([ that she succeeded in overwhelming the congressmen with her frankness .lrrl sincerity, and this was given prominence by the controlled media in Manila. But r,yt,witness€S had a different account. Many of the lawmakers had come with a pre' lrrtlrt:cd mind and seemed bent on embarrassing Mrs. Marcos. At one point, Con' Hrrssnran Clement Zablocki, Democrat of Wisconsin, walked out of the meeting to pr(,tcst the behavior of his colleagues. He said he felt the session had gotten out of lr,rrrtl, that one of the questioners was "like somebody out of the Spanistr Inquisi' llilll."

couldn't imagine Mrs. Carter being intenogated in such a manner by a of foreign congres$Ien," Zablocki said. "I thoyght it was discourteous, un' r ,rlk'd for - and I left." The incident was described by a UPI reporter as a 'terbal roughing up," but y,rorrp

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Movement for a Free

may have been a humiliating experience as much for Mrs. Marcos as for the U

wlo revealed themselves to be no less oppresSve and ::11:Tr1lys ft.y deprored. Ai unofficiatlr-*Jprliffi;ffiilH; !uuotg

ly P-::*?

and'a'half meeting rendered somewhat incoherent by poor raaio transrnission, what the parties had to endure. Some excerpts: CONG. BEDELL:

I think

xxx MRS. MARCoS: Mr. congressrnan, we happen to be one hour away from the mainland.

we all are open and want to hear all sides

know that there is not unanimorr rgr;;;;;;; C: f1. U.S. 1.^r_O_" Congres on any matter. . . We are concemed about the re.,

ports we get, certainly in regard to some of the repressi"r. to me. . . it is in the best interests of the govemment i, ,""*J to try to concem ounehes with the, plight of other peiople, because I thirk we saw what happened to Cuba wh.r, tt.rr'*"j repression. MRS. MARCOS: Mr. Congressrnan, fust of all you are basing this people who come to the philippi III::i^"_:l:i:fp:'t'by for a day or two *ho'have become experts situation.in the philippines. we t"ve ur"ome ui.,im of an infor_, mation that is brought to dizunite the friendly relar"*;;r;;f

"".,il.T;;1,litr;

countries.

BEDELL; Would you say opposition

-------/

STARK: Is

against the law

to be a communist in the philippines?

MRS. MARCOS: Yes.

STARK: What

is the penalty?

MRS. M.ARCOS: well, that is not our orientation. we believe in free enterprise and we don't intEnd to have a communist ideology.

BEDELL: I

guess your answer to what the penalty is for being a communist, I guess, is not specific. . .

MRS. MARCOS: Yes.

STARK: What about death or expulsion? MRS. MARCOS: So far, no deatJr but. . .

is subversive?

MRS. MARCOS: No, sir., We sincerely feel that tlere sfrould be an open and free discussion of whatever feerings and sentiments of the people . . . but many of these people who have U..n quotrO _ ,r. pecially in terms of human rights _ are really _r evr..vrurrw. ,or.ti_", ,o"f, ruerr ,f u the left.

STARK: What about Senator Aquino?

Is he. .

MRS. MARCOS: Well, he has some cases against him.

xxxx LONG: During the elections, you were accused of hoarding milions

xxx :

STARK: Is there a law against communists in the philippines?

all issues and we think it is to our advanthge to hear your views we hope it will also be to your advantage to voice our concem. I think that each of-us needs to speak for ou.retves-i.rru*

the two

philippines

of dollars, buying expensive jewelry, clothes. . .

BRINAN: I love your.country and your people and Ile known hundreds of Filipino Jesuits. . . . necenUy, . fr* *r.t, tf,;;; forty the most prominent Jesuits,'including "go, the provincial, - out a of put statement which I know you,re famitiaiwith. a" a_.rfi* Jesuit who has been.in tne fhilippin", artrO me to put it in the, Congressionol Record, which I aiil tt was really shattering to me t{at.the_most prominent and most intelligent clergy in the wholel of the philippines would come out ;ith a statement which was very critical of the situation and of human

MRS. MARCOS: First of all, here I am. . . pride myself as the No. 1 beggar, trying to do all these projects. We have the national educa_ tion program. . . we have to spend about pTGmillion for the poor . . . the nutrition program . . . the population Center. . . We have the cultural program. We have the Save-A-Life program . . . the medical program.

I I

rights.

LONC: Would you like to speak on the accusation Jack Anderson wrote that your husband had found something like $r00-billion which is already stashed away?. . .

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Movement for a Free

I wish it were all here and I can maybe . . , told Cong. Wolff.that I could loan some to New V"rt.E"t rlr.i sad, that we will have to decide our . . . base

MRS. MARCOS: Well,

our thoughts about the philippines from all these ";r;;;;;; gossips.

has declined almost 25% in the last frvJyears. The gap betw, the rich and the poor, already one_ of ttre largest in Asia, has portedly broadened. . . The concentration of wealth in a iew,

rich and the poor widen. The buitd-up by fl.Iiy1".the structure to support those people in power, ana tf,e

-milltaV

kind of inherent instabitity that

what we worry about.

breeds

ra,

in a country and that

MRS. MARCOS: This is what the New york Times says.. . Now, years after the New Society, we have p35.billion incre"se in

9rJg:t.

In per capita income, in March tS7Z, .

was $220, now

MARKIN: But per capita is per capita. That

does not tell you about the breakdown in the toial income picture, and who is getting all

that money. . .

MRS. MARCOS: But most areas.. i.

of this income, \Wo

hasgone

to the rural

MARKIN: None of the newspapers, none of tj,e news sources that have in this country will agree with you, Mrs. Marcos! them!

Li i

None of

MRS. MARCOS: yes, but we

!a1e no say. . . They don,t even print our side. We get professionals like Doremus to help us. . .

BEDELL: I should like to say, if I might, that I think this is part of the purpose of this meeting. . . If you have information anJ r.r";l;" various questions in our newspapers, we should like to fr*, tfr"t information.

MRS. MARCOS: All right. And I

news crews

to come in

and

investigate the issue? the New y

Times. This thing has been printed time and again. It has to with a concentration of_wdralth in the philippines in terms of y< your family, your friends. . . The rear wages of workers in Man

is $450. .

lems in our relatioirs that I came from the Philippines to the'U'S' because the lawmakers and the decision-makers are basing this on. . . on. . . on this paper that has sometimes been written by your

RYAN: Would you allow CBS or NBC or

. . . I'm going to cite you an incident n

pseudo-exPerts.

xxxx MARKIN:

Philippines

tlis is because of many of thpse prob-

MRS. MARCOS: Oh, yes, look at the. . . real facts and I wantto invite each and every one

ofyou to please come and see for yourselves' '

have just got one buming question. Ite talked to I've spent a year and a half in the Philippines, by Filipinos. many the way. . . people wl'to've come to this country since 1972 and almost without exception, the same kind of stories emerge' Now

MARKIN: I'm sorry I

you blame the communists. I\e been to Chile and they've talked about the communists' but after a while that just doesn't wash

anymore. Because you talk to the same people that you know were not communists. Now the one thing that I want to bring to your attention: I saw tears come to your eyes when you mentioned about the bloodshed during the World War II and I happen to

knowallabouttlrattoo.Butthere'salsopeoplesufferingnow from being tortured in the Philippines. I don't think that' ' ' in fact two hours ago I had a conversation with a person that just

retumed from a visit at the Bicutan Rehabilitation center - rigJrt outside Manila . . . Showed thern where they had been tortured young people . . . and the stories are all the same' I mean these people can't be making up all these things - they don't even know

eachother.Iwishyouwouldgobackandi-rrvestigatejustone story . . . two young people, a husband and wife - Mario S' Cayab' yabandandhiswife,MelvinMendezCayabyab,whowerearrested on tvtay 5th of this year at the residence of her father who is Lt. Col. W. Mendez, Philippine Air Force. One is 30 years old, the other is 31. Mario, the young man, is a mechanical engineering student. His wife is a social worker . . . I have stories they were tortured. electric shock treatments, beatings, water torture.

But,Mrs.Marcos,.it'snotthis.I\eheardofhundredsofthesame stories .from different people that don't even know each other. How could the information come all out? It's going on!

MRS. MARCOS: You know, the stories have also been made up' Will

you,sir,cometothePhilippinestoseeforyourself'Iwouldlike io see these people being tortured and these people tell me exactly because I go around Metro Manila day and night' I do inspect' I

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION go to the slum areas. . . Filipinos

The Movement for a Free more than anyone have *r, *ireally fight Ii

treated like human beings, otherwise

BEDELL: I have one qrick question, that is, we would like for u . *,oula *. rr"r" irr. to wherever l:j",j":,""J.lll]jr'': wish to visit with regard to ,"r;;il;, ".."r,

i" ,., r",

MRS. MARCOS: yes

. . No, it,s not against tJ_re law. But it,s suL : materials t" a"*'e"o' tr" poii'v oi ;ff.1",:il1#::ive

SEIBERLING: So that there,s a limit to freedom of

speech and p

MRS. MARCOS: yes, because we have got to start somewhere. We to start with discipline before *, .in tru*

f.rrao,,.

SEIBERLING: Well, I suppose the

same could

*;tr#.""#il::,:il:r_T,:

;;;il* s r suggest :1'l: ':,:d M.r;;r*; ,r;J-"li;iilfrll,, u

f and_pres

are in government in the philippinr, ," ."rrralr the history of South Vietnarr,, drru ana *irat wnal ls i, gorng g"ire on in ;, Korea' Y:t. forea and enrt is ic goir a. on with respect to our r with.the philippines, self the orpai;^n -a u* iori question as to ....,11t:T wtrere it i, g.irg "" _^ your courage for coming here to

goverffnent. But

suggest

t"ffi"r;::'.1il,T:

,r?,o"rf..o the cause of

to you tt ut ttr.r"

urJ

,r_.j-"iii

people.to set r happen to thini tr,,

#:,,*,perican ir,.,y.f*:.

riglrts in the Philippines than the United States'

SEIBERLING: All right. Then why do you prohibit people from exercising the rights of free speech and free press? MRS. MARCOS: We don't Prohibit them.

SEIBERLING: Oh, yes, you do! If they say something that's subversive and undisciplined. . . All I m saying is that you're privileged to do whatever you want to do but don't ask us to support your govemment. MRS. MARCOS: We're not asking, sir.

SEIBERLING: Oh, yes, you iue. Military

. . we have military agree'

ments. We have trade agreements.

try, and yet we hi mo:e constitutional be said about this guarantee of the frr nf .^ -rye of cnaanl, speech and ^-r press, *q tlrf

it,?H.l,TL-?:';"11:i would behoove you

Philippines

;;;; il;rr,

of suppr p.eJo.nt;rff;.:1,'Jl|, rerms

urat we :""1*j::j'::::g::',r'lt Tg ou,,. g;,.,*ents not support, how thev run their internal "affairs. But

the 1 that we do support, I tI we have an obligation to say that &r€ minimurn minim,,- standards are "_^-r^-r^ 1TU. thar we.r.

r;.;;;;;;;;:ri;jTffl I.,u,s9,t d,;;;;ave philippines Ylli1: sone so rar i ;'ffil-:::" the thai it is tim;'for;;"#ffir'ffi:::: iiiil; ,;;i;;r""n. o, course, we ::y:'",::,*T:j: l._?k. not going to see torture, " Thel ur""orgoing,'o.J"o;',iil:::ltil:;

MRS. MARCOS: Yes, sil, you have military agreements. I think the Ambassador (Romuatdez) can tell us exactly the real facts that's going on.

SEIBERLING: Well, I'd be glad to meet with the Ambassador but can do

tlat

some other time.

MRS. MARCOS: We feel that we'd be shortchanged. . you see, the bases, the U.S. bases in the Philippines are a magnet for us * some kind of magnet to all the superpowers - China here, Japan. . .

RYAN: Are you saying that you'd rather not have the bases there in your country? Would you rather, would

be better for you. .

MRS. MARCOS: Well, I think the Ambassador can put

AMBASSADOR: The agreement is

till

1991. We

it. . .

will not unilaterally

abrogate that.

torturing persons. But

sugges,

,r,", i,i.ri

,ir., u* hundreds

reports coming to this country. that lt is going

*:i,fi:.j::

your

owr'"r.,

u""uu,,

i,;;

;n,;;;;ffillili Jr;; ;;;;,;#;;

Speaking of right now, because that's not what my assumption is. My assumption has been that Pres. Marcos and his government want to keep the bases there. Now is that assumption mistaken?

RYAN:

It is not what President Marcos wants alone. It has to be also what America wants. Whether America wants the bases in the country or not - it takes two to dance - In the long'run -

MRS. MARCOS: MRS. MARCOS: If you are concemed, I don,t think anybody woirld be more concemed than you about American affairs. . . uU.rt hrrn*

do we really have a say?

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

xxxx BURKE: . . . For us who have voted consistently for economic ance, it has'become very difficult when we are faced with circumstances, and in my district the complaints we get often comes from religious groups. They come from ttri F Catholic Church, from people who have a great credibility.

MRS. MARCOS: The philippines happens to be the only Catholic cr try that we have in Asia. 85% of us are Catholics and one of fust. things that the President wants to break down is the big garchy in our country. . . and then one of the big oligarchy nl of the Church, so the Church feels threateneO aiO ,h;;";, arms, and this is the big landed estates. . . This i, p*iof;#d going on, especially the hierarchy . . . The philippines happens be in a very strategic position, where everybody wants to tak, piece of . . . like China, where everybody goes by . . . The stra gic position of the philippines is, it is between two oceans, i Pacific ocean on the right, across the China Sea, the rjltra to the north we have Christianity, to the south, Islam. . . We 7,150 islands. If we did not have a strong leader to unite lountry, our country, we would be hamburger and we would fallen long before the fall of Vietnarn.

BEDELL; lVell, we want to thank you very much for being with Mrs. Marcos. We have gone for an hour and a half herl and appreciate very much your time, and again, tJrank you for here.

To Manglapus and other Filipino rebels in the U'iteir States, tie negat of the congressmen to Mrs. Marcos' statements pronrised eventual otr support of the Movement for a Free philippines by the American governmen.

reaction

But fast-breaking developments in Asia and the Middle East underscored th urgent need to firm up the military bases agreement with the philippines, on termi favorable to America - and only Marcos rould do it. (Under the new constitution treaties entered into by the president need no ratification by the Interim Nationa Assembly. And so until the regular National Assembly is e[cted on Marcos, call his signature is all that is required to make a pact binding.) wren the new milita

finally hammered out -'rg7g, it became painfully crear to t for a Free philippines that the u.S. would relent on its iruman right campaign in the Philippines to spare an any, Marcos, from further embarrassmen bases agreement was

Movement

and. annoyance.

America, after all, had gotten what she wanted: continued and virtually,unres-l tricted use of air and naval bases in the isrand of Luzon. Except that the peioo n"ai

The Movement for a Free

Philippines 5l

hF;:l clr rr t(:ltctl and the military aid increased, nothing much had been altered. Under rs;i"r.rl tr'un$, Filipino sovereignty over these bases would be recognized. Only the t,lriltl,lrirrt lllg would be flown, the perimeters guarded by Filipino soldiers, and the l.;,* ,: rlri'rrrsclvcs placed under Filipino commanders.

t)l

tlrc surface, itlookedasif Marcoshadscoredsignificantpointsihthenego' t as the United States was to be asured of 'trnhampered military operailvolving its forces in the Philippines," and have effective command and control 5'rrq llrrr(trrl States personnel, employees, equipment and material, the presence of a rr?rr ltgtir,rrrr llrr

l'llll,rr',, t ornmander was merely symbolic. I irr: Isignment of Filipino troops to guard the base perimenters, of course; *r.rirrrvr.rl :r rnajor source of irritation since there would be no American soldier to i1,rrt ;rt lrilipino civilians straying into these forbidden zones. But it also relieved f lrr, I I 5. Armed Forces of security service expenses. ()rrc decided improvement was the United States agreement to retain accused prevent their "inadvertent Iti:rii,,nncl in the Philippines for a reasonable time, and to jurisdiction rfr,1,11q11;,,." to enable both governments to determine the question of rr!,,r I l S. rnilitary men involved in criminal offenses committed on or off duty' Fi' llptrru lrrosecuton and judges had always been chagrined by the sudden transfer or h,lr{' lclve of American seryicemen under investigation or facing charges in Philip' ;rlttr lrrttrts. All in all, however, the girme was in favor of Wastrington and thereafter the ll li ( iovcmment indicated that, in a manner of speaking, it would be willing to let f[lrr (|ri come in from the cold and enjoy a second honeymoon. l'his tum of events forced the Movement for a Free Philippines to reassess 1a posilion, so that Manglapus - the man who once relied heavily on rhetoric to win lrri lx)litical battles - now finds himself at the forefront of an effort to topple the Mu,, ,,s regime through armed violence. Those who know Manglapus as a lawyer, ,rrrrtor, rnusician, writer and poet do not believe that he is capable of killing a fly, but ,* ,r lcader of the Nicaraguan revolution once said: "All poets are revolutionaries." llrt. luct that the MFP is asking Filipinos to raise fundsforarmspurchasesindicates posed by h,rrv lur Manglapus has travelled in his quest for a solution to the dilemma lVl

rt I (: (

)S.

A reported tie-up between the MFP and the communist New People's Army, ,,r with the Moro National Liberation Front - the Muslim separatist group in N{in' illnuo -- is largely speculation. Marcos intelligence men insist that such a link exists' Nur Misuari r lllning that the MFP-MNLF alliance was formed after Manglapus and lrct in Paris or Belgium in 1978. group. But sources close to Manglapus deny any ties w'ith the ubya-based rebel to Mindanao in war joh bring the and forces to offered once I'lrry admit that Misuari victory of event the in and, logistics the supply would MFP provided the M,,,iila

trHirinst Marcos, agree

to the creation of

an independent Muslim state comprising the

rrllrlls of Mindanao, sulu, Basilan, Tawi-tawi and Palawan. To this last pointi how' rvcr, the MFP objected, and the move fizzled out.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION As for the NpA connection, erstwh,e

':*:T*'.j

associates

;;#;;

I\,angrapus in the

ffi

fuTWffi

:':'Jfr'ff fr de te r him r,o*j'I'^l:rl{J:rh'}"ietiu"thathisstrongcathoric *,r.in gl H,il-'il J ,x:ffl ::ffii J#:l .

,$flHiilffi

cirgulstances. rust 11 fJre

as moderates in the iT: X*r'*::j"::1*f ffi ffi '#.f il:*f ::_1f"11,11.,,o."r;;ffi:;:,T:ff [:::il,*:Ti if,HliffiH'#,::#::::,:*:qT::@;ffi,i.H:'"':1:#T*,i; only to attain his objective"rrrtiieii**ffid#ffi**H:

tSH,,-bp,Biisilt8fi

N "popular" elections, fust in l97g for the Interim National Assembly rf irrrdfolains then in 1980 for provincial governors, city and municipal mayors and other hrr ,l .lficials, Marcos was out to prove to the world 'that fir from being a dic-

lar,rship or totalitarian rule, his government was an authentic democracy. But by rurlrvglfi1g and manipulating the polls, he only succeeded in proving ottrerwise. lndeed, after a six'year moratorium on political activities, the elections grimly

rh.wcd that Marcos had become a master practitioner of the very evils that he ryirl the New Society would eliminate. In the past, philippine elections, especially lrrr l'resident, had been character2ed by terrorism, vote-buying, aad cheating in *tftts dominated by entrenched local or regional politicians. Under martial law, it wrls lhe Sovernment itself that violated, on a massive scale, all the rules of a democra-

ltt t'lcction.

Although a decree "suspending the effects of martial law,, during the campaign lreriotl theoretically assured a free and untrarnmeled discussion oiissues by the

r iurdidates, the controlled media refused to give the opposition equal time and space. (;()vcrrunent officials and those in the civil sewice were forced to work openty for lltc KBL slate, and uncooperative employees threatened with losing their jobs. Bar,rrrgay chairmen were required in their respective villages or districis to ensure, by lrrrr rneans or foul, the victory of Marcos' handpicked candidates also under pain Ul dismissal. School teachers, who have always served as impartialelection supervii{)rs' were told to look the other way while KBL leaders stu}fea balot boxes or reIl;rt:cd tally sheets with spurious ones. ostensibly for community development proI.trls, n-riltionr of pesos were released to fund the govemment campaign o. to 6uy vrrtcs outright. Even the military, which had previously performed police functions Itr pre'martial law elections, became an accomplice in this nationwide demonstration ill raw power - acting in places as an instrument of political intimidation, fraud and r

epression.

The worst election in the memory of Filipinos was the 1949 presidential poll wlren the country stood on the verge ofrevolution because offlagrant abuses by the ()uirino administration. But it was notlfng compared to the two martial law+tyle clcctions. Nevertheless, Marcos' obsessive efforts could not completely crush the ,|position. In tlese two campaigns, it was evident tjrat the peopli's sympathy was lirr those who dared to speak against the evils of the regime. ln Mindanao and the ('c,tral visayas regions, the opposition managed somehow to capture a few seatsin

tlrc l9T8electionfor the Interim Assembly-certainlynomeanieatconsideringthe lcrrible odds they were up against. Although the opposition in Manila, led by-Sen. llcnigno Aquino who sat out the campaigrr in a detention call, ultimately lostio the group headed by Mrs. Marcos, there was no doubt where a great majority of the voters stood.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION t 'hoise barrage" staged by Manilans on the eve of thg erections to strate their support of Aquino's LABAN ticket turned tlre entire city into a whistte s bt e.w, c ar r, jr^?::l:and_ 0", J", * o ;.:,irj"1and clanged far into the night "",, i"ri.. a,, ratfled parace ffiil#ilg compelling Marcos,to unreastr ,I1 thr for.e,";;;;;; he courd muster. Because of this trau tic experience, the leading opposition memben in Manila gave up the idea of

The Divided

A similar upset against the KBL

cipating in the 1980 election. But in the provinces, e martiar law poll irregularities onry aroused the rorillar rights, and in tr,, ,,u,{u",i pou for officials the opposition show.ed zurprising ;?r;,rgth t}re southem Tagalog province of Batangasl B-u"ngas had long been the stronghold of the Laurel clan, prominent in ^. .-produced a"supreme Court Chief Jusrice and presi< Is:tryryritic1for (of the war'time Repubric)

l;ffiffi

r'rr,"p."r,;ffi;ilr-,-#**.,

*:fll*iT"l,:: .*".',Isl:Yi-t:v,:::o.ur..a,q{innerr*r*,#"n,r,r," * ii.,ta.v;;;;"i ;'ffi ,:i*

mer Senate president, Gil puyat, ru, ffi'J*,".:ffil5 d., presence oiu.i.'r,lu..os, who had insisted Y::::: :-.g*:.,r ",o on attenr ing the party even witlrout being invited. Shelsat sto,cally through

tlistinct advantage for those running as official bets of an accredited party, esper.lllly under the new Constitution which allows even those who can neither read nor rvrttc 10 vote by asking a "responsible person" to fill out their ballots. rr

the proceeain!

spoken"_the;;;,

picture

ir ;il; ;;#d'ffi:ffi;

when the Laurers proposed to put up Jose Laurel v for govemor of Batangas, Marcos promptly threw the yrighl or nir^ rupport behind the incumbent, Ant<inio Leviste. Not only did he l"eviste inlubfic speeches _ he and Mrs. Marcos .endors-e stumped the province twice during the 19g6 campaign but he poured at least, P57'million for public works and i,r,.r rrpu"t projects to Batangas within thirty days' All these, however,.could not stop tt.-rt..tio, of the youngLaurer,who had filed his certificate of candidacy . Nu.ionJiriu. ", said his uncle, Assembryman sarvador laurer: ..The results of the erections in Batangas proved that even under martiar *r., it is possibre for the w,r of the peopre to prevail if there is a determined, united and credible opposition.,,

*..,j; ,* ::f:-i: yff:

gi.r.'r {y,, o;;, ;;"'#Ir*"ri.i'irl'iooffir'#l

,." ;d",, arso proved this through the erection of Homobon" ciangko Jr., our candidates for Govemor oiMirun,i, orientar, and for Mayo.in the cities of cagayan de oro and_ozamis, ,.rp"",ir"ty. Aside from Esmeraldo cudal whowon as vice-Govemorof Bukidnon ;;;;"., hundreds of town mayors, vice mayors and council members were elected under our partyt banner, thereby making with a mass base in erevqn pro

the Mindanao Aniance rhe rargest vinces and nine cities in Mindanao.

dp;;il;;arty

lrr".

Since the uberal Party had refused to take part in that election of 1978 - on tlrc ground that while martial law remained in force there could be no free expres' qlrrr of the popular will * the LP could claim neither the right of accreditarionnor llrt,corollary right to have its candidates elected through "Block'voting" as decreed lry Marcos. Under this system, the voter'need nct write out the names ot individual .- but only rrrrrtlirJates * a long and tedious procedure especially for semi-literates tlre name or letters of the party to which they belong. "Block'voting" thus provides

a resson

Laurer

of the

rt\ ililtional parties.

rililtt:f

J..,'" Laurer), .i, *,u**J* liJse raurer I ::::J:::"?):1 1'?, i'.:i:"^'(sarvador a'congressman (Jose Laurer IV), a constitutional delegate (Sotero Laurel) and who ha,e *aae a n",. in banking, XLXI S*,:l**,T:]51:]_,sionars nance, management and manufacturing. In 1980 Marcos fert that the tiire had come to teach the family

haa -steel t..":,";1,,Hr.,",,r,11r:":llr,.r.ft.l butterfly,', the name admiringy coined

was also registered by Mrs. Patricio Dumlao,

t;n4er the new Constitution, a political party is entitled to accreditation by ('ornmission on Elections only in the constituency where it obtains at least the llrr. of votes in the previous election. By getting his candidates for number highest tlrrrtl to register under the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan and Assembly National lntcrim tlrr, paved the way for the accreditation of these two Marcos Party, Nacionalista th,.

;;ffi#;

p:lg

National Union for Liberation in Nueva Yizcaya, on Elections, [ronardo Perez. 1',,lrtir;ul bailiwick of the Chairman of the Commission Marcos has divided and how cleverly lfut these isolated cases also demonstrate or region. The system province the them to u,r.rrkcncd the opposition by confining he used !o achieve methods of the one parties was ,,t ,r(:crcditation of political r,rrl,r.rnat<trial candidate

*'i,

t ^ :l;i;];,:ilT:,::1::::1rh:o

OPPosition

NaCionalista In the absence of a national opposition party, Marcos allowed the of deprovide a semblance would ii thinking in 1980, l,,rr ry to field local .*aiO.ttt run with not who could men pro'Marcos accommodating rrrrrcratic election besides half would share that they be told to elated were NPs tlrc KBL. At the outset, the durapparent became it But when KBL. for the budgeted ,rl the logistics originally started rrr1l the campaign that Marcos would back only the KBL' many Nacionalistas opponents. local their of instead lritting the martial law regime, An alarmed Marcos quickly ordered the 11p leaderstrip to withdraw their cer' til'icates of candidacy and strip them of block'voting benefits. By the time. this was r:lrrried out, however, the election was already well under way. But as the majOrity to o1' defeated Nacionalistas subsequently renewed their personal pledge of loyalty lrirn, the NP still remains essentially a second Marcos party. This leaves the Uberat Party and the regional groups that have attained the strtus of politicat parties after the 1978 election as the components of a national opposition. They include LABAN (Lakas ng Bayan or People's Power) in Metro

and Young Philippines in the Bicol

region, the Mindanao A1' limce in northern and southern Mindanao, the Concerned Citizens Aggrupation of /.amboanga, and the National Union for Liberation in Nueva Yucaya- In the Cen' tral Visayas, the main body of the splintered Pusyon Bisaya is regarded asaMarcos 'I'rojan horse, having been originally organized as a token opposition by a former rrrember of the Commission on Elections. Munila, Bicol Saru

'1Je roJ puu ecuo ,(cueuel pue ol ueld u sem punu srq Jo {ceg 'ualqord {nH irll allos ol ..tezc,, uozn'J ler1ual Jo puH e se peluyoddu Jlasrrnq Ernl]a8 uagl pue tuo1 -cI^IB.leqJTBarnros Ewdleq;o adoq arp tn rea{ lerp uEr,uduruc eql q ged a,ul.rrr 4oo1 or4nby'6961 q {cueprsard aqt JoJ pelerqrxou eq o1 Eunof ool rEJ III]S 'BaI? eql e4lrqBls 01 soAotu uI sropuBluluoc Iilll reqloqllir\llBeppBqeqroureaoEpuero,{euu^\o}s8puB:i(BleqtJo ploJ eq} ol Uilll -or oloruEJsrnl ouerdng ocu^uoJ ol suorlBrlosau ut .,fiessrua preue8 s.{us,{rrt {nH -Ee;4 ueeq per{ eq lspugru rrorl poolsrapun pw aJII qq JIu plolpuel puu sluBuol rltorl uir\ou{ pBr{ er{ :lr oplcBl o1 peruderd rel}aq sB^\ euo oN .uozn-I prlueJ 3o stuc;r1orrl lueplsslp ptrz uutrurSe aqt q $aJeltrl s1q pansrnd z(lsnoro8u ournby 'fc11od Ir;rrr -ureloS ocuonulrl o1 uorlrsod eAIlroJJe aJou e ur sB1rl or{ areqa elBues eql ul

'seBnp /heu srq uodn ralua oroJaloql plnoc ournby '{purur;;rrgitt -rolo u4q JoJ polo^ peq {aql ecqs pue 'peaerd plnoqs 1pm s,aldoed eW tuql 'ra,romotl 'pe1nr pno3 euardng oW 'uorsrcap Euplas-luapacord e u1 'seleprpuuJ [Buo]Buos tol uopn1qsuo3 aql {q pennber sreaf aW Uoqs sqluoru,r,re3 e qSnoqt 'a1uua5 rnrrrl 0? Jo -t(,eql trI lsos e uo^\ eq ururEord luaurdola,rap papunJ CIY-SO B ur lro/r1 Nltl fBJru JoJ suecrJoruv oql ql$ peuFuapr aurBJaq eq rIJJq/h Eupnp - JIBII E pu? uual eu() r(l, cEIJeI Jo JotueloC se Eurates ralyy '{lgrqell B pue lassu uB rlloq sB^\ qlnof slH

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NOIIN'IOASU IIIIdUSINNOC

uollPoddg PoP!4O eqf,

IIHI

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

as suggested by the LABAN group * strued as the rezult

because Aquino's release might be mis "haggling dr bargaining,? between the government and

opposition. Three weeks afterward, Aquino was still inside. Taf,ada requested for meeting with Marcos but was told that he (Marcos) had changed his mind opposition quarters had made it appear, through news leaks, thai he was caving under American pressure. "Exile" was out: a new way had to be found that wot preclude a loss of face by either side. Marcos suggested that Aquino be placed un house arrest for a brief period, and then '.phased out.,' What Marcos meant by "phase out" was never clear, but it evoked of the sensational "escape" on I october 1977 of three other detainees accused plotting tre assasination of Marcos: Eugenio Lopez Jr., sonof the newspaper lisher and a nephew of vice President Fernando Lopez;J. Almeda Lopez, a b cast executive of the Lopez-owned radio-television networks; and Sergio III son of Marcos'opponent in the 1969 presidential elections. Upon reaching the United States, the three claimed they had burrowed way out of a maximum security cell, crawled through a barbed wire fence when guards were not looking, and then sped away in a car to an airstrip in pan where a private plane, piloted by an American, flew them to Hongkong and by commercial flight to san Francisco. The participation of an American created the impression that it had been a ClA-inspired get-away. But those who familiar with the security anangements at Fort Bonifacio suspect that they had b "allowed" to escape - a suspicion bolstered by the fact that in the presence of Fi pino visiton at his Los Angeles business office, political ex-patriate sergio osmei; Jr., would sometimes call Marcos by overseas phone to inquire about his son. I whatevef Marcos had in mind for Aquino, it was to have been put into effeo sometime in December 1980 or January l9gl. So as not to make the ..phase outi look like a "sell out," Malacafrang released to the controlled press a memorandud written by Aquino to Marcos several months befcrre, in which the former senatoi had proposed a formula for nonnalization and avoiding the possibility of a civil wa ou., the indefinite tenurl-glmart-itrl law. Aquino's scheme callec for-the holding o 1o. a plebiscite in November l98l to determine whether the'people want a presidenlia or parliamentary govemment; tlie holding of a general election in November l9g2 and the lifting of martial law ancl thc take-over of the new government in Jan I

983.

Early in 1980, while he was allowed to yisit with his family attheirresidencr at Times street, Quezon citi,, I went to see Aquino. Hehadlostthechubbiness tha emphasized his youthful look as a senator and now appeared wiry. He explained that he had had plenty of time to do a l()r of stationary iogging and push-ups in prison. But for a fqw lost pounds, he was the sanre ol.i "Ninoy;, who usea to hold court at the Manila overseas Press club: ebullient, witty and bursting with ideas about how the country should be run. Then he had tol ,i us: '.If and when I get to be president, the fipst thing I'd do would be to declare martiar law, round up all the croolts and grafters in the govemment, and have them shot in the Luneta.',

, . 'i. ,,] ].

.'i,,

'l'lr ltlvkft'rl {l;r;xrallftlt 'l'lrc constant flash of camera bulbs markod our

'i ,l

(, I

llrrl

lnoolhrg fur rrroro llrurr flcluror ol. llrom *lrr, rrrlled on him. We talked about his plan for normelization. It wrs hls wly 6l' elllrrrrirrg, he said, that he had no political ambitions left and that all he wanted to rL, r, )w was to help in bringing martial law to a peaceful end. I le believed Marcos had become sickly and was looking for a way of "getting lll tlrr: liger's back," but that he felt Marcos wanted some assurance that his family rtll wlrrtever fortune he had built up would remain safe and secure. Aquino saw the l,t ,rtrr council of kaden - composed of representatives from the church, polilh al parties, labor, the military, civic organ2ations, women, cultural minorities and iriYsll y(:llrs, for army photographers were always around to tuko tlro

prrlrssionals - as the body that could enzure a smooth, trouble-free transition. lior this, Aquino came under lire from the very people who had idolized him. llrl sludents who had formed a large and formidable section of hispolitical base *orr cspecielly incensed. In an editorial, the Philippine collegian official organ of tlrt tlrriversity of the Philippines, brisfled with indignation and called his propoul "r,lllborationist and proimperialist," adding that 'Ninoy must cease posing as a rvtttlrol and representative of the opposition. His proposal will drag the Filipino into rr ,.r[promised opposition of dictatonhip by actually joining its theatrics . . . The llrrrrula offers democracy in form, but hardly in substance." Not long after, Marcos made a public statement that he was rejecting the Arlrritto formula, because it seemed to have been based on the unkind premise that Ir. was dying. At this time, rumors were rife tlrat Marcos was zuffering from some Itrrtl of rare and incurable disease and that his doctors had given him only a few nr.nths to live. Unconfirmedreportsalso had it that he wasmaking secret trips to llrt' tlnited States for medical treatment, which was the reason he would disafpear Ir,rrr time to time. Marcos then announced that Aquino was being retumed to the Mnximum Security Unit at Fort Bonifacio, ..at his own request.', on 6 May 198G, Aquino complained of ihcessant chest pains and had to be rrrshed from his cell to t}te Philippine Heart center, where attending physicians lrrl he needed a coronary by-pass operation. This was an operation they could have rusily performed, but Aquino nonetheless wrote to Marcos, requesting that he be lllowed to leave the country so he could enter a U.S. hospital. ln tris letter, he gave rllisurance that "I strall desist from commenting on the domestic political situation lrrtl from engaging in any partisan political activity while abroad." To Dr. Avenilo ventura, Director of the Heart center, he wrote another note .xpressing gratitude for the special care he had received, and stating that ..in the Plst, I've been most critical of the Fint lady's project. Now that I see what stre has rlrne here at the Heart center - I take back all my harsh words - hoping I do not .hoke. Mrs. Marcos deserves all the credit for giving our people zuch an institution likc your Heart Center. It is indeed ironical that one of her bitterest critics would be . heneficiary of her foresight. when the ultimate mist of controversy is melted by tlrc rising sun, her works for our people will find final pcognidon.,' Upon reaching the united stales, however, Aquino underwent not only a heart

]

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

operation

but a complete change of heart. Instead of maintaining silence, in ance with a pre-departure pledge to Marocs, he made several prono:uhcements

THE ABC OF HUMAN RIGHTS

ing that he would not enter into any kind of compromise with his erstwhile

he said: "A pact with the devil is no pact at all.,, And in a speech before the Asia society of New york, Aquino warned the opposition demand, here and abroad, for Marcos to step down and disman martial law as a basis for national unity were not met soon, ..even the a newsman,

inclined leaden have tfueatened to join de-stabilization efforts because the

,;"##;#i'

of their foilowers has wom ,frir,

"i,'.r-rirgfrr-;;;;;;;;; lifted soon, there will be an escalation of rural insuriency. Wone, have completed plans for massive urban guerilla warfare.',

sonte

In Manila, Marcos reacted by twisting Aquino's

warning as a virtual call -rerease the of Aquino Texas for humanitarian rea -e-1abfe tT, we strould have instead not only asked them to cure his heart but his mind as because this is certainly insanity." wiq Aquino trying to unify opposition elements abroad incruding the National Liberation Front and the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, the sition parties in the philippines including the Liberal wing of Nacionalista Party have signed a strongly-worded ..covenant unusual recalred th{ "I ordered lT:: T9_ ylh ro undergo a larcasm heart operation in Danas,

*d td-;;;;i

for Freedom"-in

newed bid to unite. From the U.S. came a cabregram jointry signed by Aquino the president of the Movement for a Free philippines, Raui ilaingapus, asting they be considered as signatories of the covenant, uriln ,.pr.r.n?r',r,. frst step the formal organization of a unified opposition. Marcos will certainly move to prevent or dismantre it, but after eight

of martial rule the nation's mood has changed. Says the

M's

Salvador l,aurel:

Unless we have a legitimate Opposition, the people will not h the safety valve so essential in a democracy for the release of resentments against the govemment. Unless pent-up indigration is expressed fully in a free debate of public issues, it is likely to explode in violence

andbloodshed....

have adopted the r T suALLY locular people under stress, urbane Filipinos U ;;J6r'tit.r* or fu,. alphabet to describe the human rights situation

the lrr ilre Philippines and the options open to tlose who would dare oppose or Deat]r' rI[rtial l"w regime: Camp Aguinaldo, Fort Bonifacio, Camp Crame It was to these thiee military installations - headquarters of the Ministry rrt National Defense, the Philippine Army and the Philippine constabulary tlrst hundreds of prominent lournalists, politicians' businessnen, - relsto1ts, Proclalilhor and student leaders, rounded up in the frst wave of arrests under rrrrrtion 1081, were brought.

addition, there are numerous detention centers all over the country, lrrrt their actual number and the detainees .who have languistred in their over' cen' ltrwing cells and corridors will probably never be known for certain. The situation of the tr:rl authorities themselves do not seem to have any real idea or lrr tlistant areas where subordinate officials are wont to conceal damaging

isc

riminating information from their superiors. In an intewiew over the Britistr Broadcasting System

on 9 May 1977, had been 60,000 l)cfense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile admitted that some from ranging crimes; nrrested since the beginning of martial law for various indi' did not estimate his grorch-climbing to subiersion and rebellion. However, evidence flimsy on - nor eute how many of these were false arrests or based Irow long the detainees had been held without any charges ever filed.

On- ttre touchy question of political detainees, Marcos himself has been rrnable to provide a clear and satisfactory answer' In 1977, he told the l.'oreign conespondents club of the Philippines: "There are lo political de' declared tuinees (in the country) . ." And yet, only two years before that, he

jails today; irr a televised nationwide address to the Filipino people: "In our the martial of consequence direct in detention under there are 5,234 people

law proclamation .'. . i,tOS are political detainees . .

In this same address, he denied that there had ever been any indiscrimi' nate arrests in his regime, emphasizing that "l have demanded - and I demand' ctl at the very beginning of martial law - that there must always be sufficient one cvidence of guilt before-any arrest is canied out." Nothing was sait about

ment and ignites the holocaust of revolution.

strange innovation of the martial law govemment: "protective arrests."

The rumblings of rebellion may begin in an empty stomach. But is the mind that has known oppression and injustice that tells the hands to grasp a gun, tells the feet to charge the strongholds ofthe status quo. It is the desperate and aggrieved mind that fans the fires ofresent-

It is imperative, therefore, that we have .a peaceful Opposition.

Either that or a bloody revolution!

14 June 1975 to the u.S. Estelito Congress Sub-Committee on International Relations, Solicitor General defending Mendoza (whom Marcos was later to reward with a cabinet rank for Marcos'appointed the before law of martial constitutionality and the legality Suprerie iourt) admitted that "in certain eases, persons had to be detained as a preventive measure, either to remove them from possible conspiracy in the .*irting rebellion or to protect them from tlose who may seek to destroy tllem

In a memorandum which he submitted on

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The ABC of Human

Rights

67 i

and blame their death on the Government.',

Apparently in line with this odd poucy, Defense Minister Enrile an order.on 17 october 1977 for the arrest of certain persons who ,.may r committed/ are commiting/ are about to commit acts tending to undermine tional security and public order.',

This catch-all order not only deepened fears that Marcos' stricture agair indisdriminate arrests wourd be honored more in the breach, uut it atro ,ui"rra new challenge to his claim that the country's detention cells held no political soners. For it seemed clear that anyone who d.isagreed with the policies and act of the regime, or dared to question its regitimacy, could be puiawayonthe Ious charge of being about to undermine the New Society. The human rights problem has been obscured larlely by definition. wren tJ. there no politicar ?riri,,..r-i"' d," P,lippin. it means _lo- ruy that no persons are .a1 being t<ept in stockades, detention ,"tt, . .on,Jqu.n." or their p"ii,i.Ji.ri,rs. And ye people who adhere to communism - are, quite

yT::"IT:ll^:tTr_ g]

:::#j:,;:::l*:,::i:1T1,, * J1_.ilri* Tqu s.r9u.fs:!eak have '.^..^ been apprehended and jailed ior

"ur.*rL'1iffiffi-;;:il;Jr:: oipolitical detainees, rht ;;;,;-;;;;;h; tt

"rr..ting materiis

;.;ghr;;;rr*ioir'",

,ti., ,;r.i:

expressing their beliefs or seeking redres of grievances, protesting officiar abuses and deprorabre *.rJ The treaEneni of detainees is another subject on wriich there is much disagree. ment, especially between the govemment and the religious community. Marqos steadfastly touts martiar law,- "philippine style," as a un-ique .*p..i*.r'io; ;;;; humane and constructive. Indeed, ,trn tt" r"rt turci'o;;J,,I;;;, cletainees _

**:J:jr"*;"::"r"t *,:jl.rr*

#riii""J

many of them well'known journarists, businessrnen and political leaders released from "protective" custody rt'c".p Cru*., the controlleo o.rrr'**. publicity to their testimonials praising *re lailers for specific acts of

wers.

*a"

kindness and

decency' But other lesser known detinees had a different story ,, ,.rr, -." riri hinted darkly at the emergence of a phirippine "Gulag Archiperago,,'tlrougrr not. on the same dimensions of horror and inhumanity denounced in iussia by exiled

author Alexander Solzhenitsyn. rn 1974, Fr. Edicio de la Torre, a catholic priest detained at camp olivas, Pampanga province on charges of subversion, succeeded in smuggling out a shocking account of the alleged torture of nineteen deiainees.

This was hotly disputed by miliwho-accused de la Torre of concocting the tare in a c*oe attempt 1'v.uuth:T.ties, to win public sympathy- As a consequence, Jaime cardinal sin requested the Marcos Sovernment to allowan impartial medical tearn to examine the qre toiture rvr E victinrs. The 'ur request was denied.

Then, prior to his departure for Honoluru in April r9g0 to speak before the fmerilanNewspaperPullstrersAssociation, Marcos relented and released Fr. de Ia tle custody of his superior ana of Cardinal Sin, on the latte.;s gu;;; Jorre.in that the'mititant priest wourd be senr to norn" io pr.r* il;;;;;rinury trrrru.

As intended, the rnove provided a humanitarian backdrop for Marcos, Ari,erican visit. The tragic, almost incredible story of an avowedly civilLed and Christian,na-

thrrr turning its back and going about its normal business while many of its citi' /qls were being subjected to alleged cruelty began to surface within a year of martial l1w. Almost immediately, Catholic bistrops and Protestant ministers started their "prrlpit protests" against the inhuman treatnent of detainees, suqpected rebels, and , ivilian dissident-sympathizers. But their lament failed to carry beyond the walls of rlrt:ir parishes, and for a while the martial law administrators could.disrniss without ,,,rrtradiction cases of human rights violations as "isolated." ,,isolated cases" came to light, however, there emerged in As more of these tlrc affected regions of the country a pattern that blotted out the storybook pic' trrrc that Marcos had been trying to paint for his own people as well as for the out' that of a progressive, dynamic and happy nation under an authoritarian rrtlc world

t benevolent government. Realizing that martial law abuses, in the peaceful areas as well as in the battlc z,1rcs, had become too frequent to be ignored, the defense establistrment qqickly ;rrlopted stem measures to improve military discipline and purge the armed senrices lrrr

rrl rrrisfits.

As a result of these efforts, 4,516 members of the Amied Forceshave been rrtler separated or dishonorably discharged for various crimes and offenses. Accord' irrg

to Defense Minister Enrile, the cases are broken down AWOL Illegal discharge of frearms

Murder/homicide Abuse of authority/physical injuries/ maltreahnent Illegal possession of fuearms and explosives Threats and harrassments Minor offenses (slander, unruly behavior, dereliction of duty, violation of rules, Drunkenness

lmmorality Extortion

follows: 903 451 515

6U 147

ll8 l,3U

ll9

223 52

"Since 1978, 1,054 servicemen have been discharged," says Enrile, "but this l'igure does not necessarily reflect a rise of misdemeanors during these two years. I{ather, it is due to the process of military justice." The removal of undesirables in uniform is a continuing process, he adds, and will continue for so long as there are bad elements in the sewice. The task may be endless,

for by enlarging the size of the Armed Forces - it 45,000 'n 1972 - MarcoshasCorrespondingagainst than 100,000 now totals more ly furcreased the possibility of military abuses. The Far Eastern Economic Reoieu cstimates that "official complaints of military abuses are logged at the rate of 54,000 annually. One out of every two soldier commits an abuse. This excludes a number of unreported cases."

The ABC of Human

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION This situation has come about largely through the militarization of

of the country which are deemed to be dissident or rebel infested. many documented cases of rape, indiscriminate arrest and detention, burning houses, summary executions, and otler heinous acts committed by soldierc urrig, to militarized zones in samar and Mindanao present an improbable picture of occupation troops lording it over a hostile subject people. But where the citizens display unusual courage i, denouncing abuses i repression, military authorities have also yielded to their demands. This has stre thened tre conviction of militant organizations that even under martial law power" cur work. In one dramatic instance, concerned Muslims and christians North Cotabato staged a sit-in at the headquarters of the central Mindanao c mand, to secure the release of twenty-seven Muslins picked up by the anny in fi The young men had been brought frorn the villages of panicupan,

Pagangan, Takepan and Nalapaan, where tortures and looting had taked place, to

place called Ginatilan. Here they were detained for three days without food, then traniferred to the military headquarters in Awang, outsitle cotabato city. one of their companions, Mustapha Kanuan, was taken sonrewhere else the soldiers were seen beating him with an iron bar and a thick piece of Though no one among the detainees heard any gunfire, the guards clairned iater th Mustapha had been shot while attempting to escape.

when they learned of the Muslims'pliglrt on 27 Novernber 1979, hundred of local citizens marched to the central Mindanao command (cElvlcoM) headquar

ten and demanded to see Gen. Delfin castro. According to a personal report filed Portia R. Mapanao, wife of Rev. Eliezer Mapanao, president of the Souihern chri ian College in Midsayap, North Cotabato:

placrds us food, but the soldiers drove them away. Everytime we put uP expressing our demands, the soldiers came out to tear them down. Then .hoise barrage.,' We sang loudly and ,o,n"on. thought of starting a created a deafe'ning noise by clapping our hands, and beating cans, boxes, bamboo, even the hard pavement, come out and hearus out . . .

until Gen. castro was forced to

Religious and human rights groups wiltingly concede that Marcos' Enrile and nllrar high.ranking officials may be genuinely worried about the behavior of the gut what they cannot understand is why the campaign to cleanse ArrncrJ Forces. has not included the security units, whose overzealousness has sector. llro military human rights violations. numerous led to nportedly tn iact, it is alleged that one of the most sinister aqpects of martial law has haon the covert actiyities of faceless rnen who have coined the word "salvage" Irrcnning "to destroy evidence of torture by zummarily executing the victim and rllrposing of the body by secret burial, sometimes after it has been bumed beyond

ler'ognition."

wme this book is not meant to be a compilation of flagrant human rigttts yhtlntions, it is necessary to cite a few documented cases if only to sltow that the male' "lrniling, benign type oi martial law" imposed by Marcos also has its dark, yolont side:

There were about 400 of us. After a hurried consultation by phone with authorities inside the camp, thq sentries told the group il.,ot tlr" general was in Marawi and that we had better disperse - or else. But we knew Castro was in and announced our intention to stay until he came out to see us. Capt. Casiple, Maj. Matabalao, Capt. Lllangkaya all tried to send us home but to no avail. At first, they used diplo" macy, and when this failed they resorted to threats. Finally, they pro.' mised to release five of the detainees, provided we stopped the rlemonstration. But the relatives and parents of the men they held would not budge until our demands were met.

What the group wanted was for Gen. Castro to release the twelve detainees still held in Awang, produce the body of Mustapha Kanuan, investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for his death, retum or pay the properties that the villagers had lost, and prose.r

cutethesoldiersinvolvedinthetortureandthelooting.

For six days and nights, the general refused to see us. For six days we camped in front of his headquarters, braving the rain, nights, and sun, and the hunger. some kindly civilians nearby offered scorching the

regions

villages of Pikit town, on 22 September 1979.

Rights

CORAZON LACDO.O Arrested 14 June 1979 by Regional Security Unit4 in Talen Village, [as Pifias, in the outskirts of Manila proper. Although without an ASSO (or Arrest, Search and SeizUre Order) the raiders arrested eighteen persons, mostly former students of tlre University of the Philippines, young workers of religious organizations, visitors and helpen. Those ariested were intimidated, threatened and tortured. Corazon Lacdo'o was made to strip before fifteen men for several hours. After placing ballpens be' tween her fingers, they squeezed her fingers until she screamed in pain. She was about to be raped, but spared when found to be menstruating. EDGAR JOPSON

Arrested 14 June 1979 together with fifteen others by twenty oflicers and men of the 5th Constabulary Security Unit, or CSU. Forc' ing their way into Jopson's house, they ordered everyone to lie on the floor, face down. The arresting officers carried no ASSO. Everyone

€ 70

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The ABC of Human

was manhandled, including Edgar,s 4year old son. The arresting an

,,',

;ffi f:::

*:-:Tl'^,Tlr:'::

t*-".o* *o*v,

i'#i3'j';:1T::3:1"..""'i'atcsur"""fi

Td "r,,,i ::l:".*,.T*_T.. days, with beatings, stripping, rtrrng*r#il

;:#::1 *o1ir.i"X"[til

SILVER NARCISO Arrested

MOMCO ATIENZA

February 1979 by Constabulary soldiers

Narciso died with

tvounds and both ears chopped off.

ERLINDA TARUC

,:ri

- CO

Arrested 4 October 1974; confined at Armed Forces Medical Cen' ter; heavily tortured; suffered mental breakdown and had to stay in the hospital for four months; participated in a 15'day hunger strike in Camp Bagong Diwa to seek the release of the nursing mothers; was placed under isolation as a military reprisal against him; subsequently suffered a relapse; brought again to the same hospital; his family and friends are continuously seeking his medical release; trial on.going (KaragatanAndrea case).

Arrested 14 January 1976, released 14 August I97g; detained Baegnc Diwa (formerry Bicutan Ret auititation center); marri with two chitdren; husband lroncio ,r* a.#ra various forms of sexual indignities and was threatened to be droptr frgr r helicopter; filed torture complaint with the office of Detair Affain, but no action taken yet by trre uilitarv; one of the co-accused the case of people of the philippinr, ,r. t riimindo David, et al; or recently

PABLIfi) ALVARO

clnn

II}PX*::*::::,1:Tj:,.,,-r,r.."-rinscopra.rnterrogatedl the probable presence of NpA *Urf, fr, ,fr. ;.i il"taieJJi:l,l v., r,:up o:. dre stauurary troopers f#, ::jt1|l TIll,hisil body with a knife. .con tortultns him, slasrring

l{llil

Arrested 12 Septemberi 1978, detained at Camp Crame, arrested by MISG men headed by lst Lieut. Dencio laurico;severely beaten and subjected to electric shocks on various parts of the body, including the genitals.

WILLY TAN

mattresses,

ffi ;ffi ffif'l.ti:T

fi"ffi:; l:::j#,T";r:y-y:",i",r,,,_1."g,]"lr#;,:ffi ir*.',rJ, ; ffi:;',Iff

Rights

ffiil:Jij..,";

charges against her dropped; granted

p.-.._rr,

release.

Arrested November 1974; confined at the National Mental Hospital; married with two children; severely tortured by police and the mili' tary; finistred his second year in Chemical Engineering at the Mapua Ins' titute of Technology; as a result of heavy torture he suffered a mental breakdown; from stockade 4, Camp Crame, he was brought to the NMH where he is confined.

PEPITO LoiPEZ

EDMUNDO BLANCO

Arrested 13 May 1973; detained at Camp Bagong Diwa;30 years old; widower with three children;in 1975 his wife was waylaid, abused sexually and killed by para-military men in her hometown in Tarlac after she visited Pepito in detention at Camp Crame;his orphaned child' ren are now under the care of his in-laws; charged with violation of R'A.

Arrested 3 May 197g,. detained at Camp Bagong Diwa; 35 old; married with one child; graduate oitne'uf. and former c instnrctor;kept in a safehouse where he

*", ,riir.,#';"';;;;r";

as ,rr"tri. Jo.k, watercure, etc.; T.:,, such on-going (Karagatan.Andrea case and violation of Republic Act I

::::*.:*::-Ti

1700 1975.

ROGELIO POSADAS i i.

the Anti Subversion Law

Arrested 16 January 1976; detained at Camp Bagong Diwa; n the onry_doc,", t" Nr.r.* physics in the phi ;i"1"ry*_I: lll.orrn, pines, former chairman.of the pr,rri., the Philippines; tortured in u ,.frnou1i ,i" frr*rf charges;

o;n"#.;;d'ililHl;

amnesty.

applied

but the trial

has been pending since

ZOII.O FRANCISCO

Arrested August lg1g n Barangay Dofia Anecita, Pambujan, Northem Samar, and killed by operatives of the 60th PC Bn; a simple farmer in no way connected with the NPA; decapitated and stomach slashed open.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION Against these flasrant hr,----, , violationr,-o1y Jfrurcfr;;;f*t-" human rights the Catholic and "eLryvrlv.' rne rhili^ppine Independent it, origins J.sio,

The ABC of Human

testant

t',." :,1r.tt jlr_

to uoc, ffi"::ffiXl'fli}:::, ili.,r, urr, r * T:rlrlmine rnd;#,; Ct o ,r,"p"ril;d;.ilffi ;:Hiyffi,"j'#::i,-::,"ri,,"iiiori,J,o",,_ ff #T#I;t ;:ri

x,lr*ilJ#HT"r$;Ti:[iqi f;:;::,U:*'m:tf:#:[,"4,ff:],:fr H,

:Xffi

t*:,, j#

J,'#

;;;"-"' 31* intervening ;::ffi in"r;;";*:#19Li pofittJl

ia.trroric church,s rore f xtH"i"J#:*:ffi ;;i*:,:x,,_:J;1r'#fl;if:*"f::j:

",il*Tl;;

,*r, ,Xl::ff1tjH,.1"-1-in theirleaders, rear themflitary, and Ieft for them to go ances is their parish to with their r onlltoo" plaints [k;-;d;;.:i*t ' ' ' and he cannot lr""r,r. ,r".v ,rrrili to do somethineiil.'i|'"Ti,fiITjr:l', do not exist. He r,r, ,"

Within a week

of tho

A6^t^_-^.

fl tr jffi*'ililri*',*ffi .[*;r#".ffi :"_1

y,h

ttre

aprementa,ff

:, ;:fr #i#

tj'^::thoritievinst;;;;il;"*1:

"T,:,".*}*ii.i*

r-*[fi**ft[t-{*$ffi tu#ik# actions. --J

rwo

r.",.i".iii#;ffi::irr;i.such *r; M;;;';lJI#11:.*':'1".t, bishops and sevenreen sions, over,"ffi r,t t..,' i#il::X --'vs rvq" ;l;$l#o,a "a ur posrble oppression :,L#, L',o,r0,. aiead. "x;orthe p"eopie days tg^r_religious s.rperiors

:^_

Within

tie

in the r

pattern of ,riI#r:"-*::#i,Ti'{ arrests, har :ll' Tj. hidden, bisltops, a serious division 3o'g "'""priests, and mass

.concrete sifuations. rights in alr areas orur".,lf This rift within . tl

issued

4 November

ar r;rdil;r-tpt "rt"'"1":L'l'riilrttt';: f;r:flrhtiltx1

other

tt*olic

Bistrops

rrit-) by seventeen bishopsconference *t

was evident in a s,,

o ,rfrort.A

i"*,ilr,,

It is in the area of hr-o- *^r.-

?#i1,3i#,T; fiJl.,l;,[T;[:."i'J#il,:fj;ltlHIiJ:ff tf,rt *r-tf,"j, ;;;j.*pPres, our people have been deprived of riehts r'*a".,' ;;;; t"iff LTr1, T:,, ffi ilffi X#:p, "i;#.r}i ston'making processes .rir*, ?# ;:ffif[r,#:,1ffiJ#,ftr

.urJ.'in:ur-

the dehuman2ing fear that comes with the power of "f the gun.

sin has ,

o.r.toprnrnt, tt er"

rights are of secondary importance. This, we believe, i, , tice compounded by deceit and wholesale manipulaiion

"^'", r:{#';:xi;n:mr:;*r*.;"i#ffiffi'[rft*# Macario Ga, ha behind the continurJ;;:' rrorcement wr of urarrlil martial law. Iow. Car.inqt ei- L^^ cardinal

Riehts

and information; rights even to their digrrity as thinking men and women. In the government's frenetic drtve towards economic

p."pfiiy

At the start of 1974, another organization the Major superion of Reriglrtrs Men and women of the Philippines organized task forces to assist political rlel[inees and their families. To the credit of the military, ,r,rr, ,Jfious task forces w.*: permitted to visit the detainees at least once a week. Gradulfly, a record of l,rtures and brutalities in various stockades throughout the country began piling up. 'l'lrt govemment either made outright denials of these alleged toiures or promised Irrvt:stigations which never came about. with the revelationl ,ra. uf ru*rer Edicio rlc h rorre, svD, earlier mentioned here, t},e authorities abruptly put a stop to ttre wrckly visits of the religious task fiorces. on 9 January 1975, the Mindanao-Suru secretariat for social Action met in ('ehu city and released a manifesto on the torture of detainees, and requested the l)rla11msn1 of National Defense to issue a formar circurar to all branch", oi rr* Ar,rcd Forces-of the phirippines, down to the municipal rru"r, them ..that lhe use of torture of any kind, on any person, for any purp"tr,'ir ,"ilustifiea unaer arry conditions; that it constitutes a serious crime;and ttrat it-wiu bb severely

**-g

dealt

wllh."

It is curious to note that whire the Association of Major Religious superiors lr,s issued two frantic appeals on the plighiof poritical detainees, the catholic Bi-. tlt,ps conference has remained_ somewhaipassive. But

then, so have ,nr-;fi;i, t'ivic.and professionar groups throughout ttu .ountry. Apparentry apprehensive of llr. dire consequences of raising one of the most touchy issues of martial law, the tttttlority of Filipinos have elected to appear indifferent io the fate oioetaineesand llrc victims of repression and abuse, except where immediate relatives are concerned lcaving it to their more miritant countrymen and to foreign hu*arril.ian organirnlions to deal with the problem. Thus, some of the_ actions taken by the martiar law regime towards reducing Itrrnran rights violations have been , ,.rjorr. to various appears coming from the I Amnesty International *a u* International commission 'rrdo_n'based bf Jurists. when the U.S' State Department issued its country Report on the philippines h: 19.7.9, Marcos propagandists made much of the faci t# ;; ,;gr,ne had been pivcn "passing marks" on the zu^bject. Actually, the State oepa.tmea-t had merely tt.tcd, in objective terms, the efforts of the i,rarcos government ,o ,rini*ir, ,t, Problem. yd__that, despite an these, the human rights situation had not changed ruppreciably, The Report states, in part:

a. Torture

official Philippine

Government policy opposes torture

but

officiars

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

their detention. The Supreme Court for ^rrrp"rio

Reports of torture in Manila have decreased, with two torture alleged in Manila 1979. Reports of torture have increased during year in Davao, Northem Luzon, and especially Samar, all areas guerrilh inzurgencies are active. . .

ordered the release of an accused subversive' Court "rO

b. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatnent or punishment Conditions in Philippine jails are poor, especially in terms of diet, crowding, and potential for abuse by guards. Facilities for political tainees are comparable to the average jail and are sometimes better. prisonen have access to their families and lawyers early in the dete period. Some prisoners :ue held incommunicado for varying periods time. President Marcos has said publicly that his Government will not abuses of civilians by military personnel. Complaints of abuses 1950 daily in early 1979, ranging from minor offenses to alleged murde rape, kidnapping and extortion. In addition_ to creating the Barbe Commission, the Govemment has begun to revive the previously mo

bund provincial church-military liaison comrnittee. The Govemment encouraged local bar associations to participate in these committees. controls were imposed by the Ministry of Defense on the use-of

by the Civilian

Home Defense Force, militia-type units fi

accused of misconduct.

;;{,il i"rn

d. Denial of Fair Public Trial public trials in civilian Most criminal defendants continue to receive fair

courts.TheGovernmenthasannounceditsintentionstoremand,asof courts in Norr*U., 27, 1978, all new cases involving civilians to civilian have had which the lust instance, rather than to the military tribunals

during the mar' jurisdiction over many public order an{ slcullV offenses Marcos reiterated the ,iut tu* period. . .In September lg7g,President of civilians as soon as Govemment's desire to phase out military trials civilian courts' even where pro;Ji; and to transfer some cases to lower cou.rt judges Irroi"g, have started before military tribunals . . . All to President Mar' werc rlquired to submit undated letters of resignation newjudges. to appoint cos in tgzz. The President has the power

e. Invasion of the Home 1973 provides that the riglrts of the peo' from unrea' pi. to Utr..ure in their persons' houses' papers and effects search war' that and violated sonable searches and seiz"res shall not be

The Philippine Constitution

rantsshallbeissuedonlyuponprobablecauseaSdeterminedbyajudge by law' How' or such other responsitte tfncer as may be author?ed President may issue an arrest' ever, under current martial law powers, the

cause when threats to urO sezure order on the basis of probable orders are not sub' These involved' national security or public order are

The Philippine Govemment denies holding persons because of their political beliefs. Human rights groups generally identify political de-

jii io ,.ri.* tV tf,t judiciary' There. have^been

rebellion. In February, the Government indicated there were 447 public oider violators in custody. A more thorough count in October set the total at 579. Church sources for the last two years-have consistently estimated 50GI0OO political prisoners. The higher number rezults from the claim that, in addition to those held in the Manila area, persons are incarcerated in the provinces without charge for up to six months. . . .

of o[taining impartial review of the grounds

allegations that some

arrestsweremadewithoutpresentationofthenecessarywarrantor order.

f. Government Attitude and Record neglding -International Violations of and Non-Go"ernm"nt Investigation of Alleged

tainees as those accused of crimes against the public order, such as illegall assembly, distribution or possession of subversive materials, sedition, and

Persons held have few ways

,.r.tt

c. Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment

Rights

has heard appeals for habeas martial law the right to under political detainees; however, be brought before the 1o detainee of a it ilited to the right In no case has the establistred' arrest the to have the legalit! of

acknowledge that isolated acts of violence have been committed poorly-disciplined military personnel. ln 1979, the Association of Mq Religious superiors of the Philippines reported unconfirmed accounts' torture and cases of zummary execution of victims in various

The ABC of Human

Human Rights

outside observers The Philippine Government has cooperated with has facilitated their contacts interested in the status of human rights and Detainees' which with detainees. The AMRSP anO its Task Force on operate pr.p.rtt lists of pottical detainees and reports alleged abuses' of the Committee with relative freedom. Teams from the International (twice)' 1974 lg73' n a;;; inspected Philippine detention centers

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The ABC of Human

1,976 and 1978. Amnesty Intemational issued a critical report in r based on the findings of a mission to the philippines a yeai earrier; presentatives of the International commission of Jurists visited the try in 1975 and again in.l977 when they iszued a strongry critical rel on the status of civil and politicar rights. The philippinr conr**.ri discussed human rights questions with representatives of the U.S. emment including congressionar and Executive Branch visitors. It publicly inveighed against what it considers to be interference in its ir nal affairs and also criticized foreign press coverage of abuses, it has continped to allow foreign *JOi. rirtu"Uy frr, ..."rr.

Rights

these two countries - now in the hands of anti'American revoremained America's staunch allies' have would Iullorurrics llut what these experts fail to see is that any country identified with a repres .tvl r)r. unwanted regime also becomes an object of local hostility. The antagonisn rrl tlrr. ncw governments of lran and Nicaragua towards the United States may be ,l'tlrintq more than the residual anger of a people who felt that their zufferings and frrrslrrrtions under the Shah and Somoza had been prolonged, if not actually caused,

lls[nylc of Nicaraguq

hy Anrcrica's support of these dictaton. Sinrilarly, Filipinos who regard this period of Marcos' nrle as a black chapter tlrr lristory of their country, would inevitably blame America for what has hap' Ur

gr.,,,tl tluring martial law, precipitating a painful reassessment of the traditionally irt,,rr,lly rclations between the people of the United States and the Philippines.

undoubtedly to avoid accusations of meddling in what Marcos insists are intemal affairs of the philippines, the united States government has scru avoided linking.the human rights iszue with its officialLd as the opposition it - "unholy', support of the martiar law regime. when tJre roard oi church society of the united Methodist church helJ a conference of Asian-American

thodists in san Francisco, u.s.A., it passed a resolution which carled upon the ernment of the united states to stop financial and military assistance

to the pines because of rampant and unconscionable human rights viorations. similar resolutions and petitions have also been issued by different in the Philippines and the United States. To these appeals, Washington poLicy-makers have turned a deaf ear. ly, it does. not wish to weaken or destabilize a regime trrat is now openry to protecting l{merica's military and economic interests in the philippines, and leader has publicly pledged that in the event of war, Filipinos ,outa nght ,ia, 'side with Americans, as they did in the days of Bataan and tonegidor. 1

From the

official u.s. viewpoint, it would be foolish iideed to u Marcos at this time, regardless of trre methods he has used to gain and maintain seif in power. Not only does he appear to be in full and effective control of the ernrnent apparatus, but there seems to be no alternative politicar group in sight

could match, or better, Marcos'pro-American stance. one excuse that the U.s. may readily invoke to justify its two-faced philippine policy is that the aid being given to Marcos is really lor the benefit of the Filipino people, and not as anti-Marcos elements would have it for purpose the of prop-, ping up a dictatorial regime. But opposition and rebel groups contend tt ut *t rnsu"trr a potcy has &e effect of artificially sustaining an undesirable govemment that is anything but democratic, then the u.s. must be held responsiulJfor the actions of that govemment which rezult in the abuse and debasemeni of its .ftirrn, of late, American political experts and opinion'writers lfe tatcen to promot-, ing the idea that the weakening of U.s. leaderstrip in many parts of the gtoue has been due to its abandonment of strong or dictatorial - gour*rnts that had aligned themselves with America. They maintain that had the-U,S. government continued supporting the regimes of the Shah of Iran and President Anastacio Somoza :

Menro

MEMO TO MEDIA: THE WORLD Is FLAT

tlcntials and execrable grammar. The Philippine press was not only free, it was free-wheeling. Anyuno wlth orrough money cou.ld start a tabloid or a makestrift radio station and wiold some of thc power of media. Press clubs proliferated and created a new industry: the giving of lwards to the gullible ones willing to pay the cost of a laminated plaque and an

or whether frcm the left or from the right _ n I- papers, Yt coup lw.olution radio and television become the primary targets of control. And so it

in the

Marcos "revolution from the cente-r.', As teams of military men scu the night of 22 September t972to round up opposition figur:s,"T,1, were busy herding Lri-U"r.", lical --othe1 rlt:SeA^ yUyrsives- ro the stockades, and tacking,,sequestrafi on n, on the doors of unfriendry pubristring houses, radio and rv stations.

cxpensive dinner.

[l:r*Y

- the large corporations a4d powerful special lrrlerest groups who blanketed the country with a network of print and electro(

up to that moment, the philippine

press had a reputation - envied by "the fieest and liveliest in an of Asia.,, In l it had also become fiercely critical of the Marcos administration. The ranks columnists and broadbast commentators who centered their daily attacks agai comrption and official abuses had swollen to a point where the i,talacanang Office found it necesaqr to place the most oru, secret payro[. stil, the hostile media climate ";i;;;;';;;;;fu could not be abated charse was. the Manila Times _ most prestigigus, credible ..,r^,,Il1lg,th,e **', circulated newspaper in the country. To be the rapped by the Times. it was oi said, was to be struck by lightning, poriticians were carefur not to pick u qu"rret *, the paper or any of its leading lighh. Many of its editorial staffers were to end up the ule srocKaoe stockade on that infamous day, rrr,1;-^rr 5^^^dav. including incluilno publistrer nrrhlicher Joaquin rno^r,i- .,chino" Roces the price for opposing Marcos. The paper's strength derived not only frorn a higlrly competent and ex the fact that its orun"rr, th.

nafists of neighboring countries

R;;;'f.#;-* ," orii-;;;;;'r;;;#;

:f*.:,lll

,O,rt.from interests ouside the company which publish"a'tni and a flock of magazines. unlike the Roces group, other publishers were in the media because they an array of ,economic and political interests to protect or promote. Large cor merates diversified into pubrishing and broadcasting for the unconcearffffi:i byvinc-nrotection against public attacks uypoliticlans or business rivals. In rlt the ulg wor of the late sebastian ugarte, pubrisher of tni eutippines Herald,..we need this

as we need a gun. .

Y_1^P:::llion

the

Manita rimes, notone was turning in

profit.

I':*:::::T:1lr,.y:.l"pers,radioandtelevision.,"i"rr,r*i,ia-lrrrthlco, In provinc-ial areas, polit{cians sought to establiJ' th;;;;il;Jr'ff

;;:

lJ:"i:."1.:ylc, :rl r. y.ur-rouid election ;"d;;. i;iffiffi, ffi. ;; o_ and ietevision stations * o . ou, jlrf uffi ;;;HjrT ;;il;ffi *neditorial :,: : and contents.

of the advertisins peso, 1t":,:*.":y0"1-1"r , ,{-hit3s. strare *n j,,#*o::H: *ol'i" u"ffi ; i##i; *::"." _" i1.. T-ti :tandaris nists'; broadcast hroc.l^oct stations oia+i^-- hired L:-^J comme-nr.rorr nists ^-

In the absence of anti-trust laws and other limitations, a company could own as nrilny newspapers and radio-TV stations it wanted or could afford. San Miguet ('orporation, which was and still is managed by the country's top taxpayer, Andres srrriano Jr., published three dailies in English, Tagalog and spanish (the pbilippines lltrttld, Mtrbubay and E/ Debate) while operating three TV stations and eightoen mdio stations under the Inter-lsland Broadcasting Corporation and the Radio Mintlanao Network. The Lopez brothers (Eugenio and Femando), who had interlocking interests in sugar, shipping, insurance, banking, maufacturing and public utilities (MERALCO), rrlso owned the Manila cbronicle, the Alto Broadcasting System (six TV stations) and lhe Chronicle Broadcasting Network (twenty-five radio stations). Besides being in sugar, manufacturing, trading, steel and other industries, the Blizaldes published the Eoening Nears and operated five radio and one television station through the Philippine Broadcasting company, the Manila Broadcasting Company and Cebu Broadcasting Company. . Gen. H;lns Menzi owned rubber, citrus, and coffee plantations, a paper mill, a trading company, the Manila Bulletin and a couple of radio stations. Shortly before martial law was declared, a new daily burst upon the media scene. To lure mass readership, it ran full-color news photos on the front page and sold for only P0.15 per copy - a bargain in those days. Except for the curious, nobody paid much attention to it, especially because it was plainly pro-Marcos. It had obviously been set up to provide the administration with its own '"gun" to meet the attacks of "enemy" media.

But overshadowing the presumptuous Davids and their puny

rlirrgshots were the Goliaths of media

;";;.hr;, ;i#.";;'

:y::fl1

lo Mtrrlln. 'l'lrt' Workl lr l"hl

il;;;";;;;;ffi; *Jli;, *rffi;;h";ltiJ:':[r

With the commanding lead attained by the older, more established papers, the fixpress seemed destined to fail. But with the advent of the New Society, it replaced the Manila Times as one of the Philippine's leading newspapers. Its publistrer, Roberto S. Benedicto, also took over the Alto Broadcasting Corporation owned by the Lopezes and ended up in as many businesses: sug:u, manufacturing, electronics, real estate development, shipping and banking. Ironically, it was precisely to prevent media from falling into the hands of a few that Marbos decreed the public ownerstrip of newspapers, radio aqd television statipns. Never again, he vowed, would oligarchs and powerful politico-economic groups prostitute media to sway public opinion or exert pressure on political decision makers.

.',?

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Memo to Media: The World is Flat

To set the example,

Da*y Express sord stocks to the public, but the .the ponse was cold. Because they couid bostrut down

"rt;;;;:;;;;;;

*re governme",,no,.o *"; ;;;;; *::i,:"-'::,:::T:11 -T'o:.it 1' to operate, became app;;;;;;;r;;;; t: tJre. select rr* *r,o oruiiro *"rrJii*r";:"ffi ffii f:111 I::,9.,0',::r broadcast stations

j-":tLady's^young-e'u-*,"'i,r,r;;;;;;;;,*I*l li;#l",il.l I::::llfl:,j^l:qf These, and the4.iorrra.,."r,r,,.o,riil)"ii"iiiffi E x pre ss, constitutbd th. .:rr'for,nJi,, I; ;: ;#ffir: {::::), Society. L:::3r^X1^*,'

The broadcast industry fell into the same pattern of ownership.

y::,"_*1r,::,,ir9-T*:,y:oamurti-medi.;t*;d;.;'ilffi;';#J u wgtlt

t*g.ri;;;;;;r"y when it Jipr*'i,#ffi;il;", ;:lJfiilX

Llpez network ff,1iy:"t_ry,.'.','::::.:::1" _ tr,.9uqt p:,,TI,,y *11*y.?I "

tt.,.

company r.*y,,,l.,a,a uy ffiT:":::*'*:-::l"l T*.Tv o,i l"*ilq. n r". o,*,e,i ;, ;;;,;,1;d ;l; i:::,:: *r::f conditions, l-lI: t itI,i, T: deringpresent is unlikely,fru, rf,.yffi;;; ili't#.

*:j:

d.fr; ",""6#,il':#; ^ffi;r;;"*fi

Glberto Duavit, ur,.o,; *:.::l:,1*:,:,Td an r,_'i:]:{T:",. .y,dl exclu sive r.*"r,rr"

:T: y,::ri:"lre precedented.

Metro Manita area, Benedicto,s dominanr. in

tl.

,rv

t9l9vI

meJia fielO is

through serective ownership, ):, "..":,:::*11 "::ll,:"lyc d.,igi dT:d,." o r. a'v u i",. ii' LiJi.# #,:::::, ::": strict :_"^l T^.:::l-::, of martial ilaw, " censorship wa"s imposed "p,,.i, ;r-;r';;i"; m,lG ;:6ril.'J e

with the creation of the Department of public .In 9:i^*:ll.,:1. rlp.Iision pr.Ai. was assigned to 1972,

I:dl:

i:*:*:

.jl'_"*,I

a Mass

i"rriJffiil#;;;

Informa ur uldlua

was handled personauy by

1""":;'v^1: Francisco :, .nr,*r^T*asement formation Secretary Tatad. Since lfr. ,yUr*;;

,fi;

::"iJ:I.tad respectability.

PrclJ to be found to give thelocal press a semblance of independence

This led to the creation of the Media Advisory council. under president to be headed by the prestdent of the National press rrcss LIU Club ff:;3:"..i?"r,^,,,::-, chairman, with a recognized civic leader to be appointed by the president

(of

one ..prrr.ro,iu, each from the Manita Over Ii1,:ff:t::cochairman, 1nd. Press club (which was and is dominated uf io..ig, co*esponden,r),;Til:Tl

ffli*:rran,

and such others as the president

,f," pf,ifippt,r,

*ui

a.Sgrut,

Along with the Mass Media council, the philippine press council and the pr consultative counc, organized by Tatai on 4 october 1972 we.e declared rl existent.

The MAC thus emerged as a powerful entity. Since its members owed their hppointrnent to the president, they were in reality

government and acted on orders of Marcos.

extensions

,h;";;;

'Ihe idea for this ostensibly self-regulatory body came from Primitivo Mijares, Pres Club President and columnist of the Daily Express, and Dr. GuilNational ilre Vega, a presidential assistant. Mijares was later to defect to the United de lerrrro ltrrtcs and literallyvanish from the face of the earth, while de Vegawould.be shot tlghl in his Malacaf,ang office under the most mysterious circumstances. When arres lprl. thc gunman - a reporter turned strow-business promoter - refused to talk to {lyollc except Gen. Fabian Ver, the President's chief security officer. Sentenced rlror t ly by a military court to die before a fuing squad, de Vega's killer is still in pritlrr, ;rwaiting execution. As intended by its architects, MAC had authority to regulate all forms of mass lrtrrnunication - from newspapers and broadcasting stations to fiIrns, billboards nrrrl signs or displays on pushcarts or store windows. With zuch broad powers, the {'lrrncil became a hotbed of graft and comrption. Mijares, who became its chairman as NPC President, came under strong sus: plt'ion of feathering his nest, especially when his friends noted a striking change in irtr litcstyle and spending habits. The very personal and arbitrary manner in which he rllrcharged his functions created widespread resentnent in the media industry until, urrc tlay, publishers led by Gen. Menzi and broadcast owners represented by colum[lrt 'leodoro Valencia trooped to Malacafrang to ask President Marcos to abolish the Mctlia Advisory Council. And so in December 1974, the Broadcast Media Council and the Print Media ('rrurrcil came into existence by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 576, with Valencia nrrtl Menzi heading the two bodies, respectively. Previous to this, Mijares, unable to Fccount for funds belonging to tlre National Press Club and facing the prospect of ullrcr serious crirninal changes, had fled to the United States and there joined the Movement for a Frge Philippines of former Sen. Raul Manglapus. Because,Mijares obviously knew too much, Marcos aides frantically sought to prcvent his appearance before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee. At llrlt time, the MFP was lobbying against U.S. economic and military assistance to the Itlrilippines. They believed that Mijares' testimony of rampant graft, human rights vlolations and other abuses would result in a reduction or outright elimination of Arnerican support for the martial law government.

Either because he had reached the point of no return or had become conrcionce-stricken, no appeal or offer could persuade Mijares to return to the Philip' pincs. A last-minute attempt to buy his silence for a reported $100,000 backfred when Mijares exposed it in the American press. Not only did he go on to testify before the U.S. Senate sub-committee, but he exposed the scandals of the martial law government tn Tbe Conjugal Dictatorsbip ul Ferdimeldd M.trcos - a book that included rumors about the private lives and luves of both Marcos and his wife and has been described by serious readers as "political pornography."

In it, Mijares detailed

- with obvious exaggeration and bitterness - how Marthe govemment and some of the country's largest businesses, particularly thc Lopez-owned Manila Electric Company, through the simple exp6dient of declar-

eos seized

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Memo to Media: The World is

ing martial law. The most memorable parts, however, were tlte chapters on amorous escapades and his strained marital relationship. Mijares seemed since he was among the few who could freely enter the Palace and was privy to ofits boudoir secrets. Not long after the publication of this book, he disappeared from view. At it was suspected that he had gone to Australia, or South America. But as passed, none of his friends and associates in America could say for certain had gone. The most persistent story conceming his disappearance is that he boarded a plane in San Francisco and was probably thrown into the Pacific since he was not seen to disembark in Honolulu. But this must be dismissed as body's flight of fancy, for disposing of a man aboard a jetliner in mid-air possibly be done without being noticed by the crew or passengers. The odyssey of Primitivo Mijares remains one of the most intrguing connected with the Marcos regime and cannot be told without raising many swered questions.

With the regulation of media in the hands of the newspaper publishers broadcast operators themselves, the govemment is able to declare with a straight tlat censorship is non-existent in the New Society. The Ministry of public I tion and the Office of the President are nonetheless quick to declare an unfavorable news items usually carried by the foreign wire services, or to order *ithdrawal of banned publications from the newsstands. Thousands of copies of P.tilordrrrtt, a magazine published by Gen. Menzi, had to be collected and thrown into tlre fire because,of an article that had slipped through the editors, citing a campus poll which showed that Sen. Aquino more popular than Mrs. Marcos with the studentry. Time, Newsweek, Life, politan, and the Fdr Edsten Ecottontic Reaiea are among the controversial zines that have been banned from time to time, for befurg candid about Marcos his wife.

The most insidious form of censorship, however, is tirat which the owners and working journalists impose upon themselves - for fear of losing

business or their jobs, or landing in a detention cell. Under such psychological media.men became unreasonably cautious and the result is a diminution of the of press freedom perhaps never even intended by the rnartial law authorities.

of the fear is generated by Presidential Decree No. 90, which orders that:

FIat

der is a governrnent official or employee, the accessory penalty ofabso-

lute perpetual disqualification from holding any public office shall

imPosed.

Since no real distinction exists between the institution of government and the potsons running it, joumalists who dare to criticize Marcos, his wife, and otherhigh

irlticiuls risk serious trouble under this decree, not only for creating "distrust for the rlrrly constituted authorities but also for '\rndermining the stability of the govern' rrrr'rrt" itself. Having abandoned its traditional adversary role as Burke's "Fourth Estate" or liscalizer and watchdog of govemment - the Philippine press, once t}te most vigo'

tous and precocious anywhere, has become an obedient lapdog of the regime. Instead rcrving as catalysts of change and reform, media under martial law serye escapist err,ls, functioning, in the words of Dr. Gloria Feliciano of the U.P' Institute of Mass

l',rrrrmunications, as "the antidote

,,rl rural

to conditions of abject poverty and misery in

areas."

one such .'antidote" is a cheap tabloid, The People's Journal, which is sold at I rrrbsidized price. Owned by Marcos' brother'in'law, it offers little by way of real rrrls, but brims over witlr stories and photos on the lurid side - to sweeten the lrr';rvy Marcos fare.

Tucked inconspicuously in the National Budget for 1978 - the year this paper wrrs launched - was a P3-million item for Tbe People's Journal as part of the appro' priltions for the Ministry of Local Governments and Community Development. I illrrrritted a question to clarify this during the Question Hour of the Interim Na' 1,,lul Assembly, but Local Government Minister Jose Roflo = who owes his'cabinet to Gov. Benjamin Romualdez, the Journal3 publisher - refused to give an ex' lrrrsl

pl,rrntion. If dissent in media is at all allowed or tolerated, it is for the sole purpose of people are still lr,rrrling credence to Marcos' dubious claim that amid martial law, the lr,,t. to speak their minds. Occasionally, the public,is treated to the rare spectacle of I r.rrlumnist or letter-writer denouncing official abuses or wrongdoings. But certain rrrrwritten rules govern: the criticism must be couched in restrained language and qlttrtid, neaer be directed at Marcos, his wife, their children and other members of the Mnrcos and Romualdez clans'

An!

person who shall offer, publish, distribute, circulate; spread rumors, false news, information and gossip, or cause the pu tion, distribution, circulation or spreading of the sarne, which tend to cause panic, divisive effects' among the people, discredit distrust for the dulyconstituted authorities, undermine the stabili the govemment and the objectives of the New Society, endanger the

lic order, or

cause damage to the interest or credit of the State upon conviction, be punished by prision conecional. In case the

The situation is thus reminiscent of the Spanish colonial times when, under Irtt majeste, it was a crime to insult, by word or deed, members of the royal family ur rrnportant govenrment personages.

No one has stated the regime's position on media more clearly and zuccinctly tlrirrr Mrs. Marpos. As the govemment's chief image-maker and propaganda expert' r;c frequently reminds editors, writers, film-makers and producers of radio and tele' virion programs to accentuate the positive aspects of Filipino life - to promote, in Ircr words, "the good, the true and the beautiful." Her admonition echoes the argument that in developing countries like the Phil'

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Memo to Meda: The t{orld is

ippines, media strould be a tool for dwelopment and must consider it their duty function as a virtual propaganda arm of the govemment to ensrre the realizati

of socially-desirable goals.

This has consequently led to the idea of "developmental journalism,,, a that has become fashionable in media seminars and conferences but which has be'better definod and undentood. while there can be no quanel about the need the pres to adopt a supportive stand towards the government and its efforts to tJre people's standards of living I believe that the total abandonment of its tional advorsary role in society eqpecially in the absence ofa political deprives the government of an objective feedback system and a mechanisrn for forms and self-renewal. without a free and militant press to serve as devil's cate, bureaucrats and civil sewants tend to ignore public sensibilities. This why graft is rampant at all levels of the Marcos regime. Says Raul de Guzman, Dean of the U.P. College of public Administra "Even under martial law, cases of insuflicient or ghost deliveries, over.pricing, 6nd repurchase ofstill usable supplies, etc. abound." ln a scathing denunciation of widespread comrption in the government, nist Ernesto Granada wrote before he died:

Where have all the ten-percenters gone? They are now busy influence on infrastnrcture projects atrtle Deparknent of public Public Highways and other development agencies. Right now, the govemment is spending billions in in is only logical that all the hustlen in town congregate in offices in infrastructure where they serve as go-betweens in deals between tractors and government officials. A sewice that is lucrative in a deal involving, say, p20 million. lWo of P20 million is how much? For all its major reforms t}te Society has not done away with influence peddling, with its ing evils of kickbacls, overpricing, etc. In most cases, only the peddlers have changed.

pre-martial law days, comrption may have reached epidemic but the people felt they could always run to the press to expose it. Government cials lived then in the constant fear of public condemnation or even disrnissal the service. Under Marcos' New Society, pases of graft involving important never see the light of day. And in the spirit of "developmental jdurnalisrn," men dutifully parrot the line often used by Marcos himself that govemment tion is but a part of "the sick PMippine society." When I became a member of the lnterim National Assembly, one of the bills that I filed was Parliamentary Bill No. 477, entitled: "AN ACT ABO TTM COUNCILS FOR TTIE PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA BY REI PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NI.JMBERED FIVB HI.JNDRED SEVENTY.SIX, STEP TOWARDS NORMALIZATION.''

trlat

In the explanatory note, I pointed out that: These councils were authorized to adopt policbs, formulate grride standards and promulgate rules and regulations for the operation and discipline of all mas media under their reqpective supervision and to administer and enforce the same. Althorgh their main function is to elevate the ethics and the standards of orcellence of mass media in all its aspects, the BMC and PMC were actually created as part of the martial law apparatus, for the purpose of controlling media activities throughout the country.

lines,

Since the appointed members of ttrese Councils are tiemsehes owne$ and operators of radio and television broadcasting stations and publistren of newspapers and magazines, new applicants have experienced difliculty in securing media permits. If it is the genuine desire of the government to elevate media standards, this objective'can be effectively attained through the professional media organizations which exist for this very purpose: the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Publistrers Association of the Philippines, Inc. @API). Both these organizations, are, in fact, already engaged in efforts to improve journalistic standards. Except in totalitarian countries, newspapers are uzually established without the necessity of prior approval by the state. In the case of radio and. television, regulation is primarily for the purpose of allocating communications channels and frequencies in accordance with inter-

national agr€ements. The continued existence, therefore, of ttre Broadcast Media Council and the Print Media Council contradicts the essence of normelization to which the Govemment has publicly committed it.

self.

Their abolition would ensurc a free flow of information which is vital to good govemment, liberate media men from the prychological fear that constitutes a worse form of censorstrip and prove to all the world that there is no such thing

as a

controlled or managed press iu this

country. As all parliamentary bills never reach Fint Reading on the floor without prior tpproval of the Steering Committee which Marcos officially heads, I was surprised that lhh bill was given due course. A Cabinet oflicial had a simple explanation: Marcos *nr actually of two minds about media. While he wanted the Councils abolished as par-. pnrt of the "democratization process," he was averse to giving the opposition iir,ularly the group identified with Sen. Aquino an opportunity to start its owri nowspaper or media facility. At the public hearings held by the Committee on Public Information, the

l'lrtirman of the Broadcast Media Council, Teodoro Valencia, favored the outright

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION Memo to Meda:

abolition of the councils. Gen. Menzi of the print Media council preferred, on

l*"l,i;j:_,:_:::*:,0:...:l:1".1,"y9*lyarcos.Ho*ever;,r,'",',,**,,u ment against tho socalied system of media self-reguration was to .o*r'iroXl"ii p"i gr: i"La.-his- re s;n#; r-* ll:_n, -y"*,.119g0, Marcos ^ IIry*9 cabinet ^3:"fl "wing in January Tatad admitied that:

If tre

of a council of publishers that decides who r and who may not, is not made i.rr r.pugn*t by the fact that council is misleadingly described prir.ii-J.g*tlti;;: body, it derives its authority from a specinc law, its officen have appointed by decree, it collects fees from print media

,r:i"*:

a grave

infringement

r.r.;";;;;;;;

il;

Fortunately, not all Filipino journalists and modia men can be so easily bought intimidated. perhaps because they have nothing much to ros. e*"eft'oeii lives or pcrsonal libertieq srnall-town newspapermen havg been more outspoien than those w,rking in Manila. No one has stated the dilemma of the phflipirt"..ailr"oI lrrurtial law more courageously than llis Generar, editorial *ritui

or.fr.edo- of the press.

that the d;r'd,r;;;ffiili#:: *:9^.* ll*o :l * J . a. t.o,, i io *;;;t' # ffi ;:X.f# ,Tn:.,t i ::'l :i-"]1. | ::^*J .", ,upp,,,.i*

L..gwrrS,vs

,r.

qo:erunent nor onry in m,"ting tre dangeq

:#:i,,:"" ::T:"::::*TIy.l,,I1 ***;l:^o_,y,:*"'.Tlf of i{Tr.;rh;;;;;;;;#;,#;ffi

i:#

Ii.^,^.T :lla lyr:rship became clearer when Information Minister T f ,'1,*j)::,'::ii;::' j':1.1,ri,9,r,.il'r,.rli*;;ffi ffii'r".i",ffiT*1i

:l#:.*'f#,,,,,:.9:..?TTll1,I,r;;;i,:,$ j;';iffiff

:i"H:lll,,?

j:*:::.':i;F1.;;;,#ffi ;C';':i'Td:lll :*j,#.'"::"iY maintenance of decency and public order.,'

But this "barancing-of-interest rule" has been described by Justice Black aang"-u, threat to freed# of-eipressionaq Pressron ;|: the press. It assumes that1r-3r.Tor, the interest oi,r,rlorr-rnent in stifling this freedoni haviniit.exerci,"d. F;;thfuii,.",on; ti philippine Supreme pre-martial law fJ::::T:*:_p,eoprein Court, ,p..k r, ,h;;rh J;rr*;nrique adopted the "clear andpresent danier^mre"t on, ru* in ot ingp."r, iili"

:j..tllT::*.:T :::1.*i,,:: It

-;;;;"

said that "there is to be no previous restraint on the communication

i, riu'r *,1,, j: ff 3:':: T^:::*:I :l:1.,

# ffi:T

::iffi:

'"I3:J"'""":'::T:F:"il;'il;;i#Iio'i'l:ffi".# l"tx:;::if substantive evil that Congess tras a-right ,o pr.r.i,.,, f:::i::LT:i:-11.:T y,"ii,:.y;;iJ

time when trre supreme

;jil.ffi X :lY:*::,:l]t-independent:,orraru"ayT;;;;Jffi rrrtiJf.*.

gical constraints imposed Uy

ii-";;;r#;;:

lon weekly:

lg73 Constitution provide explicit guarantees of Ir:-r+r. ft. principle

or this u,,n. isht uy t, lrT,j*j,:.::f^':,f:l j'.:]:'i-0.;;i.,';;;;d"p;;;r':T#.,# 1:,::**T ff ;ff"'::'::'[:^"::::'::1

"balancing of interest{' ruI9 is q}estionabre, it has been exacerbated by

"If free speech strould be stifled and freedom of expression abo_ Iished, I would have nothing to do with it; I would its aborition. Freodom of the pres tfuives onty in a rree society. tt is the duty of the pres, therefore, to strengthen the freedom of the country in which it operates."

o.g*irrtions,

body constitutes

oiii;;;; iften contused f4;Jt;il;;;; they do q.:{9-l his poriticar concems. And'yet, Lerore aedaring ;ffi that :,,,1 hw, Marcos hud told Filipino veterans:

The existence

most important of all, it. exercises a licensing function,i p"*.; *f can only be exercised by the State. . . .F o* the principle of conflict of interests alone, these strould never have been there, exercising . p"r.n,ly un.o, power. From the point of view of law, ileir'continued existence

Flat

rtre fact rhat under the n9w order the political i,t"r.rt" with those of the nation..M.e are consequentll

publq

"r.

Ihe World b

our experience with this basic human freedom (of the press) in this country is like history in reverse. Man once thought ttrat ttre world was flat; that if one would sait far *ougf, irr" ,f,. ilrir;il;O his strip would falt o{,as the edge of i table, o, U.. AruorriJ iy n,onrt.rs .{roy that were at the rimits of mai's concept of his world. But men of wis. dom and vision,,those who tuouta iest ttre timits or*ri.t,,* yould like to believe,

exptodil;;y,Ir;,t#

saw the truth and dared fl"tn.r, of the worrd, and proved that it is round-that man .Lrro .", ,u around it, his freedom limited onry by stormsandhazardsandhisown

weakness and fears.

n"*i"t

But our experience with the fr..rd-91 of the press in this country is the reverse. we started out with the berief tha, ,rr. *"rrJ that the freedom lof the press is uaseo " -und, on the right ,*J..ign peopre to know, for if they are sovereign and must il"rc"irrr, m. ,r,irrr.-rr"'.irfi decisions, those decisions strouid not be r.s, int.i'ig"rt; and no, intelligent

tt* kil;;r? ;;d _;"

decision is posibre without adequate the facts. And in a democratic society _ a truly democratic need of the peopre to know ttre truttr is happening in their government cannot be fined by a Ministry "; of pubric

*i;i

is not to the peopre.but to the

rnformauon *rr"* rirrt loyalty rppointine;o*;;; d;#o actuary

That need of the people to molw can be fiIled ogly by a prou or media trat is free free because it is not a ministry of trro govornnnnr but independent of it, a true fourth estate, not a mere prrt ,f ihr rlnt estate which is government.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Bard on this need of the people to know, we could sail around world of press fieedom, limited only by the laws against libel, sedi

CHURCII VS. STATE

and obscenity.

This, in essence, was our concept of pres freedom since we our first definite steps towards nationhood about a century ago. This our concept of press freedom at the birth of the First Philippine lic, as it was in the American era, and in the first 26 years of the

Republic. However, after martial law'was declared, we were told that world is flat, that the freedom of the press srffen from more restricti than we believed. One reason given for the change is that the kind press freedom we knew was western, not srited to our Asian

ment'or to the conditions of our still-developing economy. We had have our concept of pres freedom, philippine style. Coniormably, I need of the people to know had to be restricted within much limits. Thus, the people were made to approve a new constitution wi out first being given the opportunity to adequately understand its tents, or ey yes to referendum questions without the opposition ing gnen equal chance to fully air its views particularly, over

media.

. Oh yes, we may yet sail the sea of criticisrn and even expose g and comrption in government. But we may not sail too far ori intJ morc fundamental horizon - which is criticisrn of Malacaflang, lest I be {evoured by the monsters who would withdraw our permii to pu listr, as well as even the more vicious dragons that guard the edge oi world of the'New Society, rendered flat by the need not to say zo Malacaflang, much less, criticize President Iri"r.o*. A new kind of idc try is being taught - one man is always right, as if he were God. people may not elect even their barangay officials. The sovereign e toral will of 42 million Filipinos is substituted by the choices of one man.

Yet, we are supposed to be a democracy. But could there be a democracy under conditions when the people are less sovereign, whe their collective will even in the most basic exercise of sovereign powe which is the ballot, is regularly substituted by the will of only oni In any age, in any region in this world, in any stage of economic de, ment, such conditions could be nothing else but dictatorship. It is time that we reelize that the world is still round and call a tatorial spade, a dictatorial spade not a democratic shovel. -

MONG prominent persons rounded up in the early days of martial law was a Dutch priest by the name of Comelius Lagerway. No one could readily underltlnd why the Rev.'Lagenvay deserved such treatment, except perhaps that he was (und still is) the executive director of the Communications Foundation of Asia lrrd the Social Communications Centre, which had been putting out a number of rrrcially-oriented publications and programs that overzealous military authorities ttruy have considered "subversive," Through the controlled media, the nation was made to understand that the nrartial law administrators meant business, and that they were not going to make any oxceptions even of men of the cloth - if they happened to be guilty of wrongdoing, rur wrong-thinking, as was supposed in the case of Fr. l^agerway. As a matter of historical record, the oaily Express reported some weeks later that the Dutch priest had been released from detention only to be picked up a rccond time, but again subsequently released as a reformed or rehabilitated individual willing to lead an exemplary life under the New Society. In reality, his jailen were as beweldered as he was, and could not $ay exactly what he was being charged with. All over the country, during the frst few yean of nrartial law, priests of various nationalities - Filipinos, Americans, Spanish - sufI'cred the same fate: '"To be arrested without a charge," as the late Assemblyman Natalio Bacalso put it, "and then released without an explanation." The message was liightfully clear. Not even the venerable Church was to be spared by the Marcos

A la

"revolution." Ironically, loog a symbol of aristocracy, feudalisrn and the status quo in the l'hilippines, the Church harbored clerics who had turned revolutionary ever before Marcos came to power. The period of radicalism that brought the students out into the streets and the barricades in the early 70s, also saw the activist priests and nung climb down from the pulpits, emerge from the,,cloisters and stred the traditional robe for the clerical collar - or even denim jeans and jackets - to practice what they had been preaching.

L,aboring in make-shift medical clinics and dispensaries among the sick and tlestitute, at the waterfront among the underpaid stevedores, or in sugar cane fields among sacadas or migrant farm-hands, they blended in with the starry-eyed reformists and thus, in the eyes of the martial law government, also constituted a grave danger to the Republic. To the ardent defenders of the State, the line between social work and zubversion became blurred, resulting in the unjustified arrest of innocent rcligious or lay leaders. On 28 August 1974, for instance, much was made of the fact that elements of the Church were discovered to have given refuge to some 'tltra-leftist subversives" who had literally gone underground. In one swift move requiring the'use of armored cars and helicopters, government raiders captured some two dozen of these so-called subversives in their 'hnderground tunnels." It was a coup that the military could not

'''- ^El!r-

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

'ppr},', however, turned out to be the cheertulry l:lr-:lryq,:o*t:]h" ted and sun-lit corridors of the Jezuit seminary of trre sacred H-eart in

the, rurd rural outskirts uLtfttsltts oI of Manila. lvlalula. , _Onj v's of ur the u*i ur.,ru infirm rougers lodgen or of tne the semrnary seminary at the time was an old uncle of Isaias Edratin, who nearly oieo of friehi hovering 11. side hil window and armed troopen swarminiover the premises.

::)

"i""

r,lr.*'ffinl,i

It is pertinent at this point to define the Cburcb in the popular r9pu.te9J:^be the ..only Christian nation in Asia,,, the country, in lr-lrl*..i:"e

,il;a;tilil,;;;'-r#; ,

'l-r!

lation of 42 million.

*^^_

ryl".Tever mention b

T"9.

ana f .SS millioi U"-rti*r, in

of the ,thurch,,, it is generally u

9t.do*-*t r'political divisions',

"r, *rr,--,rr.

cir*i,

both

lr"ri"

i*o?.r

bistrop of Manila.

A native of samar and member of a distinguistred poritical family of I Rosales is sympathetic if not io la"r.*, then at least to his wife rv who wtlv vl .'ourT, from the same region. He is unabasrredly open in his zupport of the martial as

it may seem,

Rosales'pro-Marcos posture has been ignored in

ing to thousands of civilians. lr..ruT of the widery herd belief that Rosales became a prince of the chu intercession olMr1. [,rarcos and that h" h"r;;;;tr,, ,l.ipirrt or 1.:r*,,n: rous gifts ,froT the First Family, the opposition within and outside the off as a casualty ot iiog na toob,silenced by .^ his powerful,trim. to patrons. "

d.b;;i;;;

cardinal sin has not been as fortunate. He is faurted not onry for being rant of Marcos, but also for his failure to speak out in . *o* i*.efur mi against the excesses of martial law. Arthough Sin, using the foreign press as forum, has strongly opposed certain policies ind actions oithe Marcols r.gi.", ; deplore-his "wishywashy" readership. when tjre rusirry orr"rtiur 1lt-l'Tl..yho

*: *nlryr":.d

I for

nutshell, the cardinal defines critical conaboration to mean that:

The church will accept martial law as a necessary expedient to weed out the evils in the government and society provided it is not maintained longer than necessary. The Church will collaborate with the State on all matters involving the welfare of the people in furtherance of the

in her considered opinion, are contrary to human rights and ini:mical to the public

interest.

un"o.-

His refusal to question the legitimacy of the present order may well stem froin for the constitutional principle of the separation of the Church and State. But it may also spring from the fact that his duties as protector of the Church's clrthly goods render him as vulnerable as any Filipino businessrnan, wlrose rise and lirll under martial law could well depend not only on coo but on Marcos. The Far Eastern Economic Retiew has described the Cardinal's difficult and sch2ophrenic role, as spiritual leader and earthly steward, in a little-kno*n ,t*ggl" lirr control of the Philippine Trust Company. This highly profitable bank had long been the church,s source.of funds for charitable and educational projects, including the powerful Catholic broadcasting station, Radio veritas, which beams programs to the chinese mainland and the aiian suucontinent. Because of its enormous goodwill and resources, prc had also become the target of acquisition moves by business groups that came to sudden prominence witl the declaration of martial law. At one point in the controversy, only Marcos could resolve the question of control - whether or not the Archdiocese of Manila representative, ;".; i;;;.1 rlate the board of directors and thus assure the Church of continued and effective ownership of the bank. Because of this, Sin's occasional warnings and denunciations against the government were taken as the brave but token challeiges of a figtiter who Irad one's hand tied behind his back. The Philippine Trust company was founded ,n rgrT by a group of American husinessmen who later went bankrupt. Being the largest depositor, tie Archbistroi of Manila then took control of the prc. But dark ciouds rt"rtra iorming ov". the heads of the church-controlled board of director; h rr,"'c*i.ur n*r. required all commercial banks to raise tleir capitalization to P100 million. pTC then tt genuine respect

nreflquy as well as o_f the strongest and most organizejpofitical i:^tj.r^r_":rs sition to the martial law regime. However, tre tras been critiJized even tt e p.i:tt_, of his native Samar, *f,.* ,h"'g"r"^ffiJn,-La ,UU",v u :::,:1 ;the-Urcommunist New people's against Army has brought rip*oioi, a'.uti'ffi ;

Ii:llIT

lions, characterized by mutual esteern and respect. I go to him when I need his help urrd he comes to me when, as a member of my flock, he needs spiritual solace. As long as this situation'continues, we needn't worry. It,s when peopli stop talking tha! thcy begin fighting."

;rromising atitude towards the Marcos government.

:tg.:, and has made no public protest against human rights viorations or repc injustices. lltTi:

It is the stand of a reasonable and pragmatic man left with few options. But as Archbishop of the capital city of Manila and spiritual leadpr of the naiion,.Cardinal Sin is held by countless Filipinos as a pillar of strength against the reported injustlces rurrd oppression of authoritarian rule, and they expect him to adopt a totally

y{9s, Ar9luistrop of cebu (trre second rargest city) and laime carainat sin,

..^ -

State

common good, but reserves the right to criticize any state policies which,

comprisJ M.gtyo ot f".,i-t :lT"I:I*ading T:*'.-n, and laity who community "pp;;.i"il; i*o cardinis,

l*-0'T: "*"n' syrnbolize tl,e two ,61

Cturch vs.

be wrirten, Cardinal Sin would probably be best r._r*b, enunciating his principle of 'triticar colraboration', which Filipinos gener

acceptaStheofficiaIstandoftheChurchvis.a.visMarcos.

voiced by his own priests for being publicly frir ...,., Marcos, .r,r_ 1"ply^.,o.criticisns wrth Sin has decrared: "president Marcos and I maintaii very

i;rl;;l*.

cordial

ffi , ,, ',

il, .ll i'

'!l

I ,, , i ,t"t

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Ghuch

had a capitalizirtion of a mer€ P20 million, and a surplus of p5 million. The was to scout around for someone acceptable enough who could take over tlte by putting up the required additional fundrng of p75 million. When Rufino Cardinal Sanios died in September 1973, Bishop Ariemio took over as officer-incharge of the Manila Archdiocese, and entered into a with victor Tan, a banker and financier, for the purchase of 603,100 strares in Philippine Tnrst Company for P73.3 million. This transaction gave Tan interest (60.3%) in the pTC. In retum, Tan was to lend the Manila Archd"iocese p30 million, to be 16 yean at 9%o intetest, The dividends eamed from the Archdiocese's 33.5% strares of the PTC stock would be used to repay this p30 milrion loan. In tion, Tan also agreed to open a domestic letter of credit for the Church. This was the situation which Cardinal Sin inherited when he was from his Archdiocese in Iloilo, in the Central Visayas, and named Arch Manila.

In early 1974,Tan was able to pay the first two installments of his PTC strares amounting to P52.8 million. The third and last installment, the balance of P20.5 million, was to have been due in 1975. Meanwhile, Tan took over management of pTC but soon thereafter his ship with the church dipped to freezing point. It becarne apparent that Tan issued unsecured loans to which rrc wouia be fiable. He had defaulted in his ment of, the ta,res pertinent to his take-over of the bank. He had also failed to the letler of credit which he had promised the church. As a strocking climax, it discovered that the P30 rnillion loan to the church did not come from the Tnrst company, after all, but from Tan's other bank trre continental Bank which was on the verge of collapse. If Cardinat Sin started looking askance at Victor Tan, so did two other the central Bank, which frowned upon his dubious financial dears; and the which stopped victor Tan from boarding an intemational flight in June 1974, detained him for his alleged "misappropriation of deposits and other financial gularities." :

Because of the adverse effects that the Tan affair might have on the en banking community, Marcos was forced to step in. He ordered no less than c'en Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros and the chief of the National Intelligence and curity Authority (NISA), Gen. Fabian Ver, to seize the assets of victor Tan. The Archdiocese of Manila then asked Gov. Licaros for the third installment the block of PTC shares which Tan was supposed to buy. But Licaros dilly.da on this demand for several months, so the-ihurch not only moved to ,.rino original contract with ran but also rpanaged to have its nominees elected to board, to fill the vacancies of Tan's nominees. In effect, the church had regained control and owership of the bank. prompted Licaros to send a check for P215,000 representing Tan's final ment of the church's shares but this was rejected by the Archdiocese. then charged that the directors had been iuegally elected and would face sus

rm.

State

lrr the ensuing court cases that the Church and Central Bank filed against each 1t1or, the court decided that the Central Bank was enStled to five directors, the l'lrrrrch to four. The remaining two directors would be chosen by the minority stock' lroltlers.

As these last two were actudly nominees of the Archdiocese, it re-acquired uontrol of the bank. Still the controYersy remained unsettled. Gen. Ver thgn sug' gcsted that Licaros and the Cardind resolve t}re matter amicably through mutually rucceptable panels. The resulting agreement, subject to Marcos' approral, was that llrc shares would be distributed among the Church, Tan's crediton and a prospective lirreign investor - with the Church retaining majority holding. Marcos did approve the scheme but later suspended its implementation, explaining that Tan's lawyers had raised legal questions that needed to be resolved. lrrsiders claim, however, that the srspension was caused by the entry of Herminio l)isini into this tangled financial web. A golfing partner of Marcos, Disini had all this while also been making quiet hut determined moves to gain control of Philippine Trust Company. Having assem' bled some thirty corporations - the Herdis Group of Companies - since the start o[ martial law, Disini now cast a covetous $ance at the prestigious bank for tJre l)urpose of diversifying investnents and expanding the financial base of the Herdis cmpire.

Through one of its financing companies, Disini had made an unfortunate invest' in Tan's ill.starred Continental Bank of up to P22.5 million. Claiming that 'tan had turned over all his assets to Herdis, Disini proposed to effect a settlement of the orginal controversy between Tan and the Archbistrop. At this point, the Central Bank relented on its stand against the Church, giving rise to the belief that it was sympathetic to Disini's desire to take over the bank. Under normal and more felicitous circumstances, the Church would never have wanted to dispose of Philippine Trust. The bank had literally sewed as a Senerous provider for numerous social and religious proglams. But it was now operating under stringent conditions imposed by the Central Bank. Not only did it have to increase capitalization from P25 million to Pl00 million, it could no longer avail of rediscounting facilities and branching privileges. Which meant that, unlike all other banks, PTC could no longer '\rse its loans to clients as collateral for its borrowing from the Central Bank" a penalty imposed by the CB for an alleged unauthorized investment of Pl million rnaae Uy the bank n 1974. To a non-accountant like Cardinal Sin, the apparently coordinated moves taken by the government and a favored group smacked of outright penecution. In the same bitter mood but with diplomatic aplomb which again his youthful and indignant priests mistook for avacillating stance - Cardinal Sin was compelled to write Marcos in February 1978: rnent

Mr. President, the PTC and its stockholders have suffered more than enough from the persistent efforts of the Herdis group to gain control of the bank, by means that do not sit well with the lofty ideals and

Church vs'

THE COUNTEB.FETT REVOLUTTON these uses of government power

in order to

favo r one

$oup to srbvert the administration ,.of justice in the have led me to the donclusion that it is only by the Church selling completely from PTC that this bank will no longer be persecuted businesses and

tloscribed the situation thus:

Before inartial law, the people could always nrn to the government whenever they had problems they couldn't sofue by themsehes. If a man had a grievance against anybody, he could always run to his conSlessman, govemor,mayor.Today, however, the situation has changed'

harrassed.

The zupplicant posture which Cardinal Sin displayed during the struggle control of the Philippine Trust company may have contributed to his image asr

Becauseofmartiallaw,thepeoplehesitatetogo'tothemayoror

prelate 'Vho played ball" or "looked the other way," or even "turned a deaf ear" the sufferings of his flock under martial law. But just when his detractors were prep:ued to dismiss Cardinal Sin as a leon who changed colors as often as the occasion required, he stirred the and the entire world early in october 1979 with his triple demand for Marcos ,'lift martial law, call for free a4d honest elections, and inhibit himself from ru for office, in order to avoid an imminent civil war. Or so the wire services quoting an interview that the cardinal had given to the British Broadcasting poration. Only a few days before, newspaper photos had strown him enjoying a joke with Marcos at a Palace dinner. How could this man now say that unless M took the political steps he suggested, there would be a national upheaval, even ing that "if. God wants to punistr a people He would permit them to engage in a war?'l It was confusing to most people, but then the Archbistrop of Manila had known to cornmute .between compromise and condemnation in his role as a collaborator. Foreign correspondents took his word more seriously than Filipinos did. revolution in Iran was crowding the front pages of every major newspaper, among countries in Asia and the Pacific the Philippines appeared to be the next der keg with the distinguistred writer, Gunnar ll,tyrdal, pointing to similarities in social,'economic and political conditions of both countries. Media reporters flocked to Manila, expecting to find another scowling Aya lah Khomeini in the person of Jaime cardinal sin, 4 religious figure turned poli leader of his country. Instead they found a jolly and affable man who had been many state dinners - a living example of the good life under martial law whose only complaint was that he had be-en quoted out of context. The television men and foreign correspondents glumly packed up their bags and cameras, but not before Information Minister Francisco Tatad had called them a "bunch of vultures . . . Iooking

In Hongkong, Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo, unable to

-by

approached voice.

or not, whether we admit it or not,

climate of

people with a complaint to make or a dissatisfaciion to

The Church hierarchy itself has been careful to define its position in the com' munity. In various oflicial statements, it has repeatedly emphasized that it has no interfere in those matters that are properly the concern of the State and the wish pofitigal authorities. But taken as a whole, the statements, the actions, the protests, the sermons and pastoral letters initiated by bistrops, priests and nuns in all parts of the country attest to a prevailing sentiment within the body of the Church that could well be understood as its de facto stand on martial law and the New Society' Only a srnall minority within the bhurch hierarchy and laity publicly profess their more out of a sense of gratitu$e for support or acceptance of the Marcos rule tliiect personal favors received than the sincere betief that the regime has truly pro moted the spiritual and physical uplift of the human person. It is perhaps in recognition of the latent political powers of the Catholic Church that Marcos and all those involved in the imposition of martial law have gone out of their way to court the bishops and other leaders, and to react positively to petitions and complaints filed in behalf of their paristrioners. Throug[r the National Secretariat of Social Action as well as the Clrurch' , Military Lialson Group, the Church has zucceeded to a large extenf in minimizing

;

is a cardinal'

Far from diministring his stature as a potential leader, tlre incident had the effect of elevating Cardinal Sin to the political level of Marcos. The polarization that resulted opened the eyes of martial law administrators to a frightening new reality:

.* ,.port f*" t" tfn *ffiUryitfrJn h, "* Ue ditaineA indefinitely with' out any charges being filed against him? And can the mayor or governor be of any ,.rl h"lp 6 him when these oflicials, as we all know, can be removed by the simple act of accepting their courtesy resignations?

fear has been spawned as a result of martial law. And because of this fear, thri people have serious second thoughts about running to a government oflicial for redres of grievances. where do the people turn? To the priest. My priests tell me that hardly a day passes when they're not

resist a pun, said,

are absolutely false. . .

goyernor or legislator. can a man denounce a crooked barcngay captain, io, .*"rnple, when that captain enjoys so much power over him, when he

whether we like

for blood."

"All talks about civil war in the Philippines sin to tell a lie. , ."

lhat having lost confidence in their local leaders, disgruntled citizens were tuming to the Church in greater numbers to seek redres of grievances. The Cardinal himself

moral principles of t}e New Society. . .

All

Stste

violations of human rights, securing the release of political and other detainees against whom no qpecilic charges had been filed, and compelling improvements in prison conditions. It is no exaggeration to say that tfuough the martial law years, the bhurch has served as an effective countervailing force against the exerclse of nearly

i.; ': i if i'll

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Church vs.

absolute powers, and may be said to have stOpped into the vacuum resulting from

i. :

,I I

.i.

. w._ carefully avoiding direct and open involvement in political activi sl'ch as plebiscites, referenda and elections, concerned church leaders trave kepi democratic spirit alive at the grassroots through yeiled admonitions, protests, reminden in sermons, pastoral letters and other publications. There have been cg however, of radical priests either taking part in public demonstrations o. orl advocating a boycott of the elections and plebiscites, and often enaing

detainees themsehes.

, significantly,

the most outspoken and militant bistrops are found in the of Mindanao where Bishops Francisco claver of Bukidnon, Jezus varela of M occidental, Antonino Nepomuceno of €otabato and Antonio Mabutas of to mention a few * are held in high esteem. The conditions under which they salled upsn to discharge their spiritual duties explain why they r".* *o.. frrrioi in their defense of civil and political rights. Even before tle declaration of martial law, the militarization of Mindanao already started due to the threat posed by the tr,toro National uberation Front other Muslim rebel and secessionist groups. As the Muslim rebellion saineo *, tum with the support of Libya and some Islamic nations in the Middle East, troops were poured into the ishnd. The presence of thousands of soldien estimated to have reached $e qeak of the fighting in 1975 - and the highty unstable political situation in south, gave rise to numerous abuses perpetrated by militaipenonnel as well as local government officials who used the emergency to justify the arbitrary usel Power.

with no one else to tum to, the people ran to the church and priests nuns found themselvei in the role orpoiiticat leaders. In Davao and other Mindi provinc.es' distraught families sought their help in locating missing menfolk,r'

arrested as- suspected rebels or subversives. Although the mititary a-uthori-ties insi that they had already been released or allowed to return home, tt e men wefe Llt,t

where to be found. Subsequent investigations revealed, however, that they had isummarily executed and buried in unmarked graves. Shocked by these and other serious crimes, Monsignor Antonio M B,t9p of Davao, raised a loud outcry that the martial law government in could not ignore, especially after the international press sent it echoing ,rourJ world. Deputy Minister of Defense carmelo Barbero had to be sent to Mindanao conduct a probe of military abuses. And in Manila, top defense officials t Minister Enrile took a long hard look at the state of the nation,s ""J.J Armed Forces vowed quick uncompromising action against corrupt and trigger-happy military

sonnel.

In a conciliatory gesture, the church promptly disclaimed the statements

of bishops and priests ranged against Marcos and martial law. Because to different orders and religious organizations, priests and nuns in the fi are usually held accountable only to their superiors, most of whom" are based actions

belong

State

l(eme. This has made it possible for Church leaders in the Philippines to wash their of activities outside their respective jurisdictions that the regime disfavors.

lrnnds

rliocese

of Manila, he

opcrating outside his The consistent runcquivocal and hoth Marcos and his lcgime a meazure of

rtitute 84.97% of the

exercise administrative control or supervision of priests responsibility, much less discipline them.

of the Catholic hierarchy in the Philippines to take an rihd on prickly martial law issues, and the projection of .5 faitnful, practicing Catholics, have naturally given the

for in the eyes of ordinary Catholics who conpopulation, a govemment tolerated by the Church

possibly be bad. 'archy, there is undeniably much dissatisfaction with in the face of rapidly deteriorating social and economic ing gap between the new rich of the New Society and because of her traditional posture as an institution conneeds of man, the Church has been religiously avoidgovemment that might expose her to the charge of poliwith the hrg a confrontation

or by its highest Within the lhe existing order, eonditions, and the the poor of the Old. ocrned only with the tical interference.

This confrontation nevertheless nearly took place when 129 Filipino Catholic Church and lay leaders held their annual synod in Manila on 28 October 1979 and rdopted a resolution demanding an end to martial law. Coming close on the heels ol Cardinal Sin's dire wamings of a possible civil war in the Philippines unless Marcos cnded martial law, the synod resolution touched off a concerted attack against the Church, unprecedented in its bittemess and scope. The extensive use of the controlled media and the uncontrolled outbursts of some members of the Marcos-dominated parliament indicated that the barrage was heing orchestrated by Malacaflang and that the mirtial law administrators did fear the Church as a formidable threat to the regime. In pooled editorials, the newspapers chorused against the dangers of the (lhurch's penchant for "encroaching on affairs of State" and reminded the coun' try's high prelates of the principle of the separation of the Church and State. As if on cue, two members of the Interim National Assembly also assailed the synod action and Cardinal Sin. Assemblyman Arturo Pacificador rose on a question of personal and collective privilege to denounce the Church for political meddling, while Assemblyman Antonio Tupaz fired off an open letter to the Daily Express, practically accusing Cardinat Sin and other Catholic leaders of plotting to take over tht: govemment:

is the prelates, the cura Parrocos, the righteous cassocked preachers who since the l6th century have brought pain, tragedy, deceptiorq abuse, and finally revolution to the Philippines. . . The predecessors of Sin and Villote habitually tried to wrest power from the government. To achieve this end, which they pretend to be ordained by God, they cajoled and mesrnerized the people with homilies, and if this failed,

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION whipped them to childlike obedience. They would not bury except for a fee. They lent money at usurious interest, and it was

fqom the obrus pias. Ttrey had more ing engineers. They enriched themselves wi They kept mistresses. They sold

rncluding public officials - to kiss their waged a propaganda campaign against state for privileges. They have not l9th centuries were not sufficient to Ppwer. Many are still at it today with

Tupas implied that this breathless litany

Orurch Ys.

Stste

tence of the State. But the effects of martial rule in a given situation to the hindrance of promotion of the spiritual and moral basic rights of rights, is quite man, to the dignity -isof man and his basic constitutional judgment citizen and is of every *othff matter. It zubject to moral

mines than the at the galleon

required

From tlre pulpit

while importuning l6th, l7th, lgth,; ;egos and their I abuse and

city...

quoted ftcxn Tadhana (Marcos' epic saga of the regime's approved history), thereby also ssuggesting venom and malice - had been written at the instance of

ly activities had which is now dnpping himself.

;letter

ter and ominous development. He pointed out that only a rireek before, tle full of reports from the troubled areas of the country, telling of

papers had been

torious campaigrrs against armed dissidents. '!It was as if, having no morc dragons to defeat, the Government has to facture a dangerous enemy to fight, in order to justify continued martial law,,, observed.

that it was Marcos who ultimately decided to back out of a confron with the Church is evident in the way media suddenly dropped the issue. Thus,

open 'lrar" which could have tested the church's political strength was averted, the nation spared the tension that might indeed have created tlre revolutionary tion Cardinal Sin had warned about. Nevertheles, the active involvement of priests and other religious in matters that the governrnent insists fall within the exclusive domain of the continues with undiminishing fervor. In a talk before the Bistrops-Busine Conferenco, the Most Rev. konardo kgazpi, Auxiliary Bishop

of Manila, ex

that: Politics. . . cannot be separated from religion: the two are c distinct from each other, as the specific orders to which each of belongs are distinct. But neither do politics and religion exclqde irther since their common object is the hrman person. The interest of State is precisely to respect the limits qf this distinction and the p eminence of religion. There is in truth ah intrinslc relationship be religion and the well-being of the State. . . Martial nrle, for example, as a constitutional meastire of ment to self-defense against serious disorder that distrust the fabric the society, is definitely a political matter. And is therefore the

be no quarrel about the gov' itrlment's repeated appeals for close and harmonious collaboration among all secl towards the building of one nation that was also one in qpirit. However,, he

In conclusion, Rev. lrgazpi said that there should

lors

pilhrted out that "the Church in the here and now can only best participat: in tlls *,u,,rnon endeavor not by being silenced to submision nor by being pushed within lhc safe precinct of the sacristy. She can best help our political leaden and our socloty by teing given the freedom and the encouragement to fulfill the role assigned Io hcr by the Author of the State and of the Church."

Sometimes, said the Auxiliary Bistrop, "an explicit, direct denunciation of an lniustice and those responsible for it becomes necessary. In the face of these, the ['Jrurch cannot remain silent, cannot take up a neutral posture. Particularly' in the runlortunate situation when the voice of the Church is the only voicd that can be ruiscd in defense of the silent oppressed and in denunciation of those who oppress lhtltn." Significantly, the challenge facing the Church under martial law is being met,, 16t by it, prin."t whose voices would be heeded by the martial law administrators hrrt by quite ordinary men and women of God whose daily acts of selflessness, rtourage and heroisrn in far, unheard of corners of the archipelago amount to a repof their cautious superiors. In t}1e depressed and underprivileged areas of the country, clergymen insist that lhe Church cannot, and strould not, operate in a social vacuum. Says a priest who works in a militarized zone: "How can we preach the Good News to people who lro zuffering social and economic injustices? I cannot ask them to strive towards, turnctity wh"en their daughters have Leen raped, their husbands and sons detained'

rrxrch

withoutchargeS,andtheiipropertiesdestroyedorlooted.''..f.

Churchmen as a whole feel that martial law has actually done more harm than good to the country, and a Mindanao bishop who vehemently disagrees with CardinalSin looks at collaboration with Marcos in any form as "helping a thief dispose of rtolen goods. He doesn't own the country, the people do; therefore, he should retum It to them." That is a tall order, one that Marcos is not likely to fill - especially on tlre mcre say-so of those he obviously considers a hindrance to the success of hiS re' gtme. Aittrough he has carefully avoided making any comments that would offend tfte Church, his attitude is reflected in a statement that Mrs. Marcos, his acknowl' cdged alter-ego, made before a U.S. congressional group. When inf.ormed that mgst of the complaints about martial law reaching the United States came from the Roman Catholic Church, 'Trom people who have a

THE COUNTERFETT REVOLUTTON

great credibility," Mrs. reacted by saying t},at .,one of the first things thrit flar"cos President wants to break down is the big oug*ity i" o"..ouii.y.'. : *a one of big oligarchy now is tlre Church. . .,,

THE NEW

OLIGARCHS

YEAR before he imposed martial law, Marcos had already sounded the call to arms against the country's oligarchs. In newspaper pronouncements and public rlrr.cches, he denounced them for strongly resisting change in order "to hold on to

a ll

tlrcir privileges." Although they manipulated political authority and intimidated not interested in political power as

grolitical leaders, Marcos said, the oligarchs were rurch but in economic gain and social prestige.

Even as early as 1968, his wife had deplored the stranglehold of the'nation's f(.()1omy by a few. In an infonnal talk wittr newspapennen at Malacaiiang Palace, she ruritl that on waking up each moming she "worried about the poor and suffering peo' grlc of the country who have barely enough to eat, while the rich seem to wallow in rurch luxury," and that whenevet she thouglrt about this, tears would come to her 0y0s.

was a shame, she observed, that the Philippines was practically owned by orrly ten families - and among the names that she mentioned were those of the Eli' ruldes, the Sorianos (of San lr{iguel Corporation), the Madrigals, the Cojuangcos, the l.opezes, Yulos, Ortigases, Aranetas, and the Ayalas. No one could quarrel with either Marcos on this point. For generations, Fili' pilos had become inured to the reality that Philippine society was traditionally oli' gurchic in character. A very few owned most of the country's wealth and the gap hetween the rich and poor not only continued to widen but, as Marcos pointed out, irrcreasingly provided the wealthy few the opportunity of exercising undue influence on the political authority. "Oligarchs," he said, "either 'buy' politicians or become politicians theurselves." Arnong those wl.ro felt alluded to by his tirades was fomrer Vice President Fer.

urndo Lopez, Marcos' runnirtg mate in two successive and record'setting elecIoral bids for the hig|est positions in the land. In his rejoinder before a trade conl'crence of businessmen and industrialists, Lopez gave the issue an air of levity when lrt declared: "I am not an oligarch. Why, I do not even know how to spell oligarch! "

of the Filipino electorate. In previous elections' of the underprivileged by training their guns on the

Neither did the majority politicians courtsd the votes

i'heartless rich," "the greedy caciques," or the "wealthy aristocrats." But now here was Marcos assailing a tongue-twisting class of villains as the obstacles to economic progress. Who were these new oppressors? .,The Greek political thinkers who coined the temt," Marcos explained to his countrymen, 'tnderstood oligttrclty as the rule of the few, against the rule of the rrrany, which is democracy: "

Thus, more than a year before the 21st of September 19'.72, the grotlnd was arealdy broken for the establishment of a "democratic machinery" to demolish the lated oligarchy. Marcos would call it his "Dernocratic Revolution." The controlled rnedia would label it "Martial Law, Philippine Style" - one without tanks in the

The New

IO2

"THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION streets or guns pointed at cowering cirrilians. But by whatever naine, the new would do away with the priVileged class and raise the status of the common folk, promise bore faint echoes of President Ramon Magsaysay's famous dictum those who had less in life strould have more in law.

by a blare of

red'cows. One of Marcos' early wamings raised hopes that Malacflang would come a model of integrity for all govemment offices to emulate. "This office leave no stone unturned to go after those who abuse," he wamed. Along with a call for national discipline, Walang Palakasan became the cry of the new dispensation. This Tagalog phrase carries a number of connota no weight-throwing, no name-dropping, no favors asked or given, no attention, no influence'peddling. " When Marcos said, "[rt no man invoke friendstrip or blood kinship to e himself or to enhance his position," the whole nation cheered. Here at last President who meant business. uttle did they suspect that for those in his inner . cle, it would mean more business. After eight years of martial law, many of the "old oligarchs" are still much around, a little less influential perhaps but just as wealtly, if not more And, added'to their ranks is an aggressive breed of new oligarchs to whom p rity and success had been elusive eoals before that fateful September day. By Marcos' own definition, mere acquisition of wealth, however immense sudden, does not'make one as oligarch. To qualify, a Croesus must be in a posit: to use his wealth to manipulate the political leaders of the country. Since an impo,ssibility in a situation where the ruler is all-powerful and beyond ma tion by anybody, as in the case of Marcos, there is, in theory at least, no oli to speak of in the New Society. Still the nouaedu riche of the martial law era could well become the oli of tomonow, for with their newly-acquired or vastly expanded wealth, they be in a much stronger position * again to quote Marcos - "to buy politicians become politicians themselves" once political normalcy is restored. Even now, t close rapport and easy access they enjoy with the suprenre governing power, ei because of relationship by consanguinity or affinity or intimate friendslrip on the putting green, represent a rare kind of political power that could magi open many doors. Then, too, by the Marcos definition that oligarchs are also those who are " interested in political power as such but in economic gain and social prestige," conclusion is inescapable that there truly exists, under martial law, a "new oligarchy, - whose members have managed to acquire in less than two decades such wealth as would have taken the "old oligarchy" two or three generations to Socially, the new oligarchy reached a breathless peak pf prominence when i members graced the ground-breaking of the P3-billion Marbella Club and Resort Puerto Azul, near Manila, and rubbed elbows with Europe's millionaire jet-set I

103

Iltcltrding4ltitledguestswholookeddownononeofthecelebrities,SeanConnery fellow"' ll..lutues Bond fame, as a mere "actor of Rowan to explain the .overnig[ affluence Roy When asked by Fortune's

did burst upon the Philippine scene, the New Society was u slogans and promises that wafted like a breath of fresh air across a made arid by influence-peddlers, vested interests, political untouchables and When

OliPrPhs

as the law' Mrs' Marcosiave a reply as memorable rcl^tives and friends ,rnJe' *u'tial and f,or?") power in Jose Avelino 1'frhat are we r,r;rssic statements of former speaker don't steal")' St'rrator Pacita Madriguf W"* ("ft{illionaires others'" than She said, ':Some are smarter .r -- -1L^- can be seen -be smarte.r ttrl ott11s these relatives unJ ftit'O' may indeed

That

lrrthenumbe.or.o'po.utionsthattheyareinvolvedwith,eitherasboardchair. begrudge 'them ordinary times' few would probably nrcrl, presidents or directors' In fu y:::.":-and his wife special tlrcir new-found success' But their .rtLti*S"n intelligence entrepreneurial native the inevitable q*rti"" of whether their r.ises

political clime' t',ruld have surfaced under a different

been made

in Malacaflang' attempts have From as far back as Marcos' flrst term lris wife to various businesses that suddenly lty lris politicut .,.n,,i., to link him and They claim Pt'-tt new captains of lrurgeoned during tlre *tti't law years' if not all' of these bompanies are are really mere fronts anO ihat many' irrtlustry

, irctually Marcos'owned or'controlled'

can plrsonally attest to the fact' however'

tllattlrerelravebeennu,,,".u,instanceswllenMarcosandMrs'Marcoswoulden. eourageminorgovemrrrerrtofficialsordistantrelativeswhocametothemforhelp, situation' a means of improving their financial Io go into business for themselves' as Becausehusbandandwifeoperateasseparatepolitical:ltit':tanddealinde' l,endentry with distinct"g;;Il::i!':*:, ..ir.,r":::1.*::'-s31::'$,'r::TTil:l,TILl: situation. w1-,i1. Mu'.o' allegedlv works oro l[#TJ:l

X#;:'ilii.iHir"

llrrouglrmembersofhisorvrrclarrandfriends-likeAmbassadorRobertoS.Bene. Rarnon and Eduardo cojuangco - Mrs' tlicto, Antonio ploirenio, ona ,n. brothers Marcosreputedlylnoves,tlrrouglrlrerfavoritebrother,LeyteGovernorBenjamin well'known business leaders as Cesar Zala' l{o,rualdez, who, in ,t;;,-t;Ut;n such Orosa'

of Sixto and Ramon Emilio Abello, and tlie father'and'son tealn interests are said to mesh perfect: tlreir In tlris intricate mare of relations}rips, protege set up-by-Herminio Disini' a known Marcos V i" tfrt gr"up of .o*p*ies per' and Escolin' Mrs Marcos'cousin rnd golf partner. Disini is married to nr' maay

mea,

stlnal phYsician'

Aratlrercomprelrehsivelistingof..Marcos.related''corporationshasbeen company' which' in to an unidentlfied Uut eJtaUlished and diversified

attributed

wanted to ascertain whether it was planning to expand ,o o,-ir.. fields, reportedly prove wittr well-connected individuals might vcnturing into areas *tr.r. ,o*p.tiiion tlisadvantageous' or even ruinous' rqc{s at-the Securities The list i, prrp;;ly-bu"d on available rybl'"supplied by repu' information Exchang, co**irrionllr *u ur on confidential and

tablebusinessmenwlrobeggedtoremainanonymous,forobviousreasons.Butitfails of Marcos and his wife are the real owners to establish beyond .ruroiiul, doubt that the cornPanies cited.

IO4

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Political opposition quarters argue, however, that the whole puqpose of ing other persons as officirs of these enterprises is precisery

lTl$t,thr

i,:

apoint that cannot be settted

power, and even then to rest.

,l,r::Lrj.T

doubt

if it

to conceal the

rr,il'M;;;r,rr r"np.i

wourd be possible

rrv ,rr.

j"*"

*'ri,r,

The New

j;;;;"*;i#;"r;

fftrygtt

of affluence only to loseit

network and are at

Company

his defeat. Nevertheless, the extent of the business activities and invorvement of a nu of 'Marcos relatives and friends compels attention to a phenomenal fact: that now equal, if-not surpass, impressive array of econornic interests rr.ra uy,r* te yarcos had ptedged to exterminaie. That, g::l,I ;il.;ioubts ab the New society and exprains whv it has ceased to

2. 3.

Roberto S. Benedicto is one of tJre closest personal friends of President, being a classrnate ancr fraternity brother of Marcos at the I venity of the Philippines conege of Law. He is an o.igina iunJ, and trusted crony from the days when the president *us-nghting oi

maneuvering political giants. Benedicto was formerly the head of the government-owned pines National Bank which finances sugar of,erations and is cu the chairman of the philippine Sugar Commission, titution that is the sole buyer of sugar from the farmers *d vv'ruYYsvr .onrro, Iy has a monopoly over philippin, .iport, of sugar. , Benedicto also heads the National Sugai Trading Corporation, government corporation whofly owned by pHILSUCOM

,hr;;;r;;;;

that acts

of the Commission and which has an authori capitalization of Pl0Gmi[ion. In addition, he owns sugar rands and

veral new sugar mills, and his shipping line, Northern Lin.s, curries su to Japan. Benedicto was also a former ambassador to Japan_ Beiredicto has controlling intereits in Repubric planters Bank Traders Royal Bank. He-owns a local n.*rpup.r, also owns the largest TV and radio network i, tir, trols 36 radio stations and five TV channels. The Lopez "ount{r, family, the for-l rner omers of the radio/TV network, claims that no payment was ever made. This situation caused confusion and consternation in Manira be-,

iirr*. ^, "rri *il;";;;:

Position

Activity

Director

Mining

Marinduque Mining

Roberto

& Industrial Corp.

Benedicto

Planters Products

-do-do-

Principal

-do-do-

Francisco Benedicto

-do-

Banking

-do-

Sugar Trading

-do-

TV Station

-do-

Systemg Corp. Traders Royal Bank

National Sugar

Roberto

Benedicto

8. 9. 10.

Trading Corp. ABS.CBN Republic Bank Nivico Phils.

The listing that follows is an excerpt of the confidential ..corporate st: prwiously m3ntioned, and.is here incruded.onry for the purpose or rr,oiing *,at cos may not have kept faith with his avowed ..democratic revolution.,,

GR.OI.JP

Incumbent

4. 5.

;;pt* Fil;;:-""'

R.OBER.TO S. BENEDICTO

to whom to collect from.

Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) Davao Bulk Corp. Phil. Consultancy

hili,

sugar marketing arm

a loss as

BENEDICTO

.T lo b::.Garcia, in fact, oi.a , ,"rpri"Jr.r, poo, .rt ::.li..l:1some l"nql of |ris reratives.did acquire a degree

rtjl

105

cause Citibank, the U.S. giant, and the Philippine Commercial and In' dustrial Bank, had together loaned $6-million to the Lopez-owned

that former presidents Elpidio eu

lfiol::]1r9alize (1948's3) and carlos p. Garcia (r9s7-6r) *...-;;;

Oligarchs

Celebrity Sports Plaza

-do-do-do-do-

Agri-business Media

owner

Chairman Chairman

Banking TV manu-

facturing

Pres.

-do -

Sports

club

RODOLFO CUENCA

Rodolfo Cuenca is a vivid example of one man's meteoric rise to the position of head of a very successful and fast-growing conglomerate from a modest start. He has rnaintained a close personal friendship with Marcos, stemming from pre-martial law days. He was a fund'raiser in the 1965 campaign and is a frequent golfpartner ofthe President. At 51, Cuenca heads an empire that got off the ground in 1966 when his original Cuenca Construction Company was awarded several large-scale construction jobs by the Marcos Sovemment, by virtue, it is said, of the Private Finurcing Act of 1963 which encouraged the private sector to build infrastructure. ln 1967, Cuenca's Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines won the bidding for the completion of the North Lu' zoh Expressway for P29-million, and the construction of the Manila South Expressway for P34million. After CDCP's.success in the building of expresiways, it zoomed through other gigantic projects in the con'

ffi

106

ffi l' l,tl

li!.',,,

''i|,'

,]ffii iil,

:ii[i,, ff

;IH

kyto

Samar, the Pantabangan Dam, the Candaba viaduct, and other

But by far, CDCP's most ambitious project is the New City or. Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCB.RP). project involves the reclamation of offshore areas totalling 2,r hectares, extending from the Cultural Center complex at Roxas

iiiifli

Yliil,{

The New

struction business, notably the San Juanico bridge connecting

'l|l1, ,r

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

d. 5.

TUBO fufcultural

-doPrincipal owner

and

CDCP Mining Corporation

vard to Bacoor, Cavite.

PHIISKAN Industries Corp.

Today, CDCP is the biggest local construction company 1977 was the country's eleventh biggest corporation in terms of ces amounting to Pl.9-billion and the 14th largest in terms of fixed amounting to P5OGmillion. It is staffed by highly-experienced con ton, engineers and managers recruited from the other top foreign local construction companies. CDCP boasts that it is a top

Builders Insurance Agency

and employment generator: it has launched projects in Jeddah and man in Saudi Arabia, Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia, karta in Indonesia, and Libreville and Port Gentil in Gabon, and

Corporation 10.

P.T. Iphelco or the lndonesia-

ll.

Philippines Equipment basing Co. Traffic Control Products Corp. (with Kikusui Uner Co., Ltd.)

t2.

Galleon Shipping Corp.

(with

Sta. Ines Metd

Forest Products Corp.)

in Iraq.

14.

Hydro Resources Air Mindanao Corporation

CDCP heads some fourieen other companies in other sectors of economy. Among them are: l) CDCP Farms Inc. (formed in I involved in livestock and crop production such as rice, corn, fruit tree planting; 2) Tiena Factors Corporation (formed in I which sells ard services heavy equipment, such as crawler cranes, hoes and shovels, Grove hydraulic cranes, SDM generators, Mitsu

15.

Dasmarifras Industrial

16.

Corp. BBC Nomelex C,orporation

forklifts, Johnson outboard motors, Terex earthmovers and other ment for mining, wood-processing and logging; 3) CDCP Mining poration involved in the development of copper mhes; 4) philskan dustries Corporation for industrial refrigeration; 5) Builders Inzura Corporation for the insurance needs of CDCP employees and and which is also the general agent of several insurance Traffic Control Products Corp. (with Kikusui Liner Co., Ltd. of J which makes road markers and traffic paints;7) and lately Galleon

ping Corporation, fomred only

in early

1978 whcih presently

five vessels plying intemational routes but which is in the process of, quiring newer, more modern ships;8) and, in relation to Galleon, the zon Stevedoring Corporation which was formerly owned and ope by the government and which possesses big cranes and vital h equipment that are at present in short supply at Manila's ports. Following are the companies which Cuenca heads:

I. 2.

Company

Incumbent

Position

CDCP CDCP Farma Inc.

Rodolfo M. Cuenca

Chairman

-do-

lO7

Director

Land Project Manager Affiliates CorPoration Midland Inzurance Inc. Development Corporation Tierra Factors

Oligarchs

13.

Principal owner

-do-

HERMINIO DISINI

The quick ascent of Herminio Disini is the most talked.about in the group. This relative (he is manied to Mrs. Marcos'flust cousin and personal physician, Dr. Inday Escolin, who was formerly the govemess or tn. Marcos children) is a close friend and frequent golfing partner of the President. At 43, Disini is heralded

example of the up'and'coming breed is hard'working, aggressive, daring, He of young Filipino entrepreneurs' foresigltt. of remarkable possession and in as an

HisbigbreakcameinlgT0witlrPhilippineTobaccoFiltersCorp.,

in a rented one-room office with only a secretary and a messenSer.

(Previously, he had worked for ten years as a certified public accountant with Peat, Marmick, Mitchell and Co., in California, and then as financiaf officer and director of F.E. Zuellig, Inc.) one third of the strares of PTFC

is owned by Baumgartner Papiers of Switzerland' Then, on July 2l' 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 750 in order to .,ensure fair competition in the local cigarette industry as well as .to

ffi ilir

108

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The New

stimulate the development and growth of the local manuficturers of rette filter rods." In the words of the New.york Times,.oThe decree imposed a 1 duty on the iinported raw materials of Mr. Disini,, a*.rt""f *A gJt oop.d competitor, Filtrona philippines, [nc., and cdrrtinued t]re

10% tariff on those used by Mr. Disini;s company.', Mr. Marcos tre decree n 1973 after Filtrona had turned down an offer from Disini to buy it out, according to a former executive of Filtrona. decree forced it to close its operations in the philippines and left Disini with a neiumonopory (in factTsyo) of the ruciaiive filter br here, with an estimated profit of ,nor. th* $l-million a month. U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan protested these moves, Marcos i

zuggested that Filtrona join Disini in a $4Gmillion venture to facture cellulose for filters. The Herdis conglomerate is now also supplying the Southeast filter rods market. It has set up Cigfil (Thaiild) Ltd., a joint with a leading Thai company. In addition, Technosphere and Recycleis, Inc. produces homogen2ed or reconstituted tobacco re-use as cigarette filters, pipe mixtures, and cigar binders. Now, Disini heads Herdis Management and Investment

tion, controlling some 3Godd enterprises, which altogether

have

o! over P200 milliorr. HMIC is the holding ana management cor the Herdis Group which is said to have linkages *itf, *r. f 9_f

Hughes empire. The Herdis.,troika" is a powerfully competent man teirm composed of Disini, Jacob and Velayo.

acquired

major Herdis subsidiary is Asia Industries, Inc., which in 1975 from its American owners. AII is the exclusive d

butor of equipment machinery in the electrical, communications,

struction, mining, agricultural, refrigeration, Iogging and wood is also the agent for Westingtrouse, ITT, I Thermoking, and PMC Corporation (materials handling).,In add: AIIhas set up the following: Beta Electrical Corporation, a joint turc with the Ayala group for tre manufacture of erectrical oistriuu systems; Tambuli Telecommunications, a joint venture with ITT for

ing industries. AII

manufacture of electronic private exchanjes; and westinghouse Asia ( trols corporation, which manufactures circuit breakirs and equipment. AII is the Philippine representative of Westinghou$e

Systems Company, which brings

ui to the Herdis-IVestinghouse

For the Bataqn Nuclear power project, two Arqerican

presente-!^

their proposats: General Electric, in a ..thoioughly

proposal" with detailed costs and specifications for two oo0 rnrg. reacton amounting to $TOGmillion; and Westinghouse, in nothint

than its standard advertising brochures, quoting a price of $50Gm for two reactors of the same megawatts. However, when W

presented roactors.

Oligarchs

109

its formal bid, the price increased to $l.2-billion for the two

A few months after this formal bid, the price again jumped; this time to $1.1 billion for just one 620 megawatt reactor, thus prompting Secretary Patemo to state in a memorandum that the govemment was being offered "one reactor for the price of two." This is the price at which the project was finally approved "deqpite calculations by the Phil' ippine National Computer Center that the plant was overpriced by at least $75-million compared to similar Westinghouse piants built in Yu' goslavia, South Korea and Taiwan." Disini and several of his companions profited further from this deal. For "assistance is obtaining the contract and for implementation ' services," Mr. Disini stood to gain a commission and/or service fee estimated between $6million fo $3S-million, according to TI/$E maga' zine. In addition, a year-old Disini company, Power Contractcrs, Inc', won the contract as chief sub-contractor of civil works in the nuclear project. Technosphere Consultants Group, a Herdis company, will pro' vide engineering and construction management. Still another Disini company, Summa Inzurance Corporation which deals in non-life insur' ance, won the contract to write a $668"million insurance policy on the project, backed up by the GSIS, involving a premium of $lGmillion. This is the largest single policy ever written in the Philippines. The con' tract to install communications at the project site was won by ITT, of which AII is the Philippine agent, as mentioned above. The entire deal has raised serious questions of law, policy and propriety. In anotler deal, the Herdis subsidiary called Asian Petrochemical Development Corporation has been appointed as govemment agent for an $8OGmillion petrochemical complex. A senior executive of a major U.S. petrochemical company that expressed interest in investing in the complex was told it would have to pay Herdis a commission of 2 to 3% of its investnent as an agent's fee. Reacting to Westem press accusations of influence and special favon, "the President promised to conduct a broad investigation of Mr. Disini's acquisition and to divest him of some of the important ones, particularly a 500,00&acre timber concession." The constitutional limit is 100,000 hectares per corporate concessionaire. More specific{Y, Marcos ordered the divestment from the Herdis group of three c6rporations: Philippine Cellophane Film, which operates the country's fust and only celtoptrane plant; Celluphil Resources Corporation, which ope' rates a 100,000 hectare pinewood forest concession and runs a long'fibre kraft pulp mill; Herdis Textile Corp., which oPerates a fully'integrated textile mill that converts filament yarn into a variety of fashionable fab' rics for export only. Though these three organizations which are going to be turned over to new owlers are major manufacturing concems and,

Tlie New

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

machineries in the electrical, communications, construction, mining, agricultUral, refrigera' tion, logging, and wood ProcessF

to Disini, are the viable projects that were intended to bo group's profit centers within the next five years, informed busi sources in Manila say they are not only the least profitable of the 3 so Disini ventures, but they had in fact incurred.losses according

ing industries

P25Gmillion.

these three companies to their new owners may some time. Says Rodolfo Jacob, vice chairman and chief oflicer of the Herdis group: "lile will help train the new owners expertise in the operations before turnover is made. This h to srnooth transition from us to the new owners." Herdis is said to have financed its rapid acquisitions and ments by taking over P200 million in foreign loans, all guaranteed the govemment banks, according to t}te Nezu York Times. Manila say that often Herdis has had to "put up little or no securityi its own. . . and needed only political approval to win the

T\rmover

Beta Electrical CorP.

Electrical distribution changes

11.

Tambuli Telecommunications Inc. Westinghouse Asia Controls

12.

Corp. Power Contractors, Inc.

9. 10.

Amidst this backdrop of criticiun and bad publicity, consternation is seen as he alleges that "they (the foreign interests have been persistent in their accusations) want to neutralize us. we are neutrelized." But Disini claims he and his outfit are doers and

t4. 15.

lopment CorPoration Food Industries, Inc.

HERDIS GROI,JP

Investnent Corporation Philippine Tobacco Filters

3. 4.

Cigfil (Thailand) Ltd. Technosphere Manufacturers Recyclers Inc.

l't.

Holding and management pany of the Herdis group Cigarette filters

18. Herdis Marketing CorP.

Philippine Cellophane Film

cessing Corp.

7, 8.

Sterling PhiliPPine AirwaYs

19. Sulu Sea Oil DeveloPment 20.

-do-

Homogenized or

tobacco

for

21.

reuse as and

22.

rette binden Cellophane for packaging

23. 24. 25.

Corp.

Cellophil Resources Corpo. ration and Cellulose Pro-

Timber, kraft-pulp used in production of cellophane, staple fiber for tottilg and

Vulcan Industrial & Mineral ExPloration CorP. Investnent & Underwriting Corp. of the PhiliPPines Summa Insurance CorP. Mercator Finance CorP. Edward R. Bacon (Phils.) Inc'

Promark Integrated Sales Inc'

tate tow for Herdis Textile Company Asia Industries Incorporated

management conzultancY Petrochemicals Cleaners, detergents, com starch, shampoos, swimming Pool

tems,

for

seisrnic, geoPhYsical

exploration Charter flights Marketing services for the Herdis Group's products Oil exploration

CorP. & San Jose Oil Co'

filters, pipe mixtures

Construction, engineering and

and geological oil and mining

Activity

Corp.

Construction and engineering

9o*' CorPoration

Herdis Management and

and control

brOakers

equipment

Summa ComPuter Services

16.

Circuit

chemicals and equiPment, vend' ing machines, PaPer cuPs' coolers and Post'mix disPensen Computer sYstems, software qYs-

who witl undertake pioneering projects in the future.

Company

systems

Electronic Private automatic ex'

works Technosphere Consultants Groups, Inc. Asian Petrochemical Deve'

13.

guarantee."

asks

Oligarchs l l l

Non-life insurance Financing General contractor Asbestos Products, electrical

items, steel barq, sPare Parts for heavY equiPment, wires & cables

cigarette Filament yarn into fabrics

Distributor

Underwriting & Financing

26. UsiPhil IncorPorated

equipment

Distributor chineries

for

CaterPillar ma'

II2

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

27.

Koppellncorporated

28. Equipment

credit

corp.

The New

Refrigerators

;Hffi:',

and

Incorporated Trans-Asia Oil & Minerals Development Corporation 33. Farm Machinery Corp. 34. Asia Pacific Finance 35. Inter.Asia Insurance Broker Services Incorporated 36. J.J. Rich, Inc. Machinery & Equipment Marketine 37. Falcon Rare Metals & Indus-

trial Minerals

of Floirendo, but he deserves special mention in this chapter beqause of his intimacy with the First Family. A nephew says that whenever he is in Manila, he regularly spends his aftemoons at Malacafiang Palace with other members of the business "in-crowd" who patiently wait for their unscheduled tum with Marcos. The possible marriage of his son to Imee, Marcos' eldest daughter, was talked about for a time, but this failed to materialize when the young Floirendo, against his father's wishes, in-

svstems

stead chose to marry international beauty queen, Margie Moran, granddaughter of the late President Manuel Roxas.

Oil exploration Agricultural machineries Financing

THE MARCOS FAMILY

Insurance

Dr. Pacifico Marcos, the younger brother of Ferdinand, is Chairman of the Medicare Commission.

Manufacturing and drilling for oil exploration

He is manied to Uoyd Velez Marcos. Mariano Marcos II, their only son, is also deep into business, having with him a core of young managers to handle their businesses. Together, they have the honor of

Antonio O. Floirendo is a close personal friend of both

having the longest list in our researches ofnew corporations. Josefa Marcos is the mother of the President, and in spite of her. age, is quite active in business corporations. Close relatives do the spade work for her financial holding group, the Josefa Edralin Marcos Foun-

dation.

oi[. First r.ady,s en I l,"s,,r*^T..u"i :o_y':ITil-I! on her trips abroad and is ole th; i;;;;;;ffiffi;'n:I:

of Ferdinand who came to promito his involvement in the Golden Buddha case. He works closely with Simeon Marcos-Valdez, another uncle of the President, Judge Pio Marcos is an uncle

nence due

projec.ts. "f

A sf,re*a Uuinlror_, he has sided _T:,T..11o_Tn-*.*e the govemment in power since the Garcia Marcos greatly during the l9{i5 a.a rseg carniaigrrs and has been

#ffi#irffT

who has built a financial enterprise from construction contracts awarded

him by the government.

supporter and front man ever since. his big-break in the earty 1970,s when he was a, v..s vvrvuy rduuJ i"; ror hi' llls Danana business, the Ta He started orr.o as a Ford dealer,

|r^":"**"t :1*l:X-T^?:Xi:4, ":rv I; flYj:.,:fT::t^g;oSoration.

the

Marketing

ANTOMO O. FIOIRENDO

I 13

There are persons whose interests are far more extensive than those

central

29. Asia Pacific Real Estate Inc. ReJEstate 30. Pacific Apparet Manufactur- C"r-"rt, ing Company Incorporated _ Eastem 31. Chemical Industries Chemicals

32.

Oligarchs

Fortuna lr{arcos Barba, the sister of Ferdinand, engages in importation. She iq currently a director of Philippine International Shipping Corporation, a newly organized cornpany with a container service to Europe, and which has on its Board fomrer Minister of Trade Troadio Quiazon and Maritirne Industry President Generoso Tanseco. She is married to a colonel in the military. Elizabeth MarcosKeon-Rocka is the govemor of Ilocos Norte. Her Vice Govemor is Ferdinand Marcos Jr., tlte President's only son, who campaigrred for public office while studying abroad.

ff -'.l; il;.: ,i:? "'l# ;ffi lffi il: ;T:l,TJg. :;*::^:ly::''G;;:r;th. n,"i" ffiil J* ;-ffi' *:,Yi,:l::T :*::J: :.it":?'tiirniUio'n;;r"'r;;;";ffi Philippines,andhasreached*rf oiil

Other Floirendo companies are: 1. First National City Bank Finance

2-. Nzal Commercial Banking Corforation

?. {OF Shipping Company 4. Pi_oneer Trading & Sirpply Company 5. OLAHASARdil

MARCOS GROI.JP Company

l. i.

Workmen's Insurance Inc.

Incumbent

Pacifico

Position Activity

Board

Marcos Chairman

Non-life lnsurance

II4

THE COUNTERFETT REVOLUTION

Liberty Mines

Inc.

The New

- - do -

Polar Mines

-do*

-do-

Pacil Management Inc.

-do-

Principal owner

ores

eum ducts Gold & copper

15.

Homeowners Savings & Loan Association Inc.

-do-

Banking

16.

Asbestos Multimining

-do-

Asbestos

Industrial Corp.

17,

Manage.

ment

Noroil Mill Company

=do*

-do-

Marcos

18. ASEAN Integrated Marine Carriers, Inc. r 19. Intercontinental Wood Pro-

Montevideo Realty Cor-Tech Phils. Inc.

-do-do-

Real

Principqt Amuse'

owner

Inc.

rice hull Bayanihan Mineral Development Co., Inc.

-do-do-

Masagana Sugar

22. 23.

Everlasting Memorial Park Inc. Neso Development Corp.

24.

Marcommen Shipping

Real

Copper;

Development Corp. Luz Travel & Tours, Inc.

12. L.V.M. Timber Corp. 13. Philippine Iron & Steel Cop.

Pio

-do-

Travel

.)q

26.

services.

-do-

Company -

Marcos

coral

Omico Mining &

Industry

Forward Manufacturing Corporation

Fortuna Marcos Barba

Timber Iron

Corp.

27.

Ocean-World Shipping

28.

Hasmin Tours & Travel

Principal owner

Sulphur, clay,

Inter-island

29. Fortune Realty Dev. Corporation - do - - do 30. Koyophil (Phils.) Ingorporated Aderino Principal

bon, bir minous

Marcos

subs

owner

phosphates,

Ocean-going ship-

Travel service Real estate

General merchandise ex-

hydrocati bon zubsi

tances,

Jndustrial products trading

pinc

kerite,

Timber

going shipping copper & gold

,Farming

-do-

gessing

Principal Sugarmilling owner do - - Memorial park do - - Copper &

Judge

steel

Kaunlaran Petromineral Inc.

shipping Wood pro-

& ocean-

-do-

-do-do-

Inter-island

gold,

-do-

-do* -do-

ment ser'

ganse,

chromite] UnladAgro-Industrial

Principal owner - do -

Iron, ni, kel, mani.,

10.

Mills

21.

made Sanwa Phil. Realty

20, Malayan,Integrated Industries -

Panel boards,

8. 9.

E. Marcos

Josefa

cessing Dev. Corp.

wall

14.

Corp.

vlce

productt

6. 7.

Southem Games & Amusement Mariano Development

I 15

trates coal,

Oligarchs

port &

import

.11

31.

Quezon City Development

Bank Uoyd V. Director Marcos

Banking

I L

ll6

The New

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

32.

Market Corporation of the

33.

Philippines Republic Bank

- do.-

Director

Marcos

34.

35. Multi.Mining & Industrial 36. Vicor Music Corp. 37. 38.

Chairman

Pub

& Pres.

ofl

Marcos

Joseph R. Principal Marcos owner

ing pro-

owner

Pacifico Chairman

wh cessed

food, verages

39.

produc MagkaibiganTrading Corporation

40.

Gencars, Inc.

41.

Karma Janitorial Services

42.

Fredway Industries

43.

Incorporated Steniel Manufacturing Corp.

44. Zamboanga Wood 45. Hi.Cement Corp. 46. Super Industrial Corp.

Pacifico Principal

Marcos

owner

-do-

Mariano Marcos II

-doSimeon Valdez

-do-do-do-

Dealer mme indust Car

ship

servrces

-dodo

-do-do*do-

Manu

turing Paper p

ducts

Furni Cement

Iron & steel

47.

Olympialntemational Incorporated

ducts Exec. Vice Office Pres./ equip

Director

'48.

Tradewinds Hotel

Pacifico Principal

Marcos

owner

Benjamin 'Kokoy" Romualdez is a brother,of Mrs. Marcos and may be described as the "favorite brother-in-law," judging from the different positions he has held. He was formerly ambassador to Peking and at present he is the govemor of I*yte. He was reportedly proposed as ambassador to Wastrington, and Mrs. Marcos was quoted by the Neo York Times as saying that the choice would be "good for the United States.

Director Mariano Principal Marcos

Fortune Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. Coral Phils., Inc.

cial ing

- do

Inter-CommunicationPublishers, Inc.

THE ROMUALDEZ FAMILY

President & Chairman

Pacifico

Oligarchs ll7

Hotel

Kokoy is presently the owner of the Times Journal, and, under n:rmes of other people, owns or controls other institutions. He controls the Phitppine Trust Company, which was formerly owned by the Archdiocese of Manila. When in 1975 the Lopezes "sold" t}re $400-million Manila Electric Company, which has monopoly over electric'power in Metro Manila, in exchange for the release of Eugenio Lopez Jr., the Lopez family received $1500 for its $2O-million shares in the company with the promise of further payments at a later date - but no further' payment has yet been made, according to Lopez family sources. At the initial stage of the take-over, the official head of Meralco was Emilio G. Abello (Chairman and President). Abello also headed'the former Meralco Securities Corp., which was in 1978 renamed First Philippine Holdings Corp., and has become a fast growing conglomerate. FPHC has controlling interests in (l) Philippine Engineering & Construction Corp., (2) Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (3) Philippine Petroleum Corp., (4) Marikina Electric Light, Inc., and (5) Phlippine Ambrican Investrnents Corp. (PATC), headed by Jose Ma. G. Abello. For many of his business deals, Kokoy is said to often,rely on the expertise of Cesar Zalarnea, Antonio Ozaeta, Sixto Orosa Sr. and his son,. Ramon. Cesar

Z. Zalunea,Chairman of PIiil-Am Life Insurance Company, was already financially established before martial law. He is now the Chairman of Fint Holdings and is likewise a consultant of the new Ministry of Transportation, whose Minister, Jose Dals, is known as a Zalarnea protege. Antonio Ozaeta is President of Philippine Commercial & Industrial

Bank and one of the principal officers of Meralco. Sixto Orosa, Sr. (father) and Ramon (son) are the financial consultants who handle some of the dealings of Kokoy. Alfredo "Bejo" Romualdez, the brother who was a former navy reserve commander, is one of the men behind the enormously profitable Manila Bay Enterprises, the gambling monopoly which operates floating

casinos

in Manila,

Cebu, and just recently, Baguio and Davao. Each

casino is reputed to gross around Pl-million a day.

ll8

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTTON

The New

When martial law was proclaimed, all casinos were closed and nounced illegal. However, Mr. and Mrs. Marcos personally the first Floating Casino that was set up. "Bejo" also took over the chise of Jai Alai, formerly operated by one of the Madrigals, and now rated by Bejo's Jai Alai and Amusement Corp. After martial law, the pre-war franchise of the Madrigals renewed. Also, before martial law, betting had to be done at the itself on Taft Avenue, whereas now there is a proliferation of o betting stations all over Manila. The Martels are connected to Marcos through Alita, Mrs. Mr youngest sister who is married to Rodolfo ,'Rudy,t Martel. The Sroup owns 6Wo of the Century Park Sheraton, a plush five.star They also own Harrison Plaza, a. vast multi-million peso shopping which was previously a large urban poor area, cleared of the residents, intended for expansion of the zoo. Two steel companies, the Marsteel Alloy Corp. and Marsteel Consolidated, Inc., which has gone into oil drilling, are also controlled by the Martel family: J Martel is the president of both companies while Antonio V. director of the AMAC

ROMUALDEZ Company

Incumbent Position

I"amarco Agri-Business Corp.

Eduardo Principal Romual- owner

Armco-Marsteel Alloy Corp.

Jose

dez

President

Poultry

Steel

Martel

Antonio Director V. Martel 3.

Manteel Consolidated Inc.

Jose

President

Steel

Principal

Jai Alai

Martel 4.

Philippine Jai Alai &

Alfredo

Amusement Corp.

Romual- owner

Century Park Sheraton

11.

Harrison Plaza

berting

Alfredo -

Times Joumal

Kokoy -do -

Phil. Engineering Co.

8. 9,

PCI Bank Meralco

Romualdez

-do-do-do-

-do-

Ricardo C. Silverio is one of the closest friends of Marcos. Hb was a srnall textile merchant until 1961 when he founded the Delta Motor

Corporation. When this co*n*t was later given the exclusive rights to assemble and distribute Toyota automotive products, he made a fortune. The Silverio family has taken over an island (near Benigrro Toda'q H,er' mana Mayor) which formerly belonged to the Lopezes. Including joint ventures with the Japanese, the Silverio family has some 30 firms in which it has substantial or majority stockholdings. Among these, 6 are in the top 1,000: Delta Motor Corporation; Delta Motor Sales Corp.; Mariwasa Manufacturing Inc' (ceramics); Kornalzu Industries @hils.) Inc.; and Delta Intemational Corp. (trading). Silverio has also diversified into other activities such as banking (Filipinas Manu' facturen Bank), where he is chairman and president, insurance (Philippine Underwriters Finance Corp.), air transportation (Air Manila International Inc., where he is chairman and president), and logging (C & M Timber Corp., where he is chairman and president). The family's holding company is R;C. Silverio Management Co1p. which officially manages the following Silverio firms: (l) Delta Motor Corp; (2) Komatsu Industries (3) Delta Heavy Machineries; (4) Delta Air Corp.; (5) Air Manila; (6) Delta International; (7\ C & M Timber; (8) Denso phils.; (9) Delta Mining and Intemational Developnient Cogp.; (10) Golden River Mining Corp.;(l l) Tower Avionics. In addition, Silverio is the principal owner of SST Machinedes and Supplies Corp,, Silver Lines Inc. (shipping); and is director of Ste{ing Life Aszurance Corp., Land Project Manager Affiliates, and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Co.

SILVERIO

Banking Power

Position

Sil' Chairman & Pres. Sr' '- do ' Delta International Corp. Delta Motor Corporation ITtd 9,-lu*"n & President

1.. Air Manila International

facturing

GROI,JP

Incumbent

Company

Media Manufac-:

Shopping

complex

RICARDO C. SILVERIO

Casino gam

Romualdez

I 19

suPermart

dez

Manila Bay Enterprises

Martel owner -do* -do-

GROT.JP

10.

Oligarchs

Inc.

Ricardo verio do do

I2O

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

4. s. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Komatsu Industriei @hils.) Inc. DENSO @hits.) Inc. Golden River Mining Corp.

dododo-

C&MTimberCorp.

do._

11 l

Board

-do*do-

LAND REFORM BLUES

Chairman & managing

tor

Mariwasa Manufacturing

Tower Avionics Sales I"and Project Manager Affiliates Inc. Manufacturers Bank & Trust Company

12. Daikh (Phit.) Inc. 13. SST Machineries & Supplies Corp. Silverio Management Inc. Delta Mining & Industrial

14, 15. 16. Refrigeration Industries 17, Sterling Ufe Assurance 18. Filrnan Bank 19. Silver Lines, Inc. 20. Delta Motor Sales Corp.

-do-do-do-

Marcos. He was

the survival

Director

-do-do-do-

Director Chairman

Principal Chairman/ President

-do-

Director

inuorJ;'n;il;;i#;ud; ,rk o*

::T:TI,:}:: *.lry,**

*:Xf*^l:rh",

;";;;; #;*#; ,?,::.Ig T' gr relatile, {yture.;n91is irt rrarr.or;;;ffiil;H'ffiffi:l' the ord

Philippine government with great authority. The field of economic dwelopment had been and still remains his primary lnterest, so that when Marcos sounded him out on tre wisdom of placing the country under martid law, Melchor readily agreed to go along with the decision but only on condition that Marcos use his emergency powers to carry out a genuine reform rurd development program. To which Marcos reportedly replied: ..when this is ull over, Alex, I want to live here like everyone else.,' This was att that the man responsible for many of the U.S. and foreigr-funded infrastructure projects then sprorrt. ing in the countryside needed to hear. In washington, his main brief was to drive home the point that proclamation l08l was really a blow struck for democracy, and a mere seizure of power, as Marcos' numerous critics would have it. Within a few days after martial law went into effect, Melchor called a press conference where he tried to justiff the action. Marcos, he told American newsmen and opinion writers, had taken a drastic step under the constitution because unless agrarian reforms were instituted, sociat unrest would escalate into a bloody revolution. This theme was expected to elicit a warm response not only because it would appeal to the American egalitarian spirit, but also because of a growihg concern in the u.s. with the threat of communisrn in Asia. In the philippinis, the focus of this problem was Central Luzon where the ownerstrip of wide areas of fertile rice and sugar lands was concentrated in the hands of a few families. It was not for Melchor, however, to disclose that apart from the long.felt need to put an end to the recognized social and economic inequities of the landlord-tenant system, Marcos had a political reason for wanting to use the coercive force of martial law to clip tre powers of the rich landowners, the sugar barons and the millionaire land speculators. These 'tillains" of land reform aehghted in fancying themselves as the kingmaken of the country as indeed they werJ. No politician if national stature, no President whether incumbent or aspiring, dared to antagonize this en. trenched and privileged group unless he desired to commit political zuicide. In tho the

industry, b}! the listing alone of .o*p*i., in wruch members of Marcos and Romuatdez families r.. could also be said that the rise of futherto persons to businr prominence is the most dramatic proof of economic progress under New society, one cannot disregad a *iaetv accepted truism that in context- of Philippine politico-economic rrulitirr, proximity to power is almost absotute in a controued economy can be a distinct advantage. *.:nq, as president Garcia once said, o*T ii'essentiauy

"t did not demolisrr

- democracy.

ln the celebrated purge of 1975, he functioned as a ..Little president" whose main responsibility was to manage a sprawling bureaucracy. He coulJ therefore qpeak for

i, .o;;;;

merefy to establish a new breed of oligarchs.,,

not suppres

known to be "America's boy" in the Marcos government. Until Marcos cut him down

To be sure, there are many others, inside the government and who. have succeeded in scaling unprecedented heighls

T,ln :_t*",0 said,_on declaring martial raw, that

No one in the cabinet was better qualified for this difhcult job. A product of the u.s. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Melchor counted many friends in the u.s. lrmbassy in Manila and the U.S. Agency for Intemational Development, and was

-do-do-

- do- do-

to explain to the American people how necesary *"rtid law was tL assure them that the .leaceful revolution"

of the Phitippines, and to

had been staged in order to preserve

-do-

-do-do-do-do*do-do- do-

Corp. ?1. Delta Heavy Machineries 22, Celebrity Sports plaza

Chairman President

after martial law was declared, then-Executive Secretary

Alejandro .Q IOR]LY \J Melchor was in the United states to carry out a mission assigrred to him by

.-iw,

122 THE COUNTERFETT passage

REVOLUTION

Land Reform

or enforcefiient of laws affecting their interests, the power of

the

lor{s was strongly felt by Co4grrss and the Executive branih,of govbinment,

ii :

many of them were tools of or landlords themselves. This was the situation whert Marcos declared martial law, and in the rert tionary fervor that seemed.t6 grip tha country ot the time,,nearly everyone that it was the only way to get the agrarian program going. Says Dean Jeremias temayor, President of the Federation of Free Farmers: '"lVithout martial lai woulil have been impossible to achieve the gains that we have realized during past eight years." Without question, the authoritarian approach has been highly silencing the objections of once-vociferous and defiant landowners and their obedience. But it has yet to overcome the resistance coming from the ter themselves, as legatees and victims of the centuries-old body of practices and. tignships govemiqg ttre ownership, use and disposition of land. The. long-accepted historical account is that before the Spanistr conqu carne to colonize the Philippines in the l6th century, early Filipinos lived under a primitive feudal system, with the tribal landlords employing slaves cultivate the land. These slaves were of two classes - the aliping namamabay, i y:rr.lurt of.tfre hgusehold and could not be sold, and the aliping saguiguilid,:uql tilled the land in a state of lowly serfdom. During the Spanistr colonial era, huge tracts of land the boundaries of extended "farther than the eyes could see" were granted to encourage spar settlen to populate and deveiop the countryside, or f reward spatJ soldiers loyal service to the crown. In the beginning, lhese encomienderos, or grantees vast estates, were simply installed as protectors * not as landlords of the farmers who happened to till the land. They were charged with the duty of their "subject farmers" from attack by orrtsiders, and to maintain peace and within,their territory. As pr-otectors, they had the right to collect a 'lrotection but this privilege was later abused. The protectors became landlords, and the tion fee" was exacted a.s tribute, tax or rent, which could be paid in cash or in This gave rise to a share-cropping system that held the lative farmer in abject age to his encomiendero, who then became known as baciendero. Subsequently, the great religious orders of the Spanish era notably the rninicans, the Augustinians and the Recollects carved their own land the perimeters of which encompassed whole towns and villages. Between ecclesiastical duties and sewing as representatives of the civil government in their pective regiorrs, the friars had neither time nor energy to develop their vast A class of entrepreneurs - the inquilinos - came in to lease these "friar" lands paltry sums. They cleared the forests and tilled the land with the help of .wtto were recompensed by a share in the harvest. The onerous sharecropping tem that they imposed was a form of agrarian slavery that refused to die through the American period. Prof. Renato Constantino, in Tbe Pbilippines: The past Reuisited, offers entfuely different view of the history of landlord-tenant relationstrip in the

Blues

123

pincs. He writes that when the Spaniards arrived, Filipino communities were in of development and that except in Mindanao where the Muslim practiced a kind of "Asiatic feudalism," landlords were unknown in the barangays or villages that existed then. Since the tribal Filipinos were mostly engaged in subristcnce agriculture - with others still dependent on hunting and fishing for food llntl and the means to exploit it were owned in common Under this system, there could be no landlords, Constantino contends. Poople cxchanged their labors and the fruits of such labors, only to the extent necessary lo supply the needs of the village or settlement, which .was basically an extended lirmily. Slaves were not really slaves but persons under some obligation to repay. past rlcbts. In the Muslim areas, where communal ownership of land was also the praclice, a feudalistic system had evolved around the relationship between the commoq owners of the land and those who leased it from them, but it was not a transaction bctween landlord and tenant. v:rrious stages

During the Spanistr regime, the frian, and not lhe encomienderos, were the of the tenancy system. Constantino elaborates on this by explaining llrat contrary to what other historians say, the encomienda was not a land grant but n territory entrusted lothe encomiendero;it was both a reward for services rendered to the King,as well as an administrative unit under his supewision for the purpose of exacting tributes from the natives in a more systematic and efficient *unnJr. As most of these encomienderos refused to live in the territories awardod to llrem, few became hacienderos or land owners. The religious, on the other hand, "lived with their flock and thus had better opportunities to acquire landholdings, wlrether within the area of encomiendas or outside them, from the royal domain as well as from the natives," and they enlarged their estates in a most reprehensible way. Outright landgrabbing, encouraging donations and inheritances especially from tlre dying, buyrng lands with money earned from church fees and the produce of lands cultivated through forced labor, and foreclosure of mortgages - these were some'of the methods'which, Prof. Constantino says, the friars used to amass land rcal originators

cmpires.

He then described the process whereby they became landowners through mortgage foreclosures. The f-riars, recognizing the need for agricultural development, provided the capital which the natives needed for farming. In retum, they received half

of the harvest, thus sharing the risks of a bad year with the

peasants. Later,

tlrey demanded that this capital be regarded as loans, to be repaid at a fixed rate of interest regardless of how the hawest tumed out. Since this new arrangement placed the risk only on the tillers, they eventually ran deeper into debt, and as it accumulated they were forced to mortgage their lands to the friars. In the foreclosures that tlogged the borrowers' inability to pay, the friarS became tJre landowners. The farnrers who had previously owned the fields were driven out, or retained as tenants oither of the, religious order or the inquilinos who leased certain areas from the ,qlp-

Thus, feudalisrn flourished along with Catholicism. When the Phitippines was ceded in 1898 to the United States as a trophy of the

124

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Iand Reform

spanish-American war, the new colonizers introduced several laws to alleviate glarinelv wretched condition of the peasantry and to install the Filipino I "the backbone of the nation." Among trem was an expanded hna.tiuing and a nurnber of acts regulating the relationship between land-owner and

However, because of igrorance and intrinsic defects in the old spanistr rens titling system, more tran half a million Filipinos were denied the opportr: to secure ownership of the lands -they had possessed since time immemorial. over, the Treaty of Paris obliged the Americans to protect the property in of the religious orders, and these friar lands constituted, during the first few of the American regime, a major obstacle to a rapid and equitable agrarian problems. There followed the slow and costly process of breaking up large religious estates, but after two decades of American colonial rule, just a lir over half of these properties were bought up for distribution.

In the meanwhile, Filipinos tumed to land as a more secure form of in and proof of economic independence. A new type of middle-class landlords ed to compete with the rich and the astute wiro had the rnonry, the-knownow acquire vast areas the power to gab them. (roliticians we 1f; _or this lonneclions.to favored position, and several Marcos *rr.'.i.rr.a one or another of landgrabblnc.) Manv of those"*ong who-took advantage of the "thomer law were not the tillers thennselvejbut "absentee hnds in public domain by employing tenants just as the friars, haciendeios 6nd inquili had done in the past. Tenancy thus became more widespiead than ever.In separate studies made by Ricardo D. Ferer, vicente f,, Valdepefras Jr. M. Bautista, the percentage of tenant farms rose from r9.2goin rqdi l960.The statistics in five central Luzon provinces where tenancy h _39,64voin become a way of life through the Spanistr era were much higher: 64.gvo in 19 from l8.4voin 1903. h less than ten ylars of American rule, the-landed were able, entrench themselves in the govemmeni and were thereby assured or u ,tiong protect their interests.

th; r*-.tr; *ho-i.q;;

_ 9:tS*o

rolii

"social Justice" will perhaps remain one of commonwealth president L. Quezon's best remembered slogans. From 1935 to the outbreak of world war the govemment launched agrarian programs designed to strengthen already,exisr tenancy laws, mostly aimed at increasing the tenant's share of the harvest and tenure. landlords and tenants were encouraged to enter into tenancy contr which were decided improvements over the old system. euezon's ,.social Just policies also made it compulsory for landlords and tenants to submit to arbitration in case oftenancy disputes.

The Commonwealth period witnessed the first expropriation of bi

estates and enormous landholdings. Then, too, a.resettlement program was for former dissidents and landles farmers, whom the governmint stripped with families and personal belongings to trree i.rg. ,rrm in Mindanao there to be, part of what would be known as the '.Muslim" or ..Moro problem.,, At the break of world war II, a total of 165,000 hectares of virgin land in three ment areas, mostly in southern Mindanao, were being tilled by these settlers and ,

Blues

125

children born in their new home. The Colorum uprising in Pangasinan and the Sakdalista insurrection in Laguna lrad already awakened t}te govemment to the realization that unless it grappled with the agrarian question at the source, similar pocket rebellions would continue to flare up in the future. But because of the political power held by the landlords, big and small, the Conrmonwealth programs skirted the real issue of wiping out tenancy and helping the farmers become truly independent landowners themselves. Although their role in the long and sustained struggle for political freedom has not been adequately acknowledged, the disgruntled peasants of Luzon who ftgured in sporadic uprisings over land-related problems, actually formed the backbone of the revolution against the Spaniards, and tlen the Americans. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines n 194245, members of the communistled Hukbo ng Malayang Bayan (IIMB), or Free People's Army, converted themsehes into the Hukbong Bayan Laban ng Hapon, or the People's Army Agairut the Japanese.

The "Hukbalahaps," or simply Huks, as they were then known after the war, championed the cause of the "downtrodden tenants." They promised "land to the landless," and demonstrated their unswerving commitment to the goal of "peasant liberation" by conducting kangaroo trials and executions of hated overseers or encargados of absentee landlords who were safely living it up in the plustr and exclusive Manila 'tillages." It was more than land or agrarian reform, however, that the Huks sought in their armed struggle, and this was vividly brought to the fore when, in the Bulacan town that had given the nation such heroes as Gen. Gregorio del Pilar (who died in battle against the Americans), the parish priest was gunned down in the pul. pit of his own church, in full view of his flock, for daring to preach against "Godles comrnunism." In 1963, seventeen years after America handed a war-ravaged and prostrate Philippines its independence on a surplus scrap-iron platter, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was presented to the nation at elaborate ceremonies at the Agrifina Circle on Luneta Park. Its mere passage by both houses of Congress was enougfr cause for celebration, for with the landed interests determined to block or, failing in this, water it down, the Code had been enacted, in the words of one Manila newspaper, "only after tumultous legislative battles." Political drum-beaters of President Diosdado Macapagal (who prided himself in being a l'poor boy from Lubao" - a hotbed of social unrest) hailed the law as "one that would emancipate Filipino farmers from the bondage of tenancy." It raised hopes, he said, of the long-improverished Filipino tenants, whose lives had been shackled to a colonial and tenurial system and wherein landownership was the privilege of the wealthy few. Indeed, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was a giant step in the efforts to achieve a new deal for thousands of penurious tenants. Up until then, the laws intended to uplift them had been aimed principally at changing the share+ropping system which tended to place them at a disadvantage against the landlord class. In 1933, there had been a Rice Share Tenancy Law, which provided for a 50-50

126

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION , straring, but its implementation was dependent upon the landlord.dominated n cipal councils. Republic Act I I19, enacted in 1950, sought to improve this by the tenants 707o ,of the harvest, but a survey:taken five,yearss later showed that

Under the new Agricultural funA n"form Code, the tenants would be croppers no morc with the declaration that agricultural share tenancy was trary to public policy and strall be abolished." The program would establish farmers as owner-cultivators, not mere leaseholders. For all the fanfare however, the Code hardly caused a ripple in the stream of Filipino agrytlan Insufficient funds, and the predictable opposition of the landed gentry, relegate law to some sort of "legislative dead letter office'? where it gathered dust uj -

Marcos came.along. Withjn a year of his election as President in 1965, Marcos was pleased to to the nation that, in keeping with a campaigr promise, he had declared all municipalities of the second district of Pampanga as a land reform area. His celppr, President Macapagal, had pr.eviously placed an equal number of ities un{er land reform. For both Presidents, this was no mean feat, considering. rgrny of,those affected were holding influential positions in the legislative, e and judicial branches of govemment. Towards the close of Marcos? first term, the governrnent claimed that land fofrn h4d covered 126 towns and cities, and changid the lives of 92,914farm lies. During his campaign for reelection in 1969, Marcos pledged that he would pli the entire Philippines under land reform "in order to liberate, the farmers and families from virtual serfdom and to increase opportunities for a better life in r rural areas." This, of course, was disrnissed as just another election promise. Then came martial law. Five days later, Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire land reform area. on 2l october 1972, Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree 2T which he called ttre "Tenants' Emancipation Act." It was supposed to mark emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil" and transfer to them ownership of the land they tilled. It also provided for the instruments and the chanisrns by which the agrarian reform progrirm would now be vigorously mented.

To dtamatize this historic moment - which Marcos admirers likened to abt of Lincoln freeing the Negro slaves - he wrote the entire decree by hand signed it in the presence of farmers whom Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado Est had bussed in to Malacafrang Palace from nearby provinces for the occasion. ;F,y. this sirnple act, some 400,000 tenant-farmers were deemed to have maticilly become owners of titled lots totalling 750,000 hectares planted to and corn. What remained was simply the administrative business of parcelling, menting and the formal awarding of titles. ' Land was to be bought from its owrers at a price held equitable to all cemed, then parcelled out to individual tenants. The amount given to the owner for the"sale" of his estate was determined by the produce which the land '1)

Land Reform ytcltlcd annually

6lues

127

. equivalent to two an! a--half times the average harvest of : ". ,prior to October 21,1972."

tluec normal crop years That was the price that the divested owner had to accept !o1his-land, and that wls the price which the new farmer-owner had to pay in equal installments Orrer a

annually'' 67o lrlLsrerr interest orururuJ ycaf$r at u7o fifteen years' of IlIIeeIl pEriodI OI

The Land Bank of the Philippines was to provide the funding sxpport for. this classified as "landed nlirssive land transfer from landlord to tenant of areas whether nlllte" or not. The tenant could look forward to owning a family-size lot of tfuee hectares of land' lrrigated land, or five hectares of non-irrigated land. In every case, the original actually would provided he ,,*iier would retain a maximum area of seven hectares -

rrrltivate it.

io*.rur, in order to qualify for the program

and before

the tenant was required tO become a member

t{e:title

coufd

.be '

of a farm coopelative

lrsued to him, pay the amo.rtizftigns on ttle rtr samahang Nayon. The cooperative was obliged-to payments to tlle B4nk,'tu! lfe lurrd whenever the farmer defaulted on his annual landholder. delinquent the against tlccree also gave the coop the right of recourse broken frnalllt havin! with is credited With Piesidential Decree No. 22, Marcos oftenusur' and inequitable of the forever lhe tenant's feudal shackles and freed him

krus share+ropping arrangernents that had forced him to live a virtual stbhu2an cxistence as a lowly serf. The vision is electtifying, but Marcos critics insist that alter eight years land reform has been anytldng but a zuccess. Just like the pre:Partial lutu piogr*ms of the government, Operation Land Transfer has been,proeeeding at a Jezus Montemayor

of the U.P. Agrarian Reforrq Institute

has critioized tlrc-

Ministry of Agrarian Reform for allegedly "boasting about the big numfgr of iszued and signed certilicates of land transfer." The Ministry announced that ; more than 400,00C certificates had already been issued to tenant'farmen as of,the last

But, says Montemayor, Land Bank records show that actually only 80,000 had been processed, and a far smaller number than this iszued to the certificates such glowing claims of success in land reform' tt , t tinirtry', -crud$ndt admit that the program has not really officials reform Agrarian been, doing as we[ as it should. filey Ula*e the slowdown on thJt.r*t's o.ly.a lellrc' tance to bicome independent, his fear of being prematurely evicted ftorn tlle fan4, But the landlord's resistance to the land transfer scheme and bureaucratic red tipe, over and above all these is the persistent lack of money'

"fr#:;;t

ilG;

What the advocates of land reform cannot readily u,nAeryan{.t1 Y.ly

'h: govemment is able to raise enonnous arnounts for cosmetic and political-impact white P3Gmillion irojects such as a cultural center, a basilica or a Cannes-like fru.tt to provide a setting for an international filrn festival, tu1 cann-ot do the same for a program that Marcos says is the cornerstone or pillar o'f his New society. A U$AID adviser to ihe Ministry of Agrarian Reform believes that the problem is not one of money but of attitude: the Marcos government does not r$gard :

128

Land Reform Blues 129 carry out the job as fast as desired/ when the job was contracted to pri'

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

land reform as a matter of high priority. proof of this, he says, is that a wrote to some Phlippine officials lay on their desks for several months elicited an indifferent rdply. Another American expert who has been to the philippines twice durinl martial law period to help evaluate the program has reached the conclusion that geform has been adopted more as a counter-insurgency measure than as a long range program designed to redistribute wealth and raise the economic

HiJal?'i'ltHs

ffIffi,

hndlords wiur* holdings or less thari

15 hectares have opposed the program'

I:ndlords'oppositiontoagrarianreformisanoldstory.As.amatter of fact, all landownen opposed the program, whether they are big or snall. But this did not stop the govemment from pushing the pro-

the rural folks. The man who has to bear the brunt of these charges is Agrarian Reform ter Estrella, himself the owner of a vast tract of riceland in the province of

gram.

fire real intent of PD27 is to diffuse economic and political pow.er from the few to the many and this is to be carried out by land transfbr. Fourth, it is lamenied that tenants have demonstrated a reluctance

nan. He says:

to ParticiPate in the ProPam Criticisms are to be expected considering that any progrilm, cially of such magnitude and socio-economic implications as reform, is bound to have flaws. But to say that it is ..too slow,' failure" borders on subjectivity and a sorry lack ofappreciation for First, it is said that the program has not fulfilled its initial goals in fact is a failhg program for the following reasons: as the prog presently structured, there is little likelihood that the program will its goals of effecting a more equitable distribution of lands and ing an increase in agricultural production. The observation is not only false but unfair. The truth of the ter is that the accomplishment of the land transfer program for . . . and a half years (1972-1977) is more than six times the coverage of previous 30 years (1935-1965). Furthermore . . . a recent study of the Bureau of Agricultural .nomics has shown that the land transfer program has generated an crease in agricultural productivity. Again, it is not true that the presext agrarian reform only limited to rice and com lands. Several decrees and letters of tion have been issued by the President to secure the farmers'land in areas devoted to crops other than rice and com. The more sil achievement of agrarian reform, however, is the breaking up of in the agrarian sector. . . ' Second, it is claimed that program implementation has been tremely slow, The reason for the apparent "slowness" is the program,s to legal processes. Everytime a landowner registers an objection, valid or not, he is given his day in court. To do otherwise would be tamount to violation of human rights. The s:Ime process is made to tenants and, as a consequence, has had some dilatory effects. ' Another restraining factor is the shortage of technical personnel the Bureau ofLands. They do not have enough surveyors to do the tic task of parcellary mapping, and, in addition, lack the equipment

There is general agreement with regard to the existence of this reluctance on that it stems the part of the ienants, but it goes beyond Minister Estrella's contention from "fear oflandlord vengeance." While this may be true in a number Of cases, the "godfather syndromet'or on the compadrazco system probably operates to a greater degree as a constraint godfather has presence of a ubiquitous the centuries, trn*t', part. tnroug5 the baby, Ihe areas. rural the in especially life, of way Filipino always been part of the *hic-h he carried at baptismal rites, practically becomes his adoptive child, and on and the mass of lifetime obligations and responsibilthis ceremonial relationship srarzs the ities that it creates 4ao is graciously maintained' with all types of godfathers, but the greatest, most abounds Philippine society affectionate and patemal of all is the big land' exploitative, Uenevolenij tyrannical, have been emotionally, psychologlCally tenants the ,uhon on baciendero, lord or places around tlle country, it is not unusual In many dependent. and economically at the wedding of a tenant's be slaughtered to for the landlord to supply the cows of a few pesos to meet a advance for an him son, nor for the tenant to approach

daughter's school exPenses.

of money and gratitude the notion of rights, the ownenhip of land belonging 9 o1e tho and the equitable distribution of wealth, length of time has played tlre role of a dot' that tras trad it for so long, and who for as a heresy that must not stand in the farmer poor, simple ing godfather, strikes the

In the accumulation of debts

way of his long-standing personal relationship with the landord.

that the Marcos govemment lacks the political will to push "fr"rg. through the program to a successful conclusion, Minister Estrella replies that "this is a contradiction in terms. The President has made agrar-ian reform the comerstone

To the

has left no stone program." reform the agrarian vigorously pustring in untumed Government representatives take pains to explain that agrarian reform covers not only the problem of land ownership but productivity as well._ For this reason, they say, the program calls for enonnous funding to provide the "liberated 1qlTl" a pact"ge of credit, agricultural and marketing assistance that would enable him

of the New Society. Every Filipino believes in his sincerity and he

*itl

I3O

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

to attain

$9 latus of

an independent, self-reliant fatmer.owner.

tl*..1$.:tT

flrl-:^l

Iand Reform

point that the land o..grrri* reform prosram elyr. at the nationr-*;;;

;j.dr'ffi; i.

criticize* priority in thu Mrr"ot gor;**.nt. dHffi; ^r_l9l P.6t?,29t,ooo is allocated roi trre Ministry yT:f I-:F:Te "rirrr", heads, but only p325,123,000 for the Ministry,of asrJan :ry,Ln"_* for a prograrn that is zupposed to be .,th; ;;;;;;?;;;;i;; 1nftV..s-uo

lT:

:"11 "J.rely. Iand refolm ft*

Society."

lScisti:al

,., ...Ii1ry..r9:1 to the jy!p9rt, in fact, is cited by Rene F. ofreneo, r1.i rr{* rorr.ti* iirr'ri ":1.1:T.19*tred yh,,

qirq"l

L*d

Transfer has been

,*urprr"tinty

"r'";"'ffi;il; ;l;;.'iir";;;;;

tions of Pro{. Renato constantino that by timiting land reform to rice and com atove seven hectares, the government has excluded from the benefits of the

&o.,Y{,dg,ol farmers attached to 3.7 million hectares one-third of the 1g.*uqol fands * planted to other crops, not to mention tre landressJO IqI 5w orthe workini fopuJ*in;;; ,lfl9t.i_" :dd from lessees, o*nur*ulti"utors and n ortiring tenants

;;';;;*.r'.

to..tr*I*t: -*l j"!:

ttn ttansplanting, weeding, harvesting and threstring seasons, triese farmh .dufug rlave been.described as "the-poorest of the poor,'n without any legal claims on anc no permanent sources of income.

totat rurar y*k L1r:.Tt_:::: ]",q', l9r:g of some 7.7 miuion engaged forestry. a1d fi$ing, about 4OO,00O rice and l{i^"ltlrlb; -onty of, the agricultural "r* ;rf;?

!ttt:1t L,and rransfe.r,

workini popuration could be covered which the government seems to treat as an obrigatory business.

il 6;

j:,lT,T.. l: pls ,r,' r*o rr"r1rui asinglhethousand";i;rrri*dl;;;fffi ""ir*?lr'rr* rrv .i;;; yglD 3ll.^1,".:*:_1lj*At:disef civit servantr, ,.il.rr, and the setf-employed, who have sunk :T:ll.,tl^.

If::X,:Ts life

pai'ings

in farms rangng in size from ten to twenty hectares. It was that in tt. initirt stages of the operation the decree had in-descending order, first to t*Ot otairgs in excess iOO 1tade.to,1nplV, -rnodest

uau]v

,S *o-n for

"f ,;;;;? r,,"n;;;il;

seven hectares.

But,Marcos foes prefer to link his apparent disinterest in land reform to under martial law, many of nis ?ri.nAs and members ,f,. Orl.r",

l!1q:.311

of vast tracts of coco-nut, suglr, and banana _lqisitlon

fI:,

in pala

iJ ht":#;;il";;; orii,;il;;;f ffi.i; ;;;

and Mindoro.'rr,Ir."o, hr; in such projects ur."ur.

?i*",.Bykidngn, rn*rest

,Y^T3|I lands from'Operation

"f pr*tlrio*

Land Transfer. The sc.liele worked out byhis experts for these special areasis one

#: r*"ii*Ii"ii#"i;

for exampte, does not suite become trre inoepenail

::::,:::":::1llt-::"1"t", mer'owner that the reform program L supposed to make r,* corporation which the original landlord controls *0.*"g.r.

Blues l3l

Those who give Marcos the benefit of the doubt concede that export-oriented ,rliricultural undertakings can become competitive in the world market only through ,pr:rlity control, production efficiency and economies of scale -. none of which is It::rsible on so-called family-size farms. And the main thrust of his government right rr,rw is to maxirnize the production of export crops because of a desperate need fur loroign exchange to service the country's enormous maturing external,debts - most. nl which were incurred during the martial law period. Since this huge indebtedness has not benefitted the srnall farmer and yet is, l,t'ing discharged through a policy that has the effect of derailing a program ainred al irnproving the farmer's economic status and his place in Philippine $ociety'; one beliirrs to wonder if Marcos really meant to change the concept of land'orvnership oy ,r l'cw that, in his own words, "spawned valid and legitimate grievances that give rise Io violent conflict and social tension."

1Q Alternatives in lDevelopment I33

ALTERNATIVES IN DEVELOPMENT

As Executive Secretary, he wierded such tremendous political power was also known as the "uuie presidenti he I uatit 2t septembe r r,97s,whenthatMarcos abolished his office in a huff. Merchor was s9oul, rlr., *ir, ,r,rs took prace, ,ut he frobably knew.what was comii;. Ibefore, w;, he had written a"confidentiar rnemo to the President grorosins a toi-to-bottom_purge of the government, and at the 3rd annivenary cerebraton ,ir r.ira r"* at the Luneta park, it riras prain that. Marcos did not rerish having ro chotttre ileao, or ,uuirri*o-itrrer rrigrr governtnent officials in fulI view oi the puutic.

oR many years," Marcos.tord th. American Newspaper pubrishers

p-ur.*

ple choice 1;;:.f#_:jl"T l,llg:_*. a. between irre western

;

o.r.iopr.r,

Associr was perceived as a

lp#1fr"ilIir,ffi'ilr:.*:rJ ";;ffiyw;"iffi

*il,f*,'fl *t,1*:*1fl t wiae :i1Tff'f J io-ie, ;-J;;,

velopment about withou

spre ".*JJ,ilnotbring r:ffi H"ffi ::: coylu"i* j* ,nr*, a high degree of regimr :::jj1:.j *:*:: lana, supp ssion and pro ablv a ong eriod rr -r.riir. a"ffi iilffi:.::;T* torarris.a:$g'*;t a ", compromise betweenI Orctatt dicta ,"n n*l3il.}' and d6mocracy ":11,T a third way whictr he calted ..constitutional re

hg*t

authoritaria-rl

yT:ry::terated o* or the principal reasons he had ,"" for n"Ir1*-lT:"J^?i* declaring martial law in the philipp,r,* ,irr".i"rffi::fi:H:Tr:? ffi try' There has been a $eat controversy on this point, which ,i.. ,.ry "i the re35 orconstitutionar raw"r*., g::,:::y knows, P:1*:: il,l1:j :Td.:, stitution specifically provides that the p*sarr, _.;;ffi;:

shoot

ffir,LH_rrr;

r*iriii ffiffiilffi;fl#ffi_h

i"Tr as YTi*:T,"I Iem, he saw it,

was more economic

tull * ffiffii#"#;ffilti:fi nri,1'tr,. .onfusing

:f:jr,f"y phere that beclouded the fust davs of a 'llong siege,, seemed improbable. "r,r,"lL*

we,. The prr

**""ri'r'rrr"ffiTHfrr;

to surmount it. In as much :::rT1.;rl:1,r.needed coutd not possibrv take place ou.-ieht,

*l}'.:,:,n.f:*:....

causes as

economic

and heady

reformist

i'".il'ri,ffi;r*r*"JJlTI

plan of establishing what *outo ,,riuni;;;;td;ffiffi:*#Ii:1 ::',q,Y':"L:1,[1"?,::T::*:il]nrevi3us.r,"p,.ii,.a,il.,a-to*ppo,l cos'

dition that it pursue legitimate devrfop*rrigorlr.

while Defense Minister Enr,e handred security matters as Martiar Law assumed the task of developmeri, H:":::,_Y^r]chor of an American-trained management .*..utiu"'-';;;il;"ffi,

ii.-C"J#.rrr#; ffi

**:ijT,::.Ir.T:-1:,"q,':::ry:t,"1, r-al ffi;;#'Jrrii"n

projects funded bv roans from the worro

:ffi:i

rrvoio-edctri.,-ffi.uon

or aided by thr^yir.t:1,S"jes, West Germany and other foreign countries. Because of Merchor's background ani associations, many assumed that Ma

hlyf -13:H:::*.,'"h::"TT:lh*i7o,y,i,J;n;e-A#;anasent r* orr.rtintffiffi, made a side-trip to soviet Russia from nJir, the purpose and steer projects in ths rmippines. Merchor had come to

for oil exploration

Hf ": f i::l :L.::I ^"1 * y1rJlo*i,t,ti.,ion. * J *",'ilsponsure therecmitmentoiyounsu.s.-educaieir."n#ri"ti"j';I#,X1l,;',iii,Tlrl in the numerous deveropment corporations ta

.gr*ir. ;r;;;

his b,

so],*rnt ni, ;pr;;;r).

n:.i been instnrmentar ;i:1,":",::Tl;*:::::,:y:l:hi: institutions;;;-*i"""td

At the forefront of this unique, if unconstitutionar, thrust was Executive

A magazine article described Melchorls-subsrquent fall from grace as the offof a power struggre between hir, ;i the defense chief, but parace insiders at it as Marcos'way of punishing r4erchor for

the television yiewers. Melchor, however, was allowed to retain his posts;ril-D;;;i;p.ent Bank the Philippines and otrr.r Jforations which he had set up, and to represent the philipoines as an Executive Director in the Asian Deveropment Bank. Marcos courd not ouri ;h"r p*sidential Management staff _ the corps of technocrats responsible for tire implementation of goiernment proje_cts _ would have been totally demoralized uy r,i- iJrr"rar, causing.;";-l;

or imminent danger thereor.

itself but to remove its :1 -*rrection

replacements

engineering a purge that pained 'roked as president, more than iiaia trr.i".t.Jn rrtiorrlrirr. E;".;;;:Marcos quar'im' were moved to say then-that lcrs except in extreme cases, it was .hn-F,ipino,, to lire a man before a live crowd-of trrour*or, not to mention

*;;il9n, '^* .'"l]::5,11"T:t't Marcos, however, had 1,3i'.,i"'r added , ru*

irrri,

had been recommended Melchor, and to obseiers trre ctranging of the guards had the 'y a cleverly-planned 'cou3 witrril .;;;;t."babry aimed at preemptingearmarks 'f Enrile,s position as the second most powerfut'rn"n -e oi.tfrc regime.

various intemational financiar

ffiilffiil.T,T; ru;;; i

In partnerslrip with^the

of.deverop. in secu'ng ur securing me the tunds runds from

il'dffi ffi,ffiT-*:ffi Lh HI"HIH:# the technocrats

whom he.assembled formed Tfit"ry, part of the power erite.of Niw s"rir,v.--rnr"i"rity of them had been to the best schoots in Europe and the lfe united sr.rrr-.i,a't.i*lra ;i JJoro,,i"r,,,*ngement, poritical science, sociolory, finance. Like Melchor, they were facile rt making economic feasibility rfriirrandanJ conducting impressive:i".i"ri:*ri colored slides, carouser projecion, fr6-.ilt and computer print-outs. They were the new breed of govemment planneri ana imptemerrr* *r,J*"*rJtransform the countryside and speed up progress through new una more efficienr;;;;t;;

;,!,iffi

things.

Sometimes, however, tlreir obsesion with efficiency and results blinded them situations that demonstrated the abzurdity of planning from the iop. "r..iing ore lvt sintering plant was establisrred

to political and social realities, tt.rruv

;.-il,

in my home province or "n 1tiryri, o.irnirr, * entire community of fishermen was relocated from their coastar village to , #rrt"" site, and there trained to become larmers and to iaise sirkwormr. br.*^., trr. p-i."t failed. Aftei , ,t ort period, the fishermen went back.to the sea *r,.il tir.y and their ror.r"trrr* had alwayc helonged, Ieaving the 'tnodel barrio" oipiuauri.r,ed panel.Lock homes bohrnd ar a

134 .,

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Alternatives in Development .135

momrment to the showcase type deveiopment which would become the of the regime. The sintering plant itself had been intended to strow that under martial and'a ptrong, highly centralized government, the country wbuld be making g ctrirlaq in in industrialization. indrrctriolizotinn U/ido nrrhlinifrr urac given cirran to +n the +ha contract nna+ta + which f,r^ publicrty was strides Wide '.,1^:^L Ma signed in October 1973 with officials of the Kawasaki Steel CorBoration of Jap: a breakthrough in the govemment's effort to attract foreigrr investnents. The cstimated to cost 62 billion yen (or the equivalent of US $214 million) was planned for Tawi-tawi, southemmost island group. But because of the created, by the secessionist Moro National Liberhtion Front, the industrial owilea Qy the Philippine Veterans Investment'and Development Corporation in more peaceful part of northern Mindanao was offered as an alternative site.

under martial law conditions. Marcos himself inaugurated the plant upon its completion in April 1977. Tllre l'hilippine Sinter Corporation, a P5Gmillion subsidiary set up to operate and manage the sintering facilities, announced that modern and costly control devices had been installed to spare the people of Villanueva and adjacent towns from the 'Chiba ex-. perience." So far, there have been no telltale signs ofthe dreaded pollution. Filipino scientists claim, however, that it will take some years for the danger signals to be discemible. They wam that the "little dust" which PSC officials dismiss as harmless actually contains noxious elements tike NOx, SOx, arsenic, cadmium,

zinc and lead, aside from poisonou3 rns1nllig particles in the dust rising from the rawrnaterial stockpile. Since the disclocated residents of the old barrio have no skills and therefore irlmost no opportunity to work at the sintering plant, they must eke out a living in some desultory or irregular fashion, Neither fishermen nor farmers now, they have little to look forward to and may eventually end up as part of the statistics on the unemployed and the displaced - unless they are willing to raise silkworms, which the government, against all logic, wants them to do. The Japanese, at least, had been honest about the project. Early n 1974, when Tawi-tawi had been ruled out as a zuitable site, a lS-man team of Japanese engineers headed by an elderly gentleman who was introduced as Dr. (Engr.) Komatsu, arrived from Tokyo to investigate the possibility of establishing the plant in Cagayan de Oro. As Mayor I considered it my duty to tell them that it would be

1 Nothing was said about the fact that the sintering operation "dirty intermediate process" of removing the impurities of iaw ore, and rendering it into partially refined pellets for steel.making - would ,the surrounding environment, require a tremendous amount of electric energyr - being automated - provide only a few jobs for the local populace. It was form of development that could bring more harm than good, but Marcos n prove to the world that his govemment was willing to go to any length to regarded as a

datemulti.nationals wanting to do business in the Philippines. Although Kawasaki had been buying great quantities of iron ore from and Australia, these countries had refused the company's request to locate the ten4g plant in their territories because of the problem of massive pollution cially after noted environmentalists pointed to Kawasaki as the culprit in what is referred to iri case bools as "the Chiba experience." ,,Chiba, once a peaceful, coastal prefecture in Japan, had been the scenr Kawasaki's fust expansion in steel-making. It was here that the company evolved pattern of locating its facilities in underdeveloped areas. Before long,'the r surge of local prosperity in Chiba was choked by thick smoke and waste that turned its seas a coffee-brown and permanently strrouded the sky with a ing violet haze. The presence of a1l types of pollution quickly earned for Chiba : intemational reputation as "Japan's pollution department store," and caused straqge deattrs of 30 persons tn 7976, and another 500 in 1978. So that when s4ki took steps to put up the sintering plant in this heavily polluted city, a grouP Of irate citizens filed suit in a Japanese court. Kawasaki, in its defense, told magistlate that the cause for alarm had become moot and academic, because the poration, had by then secured approval of the Marcos government to construct controversial plant in Mindanao. The "development project" brought more than the prospects of men-tdl damage to the town of Villanueva, in the province of Misamis Oriental. its haste to aicommodate the Japanese, the government forced the landowners sell their properties at a price way below the prevailing market value. Entire ,. had to be uprooted, to,enable the company to build a kilometer-long quay for ocean-going cargo.vessels. Obviously, these coercive moves could be taken

locate the sintering facilities near a populous city. The affaof the group then offered the observation that by allowing Kawasaki to operate within our territory, the city's annual revenue would increase at least 300 times. That year, the city had a total annual revenue of P6 million, up by Pl million from the previous year. With about Pl,8OGmillion to spend, we could build all the schools,.hospitals and roads that the people were cla' disastrous

ble young man who served as interpreter

rnoring for. '

But I told the Japanese that pollution was too great a prlce to pay for progress. At the end of our conversation, as the team prepared to leave, Dr. Komatsu * who all this time had spoken through the interpreter - pulled me aside and said, in the King's Englistr: 'Mr. Mayor, let me commend you on your stand. Yes, pollution would be a problem. The reason, in fact, why we have to corne to your country is that we are not permitted to operate in ours." The nuclear plant in the placid town of Morong (population: 11,000) in tsa' taan province, about 180 kilometers north of Manila, i.5 another huge development undertaking that, in the opinion of many Filipinos, should have been somewhere down in the scale of priorities. More a status symbol than a pressing need, the nuclear reactor had been conceived ln the middle sixties as an alternative source of clectric power, but because of the country's scant resources, lack of technological skill, and the environmental dangers it would pose, the National Power Corporation moth-balled the project. With the declaration of martial law and Marcos' need to prove that an authori'

136

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

rncie n t in at ain in g dever opme n t ,?;il J",tr "il:::"',ffi }'" :: i.1Tl.T re.";"'J;#,'uL:::LT-,"Hii:1ffi ji1,rffi ff l'::l,tT"**":l*t:-T: ;l r:*o

;;iilT;,T:':fl:ff:' ;: Iff:f' J:"1'*::'T,1" :rll j: '::;J#Ti:'ill:l':rlH;{,#,.T;'J::':i;;::;:T',*: :i:ffi

i*t

have

jffi

*Xlf

^-r

,u.t.u. p-o*er^nlanl in

as the phiti

l,u .*ii,,,",'i, t,{ p exp s r rh at,, * suffer substantialty for iAji,:'il ffi1T t Jhffi sbeH:fff"ilfHr'?: -q en se

bodies or the exporr ::l,X,X*1'ofi:1tl,rj countries' and that the *:*"::l*; Nircrear n.grii '!J;,*,.,"ry i"ffi'r:il;::?r[ ITITJ "-*'"', "'v riu*

to $3s,000,000 ;l,I'.fr:;il;;T,"":':::: lT:rl''"iiuoa and.;;;"*::;:il fiT:r::ii:frX: Lorenzo ranada wrote a st worded l[ra.;i;|;";r,1",i,1]ll,:l,-l?pG;ffier letter to rr.or,.1:..:,dir; ;;; ;'*#ffi i:;ilffi[J:,il1.:i nuclear accident at

to ,u*

about P350,000,000 in service fees

Three_Mile

tslaniin tL. UrilrO

Marcos reacted by creating a special

project

which

subsequently did.

States.

.o*-ir,..

headed by Justice Minister

ers.,re #i{il T.* il,io, r.r*iii"J' T.flt;t;n;;:::,

lined ffi:l;,ilX the appoinhaent, sensing that the

;:1fl:Hy":*.fff

crose

ratter, however,

Early in tlso' stronry after Marcos signed the U.S.-philippine bases ment' the u's' Nuclear Reg,ratory co*,,iriion approved the westinghouse thereby, remnovins*':T,I ril1i,dg;;; * rn, project. As in the case of the nucrear r,,niing foi ari of the massive developn !r*t, projects undertaken bv.Marcos rt^'.o*L-ir'o-r, foreign loans, principary

I,}::J#}, Hl,*i

*f**",1*lli;;#-

from

*ru.i ,r,,i,i,io s,;',., and Ja1

According to the central Bank, the philippine externar debt was $600-mill Ir ,1,

but has

00 a month just to

,r.H,[

f :"#j

one reason or another, then his repayments suffer and he faces foreclosure. . . rc ,irJJirrrforc channel a.greater part of these foreign borrowings aao cupitut-accounts into productive

lJ r. of approval on the Westinghouse

rr^;;;r.

H#T:TilH l:Ttrj?il;

uiui"n iouur yrurty just to service past foreign indebtedness' Thus we are tiL. il.";;, who eams p500

iffiltrff:T*t",;i,lf;

riil,i;,HrTil:li::l

ftis poricy say that Marcos is gambling on uncertain fu_ ,, ,rq_ *l,r.v ,uron! nno;? p--;..r. says i: tawGuingoni, . foirr, "rir,.. delegate:

ffl'llrilil;ff philippines.

Despite these orotests, construction was started in April 1976.Theimmedi beneficiary of the Westinghouse O.A *r, Or,. ,lndustries' Inc', a company control uy Herminio by uerminio Disini, "Tl'l'ni, oitrrri--r"","sp fria-,r ^. a rt-os, r.i"na*o;

"u.t H:"nffiT#*',T:L:r"#,'":tbvMarcof ;i;.-;;intemationar

by about a uruion oouu.,;;;;;;;;;il;, that we also pay back aboui

rhe They rhe rnternarionar Atomic Ase

,r,' o.o,J"ia];;::

,r.'"nii r""rr a.orori.b.veropment Authory.*-in.orderto attain

"JrJritutional

feal citing Danier Ford, ext r"e:lil"#,#ln,*r*:i:::y:.,*.1 fhrs cor."*ri'sli;;*i'#1rr"ili:

y:;;: RI.,'", that :ff1;T::l::i*i.j,^r"f.?l end users must not presume

$r-billion in

Like personal loans, our foreign indebtedness can be good or bad _ good if applied usefully, Uua if ,..[rrrt-r."W. .

Xl:::lll"x:il,ifff it'-::k,'l:*:X*:**i* *i; ;# ffilJJ:T;;1":::HTffi

economy, efficacy and s1f3tV.:f u

;.; ;;;;jmartiar

137

d.;;;;;$3-billion

yer.banker Teopisto

might induce cracks in the. reactor

tive ;l'J director or the Union or

197.9;.andmore than law years.

Those opposed to

ue impbrt"a

In Morong town itself, the people were within the so-called ..arc of n*,t"."*"i",1 apprehensive that o7^ u^r, .L-

- a growth

Development

tue, specia,y because

,*{': H.i, lfi ffJ,ff ,,:.1 ltfl ffi lt*: i:l:yto _,"y:. "r,'.ffi i-* ai,#a; ilJ,JJ:],rTil:1il:.T"1: il:[:,frd great cost.

e80

:..!??2; of $ l.bilrion

$8.4'bilrion

Under a S-year pran ruoir.o"uy ity, the country strouia borrow;;

ff ti n, ;ffi;*fr ffi ;:r^[i.,il: ;l::,:If , "ilTlTl':l;,a, ?dffi:il "# J;$,lT- lflil: : ffi' il 3l -ry::::*::;d * lli;,T,H"H',*'.'jil**.:::,-1{li,i;{ffi;"il;':ff #,'nl. ::#':1ffiil:ilffi ,': ,':#:::::1T"::*::::':.'lj"l";l!;;$'#fiT;:ff h:l;:Xifl ?,';i;:l f fl,,i#f ':;Hf;#T":f:j,;;,,rr;;ffi o bj e c

Alternatives in 1965; $2'2'billion

projects rather than into impaci st*.tu.er-und ventures that are politi cally appealing but of dubious ,.ororni.lro lo.iu uaue. .

The quarrel is apparently over how the loans are to be appried and used. servof Marcos' pro.trri y to go into rrornic and sociar value" or ,.dubious ecoa.e lou.tee'n'oJ'uurirut faburous five-star hotels _ unr:<lualled in their luxury and elegance errn in ,orn, grru, Itnd America, the of Europe ,orurrtion and cultural centers, rcstored churches and the historic ,it.r, ta. liuntry clubs and high-crass resorts. A, lltese' Marcos critics say,, have not .t*riuri.d at alr to improving the rife of burdened Filipinos. The debt_ developmrr, t o n giv en r". rr,, r, . rng as constant reminders

r.n*r,

rlu$.;"r."*;;;;;;iigr,

"iti*

"i,fr.lTjilj rtSi,fril# rrr;;;; :;il;, iH H: j:: j::,*:i; fi :',',:'fi *::iiJ# :,.H: :: llj x*t :: r * a,,ii*, ;il",o u,, ffi J There is little doubt i

",.r

:rrrd

i""trlt deveropment arso in terms of what it rurl"rr#L"*sts. This provides an explanation expenditu* iy Mr* Mur"or, as the acknowledged aesthete

that Marcos ean do to perpetuate una uou*"u rvhy he has indulged the

image-builder of his .ry_.:. of staggering ,rm, of money o, iriou*.*re proircts designed to idealize ,uth-r. ih* *;;;h="'g"vemment,s concerns. The various "centers" for rutritior\ .n;onment, population contror ancl 0ther r)rogrirms which are housed in moaem,'carnrira ttturals and piped'in rnusic, by w', as well ,, ir*''*"a.r ho'si,g and livclihoocr

r,.raq;;;;;;;nded

I38

hardly reflect what is being actually done at tlre grassroots level. They are tlere impress foreign visitors and the representatives of funding and sponsoring tions, and those urban Filipinos who are appallingly ignorant of depressed conditi obtaining in the slums and rural villages of their own country. The effect of this "cosmetic" approach to development - which somet reaches ludicrous proportions in the efforts to screen off blighted areas with tive hollow-block walls, wood screens or quick-growing shrubs and trees heighten the people's expectations and eventually exacerbate their frustr should the government fail to deliver the promised prosperity. Technocrats of the Marcos govemment maintain, however, that there has

no "misallocation of resources" and that the drama of development is indeed place in accordance with a well-conceived scenario. A publication of the Ministry the Budget states that: "We borrow to build irrigation systems in order to inc food supply; develop energy resources and construct power systems to provide base for industrialization; build roads and bridges to make industrial products farm goods accessible at lower cost, and continue wit}t our housing, education other social services to provide the human resources necessary for sust growth. . ." As for the practice of borrowing from foreign sources to finance all these vities, Jaime Laya, Marcos'young and tireless Budget Minister, explains that this necessary because of the heavy foreign exchange requirements for the of machinery and equipment needed to implement the projects. In addition, he the limited savings in the country and the absence of long-term domestic capital ket forces the government to turn to the capital markets abroad, where lo loans are readily available at lower interest rates. To refute claims that borrowed money is being wasted on political projects, Laya cites the following as examples:

Roads and Bridges

a. Philippine-Japan Highway and its related projects

b. Bicol Secondary and Feeder Roads projects

Alternatives in

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

2. Agriculture a. Integrated Agriculture Production and Marketing project

b. Smallholder Tree Farming and Forestry project c. Agriculture Research d.

Cagayan Integrated Agriculture Development project

e. Magat River Multipurpose project 3. Power and Energy

a. Sixth Power project b. Agus V Hydroelectric project c. Cagayan Valley Electrification project d. Makiling-Banahaw Transmission line

4. Education and Social

Services

DeveloPment

139

a. Fourth Education project b. First Asian Development Bank Engineering Education project c. Bicol Integrated Health Nutrition and Population project d. Philippine Population project 5. Waterworks

a. Metro Manila Sewerage and Sanitation project b. Manila Water Supply project c. Waterworks Development project. Despite the insistence of the Marcos government that all tlese infrastructures are intended to promote agricultural and manufa.:turing activities which increase the stock of consumer goods needed by the people, the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines charges that the projects are really for the purpose of attracting foreign capi. tal and boosting exports, Marcos'main economic thrust.

This policy, the CLU claims, is inflationary since exports increase money supply without increasing the supply of domestic goods. Not only that, the emphasis on export production makes it necessary for the country to import domestic needs rczulting in the "importation" of foreign inflation as well. If the number of foreign and transnational companies operating in the Philippines were to be the yardstick of development, martial law cannot but be considered tn outstanding success. Statistics compiled by the UP law,Center show that there were 324 foreign-owned, foreign-affiliated and transnational entities out of the top 1,000 corporations as of 1978. Central Bank figures also attest that in terms of direct equity investment, t}te l'hilippines attracted foreign capital of up to $1.18-billion from February 1970 to September 1979. With equity investments of $604.76-million and $228.63-million respectively, Americans and Japanese led over investors from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Hongkong, Taiwan, Switzerland, Sweden, West Germany, Singapore, France, South Korea, Netherlands and others. The Central Bank attributed this increase to improvements in infrastructure, ports, communications, road networks, the abundance of raw and semi-finished materials, liberal laws on the repatriation of capital and profit, and to low labor costs. Although forergn companies are asked to invest in areas not adequately ex' ploited by Filipinos, under a set of Priorities Plans for agriculture, export, investrnents, and public utilities, Filipino business leaders fear that foreign dominance of

especially those with a high "import content" such as the manufacturing sector petroleum refining, food and beverage, transport equipment, cosrnetics, pharmaceuticals and chemicals will stifle real industrialization. The National Economic Development Authority indeed admits that most Philippine industries remain "assernbly-type industries." One disturbing aspect of the entry of trans- or multinational companies is that, whfle investing dollars in the country, they compete with capital-short Filipinos for local credit facilities. Between 1972 urd 1975, when Marcoswasvigorouslypustring his campaign for foreigr investments, foreign nationals brought in a total of $485.1

I4O

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION million, but at the same time they were anowed by the government to b $3.934.14 million from private loci sources over a srrorter period n rg72-74. for every $12 they invested in the philippines, foreign.oirp*i", uorrowed $r from local financing institutions, deprivinj Filipinos oi capital to start and devel their own businesses and industries.

Marcos has thus been accused of being a toor of foreign interests, particurar the Americans, and of reducing the philipfines to the statirs of a .,neo-corony,, a source of raw materials for the u.s. and other industrial nations, and a market

finished goods. His critics attach great significance to the fact that the Ameri Chamber of commerce in the philippines was among the first to congratulate cos for declaring martial law and to pledge their cooperation. They also charge that technocrats who influence govemment policy

secretly

unwittingly serve American business interests, because of their connections, ba, grou,d and education, as examples three of t},e most .r*p."t.a members _citing the Marcos cabinet - Finance Ministei cesar virata (named one of the five m, effective ministers of the world in a recent suwey of the Institutional Inrestor,

Alternatives irr

lrirr and a host ol'otlrcrs now occupi,hg sensilve positi,xs in the gcvcrnnlent, 1ii. ('errtral Bank and the Development Bank constitutes a new set of instruments try wlrich powerful countries, particularly the United States, are able to promote and ;rrtrtect their interests in the Philippines. Says Alejandro Lichauco n Tbe l-icl"'auto t'ttl,crsi "These technocrats have been affective in establishing through their ideas anri l)ronouncements the general climate and intellectual atmosphere conducive to or,r li,rvernment's acceptance of policies responsible for our continuing colonization. . ,'' Aside from Filipino entrepreneurs who feel threatcned by the Marcos opilrl rloor policy, labor likewise thinks it ls getting the short end of the bargain. Since tlri' liovernment is offering low wages as a principai come-on for cost-conscious fbreigrri it would be to the "national interest" tc keep wages down to a minimurrr :rcceptable or tolerable level. Dr. Gonzalo lurado ol the U.P. School of Ecoriomics believes that the martial luw govemment prejudice against labor is reflected in a declaration "so well corr' ccaled that it can be missed by a trusting population" - in ttie I0-year I)evclt,, rrrent Plan 1978-1987 which states that: t:ompanies,

international publication), Industry Minister Roberto ongpirr, and Economic pr

ning Minister Gerardo Sicat.

Workers will be accorded just compr.r::;ation that will ensrrrc tirs maintenance of a minimum standard of hviig wirhout prejudice to tl',' efforts to promote a bigb employment leael in the economy. (ltalics mine.)

Both virata and onspin glTe from the prestigious auditing and managing firm

of Sycip, Gorres and velayo (scv). perhaps because it servic"es a large American clientele in the Philippines and Asia, and one of its founders, wurrrington sycip, is an American ciruen, sGV has often come under zuspicion as a cIA frlnt. (Aagered by the shabby treatunent she had received at a meeting with members of u.s. con_ gress, Mrs. Marcos once advised a group of Filipino busiiessmen to drop SGv in favor of carlos valdez and Associates, implying tlat srre herself mistrusted the firm for its supposed CIA links.) Before joining the government as head of the National Economic councl, precursor of NEDA, sicat served on the faculty of the u.p. schooi of Economics. As one of the foremost exponents of free-enterprise economics, he is reputed to have suggested, prior to his appointment as NEC chairman, that considering &e present state of' their country's development, it srrourd not matter to Filipinos who controllecl the resources and economy of the country. sicat says, however, that he has been quoted out of context and that, in fac1, he has strenuousty worteo for the protection ofthe national interest through the adoption ofappropriate policies. Y,ata, likewise, has been accused of opening trre aoors wide to foreign domination of the Philippine econorny. As head of the technical panel that undertook preliminary discussions with its American counterpart o, u *o""rror treaty to the Laurel'I"angley Agreement, he is said to have ..committed the philippines to the position that the "national treatment clause,'which confers parity,ishi"t, Americans in all areas of business, wouid be incorporated in the neurtrexytlthefullestextent possible." Like sicat, virata feels that he has been misundersiood in his advocacy of foreign investments as a means of accererating national economic growth. In the eyes of fervent nati'nalists, the phatanx of technocrati exemplified by .Alejandro Melchor at the beginning of mqrtiar law and th* byii;;, virata, ong-

Dcvuloptnent l4i

Dr. Jurado suggests that the objectives of these policies is to see to it that the share that goes to capital is not diminished, to enable capital to "promote a high level of employment." He contends that this is not oirly an acceptanceof theexisting distribution of income as between labor and capital, but a contribution to the "preservation and reinforcement of that distribution." The implication is that labor cannot hope to attain a just share of the production output - even if orily to meet the high cost of living - considering that Marcos's aggressive drive for foreign investments is strongly anchored on low wages. A paid advertisement that the martial law government placed inthe New Ycrk 'limes (28 luly 1974) assured Americans intending the business in rhe Philippines that: Recent presidential decrees have simplified conciliations and arbi-

tration of labor disputes - low labor costs for the foreign company setting up a plant in Manila could wo;k out from 35 to 40 percent lower than they would in Hongkong or Singapore.

This "competitive wage level" has been achieved by denying to workers the right to strike in vital industries. Theoretically, the right exists in respect to other industries but inasmuch as the term 'Vital" applies to nearly every major company whose shutdown could affect the economy in some way, the worker is deprived of the only effective and democratic means of improving his pay and working condi'

142

TTIH COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

tions. Marcos, of course, has decreed periodic upward adjustments in salaies, and allowances on the basis of recommendations jointry made by rabor, and the private sector. These, unfortunately, have been nufified by a decline of "real wage" - or what the laborers can buy with the money te earns - from l index points in 1966 to approximately 63 index points in lg7g.

"trn money terms," explains Dr. Jurado, ..the wage rate of skilled in Metro Manila increased from about p7.30 in if,ae ti approximatelypl5.40 1978, but the real value of this wage feel from p7.30 to p4.70-or a decline of

than 35 percent, because ofprice increases.,'

to keep pace with the gailoping inflation that Marcos persisten blames on the oil crisis, more and more Filipinos are reported falling below U.P. economic researchers Edita A. Tan and virginia Holazo call Unable

the,;povertylino or the absolute minimum income needed to buy the recoinmended nutrient quirements for the family, two changes of clothing for its members, Grade M

ing for children, necessary medical care, and assumed rental and fuel costs based food expenses. According to Dr. Mahar Mangahas in a study (Meazuring philippine Devero ment), 59.6 percent of Filipino households were already uaow trris tin e n lgi Three years after martial law, when the economy was supposed to have imp because of Draconian measures adopted by Marcos, the figuie rose to 6g.0 pi Another estimate made by the Development Academy of the philippines placed the number of families struggling for survival below the poverty lue at diTo . In urban as well as in rurar areas where poverty is widespread, malnutrition become endemic. In 1978, five million schoolchildren, reprisenting s6.wo of nation's pre'school population of 9.1 million, were *.ighua th.ough ilr.-go""r* ment's operation Timbang. Sixty percent of those weighed were found to be suffering from severe and moderate malnutrition, 46yo were considered unO"*righi una only 26/s of normal weight. The NEDA promptly wamed that the sites chosen for this zurvey were mosfly depressed areas where pockets of severe malnutrition exist and said that the figures may not be reflective of th. .ountry,s real nutritionar pic.

ture.

Govemment sources say that other health and nutrition surveys indicate even a worse situation than operation Timbang has uncor.ered, but that they have been

forbidden to make the results public. The suppression or distortion of data has enabled Marcos to clairn that under martial law and an authoritarian form of govemment, the philippines has .urirrro the reform and development that past administrations, using the westem or American republican model, found elusive. In his most recent book, In searcb of Alterna-

tiaes, Marcos says:

The economy has grown at a rate of 6.6 percent annually from 1972-1979, an improvement over the performance of 5.0 perlent in

Alternatives in

Development

143

1965-1977 despite serious external developments. The population growth, reduced to 2.38 per cent n 1979 after reaching a high rate of 3.0 per cent in the early 60s has become more manageable. . . In agriculture, after having been a perennial rice importer, the Philippines is now self-sufficient and is exporting rice. . . Continuous investment expansion has been made in public works,

private construction and installation of new industrial capacity. These have permitted an employment rate of about 95 per cent for many years now and the development of technology and manpower skills. . . The industry sector, even as it was undergoing restructuring, had contributed significantly to development, its share in total economic activity having risen from 29 per cent in 1967 to 31 per centn 1972

and

to about 32 per cent today, surpassing

ture..

the performance of agricul'

Foreign trade has expanded remarkably since 1965, when the ex'

port profile consisted mainly of raw materials like copra, logs and mine' ral ores, with a few manufactures. With the massive export drives and trade policy reforms started in 1972, total exports reached $4.6 billion

in1979... This improved export performance has produced a manageable balance of payments position. Also, the utilization of foreign loans was concentrated on priority projects and has been stabilized in relation to total resource needs of the development program. . . The total budget of the national and local goYernments grew in response to the needs of a developing economy, from a level of P2.7 billion in 1955 to P6.3 billion n 1972 andP42.2 billion in 1979. . . Tax refbtms initiated to meet t}te development objectives of equity, industrial efficiency and promotion of desired economic patterns, contributed substantially to the creation ofnecessary resources' . . Real Gross National Product (GI.IP) increased at an average rate of 6.6 per cent from 1972-1979 as compared to the average yearly growth of 5.0 per cent from 1965-1973. . Quite contrary, then, to the facile suggestiortd of some quarters that there has been no distribution of wealth, the Gross National Welfare of the Filipino has been enhanced in the seven years of the New Society.

But this rosy picture painted by Marcos fails to conform to the reality unveiled by independent researchers in the U.P. School of Economics, in t}1e Center for Rescarch and Communications, and institutions of higher teaming throughout the country that under martial law, people are not eating enough, not getting the mini' lrum medical and social services they are entitled to, and are unable to send their children to school, to clothe and house them. Why this serious discrepancy?

..rry:

144

One alswer may be that in refusing to admit failure, Marcos sometimes his technocrats to change the facts to conform to "the real situation" as he seeg !n April 1980, Minister Gerardo Sicat of the National Economic Authority reported to the nation that the inflation rate in Manila was estimated 24 per cent, and 20 per cent for the rest of the country. These figures had arrived at on the basis of a nationwide zurvey of goods and senices. But worried that the published NEDA rate would detract from his claims of success, said these could be "completely wrong" since prices of consumer i particularly in his home province of Ilocos Sur, were one-third those of "If tlre inflation rate in Manila is 24 per cent and the prices in the are one-third," he observed testily, "then in all probability, all these statistics completely wrong, that ttre inflation rate nationwide is much lower than the minus three or minus four per cent that the statisticians are talking about! ', Sicat hastily issued an announcement that Marcos was absolutely right. But reviewing and updating the comparative data to support Marcos' personal NEDA statisticians found themselves in a worse bind. For within the short of time that it took Marcos to order a quick change of figures, the rate had actu gone up to 25.9 per cent for Metro Manila and2l.2 per cent for the regions ou the Metropolitan arca. Prosthetic operations such as this, however, cannot completely hide the that in so far as the common man is concerned, things have not changed for better. with inflation staring him full in the face, the future looks bleaker th ever. Like most leaders, particularly those of industrialized countries, Marcos the present situation on the soaring crude oil prices which have set off an chain reaction affecting both the factory owner and the lowly balut yendor On the other hand, some.observers are of the view that stresses on the pine economy may not be due entirely to the oil crisis. They point out that the .organaation of Fetroleum Exporting countries (OPEC) increased crude prices by only 14 percent and spread this over four quarters ln lg79 to cushi tlre impact, the Marcos government raised it by 23 per cent - effective immediately About 2o per cent of the govemment increase is attributed to higher taxes, and balance to "compensation" to oil companies and their dealers. worsening inflati in the Philippines, they say, has been caused by the so-called development poli adopted by the martial law government, faulty implementation, and a scale of ities locked into Marcos' political requirements. Dr. Gonzalo Jurado has drawn some conclusions which, I believe, provide a more honest and objective explanation of why Filipinos are going through times under a system that is supposed to lift their economic condition:

Alternatives in

lHE coUNTERFEIT REVoLUTIoN

Govemment policies have failed to stabilize, much less control, prices of commodities and services. Government policies not only have failed to improve income distribution,, they have in fact contributed to its deterioration. More households felll below the poverty threshhold between 1965 and 1975, and there is rea-

Development

145

son for believing that even more fell by 1978' tlre stroulders of the two Government taxes"have placed a heavy burden on

great clases in

pmippi"

society, but especially on those

of the low'

income class.

Much taxes have been Government expenditures have been inflationary'

usedtofinanceprojectsandprogramsofaquestionablenature.Budget. without diminishing ary expenses to'la"Ut cut down by at least 309'o the quality and quantity of public services'

_ Government poti.i., urc Ltii"bor. They curtail labor's rights to act deci' _

sivelY on its own behalf'

low-income class in Philippine Govemment potilv has been harmful to the societY.

empirical data and the peo' These conclusions are supported both by available statistics and the bortailored Yet Marcos, titi"g t'it own set of 1,lc's experience. persists in spread' talents, and best minds rowed credibility of some of ihe cJuntry's

irrgthemyththatundermartiallaw,thePhilippineshasbeenmagicallytransformed ,,,.,"d

thut tire national economy is not only sound but Governmentspokesnenvi,gorouslyasserttlrat..Marcoshasstrown,totheob. the flourishing'

vious satisfaction

of the people,*that his

arguments for a strong govemment as

illlswertoanarchyuna,o"iat^dis"ontentarevalid,despiteth.esnlplqandassorted Filipinos have "fulfilled the para' rnischief of certain foreign medAlels,"and that the tlox of authoritarian

and authentic welfare"'

Butbetweenexistingrealitiesandhisstatisticalclaimsthediscrepancyisso

high taxes, unemployment, tight glaring that Filipinos - ciught in the squeeze of going hay11e - cannot be system a the indicattrs of r:redit, soaring prices, "J"[ that Marcos refers to country same blamed for asking ,r,.trrri itre rhilippines is the in his state'of'the'nation messages'

Ihe Marcos

THE MARCOS CONSTITUTION F THE

delegates

to the 1971

charter that came out of

constitutional convention who denounce as a spurious document, no one could be

vehement than Cebu's Napoleon Rama.

"The new Constitution," he says, 'ris a creature of Malacaflang. Not

provision was approved without the knowledge and consent of Malacaflang. final draft was discussed and approved in Malacaflang. The new constitution is pr a Marcos constitution. what was conceived as a charter of reforms for the tion of the Philippine govemment and people turned out to be a political stein's monster."

Being one of a handful of "anti-Marcos" delegates who landed in a cell when martial law was declared, allowance must be made for Rama's bitte But his accusation, which many others have aired, cannot be ignored or taken It strikes at the very legitimacy of the Marcos government and raises the tant issue of whether he should be regarded as a "duly-constituted authority" or overstaying President under the I 93 5 Constitution. Indeed, if the 1973 Constitution were to be set aside as a',bastard sired under quesfionable circumstances by fathers unknown, then it would most tainly follow that Marcos is guilty of a gigantic political fraud unequalled in the

tory of this or any other country. It would follow, too, that the military

support of his "crisis government" is premised chiefly on the soldier's swom duty - has been his principal victim. That the new Charter does not express tJre genuine sentiments and aspira of the people or reflect the spirit of the Filipino nation, is the main brief that constitutional delegates hold against Marcos. They consider his meddling a sac of the sovereign will and a mockery of tlte convention. Sigrrificantly, it was not Marcos but Antonio Cuenco, a neophyte man from Cebu, who fust proposed to call a convention to bring the old tion up to date because ofradical changes in Philippine social, political and eco conditions. Activism was on the rise, and the cry in streets and university was for a "relevant" charter a basic law that would truly liberate the country "feudalism and colonialism" and serve as an instrument of reform and There was no denying that the 1935 Constitution needed overhauling. It been framed and ratified when the Pfulippines was a colony of the united and the delegates of that era were under the strong influence not only of practices and values but of powerful business interests which coveted the as a rich source of cheap raw materials and as a new market for their products. The authority to call a constitutional convention had spnrng from the I TydingsMcDuffie law, otherwise known as the Philippine Independence Act, the United states congres approved and presideni Franklin D. Roosevelt defend and uphold the Constitution

quently sigrred into law on 24Mrrch 1934. ThisAct set qpecific.conditions and tations which required, among otlhers, that the Philippine Constitution establi*r

Constitution

141

rcpublican form of government, include a bill of rights, and, most important of all, contain certain provisions defining the relations between the Philippines and the LJnited States, during the period of the commonwealth and after the country became independent.

The 1935 Constitution was thus an American instrument, based essentially on the Tydings-McDuffie Law, and the three laws by which the Philippines was govr:rned as a colonial state; the instructions of President William McKinley to the Philippine Commission in 1900, the Philippine Bill of 1902,and the Jones Law of 1916, which was the closest to being a constitution. However, certain features were also adopted from the constitutions of Mexico, Spain, Germany and several South Arnerican countries, the unwritten constitution of the English, and the Malolos Constitution of 1898 which established the frst l'}hilippine Republic. The delegates took only six months to complete their work, so that in less than a year of the passage of the Philippine Independence Act, a committee composed of Senate Pres. Manuel L. Quezon, Convention Pres. Claro M. Recto and Delegate Manuel A. Roxas was able to submit the Constitution for approval by President Roosevelt. On 14 May 1935, the Filipino electorate ratified it by avote of 1,213,046 to 44,963.

Intended for both the Commonwealth (the l0-year transitory government) and the Republic that would supersede it upon the proclamation of Philippine independence on 4 July 1946,lhe 1935 Constitution was amended only three times in the span of 35 years. I'he changes were aimed at easing the onerous economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, changing the National Assembly into a bicameral legislature, and giving the Americans "parity" - or "equal rights" to exploit natural resources and operate public utilities in the Philippines. This last amendment, introduced n 1941 , is particularly noteworthy in that it iocused unprecedented attention on the Charter as the embodiment of tlte national interest. For while "parity" was intended to mean "reciprocity of rights," Filipino nationalists saw it as a one-way street favoring the Americans, since native entrepreneurs, wanting in capital and technical know-how, could not possibly hope to compete in the U.S. - or in their own country.

of the Sixties, the criticisms against the 1935 Constitution from "outmoded" to "colonial, overly-centralized and devoid of sooial and

In the ranged

decade

ecbnomic rights." A strong wave of nationalism was sweeping the country, and the vigorous demand by a younger generation of Filipinos for a new charter indicated a fervent desire to erase vestiges of foreign domination. Not only that, it was clear that they were completely dissatisfied with the status quo and had convinced them' selves that profound changes in society and government could be achieved only through a Constitution that was "distinctly Filipino in character and which could best serve the interests of a truly independent nation." Along with the conviction that the old Constitution had been forced upon u people who had no choice in the matter, it was generally felt that its provisions ltutl

I48

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION truly become irrelevant to the times and might even be responsible for ..the

The Marcos

mic imbalance, the growing unrest that stemmed from this inequity, and the i of govemment to cope with the risingtide of expectations." The 1935 cha critics said, tended to favor the big land-owners and the political and elite, without providing clear and specific guarantees for the promotion of tho terests of labor, the youth, the farmer, and other lowly sectors of society. congress, which was itself being eyed as a target ofreform through a cc tional change, could not ignore the clamor. on 16 March 1967,bothhorr.,

joint

session and approved a resolution authorizing the constitutional conven 197L A subsequent law fixed th€ IOth of November 1970 for the elect of 320 delegates.

be held

Public pressure for a constitutional assembly of responsible men and compelled congress to enact a measure prohibiting its own members and other errunent officials from participating in the convention. It also imposed a.drr limit on election expenditures so that moneyed but unqualified candidates would be able to buy a seat in this historic meet. An indication of the tremendous interest in the convention was the n candidates: 2,481 n all vied for 320 seats. Among those elected were two Presidents of the Republic - carlos p. Garcia and Diosdado p. Macapagal former senators, seven former cabinet members, nineteen former congres only thirteen women made it, but as the records wilr show, they influenced male-dominated convention in many ways. Despite efforts to avoid or at least minimize partisan politics, the conr tional body soon split into as many factions as there were parties and pottical sonalities interested in having their viewpoints reflected in the charter. Pedro Romualdo Jr. recalls that some groups were known as Liberal, Nacio and christian Social Democrats. while others took the name of their acknow leader or sponsor and were thus identified as the Marcos, Macapagal, Garcia, and Roxas factions.

This division became most pronounced during the election of a conve President, with former Presidents Diosdado Macapagal and carlos Garcia, and for Senator Raul Manglapus as the principal contenders. A rumor that Marcos was

refly backing the candidacy of Macapagal drove the young Turks a bloc of tic young delegates - to throw their support behind Garcia, clinching the latl victory. A few days after his election, however, Garcia died of a heart attack. second time around, Macapagal was able to convince his doubtful colleagues Marcos had, infact, worked against him, and he won handily over Manglapus. The fight for the convention presidency revived demands by student and tant organLations that Marcos adopt a hands-off policy towards the delegates so could act as free elements. A number of important politicat leaders were also

at his command, everyone feared Marcos the most.

As early as 1970

than

a year before the convention started

tho

149

students had already presented hirn u'ith a demand for a non'partisan convention 11d a guarantee that he rvould not seek a third tenn. Ilarcos had assured the public. rrot once but several times, that he haci no intentiott of rentairing in office longer than the Constitution allorved, but on certcirl occasions he seemed vague and exas' peratingly evasive.

On 30 January 1970, a veritable annl'oi st1.rrlellts rnarching home from Con' gres suddenly decided to cross the narrori \lendiola Bridge separating \Ialacaflang Palace and Manila's university belt. Brandishing snrail-caliber liandguns. \loloto"' cocktails and bombs manufactured in school labs. thc'1 r'e11' nearll sLrcceeded in ramming down theheavy steelgates of the Palace *ith a comrrandeeretl firetnrck. but were repulsed by Metrocom troops called in to reinforce the besie'red presitlelitial guards-

The newspapers named this event "The Battle of \lendic,la Bridge." Tr"'o stu. dents were killed and scores of others injured. Constabularl handling olthe incident led to a demand for the resignation of Gen. \/icente Raral as PC Chiefl. To mollify' the studentry, Matcos appointed the more diplomatic Gen. Eduardo Carcia to replace Raval, and then invited the youth leaders to a dialogue at \lalacaiang Palace. But this meeting turned into a shrill and disorderll ailair riith the students demanding, and Marcos refusing to provide. a signed pledge that he uould notseek reelection n 1973. As he had alread-.,'made this pledge verbally'on several occasions, Marcos told the ,lelegation that he considererl it an insult'for the u'orcl ol a Presi dent not to be taken at face value. The students stalked out ol the Palace, even more angry than before. When the convention opened on I June 1971. some 8.000 of them staged a raucous '?eople's Convention" to discredit the convention proper as a tool of the politicians and vested groups. The tielegates had been elected in *'hat had been gene' rally acclaimed as "the most p€au'eful and inespensive election." Except for a lel"' "non' representing the "Nerv Left" and a handful of indepenrlents r','ho formed a committed faction." tlie rest helLrnSel ro tlie propertieJ cliss. Thel' possessed a high degree of education and w'ere obvior'tsli el1tist in their i'iels. On this same tumultous da1', as \larcos strode intc the Fiesta Pavilion of the Manila Hotel to ad,Jress lhe cLrnvention, seventeen delegates w'al'ked out of the hal] to dramat2e and echo the srudents' charge of poLiticcJ meddlin3. The militants at this point looked upon \larcos as a hated symbol ol all that \\'as wrong rvith govern' ment and Socleb- - graft and comrption, bureaucratlc rnefficiency, conspicuous consumption, opulence, criminality, high prices and inflation. ..Name aa1,thing." said a Malacaflang aide, "and Nlarcos is to blame - floocs and tyhoons not excepted,"

to be exerting efforts to influence the convention either for their own purposes or-as lobbyists of special interest groups - but because of the power and resourceg

Constitution

Marcos was the perfect whipping dog. He had just won a second term - the flust Philippine President to do so. However, the Liberals said his victory was made possible by "guns, goons and gold," and his own political leaders and campaigners described the campaign as a "case of over-kill." The 1969 elections left no doubt that pro' here was a man bent on retaining power at all costs. Since the 1935 Constitution hibited him from seeking a third term, the suspicicrn that he would try to circumvent

I50

The Marcos

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

this restriction through tjre constitutional convention had rapidly hardened into

political fact of life.

Meanwhile, the threat of a communist take-over had become a recurring as more and more students took to the streets, and ir drivers declared a strike that paralyzed most of Manila. Amid this atnospheie crisis, opposition and militant quarters insisted that the .,spectre of communi existed only in the figment of Marcos' fevered imagination.,'io ease public anxior the Senate had earlier created a special committee to look into the matter. Now,: september of 1971, it came up with a report that "there was no clear and danger of a communist-inspired insurrection or rebellion.', As expected, Malacafiang rejected this finding. Although the Senate comr had taken a year to assess the situation, using information supplied by a broad of sources including the military, palace propagandists continuea to piay on the lic fear that the "Maoists" - as all activists, radicals, socialists, aor-unirtr, o, trouble'makers, had been conveniently lumped together - were on tJte verge of ing over the country. Adding his own stick to the fue, Marcos hinted broadly l because of the constitutional ban against his reelection, he might ,r"n r.i rrl run for President in the 1973 election "if it becomes necessary . . . to prevent communist tool from becoming president.',

of tlre administration

. He was obviously hinting at Sen. Benigro Aquino, who by this time become the rallying point of the activists. Marcos was apparently set on raising issue of "democracy vs. communism" in the coming election with himself the "forces of democracy." Aquino, however, did not fit the role of a communist or one who was to tum the country over to the Russians or chinese. To an adulatingpublic"he always been "America's boy." Marcos, on the other hand, was ,urp.r-t"a of communists in his fold, having brought men with known leftisi leanings into his government. In so far as politically-minded Filipinos were concemed, the shap battle royale was definitely going to be between Aquino and um. rvrur.or, *trh"rh; odds stacked against the latter. For one thing, majority of the constitutional delegates were being swayed by the mounting tide of anti'Marcos sentiment generated by militant and reformist groups, and by an aroused media. when Marcos indicated that his wife might be a candidate for President, Delegate Rama quickly filed a resolution to disqualify past Presidents and their relatives, within the second degree of consanquinity or affinity, from becominghead of state after 1973. This meant that whatever form the government would take under the new

constitution

whether presidential or parliamentary

Marcos and his immediate

family would be barred from seeking the highest office. In the flust months of 1972, as the convention progressed, two thingsincreasingly preoccupied a worried Marcos: frst, the Rama resolution which had won tlre majoritv support of 170 delegates; second, the proposal for a parliamentary system, inwhich he detected fresh hope that he might legally circumvent the existing constitutional obstacle to a third term.

Constitution I 5l

to withdraw their zupport of the "ban involved, spending long hours in were tirelessly Marcos Mrs. Mrtrcos" move, he and to private dinners at the invited they whom delegates "hoart-to.heart" talks with was Eduardo Quintero, intimate sessions to these l,rrllce. Among those summoned of lryte in the home-province Marcos' Mrs. t rctired Ambassador who represented Marcos is parprivate with conversation of hjs tion. Quintero's recollection used the threat of had indeed Marcos that ularly significant because it confirms line: into delegates al law to bring many of the In the effort to

persuade the signers

The President was very friendly, callingme by my nickname - the fust time he ever did. "Dading," he said, "if the First Lady were not in' disposed today, she would be sitting by my side now because the request I am going to make of you is the same request she will make. I want you to know that I called for you this evening not as President of the Philippines but as an old friend. Do you remember the picture that you and I and Meldy had together in Ottawa?" Before stating the request, the President started with a report tlat the intelligence community had already recommended the imposition of martial law but that he was still hesitant [to do it] because he was not sure how the country would react. But President Mqrcos was positive that the subversives were very strong, that thgy were prepared to take over, that he was a lame-duck President - a weak Commander'in-Chief who would not be in a position to fight the subversives. Then he attacked the Rama Resolution. He stated that the Con-con

was drafting a Constitution, and a Constitution should not be against anybody. I tried to argue with the President and told him that in the Uni' ted States an amendement was proposed preventing an incumbent President from running for a third tem. I pointed out that the .proposed constitutional amendment in the U.S. was not considered an anti-Roosevelt measure. President Marcos was quick to remark that the proposed amendment in the U.S. was approved after the death of Roosevelt (as

if it made a differencc). I then tolcl the President that the First Lady had invited Leyte delegates to a merienda at the Music Hall and at this affair Mrs. Marcos told us that she was very unhappy in Malacafrang; that she could not allow her two daughters to attend school outside the Palace grounds. when I relatecl to the President that the First Lady had also told the delegates that he would be retiring from politics, as it was also her desire to leave Malacaflang, he cut me short with this remark: "Don't be naive, Dading." Regarding the Rama resoltttion, I assured thc President that I would give his request very serious thought, but I atlded: "How can I withdraw my support of the Ilama resolution when I have formally affixed my signature * and that signaturc is on tlfficial recorcl'I" Tltc

I a

152

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Marcos

President shot back: "Othdrs have scratched their signatures.,, There were really a number of delegates who had signed the resolution and had to make a speech during the plenary sission, ing why they had changed their minds. I remembir thai ttre your

ther of Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, Congressman Francisco Su explained why he was withdrawing his support, as did Delegate man and former U.P. President Vicente Sinco, who based their drawal on the adoption of tire parlialnentary system. I understood that delegates rvere called to Malacaflang ly and asked to cehse supporting the Rama resolution. In the had been the practice that before the start of dinner arnong pro-M delegates - and this happened during the .,Three Kings" Malacs dinner on January 6, 1972 - the aides would .distribute sheets to every guest so that they could make a list of anything they done for thern, such as appointments to high positions in the gove the transfer ofjudges, etc. In my partlcular case, the president called one.of his aides

this instruction:

"If

Ambassador euintero wants

to talk to

phone, put him on right away." I was really very unhappy that evening, after knowing that was going to declare martial law, that no presidential elections

take place n 1973, and that he and Imelda would stay in Malac forever. Wren Marcos hecame somewhat disgusted with the way trying to argue with hirn, he said: ..you know that under martial can order the arrest ofanyone."

with the same intensity and perseverance, Marcos also tried to push the vention into approving the parliamentary system. The proposal had been initiated Delegate Raul Maaglapus and a few others who saw the change as a means of ling the powers of the chief of state. But Marcos now seized on it as a way of ex ing his residence in Malacaflang Palace.

At the outset, most of the delegates were openly in favor of the presiden system. The committees on Legislative power and Executive power were alre:

agreed on retaining the system, when delegates identified suddenly changed their stand.

with Malacaiang

pala

The 1971 senatorial elections had just ended, and the results clearly indir that the Marcos administration was on its way out. Six of the eight candidates sonally endorsed by Marcos and his wife had lost. Among the casualties were J Ponce Enrile and Blas ople, whom Marcos promptly reappointed Defense Mini and Labor Minister, respectively. As soon as Marcos had decided that the parliamentary form offereci a avenue Malacaflang launched a massive campaign in favor of the Manglapud loJ9wer, proposal' Delegates were again summoned to the palace, individually and in gio-ups,

Constitution

i 53

l'he Committee on Legislative Power zubsequently discarded its original recommentlation and reported out the parliamentary system for convention consideration. Aflter Marcos had a talk with 39 delegates on 6 January 1972, the Committee on

lixecutive Power followed suit. That many in the convention received doles or subsidies from Malaca.flang to vote for the parliamentary form and to reject the "ban Marcos resolution" is a matter o[ record. It is there because one ofthe intenCed Palacebeneficiaries- Delegate liduardo Quintero - became so conscience-stricken that he felt compelled to expose the "payola" scandal.

Even before the convention started, it had been rumored that.certain delegates were on the "payroll of Malacafiang," that two Palace lieutenants - Guillermo de Vega and Gilberto Duavit - had established headquarters on the fourth floor of the Manila Hotel and the sixth floor of the Hotel Enrico, and were under instructions by Marcos "to take care of the boys." On the convention floor itself, trusted dele. gates functioned as "bagmen" in what amounted to a triumph of organized corruption.

The vulnerability of the convention stemmed from its composition. Majority were lawyers (45.1%) and professionals (25.5/o), with businessmen-executive (2O.6Vo), former government officials (2.9%) and farmers (5.C7r) comprising the minority. As the lawyers and professionals had been dependent on their provincial practice, rnany zuffered a loss of income and were findingit hard tolive in Manila

on the meager salary of a delegate.

Additional allowances were out

of the question.

The convention had been

made possible only after Marcos had ordered a cutdown on government spending, to raise the Pl7-million needed to hold the constitutional election and another Pl2-million for salaries, travel and other administrative expenses. Besides, members of Congress were then under heavy attack for declaring fat allowances for themselves, and a similar move by the convention would have provoked the same reaction from the public. The delegates were, in a sense, ripe for the picking. In a privilege speech delivered before a stunned convention on l9 May 197J, the ailing Quintero admitted having received a total of eleven envelopes on separate occasions, containing a total of Pl 1,150.

"I am anxious to get rid of this money," he said, "so allow me to leave it in the hands of the convention secretariat for safekeeping . . . There is a possibility I may hurt some people. I beg of you not to ask questions - to name the people who gave them to me. . . " But when the expose was referred to the Committee on Privileges, the old man executed an affidavit linking Mrs. Marcos, twelve delegates, and the wife of a Leyte congressman to the scandal. Reacting angrily to this statement, Marcos cante up with charges of his own against Quintero - after agents of the National Bureau of Investigation had swooped down on the delegate's suburban home and founcl a large bundle of money secreted inside a closet. The implication that Malacafiang wanted to convey was that for all his moral pretentions, Quintero had been on the take frorrr other sources, after all, and was not the knight in shining annor that thc prcss lrarl

:,, l

154

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

made him out

to be. The evidence

showed, however, that

The Marcos

was the

agents themselves who had planted t}re money. Some delegates whom I interviewed say

that the Palace strategy "to the convention" consisted not only of generous offers of money, custry jobs

themselves and their political proteges in the judiciary and government corporatio but the threat of prosecution or harrasynent by the Bureau oflnternal Revenue d the Department of Justice. There is reason to believe, however, that since most gates could be perzuaded with a carrot, Malacaflang did not have to use the except in a few cases. Even as Marcos had to haggle and bargain with many of them, the pressure political sinecures and concessions came mainly from the delegate side. Marcos been accused of dangling membership in the Interim National Assembly as a ba for the convention to approve the Transitory Provision, but to observers the del, gates were equally guilty of wanting to become part of this legislative body.

Constitution

155

tical prisoners. ln The Conjugal Dictatorsbip, Primitivo Mijares - Marcos'one-time propagandist - claims that the Constitution that was finally approved had been written in Malacaflang by a few men, who also altered the records of the convention to suit their version. He mentions a sponsorstrip speech attributed to Delegate Arturo Pacificador of Antique, but never actually delivered, as having been intercalated in the joumal of the proceedings.

They provided that the transition parliament strould be composed of incumbent President and'Vice President of the Republic (Marcos and Fernando pez, respectively), the President of the Convention (Diosdado Macapagal), of the abolished Senate and Congress (who must notify the Commission on Elec within 30 days of the ratification of the new Constitution of their desire to serve' and the constitutional delegates who voted for Article XVII, the controversial T sitory Provision. If the delegates had a stake in this provision because oftheir desire tojoin I Interim National Assembly, Marcos had a much greater one. Upon its approval, would become President and Prime Minister under the old and new Constitutions, of his decrees would become part of the law of the land, and all treaties, execut agreements and contracts entered into by him would thenceforth be conside legal, binding and valid. Whatever the extent of theii respective interests, Marcos and the evidently tried to use each other. He was, however, scandalized by the bla attempt of some members of the convention to secure their political future wi having to face an election. More thar this, he was repulsed by the prospect of having to work with the old political pros, whom he had blamed for the conditions that, made it "necessary" to declare martial law what Marcos truly wanted was an Assembly of new faces, a body of neophytes whom he could manipulate not an unruly' crowd of Congress veterans who had become experts at political blackmail and other, standard tricks ofthe trade. With the declaration of martial law on 2l September 1972, the way was clear for Marcos to shape the new constitution as he wanted. Delegates Rama, Jose Mari Velez, Voltaire Garcia, and many others who fought him were rounded up and thrown in jail. within sixty days, Malacaflang was able to come up with the desired draft which.contained the provisions that Marcos had spent so rnuch time in coaxing, wheedling, threatening and courting the delegates to support. on 29 Novembe/ the proposed charter was approved by the convention with a vote of 273 to 15. one delegate refused to cast his vote,27 were absent some of them having become poli-

Pacificador says that the Mijares statement is absolutely without basis, for nowhere can this supposed fictitious speech be found in the journal. He also states that if the Constitution differs from what was originally adopted, it is only in the matter of style. Many delegates, however, feel that the introduction of broad terms and ambiguous words and phrases effectively alters the substance of the charter, especially when it is left to the Supreme Court to "legislate by judgment." Marcos, though, was not entirely pleased with the approved document. While it provided for a parliamentary system and no longer prohibited him and members of his family from occupying the position of either President or Prime Minister, the composition of the Interim National Assembly was as the delegates had stubbornly proposed. Instead of showing his hand and disappointing those whom he had used so soon after the convention, he decided to deal with this problem in the classic Machiavellian fashion.

As required in both the old and new Constitutions, the charter should have been ratified by the people in a plebiscite called specifically for the purpose. But Marcos opted for a week-long referendum on 10 January 1973. During this period, hastily-convened "citizens' Assemblies" were asked several questions, among these whether they approved of the new Constitution and whether they still wanted a plebiscite to ratify it. More than 14,000,000 Filipinos were reported to.have said "Yes" to the first,. "No" to tlte second. The assemblies voted on these vital issues aiaa uoce or by a simple show of hands. In some of the bizarre cases that helped make the ratification a farce, village or district leaders .asked; "Are you ready for lunch?" or some trivial questions. The enthusiastic raising of hands was then photographed or recorded as formal approval of the Constitution. Regardless of how the referendum was conducted, the people's negative anto the question of whether the Interim National Assembly should be convened or not reflected, I believe, the public sentiment at the time. Filipinos hrid had enough of comrpt and abusive congressmen and did not want to see them back in power. On the basis of these "overwhelrning results," Marcos issued proclamation No. ll02 announcing the ratification by the Filipino people of the new Constitution. Concerned citizens then filed a number of cases with the Suprerne Court directly impugning this "instant ratification." Although a majority of six Justices held that the charter had not been ratified in accordance with the amending process specificd in the 1935 Constitution, two of them nevertheless agreed with the others to throw swer

out the

cases.

156

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The majority decision h a classic in double-talk, the strange language that Supreme Court was apparently forced to adopt in order to defend the Observing that "there was not enough votes to declare the Constitution force," the Court then went on to say that "this being the vote of the majo there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being mnsideredq force and in effect." Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who dissented from view, says that the last line was hastily added to the decision just before the just siped it. At whose irstance, no one now recalls. Marcos, however, realized that if the Constitution was to be the wellspring the legitimacy of his regime, repeated deviations similar to the January I "referendum-plebiscite" would undermine its authenticity. Subsequent were tlrerefore "approved" in plebiscites supervised by the Commission on Electi In October 1976, b.e introduced a package of nine amendments which, he were necessary for "normalization." In reality, they were aimed at strengthening control of the government. Doubts had previously been expressed over whether had the authority to propose changes in the charter, since it provides that these be proposed only by the National Assembly (interim or regular), or by a tional convention. But his appointees in the Supreme court had ruled (in the case' saniclad as. the commission in Elections) that in the absence of a lawmaking body the Interim National Assembly was not convened until June 1978 - and as the sitory of legislative power in the meanwhile, he could initiate such amendmen In establishing the legitimacy of the new Constitution, the martial law gove ment, and all of fus actions as President and Prime Minister, Marcos and those charge of defending his regime are quick to cite flre various Supreme Court on the referendum and plebiscite held between 1973 and 1976. But these decisi though apparently legally conect, do not take into account the fact that under tial law conditions, the citizens vote under actual or psychological duress worse, that their votes are not reckoned honestly. The members of the Supreme Court themselves, being personally indebted Marcos for their appointments and also subject to the same threats that ordi citizens face, canlot be assurned to be completely objective in their application the law to the existing order. Under normal, truly democratic circumstances, they have promulgated the same judgments ald decisions? This hypothetical q tion is often asked because, despite their peculiar situation, all the Marcos-appointed justices do have impressive scholastic and professional records, and are highty regard-l ed in legal and academic circles. Being more intelligent and perceptive than the nary layman, it is impossible for them not to realize or discern that the new Constitution and its several amendments have notpassed the test of legitirnacy, and that Marcos is not the duly-constituted and democratic leader that their rulings make

him appear. Two of such amendrnents, in fact, were obviously designed to institutionalize his role a one-man legislature - or, more to the point, a virtual dictator. Qs Amendtnent No. 5 states that "the incumbent President shall continue to exer. cise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." But even after martial law shall have bcen lifted and full parliamentary governrnent established, Marcos may

The l\darcos

Constitution

157

continue to enact laws under Amendment No. 6, which provides that "whenever in the judgment of the President @rime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a tlrreat or imminence thereof, or whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, irt order to meet the exigency, iszue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land." The situations in which Marcos may act unilaterally are, like the declaration or termination of martial law, left entirely to his personal judgment. He may therelore pre-empt the interim or regular National Assembly at any time and for any reason, an emergency being anything that "in his judgement" threatens the country from a pocket revolt or a sudden drop in the price of copra. And no one may question his right or authority to do so. It is all there in a Constitution that invests him with a range of powers so wide that his field of action, now and in years to come, may be circumscribed only by the limits of his imagination. Says Prof. Perfecto V. Fernandez of the U.p. Coltege of Law: ..That the govemment today is authoritarian is obvious from its organization and structure. That it is constitutional, is an official assertion which many devoutly wish to be true. In the circumstances, however, tlris is a proposition not too plain to be contested, in the lofty language of Justice John Marshall, and the debate on this particular point will doubtless absorb, if not bedevil, Philippine constitutiondl scholars for decades

tc come, . ."

Bar4ngganicGovemment 159 icrment of the locality. It created the barrio council with powers to promulgate

BARANGGANIC GOVERNMENT

ordinances, to construct roads, bridges, schools an{ drainage systems' within its boun' daries, as well as a dozen other functions designed to give the residents an opportunity to manage their own affairs. The Barrio Charter, however, specifically excluded the urban zones - districts irr the town or city proper - from the benefits of autonomy. This seemed rather un' lair to our urban constiiuents, and so in 1972 when I became the Mayor of Cagayan de Oro City, in Northem Mindanao, I organized barrio counterparts within the city proper; there was much these zones could do to help themselves but, lacking the Charter enjoyed by the barrios, they were at best socio-civic units. Because 'lbarrio" had a rural connotation, I named the urban vnits barangays. Not lortg after martial law was dqclared, I sent a memorandum to Marcos suggesting that all barrios be named barangays, and that the Charter be extended to include the urban units as well.

N 2l September 1974, in the second year of martiallaw,Marcosissued sidential decree oflicially constitutingthe barangay * which is village or district

as the smallest govemment sudivision 'oto

provide effective

lar participation in the shaping of pubtc policy" and to make the unit "an effe instrument of national solidarity and progress. Accordingly, his political technocrats in the Ministry of Local rdnted the word "barangganic" to describe the type of grassroots or mocracy'that sprang from his genius. Contrary, however, to the avowed set forth in the decree - that the barangay would serve as primary venue for citizen participation in govemment - it has become what Marcos secretly it to be: the base of a massive, village-level political machine a-nd the instru his authoritarian dictates. Instead of functioning as a mirror of the popular will by which the na leadenhip and the central govemment could be guided, the institution of the gay now serves as his personal apparatus for the implementation of laws, decrees flowing from the top. Instead of fostering the development of the virtues of self-reliance, ble citizenship and initiative on the part of village leaders, it has reduced them to the status of blind, unquestioning followers of a Marcos cult that is rently being built, ironically, at public expense. Indeed, the most damning indictnent against the martial law regime is its version of a historically democratic institution like the baranglry in Marcos' perpetuate himself in power. It is a perversion reminiscent of the methods create the Hitler Youth Movement in the Nazi Germany of the 1930s, and is no

chillingsinrply[recause,fortunately,theideahasfailedtocatchfire, The late Ramon Magsaysay - the man who rose from mechanic to was the first Chief Executive to recognize the rural villages as potential assets. Until then, village folks living in these barrios - or barangays, as they are called - had been regarded by national politicians as just a notch above the ted hill tribesmen, who cast their ballots exactly the way their urban cousins in towns and cities instructed them to do. But with the proliferation of local radio stations, vernacular newspapers magazines, barrio people began to develop minds of their own as well as an ness of issues, both local and national. They could no longer be treated like ca or led by the nose to the nearest polling place. They were now wont to weigh merits and demerits of the men who sought the privilege to govern. When the Barrio Charter was enacted in 1956 and later amended by lic Act 3590 - it was lauded as a historic document reaffirming the truism God's eye - and that of the politician - was always "on the sparrow.', It teed the hitherto unprecedented income of lWo of real estate revenues for the

* wasn't the Spanish barrio good enough? back to before the Castillian conquistadores cilme to plunder Barangay dates of the Philippine Archipelago. It derives from the fertile islands the rich and exploit word balangltoy or boat. The early Filipinos had come in great migratory waves to settle on Philippine shores, on boats large enough to contain whole families. The family head --*t o also acted as captain or navigator - retained leaderstrip even after landing, for the migrant families continued to group together as a community. The lreadman later evolved to become chieftain or d(ttu, and the bommunity became the But why barangay?

barangay,

Historians assure us that even before the Spanish colonizers arrived four cen-

turies ago, the barangay had already become self-contained political and social units - with several sometimes forming themselves into confederations for mutual

protection and commerce. Some of the larger and more advanced barangays even engaged in extemal affairs. In 1406, one such barangay sent an emissary to China, where he presented the delighted Emperor with gifts of fine horses, silver and other precious objects. In retum, this early Filipino diplomat was gifted with paper money and silk. However, there is little resemblance, if at all, between the barangays of old and the ones that Marcos has constituted by decree. While the ancient units were in the nature of "city-states" existing independently of the other, the present models are structured along military patterns. The headman is called a chairman - but more often a "captain," a carry-over of the Spanish practice of naming the village chief teniente (lieutenant) or capitan (captain) del banio. He is assisted by a legislative council which enacts local ordinances or serves as advisers. The people themselves are organized into work or service brigades, somewhat similar to those in the People's Republic of China, where a number of Local Gor'' ernment and Community Development Officers - now designated as Provincial or City Commanders like their counterparts in the constabulary force - were sent to study the techniques of recruitment, training and organization. The barangay Tanod Brigade is called upon to help maintain peace and order

I60

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Barangganic

units as the local police traffic bureau and the constabulary Highway patrol during religious processions, motorcades, funerals and disasters. The Barangay Ladies Auxiliary Brigade, needless to say, is composed men who initiate fund-raising carnpaigns zurd community projects, as well as mation drives along goverrunent lines (e.g. family planning, Green

beiutification, etc.). ..catalyst

The Barangay Volunteer Brigade, on paper, acts as for social aird is charged to promote massive citizen involvement in the affairs of &e ba

of this particular brigade is to act as a .lehicle i development of social, political, economic, and cultural consciousness of the in the b.arangay," this aspect has been hailed as grassroots democracy in the ma

Since the primary objective

The Barangay Disaster Brigade is expected to act whenever

calamity or

ter hits the barangay, or an accident transpires within its perimeter, while aw response from the government agency concerned. on the Barangay Sports Brigade falls the broad responsibility of deve a well-rounded citizenry * sound both of mind and body. It is charged with ing wholesome activities for the drunks and idlers of flre commrrlty, u, strengthen fraternal ties among all the members of the various barangay t sometime in 1974, I sent a memo to Marcos proposing the active inv nrent of youth in government affairs through the creation of a Department of y and a Barangay Youth council, and was pleased to learn from Malacafrans prel dential Assistant Cuillermo de Vega that the President found this iAea meritrioq Not long after, Marcos issued a decree organizing all citizens from 16 to lg old into a Kabataang Barangay; or Barangay youth corps, with the chainnan as e officio member of the adult Barangay council. The youth were thus provided r effective forum for their views and opinions on national and local issues or sri; -

was thought.

Subsequently, the eldest of the Marcos children, Imee, was acclaimed National chairperson of the Kabataang Barangay. when she passed lg, her fatl solved the problem by simply issuing an amendatory decree to include ..youths,'

161

('hairmen and for them to elect all othgr officials from among themselves. Under this rcheme, anyone aspiring for Govemor or Mayor, or Regional or National Assembly rcpresentative would have to run flust as a barangay official. But this was met with \trenuous opposition from his own partymen when it came up for possible inclusion in the proposed Local Govemment Code. Although nothing has been said about it since, Bukidnon Gov. Carlos Fortich Jr., who had previously sprved in the Code ('ommittee, believes that Marcos has not abandoned the idea of indirect elections. Those who know him well believe that Marcos is interested in this procedure, lcss as a populist approach to government than as a means 0f controlling the electrrral process - especially in the post-martial law era. By the terms of its charter, the barangay is supposed to be under the adminislrative supervision of the town or city mayor, who is presumed to possess immediate liuniliarity with the problems and conditions of the units within his jurisdiction. But in practice, it is the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development that controls the barangays through the Provincial, City and Municipal Developrnental Officers or Commanders. A system of doles which the central government offers to loyal and desewing barangays, usually around election time, and the tlrreat of removal or punishment, also operate to strengthen this hold over village or district

within the barangay, and to assist police forces during "massive security tions." From time to time, howevel, the Tanods are mobirred like an army a out to quell demonstrations or disperse peaceful assemblies outside their

In one rally staged at the University of the philippines, students complained ities committed by the barangay forces called in io reenforce the police. The Barangay Auxiltiary Traffic Brigade supplements such traffic

Government'

up to 23 years.

As "the base for citizen participation in governmental affairs and their lective views lwere to beJ considered in the flormulation of national policies ar progrilms," Marcos saw the barangay as the foundation of a great pyramid, wi the municipal and provincial councils occupying the middle levels of this tier, and National Assembly at the apex. To provide incontrovertible proof that he was truly interested in promotingi, the growth of grass'roots democracyl he advocated direct elections for the Barangay

lcaders.

In the 1978 election of representatives to the Interim National Assembly, for cxample, Development Officers compelled the barangay chairmen to deliver an overwhelming majority of the votes to the government party - the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan - in exchange for P5,000 checks which could be cashed only after the elections. At the same time, it was made unmistakably clear to all that dire consequences rvould befall those who failed. Thus motivated and intimidated, the majority of barangay captains echoed the slogan that "the KBL must win at all cost!" and allowed themselves to become instruments of nationwide fraud and terrorism. Unwittingly, they helped to stamp out the "grassroots democracy" that was supposed to thrive in their midst, under Marcos' "barangganic" development program. In the 1980 election of local officials, the Barangay Chairmen were once again required to ensure the KBL victory by hook or by crook. This time, the g9vemment made good its threat to remove disloyal Chairmen and those who failed to deiiver the required majority or refused to be intimidated or corrupted, found them. selves unceremoniously sacked and replaced by new Chairmen h,andpicked by Marcos'provincial or city leaders. That total political and adnrinistrative control of the barangay units is the ultimate objective of the exercise may be seen in the undue emphasis given to organization, cadre training and the establishment of clear linkages with the central authority. Irene R. Cortes, former Dean of the U.P. College of Law, in a lecture, acknowledges that a communication system that can be put intb effective opera[ion, such as the barangay structure affords, could be a source of strength. Ilut by the same token, it could also be a weakness if used the wrong way. This is hclw shc puts it: Where efforts are forthright and sincere to develop intelligent anrl

r'i

162

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION free participation, the integrity of which is jealously guarded, patory democracy" can become an established reality. On the hand, the process could, by manipulation, be zubverted and re the yrfing out of whatever gains may have so far been achioved in oping the barangays' interest and involvement in local and nat grams in considering and reacting to public issues, and in among themselves. .

BarangganicGovernment

Item:

That many of the barangay leaders were appointed more or less on the basis of closeness to the appointing-powers rathor than cornpetence, honesty and integrity is ofpublic kngwlgdge'

2;KY,r'J'ifft

Popular participation in the form of reaction to policies made or as feedback mechanism to con{irm decisions already may be participation of sorts. But until initiative comes from the themselves, until their voices are heard in policy and decision m their will freely exercised is faithfully carried out, citizen parti will not truly come of age.

Thll the people's voices are seldom, if ever, heard in policy and decisiori,r ing is evident in the many unrealistic and irrelevant projects that the barangay -Bicol asked to on Lrders from above. In the regon, tt-,e ,iurgis TpbTrrtr once asked by Development officers what they considered to be their riost pressing needs, and they cited transport facilities for their farm produce, irril systemsi and work opportunities. The central government responded by di the barangay folks to give first priority to Mrs. Marcos, beautification can As surely as "mass follows class," a favorite expression of Mrs. Marcos, baranqqy- has-also been infected by the virus of .o*rption that plagues the gov, t

;;;;;:;'"i

iii,i,", o

" about the rggime. Graft, which had previously been confined to the ministries the bureaucracy, has become endemic even in the countryside that even the trolled local press occasionally feels it must speak out:

Item:

The Ministry of Local Govemment and Community Devei ment is currently investigating the reported anomalies (o, pricing, delivery of defective materials) regarding the Barang Development Approach Fund . . . totalling pZbO mruion ;l Such materials are procured by the city or municipal ment officers.

Bulletin

17 August I Item:

Barangay officials, mostly from the Visayas and Min are being pressured by some public and private officials I keep silent on the BIDA Fund mess.

.1.

-Daily Exp 17 August I

163

Through the comrption and intimidation of the leaders and people of the balrngay, Marcos seeks not only to build a village-level political machine which her could activate at any time by simply pushing a single button in Malacalang Palace, lrtrt a personal cult with himself and his wife as the central figures. In 1973, during my brief stint in Malacaflang as Undersecretary of Public Inforrnation, I was greatly disturbed to discover that a special group in the Palace had hccn tasked to prepale a detailed plan for the establishment of zuch a "Marcos cult." 'l'he proposals contained in the paper ranged from the erection of monuments for Marcos and his wife, the naming of public buildings and parks in their honor, the eoining of medals and commemorative stamps, display of life-sized portraits of the l,resident and the First Lady in schools and government offices, oaths of loyalties nnd prayers, and similar rituals. Many have already been implemented witJrout the public being aware that the formal tributes paid to that Marcos family are actually palt of a grand mosaic little llid out to enhance their politicd pernanence, by etching their images into the Fili' pino consciousness. In all Philippine schools today, both public and private, text' books have been revised to praise the virtues of the New Society. Schoolchildren are hcing taught to idolize Marcos as the "savior of the nation" and Mrs. Marcos as the "ideal Filipina woman." This deification is being carried out through an esoteric barangay brigade training prog:rm which also plays on the zuperstition of simple village folk. When it was fust introduced, there was mixed reaction throughout the country. Barangay trainees made a joke of the ritual, but others saw it as a "prelude to dictatorship." Because of the human rights imptcations of the brigade exericises, members , of the Catholic Bistrops Conference, the Major Religious Superiors of Men in the Philippines, and the Major Religious Superiors of Women in the Philippines were lsked by Joaquin Bernas, S.J., Chairman of the Executive Board of these organiz*' tions, to verify reports coming from Nueva Ecija, Zambales, Pampanga, Laguna, Batangas, Iloilo City, Antique, Misamis Oriental, Iligan City and Zamboanga, said Fr. Bernas:."These reports, in connection with training seminars for the Barangay Brigades of the martial law regime, and specifically for lhe Barangay Kapal programs, have given many citizens cause for grave apprehension that there is probably a pattem of preparation for totalitarian rule, based on a personality cult of certain high officials of the martial law regime." As uniformly reported to the Jesuit Provincial by priests and religious or lay leaders;

This pattern begins with an invitation to a four'to-five'day train'

:\:

]

t' ,.

t64

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION ing seminar for Barangay Brigade leaders. participaats are degrees of pressure, often not too subtle, often veiled threats in case of refusal.

Barangganic

Governrnent

165

mes and the

nationalism, discipline, community involvement, government like, albeit strongly favoring the viewpoint of the

those at the barangay level, were prominent in organizing and reci.uiting for the seminars. In a significant number of seminars reported, ministers andior leaders of a local religibus sect were active in recruiting and staff' ing the seminars, and in exhorting and inducting the members -of the Barangay Kawal. It is improbable that these are merely spontaneous local phenome' na. The reports are too widespread and similar, indicating a deliberate'

ciety.

govemment-sponsored or government'supported pattern or p6licy, pro'

On the last night, hciwever, the seminar takes on a new atmoqphere of mystery and suspense. As the night deepens, the pants are blindfolded and led by circuitious routes for about 15 to another place of assembly. When their blindfolds are removed,, usually find themselves in a hall iri which the only light comes torches which flank a fullJength picture of President Ferdinand cos. This picture is invariably of heroic, more than life.sized and is sometimes also accompanied by a picture of Mrs. Imelda dez Marcos, and sometimes also by that of the mayor of the Often some flags or banners flank the picture or pictures. In the ground there is a red-covered book of one of Mr. Marcos' writing, decorated stand, together with some oatJr forms for signature. A

bably nationwide in scoPe. The terms of the oatls in these seminars far transcend the oaths to defend the Constitution and democratic rights and freedom, and to tell the truth, to which we are used in a democratic political system. Ins' tead the oaths in those Barangay Kawal seminars and the setting in which they are held, convey the strong impression of a personality cult demanding absolute loyalty - a totalitarian propensity contrary to the spi' rit of the I 93 5 Constitution.

" varying

During the seminar itself, nothing remarkable happens until

night. Before that there are the expected lectures and di

skull often completes the setting.

After a brief exhortation touching on the greatness and beri

of the New

Society and its exalted leader, the presiding officer:r

begins to inform the participants that they are being lnducted into$ Barangay Kawal (Barangay Army). They are then told that as

Kawal they will be sworn to defend with their lives and their total mitment, the "Supremo" and '?rimer Ministro," and the strict secft regarding the dramatic events of the night. Then follows a formal call for those who do not wish to oath to say so. (Al1 those reluctant to take the oaths were afraid to, so, on the occasions covered by our reports.) And so the oaths are istered - one of total commitment to the "Supremo,,, and onb to secrecy. Many participants at this point take the oath under duressi ing afraid of the consequences of refusing, and being still in a statqi disorientation from the suddenness of these developments. The participants are then requested to affix their signatures to oath forms or to the red-covered book (which, in alother country, have been a copy of .Mein Kampf) of Mr. Marcos, writings, so that they could be summoned to fulfill the obligations of the they have taken, whenever necessary. In some instances they are told sign their names in their own blood, and many do so. Toward the end the ceremony, the participants take part in burning an effigy of the Old Society and its evils. In all these reported seminars, local govemment officials,

Barangay captains and Development officers of the Ministry of Local Government whom Ipersonally interviewed confirm the information embodied in Fr. Bernas rrremorandum. I'here is no doubt that over and above their perceived duty to God tnd country, barangay trainees are expected to render loyalty and homage to Marcos and his wife, before whose candle-lit images they are made to repeat the following oath: We, the people of the barangay, declare and proclaim before the entire nation and the world our commitment to the ideolory of the New Society and our dedication to its goals ofauthentic growth and national development.

We pledge allegiance and loyalty to our President, Father of the New Society, and our beloved First Lady, Mother of the Barangay Bri' gades. . .

is possible - but highly improbable - that the "deification" program does not have the imprimatur of either Marcos or'Mrs. Marcos and could be the brainchild of those around them who may have more at stake in the perpetuation of the regime. But the nature of Marcos' "barangganic government" demands that the leader exude the aura of power and invincibilify.

In pre-Hispanic times, the barangay chieftain was morethanamereadministrator of village affairs. Although he had a council of elders, its role was essentially consultative. It was the chief who acted as lawmaker, judge and executor. As the New Society has been politically structured, the Interim National Asembly ntay be likened to an impotent council of elders, Marcos himself to a powerful chief, and the Philip. pines to an extended barangay.

Facade

DemocracY

167

from Washington for popular elections and the restoration ofrepresenta' tive government. Thus, on 7 April 1978, Fitipinos trooped to the polls for the first time in seven years to elect representatives to the Interim National Assembly. Under the 1973 Constitution, members of the parliament were.to be chosen by district. But l'earing perhaps that the opposition might win a majority of the seats if the campaign were to be confined to a smaller atea, Marcos deereed the polling to be held on a re' gional basis and scheduled it without giving his opponents time to organize.

less pressure

FACADE DEMOCRACY S long as he ruled the Philippines by decree, it was impossible for M svadg the charge - persistenfly raised by the opposition and the world that the New Society was dictatorship, pure and simple. From the start, he had his regime a 'trisis govemment" seeking to legitimize one-man rule with the we quasi-legitimate term of 'tonstitutional authoritarianism." These labels were to inadequate. In the eyes of the world, he had merely joined the ianks of the Shah of lran, sident:Anastacio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua, and other strongmen who eve had to flee their country to escape the consequences ofrevolutionary upheavals. \{ qtill, in some p.arts of Africa, Filipino overseas workers were aghast to learn sophisticated natives sometimes referred to Marcos as the "Idi Amin of the Pacific an ext(avagant but damaging comparison resulting as much from widespread about ftre Philippines as from disrnay over incredible conditions in Uganda at the In the United States, the outcry against the "Marcos dictatorship" was shrill owing to 'the presence of Filipino rebels who linked President Carter's rights campaign to their demand for U.S. withdrawal of official zupport to the law government. Fconomic and military aid, they charged, was being used by to oppress the people and to perpetuate his unpopular regime.

/f fl

Evidently, the ambivalent American attitude towards repressive in various parts of the world had been formed by global strategic necessity. The policy that President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, State Department tary Henry Kissinger, seemed to espouse was that so long as the "son-of-a-bitch" their "son.of-a.bitch," there was nothing wrong in going to bed with a dictator. President Carter's evangelistic vision of America's role as the guardian of and human rights throughout the world soon placed the U.S. in an awkward tion with respect to its alliance with countries under authoritarian or dictatorial In the heyday of CIA adventurism, this problem would have been solved nea by deposing .- or disposing of - an undemocratic ally whom the people had grown despise. But with the flood of exposes about the CIA's covert operations, the appears less inclined to violent methods in effecting changes of government. Even if a. "CIA" solution were available, the case of the Philippines would require the existence of a viable alternative - and in so far as the Americans are cemed, there seems to be none in sight. In their view, the opposition is so that if conditions were created to force Marcos out of Malacafrang Palace, a vacuum might enzue - thereby exposing the country to the danger of a take-over forces unsympathetic to the U.S., notably the small but tightly-organized, higlrly ciplined leftist elements. Marcos, however, is not one to take unnecessary risks. Rather than provoke tlro displeasure of the Carter administration, which had become increasingly embarrassed by its material support for his one-man rule, Marcos reportedly succumbed to relent.

Said an unsuccessful candidate: "That was a selection, not an election. Marcos strould have appointed the members of the Assernbly and saved money for the coun'

try." To underscore the significance of the event, Marcos convened the Assembly on June, the day marking the frst declaration of independence from Spanish rule. The [2 nationwide celebration focused on the imposing new parliament building which had been built in such a great rush that its roof leaked. And since it stood on what had been a garbage dump, huge flies competed with assemblymen for attention in the session hall. There, Marcos, in his dual capacity as Prime Minister (under the l97f Con' stitution) proudly stated: "\ilith the Interim Batasang Pam6a25a (National Assernbly) now convened, we have demonstrated a very basic principle of the free society: the consent and participation of the govemed. . . ."

He then stressed the point that the fledgling legislature "manifests in formal form the transition from constitutional authoritarianism to liberalism - despite the claim that the contemporary historical trend in the developing countries is towards authoritarianism."

In reality, what Marcos inaugurated was a cross between a quasi' and facade-

democracy * a government dominated by one party, with all the trappings of liberalism but none ofits attributes. Professor Samuel Finer, Chairman of the Political Studies Association of Great Brit&in, has defined facade-democracy as "a system of rule where liberal'democratic institutions, processes and safeguards are established by law but are in practice so manipulated or violated by a historic oligarchy as to stay in office." Although this system is uzually identified with the "old oligarchy" or "old autocracy," the Marcos govemment somehow fulfills the definition because of the me' thods he used to establish it and the absence of constitutive freedoms. In Finer's view:

The constitutive freedoms which are the prerequisites of a liberal democracy are the freedoms of speech and press, of assoiiation and of elections. If any of the first three are curtailed or abolished, the elections becomet pro tanto less than a true expression of public opinion. If, in addition, the elections themselves are falsified, then those in office perpetuate their hold on it or freely dispose of it on the strength ofan entirely fictitious claim to the support of public opinion' In some way or another, this is precisely how facade'democracy operates.

In the liberal-democratic

sense, therefore, the Interim National Assembly lirils

lll

I68

THE COUNTERFETT REVOLUTION to qualify as a real parliament. It can not ratify treaties, nor remove the incr Prime Minister through a noconfidence vote. In the Assembly itself, there is settling belief even irmong members of the ruling party that the transition has been set up as a mere showpiece.

Not only does Marcos still continue to exercise legislative powers ofter though oblivious of the Assembly's existence but refuses to give asse.nutymen adequate staff zupport they need to function effectively as lefislators. For r and clerical chores, the assemblyman has to make do with his own wits and sources. Even the speaker of the House, former Supreme court chief Justice Makalintd, has complained privately to colleagues uuori tt l, deprivation. As blyman Nick Logarta of the opposition pusyon Bisaya puts it: ..This body has programmed to fail." Eren if Marcos were to anow the Nationar Assembly to function n serious doubts and misgivings have been expressed about the suitability of the 3.n9ry-:lltl.*_ to Filipino experience and temperament. Indeed, no sooner was Interim National Assembly inaugurated than leading members th. "f tiated a move for a retum to the old presidential forir of government. As expected, the move was opposed by those who argued that the yr1:, was practically imposed by the American colonial administrators, and that Tydings-McDuffie Law providing for philippine Independence in l946left the pec no choice but to accept the form of govemment required by that law. It was, in a price that Filipinos had to pay in exchange for political freedom. . There is ample historical evidence to show, however, that Filipino leaders the past did evolve some form of parliamentary govemment. The constitution resr ing from the Pact of Biak-na-Bato on I November l g97 provided for a Supreme cil vested with legislative, executive and judicial powers and an Assembly of Re1

^il;;;;;

tatives elected by univeral suffrage. The Malolos Constitution drawn up two later created a Permanent commission to sit as a legislative body when the Assr was not in sesion. It also rnade the legislative branch superior to the executive judiciary.

These ideas were borrowed from other parliaments like those of France and gium. unfortunately, the concepts could not be tested, because of the revoluti situation obtdining at the time. . whether Filipinos really prefer one system to the other remains an open tion to this day. By adopting the parliamentary form, the framers of the 1973 stitution rendered the issue moot and academic. But as we have seen that Constitu tion was the result ofMarcos'manipulation and cannot be said to reflect the true sen

timent of the Filipino people or their representatives to the convention, majority oi whom were for the retention of the presidential forrn under the 1935 Constitution As previously stated, the presidential form, with certain modifications, ,as the first'l proposal to be reported out by the committee on the Executive in october 1971. Four months later, in February 1972, the Committee abrupily reversed itself and sgb{ mitted the parliamentary system for consideration by the Convention with the few who had thought of it as an -antidote against the abuse of presidential powers how,

by Marcos' proselytes. There were several valid reasons though which made the parliamentary system an lnteresting proposition io the delegates. For one thing, the fusion of the legislative tnd executive branches, with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet - technically, the Bovernment - the implementing arm of the parliament, promised greater coordination efficiency in the realization of programs. For another, the participation of execulnd , tlve officials in the discussion of measures was expected to bring to the legislature in. i lbrmation that it could not have if the executive and legislative branches were sepai rnte, coequal and co-independent. 1 Under the 1935 Constitution, the powers of the government were clearly divided , hctween the President (Executive), Congress and the Senate (Lrgislative), the Supreme ,(lourt and the lower courts (Judiciary) - with the legislative bodies enaeting, the Pre. itident inforcing, and the courts interpreting, the law- This division provided a built-in itystem of checks and balances. There could be no real abuse of power, since one ;hranch could, in a sense, stop the other. Exponents of the parliamentary govemment pointed out, however, that the pretidential form was susceptible to deadlocks - usually between the President and ConJoined

which were detrimental to national development and progres. They also lrgued that a President with a fixed term and not subject to removal at any time was 'prone to act arbitrarily, often in total disregard of the party and those responsible gress

for his election.

He could be ousted only through impeachment, but this procedure was considered cumbeniome requiring at least the two-thirds vote of Congress for the initia.the Senate for conviction. In any case, tion of charges, and the three-fourths vote of

irnpeachment proceedings could be filed only for treason and other high crimes, and would not provide quick relief against an abusive or incompetent President. On the other hand, the Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet may be changed during their incumbency as members of Parliament for iny reason tJrrough the noconfidence vote. This feature of the parliamentary system appealed to those who felt that with one man exercising the powers of the Presidency as an independent branch of govenrment, the office had become extremely powerful. Obviously, the parliamentary system as a more effective and democratic form of goverrrment was farthest from Marcos' mind when he decided to sway the convention. The presidential form enabled the chief executitve to dischuge his duties with less interference than a Prime Minister, who was legally responsible to his peers in parliament, might have. But, as mentioned earlier, he saw the change as a means of cir-

cumventing the prohibition againit a third successive term under the l935Constitution. And when he declared martial law, the parliamentary system offered still another opportunity to enlarge his ruling powers, since he could now dictate what laws should ot tnuilll;r. of its extraordinary flexibility and utility, partiamentary govemment has been called "a tool of monarchs, of oligarchs, and of democrats" - suggesting that in the hands ofanastutepoliticalleader, it could be used either for dentocratiq or auto. cratic purposes. In Britain, Canada, Australia to a certain extent, and several West

-T I7O

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

European countries (not including France) where the British example is legislative power rests with the parliament alone and the government leader s its zufferance. But in the Philippines, where the Constitutign empowers make decrees even after martial law is lifted, the dcmocratic potentials of the have been subverted and the nature of parliamentary government so altered that to call it "parliamentary" would be open to question. Those who believe that this abnonnal state of affairs is transitory and when the country retums to full nonnalization need only to be reminded that martial law were to be ended, Marcos would still continue to rule in exactly the way that he does at present. He has succeeded in institutionalung, throughvir constitutional provisions and amendntents, the authoritarian features of his regime to the point where there would be no substantial difference between ernment that now operates and the one that would emerge after martial law. Even without Marcos, doubts have been expressed whether the parli syqtem pattemed after the English rnodel would work as well for Filipinos. English have shown, parliamentary govemment can be a "prornoter of p democracy." But first it must be founded on a vigorous and enlightened party by which the people, exercising freedom of choice, take active part in the fo of ideology, philosophy, policy and progriuns. Althouglt parties have existed i Philippines for more than three-qtrarters of a century, they have not really se promote ideas and progrirms of government, mainly because Filipino politicians impelled more by ambition than ideology Political parties, as we know them today, did not come into existence un beginning of the American occupation in the early 1900s. Their prototypes varigus reform and revolutionary organizations, such as those fomted by And nifacio and General Ernilio Aguinaldo during the last few years of Spanish rule. These two leaders of tl're revolution were then locked in a bitter rivalry to form the Magdiwarg group to oppose Aguinaldo's A4agdalo. Bonifacio led break weakened Filipino resistance to Spain, but it sired the beginnings of parties in the Philippines.

to be formally organ2ed during the Ame the Federal Party. It was composed of prominent Filipinos who the annexation of the Philippines as a state of the Anerican union. It is interes to note that this idea was to persist for seventy years and find another advocAte the Philippine Statehood Movement, which could have evolved in 1972 into a if martial law had not intervened. But at the turn of the century, the statehood form was so unpopular that in 1905 the Federalistas decided instead to work The first political grouping

regime was

Philippine independence

Two years later, the Federal Party changed its narne to Partido Nati' Progresista (sic) but it continued to be unpopular and was roundly defeated in 1907 election for the first Philippine Legislature. The Nationalista Party, eventui to be dominated by Manuel Luis Quezon of Tayabas Province and Sergio Osmefla of Cebu, emerged victorious. From l90l to 1907, a number of political parties carne into being and

Facade

DemocracY I /l

pro'Filipino."

Even in tlturo parties, ol political lrrrly years, Filipino politicians had no qualms about changing r.onsidered either "pio-spanistr, pro-American or simply r'roating

tleir own, whenever personal ambitions dictated.

ln 1922, Manuel Luis Quezon

left the Nationalista Party after accusing Sergio ()smef,a of one-man rule, and later won massive public support of his principle of rollective leadership. Once in power, however, he violated flris principle with im' leader than Osmefla lrtrnity. Up to his death in l944,he became a more autocratic imd ever been and was regarded as the Philippines' premier strong man c()s calne along to claim the distinction.

until Mar'

There is a striking parallel in the political behavior of Marcos and Quezon. A l,iberal for fourteen years, Marcos also deserted his party to seek the Nacionalista prcsidential nomination in 1964. He then defeated President Diosdado Macapagal pn the issue of "one-man rule" - only to face the same charge from otherS under tnurtial law.

While clashing ambitions ofterr caused the split of political parties, worthy

national goals, on the other hand, often brought them together. When the Bacon and Kies bills were filed in the U.S. Congress in the twenties for the separation of the lrrsh, resource-rich island of Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines, the leaders of the major political parties - the Nrrciornlista Consolidado and the Democrata Itruck a coalition called the National Supreme Council to fight the move. which they trelieved would set back the cause of Philippine independence. In the first election held to establish the Commonwealth Govemment under tlre Tydings-McDuffie [aw, the Arrrrs'-led by Quezon and the Pros led by Osmefra

ict aside potiticat and personal animosities to fomr a coalition in support of

Que-

Ion for President and Osmefla for Vice-President. Their avowed purpose was to forge r national unity. It was from the Americans that the Filippinos acquired the political education tlat the Spanish colonizers had denied. Spain had introduced a system of indirect rule in the islands, with the Governor-General exercising authority through appointed rcillos in the provinces and cabeztts de barangay in the municipalities. The Itrcal power structure then was clominated by the illustrados, the moneyed and educated class, most of whom were Spanish nrcstizos or half'breeds. They had no inlluence on the colonial administrators, who were guided by policies set by the home Bovernment but.often acted on their iaitiative. with the coming of the Americans, the people had their first taste of popular clections and the chance to evolve their own system of political bargaining based on trative social values, practices and traditions. But for the question of statehood or

ald participation by Filipinos in the colonial government, no real country and the people voted on the basis of personalities. The divided the lssues lirst biennial election of municipal officers was held in December 1905, with flre clcction of provincial governors two months later. With a few exceptions, tlte landetl, cducated elite and traditional cornmunity elders who had served as Spanish surrogates predominated the leadership strata. At the national level, the Philippine Cornrnission appointed by the Presiclent independence,

l1il

.,-,,i

172

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Facade

of flre United States sat as a legislative body, with the Goveinor General executive. An important political change took place in 1907 when a sembly was elected to fomr the lower house of a bi-cameral legislature, with ippine Commission, now rvith mixed Filipino and American membership, ing as the upper chamber. With the passage of the Jones Law in 1916, the

sion was phased out and replaced by a Senate. Although legislation was now hands of Filipinos, all laws had to be submitted to the U.S. Congress, which hh power to annull thenr. Through this fomrative period, the development of political parties until the Second World War, when all political activity ceased. After the frorn the Japanese, there canre a renerved flurry as the country prepared in I the first post-war election. Challenging the supremacy of the Nacionalista Party, led by President Osnrefra who had succeeded Quezon upon the latter's death in ihe U.S. n 1944, rebel NPs who had organized themselves into a "Liberal" wing. This group, by Manuel A. Roxas, was later to become the Liberal Party. From l949 until free election in 1971, the LP and the NP dominated the political scene recognized as the two ntajor parties in the Philippines. However, they did not function as real parties in the sense of being one artother. not merely on an incidental or telnporary question but on "a principle of action which constitutes a rnore or less pemranent bond iunong wlto take one side against another." According to fonrrer Supreme Court Justice Roberto Concepcion:

One singular feature of the political stnrggle in the Phil since 1916, is that it l'ras not been based upon a disagreenrent on progLtlts oJ' gouerttilteilr. In fact. nrany believe that there are nO, stantial differences between our political parties. Their rnain pu it has been pointed out - is one and the sarne : to control political por for the sake of its perquisites. Althouglr fonrrally stnrctured and bound by a set of rules and platfomrs, ippine political parties functioned nlore like private clubs in which mem based on convenience, not principles. The rnost fanous and oft-quoted rat tion of this phenomenou was offered by President Quezon when he declared: loyalty,to my party ends rvhere my loyalty to my country begins." Since Filipino politicians have often invoked this dictum to justify fickle changes of affiliations. I

With the introduction of "parliamentary" govenutrent and a new constitu provision requiring that "no elective public official may change his political affiliation during his tenn of office, and no candidate for any elective public may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately or following the election," it was hoped that a real party system would evolve. As part of his promised political reform, Marcos issued a decree to im

Democracy

173

llre constitutional prohibition against '-'tumcoatism" during the elections of 19g0. 'l'his could'have been in perfect order, except that his timing betrayed his motives. lly making the decree public only after many of the candidates for local office had ;rlready switched parties, he ensured the victory of his KBL slate through the lastruinute disqualification of "turncoats" who joined the oposition. And yet, two years before, in the election that he called for the Interim Natioriil Assembly, Marcos had encouraged politicians to leave their parties and join his umbrella organization, the "Bagong Lipunang Kilusan ng mga Liberal, Nacionarista, at Iba pa" (New society Movement for the Liberals, Nacionalista, and others). It was only after he had estab. lished a part! of veritable tumcoats that he felt duty.bound to comply with the constitutional mandate against turncoatism. I what Marcos obviously seeks to develop, whjle he has the power and the opportulrity to do so; is a party system in which the KBL will emerge, after martial lalv, as the only national political party of consequence - with the opposition confined to regional or district constituencies, capable ofengaging the KBL in a few areas. Following the refusal of the Liberal party to take part in the l97g election, the political opposition at present consists of the regional parties that the Marcos regime recognizes as the most active in the provinces and cities: Lafras ng'bayan ot People's Power (Metro Manila), Bicol saru and young philippines (Bicol Region), the concemed citizens Aggrupation,of Zamboanga (southwestem Mindanao)-, *J the Mindanao Alliance (Northem and Southeastem Mindanao). Because of its origin, and the proclivity of some of its members to publicly profess loyalty to Marcos, the

Pusyon Bisaya (central visayas) is generally regarded as pseudo-opposition.

Although it had been his apparent intention to establish a parliamentary government on the strength of a single party, Marcos realized in l97g that, with the eyes of the world focused on the frst "popular" election to be held under martial law, it would not do to hold it without a credible opposition. He had hoped that the Liberal Party would field a slate for the Interim National Assembly, at least in the Metro Manila area.

But upon the advice of former President Macapagal and other high LP officials, sen. Gerardo Roxas, President, had already urnounced that unless Marcos agreed to lift martial law - not just "suspend the effects of martial law" participation would be futile. This decision cost the Liberal Party its accreditation for the- 1980 elections, since the new Constitution provides that "a political party shall be entitled to accreditation by the commission on Elections if, in the immediately preceding election, such party has obtained the third highest number of votes cast in the con-

stituency to which it seeks accreditation." Events proved the Liberals right. Because of the fear that Marcos would use all the might and resources of the martial law govemment to exact a KBL victory, his candidates ran unopposed in all but {ive regions. In these areas, the election was marked by unprecedented frauds, intimidation of voters, civil servants and village or barangay leaders, falsification of poll retums, and stuffing of ballot boxes. it was, as one opposition candidate put it, a political nightmile. Marcos knew very well what was happening, but he maintained an olymplon

174

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

like a god putting his people through the test. His feigned de ever, could not relieve him of responsibility for ttre conduct of the cially since the nationwide confusion had been caused by the Commission tion itself through the issuance of conflicting orders and instructions, delays takes in the shipment of poll materials, and the cibvious manipulation or pose,

of rezults in hotly*ontested areas like Metro Manila. Like the Supreme Court and the Commission on Audit, the COM constitutional body. As such, it is supposed to be impervious to political and forms of pressures by any branch or even by the head ofgovernment. Before law, the,'opposition party was represented in the COMELEC to enzure its i dence and fairness. Marcos, however, packed it with his own men who important decisions without his prior knowledge or approval. He is thus manage and control the outcome of all elections, referenda and plebiscites in places where people refuse to be cowed. That the COMELEC exists to serve his political interests, rather.than the lic's,is evident in the treatment of cases involving the opposition and i candidates. Said former Senator Ramon Mitra, when urged to run for Mayor of nila in 1980: "I will run only when the COMELEC has learned to count." Tii understand what Marcos wanted to accomplish in the 1978 IBP elec it is necessary to exarnine the Pusyon Bisaya (Visayan Fusion), the party that swept the Central Philippine provinces of Cebu, Bohol, Negros and Siquijor Island by a landslide. By 1978, the U.S. government was said to become increasingly embariassed about supporting a regime that its own media citizens perceived as a "dictatorship" and was therefore anxious for Marcos to a democratic election - or what would pass for one. Thus, it was also i bring the opposition into the picture, especially in cities like Manila and Cebu, the voters had always asserted their independence. With the approval of Marcos, it fell on Casimiro Madarang, a member of Commission on Elections, to organize the Pusyon Bisaya rn Cebu. In thebelief it was really opposed to the martial law government, the people threw their whelming support behind the fledgling party. What had been originally intended a shadow-fight soon tumed into a real bout. Alarmed by the results of a survey, which showed the opposition leading the KBL by a wide margin, Ma ordered the Pusyon dismantled and its principal candidates - Antonio cuenco Lito Osmefla, scions of Cebu's dominant political families, and former constitu delegato Victor de la Serna of Bohol - taken into the KBL slate. The last thing that Marcos wanted was a KBL defeat. For even if the wi were to be his own men disguised as opposition candidates, it would appear to unsuspecting domestic audience as well as to his anxious American sponsors control of the political situation had passed from his hands. To complicate matters, those who were left behind inthe pusyon line-up , ded to pursue their candidacies, this time with two fiery and incorrigible op tionists to lead them: former congressman Bartolome cabangbang, anairforce with a distinguished war record and President of the philippine-American F

Society, and former constitutional delegate Natalio Bacalso, tlte most outspoken to Visayan news commentator and joumalist. Cabangbang and Bacalso spearheaded a campaign that was to dismay Marcos liom beginnlg t-o end. They concentrated on the most sensitive issues of martial law t umai righls violations, military and government dbuses, the alleged extravagance of Mrs. Marcos, graft and comlption and dictatorship. These same charges were be' lng levelled by the LABAN group in Manila, and Marcos was loathe to have thern rired in the provinces, fearing that the entire country might came to hate him and his family by the time the election was over. The hard anti-Marcos line proved so effective that, in the words of one Cebu business leader, "even a dog running with the Pusyon could have won." But as the votes from the four Visayan provinces were being tabulated, and the opposition lead became wider, the boxes containing the official retums from Dumaguete City and Negros Oriental mysteriously disappeared. They were alleged to have been inter' oriental, cepted at the cebu waterfront by former Senator Lorenzo Teves of Negros tumed boxes zuddenly the days, for three Missing *d tt rr. constabulaiy troopers. up on the steps of the Cebu Capitol Building.

,Int}tecountconductedbymediaandcitizenvolunteers,theKBLhadbeen

the ,oundry beaten by the Pusyon in Negros. But when the boxes were opened and b-uckled the COMELEC As won. had also candidates Marcos four retums c&nvassed, down to hear a string of protest cases {iled by both t}re Pusyon and the KBL, Marcos the decided that the credibility of his govemment had suffered enough. He ordered winners' as the candidates Bisaya Pusyon thirteen proclaim all Commission to . The story in central visayas really began in the Bicol region, where a member of the Commission on Elections had agreed to help a couple of friends against the KBL. The deal was that in the manufactured returns for the provinces of Sorsogon, names of Masbate, Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, and Cantanduanes, the two KBL candidates would be dropped by the commissioner in favor of his two

opposition friends.

returns intended for cebu were shipping enor shipped to Bicol, while the ones for Bicol were flown to cebu. As this The stupidit. rectify *., dir.or.rrd on the eve of the election, there was no time to in the central least at of a CoMELEC clerk had saved t]le day for democracy -

unfortunately

for the plotters, the fake

ity

Visayas.

of political strength be' was clearly in favor of the sentiment tween Mrs. Marcos and Sen. Aquino. Public group staged on election LABAN the barrage" opposition, as indicated by a "noise car horns, beating blowing by force of show .u.. fnour*ds joined this spontaneous As all of Manila took voices. of their top at the cans and kettles or simply strouting that unless real2ed Marcos celebration, Year's New of a on the festive atmospheie go down in would slate KBL entire the and Marcos Mrs. all the stops

In Metro Manila the election was

he pulled out certain defeat.

considered a test

anomalies and irregularities in the Manila area published Religious Superiors in the Philippines on the sixth annl" of Major by the Association

A report of election

176 THE COUNTERFEIT

REVOLUTION

versary of martial law,2l September. 197g, cites a good number of activities" in this connection. Some typical cases:

I*s

LionsRoad,Mandaluyong,KBlpeople were taking pictures of who refused to show their filled ballot. National Manpower, Roosevelt General Hospital. Govemment ployees were coerced to vote KBL or be fued. Pateros, Rizal Province. Townspeople were tfueatened with guns.

rll

contents examined. LABAN watchers were forced to

Piflas. Mayor's men pointed guns them home.

at LABAN watchers

and

7 AM, ballot boxes were already full. Christ the King, E. Rodriguez, euezon City. Soldiers were just

Mandaluyong Elementary School. Ready-made ballots were

3 pC men, instead of

peace and order, coerced voters to vote KBL.

r -

a few meters.

in the ballot boxes. Baustista, Palaran, Makati. LABAN ballots were torn. sto Niflo, Paraflaque. Frying voten (those who vote several times various precincts) were accompanied by the military. KBS Voting Center, Quezon City. Employees (of the B system owned by Roberto Benedicto) cast their votes the before election day. L. Victorina School, Marikina. 6 armed troopers arrived with M COM men and caused commotion.

"These irregularities," said senator lorenzo Tafiada, LABAN chairman,'in letter to the commission on Elections on 7 April l97g,,,are so rampantastoleal this election without meaning. while many ieople have zuccumbed to te there is growing resentnent against this debasement of the electoral process. are already in an ugly mood." Impartial observers believe that had tJre election been reasonably fair, or if the rezults had not been tampered, LABAN would have won a sweeping victory. In the ilitial count'by citizen volunteen, Aquino and his running,mateJwereverymuchr atread of the race by a 60-40 margin. But the coMEr EC stopped tr,, p.i".i" i.ui, on the ground that it was misleading. When the official rezults were finally released, the situation.was reversed._ Not even Aquino, whose popularity was so overwhelming

that his election seemed a foregone conclusion, zurviveO.

DemocracY

177

Two days later, Tafiada led a group of angry marchers to protest the "election as he had correctly surmised, the people were indeed in an ugly mood. Marcos, too, sensed that if he allowed the march through the city, it could trigger an outburst of frayed tempers, igriting possible riots and disorder - and the start of a civil war. Men of the Metrocom were immediately sent to arre st Taflada and Soc Rodrigo, LABAN candidates Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Teopisto Guingonalr., Ernie Rondon and other opposition leaders, and to disperse their followers. As though nothing unusual had happened Marcos told the newly-elected members of the Interim National Assembly on 12 June 1978: '"[Ve shall continue to nourish a social atnoqphere where every citizen can exercise his constitutional rights without fear. Our vision remains a society free from poverty, in which our people can live in justice and peace while enjoying liberty and equality. But more than this, our vision hopes to develop a society of free men to whom free choice is a living

that never was," and

Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, precinct 16. LABAN watcher was away by policemen Manuel Roxas Elementary School, paco, Manila. 3 poll watchers, manhandled and taken away by police car. Tandang Sora High School, Caloocan. Ballot boxes were opened

Faltoc, Quezon City, District

Facade

reality."

The PuPPet Parliament

179

RESOL[,TTION

TTM PUPPET PARLIAMENT

URGING THE PRIME MINISTER (FERDINAND E. MARCOS) TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (FERDINAND E. MARCOS) ON THE DTSSOLUTION OF THE TNTERTM BATASANG

MMEDIATELY before the 1978 elections, Marcos aszured the public not o: but several times - that although the constitution empowered him to do so, would issuing decrees as soon as the Interim National Assembly was convene

PAMBANSA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 13, PARAGRAPH (2) OF T[m 1973 CONSTITI_]TION, FOR BEING A PI.JPPET PARLIAMENT AND A DEMOCRATIC FACADE FOR AN AU.

-stop on 12 June, leaving the task of legislation to the new parliament. Tiris was in ing with his pledge that with a representative legislature, the country would entet

period of transition that could lead nowhere but to political normalization

end of martial law.

THORITAzuAN REGIME.

and th

WHEREAS, the convening of the Interim Batasang Pambansa was described by President/?rime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos as s sigrral step towards political normal ization ;

To great and universal disrnay, however, it soon became evident that had no real intention of relinquishing his legislative powers. The Assembly had t installed merely as a rubber-stamp body to lend a democratic appearance to regime. The first signs came in the form of decrees that began to pour out of ,"{ang' They were all dated ll June 1978 to indicate trrey naa been promuJ before the Assembly came into existence. But as the months passed and the de kept coming, the suspicion grew that Marcos was ante-dating thr. to appear fai to his promise - prompting a member of the opposition, Assemblyman Filemon nandez, to describe the I lth of June as '.the longest day.,' Marcos finally realized that this ruse could not go on forever and he ul abandoned pretense, writing laws himself as if the Assembly did not exist. The tion became, and remains, a source of great frustration and humiliation for the bers of the ruling party who, despite the questionable manner of their etect wanted to think of themselves as authentic representatives of the people. on adjorrrrmrrt the following year, Assemblyrnen Emmanuel pelaez lrturo Tolentino of Marcos' KBL party blamed the poor performance of the Interim National Assembly on three factors:

WHEREAS, in public statements before and immediately after the elec. tions of April 7, 1978, the President/?rime Minister gave assurance that once the Interim Parliament was constituted, he would cease to exercise his power to legislate; WHEREAS, this aszurance notwithstanding, ttre President/?rime Minister nevertheless continues to issue and promulgate presidential decrees, even on matters that the Interim Batasang Pambansa could have acted upon with dispatch; WHEREAS, such action on the part of the President/Prime Minister indicates that he does not regard the Interim Batasang Pambansa as a real partner in govemance WHEREAS, certain memben of the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan, the government ruling party, blame the poor performance of the Interirn Batasang Pambansa during the past year to the tight control imposed by the President/?rime Minister and his refusal to involve the Assemblymen in the planning and policy-making process of government;

The tight control imposed by the President on the body; The inability of the busy cabinet members to engage in committee work;and The Existence of two legislatures .- the Interim Batasang pambansa

and

President Marcos.

It seemed to me that the only way to bring this matter to the full attention of the public was to place the credibility of the Assembly at issue and provoke a dis.ii cussion of whether it was a parliament or a puppei. Marcos, on the oneiana, and the members of the Assembly, on the other, would thus be forced to prove that ours was indeed a real lawmaking body and not the joke that it had graauauy become in the eyes of a skeptical public. on 23 May lgTg,rfiled Resolution No. os. rt *; I meant both as an indictment.of the system trat Marcos had imposed to ensure his control and a challenge to the right-thinking and conscientious members to assert themselves more forcefully to recover their lost d.ignity: ,

WHEREAS, members of the government ruling party who dominate the Interim BatasangPambansa are unable to express themselves freely within or outside the session hall for fear of incurring the ire or displeasure of the President/?rime Minister and thereby jeopardize the realization ofprojects desired by their constituencies; WHEREAS, to monitor the actuations and utterance of members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, military intclligcnce men, particularly those connected with the National Intelligencc and Security Agcncy, have beon appointed to key positions of the Secrcrariat I

Yrq@iffi1"

I8O

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION WHEREAS, the Presidenti?rime Minister, acting on advance supplied by these intelligence officers, has been known to order the drawal of bills and resolutions designed to democratize the or to preempt proposals embodied in a measure by issuing a decree the same subject, thus rendering pending bills moot and academic;

WHEREAS, bills and resolutions that challenge the necessity or valir of martial law or seek to correct government abuses and inequities

quickly killed

committee to prevent their discussion on th,

WHEREAS, the major media facilities owned by friends and relativer, the President/?rime Minister are under stricture not to report or rnent on bills and resolutions, or utterances in the course of floor d sions and debates, which are unfavorable to or tend to be critical of martial law regime; WHEREAS, aside from refusing to involve members of the Interim tasang Pambansa in planning and policy.making, and imposing tight trol on the body, the Presidentprime Minister has deniid assemttr the minimum staff support and facilities to enable them to functitrt responsible

gislaton

;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that instead of initiating and formu ing legislation, a large number of Assembrymen with the fovernment *g pafty now devote their time and efforts to working ior the app ment of politicat proteges or securing fat government contracts or cessions for themselves or their clients: and, according to one colu have made it their main activity "to be near the president and influence within the presidential orbit,'.

WHEREAS, the continued existence of the Interim Batasang pamb creates the false impression that democracy haa been restored in Philippines when, in truth and in fact, the country remains under an thoritarian regime bent on suppressing politicar and civir rights in name of developmont;

The Puppet

Parliament l8l

savings of at least P50 million annually, which amouht could be better spent on hospitals and medical services, schools, and other projects urgent$r needed in the impoverished areas of the country;

WHEREAS, in Article VIII, Section 13, Paragraph (2) of the 1973 Con stitution the Prime Minister may advise the President in writing to dis. sohe the National Assembly whenver the need arises for a popular vote of confidence on fundamental issues; WHEREAS, the integrity and credibility of the Interim Batasang Parn". bansa as a genuine and effective legislative body, and of the members thereof as true representatives of the people, cannot be anything but a fundamental issue of great significance and concern to the Filipino na-

tion; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE INTERIM BA. TASANG PAMBANSA IN SESSION ASSEMBLED: l. To urge the Prime Minister (Ferdinand E. Marcos) to recommend to the President of the Philippines (Ferdinand E. Marcos) the im-

mediate dissolution of the Interim Batasang Pambansa in accordance with Article'VIII, Section 13, Paragraph (2) of the 1973 Constitution for being a puppet parliament and democratic facade for an authoritarian regime and to re-program the funds appropriated therefor to projects vitally needed by the people When the resolution was calendared for first reading,

created an uproar

on the floor. Assemblyman Antonio Tupaz quickly rose to ask the Chair whether action could lie against its author for "disorderly conduct." Assemblyman Emmanuel Pelaez moved to have the resolution withdrawn for being couched ih 'tnparliamen. tary language." Another member, Assemblyman Marcial Pimentel, spoke on a question of personal and collective privilege and suggested that "if the author really felt that the Assembly was a puppet parliament, then he should resign." The session that day was recessed at least twice to enable the KBL leaders to decide what action to take. After discussing the possibility of censure, expulsion or resignation of the author, they decided in the end simply to ignore the matter and to let the resolution die a natural death by 'laying it on the table" - which, in lay-

WHEREAS, the Interim Batasang pambansa performs only one true tion under the present circumstances and that is to serve as a wir dressing or democratic facade for the undemocratic regime or r.ri E,^Marcols, who through stram referenda and rigged-plebiscites, office as President under the 1935 constitution and prime Ministei the 1973 Constitution;

it to limbo. To keep the public from knowing, newsmen covering the session and their desk editon were asked,by Information Minister Francisco Tatad to kill the story, thereby affirming the fact cited in t}te resolution itself that anti-govemment staternents and measures were being subjected to a media blackout.

WHEREAS, the dissolution of this puppet parliament would rezult in a

party, was positive. They had hoped that thiough the prodding of the opposition Marcos would realize that it would be in his interest to give the Interim National

men's language, means assigning

Privately, the reaction of some members, including those with the ruling KBL

,15'F

182

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTTON

Assembly real participation in the policy;making process of the government, one: "Your resolution aptly describes the importance of this Assembly, but it

- as the truth always does."

When Assemblyman Pelaez argued that in its wording, the resolution was cical and an act of discourtesy against President Marcos. . . ." I was both

and disappointed that he could not appreciate the intended irony. I had used the device of urging Prime Minister Marcos to recommend the dissolution parliament to President Marcos, in order to underscore the absurdity of our si Assemblyman. Salvador Laurel agreed that the Interim National indeed caught in a constitutional deadlock. His opinion was based on the ""rvas

that while the parliament could not remove &e Prime Minister (Marcos) on confidence vote, neither could the President (Marcos) dissolve the body. Laurel's position was that the provisions of Article VIII in the new tion fixing the tenure of the regular National Assembly for six years could not to the interim body. It was for this reason, he said, that he and Assemblyman Bengzon (formerly a Supreme Court justice) had filed a bill specifying and the term of the Interim National Assembly to three years. He explained that such a law was passed, the Assembly could exist for as long as Marcos refused an election for the regular parliament. Constitutionalists like Asserrrblyman Arturo Tolentino contended, that the interim legislative body could not serve beyond six years, the term

in the.constitution for the regular Assembly, an interim or transition body

in no way zuperior to the regular one. Resolution No. 68 precisely sought to force tris dilemma into the open subject it to full and unrestrained debate by the best minds in both the Assembly the country. I had hoped that in the exchange of ideas a solution could be fou break the constitutional deadlock -either through the exercise of Marcos'

nary powers or by amending the Constitution itself, particularly those trat were said to have been initiated and introduced by Marcos himself, then fied" by managed referenda and plebiscites. During the recess, the KBL members who understood my objectives

should have used a more accurate phrase than "puppet parliament." Assembl zuggested 'brppy," the English equivalent of tuta -a Tagalog word popularly applied to fanatic Uuios followers. This led to an tu mock debate - held in whispers, of course on whether it was more correct honest to call the Assembly a "rubber-stamp" or a ..stamping-pad,, legislature. levity failed to hide the apparent unease that most members admitted feeling ever they were made to reelize that the Interim National Assembly was nothing

Emilio Espinosa

an expensive sidestrow.

This great disaffection has been attributed to a lack of knowledge and

liarity with the parliamentary system which,

as Marcos himself point, out frorn to time, is basically a party or cabinet type of government. with the fusion of the

gislative and executive branches which places the prime Minister and his Cabinet firm control of the body, the members of the ruling party are expected to yield

The Puppet

Parliament

183

higher political will - in this case, Marcos as trinity personified, being Head of lovemment, Chief of State, and President of the ruling party. Under normal democratic circumstances that political will is shaped and strengthened through a concensus of the party in power secured in consultations anqi caucuSes: But in the present order zuch caucuses are called merely to formalize ac' t ions or policies already decided by Marcos. Perhaps, this is as it strould be, for doubts have been expressed whether the Kilusar ng Bagong Lipunan is a party in the traditional sense or just an umbrella organ- . ization providing temporary strelter for an incredible mix of politicians, many of whom were once identified as leaders of the Old Society that Marcos so fewently ru

(

vowed to destroy.

As originally conceived by its founder, the organization was named Bagong l-ipunang Kilusan ng mga Nacionalista, Liberal, at lba Pa (New Sdciety Movement of Nacionalistas, Liberals, and Others). This was later shortened to Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (Movement for a New Society) or simply KBL. In the frst election held in 1978, Marcos must have doubted the legal status of this conglomeration, because he asked the old Nacionalistas nrnning with the KBL to register their candidacies also as NPs. To this day, the members of the KBL and the Nacionalista Party are still locked in inconclusive debate over the question of party identity. The confusion is further complicated by the fact that in the Philippines it is hard to tell one party from another, being in reality chips off the same old block. Their platforms and objectives are based on identical perceptions of the country's needs and problems. In the 1978 elections, for instance, the opposition and the KBL NP clashed on the sangrrine but short term issues of martial law, Marcos "dictator. ship," and his personal strortcomings as well as those of Mrs. Marcos. Basic and crucial ideological questions and far-reaching goals for the country's development were hardly discussed. Contrary to the hopes and expectations of t}re advocates of the parliamentary systern, the Interim National Assembly was bom out of the "politics of personalities" * the very evil that the new form of govemment was intended to eradicate. In this and many other ways, the Marcos model mocks the English, to whom mankind owes its political conceptlons. a promoter of democracy presidential inured the,American long to and progress, but Filipinos who have been, can see they now that balances fear and of checks form and its built-in system powers legislative and of executive the fusion do that to what Marcos is trying Philippines. in the rule totalitarian could foster supporters of the fledgling parliament are quick to brush these fears aside. They believe there is nothing wrong with the system that the lifting of martial law and full

To be sure, the English meant their parliament to be

political normalization will not cure. But this may be oversimplifying the matter. Considering the Filipino's background, experience and temperament - not to mention his lack of genuine political sophistication - there is no assurance that parlia' ment will work for him as a stable and democratic institution. If and when the regular National Assembly comes into existence, the country

F:siFfr.ry

I84

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION may find itself changing govemments and holding elections more frequently

others do, or eventually end up with a legislaturd worse than the old Congress * the leadership maintaining itself in power through endless horsetrading with members of their own party or those of the opposition. One of the things that advocates of the parliamentary form of the Philippines seem to have overlooked is that'the English took hundreds of develop their own system. We are told that the flust step in the evolution parliament dates back to the l3th century, when the King of Gascony great difficulty raising funds to cover the expenses of the Crown. Somebody in the King's Council then suggested that if he secured the prior support by means of a local concensus, the collection might improve. At the results of the local concensus were merely tran$nitted through the knigh because the participation of the nobles, the clergy and the knights themselves useful they were eventually allowed to sit in the Council.

As the expenses for war with other nations mounted, the old English, were forced to enlarge the membership to include the merchants and the perous middle class, whom they found to be a ficher source of fund for thr chest. Between wars, this body gradually took on the functions of a judicial council, until it became the parliament of today an institution described as a'tourt of law, a council, a legislature . . . the meansof opposi well as the instrument of government, the preventive of revolution as well promoter of reform."

In a cabinet or party govemment, the members of the ruling party

are,

to zupport policies and measures initiated by the governrnent. But this ir how Marcos' Interim National Assembly,works. Out of ignorance, inexpe conviction - or simply in the absence of clear ideological lines dividing one from another - KBL assemblymen often fight measures they are expected to de or promote, while some members of the opposition behave as though they posed

with the majority.

fhe strongest opposition to the controversial Dairy Authority Bill, for ple, came not from the ranks of the minority but the ruling party. The rental bouncing checks bills, sponsored by the Cabinet, were likewise buffeted from sides.

This comedy of errors compelled Marcos, in the first year of the existence, to call a series of caucuses in order to remind his disoriented and wheeling party men that dissent on the floor was an opposition prerogative. ever, to avoid further embarrassment and to ensure the early enactment of ment bills, he agreed to a proposal that cabinet bills be clasified either as " bills" (those which he wanted passed and strould not be questioned on the or "free-for-all bills" (those initiated by the cabinet but which individual of the ruling party may oppose if they wish). The problem of mastering a strange new institution and unleaming old

tical habits and practices has spurred leading members of the ruling party to

The hrPPet

Parliament

185

modified version of it. A resolution authored lry Assemblyman Laurel, and signed irmong others by Defense Minister Enrile, pro. poses that the Interim Assernbly act as a constituent assembly to Consider the approriate constitutional arnendnlent. | In filing the resolution, Laurel had been assured by' Enrile that "the President lras an open rnind," but there are indications that Marcos no longer wants the subject tliscussed - and a sure sign is that the resolution has been shelved in committee. The move might never have gained ground in Marcos' own c:rmp if he had dlowed the Interim National Assembly to function as the sole law'making body of t[e land. Unhappily, he has not stopped issuing decrees, despite repeated public statements that with the convening of the Assembly all laws would now be enacted by "the duly-elected representative of the people." On the other hand, the members Irave no real cause to complain, for a careful reading of the 1973 Constitution shows that the Interim, as well as the Regular, National Assernbly cannot be anything but "a puppet parliament." ' An amendment written into the Constitution by Marcos and "approvedl by the people in a managed plebiscite empowers him to issue decrees not only while rnartial law is in force but euett after it sbdll l.taae been lifted and tbe country re-

:r rctum

to the presidential form

)

tunted to nonndlcy. The provision states that he can issue "the necessary decrees, orders and letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land, whenever in his judgment there exists a graye emergellcy or a threat or imntinence thereof,

or whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regtlar National Assembly fatls or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in hisjudgrnent require s imme diate action. " ( Underscorin g mine.) When Marcos submitted this to a "referendum" in October 1976, nobody gave it any importance. People thought that all he wanted was a mandate to rule alongside the Assembly while martial law remained in force. Only when the interim par' liament convened in 1978 did an unsuspecting public realize that the setpf amend' ments they had "approved" two years before authorized Marcos to exercise his decree-makhg powers for as long as he remains in office - or until the Constitution

itself is changed or amended. While there exists two legislative authorities - Marcos and the Interim National Assembly - their powers are not equal. One of the Philippines' leading consti-

tutional experts, Assemblym an Arturo Tolen tino,

observes

Under martial law, the President can, as a matter of power, dis' regard Batasan (,{ssembly) deliberations leading to the enactment of a law and issue a decree which enacts into law the bill that is yet being discussed in the Batasan. This could "pull the rug from the under the feet of the Batasan" and stop its enactment of the bill. 'Even if martial law should be lifted when the Batasan sl-rall have been organzed, but the President proclaims an emergency, his legislative authority would continue as under martial law. . .

I86

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTIQN

The Interim National Assembly, which Marcos offers as proof that his g ment is democratic and representative, has thus come to be kntwn by various emphasizing its impotence and superfluity. panorama magazine editor, I-etty nez'Magsanoc, dismisses it as a Libingan ng Batas-Iiatasan or agraveyard for bills, while Times-Journal,columnist Joe Gulvara laughs it off aJthe most ex Xerox copying machine. Deep inside, members of the interim parliament know that they constituto hapless cast of a tableau- staged to create the inusion "i is why, of dictato.rship. rhe. strange.paradox Y:::::_t:"1j11g:r ^ intelligent and respectable men known to be uttirly scrupulous and the conduct of their private affairs have willingly allowed -themselves to be u

TIIE MINDANAO WAR

M Ir

one not excepted, has been able to end. F:lere, on a lustr area comprising

79p00 square kilometers(or 31,500 square rniles) rich in agriculture, mineral, forest and oil resources, a fighting force representing more than four million Muslim Filipinos have been waging a war to defend what they consider tleir homeland a region that includes Mindanao and extends to the llasilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan island groups.

or*".*.i -a

,;rfi;;

such a disgraceful manner.

Althouglr the "Moro problem" is often portrayed as a Muslim{hristian confrontation, religion appears to have little to do with the violence, past urd present. The roots of this problem may be found in the tangle of political and economic grievances that had its seeds in the attempts of the Spanish colonizers and their Filipino mercenaries from Panay and Luzon to zubjugate the lr4oro people. The fact that hostilities and suffering have reached terrible dimensions can be blamed as much on govemment neglect and economic underdevelopment as on the clastr between the cultures and interests of the natives and the settlers searching for land and a better life.

_ Perhaps the explanation Revel,

may be found in the observation of Jean-Francr in Tbe Totalitaian Temptotion, that none of us is free from that murky nrrlca in t-.-^-tt^ - , pulse to crrk*i+ submit +^ to a^ tyrant's --t^ rule, and that if tyrurny had never enjoyed the co city of its victims, the history of our times and many other times would been quite different.

INDANAO the second largest of the philippines' 7,107 islands-is, tragically, probably best known for centuries of unrest, which no government, the present

scholars, historians, rnilitary men and development experts are unanimous

their opinion that the Mindanao situation is so complicated that its solution strould be reckoned in terms of decades, not years. For more than three centuries, the Maranaws and Iranons, Tausogs and Samals :- a trading, farming and seafaring people who comprise the Moro nation * have fought endles wars arnong themselves, ,guirrt the Spanish colonizers, the Britistr and Dutch naval intruders from nearby Moiuccas

and Bomeo, the Americans at the tum of tlre century, and the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. Despite assurances by the Marcos govemment that their culture and religion respected, there have been no indications so far that the present generation of young Moros more militant, nationalistic and articulate than their ancestors have any intention of giving up the historical struggle to preserve their territory and their unique society.

will be

' The movement for an independent Muslim or Moro state in the southern Philippines actually began to surface towards the close of the Sixties. It is ironical to note that martial law, the instrument invoked by Marcos to stop the secessionist idea from growing, instead stimulated separatist u-bitiorrr. when the Armed Forces implemented oplan sagittarius on 2l September

ffiI

1972, the Moros were among the principal targets in the collection of loose firearms. To be deprived of his gun is an affront to the Moro, who regards it as a status symbol and" an essential item of survival. The drive to gather weapons in the south was thus met with great resentment and opposition, especially in the wake of rumois that behind this move was a plan of the Marcos govemment to forge the Mqslims to tum Christians.

i., il

iill i t1 t:'it. I

ri.

I88

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Mindanao

Moro rebel groups seized on this misapprehension to rally their peoplc cause of secession. At the forefront was the Moro National Liberation Front led by an unpreposs€sing young intellectual who had once taught political al the University of the Philippines. Friends of Prof. Nur Misuari never capable of someday leading a revolution that would qpread from his native Sulu to the mainland of Mindanao. Misuari had tried to run for a seat in the 1971 Constitutional was dreated by the political machine of traditional Muslim leaders. In anger, hc to the hills ard there started a resistance movement that was to snowball I

full-scale war in the'southem Philippines. Although Misuari is now recogrized leader of the MNLF, this secessionist organization started as the brainchild of a of Moro scholars and professionals based in Jiddah, Saudi fuabia. With Macapanto Abbas Jr. as their principal spokesman and ideologue, the Moro triates sought the aid of Islamic nations in their plan to establish an Muslim state, comprising the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi.Tawi.

f,ibya had been supporting Muslim - as well as non-Muslim various parts of the world, and when it decided to take on the MNLF as a Misuari's tiny band of illequipped guerillas nierged with the l{oro Youth Powqr become the military arm

of the Moro National Liberation Front. The stage was th set for the "conquest" of Mindanao. In the initial series of clastres between rebel and govemment forces,

and top defense officials were alarmed to realize that the MNLF had the to face the Armed Forces of the Philippines in a long drawn-out w Each strot fired by the govemment was answered by a full MNLF barrage. Marcos tumed to the United States for additional ordnance, which the was expected to provide under the terms of the military assistance pact. But shington strorved no signs of reqponding. This was particularly galling to because of unconfirmed reports that the CIA had supplied the arms to the secessionists * as part of an American plan to gain control of the oil rich

capability

Philippines.

The Marcos govemment was thus compelled to buy guns urd from various European countries, rezulting in the procurement of mixed or in weapons. Accustomed to handling American equipment, Filipino servicemen great difficulty adjusting to an assortment of Belgian rifles, Spanish and artillery and French reconnaisance planes that were rushed to lr.Iindanao as soon they arrived. To compound the problem, the bulk of the fighting force committed to unforeseen threat consisted of raw recruits whom one flreld general described "cannon-fodder." Howtsver, commanders blamed the high casualty rate not on own errors of judgment or the inexperience of their men but on the faulty or.de tive guns and ammunition. For this, Marcos'sacked Munitions Undersecretary Salientes, publicly accusing him of acts arnounting to treason, although a West Point graduate, had no choice but to buy whatever was available in the arms market.

War

189

Aside from sophisticated weaponry, including rocket launchers and halfltrack pcrsonnel carriers which had apparently seen servicein the Libyan desert, the MNLF itf{,f.rr had the advantage of being led by a corps of commanders trained in modem *,,rtare abroad. As Defense Minister Enrile was later to admit, '"They very nearly rrrcceeded in overruning Mindanao and dismembering the country"' on 20 october 1972, about a month after the declaration of martial law,the MNLF captured the city of Marawi in Lanao del Sur but withdrew when a large days in contingeni of govemment troops arrived from the north' Fighting raged for Japanese ambassador, the llrc heart of the Mindanao State University campus, and 'loshio Urabe, then a guest of the univenity, managed to escape by crossing the battle line disguised as a Moro in traditional garb' Fartherlouth, the MNLF succeeded in penetrating the more populous crty of (lotabato. A firefight on the campus of the Notre Dame University brought out the had studied startling fact that the rebel armies were led by Muslim students who under tLe Oblate priests'and nuns.

1974, the town of Jolo, seat of the Sultanate of sulu, was qli.t tv imposed a taken by an MNLF attack force of 5,000 men. The govemment into Zamboang-a news biackout. But since thousands of refugees were streaming Tatad to lift Francisco and other Mindanao cities, I urged Information Secretary announcement the news embargo on Jolo. A month later, a terse military :tate.d was well in hand' This the town had been recaptured by the Army antl the situation that it had previously took the public by ,urp.ir., since the country was never told and seoessionists. It was this kincl of news management that eroded

on 7 February

tl*

fallen

the

eventually destroyed the credibility of Philippine media' In previous times, Jolo had been repeatedly tazedin confrontations between as in 1974' Both the Moros and invading spanish armies but never to the same extent the town was literally rebel and govemment forces incurred heavy casualties and participated in the MNLF levelled tolhe ground. Inasmuch as many of those who it days in advance' Instead attack were locJ boys, the civilian population knew about several Oblate nuns were liberators. as rgbels the of evacuating; they welcomed came marching in mass who students former their of seen applauding the retum killed in the crossfue' were thousands the almy counter-attacked,

Ormation. When the mosques Bodies of men, women and children littered the'schoolgrounds, of a Fromthetop refuge. sought had they *A .fr"r"i..r *O priti. buildings where

jet figlter. Government pilot, Col' Bautista, who had its to rescue d o,ri in * armored truck ;r"d;t ejectedandwasseenparachutTc.toYs,d:theprovincialcapitol.Buttherebelswere pieces with long knives' tirere ahead of them and hacked the pilot to innocent Both sides have since accused each other of indiscriminately killing

*ori.t our", * MNLF machine-gun

squad shot down a

other atrocities' The I\4NLF civilians, needlessly destroying the town, and committing people for qympathizing the at shot and fire, on said it was the Army thair.ihout"s MNLF responsible for the held ontheotherhand, tu*y,

;;1h;;.i.r"r".

tt.

during and after the.attack' the holocaust, and for using the civilians as a strieltl

rtlilFr"

I9O

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION col. Alfonso Alcoseba, whom Marcos was to promote to brigadier geno teafrls the rv trfantry Division in the recapture of Jolo, insisted that so much and destruction could have been ryerted had Marcos earlier allowed the

.This

ott.r.iutrry .o, "* a'n " ,i'irr"

against the MNLF. He and

::idl:l I

YTf*. had strongly"nensiv3 advocated this, but Marcos r,aa oroerea tt bels only when flued upon.

defensive policy wasobviously based on long-term political

not the least of whidr

was the danger of incurring the irs of Islamic which the Philippines was dependent for oil. At the height of the Mindanao *:"yrr,.*lro had assumed f'ull leadersrrip of the MNLF wi-th headquarten in was in fact able to convince the revolutionary govemment of Iran to issue a ment warning of "political and economic sanctions philippines

against the for, govemment's genocidal action against Filipino Muslims.,, Although not spelred out, the economic sanction was understood to be in form'of an oil embargo.

The occupation of Jolo, which fonowed the encirclement of whole of soldiers in cotabato by Musrim guerrillas, opened Marcos' eyes to the of the MNLF threat. After hours olimportuning by radio, cot. at.or"uuilfr;

against I',ouar u'q'lrr -Misuari,s! tror Lru Tqrort to.mount -an allout counter-attack From that decision, Jolo has not fully ,..orrrJ. Despite tJre obvious disadvantage of a deftnsive poliry and the unremit pressure exerted by the "hawks" witrrin the military, Irrarcos has steadfastly re to reverse himself. He has given clearance for offensive action only for the pressing reasons. In the few exceptions, civilians have been the worse victims. In ohe full-scale military operation against a rebel stronghold on Tabon Ir a few miles from Zarnboanga, the govemrient committed three battarions. Be the MNLF occupied high ground deep in-land, the invasion force, coming in fi three directions' wils pirured down for three days. Mren the smoke of battre i cleared, nothing was left.of the rebel .*p *o the surroundi.rg uittugrr. deaths far outnumbered rebel casualties. . -$ince the Mindanao conflict erupted in rg72, estimates of civilian deathsl bee.n loosely placed at 30,000 to 56,000, real figures can be had of rebel and Army dead, wounded or missing in action, .rri:.^c at a reasonalle gues. MNLF guerriltas usualy tie t other with a _y:L^of single rope before .ng.g*iiano drag their fanen with them in retreat, while the^ Army transports its dead by helicopter, cargo or truck, uzuaily under cover of darkness, to t wp the public from knowing. In the light of historicar experience, a military solution io ilr. rrri, problem would be the worst possibre course of action for the govemment to Marcos claims that his approach has been ,n"* a"".r"pr*rt?t" tirui".ilitury, in the. far. south belies this. Moreover, compared , expenditures for infrastructure and other projects in the highry urbanized u

Yl:tT,

*a oirpi..lJ;;;;;;;;:ilffi.

::Jl:::,ft

.#r'#:

::"r-'j,T:: :^r-.,*q:.yf

areas

Mindanao

r,"iiJ", L..iving

::T1]1"fl]^ :"."^tt, gardly strare :TA of the i1v,11"-rtotal govemrnent $e budget foi development.

The Mndanao

War I9l

Marcos' handling of the Moro situation, his dependence on military instead of civilian perception and advice, and.his repeated pronouncements that the lifting of rnartial law is dependent on the cessation of hostitties in the Muslirh regions, have uroused suqpicions that he may not be truly interested in an early settlement of the war. "It means,'l says a Mindanao news publisher "that we should PrePare ourselves for 3@ years of martial law, because that's how long it took the Spaniards, the Americans and the Japanese to try and subjugate the Moros." What exacfly is this problem that has defied solution for centuries, which Marcos now cites as a condition precedent to the termination of martial rule and restoration of full civil and political rights in peaceful regions? Dr. Peter Gowing, Dean of the Dansalan Research Center in Ianao del Sur, describes it as "the fact that the Moros ,constituted a nationality distinct from, and other than that of the Christian, Filipinos." Dr. Cesar Majul, who has written an exhaustive study on N{uslims in the Philippines, defines it simply as "the survival of the Muslim com'

munity.

and their mercenaries, the I\Ioros were a thorn in the side of the Spanistr and American colonizers, who wanted to consolidate the islands into a single nation state. The confrontations and the bloody encounters between Christian soldiers and Muslim waniors were not a religious struggle. It was not Christian thus the offshoot of a political fervor that had brought the Spaniards to the Philippines but the search for a new route for the profitable qpice. trade and dreams of empire nurtured by leading Euro'

In their long and valiant fight to keep out foreigr intruders

lslam, however, had earlier arrived in Mindanao by way of the Arab trade route from the Middle East. When the first Spanish sttips commanded by Ferdinand' Magellan hove into view in 1521, Islam had already reached the islands to the north. In Manila,.the great Rajah Sulaymur had embraced the Islamic faith andtlre con' version of flre people throughout Ilzon was only a matter of time. Martial law humor has it that if Magellan had been driven off course by strong winds, t]lis convelgence of Islam and Christianity would not have taken place in the l6th century, and the Philippines today would have been under a Muslim President \ faced with ah "Ilocano But as it happened, a kind of 38th parallel was establistred, with the spaniards occupying Luzon and the Visayan islands, and the Moros preserving their dominance over much of the southern Philippines region. In a politicd sense, therefore, two nations came into existence when the Spaniards claimed the archipelago in the name of King Philip II one professing Christianity and allrcgiance to the King of Spain, the other remaining loyal to the tenets of tslam and to the political and cultural system that native genius had evolved.

problem."

the islands or to e*tend their politico-religious qystem beyond their traditional domains, but that the colonizers would not rest until they had succeeded in bringing the so.called rebellious people of Mindurao and Sulu to heel. The Moro Wars were principally waged over tirritory. The Muslims of Mindanao fought not so much in l\

192

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTTON

The Minclanao

defense of their faith as of home and family. The spanistr conquistadores determined to zubdue them, not so much foi the cross of chrirt ,, io, the crowd

Spain.

when ho tried to rally the Maranaw datus in what is now Lanao against the spaniards,the great cotabato chieftain, sultan Kudarat, appealed to

patriotisn and

sense

freedom, rather than

to their religious ,"nriuititiur.

according to Dr. Majul, is what Kudarat told the assembled datus: Do you realize what zubjection would reduce you to?A toilsome slavery u the spaniards- Tum your eyes to the subject nations and look at,the mise which such glorious nationshad been reduced to. l,ook at the Tagalogs and VisaVa11. 41e y.o! better than they? Do you think that the Spaniards b.tfr stuffl Have you not seen how the Spaniards traiple them their "j feet? Do you not see everyday how they are obliged to work at thJ

and the factories with all their rigorsl can you tolerale anyone with

Spanistr blood to beat you up and glasp the fruits of your labor. . .?

Just as Kudarat and other Moro warriors never waged a Jihad agunsr neither are the christian and Muslim Filipinos ortoauyffiral -"eEr v.6'5ws lr"0rrs,

lrS*

g rcligious

war.

to note that through the centuries the Moro cause seems ft. g::to. to preserve anchestral territory, along *l::rry:.1 political andludicial irrrirrii"rr. fliir:t.rtr}r1,.1ociil lrlyTr philippine is the fact that the central is.sigrrificant

ur-rchanged:

i*ii";l;;;

government under Marcos has fallen into same frustrating rruDrr.rrurE, rulc role that ural rrappeo trapped lorelgn foreign colonizers in a sort of vietnam. In the impasioned manifestos of today's nationaristic young Muslims, of Kud.arat's $Ttuq to the Mara.r;;;d; id. *11: -appeal liberation organization, anotier Muslim revolutionary group based in Jiddah,

il;i,r;

::n*:

fuabia, which is in contention with the Moro National uberation Front as the nized leader of the fight in the southem philippines, has adopted the slogan:

Homeland, Freedom! until 1976, when the Tripoli Agreement was forged between represe of the Marcos Govemment and the uNtr, the revoruti"onu,y Mindanao, Sulu and palawan provinces to secede .orriiiri. independent Islamic republic. It was, and is, the contention of the Muslim that the ceding of the philippine archiperago by spain to the United si.r.r',n was without basis in intemational law, the Moro people and their lands having, -.q remained,outside Spanish colonial But history seems to have rendered this argument moot and academic. For: with greater fervor and determination than the Spaniardshad shown,the Americans, embarked on a Moro "pacification campaign" based on military puritiu" action and, a poliry of attraction. This two-pronged apploach to the prolle* .n.ourug"J ,rrc belief, especially among the younger Muslims, that under the u.s. th. attain a better social, political and economic status.

tu;;1..;;;;;;

-a

,nei,il;;;;,

isiii

control.

M";J;;i;

- unfortunately, this was not to be. Through the historical metamorphosis of the country from a colony of Spain into a commonwearth underthe unitJ i;;,; ,,.

War

193

ilild finally into an independent Republic, the Moro still felt discriminated' Mth {lrc arrival of more settlers from as far north as the Ilocos region, it became pain' lully clear that lacking the education, connections, and skills of the newqomers, hc could not compete in the acquisition and titling of lurds. The growing economic prosperity of the christian immigrants served as a grating reminder of his own rlcprivation and disadvantage. ln the memory that human beings are said to preserve in their genes rather than in their brains, the Moro soon relived past encounters and past battles' Once again [e saw himself as the victim of a new aggression. The first td sense and come to grips with this incipient alienation were the young Muslims. Not only were they ,tiireO Uy the spirit of radicalism that pervaded the campuses of schools and univer' sities in Manila and throughout the world in the early seventies but,like their coun' terparts in the larger christian communities, they too had become aware of the rnoral failure of their leaders, many of whom had crossed the line from poverty to affluence by exploiting their own people. One interesting phenomenon of the Mindanao rebellion is that it obviously is directed not solely against the central goverrunent but the old traditional Moro leaderstrip as well. It is a revolution against Muslims by their own brother Muslims, who want to cleanse and renew their own society while seeking to recover the lost dignity, opportunity, the freedom and independence, their people had once enjoyed. Urt young Muslims are as proud of their Filipino nationality as they are in the existence of a Moro nation. the Niuslim Some years ago, while in Cairo on a news assignment,I sought out now, but I can me elude names Their University. Al-Ashar the at students enrolled various in victories and achievements their of boast they would still remember how

athletic or scholastic competitions against the youths of other countries in the Middle East and Africa They were Moros from Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Ba-

silan and sulu, but in cairo they were proud to be known as Filipinos. Whenever I read about anothei ambustr or bombing, somewhere in Cotabato

often wonder what became of those young men. Did they join the government, or are they now in the mountains, Filipinos no longer, but Moros with burden to cast off and a nationality to reassert?

or Basilan,

"hirtoti.ul In any war * and Mindanao is in the throes of a wat - the stronger party has 'advantage of being able to present the situation ftom its point of vipw.In the the eyes of the Spaniards, the Moro, whose fierceness in battle really spnlng from a determination to preserve his homeland, was an untamed savage who needed to be

civilized. To the American cavalryman of the 1900s, the Moro wuaiuramentodo a religious zealot who, when he ran amuck, could be stopped dead only with the Colt .+S which Gen. John Pershing had asked to be ,Jesigred specially for the Mindanao campaign.

Today the Marcos govemment regards any Moro who opposes martial law as a terrorist and rejects the idea that he may have tumed cattle rustler or kidnapper for ransom to enable him to pursue a larger cause. This is not to say that all Moro under arms are true revolutionaries. Criminals have taken advantage of the situation

194 THE COUNTERFEIT

REVOLUTION

by masquerading as,members of the MNLF. It is the

The Mindanao presence

of thtr typt

that has further complicated the search for peace in Mindanao. But while the legitimacy of Muslim demands and grievances, a$ militant Muslims, cannot be ignored by Marcos and his govemment or, I matter, by.the Filipino people as a whole neither can right-thinklng md loving citizbns permit the continuation of a war that has brought untold to Muslims and christians alike. To the suffering, the displaced, and tho nature of the conflict has become immaterial. That the war in the south is a rather then a religious, struggle is cold comfort to the hapless civilians whotc have been set to the torch and whose families have been wiped out by arill Even more destructive than bullets is the age-old prejudice that tho has rekindled among christian and Muslim Filipinos. when government mostly christians from the north, look at the Moros as enemies, and Moro spread the idea that the govemment is engaged in genocide, Filipinos are trt back to the past and the horrors that the ancient Mindanao chieftains urd nial rulers lrad once implanted in the minds of their respective subjects, to their war efforts. Deliberately or not, Illarcos has followed the example of the spanish by sending troops from Luzon and Puray to fight the i\{oros, despite the of the people of Mindanao to form their own security force to deal with the and order'problern in the region. The assignment of fresh non-Muslim drafteos the north is, in a way,a reenactment of the Spanish attempt to conquer th'esor Through the experience of a contemporary war, the colonial image ol:the lvloro, treacherous people who strike only from behind or in ambuslr,is kept alive, reviving the historical division between the Christians and Muslims. The "veterans" of the present Mindanao canrpaign are, in fact,, Manila and their Luzon hometowns as retuming heroes, and the mere their narrow escapes and bloody encounters with the "enemy" serves to reopen colonial wounds. The parallel between what Marcos is doing and the spania policy of using Pampango troops to quell ragalog uprisings or pitting Hilon against the Ilocanos, is striking. what emerges is a pattern of govemance based the classic triolicy of "divide and rule."

Realizing that it was not enough to deal with the MNLF field commanders Mindanao, the Marcos govemment initiated a series of talks with the Moro Nat Liberation Front revolutionary leadership which began in Jiddah, saudi Arabia, 1975 and culminated in Tripoli, ubya, in 1976. By this time, the Muslim rebels h split into main groups: the MNLF, with Nur Misuari in ubya as supreme c( der; the splinter MNLF faction headed by Hastrinr Salamat in Egypt; and the Moro organization (BMLO) in Jiddah, saudi Arabia, directed by fc -uberation Rep. I-laroun al-Raschid Lucman, who calls himself the paramount sultan of danao, Sulu and Palawan, and lawyer Macapanton Abbas Jr., a one-time Palace assistant whb now teaches at the I(ng Abdul-Aziz University in Jiddah. Th; BMLO leadership had been originally composed of a triumvirate thai included former sen. salipada Pendatun, but in September 1980 he surprised everyone by returning,

lrr Manila and pledging to Marcos 'Muslim scoundrels,,

* trrf

w-ho had

War

195

and Lucman lT forcesinhishomeprovince,

prcviouslyt"ttl

dismantle the BMLO

('otabato.

qt"iuli::J:*::::::Ti rlil'licult because tt . gout*i"nt ^r r:L-,^ rli",ra# harl crrnceedill'ffi ll::ffi ffi ";ihil;;i.iv'il*:-:l'I11iilll':li'i;*:A*H:.T:; ir""*n lnougr

..^v settlement.of srst thq insisting that often urlr'rur5 ullcil

evgntualdid irot know with whom to deal' Martlos

ll'TT;"**";;;;;"i"r"powerrul.organ:1:i":t-',1ff ::::l*:,9"1tr or Muslim lt{inisters ::ll,:rffi':ft.1Jil;'ili"jiu.'.,t1,,', courd iin,.n". the eountries.

Barbero' Deputy Defense Minister After sending a panel headed by Carmelo groundwork, rvlarcos dispatched Mrs. Marcos.as.his ror civirian Relations, ,;i;; ;; presid.it, col. lvluammar Ghadaffi. TheJe missions led to pcrsonal envoy to uuyan on ?3 December 1976'with Marcos declaring tlre signing of the rripJli 'qg*t*t'it Front had no belligerent status ,*.p1:' rrrat since the x,roro N;;""rr Liberation treaty but an agreement between Filipino was not to be considertJ u" inttmational point in the Mindanao war' and therefore a nationals. It was f'aiftd as a turning law govemment' For her work in securing crowning achievement of the martial well-meaning admirers for the proposed by the Agreement, Ivirs. frt*cos *u' 'o*'

rebellion hardly merited world attention' Nobel peace prize, thor[h-tt, ltinorr,* that because of the Tripoli Agreement, tn lr{anila, the controlJ[;;4, annorncrd "Peace has come at last to Mindanao!"

Butthetenrpo.arycease.firethatwentintoeffectirrJanuaryl9TTwala shots fired in easily by a mistake encounter or fragile peace that could-ie-sliattered flared anew fighting weeks, a few fie air. And this .r.n*uuy .r". to purt.-lvithin the terms violating of other the each side accusing in various parts of MinJanao, with . h .!r--r c..r,, ^- ln of the cease-fire.

TheworstoftheseincidentstookplaceinPatikul'Suluonl0October1977 were massa' by Brigadier General Teodulfo Bautista where 35 officers *i;;;i.J Bautista sali' Usnan conrmander zoo men under cred by an NiNLF contingent oi met in often had men two The offer of surrender. had come unamred ,o oir.r" sali,s time he would and Bautista was hopeful that this the past for the signal; pre'arranged a At amrs. their "-rl'-p"po*' group to lay down succeed in co[vincing'iuri;, wlth.?ul:*:tit weapons and mowed down Bautista however, the rebels opt*a fire whom the to tell this tale of tieachery - a selgeant and his soldiers. only one lived

left for dead' slain troopers were stlripped of their Official u*y u"o'nts stated that the the curved then hacked to pieces with a kris' clothing, shoes and ;;;;;J effects' In Sulu, who fought in-Mindanao dreaded' Moro bladed *rupor-irrui Americans

rebels had

however,itwassaidtt,utsur,treacherousact-ionwasanactofrevengeforthe a govgmment a son allegedly at the hands of of his daughter *i fu. or.,r, of rape

patrol.

d,-Li. claims' th1 Trinoli.Agreement was Through such incidents and conflicting for like rnost oi p'p"'' Perhals this rvas bound to be' soon reduced ," u *J" "* to all soris liable couched in imprecise language diplomatic documents the pact was

ffiffiffi[

196 THE COUNTERFEIT

Thg Mindanao

REVOLUTION

.. of misinterpretations

by the signatories. happened to be in Jolo when the memben of the ceasemission representing the organization of Islamic conference arrived. F.. MNLF spokesman, Dr. Hussein Farouk, I gathered the impression that the M believed it would play a leading role in the provisional govemment and in thor tion of the legislative assembly. As it developed, this was at variance with the ing of Marcos, who wante(l to limit MNLF representation in the provisional ment to two out of nine members. Moreover, the MNLF assumed that agreed to an autonomous iuea comprising thirteen provinces in lr{indanao, Palawan, and that a referendum would be held only to approve the

In 1977,I

arrangements.

without clarifoing these crucial points,

Ivlarcos went ahead

with

a step-by.r

implementation of the Tripoli Agreement over the vehement objections c MNLF. In the meanwhile, what had begun as a "mistake encounteri between and government patrols was escalating

into a full resumption of hostilities. con ing propaganda claims make it difficult to form a judgment on where the strould be laid for the breakdown. But charges that the ,Marcos Govemment, not beeii sincere in its efforts to end the Mindanao bloodshed haunt the

! t:.

of those who have taken part in these efforts. As Undersecretary of Public Information, I was involved in the first ' talks" held in Zamboanga in April 1975. The dialogue was supposed to be atten by rebels to whom thq Govemment had iszued safe-conduct passes, *d *;;;;; starting point of further negotiations for their zurrender. In helping to set the for this meeling, I discoveied that many of the "rebels" present were in rr young Zambcianga Muslims conscripted for the conference. Their guns had zupplied by the Souflr comnrand under Admiral Romulo Espaidori. others friendly natives flown in from Bukidnon province for the occasion. only then we know that the "peace talks" had been designed to impress the organization r Islamic Conference, which was scheduled to convene in May of that year. This pretense was to become apparent even in the govemment's muchhooed economic development programs for Mindanao. In 7 July 1975,,,to advantage of the momentum gained by the peace talks," Marcos created southem Philippines Development Administration, a super-agency whose empowers it to do almost anything, "from the manufacture of hairpins to airplanes, as its first Administrator, Abdul Karim Sidri, used to say. I was appointed Ctrairman of this body, with three Muslims Pangcoga of L,anao, Michael Mastura of cotabato, and Farouk carpiso of Sulu another chrislian, Gov. Sergio Morales of south cotabato, as members of the Bo In a manner of speaking, the truck was there but it could not run for lack of fuell The meager funds Malacaflang made available to the SpDA were barely enough to cover operationS and the rehabilitation and relief of Mindanao refugees - a function it had inherited from urother abolistred agency. The situation may be different now that Mrs. Marcos has taken over the chair. manstrip, by virtue of the absorption of this body, along with many others, in the

War

197

Ministry of Humdn Settlernents. But even under the new set'up, the promise of a effort by the Marcos Govemment, spearheaded by the Southern Philippines Development Administration still remains - at"this date no more than that: a promise. In these circumstances, it is not surprising why leaders'of the Libya'based MNLF question the sincerity of Marcos and his interpretation of the Tripoli Agree'

nrassive economic development

rnent, which calls for:

The establishment of autonomy h the Southem Philippines within the framework of sovereigrrty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines;

The Muslims to have the right to set up their own courts which imple' ment the Sharia laws, and the right to be representedin allcourtsincluding the Suprerue Court;

The authorities in the south to have the right to set up schools, colleges and universities:

The organization of a legislative assembly and an executive council, to be constituted through direct election;

The graut of complete arnnesty, release of political prisoners, return of

to their homes, and guarantee of freedom of movement and right of assenrbly. Other terms to be the subject of further negotiations include the proposal by the MNLF to set up special regional security forces, arrangements for the integration of MNLF guerrillas into the Armed Forces of the Philippines, retention of part of the revenue to be derived from mines and the exploitation of mineral resources in the region, and the administrative relationship between the central urd autonomous refugees

govemnrent.

Serious disagreement, holever, centers on the broad provision that "the Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the irrrplententation of the entire Agreement." This was invoked by Marcos to hold a referen{um by which the ternts of the Tripoli Agreement, as understood by the MNLF, were substantially changed. Not only were the three Davao provinces and Palawan excluded from the agreed area of autonomy, but instead of a singfe legislative assembly, two assemblies were established in Regions 9 and 12. Where the legislative AssOmbly was supposed to appoint the members of the powerful Executive Council, they were named by Marcos.

In a letter amounting to a protest on the procedures and questions of the referendurn, Libya's President Ghaddaffi supported the MN{,F stand when he told Marcos on l8 March 1977 that the referendum should concem "the administrative arrangements within the areas of autonomy. . . and this means that the people be asked how to organize themselves administratively." Marcos' reply to Ghaddafi on l9 lt{arch expressed "whole'hearted accord and approval by our govemment as well as ourselves." This exchange of notes followed the visit of Mrs:Marcos as presidential envoy and was intended to clarifr the lettor and intent of the Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF therefore ,believed that nothing

tl: 1l

I'98

TIIECOUNTIIRF'IIITREVOLUTION

was left

but for the government to implernent it.

retrospect, the negotiations were probably doomed from the stad be, of the suspicion and distrust that surrounded the proceedings. The involveme I.ibya was resented by the Marcos governrnent as foreign interference in a domestic affair. Libyan officials, among them Foreign Minister Ali Al-Treki, o'managers" regarded as 1'handlersz'or of the MNLF. Members of the Barbero to Tripoli claim that in several instances, gisuari and his associates could not any commitments at the conference table without first securing Libyan approval. . The MNLF, on the other hand, accuses Marcos of bad faith - of entering the Agreement without any real intention of abiding by it, but only for the pur of gaining a tactical advantage in the ]vtindanao war through a temporary cease. The iebels have so fai spurned his efforts to renew the negotiations, refu retum to the conference table unless new conditions are met. Marcos, in the mexrtime, has adopted a new strategy in dealing with foreign-based Muslim .revolutionary leaders. By stepping up negotiations for surrender of MNLF field commanders in Mindanao, he apparently wants to pull rug frorrr under Misuari's feet. while the government effort has resulted in the de tion of a few high-ranking rebel officers, there is considerable speculation on much this is costing Lhe taxpayers, and how long the rebels will stay within the of.the law; Emulating the Spaniards in the case of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo and revolutionary army, the Marcos govemment has embarked on a virtual buying of loyalty and firearms in the south. This has qpawned a new "industry,'both unscrupulous negotiators and their military accomplices who reportedly su padded lists of fake or fictitious surrenderees and rusty old rifles, and for rebels have made a profession of giving up as many times as the government is willing pay.

The most serious flaw in this scheme, of course, is that, considering the r derdevelopment of the Mindanao region, par-ticularly in predominantly Muslim are not enough jobs and economic opportunities are available to hold the balikbayan returnees - as the former rebels insist on being called - after their money has out. The government is,therefore, taced with the problem of having to subsidize tl indefinitely, or until the promised prosperity of Mindanao is achieved * or lose again to the revolutionary cause.

As long as there are groups like the MNLF and the BMLO operating out the Philippines, peace in Mindanao will remain an elusive goal. For by articula

nationalistic aspirations, they will always find a sympathetic

flict.

Anolher potential danger is floreign-power intervcntion in the Hliro*uo .on. Perhaps this was what Marcos alluded to recently when he declared that the

Philippirlcs is capable of meeting any threat of subversion and rebellion and woulJ never allow loreign troops to fight on its soil. comi,g close on the heels of reports that Misuari has been to Moscow t. secure Russian aid and'has also visited vietnam with a view to establishing a supply

;

The Mindanao

War

199

base for the Moro National Liberation Front, Marcos' statement gains tremendous sigrrificance.

However, the Russian diplomatic mission in Manila, in a statement circulated S. Karimov, Second Secretary of the USSR Embassy, has denied these reports and reaffirmed the desire of the USSR to presewe harmonious ties with the Philippine government. Miridurao, nonetheless, would be a tempting prize for any country needing naval and air bases, missile sites, or zubmarine refueling bases. With a little outside help, the Muslim rebels could easily acquire a sufficiently large part of the island to enable an interested foreign power to establish zuch bases.

by Toulkun

There are many places, in fact, inhich the governmenthasvirtually abandoned to the rebels for lack of troops to man garrisons and outposts. As the military in

it: "The situation here is under control - we control some the rebels control others." That Mindanao could become another Vietnam, or the arena of foreign intervention, is not entirely intpossible. Even now, the problem is linked to at least two foreign countries whose interest has been manifested in material aid to the lt{uslim rebels Though maintaining diplornatic relations with the Philippines, Libya supports the MNLF logistically. Intelligence sources allege that Misuari is being subsidized at $l-million annually, with special allocations on a case-to-case basis. Malaysia, with whom the Philippines also rnaintains friendly d,iplomatic relations, has allowed the IdNLF to establish a primary base in Jamperas, and two minor bases near Senrpurna and Kota Kinabalo, in the State of Sabah. In recent visits to these bases, Misuari was reportedly seen in the company of ranking officers of the Malaysian Arnred Forces. To contain a foreign-backed rebellion; the Marcos govemment has been forced to spend more than Pl-rnillion per day, or about P400-million a year for the fighting alone - for food, fuel and uruuunition. In the early stages of the trouble n lg72-74, Nlalaysia was involved only Mindanao jokingly puts areas,

of Sabah, Tun Mustapha - bom of Filipino parents in of carving an independent MuslimempiretoincludeSabahand the same islands in the southem Philippines that the MNLF sought to separate. An extrernely wealthy rnarr with timber, agricultural and mining interests in North Borneo, he was said to have supplied some of the arms to Misuari. His activities, because the Chief of'State

Sulu

drean.red

though, were frowned upon by the Malaysian govemment, and attempts were made to remove hirn from Sabah by elevating him to a higher office. Subsequently, he lost the leadenhip of his party and the election for Chief of State. With Mustapha out of the way, Philippine authorities became hopeful tha! Misuari would also lose his sanctuaries in Sabah. This has not been the case. The secret support that the Mataysian goveimnent now extends to the MNLF clearly stemsfrom its desire to pressure lr,{arcos into resolving the boundary dispute set off by the Philippine claim on Sabatr. Although, in a previous state visit to Kuala Lunpur Marcos had plodgod, to

2OO

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

much applause by his Malaysian audience, that in the interest of the unity '

Amid this stalemate, one intriguing fact stands out: prior to becoming

in 1965, Marcos had been the legal counsel of the Kiram family, de of the old Sultan of Sulu, in their fight to recover, or be compensated for, dent

northem Borneo territory that is now Sabah. The Kirams claim that this had formed part of their Sultanate when it was leased to a Britistr company before Malaysia became an independent state. Because of his previous pe, involvement in this case, Marcos could benefit from a generous settlement.

the Kirams demanding $8O-million and Kuala Lumpur wanting to settle for a fi of this, Marcos'.reluctance to redeem an intemational pledge has been a ploy to force the Malaysians to pay the full amount. All ttris is pertinent, inasrnuch as the Sabah diqpute and the boundary are also tied up to the process of diffusing the lt{oro rebellion in the south. conflict is already an awesome mixture of historical, sociological, cultural,polit and economic factors that no one can reduce to a simple proposition or A lack of sincerity on the part of those trying to solve it would zurely make

worse.

What has made the search for peace in Mindanao doubly diflicult is the Marcos that is merely going through the motions of responding to the autonomy and development. Although he has establistred what appear to be nomous" govem,rnents in the two Muslim regions, purportedly in consonance the Tripoli Agreement, the local officials who were chosen in rigged elections are at all free to make vital decisions. It is Marcos who runs these govemments remote control through the local military commanders and Irtuslim surrogates. As for development, there is none that may be considered truly or substantial enough to improve conditions in an area long classilied as where thousa4ds o f Muslims and Chiistians live far below the "povert5r line." technocrats blame the lr{oro rebellion for the government's inability to pursue nomic programs on a more visible and wider scale. But with the rebel groups citing government neglect and inattentionas a major grievance, the region is caul in a chicken-or-egg situation that leaves the zuffering populace nowhere. If lviarcos is to be taken at his word, the Mindanao conflict represents last great obstacle.to the lifting of martial law and political normalization. Yet has not given this knotty problem the concentrated attention it deserves. Not has he frittered away valuable time and govemment resources on less undertakings that sometimes fall under the category of entertainment rather development; he has refused to involve the Itfindanao leaders in the peace effort'gi q*ren these persons could effectively serve as a bridge of understanding between tho .

201

Marcos may deny it but his half-hearted handling of the 'llvloro problem" which concems millions in the Muslim - and Christian - south reenforces the helief that he has no intention of lifting martial law within the foreseeable future.

mining the borders.

War

revolutionaries and the govemment.

f Southeast Asian Nations ,(ASEAN) steps would be taken to this claim, he has not pursued the matter. It is said that he wants to Malaysians to sigrr a border patrol agreement aimed at stopping the flow of contraband from Sabatr and denying sanctuary to the MNLF. But the insist that it would be impossible to forge such an agreement without fust Association

The Mindanao

l8lullllllluffi

18 REFORMIST OR

Reformist or Revolutiona.ry 203

REVOLUTIONARY?

INCE Marcos wanted the whole world to believe that his declaration of n by the government he,?"1X,:: h as taken gre at puir, .u..-rs131i^ ^,;;i;i;;,,,staged rin1 ; ;;

3i**::r::

;.^fl.#;;riff

terms:

T Jlrffirrr";

;11::."j^_y:9lt

ch ange an

s* J.pr;i

;t;h,;;.'

velopment. orb ffi {r]g damage to their welfare and solidarity The singreminded view that govemment cannot lead a democratic rro revotu;;, _ forgets that tust< change, conditions change, govemment .uoru."r de

ll,,:: "^j::,*r,is i^ll,r:.:,"l"tve. Despite this and

their_

;:dr'ffi;:,

;;';love,,

, ffit"##I#::l j iiro,rirrr. d*rffi-;;;tlments, it tli u.rn difficurt forkr

il;,*

#i;tion, for ;x:,1f3g:;", ::',:fl # fl ;1lt';^-1'^ _,. 1.'ei n r e'' eventheelegantdoubletarkthatlrarcosir.s;;rr;il;'Jh?,ff li,".Ll"j his september 2rst Movement was nothing but sa 'r'PrE simpre uuupu doupt,etat -"r --o e[st power from within the Palace itself. - a seizur It will be recarled that under the 1935 constitution,

,'"_.rr"#il|.fil,i,1L#"j, did.

#,'#*tl.:::,"T,:j*

Xffi::%T.ffi'*T,,,

_-l,g po,s

g ,ia*,ro"s th.

rfi,""11f1..]:,::l1n of

pointed

to the preparation of r,*;;;ffiffi"dJ #:Tffil,il

want anothe, *"* Ma, p."J.;;;, ffi ffi.n,il#fi:#;rTt'

Ftric administration, or,rmi-io+*^4:^- like 1:,_- ,3linio1.1ater1, His trtos. orr,is

the people did not

afl-but one of his eight senatorial candida n,n lost. ,.3 The lone survivor was 1)zr, had Ernesto, ffi

,*rir, ##;

il::fi;lffffi": ;iffi ,; :;T":J'"11.','J:':::::'"91::)'wtrictr--iaau.,"p.*,o,effi villages since the davs pr"sioert ;;r_^;;. $

through bv dissociatine himserf

|ll.l;.iiffir,ao

p..sl,auy

rro- trrr'lair.os

;;;;"T, lJ#,:

t.*,i--rt"r, ;;,;;'r #Ji^* of regional, potiticar regime and his

and

,: to run tor for president, rresident, Marcos had *1$r,g|r,.1;;#1T::.1,:t'j::: :.,udl h* ffi ffiY to unbridled personal attacks bv trre h , r., **.- n^+ ^..^- I*11 H"'ff f y,r;J,"##:*ll,l,,;* ";r;;;;;r: t.rffi U:i'I; a vicious smear campaisr. rt nu.rno-a.rii"-ri"rjlr,ili ffirlril.t;#il.:J deep. misgrivings about .*poring

j:i:::i:illlffi

and branded hiri a in tire summer otf 1972 Defense secretary Juan Ponce Enrile remarkeo .ryiiicauy that .,whoever wants to mn for President next year strould be prepared to die." I was then *itr, rrl.rco, o;; ,il;; military installations in.the southep.philippines. Enrile,s statement was a reaction to briefings given by military commanders in Crbr, Cagayan de oro -a zr*uo*g". The declaration of martial raw and the take-ovei or trre gorer,ment onry a few montrs later thus appeared as the ultimate solution to Marcos, political pre. dicament, and one he grabbed without hesitation. yet from the start,'he sorght to convince his countrymen and the world that I perpetuating p.rron.l f o*., and privile ge. "rrXrtirl:-ffi tutional powers not onry 1o deal with the probrem "r or insuriency i..ffiil;;; othor parts of the philippines but to :'strike at the roots of rebellion il;;;;: tion." Reforms and development wourd be the main thrust of the new ;;;;-".;vqlutiol," ironically, became a favorite Marcos battlecry. Although Marcos likes to think of himself as a genuine revolutionary, he passions were fast abuilding, and

:iffJrTlbt::il1

Marcos was dlsqualii

j::T:i, il;-;" consecutive tersrs, and by te?3 *::i.ffiff":: l:.",::T woutd have been forced to step down, sunena;*,

previous Cfuef Executive had enjoyed for as tong as he

,...n.d;;;;

liar." Election

owi p,Irri*iti.r-*

similar

&esident. -

The govemment is accountabre to the people. It strourd, thereforo _^lh" poriticJcoinmunit5r, so that rr;san is can reqp( resnr ;1 to l}; the deepest needs and the loftiest arp;;;;;;;;fi;'"t then, is obligect ,WI I ,"_r*,jljlr^filji.^[1:,-u.c:u:*T;nt, instrument of the people's ioeas. Revoiutionary though to make itsetf this doctrine direction to a nation,s e: 5,"1r"::::l:r,i:l ideats that -ne

llooded with photographs purporting to strow a nude First Lady. Marcos had earlier uppealed for sobrrety and.deccncy., *a tn. opposition denied responsibility -ttir-nar..os for the llbelous material, hinting instead that it had been circulated uy camp gain public sympathy for the reolcctionist - to The photograph was obviously a fake tre work of a clever montage artist who had grafted the face of Mrs. Marcos onto the naked, voruptuous body of ano_ ther woman. To Marcos' great surprise and relief, his wife ,nor. ,r,i, uorl with the philosophical stoicisrn of a seasoned politician, justifying the tifle of ..steer Butterfly." That similar, if not worse, attacks we* in tL, ofnng Marcos appeared more wonicd than the intende,l victim. on the senate floor,-senator Benigno Aquino Jr. had arready fued the opening salvos by calring Mrs. Marcos an "Evita peron and a colossar wastrel for building u pJQ 6illion Cultural Center at a time of widespread poverty.,, S*"g UV this some. what ungallant charge, Marcos lastred back ..congenital at Aquino

comes closer to Prof. samuel Huntington's definition of a reformist:

' I

The aim of the revolutionary is to polarize politics, and hence he attempts amalgamate poriticar issues into a single .r.ur*i

to simplify, dramatize, and to

dichotomy between-the forces

tries to cumulate

"progress" and those

.,reaction.,,

must try io iiversiry ana rigidity in poritics, ti."leformer fluidity and adaptability. The revolutionary-urt u, uut, ,o or.rrocleavages, while the ieformer dissociate cleavages. The rev-olutionary promotes

tomize social forces, to manipulate them. The reiormer, quires a much higher order oipoliticat skiil rrr* o".r,rr, form is rare if only because the political talents necessary

are rare.

successfur revolutionary need reformist always is.

Marcos does sound

re-

"or*lurnfly, *.*""riJr**.

to *"t* it a reality not be a politician; a successesful

like one who aims to polarize the forces of .!rogrcss,,

iNfl

tf;

ltfl ilnr

ilff

txr

Reformist or Revolutionary 205

204

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION and those of "ieaction" through his constant reference to the Old and New but words alone do not make a true revolutionary - nor can they transmuto reality changes that have not actually taken place. on the other hand, h4arcos, than any past Philippine President,

possesses

I'y communist states.

.suchmethodsthough,havebeenextensivelyusedbyrulersofvariouscreeds' of the political spectrum as guilty - *itr, those on the' right By pe{9r-ming *.11t could' at best' acts as those on the left' of' savage and repressive -the social, political and economic otcler, Marcos, "the revolutionary of

r:olors and persuasions

the political skills and the

to manipulate the various po[tical, social, economic and religious forces that

bc a fale-lift would put it' more irt the centet,'? reveals him;f as a rightist - or as the ideologues rclctionary than Progressive. In tire sense that they too sought to improve and alleviate t1,e unsatisfactory may rightfully be considered as r:oncitions existing in their time, all past Presidents results in many areas, it rcformists. If they failed in achieving dramatic or tangible itself to a specific address to *., *ri"rv because each administration felt compelled needs' public short'term set of mandates arising from clearly-perceived, often

shaped and influenced national govemment policy and decisions for so long. consummate politician who will not hesitate to use anyone or any means to attain

objective, he could - by Huntington's yardstick have become a successful ist. But his strength appears to be his weakness. kr trying to win everybody to side, Marcos has acquired the reputation of being "too much of a politician,,, o whose words can seldom be relied upon. He is regarded neiflrer as a "good

''nor "bad" President but as ao.clever,' with all the negative qualities that the word implies. The political overlorh of Mindanao province, who had a record of dpserting every incumbent president in,th conviction that no one had ever won reclection, broke his own tradition in I by supporting Marcos for a second term. To anxious ward leaders, he gave assurance that "Marcos is a smart politician, and he will do anything to ensure victory." fu everyone had feared, the 1969 election saw fraud and terrorism on scale far more daunting than in 1p49, when Jose P. laurel, former chief Justice the supreme court and President of the Japanese-sponsored war government, lost tt President Elpidio Quirino - while the nation teetered on the brink of a civil war; One of his official biographies hints at the "revolutionary,' in Marcos. mentions that at the end of the Second world war he emerged from his moun guerilla hiijeout to fnd "the profiteers of war dispensing putronrg. and expec

PresidentQuezon_fieryandtempestuousandflagrarrtlyauthoritarianinhis the fight for indepen' conduct of govemment affairs - belonged to an era when achievement' When this for tlence was everbody's concern, and is remembered his vice President, ilar II, world during Quezon died in exile in the united States Sirgio OsmenalSr., inherited the task of

The implication is that lliarcos had displayed slfficient social and politicali to merit the interest of dedicated leftists. This, however, has come under' question because of his inability to establish a link with known communists in the Seventies. If he had indeed been approached, says a student teaaer claiming ties with revolutionary groups, Marcos would have known where to begin in his early efforts to negotiate with the underground. His unzuccessful attempts to open alinq with those who had embraced the revolutionary cause indicated that they were strangers to

him

he was to

them.

independence.

Beforehecouldseriouslydealwiththewar-ravagedeconomy'Roxasdiedofa

may heart attack. president Elpidio Quirino then engaged in what !e considered Rodriguez, an Filemon late the with the first real attempt at eionomic planning, as his principal adviser' engineer, -"a

program has since become the reference book Quirino,s^Five-year Economic Marcos economic plan bears traces oI the h' Even the of succeeding Presidents. first expressed by Quirino. The chief Execuobjectives fluence of the concepts and vision of economic development, but the own their had tives who followed him recycled versions of the original' extent, large a to progrrr1, they evolved were, the most popular political figure in certainly President Ratnon Magsaysay,

---

Philippinehistory,wasthespokesmanoft]recomnrontoo,andhisbriefadministra. firm stand against.graft tion was notable for its rural development program and its I'Iagsaysay was catapower. from toppled Quirino anJ conuptlon, the issue that

well

intemational, fame through the open support

fulted from local to national, and Asia he was expected of the United States, whose interests in the Philippines as

to promote.

Former President Dosdado Macapagal suggests nevertheless that Marcos may be a communist - or at least,aquestionable anti+ommunist. In hisbook,Democmcy in the PhiliBpines, Macapagal points out that Marcos drew from Marx, Lenin, Mao ,Tse Tung urd other known communist leaders for his idea of a New society;'i and that the methods he has u.sed in seizing and maintaining power - the abolition of representative legislature, zuppression of media, the imprisonment of opposition leaders and political enemies - are patterned after the repressive measures adopted

then

flag on felito president Manuel Roxas to preside over the historic lowe'ring of the Philippine inaugurate to and 4 lu|y |946, nrarking the end of American domination,

deference from even those who had fought in the war. Every bone in his body at this, every small wound reopened. At this precise moment an invitation for him join the communist movement came. Ybt, though betrayed by the faithlessness those he had fought for, he found it his greater sorrow to have been extended invitation. He could never give up his principles." awareness

clearing.ftt.9*it t:ft O{ the war' It

*r*

WhenhediedinaplanecrashontheislandofCebuafewmonthsbeforehis by the CIA ;rarO, i, *u, rumored that the "accident" had been arranged

becauseMagsaysay,havingattainedanincrediblylargefollowingwiththemasses' hadbecome..unrnanageable.,andwasplanningtoestablishhimselfasadictator.

PresidentCarlosGarciaintroducednewreformarrddevelopmentprograrns he tried to push a that were obviously a rehash of previous ones. Signi{icantly, ;rritoi.." First" poiicy for business, driving powerful foreign business and industrial

-J

intereststothesideofhischallenger,Diosdado}'{acapagal.

106'l'llli Like

('OLINI'[it{trtilT' I{trVOLU,t.tON

Reformist or

Magsaysay, Macapagai identifieti rrinrserf

with thc r.wry pcasart r e,dea'ed himself to the electorate as the "barefoot boy fiom r_ut,u.r,1'o r,.,,ril.ro of Pampanga in Central Luzon. StiI he ,as .rrable to give ra,d rcforrn thc r ir,pctus. l{e is unfortunately remembered as the fatherror trr. u,,,.rg.,,.y e, n.rent Adrninistration, an_attempt at providing work for.the natiu,i;;';i'i employed through labor-intensive infrastructrire pro1ects tr,urlii.rulv ,.nt ,to,

hospital, a road - the people expect it.?' "But what if I cannot deliveri' .'The fact thatyou made apromise is all that really matters," Marcos explainetl. In 1949, Marcos ran for Congress in his father's constituency in the province of Ilocos Norte. He made a grand promise that he was, however, to fulfill in siXteen years. He told skeptical Ilocano crbwds: "Elect me a congressman now and I pledge you an llocano presid€nt in twenty years and the realization of the dreams we all fought a war to win." He got their votes, not because the people believed him but because he was the son of their late beloved representative, Mariano Marcos. The father had been twice a congressman of his district. Thoughhe was to lose in three subesequent electionp to his perennial rival, Julio Nalundasan, he had a fanatical core of loyal supporters who quickly rallied behind the young Ferdinand. school

All these men had also been generousry endowed with the poritical a,d manipulative talents to enable thern to ieach the presidency tirorgt., t But none had the boldness, the ambition and the craftiness to seize 'outes vemment in the guise of declaring martial law for the alleged purpose of 'verhaul wlels or trre rnilii;il. if accepts ll:-"T],1,""i,.::-.11,*d,,"ono-i. premise that lvlarcos' real involvement is the perpetuation of porver _ and his r unmistakably supports aris _ everytrril;ir; r,o ,rr*, rvSurrg uv T rlrr into r6a^ l^^..^ 1l -clearly ^loa focus, so that what has so far appeared as a magnificent effort to lance the varied and conflicting interests of society emerges ur1 iord-*o calcuia move to serve the special interests of those who support him, even if it means

;;

:.fl]irT

;;;i

was his father's enemy, Nalundasan, who made it possible for Marcos of sorts. [n his third attempt to regain his lost congrcsto Marcos was bitterly defeated. Nalundasan partisans celebrated Mariano seat, sional mock funeral through the cobbled streets of Batac,Ilocos a victory holding by their Norte, parriding an empty coffin that was supposed to symbolize the politicaldeath of Marcos. Three nights later, while brustring his teeth at the window, Nalundasan was strot between the eyes. The It{arcoses stood as the main suspects.

while ostensibly satisfying the socialist or communist *. demand fo of large estates and the erevation of tenants to the status of has temporarily soorhed the antagonism of sugar barons and :-*::1*t1t.",,he planters by excluding their vast plantations from nut Operatioi f,una Transfer. that the scheme to have the tenants absorbed as corpora Tir-,il liillrd;.1nourn: shareholders of these estates was zctually aimed at sparing tfr. p."p.rti., ,fr"i members of the Marcos and Romualdez crans naa ateleaty'acquired in

Ferdinand Marcos, then a law student at the University of the Philippines, was arrested and charged with murder. Nalundasan had been killed by a .22 calider bullet fired ftom a rifle at a great distance. The evidence mustered by the prosecutor, was purely circumstantial: young Marcos had the motive, the opportunity, and the skill to carry out the assassination. At the time of the murder, he had recently won the title of national' strarpshooting champion. Roman Cruz, Sr. was the judge

Leyte, Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao.

To win organized rabor to his side, he has decreed a Labor code that is sup

to assure protection against arbitrary lay-offs and provide a whole .vvvrrruvvl,l cornucopi incentives and benefits' But in order to mollify businessmen and industrialist and attract foreign capital, Marcos has also denied labor the basic right to strike anr kept wages at a low level.

who convicted him of murder in the lower court.

The trial, which reached the Supreme Court, took place as he was preparing for the bar examinations. The picture of a bright young man cramming for the bar in a dark prison cell, and then topping the examinations with an unprecedented high score, cairgfut the public imagination. Ovemight, lvlarcos became both an uriderdog and a celebrity, and this status gained added dimension when the news spread tlnt his acquittal was due to his own brilliant defense. There is another side to the story,

with the political ascendancy of the military establishment as a consequence of martial law, he cultivates the loyalty of both military and civilian tua..riy givins side a feeling of importance and prominence in trr, gove*ment, 1a9h or, when this fails, by playlng one against the other. It is a dangerou, fu.., drril;'.;;; degree of political sophistication and the ability to deceive or Jissemble with poker face. Marcos appeari to have these requisite qualities in abundance.

become a national ligure

break-up

posed

Ironically,

ficing the greater good.

Negrqgr,

207

of the Ptrilippine Women's University (Mrs. Marcos' almarnder) and was a conffrtpd rrovice in the art ofwinning votes. "What kind of apromise/'she asked Ivlarcos, and he rcplied: "Anything - a

the drain.

Rcvolutionary

however.

. President Quezon apparently took a liking to him and was impressed by the

In the

process, however, he has had to pay a special price - the loss of hisr credihility as a leader. whenever he makes an announcement, the people's reaction is to assume that he intends to do the opposite. The men arouna ""-Jiri, him are frequently appalled that he cannot resist the impulse to promise, eyen when there is no neeq need ro il, to maKe make one. bne' rn In tne the lg69 1969 senatorial campaign, camoaisn. he advised adviced Helena [relenc rtani+oo

brashness that Marcos exhibited during an audience with the President at Malacanang

It is said that Quezon perzuaded Chief Justice Jose P. [,aurel to declarehim innocent, which the magistraie zupposedly did on grounds of reasonable doubt. There is no way of establistring ttre veracity of this story, but it is significant that through changes of political fortunes Marcos never ceased to hold a special regard for tWo of the Justice's sons - Jose Jr., or "Pepito," Speaker of the Lpwer House of Congress, and Salvador, now a niember of the Interim National Assembly.

,Palace.

Benitez,a noted Filipino educator, never to deliver a speech without promising the people ] sornething. Benitcz hnd been plucked from academe where stre trao u.I" prrria.ni

i'I

2IO THE COUNTERFEIT

REVOLUTION

There is a mggestion that Marcos is dominated by his strong.willod

Nothing can be farthcr from the truth. He rules his house with a flnn hand

tlere have beeir instances when Mrs. Marcos would discreetly recede into thg grgund to avoid a marital conffontation. Through tl,o years, however, the 0) of'powers and responsibilities by husband ano wire has rezulted in the distinct spheres of influence in the govemment, thus reducing the incidenco domestic friction. while Marcos handles all matters pertaining to foreign aflt defense and security, finance and judiciary, his wife takes carJof political local govemment and short-term or impact projects. she is most eqpecially to:him in devising the political projects and pu'blic activities that serve as tary distractions for the people.

In tqs

sense, stre has never stepped out

mairager. The

of her original role as a only difference is that instead of posten, strcamers,

y'!yau$ an!.1usigat

entertainment, she now directs her creative energies to activities that cost billions of pesos. If the bread-andcircus principle served tlrc emperors well has attained the respectability of a de program in the Marcos regime, it is due mainly to the efiorts of lrirs. Marcos. no accounting is ever made of public funds, it is impossibre to say -A3 govemmentias qpent on the Miis Universe beauty pageant, the AliSuch heavyweight boxing championstrip fight, the LINCTAD V, iVJrfa fa* and the IntEmational Monetary Fund meeting, and numerous international rences, concerts and cultural events in Manila that served the dual purpose of qouJrtry and the Marcoses in the international spotrighi, and $ng -the ing the population from a sullen contemplation of their r.onorni. rrlasnips. rut total investrnent in this type of maisive publis rchlirns and image-building to excecded p500 million in a five-year span. At ttris stage, 11_m$:t.q the Philippines is dependent on foreign borrowings rrna. ac -,^ll a- +L^ ^-^-^ri-^--- qt the operating expenses of the govemment, this hug" ,*p"nOi ydl as make sense except in terms of providing spectacular &versions urd Marcos more time to perfect the institutions designed to strengthen and pe his rule.

iectr

YT-

fry

Jr"ilp*;;,; ri;;#

since the end of all his exertions is political permanence, Marcos does i to fit in the category of either a reformist or r.uotutiorrury. Til;; ,""; is one who seeks to improve conditions within the framework .*irti";;, i;;; "f tioning systems, institutions, and structures, while the genuine revolutioniry J;;.j for a drastic change of the existing social, political and economic order by removing seem

tle 9ld systems and structures and transmuting society itself. Marcos has done none of these things. At best, he has changed the form but not the essence of the status quo.

A professor of the University of the Philippines laments: '"There is notfrinn.ji new about the New society. hol at t]re paraces and mansion, trr.t o* ffi#:; live in, look at theii luxr"lrious cars, the way they dress and then rook

slum-dwellers whose shanties have been screened visitors by ipil-ipil trees and decorative blocks.,'

:rLt^?i

;;;;;;

off from tr,.

"vr"or

Reformist or RevolutionarY

2ll

A harsh indictment * but it springs from the apprehension that, for all his revolutionary o, ,efonnist declarations, Irt.r.o, tras done more than anf of the old politicians and vested economic groups to preseile the status qlo. orr thg evidence of the New Society, it is clear that the "revolution Stagod by the fovemment" has a boon to been most benef,rcial to his government, and the "revolution ftom abovo" top' the good life at the few who, wilh Marcos, now enjoy the

The Other

i I I

rm_trigttty successful political partnership that has evolved out of the n of Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Romuardez rnay be considered apheno in.a country where women have traditionaly taken an inconqpicuous back politics. Wirh the exception of the legendary princess Urduja, who was ,rppo*d,

,t I

'T r

o.f wflt is now_pangasinan province, lfsilang,a:9 who fe.ryort3 took her husband's prace when biego silang

or rlre fiery Gabri died *hil. the Spanistr regime in the Ilocos in northern Luzon, no woman in philipu -against history has attained the .status, prominence and power that Mrs. l,tarcos on! ' in her husband's goverrunent. She is not just the womim behind the ihroner many respects, she is "the other president.', As Marcos' alter ego, stre discharges virtually the same duties and as much power as her husband. This unique situation finds no comparison in the world, except perhaps in -the case of the Argdntine dictator, Juan and his wife, Eva. Mrs. Marcos has, in fact, been likened to the first --'- Mrs. because.ofher political drive and her natural talent for organization-.

h;;ir1g;;

Althg;Ch.. much of her power originally derived from her position as lady,-one that her predecessors in Malacanang parace had regarded ,, pur"ty Mrs' Marcos has become a poritical leader in f,.. o*n ,igrr.. str.

ofiiqials, business and civic leaders, technocrats, military ^"j,Crl.T*.:t acade.liciansrvho eould run the govemmeni as wefl "fd.r" than, 11d ", those working for Marcos. The Palace is this clearly divided.into two rival canps, and officials are idet

*;;lrtter

ilffi;

rtias become :"_1"::t^T-!:::-"Ltr.,R"mualdez aMalacanang joke that the lines are drawn not onlyon the basis of whetheroqe from the Ilocos ( Marcos'birthplace) or kyte (Mrs. Marcos' ancestrar region) but r

physical attribtrtes

well.

whih.the people surrounding Marcos bear the unmistakable appearance of ticians and bureaucrats, tiose around Mrs. Marcos belong to the caiegory or..be ful people" -* artists, writers, upper{rust society .f rh" first set_foot-in Malacanang n 1966, it was evident that she would turn it into kind of Camelot after Jicqueline Kennedy's White I{ouse. A newspaper publistrer who had attended the staid urd formal receptions r

;il;.--F;;;"h;6

previous administrations found Mrs. Marcos ..a fresh wind blowing through the pa ace." Not only the building but the occupants underwent a strikiig transformat she wanted Malacanang to be liveabre ,rd *ur-, not the cold museum it had t since the days of the Spanistr and American gorr-d. general. auar"orri".rtoflr[i of the president's olficial ,r-rid.n.., the best d.;isn;, stylists .LTF d her into a droman of dazzling .regance. In the early dayr, T1 she was cruelly criticized by those who felt that her taste betrayeo her provincii up'bringing, but gradually she acquired a sophistication that the society women of

:: *:,j1:fl:"riJj:Ti: tl-r

For the new Fint Lady, life in the Palace - only I stone's throw from the to garage where she had qpent a bitter childhood_- was that rarest of opportunities of an good humor and enthusiasn the with it seized she and Irq,r1r. an education, avid

student.

pin striped suit Once she teased Labor Minister Blas Ople about the expepsive planner and speech he was we'aring. Ople, who had been the chief Marcos propaganda newsPaperman writer before his appointment as Minister, had been a harddrinking ill'at+ase in who took pride in his peasant origins in central Luzon, and he looked to wear. the formal attire that Mrs. Marcos required all cabinet members

"Ople", she saicl, '!ou don't look like a communist any"lor:j' ..r.rna, not," replied the embarrassed ople, "but for the First Lady's

infor-

mation" this zuit was made in Hongkong by communist tailors"' Marcos Realizing that the Labor Minister had been stung by her remark,,Iurs. has Ople glad "I'm observed. ,u*.J io thJse of us who were present and blithely to carne l_first when gaudy things learnecl to dress well. I myself used to wear such leam anything'" not and Palace a Malacanang. But it's stupii for one to live in archaeolory and the The hours qpent at leaming Spanish and French' art' paid off' From a glYky' apparently have and difromacy

of gorrm*eni *iar*y.O politi.i*', wife,

intricacies

rr"r;r;;;;;

or Marcos groups.

213

Manila soon envied.

THE OTHER PRESIDENT

hesident

she has metamorphosed

into a poised and confident

artists' or diplomats' The lady who appea$ completely at ease with kings' concert william sul,Lry i, tota *rat at a dinner hosted by Marcos for u.s. Ambassador the "nutriabout tir*, ,te complained that the people did not seem enthusiastic

brn,l -the enriched bread distributea Uy ttre govemment's American'assisted'nutriyou tion urd feeding centers. whereupon'srtlir- facetiously suggested, "Have tried giving them cake?' party, Mrs. Marcos reportedly confided to a friends that stre had felt After the -Am6asador's remark, since it implied that stre knew nothing about insulted by thS French history and Marie Antoinette's famous retort, Before her, all First ladies had played a secondary and ceremonial role in the Palace. Aurora Quezon, Esperanza Osmena, Trinidad Roxas, Vict-oria Quirino'Gon' zales (Elpidio Quirino was a widower and his daughterservedasPalace hostess), Luz Magsaysay, l,eonila Garcia and Evangelina Macapagal - all had remained unobtrusively in the background while their husbands bore the wearisome burdens of the Presidency.

At the outset, it looked as though Mrs. Marcos would be relegated to the same monotonous'fate. ln her first year, she busied herself with civic and charitable

work, and the sponsorship of cuitural activities. But eventually she became the link between L4arcos and those officials who could not readily reach him with their problems. When a quick decision was needed, she made it for him. It was not long before Marcos himself realized that his wife's quiet assertion of presidential Powers allowed him to attend to more important matters.

214

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION But her greatest usefulness lay not in relieving him of part of his cares and concems; it was to be fo-und in the very nature of their she could speak for Marcos without committing him or the govemment. In th6 plomatic field, it gave him a widellatitude for maneuver. she thus became.hig' sonal envoy to china and Russia when the philippines wanted to lay the grou work for the opening of official ties with these two countries. There stre lut

personal charms to work, disarming the late Mao Tse Tung by giving him a aaught kiss and flattering old konid Brezhnev with what passed for schoolgirl adulation. And when Marcos needed to soften the attitude of the Libyans towards the

ippine govemment and persuade them to withdraw their support of the Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao, he dispatched Mrs. Marcos to poli where stre spent three full hours with the intractable col. Mummar Ghad and extracted from him a prornise of ubyan cooperation. Tradition-bound :

lound it hard to accept that a womim should face a man alone, but it was not lirst time that Mrs. Marcos had risked gossip and derision to accomplish a delic political mission for her husband. In the fight for tlte presidential nomination of Nationalista Party in 1965, she was known to comer delegates in the privacy of

hotel rooms oblivious to all the nrmors circulated by Marcos'enemies. With her growing importance in the tr{arcos administration, Mrs. stepped out of the Palace shadows into the limelight. she no longer hovered her husband at state functions: she occupied a place beside him. The public become so accustomed to seeing them togetlLrer thai dire significanceisofteir attac to her absence. It comes as no surprise that Marcos should freely share not only the hr but the powers of the President with his wife. In the 1965 and 1969 elections had been his chief campaign planner and manager, and by Marcos'own adm he could never have mdde it to Malacanang without her. Until then, stre had like a typical politician's wife who kept to the kitchen and to her own The one thing she said she could do best was to feed asmany as fifty persons previous notice. Early. in their marriage, before her husband could suspect that she a talent foi'getting along with all kinds of people, politicsiepulsed lier. she had a taste-of it while living with her uncle - the late Daniil Romualdez, SpeitJ er of congress in the post-war administration of president Roxas Mrs. Marcos. could not get used to the impositions and pressures that leaders and favorseeke heaped upon her during Niarcos'absence. She found the constant invasion of privacy, the stream of visitors, and the all-night meetings an intolerable strain. Marcos was named member of a congressional mission to the united states, she ged to be taken along. At that time, she was on the verge of a nervous 6rr.L6opr. -,,r1 By 1965, however, stre had developed not only a stomachbutahead forpolii tics Stre proved to be arr aggressive campaign worker whose enerry no one in the : Marcos camp, man or woman, could surpass. she would go without sleep, and' still be full of undiministred vitality the next morning. She had suddenly beiome a humm dynamo running at an incredible speed, as though she were herself the candi..

The Other

hesident

215

date. Even Marcos found difficulty keeping pace witli her. That year, he was carght in a great dileqrma. He had reached a crucial point in his career with the presidency almost within his grasp. But President Macapagal was bent on seeking a second term, and he was still very much in bontrol of the Liberal Party. It was clear to Marcos that his chances of being nominated by the'ruwere nil. ling party -

At this time, some Nacionalistas had grown desperate in their search for a man wtro could deftat Macapagal, and they turned to Marcos. The invitation extended by a group led by Speaker Jose laurel placed Marcos in a real quandary. If he switched to the opposition, he would be facing not one but four formidable rivals for the nomination. Three senators * Arturo Tolentino, Femando Iopez and Gil Puyat ' had long started their campaign for delegate support. And way ahead of them was Vice Preiident Emmanuel Pelaez, who had been elected as a Liberal but broke with

of "borrowed honor." Shortly before this, the Macapagal administration had come under severe attack for its invohement with Harry Stonehill, an American businessman -whose Macapryal on the issue

flourishing real estate, tobacco and trading intereSts had allegedly burgeoned through the h6lp of zubomed officials. Stonehill, it was said, had contributed heavily to the

Macapagal political war chest.

'T;

sl'rield Macapagal, his propagandists under the direction of Press Secretary Rufino Hechanova leaked a roster of politicians who, at one time or another, had purportedly been the recipients of Stonehill s largesse. Among those in the list was Pelaez, who reacted furiously. He accused lvlacapagal of "boremploying "squid tactics" to confuse the public. Macapagal. and rowing his honor" butterfly" having changed parties often. Still Pelaez "political in tum called Pelaez a hero and became its leading contender for the presi' fold a returned to Nacionalista

ttnn-Vi.t President

dential nomination.

For many politicians, crossing party lines had become as uneventful as a vacation trip, mainly because parties differed little from each other and were no

more than shelters for benighted pursuers of political ambitions. Platfcrms sounded maddeningly familiar and all seemed to travel on the same pathways. The Liberal party, for example, was originally the "Liberal Wing" of the Nacionalista Party which traces its ancestry to a turn'of'the<entury organization. The LP came into existence at the end of World War II as the offshoot of a power strug' gle between President Sergio Osmena, Sr. and his rival for the presidency, It4anuel Roxas. In the election of 1946, both parties offered practically the same program of govemment: the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a war-ravaged nation. But while Osmena refused to conduct his campaign outside Malacanang Palace,the younger Roxas, still vigorous despite his concentration in a Japanese prisoner-of-war campin Mindanao, storned the couritryside. With brilliant oratory, he demolished the charge of war-time collaboration with the enemy .. and won. From then on, the outcome of every Philippine election has invariable hinged more on the strength of personalities than on the validity or timeliness of iszues. When Marcos decided to join the Nacionalistas, his l4-year memberstrip in the Li

216

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

beral Party hardly mattered. steadfastness and

loyalty

The Other

217

to relieve the candidate of all the worrisome details of a campaigr;' she would say with a proprietary tone of voice. Marcos could no longer think' He was groggy t o* fuigue, from delivering hundreds of speeches. He was like a robot." person, Lisieners find it odd to hear her refer to him always in the third his nicknames are Andy,which or Ferdie as never -President either as Marcos or The to close friends, or even as "my husband." Appuently, she wants their separate

a strong credential, indic qualities found wanting in rrnost political i..d.;; served instead as

Nacionalista friends were particularly hopeful that as president, he would not those responsible for his election. But there were serious iszues against him. Although he had been acquitted tJre celebrated Natrundasur murder case , his rivals for the nomination hinted broa, that he had been freed for political reasons - not on the strength of his innocence. Added to this were charges of complicity in a landgrabbing attempt involv

the inrpres' identities firmly established outside the conjugal home, and to convey by matrimuch so not bound personalities, distinct two fact, sion ttrat they are, in in the Marcos to his defeat On political objective. common monial ties as by a them." of two fighting was "I ruefully: obsewed Pelaez Nacionalista convention, There is nothing in Mrs. Matcos' early life to indicate that she would bec-ome made by official the ambitious and selflassured womut she is today. Much has been Romualdez clan powerful political the to belongs she that fact biographers of the

thousands of hectares of public land, which a Spanish tobacco company had from the goverrunent in Isabela province. He was also accused of having p:

irhmensely from the immigration scandal which made it possible for chinese to enter the country under a quota system granted to favored congressrnen. In nomination campaign speech, pelaez warned: "If Marcos gets elected sident, we might as well close down all our schools and churches.,, Portrayed by political rivals as 'oruthless, corrupt and dangerous." Marcos considered the man least likely to zucceed in the 1965 Nacionalista party convent All the cards were stacked against him. yet when his personal campaign m started to roll;,with his wife at the controls, there seemed to be no way of it. After two gnrelling days of balloting -- which pelaez partisans claimed was fluenced by money and terrorism N{arcos ernerged victorious, garnering a v of 777 against Pelaez's M4, From the result of that convention, the tuming of his career - and of Philippine history - has come his lucky number, seven, now performs a mystical function in the conduct ofhis govemment. It is often hard for many to believe that a politician as pragmatic as Maicor should also be egregriously zuperstitious, but this peculiar ambivalence rr^-ar, been found in powerful rulers of the past who owed their decisions to the cou of diviners, astrologers and seers. No royal court was without a magician or whose word carried more weight that the minister's. The German dictator, Adolf Hitler, epitomized this dependence on the occultj When his conquering armies began to zuffer disastrous ,.n"ig in the fall of 1944,,), the generals who &antically awaited his orders were shattered to leam that he l tumed to astrologers for military advice, and that the prosecution of the war Europe, Russia and Africa no longer hinged on the moviment of troops and but on the movement of the stars. Evidently, Marcos is convinced that he owes the presidency as much to his wife as to his benign planets. The bumper harvest of delegate votes in the Nacionalista convention was indisputably the fruit of her organizational and managerial talents. when money was needed, she was there to supply it. when a deregate proved difl ficult, she disarmed him with her personal charms. soon after her husband took his oath.as hesident, Mrs. Marcos would reminisce: "'I had to take care of everything: the schedule, the propaganda materials, the stage entertainment. she had been the writer, producer and aiictor or u *qp.nse drama, with Marcos merely an actor responding to hgr directions. l.[t was *y iou

President

Lyt.. la The Ltntold Story of Imitda tr'Iarcos, author Carmen Navarro-Pedrosa pro-

gained, by the affluence and chronicles, however, that stre zuffered, rather than was the youngest rninence of her relatives. Her father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez; attained the never of three brothen, all of whom took up law as a profession. But he President Quezon success and prestige that came to Norberto Romualdez, whom Miguel brother, appointed Asociaie Justice of the Supreme Court, or to another

bedomualdez, Norberto o, law partner in a thriving practice in Nlanila, who later came Mayor of Manila. (a Mrs. Marcos, along with Benjamin (now Govemor of Leyte) and Aleta loveapparently and central Bank official) were children of orestes' second by his mother, less - marriage. According to Pedrosa, this union had been arranged the fam-tlV to spare effort in an the strongwilled Dona Trinidad Iropez- Romualdez, of his the death after that, from an imminent scandal arising from a relationship second The backbround. frmily first wife, orestes had with a womm of unacceptable Mrs. Romualdez, Remedios Trinidad, had grown up with the nuns of the Asilo rhatriarch, de San vicente de Paul and she was the personal choice of the Romualdez to create love intcnded spumed Oreste's Dona Trinidad. Owing to reports thai a-m' three 3:00 at held abruptly be had to troubles at the wedding, the ceremony hours ahead of schedule. ' Marred by a series of misunderstandings between her ill-matched parents happy and the children of two marriages, Mrs. Marcos' childhood was not exactly a nc't galage in a live had to (Benjamin) one. For a time, she and her brother Kokoy boxes while wooden of tops bare the too far from Malacanang Palace, sleeping on their mother stayed with friends elsewhere in the city to avoid another quarrel with her step-chiidren. Only in Tacloban, kyte, w[ere Orestes finally settled to be' lt{rs' Marcos come the Dean of the School of Law of the Divine Word College, did a young into blossomed she war, the After finally experience a sort of awakening. informal and parties at greatly after sought was woman oi ,turning beauty and

dances.

was this same beauty, but fuller, more mature', that young congressman Marin cos marrried in 1954, following an eleven-day whirlwind courtship that culminated

'''F{.'-

218

:-" --

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Other

what all newspapers public2ed as "The wedding of the year.', The union was to become the political partnership that Nlarcos hoped would advance his poli

career. with the voters of Ilocos and closer to reality.

lryte

nao, could go on in the provinces for years without affecting his rule, widespread of the unrest in the capital city could bring it down in no time' This is clearly one hapmillion inhabitants eight Manila's qpared keep to reasons why nothing is being free in the providing concerts Mrs. Marcos of fark, py- with the Ivletro gour.,i.nt means if it ev€Il ': urban facilitieS improved and .rt.rtuirrr,rnt. subsidized foodstuff and hospitals. depriving the poor and inarticulate rural population of schools, roads

now behind him, the presidenry

Years of living together and fighting the same battles have somehow their attitudes and mannerisms in identical pattems, but Marcos and his wife are different as their backgrounds. Though they exhibit the same keen appetite : wealth rind power, their priorities seem to run in opposite directions *iti, nl1.rrur, the bom politician, prone to regard wealth as a means to power, and Mrs. Marcor

.Becauseofatendenrytoqpendthepeople'smoney'aswellashe.own,ina

ihe extent grand manner, [,Irs. Marcos has arroused considerable curiosity about_ her among Baker ranked Richard writer if her private wealth. In 1975, Cosntopolitan El2abeth included list Queen distinguished The ,fr" *o.fa't ten richest women. the Americari and onassis cristina Netherlands, of England, Queen Julizura of the on her on the heiresl Doris Duke. It was an honor that Baker probably conferred people is most to Unknown shopper' intemational lavish a basis of her reputation as jewelry and for clothes, to shop out tirne Marcos.takes Mrs. tfr* fu., that when than her friends more for so does she or Arnsterdam, York New in Paris.

tending to view it the other way around. a .ftr- style'setter and image buirder of the government, she equates devt wrth 1'beautification," believing_as she frrvently does that goveming a cou 11nt is very much like rurming a household. The luxurious Manila Hotel and

Hotel, the Philippine International convention center, the philippine i center for Asia and the cultural center all attest to her sense of beauty Plerza

grandeur, but which.critics cite as evidence of an ..edifice complex." Indeed, judging by what stre has done in terms of infrasiructure, historians probably rernember lvlrs. Marcos as the real builder of the nation. she has sh,

bangles for herself.

Like a typical Filipina, she cannot think of returning home without the custowhole planeload 1nary pasaluboig o, arrival gifts * which, in her case, could be a of souvenirs for mernbers of the National'Assembly, govemment and military of' flcials and their wives. '[{er generosity has, in fact, become a byword with favor-seekMarers. who p re fr r to course their petitions through her instead of going directly to known' is well frugality llocano cos, whose But her displeasure can be equally extravagant -_ and devastating. Palace

that what normally takes a year or so to construct can be done in months shudder whenever they think of the cost of meering

,ar;fitlos *.9,tntr:.:rs

often impossible deadlines and the structural changes that she may suddenly either because stre finds the ceiling too low or the design unattractive l" ,rr. ..* A^' a^f +L^ ", cf Convention Center the fr^-..;-at^^ and the Manila Hotel. she is not b:vol9 literally changing the landscape regardress of expense to achieve the particular effect she wants. For the presidential rest house on the is r:f I-eyte, the Philippine Navy had to barge in tons of white sand for the beach ':_r:1l,Gruur. and flowers were flown in from r,ianira by the philippine Air Force,. togetler with a crew ofgardeners from the Luneta park, to transform the scene ovemight in time for the arrival of a select group ofjetsetters from Europe. a,r"rii;'m:rngrove swamp was turned into a manicured golf course for Marcos, ,*aluriua uo'.'', Her magnificient obsession, it appears, is to create a city of Man out of Metro Manila'- now proposed to extend from the Manila Bay to province euezon which faces the Pacific ocean. The country's leading architects are already hard at work on a master plan that envisions a color fu l, environmental Xanadu of tile roofed buildings, green belts, aviaries, museums, parks and a network of flower and treelined boule. vards and waterways. The dream, unfortunately, is a luxury the phitippines can in afford and when one thinks of the thousands of depressed communities crying for the most basic services and facilities the city of lr{an raises a question

writer puts

it, "

on pushcarts."

or*o"rrr friorities. As one

we are building a cadiilac city while the rest

or-trrr."urt;rd.;

what many cannot see, however, is that as the seat of the nationar govemment and the showcase of his regime, Manila is politically more important to Marcos than the rest of the country. while pocket rebellions, such as the Moro uprising

rvi*d"-

President 219

that she was responsible for having Benigno Toda booted out as ChairPhilippine Air Lines and divested of his stocks in the company at a price of the man dictated by the'loverrunent. Publicly, the charge against Toda was that the national flag carrier had been a consistent loser under his ntanagement. while his own comparealized trernendous profits in management fees, and Rubicon Enterprises ny sources say

conrmissions eamed as agent for the acquisition of aircraft and spare parts. Toda could have weathered this crisis if he had been Inore circumspect, but in a predesperate rnove to raise cash for operations he allegedly made the fatal error of ,.niing a bill for Mrs. i,iarcos'foreign trips. t\iarcos was repoftedly'stunned by the staggering sum. Toda. so the story goes, tried to explain that the amount covered the ur. of several jetlinen to transport his wife's arge entourage, usually consisting of ladies-in-waiting, beauticians, security rnen, television crew, journalists and socially-

, ,

prominent rnatrons called her Blue Ladies. Toda further explained that the United States Federal Aviation Administration had, at one tirne, imposed a huge fine on PAL for making an unauthorized landing at the La Guardia airport in New York, because Mrs. lViarcos insisted on landing there without prior clearance,. As of that mornpnt Toda's goose was cooked, as the saying goes. There aie those who believe that idarcos defers to his wife not only because he needs her as a political ally but because he wants to preserve domestic peace. The as sumption that irnportant national decisions are based on considerations of matri' monial felicity rnay provide choice grist for the country's rumor mills, but it ignores

220

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

The Other

the fact that Marcos truly respects his wife,s political judgments and instincts treats her as a working partner in govemment. He once saiJ: ,,She is worth ten

shows that she is indeed

President

'The Other President"'

net members."

The admiration is obviously mutual, for whenever the opportunity p

itself, Mrs. Marcos is equally eager to praise herhusband as ..an ex'tremely irirui rnan, full of vision . ' ." with this for_ a start. she wiil prunge into a non-stop his views on economic development, the sfriitin[ balance of power ::ltt: intemational :, Asia, politics, and a broad range of ideas that, one is made to unde stand, Marcos shares with her as a colleague. There are times when she sounds maddeningly like him, down to tt, trii pause, as..though to perfect her claim as-Marcos'altei ego. tn this roie ":.|o..d she has been incredibly faithful to the original. encouraging the belielthat in event o her succession to power there would be no deviation from the thrusts and directi

of the New Society. Through her appointment as Govemor of Metro Manila and r\linister of Hu Settlement, Marcos has opened the connecting door that separates heL uearoom from the stateroom. For as Governor of the National capitai Region, she is in a, strategic position to seize control, if necessary, of the seat of government. And as Niinister of Human Settlenients, sne is the hr;j r"*.n,. rnent " her ministry having been empowered by presidentia aecr.. to functions and responsibilities belonging to all others. Her actions officers, drawn mostly tiom the ranks of retired miritary officers,, and the Human Resources Technology center, a high-powered bank of technocratic and managerial talents, actually comprise a ,. shadow cabinet', that could replace her husband's cabinet in case of a government revarnp. There is no doubt that through the martial raw years, I\,irs. I\{arcos has been assiduously leaming and preparing herself for national leadersrrip - a role so far beyond the wildest dreams of the beauty contest winner whose tnly ambition, in .1953rwas to become an actress. That year, she had just won title of .,Miss Manila" and was eagerly looking forward to an opportunity for {ilm stardom through

;i;::g;;;;#;;,r*';

;;J;;

a con-

tract ofEred by SampaguitaPictures. Though it was standard for a]l aspiring beauties at the time, the studio offer was aniggardiy one: p50 a week to start,iith promised increases as the starlet's popularity grew. Tire future lvlrs. Marcos had the instinctive good sense to tum it down, The world has since become her stage, and the same flock of weaithy society matrons who had snobbed her frorn their glittering parties belbre marlial law now shamelessly scramble for invitations to Palace soirees and state receptions. their past contempt replaced by a grudging admiration for the once starry-eyed23-year old lass from Leyte who sought to conquer Manila with only p5 in her purse.

More poised, knowledgeable, and queenly than the best of them, IMrs. Ir{arcos oye1. her new and vibrant personality, not from the ministrations of an army of plastic surgeons, hairdressers, couturiers and jewellers - as her inconstant friends may suppose *. but from a real sense of achievement. A glance at the number and importance of the concurrent ofiicial positions she holds in the govemment clearly

Governor Me tro Manila RePresentative

Metro Manila

Minister

lnterim Batasang Pambansa lvliriistry Of Human Settlements

Executive Director

National

Environmental Protection

Council Honorary Chairman Chairmur (Board of Trustees) Chairman

Council for the Welfare of Children Technology Resource Center

Human Settlements Regulatory Com' mission

Chairmur Chairman of the Board Chairman of the Board Chairman of tJre Board Chairman of the Board Chairmur of the Board

National Housing AuthoritY National Housing CorPoration National Home Mortgage Finance Co.r' poration Human Settlement Development Corporation I{ome Financing Corporation National Pollution Control Commis' sion

Chairman of the Board Chairman of,the Board Chairman of the Board Chairman of the Board Chairman Chairman Chairman Chairman

Metro-Manila Transit Corporation

National Electrification Administration Green Revolution Foundation Folk Arts Center Corhmission on Population National Nutrition Council Pasig River Development Council

Chairman

Philippine . Heart Center for Asia Cultural Center of the Philippines

Chairman

Design Center of the PhilipPines

Chairmur

Metropolitan Theater

Chairman

National Commission

Chairman

National Parks DeveloPment Com'

Chairman Chairman (Board of Trustees) Head of thb PhiliPPine Dele gation Special EnvoY ofthe President

on the

Role

of the Filipino Women mittee Manila Seedling Butk Nayong PiliPino Foundation UN General AssemblY China, USSR, Rome, Yugoslavia, Libya, etc.

221

222

THE COUNTERFETT

REVOLUTION

special representative to diffe-

rent international conferences

Chairmur

: : :

UNCTAD

Intemational women,l

year held in Mexico Southern philippines Development

TI{E QUESTION OF SUCCESSION ECAUSE of the strange but prevalent notion that the Philippines is being held .ED lqgsthsl by Marcos anl the strong authoritarian leadership.that he provides,

Administration

nagging fear - especially qmong middle-class Filipinos and foreign businessmen in fnfanifu --- that his death or incapacity would plunge the country into a civil war. So widespread and real has this fuar become thal even some who profess a great dislike for him are wont to believe that without Marcos, there would be-total disarray. o'We car fault the man for a lot of things," says a Makati-based banker,"but I dread to see the day when he kicks the bucket' As far as we can figure, there's no

there is

one around strong enough to hold tlris country together."

The myth of indispensability is actually a dusty old item in Marcos' bag of tricks. In the 1965 presidential election, when he saw that the Nacionalistas had become intimidated by the image of Macapagal as a powerful president, he wrested' the party nomination from four NP stalwarts - then'Vice President Pelaez, and s.n"to6 Femando Lopez, Arturo Tolentino and Gil Puyat - by convincing the Nacionalista delegales that "only hlarcos can beat Macapagal' '' Since he had just deserted the Uberal Party, everybody in the convention give him a aszumed that he knew exactly wheretohitNlacapagal andcould,therefore, more decisive thrashing at the polls than could any of the old Nacionalistas' The most successful myth of the martial law propaganda machine has been that "only Marcos Can save the Philippines. "This messianic claim has gained quite a n*ter of disciples, mainly because no one of stature or consequence has 4peared on t1e political horizon as a likely successor or alternative. The reason, of course, is that *ith lt{ur"or running the govemment as a one-man strow and the controlled media steadily focusing the spotlight on him, it is impossible for anybody to be prqjected as being .qurUy or more capable of steering the strip of state through troubled waters

with the exception of il{rs. Marcos.

Having eclipsed potential leaders from public view, I{arcos at one time declared: "I am willing to step down from the Presidency if there is anyone betterto.take my place." The statement fooled no one, of course. As the sole judge of whocould fill was apparent that he merely wanted to foster the illusion further that he had become a national necessity - indiqpensable to the .security, stability and

his *roes,

prosperity of the countrY within a yeff of establishing his 'ncrisis" govemment, Marcos hinted that he had signed a secret decree providing for an orderly transfer of power in the event of his death or incapacity. More than this, he would not say, claiming that a revelation of the decree's contents might provoke a power struggle.Instead of giving assurance to the nation, this announcement - and tlie element of mystery that s?rrouded it worsened the people's fears. . Not until the Interim National Assembly convened in June 1978 didhedeign to clarifr the situation. Taking advantage of the Question Hour - which gives to inembers of the Assembly the opportunity to intenogate the Govemment'(President

'i]lFllryF-

224

Marcos and the cabinet) on the first and last Thursday of the month

following questions:

l. )

The Question of Succession 225 the Interim BafasflE of the President @rime Minister)' the Speaker of p*o*r. shau ; as president'and perform the duties under Article if there be VII of the Consiitution, urd the Deputy Prime Minister,.or

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Sometime ago, it was reported that your Excellenry had signed a Decree providing for a mle on srccession in the event of the presr dent's death or permanent incapacity. Is this report correct? If there is such a Decree, would your Excellenry care to disclose

morethanon,,.th.&niorDeputyPrimeMinisterstrallactasPrime Minister,withthepow,inandfunctionsprescribedundertheConstitu. from amonB its mem' tion, ,niil th. Interim Batasang Pambansa elects

its details in order that the people may know what procedur., tt u Govemment will observe rtoutO.a situation urir,,.quiring it,

bers

President ard a Prime Minister'

convene Section 2. The Speaker strall immediately

or call

President

the Interim Batasurg Pambansa which :tt-1-3 anoaPrimeMinister,inaccordancewithArticlesVll'VIIIandIXof

implementation.

sh'11:

session

under the rules of the fusembly, the official concerned has a choice of ing orally or in writing. with a sense of the dramatic, Marcos took the floor August 1978 - "to inaugurate,' hs he put it, "a democratic device by which r

the Constitution' Section 3. This decree shall take effect immediately' provides: Section 5 of Article VI of the 1973 Constitution frory office' removal h ; olf pe'mment disability' death' AssemNational the president, of the Speaker or resignation oithe for the elected hasbeen bly drall act as President until a- successor unexpired portion of the term of the Presid^ent'

Government can be made to account to the people. stating that he had come at oI a nrember of the opposition, he managed to convey the impression the Interim National Assembly was indeed a democratic forum, where no less the President and Prime Minister could be made to answer questions by a member - though this was not to be so in zubsequent days, when he would pletely ignore questions tending to embarrass o, plu." thl regime in a bad instance

Atthesametime,section5(1)offuticlelXofthesamenewConstitu.

He said:

tion Provides:

Prime Minister The Prime Minister shall appoint the Deputy

fromamongthenrembersoftheNationalAssembly.TheDeputy

known as Presidential Decree No. 100, two years after the formalra cation of the new constitution, and a second one before mv departui for china on June 7, 1975 known as presidential Decree Nol z:i, *o third on January 15,1976,known aspresidentiar Decree No. 73r-A. They have now lapsed into history, but they provided for a taker cornmittee or commission of the cabinet to run the Govem until my s.rccessor could be chosen by the people, directly or i at the hstance of the caretaker committee. I^ater on, the Bayan [the legislative council composed of provincial iou.*orr, litfl, mayors' members of the cabinet, regional representatives and others,

prime Ivlinister would act as Prime Minister until the Batasang Pambansa

electsthePrimeMinisterasprovidedforunderArticlel,section3of the New Constitution'

The choice of ceremonial President and the Prime Minister ex.frrrir.fy*nf,.thepoweroftheMajorityParty'Itdecideswhomand

WHEREAS, the election of the Members of the Interim Batasang it necessary to implement the provisions of the constil tution on the matter of srccession to the ofiices of the president and Prime Minister. NOW THEREFORE, I FERDINAND E. MARCOS, president of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers inme vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order: Section 1. In case of permanent disability, death or resignation

when to elect the President and the Prime Minister' to some was The nagging problem that has caused so much anxiety Pambansa' Batasang the o f solved with tt! ri.ction of the Members legisldion may be Incidentally, the srggestion has been made that

successor.

Pambansa md<es

I intendto

have not yet appointed a Deputy Prime Ministertut For the Deputy do so after I have obtained the concensus of my Party'

appointed by Marcos] , the, Sangguniang Fanglungsod and panlalawigan, [city and provincial councils] were aut]rorized to ratiS the choice of -the

These decrees have been replaced by a new Decree, sigred by me on June ll,lg7s,Presidential Decree No. 1514, which reads:

pelform such other Prime Il'liniJter shall head a Ministry and shall Minister' Prime the by him functions as may be assigned to

procedures outlined in the litest Decree be modifiedor altered by embody ConJrutional mandaies. They cannot constitutional amendby done be only can ordinary legiJation. They the modified or semiof concept very the moaify ment which would

required on

. '

*..t"ion' lit

parl|amentary form

of gtvemnlent that is provided for in

the New

Constitution ' quash the rumors and qpeculationsthat With this statement, Marcos, sought to

r'aoaoggeothemartiallawregimefiomtlre{irstday.orrlyonesrnallthingnow of the Deputy Prime Minister. But this remained to be done: tt e upioi"tment

226

The Question of Succession 227 the gove'm' that the move would onlY revive dynasty charges and further erode

THE COUNTERFETT REVOLUTION

apparently simple task proved

be more nettlesome than the basic

rrrent's image abroad

succession itself.

Even before martial law, it was clear to everyone that Marcos was al paving the way for his wife's ascent to the presidency: since he was barred seeking a third term by the provisions of the 1935 constitution, political predicted that stre would run in the 1973 presidential election. Thereafter ing on the circumsturces - it was believed that husband and wife would take tums At Malacurang. one major fictor that may have dissuaded Marcos from pursuing this was his aversion lo.exposing Mrs. IMarcos to the same vicious black propaganda this enemies lad thrown at her in previous campaigns. As a candidate, she natu-rlly become the principal target and there was n"o teuing t ow f.;;i;;; would go to attack her character. In his qpeeches in the uppei chamber, Sen. about hitting-even a First l^ady.He r,aA jreaoy i"^*rms her for the Cultural Center, calling it ..A-p*th.o, for lmetaa,,, by J-uanico Briise y.pg h", ho.n, istand of I*yte to which he labelled "The Bridge of Love.', To make matters worse, a Malacanang opinion survey indicated that with country in a vile mood, the young Tarlac senator was a "shoo-in', for the From the standpoint of political survival, the only option open to Marcos was ':"r"11,:o center." lVhatever pians he had of retaining -lo*-pr prsidency by getting Mrs. Marcos elected were thus postponed. Martial law, ever, would dmpower him to confer on the First Lady any ornri"t status she desi Under the caretaker concept embodied in his first secret decree on the cabinet committee or commission was to be composed of the Executive Sec tary, and the Secretaries of Defense, Labor, rncal Govem;;"i ;JAgru.i* Rrro. As First Lady, Mrs. Marcos had no place in this junta, not beiig rt:yr.*-ent. To include her would have confirm.O tf,. suspicioi establishilg a personal dynasty. But with her appointment as martial Marcos constituted uv iecree out of tnr .iti., n,I*ilu, *.Y:1"-YLr|(ytrictr "i Quezon, Pasay, caloocan and several towns of the provinces of Rizat her election as member of the Interim National Assembly .*prrr.*ing ,r* c-apital (Metro Manila), and her zubsequent appointment rrai.i"..'"li _Reqion HumanSett1ements,Mrs.Marcosacquiredal1thecredentialsofasuccesSoI. under Presidential Decree No. 1514, a[ that was needed to place her in rine was her appointment as his Deputy prime Minister, and no: one, ii rr..ra,lortJ vrrrvu, vvuru. be a better choice considering the extent of her powers and responsibilities ,; in

*ry l3 *",y flUT

hnfi

;d il;

jaunts. tirhe, Mrs. Marcos was away on one of her frequent foreign ground Philippine' for She flew to Moscow to meet with Russian leaders and lay the Russian diplomatic relations, next to Wastrington to disabuse the minds of some of American congressrnen abotrt martial ,law,- and fina]lV to Rome for the. .fune{ pope pa,l Vt. Uarcos had planned ori welcoming her at.t: titpgn with a *ft.her appointment. as Deputy Prime hlinister. But he could have done so onlv b1

At t[is

."1.g'

orty

a n.consensus"-from his party. Adverse reaction-P h:, elevation- nof

Manila l-rut in the news capitals of the world

forced him to relent.

rzuccession would 1979,to reassure the nation that the mechanism of

In lune still operate even without a Deputy Prime Minister, he told the Interim National elect' ,Lssemtly that if ever the need arose, it was within the power o fparliament to ttre until government the run temporarily would who * Lting Prime Minister, fears allay to failed pronouncement the Still, Minister. J.r*n "f a regular Prime that in the event tltat a power struggle erupted during the interim period -and the pga' Assembly failed'to elect an acting Prime Minister, the government would be act could decree, Marcos' under Speaker, the lvzed for lack of leadership - since

li]T-i

orrty u, a ceremonial President. The question became a matter of serious concern when Marcos had to leave the country in April 1980 to speak before the American National Publistrers Asso' ciation in I'Iawaii. Once again, the need to appoint a Deputy Prime Ministe-r arose; and the Inte' again, Mrs. Marcos was pr-oposed; and qgain,members of the cabinet

*:_

to name ttre stanaing Cabinet Coordinating Committee headod by Finance IViinister Cesar Virata to "run" the government in his could step into the absence. ln a contingency, he said, Speaker Querube Makalintal Prime Minister shoes of the ceremonial President and at the same time act as sancaltho,rgh neither his own Decree No. 1514 nor the constitution specifically

;"fn;il;? il;;;;;, ile;;;;

.;;;ffi;l N"ii*i

the

government, Marcos, however, failed-to reckon with public opinion and the temper of his own party members, several of whom saw her as a thieat to their post-mirtial law political plurs. In early-August 197g, he convened the KBL to a special caucus to "discuss vital rhaften" but principally to consider a resolution urging him to name

as his Deputy. t*o teaaing KBL members, Assemblymen Salvadgr Laurel and Arturo Tolentino, raised strong objections to this. Th;t;;irtrd;;;

Mrs' Marcos

IV{arcos was tltus compelled

tions this.

Nothing more was said about a Deputy Prime ldinister but newspaper',photos * not Minister Virata - presiding over cabinet subsequently strowed Mrs. Marcos meetings. One caption read: "The country is in good hands'" . in Otbrr.u.r, believe that.the post of Deputy has already betdn filled and that offlci{ of Mur"or' death or iricapacity, his wife will have the strongest tfn "*"i mantle of leadership. Says former President Diosdado Macapagal: "I the aiA* ," u* lvitling to bet that within ten minutes after he dies, Mrs..Marcgs will be able to paAr* ."Orcree appointing her Deputy Prime Minister - ante-dated, of course." The larger and more crucial concem, therefore, is not whether anyone will be around to take immediate control of the govemment but whether Marcos' suc' ,.r*r'*ru be able to command the respect and loyalty of all the sectoral forces that the honey of animate philippine *Jty, especially ttre military, which, having tasted o fthe guardians political power, is not likeiy to revert back to its traditional roJe as leader' nation's security. No oneafter Marcos, in fact, can,hope to aqpire to national

228

The Question of

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLU'|ION

ship without the blessing and zupport of the Armed Forces

Malacanang Palace, where partisans identitied with lvlrs. Marcos rcportedly carry on a srbtle campaign of vilification against Enrile'

liitt strongly in

the philipplnil''

power elite by virtue of martial law. The question is: will the rnilitary accept Mrs. Ir{e-cos as a leader? Wlthln deftnse establishment, doubts have been expressed that a woman can exert tlto and decisive leaderstrip soldiers expeci, only of men. [n a series of casual concucted qpecially for the concluding portio:r of this book, at least thrce floki rals observed thaf Filipino cultural values as well as military traditions and attitudes would in all probability militate against the idea of a woman Com: in-Chief. Said one, "Our sofdiers would literally be'under the Wa!'.. a de1 ry phrase Filipinos use for henpecked husbands. In a qpeech before the Manila Bay Breakfast Club, President IMacapagal

the minister's political confidantes are to be believed, hlarcos has been trying to relieve Enrile of the powerirl defense portfolio to clear the way for Mrs.

Marcos. These sourceS say that on several occasionshe proposed_to send Enrile out of the country as an ambassador, and that when the pc,sition of Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court became vacant with the death of Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, I\'larcos

t"rff '* "ff.[]r[

defense minister managed to retain his post by reminding Marcos of a pledge he, Enrile, had made to "clean up the army ' before lelring the govemment. Although Enrile may not be in full control of the military estaLrlishment Marcos having made certain to break it up into separate cotnurands with direct * he has built a large enough follow' lines of communication to Malacanang Palace to be considered_a key figure.r1 ministry defense the ing in the Armed Forces and Perhaps for this post-Marcos-days. the in to brew powe, play that is expected

this view:

"One . . . possibility is that the President's wife may try to dictatorstrip by claiming succession under an appointment as Prime Minister who under Decree l5l4 takes over as provisional Minister. It is believed that she will not obtain the zupport of the mil necessary for her'to assume the mantle of dictatorstrip. What is more ly is what has often happened - that a wife cannot keep power derir from herhusband after he is gone.

prove everybody wrong in the, end. A westem diplomat recalls her words at a

" The trouble with chiurg ching (widow of Mao Tse Tung) was that

she did n;

on the other hand, there may be otrers as quick if not quicker better prepared 6r that "right moment." one possible rival is Defense Minister Ponce Enrile, who as Martial Law Administratoi is the second most powerruiman the regime. A defense ofrcial describes him as',extremely loyal to

but this is hardly assuring for those who do not wish to gle.

1978, Enrile confided

trrrpJJ*t;

be caught

a powe

r st

to some newsmen that he had submitted his resisnaj

tion to l\'iarcos and was looking forward to retuming to private life. At ,rrr-*iri: he said, he would consider serving as a govemment consultant or trouule-srr";;;;:-j if Marcos prevailed on him to stay in the govemment. "In that capacity,,,he sad,,l

"I would

th-.

IVIrs. Marcos, however, is not the type who will take things for granted, many ways, she is more thorough tlan Marcos himself. It is thi-s attention to smallest details and her remarkable drive, fueled by a vaulting ambition, that n

Succession 229

be in a better position to help our people and my friends.,, But tlrere was, in the way he spoke, a note of weariness. He soundedlike one suddenly grown tired not only of the unremitting pressure of o fficial duty but o f the. intrigues sown by those who wanted to downgrade him. Rumors conceming Enrile's strained relations with Mrs. Marcos abound, and in many of these it "is either that the First Lady refuses to speak with him or that Ivlarcoq has placed his defense chief under house arrest. While their cordiality at public functions belie such stories, the undercurrent of rivalry continues to b6

,rur6n, his activities are being carefully watched, and once he complainedthat: "I could be the only Defense Minister in the er.rtire world under surveillance by agents govemment." of my - own situation, whicli carries serious political implications,.:stems This comic opera -Gen. Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security from the fact that Authority, reports directly to his cousin. the President, and Mrs. Marcos. As commanding general of the Presidential Security Command, Ver s other duty is to provide-Jcurity and protection for the members of the First Family. Technically abnormal politi this responsibitity UegLs and ends with Marcos, but considering the ver is obviously involved, stakes personal the and ties, kinship cal situation, the Marcos ceases when and if the funily of the safety ensure to committed not only period of the dangerous through Mrs. Marcos see to also but to be chief of state, succession.

resistance to the prospectof awoman generals hail frqm Ilocos or northern the of N{any melt. could commander-in{hief as well as to the intelligence chief, Marcos to stars their. owe they L.rzon region and cleared. Ver is thus in a privileged first are rank senior to promotions with whom all by officen on the way up' One incurred gratitude of debts on position to coliect at the crucial problem that Mrs. Marcos would have to fale is the possibility that himself' for credit the use to decide may moment Ver there is Regardless of how the Armed Forces will split in a political struggle, of the consists , ,"gr"r"t of the military whose role.cannot be underestimated' It or factions but personalities youig ofiicers who are loyal to none of the contending idealism and integrity io thi cause of civil ordei and democratic govemment, whose whohave,come to realize have not been compromised or tainted by corruption, and welfare, but the political people's that mutial law has been used to promote, not the and economic interests of a few, may be That certain elements in the Armed Forces are beginning to be restive

with ver in the picture, military

230

THE COUNTERFETT REVOLUTTON

gleaned from a report which fint ppeared in the February l9g0 issue of tho Eastem Economic Review and admitted by the Defense Minister six months lr It said that about 200 men; mao}, of them retired military person,el, were a*e on January I st for plannin E a coup d , etat. The group, allegcdly led by a retired Air Force ofhcer, Col. Jose Reyes" planned to capture the AFP headquarters i, camp Aguinaldo on New year,s and hold the Armed Forces chief of Staff, Gen. Romeo Espino, hostage. The was aborted when a military police sergeant informed on hir f.[o* conspira. tr{embers of the Presidential Security command in Malacanang then picked up assembled men d Reyes'residence in euezon City. The sarne report also disclosed that in September 1979, Lt. col. satu

Domingo, former deputy chief

TOWARDS TIIE KINGDOM OF MAHARLIKA in a meeting at Malacanang Palace, Mrs. Marcos, reminiscing about her childhood, recalled how,stre_ had once been chosen to play the had listened in thrall while Queen in a skit and how hei classnates, as loyal subjects, stre sang a ditty that pre-war grade school pupils know by heart:

URING

When I grow to be a ladY, I'll be a Queen, a lovelY Queen, Walking in the garden *radY kr lown of green with silver sheen, Maids in gold and white strall follow me

of the constabulary Anti-Narcotic Unit (c

was apprehended upon his retum from the United States and accused of having with Raul Murglapus (head of the Movement for a Free phirippiner) on u plL

smuggle arns rnlo into tne the country. counlry. ilc aurr$

when he decided to use the military sector as an instrument to perpetur., himself in office, Marcos aroused in the Armed Forces an awareness of their political capabilities. He thus opened the way for the military sector to assert

tical leaderstrip simply by seizing the government and placing the country

junta rule or a surrogate civilian regime. says Supreme Court Justice claudio Te, hankee: "The greatest single harm I see arising out of a prolonged rnartial law regimc is that it breaks the ground for a succession of martial law iegimes in the fulure Granted that one martiat law regime may be laid to rest at the end oflone's life, time, there is nothing to prevent the next regime from imposing martial law for whole lifetime of the next generation." Retired Justice J.B.i. Reyes puts it i r -l

plainer language: "The one great dissewice that Marcos has done by declaring martiali law is to rnake this country a banana republic.'" the question of zuccession, therefore, and the kind of govemment that zupplant the martial lav regime, the military will be a determinlg Factor. w6ile ryill $ev fave gone along with Marcos up to this point it does not necessarily mean that the men in uniform wholly approve of the authoritarian and dynastic rute that,i he has establistred and seeks to make permanent. For even if they do owe their.i improved status to Marcos, their larger commitment is to the constitution and the

people.

the military leaders appear to be supportive of his goals and policies, it is onl_y because, like most Filipinos, they have been gulled into believing that Nlarcos is honest and sincere about reforming society and govemment, and it ut in trying to achieve this difficult task, he has maintained a scrupulous and faithful adherence to the constitution. In their new and decisive role asthe nation's power elite, the crucial test for the Armed Forces will come when they are finally confronted with the question of whether the 1973 constitution which every soldier is swom to defend - is a genuine document embodying the hopes and aspirations of the Filipino people, or as decried by a group of independent ,orrurntion delegates * ,.a Constitution of, by, and for Marcos.,'

a break

fuid suitors of a high

degree.

of those to whom stre recounted this particular experience recalls that her young .t r r..*.4 *ore fulfilled than nostalgic, as thougfu stre had finally realZed girl,, drra*r. Indeed, Mrs. Marcos'preoccupation with royalty has not escaped those Palace, ilrro nure come close to her. She ryeaks of Malacanang as if it were a real question: "What sometimes airily tlisnissing gossips aod *mots with the rhetorical to obsene that heard has been she times, various Ai intriguef' is a Palace without practice of choosing a "our people are used to being ded by royalty" - citing the One

qu..n toirig, over a banio or town fiesta- And because ofher penchant for inviting nouiuty as personal guests, it has become a joke among. unrepentant critics ror.rgn -there

may yet be a Proclamation 1082, by which Marcos and Mrs. Marcos would that Maharlika. crown themseives King and Queen of a kingdom to be known as Speculation about rnuch is there thougtrt, serious gives one no Althoug[r power' Tt[ough what lvlarcos will do n.*t to perpetuate himself and his family in legitimary ard the establistr to how been problem has years, his the martial law to clothe careful been has permanence of his regime, and to overcome this Marcos has done he is nothing his actions with the garb of constitutionality. In fact, there which can be challenggd effectively for not being, in some way' sanctioned by the Constitution. On the charter that he fashioned first'by influencing and manipu' lating the 1971 constitutional convention, then by a series of amendments that the natiJn haa no real opportunity to examine Marcos has anchored his b,rand of

authoritarianisn.

UllesS the 1973 Constitution is amended, he cannot be removed as Prime Minister, ard until he himself decides to bring the situation to an end by calling for a total strift from the presidential to the parlinmentary system, he continues to be president"of the Republic under the 1935 Constitution - the only chief of state in the entire world to serve in a dual capacity, under two Constitutions. Without the Filipino people fully realizing it, he has already become their President/Prime Minis'

ter

expect Marcos to give up this ultimate position of power is to indulge wishful thinking, for few political leaders would voluntarily step down fiom the

lor

Ufe.

232

THE COUNTER.FEIT REVOLUTION

highest office or create the conditions that would lead to their

::ff:! J,ili,I,rL"."iH,Tj.i

o, n 1* i,,fl Nrti"rJ'arr#fi;rffit":r?rfiE

:l ;: * # ffi [l-1 of'*.Int"ri*

: f ;:;fl

:: started, they say,-witrr flre eleJtion

;il;':1;:,T,",:,":'LT;H:,:1,::,;l:lrI;:;il;lilJ*",oou.,huurthi te73 constirution *a .ri,"inute ;;

ilfi:lI#ffinffi;:l;:T'.*1l,,$

amendments thai have maae Marcos conrpletely rulnerable

ffil,rJ

Towards the Kingdom of

demise.

him *r- ,*trrnr.ty po*..frl *i.r. i"'0"1u,., urrrui,r, *;'; .;;;rty rrri, would rendai doubt whetherhl willing to permit"or.n..onr. parry to any acrion that could presagehll

Maharlika ng

perfected - would once and for all erase the stigma of dictatonhip which tJ, u".n sticking like. a bone in the craw of his regime. For strange as it rnay seem, modem man seems more receptive and sympathetic to kings than to dictators or presidentsfor-Life, perhaps because of the violent or irregular manner by which many of the latter have come to power. In Filipino foiklore. khgs have figured largely as autocratic godfathers capable of meting out harsh punishments as well as generous rewards. This is the image Marcos has been trying to project as a martial law ruler. Apart from the system of personal rewards and punislurent that he has instituted, there is a clear effort on the part of his propaganda apparatus to build him up and the First Lady as royal personages.

.onna*.Jl;;;;";;,,i}l,lffi ;"_HT".|"T:,,:jilrr'j;lffi :,l}Hfl.:J ;;;;;;ffi ;, H.: Tir.r,fftIl:T ffi., f; 1il.il#,.,l'#:'*Jffi-iffi .'#.'J;'j:to.oni.or",,,;;dhi;."r.*liJJ, ready showing signs ooff rpcrtnit,o,l^^ ready calcir rar,.. * ^_r J : .re sv!r

then are his options in

rrvw.

plrt-martial law

Prime '\hat Minister for life by preserving the Octoher

era,i He courd either remi

te76,_^-:._

.-_

::T"TT.n:;i#Lir;;.':"L.:1#??:tx,,1T.Jfl::*$#'# As a constitutional prime Minirt", with the power to legislate alongside the

ilffi'#,ffii,i};H to him,:::'j ao., *r-ur*;r';..J:'i *::::"':l^{^. ::', or his rire-But this provisions,

[l;ff?fl:f: il::.*;

[r*rff""ratr

Under a presidentiar system, he would enjoy a short but specific tenure, with ,ff t o r a no con nden ce vote inherent , ;;fi in parriamentary sovernments and i 1 r . Bu t ag ain th this is would wourd not for fiffithe automatic elevation of Mrs. uu."*;" nor iauor ^:i"ryI,];; *'ii.1;,Xli#arn

*^*,n fffi*J*Xr:"::,:,_l{.y t{,1*iit1fJt ilru.'*, #J,,:#,i ilj:[:*j

;;.;il

ffirffilflffi#;

because

hand,

a,rffnjhffiH#Ttr'1n alt, a rnonarchicar svstem wourd ?:::i::y3Ihas done undermartiarr"*. B,,t of regitimr;,h.,.1,i:;T:Hffitffi,ll#;liilXl ramilv, therebv securing the pofitlcar r,ir-*ii, *;;i;:r, providing protection for whatever,irry il; as wen "r fr"". A monarchy

set up with trrr

,_assed over the years.

.ppur.i insent of the peopre through another 6-. *rr"*.0 plebiscite, a qystem Marcos

Constitutional amendment ,.upprorj,;

has

ofthe great distance between Spain and her coionies.

In Article XV, Section 2, of the Marcos-designed constitution, it

wourd rirt him to a h thepressurer;ffirffi;r-J#:,ffir:ilr:Tri:,ffifi

plane, there to be free of o,*.,ti,TilT:'?:.1"Ti11'l1l".l:

The official, embossed fullcolor portraits printed at enornrous expense in Japan and now displayed prorninently in all govemment offices, show Marcos resplendent in curnnrerbund, rnedals and pendant looking every inch like the King of Thailand or the deposed Russian Tsar Nicolas. I\,lrs. Irrarcos, in flowing gown, sash, jewels and tiara, is made to resernble the ill-staned Alexandra. For ordering the removal of these pictures from the Cotabato city Hall, Mayor Teodoro Juliano was suspended for a period of thirty days on various charged, including ..hostility and discourtesy to the First Couple." This endeavor to depict Marcos and his wife as royalty could be written off and forgotten as a concession to their vanity. But it gains ominous significance in relation to the practice; nlade perfect by his regime, ofconditioning'the public mind to radical moves he is on the verge of nrakihg. Martial law was preceded by thunderous wamings about a cornrnunist threat; Mrs. Il,Iarcos'appointment as Metro Manila Govemor, by a flood of resolutio,s purportedly adopted by local officials, barangay, civic and business leaders; son Ferdinand Jr.'s candicacy for vice-Gover_ nor of the province of Ilocos Norte, by the irresistible "clamor "of political leaders of the north. This Pavlovian technique is evident once more in the proposal to rename the country - a prelude, nlany believe, to the establishment of the first monarchical form of Sovemntent since the days when the Spanish Covernors-General ruled the islands like kings, exercising military, administrative, judicial and legislative powers

is provided

that the "Interim National Assembly may by law adopt a new niune for the iountry, a national anthern, and a national seal, which shall be truly reflective of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people." A bill authored by Assemblyman Edgar Ilarde of the KBL party now seeks to iename the country Maharrika, apre-Hispanic term meaning "chief." A scholar has pointed out, however, that the word, an Indian derivative, actually means "big pha1lus," which was probably one of the qrain"* tions for a chief in those days.

For some reason, foiarcos has been obsessed with this name. It washisnom-deguerre as a guerrilla soldier in tlre Second world r,var, and now he has decrced it for exclusive government use. with others bound to follow, the philippine-Japan Friencl-

rl il

fl,'

al 1f {li

Ii ,t,

lI l[i ltit

fi iii ffli

fr fr

It" #r

I #

r fi

Ifi. H

I u ilr

ij'.

t I I

[ il

t l

I ir

234

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOT-UTION

Towards the Kingdom of

ship Highway has been re-christened the Nlaharlika Highway; the government radio and television network is called the Maharlika Broadcasting Service; and main reception rcception area of Malacanang Palace, Mahar.lika Hall. The prospects a"re vast and terrifiing: should the country and its leader known by one name and the people conditioned to the idea that the president/prt Minister not only represents but ls the state, there may come a time when to Marcos would be construed as an attack against the state itself and, therefore, the purview of treason or any of the crimes against the public order or the s,l and security of the nation. Because of its enormity and audacity Filipinos find difficulty accepting the idea, but Marcos tras sprung ro rn*y surprises or people within the short,span of eight years'that it would be a mistake io ignore signs pointing to yet another startling change in tre political order. why the same Filipinos who fought bravely against the Spanistr and Amer colonizers and the Japanese invaders suddenly cannot find the will and the cou to shuck off a fonn of bondage that enables their govemment to do what it ple ofte:r without regard to their sensibilities is a strange phenomenon that comple baffles foreign observers and visitors to the islands. one explanation that readily comes to mind is that through centuriesiri oppression and exploitation by foreign colonizers, the Filipino rnariaged to su by collaborating with the authority in power. ln the sane way, he prob"ably hopes survive the present regime. But collaboration is not cooperation, and the atti that he shows towards the Marcos govemment, not the l9i3 constitution, is the proof of its legitimacy or lack of it. Another explanation rnay be the people's vaunted patience and religiosity i rnanifested daily in the exasperating Filipino propensity to leave to Divir-re prtvi., dence, or sotne.benevolent force that guides the destinies of men and nations, orr even to chance, the solution-to his problem or condition. But beneath this external forbearance is a profound disaffection b about by worsening economic cottditions, for which Marcos has been directly Ulan;a. VVith his New Society becorning ntore transparent and indefensible each passilg day,l and the prctense of collaboration gnawing at their dignity and self-respe.t, e16ino, may not long ren.rain the patient and submissive people they are generally thought be - especially when their very survival as human beings is at stake. Marcos, in the meanwhile, is concerned with survival of a different nat Thus far, he has managed to keep his ailing regirne alive through an artificial support system - the fumed Forces of the philippines and the U.S. Government. Thiough massive doses of military aid, the u.s. has provided Marcos the resources to buitd aid equip a large, modern army which enables hirn to control the govemment and ulti. rnately the entire country. U.s. economic assistance - in the form of liberal, long-term loans, outright aid,-and sponsorstrip of Philippine requests for enormous borrowings from the IMF, , the world Bank and the Export-Import Bank has further trelpea"traarco, ', local economy afloat in the face of worldwide and domesticaliy-induced inflation. Also because of American support, he is able to undertake political imfact pr"i."i,

il;;;

Maharlika

235

and maintain a semblance of economic success, deqpite widespread poverty, un' employment, and malnutrition caused by "development" policies that fivor export instead of domestic Production. certain basic truths, however, cannot be denied, and one of these is that a government which alienates the people because ofunmitigated graft and cor.ruption, oppression, extravagance and the suppression of their political and civil rights also radicalizes them. Deprived of the sovereign power to correct a political aberration and weary of the burdens such an abnonnality imposes on their minds urd spirit, the people rnay be driven by sheer desperation to the side of those who appear to be the only active opposition and, therefore, the sole altemative to Marcos - the commu' nists. Aware of this danger. some newspaper columrists have wamed that the true subversives - the real enemies of the state* may be the abusive and indifferent oflicials themselves, rather than those who have gone to the hills to face Bovemment Marcos with guns and bullets.

After a visit to Mindoro province, Fr. Bel R. san Luis of the Divine word College was so appalled by the apathy of government officials there that he was prornpted to write an open letter to Marcos, stating that: What Isaw convfurced me that the beautiful island of Mindoro has been a victinr ofgovenurlelrt apathy, unconcem and gross neglect'

Riglt i1 the heart of the capital, what were once srnoothly

paved roads

have become eroded and dusty, much like a barangay road. The main arteries linking distant urunicipalities have been tumed upsidedown when the goJern'

ment attellrpted to rcconstruct them, using funds from the World Bank. However, due to serious anomalies, the roads never materialized and'the fate of the Mindorenos tuade

tum for the worst!

people be punished for the sins committed by politicians and scoundrels? People commuting to far' unscrupulous crookecl lung diseases due to long expozures to dust; have suffered away nunicipalities as a result of the constant pains dislocations and others suffer frorn bone jarring on tlte "tnoon craters" and the rugged highway contours. The provincial government's apathy is graphically shown in the sorry state of the provincial capitol. Until now, nothing has been done to rebuild it

Mry should huocent

afte, it bumed down some three years ago. This is an appeal to President Marcos to immediately.look into the plight of the people of Nlindoro. Though naturally patient and religious, the Mindorenos can despair of their sad condition and - it's not farfetched - run into the syrnpathetic arms of the dissidents and the NPAs'

This letter of Fr. San LJis could have been written about so many other provinces in the Philippines today, frhere conditions have become worse under martial law.

The specter that Mucos constantly raises as a fearful "altemative" to his rule is the possibility of a communist take-over of the govemment - a threat that middle class Filipinos and American businessmen thought real enough trl 1972 to welcome

'i;i'' :

.'1:;Y,1

' ':l.fi;:4 -

. 236

*ts,;'tF.,,..

- ":".

..: THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Towards the Kingdom of

the declaration of martial law. Since then, however, because of grcder public avnrfl ness that no zuch danger exists or ever existed Marcos r,ri u.., ;"rrr.[rd-; lump communism,'the woddwide oil crisis and the Mindanao Muslim reUeUionlsith& raison d e*e for rl,fusins to Iift martial luy retum the country To be zure, there are communist and other gmups of varied hu., _ ttre name of Social or Nationar Democratic r-orres (trre miritary ,.ur-rr,r*"s"e-", Dems or Nat-Dems), sandigan, April 6th Movement but alr seekingto;;;-,k.thi

b."k;;"r*Ji ,;;;Jffii

urd capabilitv .Tngt_b: undetermined. thbl ::::,*"T:Tl"*--11"^::1" most significant, of course, 1l':1t,h for having waged a zustained fight is the Party of the Philippines and its miJitary arm,tle New people'sL*y. , Between January and July l972,the ranks of the tna reportedly grew 6,500 to 7,900 * an increase fostered as much by the politicalization of a nurnber of Filipino students in the country's university and college ,.rpur", * public disenchantment with the pofiiicat ieadenhip ui th, ti...-with the decft of rnartial law, student organizers and recruiters burrowed underground, rear 1io: defense authorities fiee to make the undisputed claim that ..the bickbone of rebellion has been broken."

However, continued encounters and pitched battles between troopers and NPA bands, particularly in the provinces of cagayur vall-ey, tsabelaj and Nueva vizcaya, indicate that the Marcos govemment has noionly ailJd t, *id

theconrmunistproblembut,worse,mayhaveiontributedtoitsqpread.

when President Magsaysay uccessfully stemmed the tide of the communist" in 1953, the HMB forces were confined ,o t},, Cuira,l Luzon provinces where agrarian unrest had been most violent. The Huks werp i strangers to the areas outside pampanga and Nueva Ecija, and for this ,eu*n drJ incursions into the Bicol, panay and l'{indanao regions provqd disastrous to tiem. The New People's Army, on the other hand, has managed to establish a foothold or,

led Hukbalahap movement

acquire a mass base in the places where the Huks had previousty failed - in th. thrru hinterlands of Agusan del Sur and Agusan der Norte, surigao o:9lhces, ?T:o _the del Sur, Misamis oriental, Misamis occidental, Bukidnon, zLboanga del sur, Zam. boanga del Norte, Eastem and Northem Samar, Negros oriental and Negros occi, dental , Iloilo, Antique, Capiz, euezon and Sorsogon Ifl these provinces, military authorities admit that their campaign against the' , NPA has been hampered by the people's relucturce to inform o, tr,, ,eiel, - * unlike the President of Magsaysay when villagers had confidence in the govem- ,i !ar-s ment and freely cooperated with the military. politburo member, Mariano [algos, who had eluded the army for years was finally captured'in Manito, atbay in tis:, only because the farmen in the area volunteered information on his whereabouts. under Marcos, the villagers tend to sympathize with the rebels and often wam then about the presen@ of govemment troops. Against a well+quipped Armed Forces, the NPA is obviously a poor match, rnd lno amount of propaganda can convince the people that it is ,.prufu or seizing the govemment or the country through violent means But the movement presenti a serious long-term problem in trat, unlike the HMB, it has acquired a national di ,,

Maharlika

237

mension. While the Huks were limited to agrdrian communities, the NPA wifh the youth intelligentsia at the core, is providing a more broadly'based political altemdive that the moderate political opposition seems unable to offer to the idealistic and reform-minded Filipino Youth. The irony is that where, at the start, communisn appeared or wasmade to appear as the greatest danger to the Republic, it is now considered less o f a menace than the repressive policies and corruption of the Marcos regime. By creating the conditions and the climate which enable the New People's Army to dtract those in

of a credible and effective political altemative, and by failing to inipirc

public confidence in the govemment, Marcos can be accused of doing more tlan the communists themselves to promote communisrn througtrout the islands. There is no question that because of martial law Marcos has already carved a niche for himself in Philippine history. He will zurely be remembered for the fine

and costly edifices that serve as monuments to his rule, for his political str{a-gets and rhetorics, and for proposing to reshape the social, political and economic landscape ofthe nation. But by goveming through force, intimidation and deception and taking away from the ptopL the freedom to decide their own future,he will also be condemned by generaiions of Filipinos to come as a false messi*r who, on the 2lst of September 19?2, presided over the death of democracy in the Philippines'

rli[ili

QA AN AGENDA FOR NORMALIZATION

Affi

;1fl1il"jiffiI,T,*:i.,T,,,T j?lfl,!iiiii{,#";^ffi..:,,1;ffi

ti on s Presiden j

arros

yy,:, urir"rJiy ;ffi;ffi;l;: ;Hffi

,"#::11

Io 0."o,,, dipromats and high go\ gover |iff iiili,il:'L:*:-:'::,1:1 *:ti'$ - people and eve.nts ilaa u*, ,ny ;rrri, p;r"Jffiil}.*o hrgh jn" :: i-i :*--F th e np-e-c-tiie- i g ouwho ,",, rnore l,X,'j' #J, i",',1# ;: trre tirne i'. ."rrror,J. iri";TorJr?rilt;rJJ.:ilir:iff ",ouin i " spenr gmft ,r,.i i.""rj.,#lfi, ,u* oo, ii].il,,i!|, leTl T:,T:::,:i.,1.: the people of r,v :l:l"1,rtl citi .r..i.i,"r ;ft:,"."ffi::';:Tir#"i?H #lrr:' ment officiats

cagayan de

oro lies in a shelterecl bay in the christian-dominated .ivil,,i.iopur,tio, northen

tu,r, or Mil; :;:i t Iffi*ii.:ly:,1f:";jj..::1:i 300.000, r, osrry rro. ti,. vi,ffi ';#;xl, abou ."

se^t

lrers

:l1l:il,':i,:::j":'Tlj,lli::,*,,:lT 'rthe citv of golde, tiiendship."

;:T,

.#rJji:i,l;Jo

.r,u,,i'una eaq,.going ways and i, kno*n

il;,ili";1f,rffiTt;: ffff;i,s, ;d; and so became part orthe surtanate,: of :,t3ffl; Sampuma ?,1r',:,i:"""i:::::ily""j: in Lanao. During ,r,.'so*irr, iu";il;ffi"#JrH:ilfi;:li::i; peace and trre coronial r,.i

ire*

adrninistrators introduced the upper-class natives to bu[it center of trre south. Gordhaving i, trrr^l.rur*, rrrr"rrding hills, the town also came to be

fighti,g and the opera. esrabrisrring bee, found along the river and

flili,iil[:avan

oro

- 'r,, ""t

u,. or"o,,

chose when.it was chartered as

witrr an arca of c-lose to 50,000 hectares, its boundaries extending sout' as-Bukid,ro, a,d tire norrru, as far o.""r.l'or r*-,

il,or t'e rnost,progr€ssive city r'nrr.rr".

ancl

political lifd of ,ir.

c*il;;r" ,il;;;;,

today is one, they &rrrir.*lrt considerable influence onwhich the social .o,r.,,nrn.r,-.r'0" arrr.ricuns;;;-;;ry. the 5,000 pr"r,u,ion]Jst'outsiae

established in the early 1930s, tire

hectare Der Monte radio stations, two television stations, well-informed, indepenae,t, assertive

,T::rl:

Through

". the citv. A jet airport, eight ani sa comnrunity papers"keep trre peopre

riui."pirited. It was,therefbre.,

with awe C;;M;;", on the lst of January 1912. T As soon as I stepped. inside city irJil'i, b3cam9 apparent me that a chasm exists between pitiu.a wide ,hrory'-ii.r.ti.r. orr'rr th; to {il things that I leamed was that inrd misgivings that r

,r-1,r]{ ollh

the r,ayor

a rf ,innin. .iiy i, expected to function not onry as a manager or adrninistrator 1rbur arso-as a goifather't" i,, irr,gli'#s. one dqy I woutd be calied upon ro..tu u. broken Uriogi, rfr. nJ,

gras.roors poriticar educarion that even It was also then that I realZed

,;;ft;;;*..

Ir was a a, trrt unir.;r;;;d;ulr'prouiar.

r,o* alprv the Americans were invorved in the running of our govemment, even at the municipal lever. They served as advisers and consultants on police, agriculrure, ;i..*n*ii"n, oopurriiinlritr, ,yrtrrnr, local administration, urUan ptlnning works matters *Oiiir* money

il-p-uiil

for many of the projects came from the U.S. Agency for lntemational Development, their word canied weight with local officials. With their help, we organized the fust Water District in the country, which immediately qualified our city for aloan from the World Bank for amodem,more efficient water system. It was also with American asistance, specifically the Ford Foundation, that we were able to establstr the Model City Population Prograrnme a project aimed at testing the effectiveness of local govemments in the management of population activities - from research on knowledge, attitudes and practices to the delivery of condoms, pills and intra-uterine devices over store counters and vasectomy services in our hoqpitals. This pilot project eventually gained the attention of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (which is headed by Rafael Salas, a Filipino technocrat who once served Marcos as Executive Secretary) and was the zubject of a paper discussed at the UNFPA-sponsored population conference in Tunisia. When it launched "Operation Outreach," the Population Commission (another project supported by the U$AID) used our experience in the Model City Programme to carry out its national population objectives. The Americans were also around when we brought electricity to the hinterland barrios of Cagayan de Oro, and through the Urbur Development Project they funded the formulation of the fint urban framework plan ever designed for a Philippine city. This was based on the recommendation of the citizens, urd that plan is often cited as a model in democratic city planning. Our poiice department, the recipient of a Philjppine Constabulary national award for efficiency, was likewise the first to evolve a procedure for its integration into the National Policp Force. We achieved this, again, with the advice of American consultants, who also zupplied the patrol cars, traffic lights, side arms and the training that our 200-man police force needed. The key to the zuccess of dl these undertakings, however, was the involvement of the people without whose support our administration would never have accomplistrcd so much. In rctrospect, I can see clearly now that the government was in their hands, and our leadership was effective only in so far as we responded to what we saw as the popular will. Before martial law, t}tere was real autonomy in Cagayan de Oro. While other cities and towns were dependent on doles from Malacanurg - then known as "na-. tional aid" - for capital projects and govemment operations, we bent every effort to rely on local resources. I came into office with a P.S-million deficit in the treasury; inside of six months we had wiped out this shortage and accumulated some surplus. Skeptics said it could not be done, but we did * with the people behind us. Ours was the lrst Mindanao city to computerize the local tax collection system, with IBM working hand in hand with a staffof homegrown programmers and keypfnchers. The search for computer talents is an interesting story and deserves to be told here. lnstead of recruiting them outside, we had IBM conduct aptitude and intelligence tests right within City Hall. To our am.vement, the most promising ones werc college graduates asslgned to clean the public rcst rooms, and some highly

i 1i i

riiliffill!]ill

,;#W-n*

,:.ifl;i "t".rr"ir'r

iiri::ri I r":rr lrlr,rll';::i

t l," *,eo'o

240

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

qualified personnel performing tJre most menial jobs because nobody had to find out what they could really do.

Army.

My record as a city executive must have impressed N'Iarcos enough to appoint me successively to three national positions in a concurrent capacity: first in 1973 as Undersecretary of Public Information, then in 1974 as Presidential Action Officer ror Northem Mindanao, and in 1975 as Chairman of the Southem PhilippinesDeve' lopment Authority - a position now held by Mrs. lviarcos.It meant I had to shuttle

The response to the tax campaign was even more gratifying. From tol976,we increased the annual revenue by 2o% each year, u."rord that no administrator had achieved. But the credit belonged to the citizens whose was definitely an expression of confidence in their govemment. They could seo, goyrse_,.

tfat their

money was not being qpent frivolously but on projects ii,hich th

between Manila and Mindanao. The prcssure of numerous responsibilities in distant arcas soon took its toll. In September 1975,1caught a bad case of viral hepatitis that kept me in a hospital for three months. leave as my doctor advised, I decided to retire Instead of taking politics. In a letter accepting my rsignation, and govemment completely from the I would retum to tlre govemment service hope that the graciously expressed Marcos Ihad already made trp my mind to retum to permitted. But my tealth ,, *on-r, private life and was eager to enjoy a welltarned rest. In 1978, however, lriends and supporters pressed me to run tbr the lnterim National Assembly on t}re ticket of the newly-formed Mindanao Alliance, an opposition party organized by lawyer Homobono Adaza and otler young political leaders in Mindanao. Their objective was to provide the neglected and impoveristred southem region of the country with stronger and aggressive representation in the new parliament. We all strared the feeling thd the older Mindanao leaders no longer cared about the region, either because they had become comfortable ard affluent under the Marcos regime, or because they had lost their courage entirely.

helped plan or suggest.

As the most visible symbol of leadership in the community, I rearized their confidence in our administration depended to a great extenttnmy own ( bility as $Iayor, and so at no time would I ever make a promise or pledge knew would be impossible to carry out. our liftstyle also had to conform to public:s idea of good govemment - that their elected officials shun ext ostentation and the arroganc€ ofpower. I took to using ajeep and a battered piik truck as my official vehicle and this had a salutary effect on my constituents, u agreed that the lvlayor's ceremonial car was more useful m poii." mobile unit,

" of the expensive some. bureau chiefs were forced to divest themselvei ; gazzlng cars they had previously acquired for themselves and, contrary to a st govemment policy, which they used to transport their wives and chiliren to and malket. In the relocation of squatters and the expropriation of property foi set roads and other public purposes as in every move that affected the private rightsi of the individual negotialion, compromise and cooperation brought the coml munity together in an exhilirating strow of unity. Even the student activitists found that they could deal reasonably with the authorities and behaved in an aggressive' but respectful manner. a result,

on the eve of the national independerrce day cerebration on 12 June 1972, they swarned all over the public plaza with cans of red paint and, totheconstema-'r tion of byslanders, began to paint revolutionary slogans on the newly whitewashed curbs, benches, walls and monuments. I had them rounded up by the police for de-. facing public property and obstructing traffic. Meeting with them thai same night, I promised that no charges would be filed provided they went back and cleaned up the mess they had made. I also offered to find a place where they could prominenulr,.r display their

messages,

An Agenda for Normalization 241

As the boys went back to the plaza, this time with cans of white paint, I perzuaded the Coca'Cola bottler to set up giant billboards at strategic places around the city. These "Freedom Billboards" were, to my knowledge, the only ones of their kind anywhere in the Fffippines and the students lost no time in ilastering them with slogans denouncing U.s. imperialistrn, Marcos, and the Establishment. Among the largest were the words: "canoy - tuta ni Marcos ug mga Kano!" In their eyes, I too was an American and Marcos lackey for being purt or the government. -Bui that did not prevent their leaders from coming to me.for permitslo assemble and hold demonstrations. I noticed, however, that they were iather apologetic. when martial law was declared, some of them fled to the hills to join the New people's

"0.n "

During the campaign md ever since becoming a member of the Interim lrlational Assembly, I have often been asked why I joined the opposition when I had long been part of the Marcos govemment and active in the prosecution of its projects around the country. What had caused this change of heart I On26May lg7l,lwrote this column nthePhilippines Herald'

The mailed-tist policy that P.C. Chief Garcia recentlyenrnciated against yiolent demonstrators and activists has once again prompted the opposition to raise the specter of a police state in this qountry' The latest to voice this fear is Rep. Neptali Gonzalez, Liberal of Rizal, who urged citizens in a qpeech in Bulacan the other day to "get involved. ' . lest by our silence we allow (the military) to take on its next calculated step a witchhunt and a crackdown by the state police against what the P.C. Chief has labelled as'inciters' and 'agitators'. . .

Two years after Presiient Marcos took office, Sen. Ninoy Aquino aired the frst waming of a ganison state, pointing to alleged constitutional violations by the President. Although the accusations created considerable stir in the press, the public wam't quite prepared to believe it, After all, before Marcos, President Macapagal had also been accused of practically the same mischief. And the Nacionalistas then had a polile phrase for it - "one-man ruIe."

242

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLTJTION

to crnpaign "bombas," quickly disnissed the whole thing as an political fairy tale. The Aquino charge against President Marcos also suffered the same To a weary public, it was another case of "cry wolf." Since then, conditions have changed to a point where a police state has become more a

243

govemment.

Indeed, Marcos became a hero ovemight and few questioned the legality or constitutionality of his action. Proclamation l08l sounded like a Sermon on the Mount: it held forth the promise of peace, order, progress, justice, and above all, real democracy. The inconvenience, it was supposed, would only be temporary lasting six to eight months at the most. Within that period, the New Society soinething that the students, the communists, the middle'class, big business atd

possibility.

If it

ever comes into existence the blame will surely be not on Marcos alone - for no man can resist the temptation ofpower - but on one: the opposition, for being weak and leaderless; the radicals and ext for alienating public sympathy and support because of their violent and the people for being tired, passive and disorganized. Like it or not, we are actually on the road to dictatorstrip and pe what is delaying it is the President's own asses$nent of whetherhe can ably justifr such a move. Right now, this very moment, he could effect a t over.

the intelligentsia longed for - would be born at last. It was this euphoric climate that enabled Marcos to caryy out his plan of institutionalizing one-man de. The first order of business was to have a Constitution that would given him nearly absolute powers to run the country as he wished' This he achieved by controlling and manipulating the constitutional convention and having the new charter "Iatified" in a simple referendum - instsad of a plebiscite to. as req:uired by the 1935 Constitution - where the people had no opportunity know.what theY were aPProving. In several so+alled consultations, referenda and plebiscites that he called from 1973 through 1976, amendments were introduced to further strengthen his control of the govemment. In tlre last of these, he became President and Ptime Minister - of the old and the new Constitutions, r€qpectively. Since his tenure as Prime Minister by constitutional amendment has not been spelled out, he therefore holds offrce for life - and may be removed only through another charter amendment' Within a year of martial law, I could.see that what had been introduced witll blaring fanfare was not at all a New Society but the same old one - with new faces' The piomised rcforms and charges fiiled to material2e and wide disaffection began to set in. In tr{alacanang Palace, I had a more intimate glimpse of the Marcos government in action. There, I came to the sad conclusion that, contrary to his grandiloquent that he could announcements, he had placed the Philippines under martial law so of his mombers and his wife of succession the ensure and life remain a President for family. It was a rude awakening but one that no reasonable man could escape. True, better a second term extended by martial law had given Marcos a chance to acquire a predecessofs' his any of problems than nation's grasp of the firmer education and a He could therefore be the most competent and knowledgeable chief of state everto I

He could, for instance, procldim a state of emergenry in the suspend the operation of the constitution and all the laws, order tre arrest members of Congress for being derelict in their duties, fire the Supreme Cou

dismantle the comelec all in the name of restoring things back to normal removing corrupt govemment officials and establishing a disciplined social and political order under wliich this nation may be great again. And let me ask, who would oppose him'/ Congress Our lawmakers can,t even put their own house in order. The supreme.court?But who would enforce its judgment'/ The students? with what-pillboxes and molotov cocktails and red flagsl The army? But the army is for President Marcos. The people?They need to be organized and aimed - and above all, they need a leader who can rally. them to the cause, sorneone they can trust. But of those among the oppos! tion, the radicals, moderates, even the communists * who can trrey reafly trust? No, a revolution is still years and years away, in spite of all the brave tdk in the coffee strops and cocktail parties. If it is a dramatic transformation, a complete change that this country needs, President lr,Iarcos can do it now simply by taking over the govemment ard doing what the swivel chair revolutionuies and the radicals propose to undertake. He would become a dictator, of course, and we would have to give up certain freedoms. But if we admit that the Philippines needs a thorough cleansing, the saner altemative would seem to be for President Marcos to pull a coup from within, rather than for a whole nation to indutge in madness and wallow in blood.

Normallzntlrttr

One year and four months later, this prophetic piece read llko u sccttnr{o lirt the stunning developments that took place on 2l Septembet 19'12, Wlrnl I ltntl called "a coup from within" was Marcos' "revolution from the c€nter.n' Uke many Fitpinos then, I sincerely welcomed the declaration ol'tttttttlnl law. Here, I thogght, was a way of knocking sense into the heads of politicians who had become abusive a{rd calloused to the people's cry for good govemment. To tlte majority, martial law was regarded more as a means of restoring sanity to the poll' tical ana social order than preventing an "imminent" communist takeover of the

President Macapagal, they said, was on the way to becoming a right.thinking people didn't watch out he would do away witJr cracy and transform the Philippines into another Indonesia. But nottring of the sort happened and the people, by this time

and

An Agenda for

occupy the Palace.

But

could see, too, that power was affecting him

it would

any man' He

.' 244

' ,

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

to those in the political and business sectors who have given him realistic counsel. I{e seemed no longer to need advice, only information on which to base a decision or to zupport one already made. And s much of his information came from fawning sycophants whose main .orarrn *.u tn please him, Nlarcos became isolated from the reality and the dangers of the situation was becoming less accessible

he had created. As nothing could be more perilous to the stability and dynamism any nation than a powerful leader who has ceased to feel the puls6beat oithe peop Marcos has thus become an encumbiance. If he had not declared martial law, what would have happened to the ph pines? The comm,nists could never have toppled the govemment and seized country, as Marcos wamed, not only because they did not constitute a real or i nent danger at that time, but becarse the people would have found an altemative _ new set of elected leaders in whom they could repose their faith andconfidence,

The situation that the militants and the intelligentsia deplored in the Seven had actually reached a plateau and was no longer-a .u* of things getting wc before they could get better. Time was clearly running out on the power blocs special interest groups who were believed to have u ,t*ghhold on the political economic life of the nation. They could not indefinitely holrl high ground. Thrqui the emergence of more sophisticated and socially-conscious leadeis, drawing thJ support from the young crowd of intelligent and articulate voters tJrat the unive sities were turning out in greater number and who exerted influence even on the significant changes were taking place in society and govemment. The administration after N4arcos was sure to address itself to the problem of qraft and corruption, economic inzufficienry, government reforms, and the Mindanao. conflict, perhaps not with the same pomp and elegance that have become the hallmark of the regime but in the accepted democratic mann9r: with the involvement and participation of the people. For in that year, no responsible leadership could have tumed a deaf ear to the mounting demand f6r change, developrnent, r.ror*r. The system then and the personalities that had long dominated it were bound to undergo a drastic transformation, assuring the viability and vitality * of new ideas and concepts. There could have evolved an authentic Filipino political and economic ideolory, representing the collective wisdom and judgment as well as the basic goals of all the people - instead of the single view that ltdarcos, with the help of intellectual stylists, now wants to force upon his countrymen on the assertion that no one else has the wisdom and the vision to plot the nation's future. There was always the possibility, of course, that, like Ilrarcos, another president might have been sorely tempted to invoke martial law powers to perpetuate himself. I{owever, no Filipino political leader of note at thatlime not even the impetuous sen. Benigno Aquino Jr. who vowed to declare martial law if elected had the same cornbinatibn of qualities that goaded Marcos into making that fateful September decision. Indeed just as he was wont

to say, in 1965, that "only Irlarcos can beat Maca-

pagal', and,

An Agenda for Normalizatlon 245 \

1972, that "only Marcos can save the nffiipptnee,"

eoontr tttut

6..*r. of a liftlong obsession to scale the 'heights of leadership, an ln*tlnet nnd passion for power, a desire for historical prominence, a capacity to deal rutlilernly *itt tt. problt* of political survival and permanence, a politically'ambitioul wllb also sirnilarly driven, only Marcos could have declared martial law'

One cannot deny that through the establishment of an authoritarian Sovorn' ment and the exercise of nearly absolute powers, he has dtered the'people's liveg ln various ways. But considering the price in terms of human rights and basic freedoms, not to mention the deaths and the suffering inflicted upon those who would not recogrrize the legitimacy of his govemment, the qUestion that will preoccupy the present and future generations of Filipinos is: how much has the "revolution from the center,, achieved to improve the quality of life of 47 million Filipinos? Figures, it is often said, do not lie, yet one of the most disturbing features of ttre muiiat law era is the deliberate attempt to mislead the people at every tum with statistics on economic triumphs of fantastic proportions all these in the face of shortages of basic needs and the very glaring fact that malnutrition and, in some stalls the country. areas, plain starvation industries, traditionally a source of foreigrr exchartge coconut and The sugar in strambles. Though Marcos cannot be blamed thousands,lie of and the livelihood market, control of the marketing mechanism the world in for adverse conditions his friends has deprived the planters and pro' few of by a and govemment by the

au"rr,

*d,

consequently, the workers,

of their just

of export

and domestic

revenue.

Land reform, which was zupposed to redistribute wealth urd the means of production in a basically agricultural nation, is _being pursued in a manner tltat argues doubts about Marcos' sincerity and the real thrust of the program. For while he speaks of creating a class of tillerownen through land reform, many farmels have gone back to being tenants for lack of capital and technical assistance from

the govemment, and even as big-landed estates are being broken up for subdivision to the tenants, larger areas ile being tumed over to corporations controlled by a few, often in violation of the Constitution.

Similar contradictions may be found in other,vital areas of national life, with Marcos aiserting the very opposite of what his govemment has done or is doing. While prollssing to be u ct a*pion of press freedim, he has kept media under tight control by allowing only his close friends rrd relatives to :*1 the majQr radio, televisioniand press facilities urd intimidating joumalists with the constant threat of losing their jobs. With the private media as an integral part of the vast govemment propug-d, apparatus, public discussion of sigrrificant issues has been one'sided, iru"i"t the citizens ignorant of the true state of the nation's affairs and incapable of making intelligent decisions for themselves. lVtrile maintaining that the military is subordinate to civil authority, hb has in fact placed it on a footing superior to all sectors ofPhilippine society,by allocating u *"io, part of the govemment's scant resources to the defense establistrment and ,r"n *.uking military concurence of some of his acts as President and Prime Minis'

246

An AgPnda for Normalization 247

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

ter. worse, he has converted the armed forces into a political machine of awei power, as demonstrated in the two martial law elections when soldiers wero either as captive voters or to terrorize civilian voters. lvhile insisting that the diryensation of justice is a primary concern ol regime, he has stripped the judiciary of the independence and integrity so vitgl the fair intemretation and application of the law, by demanding trr.i aiiuag.s I mit courtesy resignations in total disregard of the security of tenure granteJby old and new Constitutions. while pledging that his regime will not tolerate violationsof human rights torture, there is ample evidence that such cruelties have actually taken, and are taking, place and that the perpetrators have yet to be called to account for con ting brutal and debasing acts against their own countrymen. while expressing qympathy for the plight of the Muslim people of Minr and a determination to end the conflict which has exacted a tremendous toll in prgrrty and human suffering in the southem philippines, his regime has spent

millions on the fighting thm on the development of the island. l&hile promising normalization under ttre aegis of a democratic gove he has rewritten the constitution to enzure the retention of his martial law so that nomralcy would merely be the indefinite extension of authori(arian rule, proclaiming a "humanist approach" to the challenge of develop: _ with_ th9 people as the principal object of his concern, he has plaLd more em on the building of a large, modem army than on education, public health, the nistration of justice, and other essentiar services w*uoii. oi*rri.t are k; tanks and armored cars sometimes rumbling past villages where schoolchildren neither textbooks nor writing materials and hold their classes under the trees, where thousands die without ever seeing a doctor in their lifetime. while insisting that political reforms initiated under mutial law have laid the foundations for broad, participatory govemment, he has established

Fil"

monolithic authoritarian structure in which an impotent ,.parliament,' seles a democratic trapping, and a barangay system, whose-officials are being

br.i";;ad

to become blind followers of a Marcos cult, functions as a mindless potiti.ut machinc programmedtocarryouthisordenratIrerthanthepeople,smandati. Marcos justifies all this by saying that for a developing country like the philiplr pines there is a third alternative - a form of government and an ..oro-i" ,yil; that lie somewhere between westem-type democracy, which he considers too slow and cumbersome, and communism, which he critic2es for being dictatorial and repressive. The middle road, he contends, is "constitutional authoritarianisrn," a combination of the liberal spirit of one and the cold efficiency of ttre other. But in setting this up and maintaining it in power, he has used methtds and institutionl more akin to communism than democracy. Though he claims the constitution as the source of his arthority, it was he who invested that authority in himself by strrying the charter as an instrument to legltl. mize the martial law regime and the enornous powers that he sought to wlild, Necessity and efficacy are the arguments that he invokes to support the sstablldr.

ment of a milder brm of dictdorstrip. But thisrestatement of an old hat* that the does not cnder obsolete an older and mgre valid propo' end justifies the means sition: that fo-q a govemment to be legitimate, desirable and effective, it must have the consent of the people and be harmonious with their nature. There is no gainsaying that because of their Malay heritage, Filipinos lean

an inclination that Marcos believes towards a strong, personal type of leaderstrip he has been able to satisff through authoritarianisn. On the other hand, the SO-year education in representative govemment that they acquired from the Americans militates against a qystem of rule that denies them the fundamental riglrt to replace the leader when he falls strort of their original expectations. In reply to foreigrr cril tics, Marcos falls back on the claim that the political and economic order that is in furce in the Philippines today cannot be judged by their standards because it is

Filipino in character. But is it? As many political scientists and sociologists have found, the Philippine political culture is basically a bargaining orlture, with the deeply-ingrained values of Utang na loob or debt of gratitude and hiya or loss of face, the compadrazco ftinstrip and middleman) system, and the use of manipulative language as the matrix of pcilitical trmsactions. The form ,of govemment that would, therefore, come closest to exprcss' ing and fulfilling ttre Filipino spirit must be one in which the ordinary citizen has the power and the means to bargain, as it were, with the arthority. Obviously, in the authoritarian or dictatorial milieu that Marcos has created, this would be an impossibility. The reason, in fact, why the republicm form of government which the Ameri' cans planted on Philippine soil quickly took root was that it permitted the free play of the indigenous levers of compromise and intercession. lvlore importantly, it gave the humblest citizen an active and meaningful role in the decision-making process of the govemment.

With the zudden inversion of the great democratic pyramid utd the concentra. tion of political power in one man, sitting alone at the base, the people have become silent spectators in the drama of dev.elopment that Marcos cited as his excuse for declaring martial law and terminating Western-style democracy - with extreme prejudice.

lnstead

of responding with enthusiasm to

Marcos' frenetic calls for unity,

cooperation and personal sacrifice, they have become ircreasingly indifferent to these ritual pleas for support of national progrirms. Their disinterest may be traced both to a lack of real involvement in the government and to the severe lossofcredibility that Marcos has suffered over the martial law years. After reversinghimself so many times on crucial questions and iszuing statements that tumed out to be hollow, he has arrived at the point where even those who count themselveshisbelievers find

it difficult to take him at his word.

ln a crisis - urd the Philippines is in the midst of a serious one caused as much by the abnorrnal conditions of martial law and authoritarianism as by extemal r:conomic fuctors - the urgent need is for a leader who does not have to use coercion or decoptkxt to rllly and mobilize the nation behind a cause, one whom the people

248

An Agenda for Normnllz,otion 24q

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION

Since he has enstrrined in a Constitution the questionablo foaturor ol' llro martial law regime - including the power of the chief eiecutivo to govonr lrrrlclllrlloly, to make his own laws, and to,appoint some members of parliamont, tho provhrcial, city urd municipal legislative councils - those after him will be facod wlth the herculean task of unravelling the tangled web that he has strung up these part olglrt

would follow witlrout hesitation, secure in the knowledge that their interest is leader's qnly interest, and their survival as human beings more imperativelhau own. Given the desperation of the times, this is what Marcos strould be but cally is not. Because Filipinos perceive and reqpond to power in a penonal way, they prone to blame Marcos not the system he has imposed for the growing un in the countryside, the rise in zubversion, increased unemployment, terrorisn in urban areas, high prices, and a disordered mass of social and economic p

years

the opportunity denied them by Marcos to decide the type of govemment and institutions by which their country shall be governed. The suggestion of some to effect a retum to the 1935 Constitution and start all over again would no longer be feasible or progressive, for the passage of time alone, the traumatic experience of authoritarianisn, and new prcssures created by changes occuring in a complex world, have in one way or another altered the Filipino's outlook and enabled him to exa-

garchy, monopoly, injustice, dizunity and foreign economic domination.

one sigrificant inference that may be drawn from this particular grievance that so long as &ose in power arc likeable - in the Filipino sense of being at on approachahle, honest, dedicated to duty, respectful of tradition, and willing to with.the common folk it would not matter much tomost Filipinoswhat their govemment may take. If this were so, it would also stand to rcason that by replacing Marcos wi a morc Popular and credible leader witltout in any way altering the structure and thei zupposedly constitutional underpinnings of his regime, the vehement objections tri rnartial lar and one.man rule would In the long run, however, it will be found that a dictatorial or authoritarian system has really no place in the Philippines. Under any form of govemment, the bargaining culture which is at the heart of the Filipino political culture would prevail, producing an accumulation of inequities, comrption, and inefficiencies that cannot but lead to a Cycle of disappointments with the leaderstrip To my mind, the political system that could be most harmonious to the nature of the Filipino people and would consequently work best for them is one which affords them the right to change a failed leader through free elections, and only the democratic system can provide that. To say, as I'4arcos does, that the type of democracy first introduced to the Philippines during the American colonial period failed to satisfo the Filipino desire for a strong central leaderstrip is to ignore historical reality. Indeed when he declared martial law in 1972, the people were already imbued with a genuine democratic spirit, and in the same manner that they mixed superstition with Catholicism, Filipinos were in the process of building a businesslike, industrial open society through a subtle blending of native traditions, practices and values with the institutions of representative govemment. That there were defects in the qystem cannot be denied

but these arose from the fact that the modification of Filipino attitudes towards political action had not kept pace with the development of formal structures. This lag is even greater now with the installation of a strange kind of parliamentary qystem that has been described as 'hniquely Filipino" but whidr strould be credited to Marcos alone.

screen the illegitimacy of his rule.

The first and most important step would be the framing of a genuine Consti. tution by a convention of freely elected delegates. ln the process of choosing thoir representatives and through the debates on the charter, the people would be givon

slowly engulfing the country. Although they do not belittle his competence brilliance as a political strategist, the most serious accusation now levelled as Marcos is that he has ceased to be - or probably never was - the knight in armor who had previously vowed to fight the dragons of corruption, poverty,

abate.

mine his values and options. Once a Constitution shall have been adopted, the next item in the agenda for normalization would be the holding of free and honest elections for all o fficials from the national to the barangay level - with an honest and independent Commission on Elections, an impartial Armed Forces and a liberated media in strong supportive roles.

In such democratic circumstances, it does not seem likely that anyone would present himself a champion of the New Society and its institutions, not only dare because the pent-up frustrations and anger of the people during martial law would hdve an intimidating effect on those identified with the Marcos regime, but also because he has not developed a corps of leaden to take his place in the future. By eliminating the oligarchs, the power broken and the regional and provincial warlords of the so-called Old Society, and replacing them with veritable proconsuls who are effective only to the extent that he empowers them, Marcos has actually created a political vacuum and planted the seeds ofhis own destnrction. For into this void has stepped a new breed of leaders many of them reformists and revolutionaries who will not rest until martial law and authoritarian rule are brought to an end. How they will go about this would depend on whether Marcos is willing to yield his position. It is naive to expect, however, that he will let go of the power he has worked and schemed so hard to acquire. Not only would he expose himself to possible retribution by those whom his regime has brutalized, but a1l who have prospered by his rule - family, friends, political and business cronies - would never allow him to relinq.uish it. The prospect of Marcos remaining permanently in office until succeeded by his chosen heirs would inevitably force the moderate opposition to join with the radicals, if not turn diehard themselves, thus building up the tensions that could lead to violence. And when the flashpoint is reached, there is the other grim possibility that the real power elite sired by martial law - the military - will preempt everyone else by tuming against Marcos and taking over the govemment on the pretext -

ffi't''

250

rHE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTTON

or the honest intention of "saving the Republic." Marcos himself has admitted that the army is indeed locked into a position that may not be easy to disengage, describing his predicament to American l

INDEX Block-voting, 55

"i'ito,'tlrus:..Remembertheaxiom:Hewhoridesthetigercannotseemtogetoff. Yes, you are holding on to the tail, you hold bn to the ears, and if you donlt watch out, it will bite you, so you have to do it gracefully. We are trying to get off martial . law but the tiger threatens to bite instead of cooperating. . ." Whether for the purpose of firmly entrenching itself in power or serving as the

self-appointed stewards of transition, from authoritarianisn to representative democ- , " racy, the goverrunent after Marcos would be forced to as$rme a revolutionary cha' racter. For in the task sf n6rmelizing the politicd situation and repairing the eco nomy, the pressure for quick relief would probably compel the new leaders to adopt, the sane repugnant and undemocratic methods that Marcos used to establistr his{ form of "constitutional authoritarianisrn." In the words of Arlene Babst: "Tyrants have been toppled by idealists and, fanatics who become tyrants ttremsehes. And who leave the nation they aim to setl free'in as much, if not more, servitude and chaos as before. lVith the exception of perhaps a dozen leaders in the entire history of humankind, it is the rule that once a person attains power the path to comrption is almost inevitable. The M Gandhis are few and far between.' Herein lies the Philippines' tragic dilemma. Since power

corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, would the

men after Marcos have the nobility of character, the patriotic zeal, the highmindednes and the idealisn to resist the siren call of dictatorstrip? Or would they, like their fallen predecessor, succumb to the sweet temptation of power? When all is said and done, thesp questions and the terrible uncertainties they engender for the Filipino nation will lingei in history as the only enduring but dubious legacy of Ferdinand E&alin Marcos to his people.

Broadcast Media Council,

Abello, Emilio, 103, 117 Activism, 2,146,149 Adevoso, Eleuterio, 32 Aguinaldo, Emilio,9

Agrarian reform. I 2 l-l 3 I Alcoseba, Alfonso, 190 Almendras, Alejandro, 209

Alvaro, Pablito,

States, 63-64; And Oplan Sagittarius'

17; Appeal for release of, 59'62; Arrest of, 19,21; As America's boy, 41, 150; As symbol of oPPosition, 19; As presidential contender, 150; Formula for normalization, 63;

On Imelda Marcos, 226; On FiliPinos, 5; Release of , 63-64; Political

of,57;

34; Trial of,

Senate speech of, 58-59; Writ of habeas

corpus petition for, 58

Cabangbang, Bartolome, 17 4-17 5 Cagayan de Oro, 238-240

Canoy, Reuben: As Assemblyman, 178-

182; As Chairman of Southern Philippines Development Corporation, 196, 241; As columnist, 238, 241-242; As Mayor of Cagayan de

Oro,238-240; .As Undersecretary of

Public Information, 195, 241; On abolition of Interim Batasang Pambansa, I 78-l 8l ; On abolition of Print 84-

and Broadcast Media Councils, 85

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 200 Association of Major Superiors of Religious Men and Women in the PhiliPpines, 73

Atienza, Monico, 7l

Castro, Fidel,30-3 I Casinos, floating,

CDCP (See Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines)

Central Bank

of the

Philippines, 92-

93,139 Cential lntelligence Agency, 29-3

192, t94

Barangay,12,158-165 Barbero, Carmelo, 59, I 95 Barrio (See Barangay) Barrio Charter, 158-l 59 Batangas, 10,54 "Battle of Manila BaY", 9

Communism,

22, 79-80,

3l,

Manila)

for

Asia,

150, 244

Communist Party of the Philippines, 59 (See also New People's Arnry ) Ct>rrtpodro:<'o system, l3-14, I 29. 247 Concepcion, Roberto, 156: On politi104'

Bernas, Joaquin, 163: On deification Ferdinand Marcos, 163-1 65 Blanco. Edmundo, 70

Co, Ertinda Taruc, 70 Cojuangco, Eduardo, l9 Commander Dante, 2, 59 Commander Melody, 59 Commission on Elections, 174 89

105

Bigornia, Jesus,,on morale

City of Man, 218 (See also

Communication Foundation

"Battle of Mendiola Bridge", 149 Bautista, Teodulfo, I 95

Church-state conflict, 89-l 00 "Chiba experience, "The", 134

Bacalso, Natalio, 174-l'15: On arrest, 89 Bagatsing, Ramon, l: On martial law,2 Balikbayans,198 Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization,

Benedicto, Roberto,

84'85

Aquino, Benigno: Activities in United

career

81,

Bureau of Standards for Media, 80 Byroade, Henry,29-30

of military,

cal struggle, 172

Conjugal Dictatorshop oJ' Ferdimelda

Marcos, 2"he, 8l-82, 155 Constantino, Renato, on feudalism, I

2:-l l3

Constitution, ( I 9Ji), 147 Constitution. (1973). 147. 154-l 57

Constitutional authoritarianism,

133,

246,250 (See also Dictatorship) Contitutional Convention, I 48-l 5 5 Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, 105-107 .. Cortes, Irene, on participatory democra.

cy,l 6 l-l 62 Council of Elden, 63 Covenant for Freedom, 64 Cuenca, Rodolfo, I 05-l 07 Cuenco, Antonio, 146

F-eliciano, Clorla, on

rrlo ol

Fernandez, Perfocto, on lulholllffBi govemment, 157 Feudalism, 122-123 (Soo rlro 'lanrnull Filipinos: Americanizatlon of, l(1, Afld democracy, 248; And pollller, I 1.1 6l As gamblers, 14; Ae hotpltrblc, I ll As pro-American, l5; Ar mrlllonl, l2; Character of, I 2-l 3, 26: Mrxltl

of, 234; Values

Curfew,22,

Racial stock of, l2-15

of,

l-l

167

Daily Express, 2l-22, I 0+l

Firearms, 22, 187 05

l3l, 136-137, 138 Democracy in the Philippines, 33,

Debts, external,

204 Detention centers, 65 Detainees, political, 65-66 ,

Development, 132-1 45 : And Mindanao,

First Quarter Storm, The, 2 Floods, 2-3

Floirendo, Antonio, I l2-l l3 Francisco, Zotlo, 7 I "Freedom Day,'r 9 Friends of the Filipino People, 4l

lnterim Batasang Pambansa, 27, 53, 167,178-186

Itan,26

Islam, l9l "Island mentality," 8

Magsaysay-for-President Movement, 32

Jolo, 189

Magsaysay, Ramon, 3 I -32, I 58 Maharlika, Kingdom of , 23 l-237

Jurado, Gonzalo, on martial law and On wages, 142; On ecolabor, l4l nomy, 144-145

Makalintal, Querube, 168, 227

Kawesaki Steel Corporation, 134

Malvar, Miguel,

ng mga Broadkaster

Gambling, l4-5

Kilusan ng Bagong LiPunan,

Garcia, Carlos, 103, 148,205 Garcia, Nicanor, 24

Kiram family,200 Kudarat, Sultan, 192

Domingo, Saiurnho,230

cil)

137

E Elections, 53-56, l6l, 17 l-17 6 Elizaldes, 79 Encomienderos, 122-3

English, l0-l Enrile, Juan Ponce, 18-19,228-229 Espino, Romeo, 19,27 Estrada, Joseph,

Estrella, Conrado, 128: On status of agrarian reform, 128-1 29 F Facade democracy, 166-177

Far Eastern Economic Review, 67, 82,91 Federal Party, 170 (See also Nacionalista Party)

Guzman, Raul de, on graft, 84

of, l, 58 Heart Center for Asia, 63 Hechanova, Rufino, 33, 21 5

Habeas corpus, writ

Heridis Group

tt2

Companies, 109-

Hitler, Adolf,2l6 Holbrooke, Richard,34 Hukbalahap, 125 Human rights, 65-77 Human Resources Technology Center, 220 Hunrail Settlements, Ministry of, 24, 197

Huntington, Samuel, on reformists, 203

3, 183

.L Lacdo-o, Corazon, 69 Lagerway, Comelius, 89 Lakas ng Bayan, 55, 62 Land bridge theorY, I I Land reform (See Agrarian reform) Landsdale, Edward, 3 l-32

Lapu-lapu,8 Laurel family, 54 Laurel, Jose, 207 Laurel, Salvador, 54, 59-60 Laurel, Sotero, l0 legazpi,'Rev. Leonardo, 98-99 Leviste, Antonio, 54 Licaros, Gregorio, 92-3 Liberal Party, l, 55-56, 172-l 73, 215

Life, University of, l5

Malnutrition, 142

Letter sa

Pilipinas (See Broadcast Media Coun-

Dewey, George, 9 Dictatorship, 6, 166 (See also Constitutional authorit arianism )

Malaysia, 199

Manglapus, Raul, 148,230

Ga, Macario, 72

General Order No. l, l7 Ghaddaffi, Muammar, 2 l4 Granada, Ernesto, on corruption, 84 Guingona, Teopisto, on foreign loans,

125,

MacArthur, Arthur,25 MacArthur, Douglas, 25 Maceda, Ernesto,202, Magellan, Ferdinand, 8

Kapisanan

General, Luis, on press freedom, 87'E8

38, 57,

Jabidah Ptoject,2T

38-l 39 ; Strategies, 137 -139 Developmental journalism, 84

Diliman Commune,2 Diokno, Jose, 2l Disini, Herminio, 93, 107-1 12,136

Mabini, Apolinario, l3 Macapagal, Diosdado,

204,223

Kawasaki Steel CorPoration, 134 Kabataang BarangaY, 42, 160 G

Jopson, Edgar, 69-70

First Ladies,2l3

190, 196-197 , 200; As basis for martial law, 132, 2O0l' lndicator of, 142-1 43 ; Priorities, 240; Projects, t

Lukban, Vicente,

Ilocanos, 20 Income (See Wages) Inflation, rate of, 144

Finer, Samuel, on facado domo$Itttyr D

Lopez, Salvador, 56, 23tt

Locsin, 'Ieodoro, 2l Lopez, Eugenio, l.opez, Eugenio, h., 62,79, l17 Lopez, Fernando, 62,79, l0l,2l' Lopez, J. Almeda, 62 Lopez, Pepito, 7l

36, 4041,

to Ferdinand

50-52,

Marcos, 35-39

Manila, 218 Manila Electric Company, I

Manila Times,78 Marcos

cult,

163-1 65, 233

Marcos family, I

l3-l l6

Marcos, Ferdinand: Accused of landgrabbing, 124; And Benigno Aqui-

no's release, 60-64; And Cardinal Jaime Sin, 90-91, 94; And 19'13 Constitution, 146; And Constitutional Convention, 148, 150-154; And constitutional monarchy, 232233; And death penalty, 208; And

development, 137-l 38; And agrarian reform, 130-13l ; And military, 20, 22, 25-26; And Nacionalista Party, 55, 183, 223; And occult, 216; And small landlords, 130; As clever president, 26-27, 2O4; As husband, 2lO, 219l' As indispensable, 223; As

one-man legislature, 156-157, 178, 185; As President and Prime Mi-

nister, 154-155; As zupreme godfather, 14; As the state, 234; As war hero, 33, 208; As whipping dog, 149; Calls for national unity, 60; Credibility of , 2O6-2O7 , 247 ; Defensive policy of, 190; Early days as politician, 2O8-2O9 ; Imposes martial

law, l, l7; Marriage to Imelda Romualdez, 217-218; Murder case against, 2O7;

economic gtrowth,

142-143:' On tnterim Batasrng Pambansa, 16?; On press freEdom, E7; On political detainecs, 55-66; On succession, 224-225; Press build-up

Marcos, Imelda: And United

States

media, 34; As beauty queen, 220;

As chief

propaganda expert, 218;

Ferdinand Marcos' alter ego, 212; As Ferdinand Marcos' campaign manager, 210, 214, 216-7;

As Ferdinand Marcos' personal

en-

voy, 214;, A,s Ferdinand Marcos'

successor, 227; As First Lady, 212-

213; As founder of the University of Life, 15; As Governor of Metro

,Manila, 1,22O,226; As Minister of

Human Settlements, 226; As the

"other president," 212-222; As "steel butterfly," 54; At US Con-

gressional committee hearing, 4450; Childhood of, 217; Early days as politician's wrf.e, 214; Edifice complex of, 2 l8 ; Family background

of,

2.17; Marriage to Ferdinand Marcos, 217-218; Official posi.tions of , 221-222; On the Roman Catholic Church, 100; Preoccupation with royalty, 231; Spending habits

of,2l9

Marcos, Mariano, 207 Martelino, Eduardo, 27

Martel group, I l8

Martial law: And the Central Intelligence Agency, 29; And civilian zuprremacy, 24;!,And geography, 6-8;

And history,8-9; And agrarian reform; l2l-122, 126-13l; And

Mindanao war, 187-188; Arrests, 21, 89, 154; Consequences of,245-246; Attitudes towards, 22-23, 23 4 ; Elect-

by, 80-81 Melchor, Alejandro, 30,

Man) Mijares, Primitivo, Military Abuses

Reactions to,22-23; Risks of, 6 Council, 80

Mass Media

Media: Adversary role of, 83; As freest

and liveliest 'in Asia, 78; Censorship otr,80,82; Credibility of,

189; Developmental journalism, 84; Dissent in, 83; Ownerstrip of, 78-

l2l,

132

o oil,6-7

l0l-l 20 Opiration Land Transfer, 130 (See also Tenants EmanciPation Act)

Oligarchs,

I 55

Ople, Blas, 152,213 Oplan Sagitarrius, I 7-28

Pacificador, Arturo, 155 Panorama, S2

Mindanao: Autonomy for, 197;Cedinj

United States of, 192; Coming of Islam to, l9liGeography of, 187; Militarization of, 96; Opposition in,

l 83-l 84 Pelaez, Emmanuel, 32, 178, i8l-182,

54; Search for peace in, 200 Mindanao war, 187-201 (See also Moro problem) Misuari, Nur, 51, 188, 194 Mitra, Ramon, 21, 57, on Commission on Elections,

215-2r6 People's lournal, 83

Philippine Council

Roces, Joaquin,2l

for Print Media

Philippine IndePendent Church,

national corporations) Myrdahl, Gunnar, 26

pot, I l;

Nacionalista Party, 55, 170-172,183, )11 Nalundasan, Julio, 207

National Movement for Freo Qlections,

for

Democracy and

Freedom, 56 National Union for Liberation,

5-56

97-100; Leaders of,90; Militant bishops of, 96; Size of, 90; Stand

banana republic, 230; As neo-

colony, 140-l4l; As oriental melting

in, ll;

Dem.ocracY

n,248:' Dialects

DiversitY of cultures in, 13; of, 136-145; Educational

system of, l0-l l; Feudalism in' 122-123; Foreign investments in,

139; GeographY of,6-8; History of, 8-9; Industries in, 139; Judiciary ':rrr, 27, 246; I"anguages in, l0-ll;

pine Trust ComPanY,9l-94; As champion of human rights, 96; Conflict with 'martial law regime,

Economy

Multi-national corporations (See Trans-

Activist priests of, 89; And PhiliP-

l'9 4 Philippines: And guerilla warfare, 8; Philippine Trust ComPanY,

Malnutrition

,78

Roman Catholic Church,

Media Council) Philippine Free Press, 6 (See

198; And Libya, 186, 194-199; And provisional government, 196;

Narciso, Silver, 70

hint

R Rama, Napoleoll-, 2, 21, I 50, 154 Ramos, Fidel, 19,20,28 Recto, Claro M., 15,147 Reyes, Jose, 230 Rice, 2

Rizal, Jose, 5, 13

Philippine-American War, I 0 Philippine Collegian, 63 Philibpine Commission, 17 I -17 2 ,

Quintero, Eduardo, l5l-l 54 Quirino, Elpidio, 3l-32, 205

Parity, 147 Parliamentary system, 152' 168-170;

40-51

Posadas, Rogelio, T0 Poverty line, 142 Press (See Media) Press freedom, 86-88 Presidential system, 1 52, 1 69 Print Media Counci.l, 81, 84-85 17,243 Proclamation No. I Protective Custody, 66 Protestant Church, 72, 90 Pusyon Bisaya, 55, 173-175 Puyat, GiI, 54,223

Quezon, Manuel, 124, 147, l7O'172, 205,207

Alliance, 54,241

Battles government forces, 188-l 89; Criminals in, 193-194; History of, 188; Moro problem, 187 (See also Mindanao war) Movement for a Free Philippines, 36,

Osmofra, Sergio,.Jr., l, 29, 62 Osmefra, Sergio, Sr., 170-172,205

of, 188; Statul under martial law, 23; Mindaneo

Moro National Liberation Front, 51, 188-l 99; And Ferdinand Marcos,

Plaza Mirand'a,

Pollution, 134

Opposition,53{4

Ordinance problems

National Union

the

Normalization, Political, 63, 249

Ctty of

l-82,

Philippines) Noise barrage , 54, l'15

by personnel of, 671 Action against abusive personnoll 67{8; And continuance of martlrl law, 25-26; And Ferdinand Marcol' suc@$sor, 230; And politicians, 23i Attitude towards martial law, 23; ' Budget, 23; Ilocanization of, 201 Manpower of,23,67; Morale,of, 28; '

ions under, 53-55, 173-177; Factors favorable to, 6, 8; Features of, Z49;

Imposition of ,21-22;Prelude to, l-5; Qualities of , 20; Rationale for, 200;

(See also Communist PartY

Media Advisory Council, 80

of, 233; Qualities of, 206,.244- Mendozd, Estelito, 65 245; Reformer or revolutionary; Menzi, Hans, 19, 85-86 202-211; Reports on health of,63; Metro Manila (See

Source of authority of , 246;

New People's ArmY, 3, 51, 236'231

80; Reforme, 79-El; Solf

on martial law, 99

Romualdez, Benjamin,

, 80, 83,

Romualdez family, 117-l 19 Romulo, Carlos, 238 Roxas, Gerardo, 56,173

Roxas, Manuel, 147, 172, 2O5 Rosales, Rufino Cardinal, 90 Rumor-mongering, 8 2-8 3

142; Mineral dePo-

sits in, 6; Potitical

tt7

develoPment

of, l7O-172; Political culture of, Sabah, 2'l , 40, 199-200 247; Politics in, 16; PovertY in, Salas, Rafael, 19,239 142; Religions in, 90; Under Ame- Salonga, Jovito, 1,41, 57 rican rule, 9-l l; Under JaPanese Salvage, 69 rule, 13; Under SPanistr rule, 8-9;, San Luis, Bet, on Plight of Mindoro, Weather in, 7 Philippines, UniversitY of the, 2

135 Service contracts, T

255

fi. li ;

I I $

fi E

t t

September

2lst

Movement,

also Oplan Sagitarius)

Sin, Jaime Cardinal, 66, gO, g3_g4, 97; On role of chuich, 'lZ, Si';

On critical collaboration, 9G9 i; On Philippine Trust Company, 93-gi Social Communications benier, Sg Soriano, Andres, Jr,. 79 Southern Philippines Development Administration, 196,241

conflict, 96-97

Turncoatism, 173 Tuvera, Kerima Polotan, 80

Steak commandos, 40

Stockades, (See Detention centers)

Stonehill, Harry, 215 Succession, 223-Z3O

Zl3 charges

against Benigno Aquino, 5g; 5n

press freedom, g6; On ratification 1973 Constitution, 155-t 56

And Mindanao w&, 188; And Oplan Sagitarrius, 29; As colonial

master, lO, l7O-172; Economic interests of, 4l; Human rights campaign of,76-77, 166; Influence on military establishment, 25; Intervention in politics, 34; Military assistance from, 25; Military bases, . 5l ; State Department Roport on Philippines, 73-75; Technical assistance from,238-239 Utang no loob, 13-14,247

Taber, Ro_bert, on guerilla warfare,

V g

ran-1dl, Lorcnzo, 57, 6G62, 136, 17

United States,

Statehood,10, IZO

of, 156; On

226 Torre, Edicio de la, 66 Torture, 66, 69-7 l, I 3-7 4 Transnational corporations, I 39 Treaty of Paris, 9-10 Tripoli Agreement, 19 S-lg7 Tupaz, Antonio, l8l, on church+tate

Tydings-McDuffie Law, 146,

Spanish, I I Spanish-American War, 9 Special Service Forces, 26

Objectivity

"rilFrlE's

. l g (See Tolentino, Arturo, l7g, lg2, lgi,ZZ3,

Sicat, Gerardo, l4O, 144 Silverio, Ricardo, I l9-l 20

Sullivan, WiIIiam, 29, Sulu (See Jolo) Supreme Court

6-t77

Tan, Victor, 92 Tan, \ffilly, 7l

Valencia, Ttrodoro, 404 l. 81, 85-g6 Velez, Jose Mari, 2, ll Ver, Fabian, 20,28,81, 219

Virata, Cesar, 140,217

Tarlac, 19,57

Tatad, Francisco, 80, l gl _ On Print Media Council, g6

Wolfe, Leon,

Wages, 142

Technocrats, l4O,144

f".*"y. l2+l21 (See also Feudalism) Tenants Emancipation Act, 126 Thomasites, l3 Toda, Benigno,2lg

Z Zablocki, Clement, 43

?56