Social Europe Journal Vol. 3 No. 4

Social Europe

Volume 3 • Issue 4 Summer 2008 Suggested Donation 5€

Journal

Contributions by Bernard Kouchner Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul Jacques Reland Michel Delebarre Jo Leinen Jan Kreutz Brendan Donnelly Hermann Kepplinger www.social-europe.eu

The French EU Presidency in Troubled Times

Social Europe Journal • Volume 3 • Issue 4 • Summer 2008

Detlev Albers

O

N 31ST MAY, the founder of ‘Social Europe Journal’ and Professor at the University of Bremen, Detlev Albers, passed away after a short but severe illness. His death shocked and saddened people well beyond the German borders.

European social democracy has lost a visionary thinker and dedicated politician.

Detlev Albers became famous as one of the leading members of the 1968 German student movement when he, together with Gert Hinnerk Behlmer, unveiled a banner with the text Unter den Talaren – Muff von 1000 Jahren (‘under the professors’ robes – fug of 1000 years’).

This slogan later became a symbol of change in Germany.

Detlev also made a name for himself as a distinguished SPD politician at the national and state level. As a member of the SPD’s basic values and programme commissions, he actively shaped the political direction of German social democracy for a long time.

Detlev tirelessly fought for a social Europe. In his political and academic thinking, he always adhered to the idea of a Europe united in peace and solidarity. Whether as Director of the Forum for European Regional Politics in Bremen or as founder of ‘Social Europe Journal’, his deep bond with the European idea was ubiquitous.

Detlev’s vision of a European Union based upon social and democratic values is enshrined in the SPD’s Hamburg Programme, most notably in its Europe chapter, on whose drafting Detlev was extensively involved. He also gave programmatic impulses in questions of ecological and social sustainability in the age of globalisation.

Detlev Albers left us a difficult legacy. For his friends and colleagues, it is an obligation to continue promoting and developing his idea of a socially shaped European Union. In today’s world this is a difficult mission. Yet, although Detlev’s political legacy will be a great challenge, his death first and foremost means that we have lost a close friend. And this loss will remain.

Social Europe Journal • Volume 3 • Issue 4 • Summer 2008

Editorial Board Giuliano Amato Former Italian Prime Minister Karl Duffek Director Renner Institute Elisabeth Guigou Former French Europe and Justice Minister Please make sure that there are more issues of ‘Social Europe Journal’ by paying the suggested 5€ donation for this issue or become a Sponsor Member. Visit our website www.social-europe.eu for more details and payment options.

Social Europe Journal is published by the Global Policy Institute at London Metropolitan University on behalf of Social Europe Forum.

Zita Gurmai President PES Women Stephen Haseler Chief Editor Poul Nyrup Rasmussen President of the PES Angelica Schwall-Dueren Vice Chair SPD Bundestag Group Giuseppe Vacca President Gramsci Foundation Jan Marinus Wiersma Vice President Socialist Group European Parliament Henning Meyer Managing Editor

Editorial team Jeannette Ladzik Assistant Editor Ben Eldridge Design & Layout In co-operation with:

Friends Jean-Marc Ayrault, Stefan Berger, Antony Beumer, Matt Browne, Proinsias De Rossa, Harlem Désir, Guglielmo Epifani, Patrick Diamond, Antonio Guterres, David Held, Andrea Manzzella, Jacques Reland, Donald Sassoon, Adrian Severin, Martin Schulz, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Livia Turco, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Christoph Zöpel

Social Europe Journal • Volume 3 • Issue 4 • Summer 2008

Editorial T Jeannette Ladzik Assistant Editor Social Europe Journal

HE FRENCH EU presidency had not even started and its agenda was already vehemently stirred up by the Irish ‘no’. The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish people came as a severe blow to the ambitions of the French President, Nicholas Sarkozy. His actual plan to bring EU policies, such as immigration, defence and social policy, back to the centre stage after seven years of concentration on the European Convention, Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty is on the brink of collapse.

But perhaps Sarkozy, who is often mocked for his overimpulsive actions, is the right person to lead the EU out of its newest crisis. At least, he has got the energy and the will to do something. Also his reputation at home is damaged after a number of mistakes he has made since his election in June 2007. Sarkozy is, therefore, desperate for success.

This might be the right mixture to solve the crisis.

This Social Europe issue starts with a speech by the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, held at the Humboldt University in April 2008 that was exclusively translated for this issue. In his speech, Kouchner laid down the original objectives of the French EU presidency. The articles by Gaëtane Ricard-

Nihoul, General-Secretary of the European think tank Notre Europe, and Jacques Reland, Head of European research at the Global Policy Institute, also focus on the French EU presidency. Reland especially concentrates on whether Sarkozy has the potential to resolve the crisis of the EU caused by the Irish ‘no’.

Michel Delebarre’s contribution elaborates on the French presidency from another angle. He criticises the missing social aspect of the EU and asks the French to seize the chance and change this.

German MEP, Jo Leinen, and his assistant, Jan Kreutz, sing from the same hymn sheet in their article. They even blame the missing Social Europe as one of the reasons the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty.

Brendan Donnelly, Director of the English think tank Federal Trust, delivers more reasons why the Irish referendum failed. He also spells out how the Lisbon Treaty could be rescued. The issue ends with an article by Hermann Kepplinger, Austrian District Administrator, and his criticism of the EU’s current economic policies.

Social Europe Journal • Volume 3 • Issue 4 • Summer 2008

Contents 171 179

Why Europe?

Bernard Kouchner

184

Could Sarkozy’s Controversial Style Be Just What Europe Needs?

Jacques Reland

188 193

(Beyond) the Social Agenda of the French Presidency Michel Delebarre

198 203

After the Irish Referendum Brendan Donnelly

The French Presidency of the EU Council: A Big Boat in Stormy Weather Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul

The Irish ‘No’ to the Treaty of Lisbon: Lessons to be Learnt for the Way Ahead Jo Leinen and Jan Kreutz

Limits to Good Economic Policy-Making Hermann Kepplinger

Click on the flags for links to foreign language versions

Why Europe?

W Bernard Kouchner French Minister for Foreign Affairs

From a speech made at the Humboldt University, Berlin, on 24th April 2008

HY EUROPE? Because a month ago I was in Slovenia attending an informal EU meeting to which all the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries had been invited. For those of you, who, like me, remember what the Balkans were like ten years ago, for those who witnessed the grievous wounds inflicted by internecine civil wars, the mere fact of bringing all these now independent countries together in peace was an intensely emotional experience. It marked the achievement of considerable progress, particularly in the case of Serbia and Kosovo, whose representatives were sitting side by side. It was a demonstration that progress was possible bringing with it the certainty that such progress required the mediation of Europe.

Because of Europe, it only took ten years, ten long years to achieve a still undoubtedly imperfect reconciliation, but one which in the past would have required generations even centuries.

Europe means reconciliation.

That meeting in Ljubljana brought back to mind another that also took place in the Balkans, in Kosovo in 1999.

Having been given the responsibility for the province by the

171 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

UN, I had to co-operate constantly with the generals in charge of the 45,000 troops without whom I could have achieved nothing. When I first arrived, that general was a Briton, Mike Jackson, who was soon to be succeeded by Klaus Reinhardt. A Frenchman working with a German. I had served my apprenticeship as a militant activist, whereas he was a traditional military man. These differences quickly proved to be of little consequence. We were almost the same age. As a student in 1968, he had been tempted to rebel, and took part in two or three demonstrations.

Later, guided, like myself by the concern to engage in action, he joined the army and became a general.

In Kosovo, there was not a single political initiative, not a single press conference nor reaction after an assassination, when we did not find ourselves side by side. It happened so often that we were nicknamed the ‘twin brothers’. Thirty times after murders had been committed, we stated in unity: ‘You have to understand that only a united Europe can get you out of this. You may not have finished with the Serbs and your hatred for them, but look at us, with centuries of conflict behind us. France and Germany

‘This feeling about Europe should not be taken for granted. 60 years ago, this obvious point was shared by a handful of visionaries’

have removed all means of waging war against one another.

What our countries have done, you can do too.’ And while saying such things, we would often join hands.

Has our example convinced a few Serbs and Kosovars?

I would like first of all to mention a few gestures that for me are the very embodiment of Europe: Willy Brandt kneeling at the Warsaw ghetto, Kohl and Mitterrand shaking hands in Verdun, that meeting in Slovenia, where the Balkan states, albeit in pain and on occasion pretending to ignore one another, explored a peaceful solution together.

What is Europe? It is firstly men and women, dreams and emotions.

Europe is firstly something we feel but in a way that is radically new both in its scope and generality. This feeling about Europe should not be taken for granted. 60 years ago, this obvious point was shared by a handful of visionaries. In the immediate aftermath of war, our parents and grand-parents felt themselves to be French or German, very seldom European.

So why Europe? Above all to pursue this courageous path laid out by our fathers and mothers, by those who found a way of thinking against their inclinations, against themselves,

to see themselves beyond war, hatred and bereavement as brothers and sisters. A path to reconciliation laid out with immense courage by our parents.

Reconciliation is never complete. It is constantly tested, and requires sustained effort, for it is always possible to do better.

I am someone who cannot bear to believe that historic progress inevitably implies individual misfortune and can be evaluated in terms of profit and loss. I cannot resign myself to leaving a single human being, whoever s/he may be, by the wayside.

France and Germany, however, have so far turned deaf ears to the plight of the last innocent and unfortunate victims of a conflict that they never even experienced. I am talking about children born during the Second World War, given the awful and contemptuous label in France of ‘Kraut children’, these ten thousands of belated victims of the violence between our peoples.

Often born of forbidden unions, of guilt-ridden and despised relationships, children of women shorn to expose their shame and spat upon, offspring of cursed mothers and fathers whose memory has been assassinated, these children are asking us today, 60 years on, to

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acknowledge their misfortune, their existence, their identity.

An identity made up of war and suffering, of love and hate is that of Europe. Let us look at the extraordinary work of reconciliation that some of these people have accomplished, most often amid tremendous sadness.

And let us grant to these last victims a more just degree of recognition of their so painful, yet so European, history.

Please understand what I am saying. Far be it from me to bring old skeletons out of the cupboard. It is not a matter of going over the painful situations of the past, but to acknowledge those that are still with us, to bring us to the point, where nobody, in France or Germany, should have to conceal their origins because these derive from the other side of the Rhine.

I would like therefore to set out a still embryonic theme for reflection. Yet would it not be logical, in a European spirit, to grant recognition to those whose lives are shared between our two countries? Could not these people, who are symbols of a Europe formed in spite of wars, make a positive reality out of their Franco-German identity?

Not all of them desire dual nationality, but most desire a symbolic gesture. Whatever form this gesture may take, I would like to propose in the first instance, that certain experts, both French and German – particularly archivists, historians, lawyers and philosophers – should be tasked to put forward specific proposals in transparent collaboration. I am saying this in front of two such children of the war, Monsieur Falguière and Madame Brunne, who have

accompanied me on this trip.

Europe, born of reconciliation, should not be afraid to pursue this task with those who are still suffering, for they are children of both our countries.

Can history ever be without memory?

First and foremost, we must seek to reinvent a common ideal – an ideal oriented towards young people who are crying out for it. It is up to us to teach them how precious the history of Franco-German reconciliation and the unification of Europe is.

Seminal projects, such as the common history manual, the second volume of which has just been published will be of great help. Written in both languages with identical content, this original and, dare I say it, revolutionary, project is creating tremendous interest in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Japan, in fact everywhere reconciliation with neighbours is a burning issue. This audacious project is admired in all these countries.

Let us pass on to our children the desire to keep the flame alight for them.

They want us to give answers to the problems that they can see coming. They want our two countries to invent and together work out a positive form of globalisation which causes them to love the world and be proud of Europe. We are only able to answer them by affirming a common will between France and Germany. Europe will not develop without our two countries. Europe will not develop if it is not able to provide answers to the day-to-day problems as well as the deeper concerns of our citizens raised by rapid and chaotic changes in the world.

You are all too familiar with the vicissitudes of European sentiments in France. You know full well how political ambitions playing on genuine fears, used the 2005 referendum to impose their point of view.

Their calculations tallied with the exasperation of a nation who felt betrayed by a project that was out of their control.

The French people voted ‘no’ out of despair or as one might let oneself sink into nihilism.

Yet, when, maybe out of remorse, in 2007 they elected the candidate who proposed to overcome the consequences of this ‘No’, political divisions soon became apparent.

But that is also what Europe is all about: submitting to more or less laudable more or less genuine political imperatives.

We must take all this into account, accept and together go beyond it.

Have European directives killed utopias?

What is the point of being European in 2008?

By focusing exclusively on the ‘how’, i.e. on the internal mechanisms of its organisation, the European Union has caused disillusion. The ‘No’ vote in 2005 was not a sign that voters rejected Europe, but the result of this disillusionment. It was a democratic reaction against a project that had become too bureaucratic, too abstract and too distant from the general public.

Through being centred on itself, the EU has overlooked political issues. Today, particularly thanks to the German presidency, a new phase has begun.

The Lisbon Treaty marks the start of a new era. We can once again devote ourselves to

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redefining the Europe of the 21st century.

We are going to devise a new Europe, which will not be that of the founding fathers but will reflect the same spirit, which decades of working together have forged and which, today, define our identity.

That is what the spirit of Europe is all about, to be able to put solidarity with our neighbour ahead of our own comfort, rights, indeed what seems selfevident to us.

Over the past ten years, Europe has changed. Now enlarged to genuinely continentwide dimensions, it has now taken on global responsibilities and is thus being confronted at the same time by a changing world that questions its positions, its values and its missions.

This world is marked by two strong and apparently contradictory developments. The removal of power from the nation-state to the benefit of influences and networks, where the power of ideas contradicts those of accepted canons, where NGOs, commercial companies and churches carry more weight than many countries. It is a world where problems, such as climate change, terrorism, finance or health-care go beyond the borders and competence of individual nations.

On the other hand, we are witnessing a new upsurge in violence, in ethnic, national and religious conflicts, bringing increased demand for protection and recognition of identity on the part of state governments.

At the same time some states are nurturing new strategic and financial ambitions and we see a return to national and territo-

rial issues that we believed were consigned to history. It is a world in which the struggle for control of resources looms large as it did in an apparently distant past, a world in which stability appears once again to rest on a balance of powers.

At the point where these two developments converge, there is, in our view, Europe, the embodiment of action based on democratic principles and contractual agreement and the answer to supranational questions and the willingness to adapt the tools of power to the new dimensions required by the new century.

Why Europe? Because Europe alone can bring about a form of globalisation that matches our history, our values and our projects and will not be to the detriment of the poorest.

This world, which is in the process of being reshaped, needs Europe.

The only prerequisite for maintaining our place, defending our values and our interests is to create an ambitious Europe that brings hope and is willed by the people, the Europe of our dreams and human rights.

All the challenges that we currently face, whether they concern ecology, climate, health, finance, security or migration, call for innovative solutions. And that is where Europe has a role to play.

That is what our partners are saying all over the world, conscious as they are of the crucially inventive role of the Europeans and the historic opportunity afforded by the American presidential elections.

While the aberrations of the outgoing administration, particularly in Iraq, have demonstrat-

ed the limits of an increasingly questioned superpower, the world expects us to show the kind of audacious creativity which we alone are capable.

Let us remind ourselves that the European project, which, as I emphasised earlier, has been greatly distorted, maintains on a world-wide scale a unique aura of boldness and justice, of grandeur and ideals, which is an inspiration to the nations of the world from MECOSUR to ASEAN, from the African Union to the Middle East.

Let us therefore extend the European ideal beyond Europe.

The European model is in fact firstly a different way of organising the world, of resolving the difficult issue of combining sovereignty and diversity and uniquely promoting respect and brotherhood between states.

The European model is also an example, which now needs to be redefined according to three major issues for the Union – its frontiers, its political ambitions and the extent of its powers.

With regard to its frontiers, we can say that all previous enlargements have aroused concern. Yet Europe has always enlarged without losing its substance. Has this expansion now come to an end? Or, if it is to continue, do we know how far

and on what terms? Let us not be afraid of thinking things through without fear or precondition.

With regard to its political ambitions we can say that Europe was formed after the Second World War, in opposition to both communism and nationalism. It should now continue to be built on the basis of a less harsh form of globalisation, according to democratic principles, a form of globalisation that is gentler with the weakest.

Finally with regard to its power and influence we can say that there is no diplomacy without defence, no diplomacy without a desire to be attractive to our businesses and universities in particular. Appropriate ways of exercising such power and influence still remain to be devised or at least to be improved.

That is the agenda for the think-tank ‘Horizon 2020-2030’ that we intend to set up under our presidency. Its task will be to list the issues and fundamental trends which the Union is likely to face between now and then and to provide relevant, realistic and innovative answers. It will present its report to the European Council meeting of June 2010.

During all the transitional

‘With regard to its frontiers, we can say that all previous enlargements have aroused concern. Yet Europe has always enlarged without losing its substance’

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periods in our history, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the message of Europe to the world has been one of freedom of thought, of the power of reason and individual initiative. This message which we need to bring up to date by asking ourselves once again the enduring question: why Europe? Because the European peoples, after centuries of terrible conflict and magnificent invention possess a unique political maturity which keeps them from many illusions and enables them to take on the responsibilities which fall to them.

To conclude, I shall take four examples which are closely linked to European identity and concerning which we now need to highlight our unique contribution. Two are concerned with the genetic heritage of the Union, and the other with two new challenges which we have to face.

The European heritage includes human rights and respect of the universal rule of law.

Until recently, we were living under the comforting illusion regarding the consensus worked out in the immediate post-war period through the Universal Declaration of 1948. 60 years on, this revolutionary vision has once again to be fought for.

Even though it has been signed by the majority of UN member states, universality, this unique magic word is still to be defined, not through ideas imposed by force of arms, but through a process of dialogue, persuasion and mutual respect.

Let us not be undone by those ever-present relativists or new revisionists. Let us not be afraid

to commit ourselves to the furtherance of rights which are not Western values, but universal imperatives. And let us not be afraid, if necessary, to raise our voices to regimes who flout human rights, who question basic freedoms and oppress minorities. It is not a matter of teaching them a lesson but to promote ideas to which we owe our very existence.

Let us continue to strive alongside those who, all over the world, seek to bring democracy and respect for human rights.

Another part of the European heritage is social rights, a certain idea of social justice, of collective action against inequalities and the protection of modernised public services.

One does not need to be a scholar to note that the foundations of this construct are under threat. Should we therefore be resigned to see it disappear? Or should we on the contrary resist at any price developments which we do not support? Let us be quite clear. No form of protectionism will stop this global movement.

If our economies falter, it is because others over in Eastern Europe, Asia or elsewhere, are benefiting from our achievements. That is the course of history and the path of progress.

It falls to us to bring the benefits of these developments to our peoples, although they may now feel under threat.

The recent conflict in a Romanian car factory seems to me to be symbolic of developments that will inevitably prove painful for a time, but which will eventually prove salutary because they will force us to reinvent our social model, taking

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account of the progress and the demands that every year give access to millions of human beings to levels of health care, prosperity and social protection which we have enjoyed for a long time.

What is really at stake with Europe is to invent a form of globalisation that enables us to preserve and expand our systems as we reform them. If Europe does not succeed, it will have missed its major objective.

Once again it is in Europe that these issues are being raised. The issue of European integration is, in my view, a key cause of the Romanian car workers’ dispute.

I would also like to take as examples two new challenges where Europe has a fundamental role to play: firstly, the food crisis and secondly, climate change and energy supply. On both fronts, Europe has a duty to be at the forefront of innovation.

The lesson of the current food crisis brings us back to the multi-purpose European model of agriculture based on regulation and co-operation. It legitimises the priority given to agriculture and the necessity of developing production through appropriate public policies.

That is what the CAP achieved for Europe after the Second World War. The European Union must, in turn, help poor countries to put in place such policies.

Europe has particular expertise and responsibilities, especially in relation to Africa, whose population will more than double by 2050. It is necessary to reallocate part of world-wide reserves to the productive agricultural sector par-

ticularly in these countries.

Sovereign wealth funds could play an important role in this regard and I have called together a group of experts to make proposals and it is my hope that they help to solve the problem of the uncertainties of food supply. To respond to an emergency is not sufficient. We need to meet the basic needs of Africans and indeed farmers all over the world.

We also have to look at the specific ways in which the developing CAP can help us get out of the world food crisis which causes political instability in many countries, and which may well compromise the achievements of our developmental aid policies. If people have nothing to eat, they will not believe in democracy.

Next, with regard to the issues of climate change and the challenges of energy supply, Europe has shown strong political will, based on an early realisation by its citizens of what was at stake. The plan of action on energy and climate adopted by the European Council in March 2007 under the German presidency has set out the way forward. The European Union must now adopt policies that meet these objectives.

For this reason, we would like to reach, at the summit next December and in close association with the European Parliament, a political agreement concerning the energy-climate package which will enable the European Union to continue to play a leading role at the ‘half-way house’ climate change conference in Poznan in December 2008, with a view to reaching a general agreement at the Copenhagen conference in late 2009.

We Europeans have to come to an agreement among ourselves regarding how the burden of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 per cent by 2020 should be shared, without putting our industries at a competitive disadvantage internationally. We also need an agreement regarding targets for renewable sources of energy.

Europe must also clearly demonstrate its solidarity in helping poor countries to adapt to the effects of climate change.

I welcome in this regard the action taken by Germany, who used innovative financial mechanisms to help developing countries through a system of bidding for quotas of CO2 emissions. This is a most welcome development, since we

‘Through its respects for standards, the transparency of its methods and the democratic nature of its procedures, Europe is today best placed to seek a just and enduring global solution to the challenges of our time’ 176 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

cannot simply say to developing countries ‘you have no right to develop, we got there before you’.

Our action must also help secure the energy supply of the European Union. How can we guard against the short-term risks such as breakdowns in supply? How can we organise ourselves for the long term against the risk of world-wide energy shortages?

In addition to these matters which will be of central concern to the French presidency, allow me since I am here in Berlin to say a few words about an issue which I know to be controversial here – nuclear power.

According to the wishes of the European Council, I believe it is necessary that we have a dispassionate debate with a global perspective in mind. We know how precarious fossil energy sources are. We know too the strategic, political and social imbalances that will be caused by uncompensated inequalities in energy supply. I am not saying, nor do I believe that nuclear energy is the only answer. Yet, for the time being, it is part of the solution to the problems of energy supply and climate change, provided of course that the imperatives of safety, security and non-proliferation are taken into account and that other energy sources are explored.

Through its respects for standards, the transparency of its methods and the democratic nature of its procedures, Europe is today best placed to seek a just and enduring global solution to the challenges of our time. Other countries will soon follow its lead, as they did when Europe imposed on itself

unilaterally, restrictions in response to climate change.

We could moreover talk about world health, concerning which there is so much to do and so much that can be done, provided we are both courageous and inventive. We know that diseases do not stop at human frontiers and those which we do not treat over there today will be a threat over here tomorrow.

We know that disease is one of the primary causes of extreme poverty. Look at the unimaginable progress achieved worldwide in the last few decades – particularly with regard to Aids, although it is not enough – but let us not be afraid to export the remedies that work over here.

Universal health insurance is possible. It is up to us to put it in place.

Only the European Union can meet the global challenges we are facing. As the British Prime Minister recently said: ‘A global Europe can change things’ and this is a man who, a few years go, was still wondering whether the European level was relevant to meet the challenges of globalisation.

As President Nicolas Sarkozy has already stated, one of the objectives of the French presidency will be to put Europe back to the leading edge on these new political issues.

The environment, energy and migration, affirmation of common European foreign defence policies are some of the issues that we want to take forward together.

In France much is expected of the French presidency. I want it to meet the expectations of all Europeans. Despite such high expectations, France must approach this presidency with

humility. Our only ambition is to take Europe forward and to serve common European interests. As Germany demonstrated in 2007, a six-month presidency cannot impose its own agenda, but must work in continuity, initiating future lines of work with the agreement of all.

This is what we will do in responsible fashion and through dialogue and listening to our partners. Our ambitions, our priorities are European.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is by looking at the world as it is, with its terrible realities and profound uncertainties, that our Europe can respond to the great existential questions that are central to the European project.

Rather than indulge in the inertia of self-contemplation, Europe should choose to confront a stormy world, however threatening it may appear.

Why the European Union?

Why take up these challenges?

Why the Franco-German axis?

Because nothing will get done in Europe if Germany and France are not both committed to creating the Europe that our peoples want. Because – without breaking the indispensable bread of friendship with the Germans – we can renew our understanding with the British.

Why Europe?

Because when I speak about France and Germany I say ‘we’.

It may not seem much to say ‘we’ nowadays to refer to two countries that are so close, that have so many ties, rivalries and complicities in common.

Yet history tells us that this ‘we’ is hugely significant.

It is significant provided that we can say ‘we’ in places other than Auschwitz or Verdun, provided that we can say ‘we’ in

177 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

relation to the future and the crises that events confront us with from time to time. And particularly if we can extend this ‘we’ to the 27 countries.

That is also the joint responsibility of France and Germany.

Why Germany and France?

Because together our two countries have the critical mass to serve as a starting point for common positions that will prove acceptable to the others.

Because our two countries have the will to pursue new policies and to extend existing ones.

Because our two countries have the capacity to remain, along with others the ‘testing ground’ of Europe. Because Europe needs the fraternity free of ulterior motives which we have built up together and which we must extend to our European partners.

We have a great responsibility. When human rights issues arise because of sporting events raising the problem of defending our values, while practicing responsible diplomacy, are we able to say ‘we’? As you know, the answer regrettably remains uncertain and we will have to engage strongly so that the Europeans can present a united front in the face of such issues.

Our awareness of this reluctance must not stop us. It is because things are difficult that we should work shoulder to shoulder, including on matters which irritate us, or those regarding which we defend diverging interests. Is it not one of the defining characteristics of Franco-German fraternity that it has been built up by overcoming apparently insurmountable obstacles? That is why France does not intend to prepare its presidency without close con-

or every insurgent killed in Iraq, 250,000 bullets have been fired ~ IRELAND is the second richest country in the oecd, behind JAPAN ~ 11 out of the 12 men to have walked on t h e m o o n w e r e i n the Boy Scouts ~ windscreen wipers, laser printers and bulletproof vests were all invented by women ~ there are five people under 18 in custody in FINLAND. in BRITAIN there are roughly 3,000 ~ spammers usually need to send a million emails to get 15 positive responses ~ Isaac Newton invented the cat flap

F

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sultation with Germany. That is one of the reasons why I am here.

Let us not listen to those who predict the end of the FrancoGerman axis, for it has solid foundations. Let us not listen to the false prophets who forecast the break-up of a historically unique relationship, but which will serve as a model and a guiding light to Europe for a long time. Let us rather listen to ourselves. Let us consider our history which weighs so heavy and is yet so rich. Let us listen to those who did not allow themselves to be weighed down by the issues of the day and proved able to devise a utopia that is both fraternal and realistic. Let us listen to the children of the Balkans who dream of reproducing the story of France and Germany. Let us listen to

‘Why the Franco-German axis?

Because nothing will get done in Europe if Germany and France are not both committed to creating the Europe that our peoples want’ our children who want us to pursue this bold, demanding and inventive path.

To say ‘we’ in front of them and for them is an act of trust and a promise, a commitment and a duty.

Thank you for listening.

178 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

The French Presidency of the EU Council: A Big Boat in Stormy Weather

T Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul Secretary General of Notre Europe

HIS IS NOT the start that a country starting its presidency of the European Union would dream of. Quite the opposite. It has been more than one year since the French election in May 2007. Now President Nicolas Sarkozy’s government prepares itself for its six-month mission of chairing the EU Council of Ministers. It is impatient to demonstrate that the motto the President used on the day of its elections ‘France is back in Europe and Europe is back in France’ is a reality. It was not, however, really anticipating such a blow as the Irish ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty has been for the EU as a whole.

The main priority for France is to make sure that the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty is indeed pursued as was decided at the last European Council in June. The position of the Czech President and more

‘The main priority for France is to make sure that the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty is indeed pursued as was decided at the last European Council in June’ 179 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

recently the Polish one will certainly complicate its task. At the same time, the fact that UK has proceeded with ratification despite the Irish ‘no’ is a sign that there is a political will in Europe to avoid a new negotiation, for which all energies have been exhausted after the transformation of the Constitution into the Lisbon Treaty.

Does the Irish ‘no’, however, totally impede the French presidency from acting with efficiency on its four priorities: climate, immigration, agriculture and defence? Probably not, to the extent that, in any case, since the Lisbon Treaty was to come into force only in 2009, France was planning to go ahead in these areas without the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, governments are probably keen to show that the EU can provide concrete results for its citizens. But the context of a new European crisis does not help in creating a positive climate of negotiation in the Council, which would allow, for example, the recourse to qualified majority voting.

Within this difficult context, this article suggests three angles through which the French presidency can be analysed: is the rotating six-month presidency of the EU Council still relevant?

What is the nature of the priorities of the French presidency

and their potential for success?

And what is the state of the relationship between France and its European partners and what impact will it have on the presidency?

Is a Six-month EU Council Presidency Still Relevant?

Before one can start discussing the details of a presidency programme, it is important to recall what an EU Council presidency really is and how it is likely to develop in the future. It should be first stressed that it is not the presidency of the EU but the presidency of one of the EU institutions, namely the Council of Ministers. The French Ministers (for the different formations of the Council) and the French Head of State (for the European Council) will first play the role of a chairperson, responsible for listening to the views of the different member states and facilitating a compromise agreement between these 27 positions. This function requires leadership but above all a capacity for dialogue and the humility to put aside his or her national position to concentrate on what comes out as the European consensus.

Second, it should not be forgotten that a six-month period is increasingly seen as a short time span when it comes to the European legislative agenda. It is for this reason that for some time now the focus has rather been put on the work of three successive presidencies, that is on an eighteenth month agenda.

In the spring of 2006, the member states decided to formalise the recognition of the role of this trio by the establishment of a common work programme.

The first to be drafted on this

basis was the programme of the German, Portuguese and Slovene trio. The next ‘Troika’ is composed of France, the Czech Republic and Sweden. The importance of a closer collaboration between the Troika countries may be increased, if the Lisbon Treaty finally comes into force, by the need to coordinate the work of the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers and that of the new permanent President of the European Council.

Finally, the function of a presidency is also to ensure the continuity of the work of European institutions. It inherits from the previous presidency and has to prepare the ground for the next.

A lot of its work consists simply of pushing further the dossiers that are on the table, whether they need to be concluded or simply further debated. This is why the importance of presidency priorities needs to be relativised. Every single sectorial Council in the EU, whether in the fields of transport, health, culture or others, will register some progress even though they have not been identified as priority areas by the presidency programme. It may also even happen that for reasons of unexpected negotiation developments – sometimes linked to the fact that they have remained out of media attention – more is achieved in domains not put forward by the presidency than in those that have been designated as ‘priorities’.

Four + Two Priorities of a Different Nature

With these qualifications on the nature of a Council presidency today in mind, it is important to stress that not only have

180 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

some presidencies been more successful than others but also a presidency has some room for manoeuvre to influence the content and the pace of the EU agenda. It is generally considered that this room of manoeuvre accounts for 10 to 20 per cent of the EU agenda during the six-month period. This is why the definition of presidency priorities, beyond ‘marketing’ purposes, is important to understand where that presidency is likely to deploy more energy and identify the areas where there is a better chance for some results to be achieved.

After some communication confusion during the Slovene presidency, the French government has now announced the priority areas of its presidency.

Climate and energy is generally the first mentioned followed by immigration, agriculture and defence. Social issues have been rather a latecomer and the Union for the Mediterranean remains an objective to be mentioned.

Climate is the ‘consensual’ priority of the French presidency and to a certain extent it has imposed itself on the agenda of the three presidencies – even though the Czechs are not as 100 per cent convinced of the urgency of the matter. The timing is very clear indeed: in December 2009 the Copenhagen Conference will be the last opportunity for the international community to agree on the post-Kyoto regime. This means that the EU has to quickly define its own programme to tackle the issue, especially in terms of reducing CO2 emissions and promoting renewable energies. Under the German presidency in March 2007, the 27 member states set quite

‘The ‘European Pact for Immigration’ is very much inspired by the rightwing French government view of immigration’ ambitious objectives and it is now up to the French presidency to lead the Council into translating these objectives in concrete measure. The aim is clear: the French presidency has the mandate to conclude the negotiations on the climateenergy package presented by the Commission in January 2008.

For that purpose, it needs to find a political agreement within the Council.

Immigration is put at the forefront of the French presidency agenda for different reasons than the necessary European contribution to international negotiations as in the case of climate. Clearly, it is a topic that is a priority of the present French government, which seizes the opportunity of its presidency of the EU to add a European dimension to its national policy. The ‘European Pact for Immigration’ is very much inspired by the right-wing French government view of immigration and is, not surprisingly, more contested by countries which are led by the Left, such as Spain. There is nothing wrong with that: it is now natural that in today’s EU, debates around more familiar ‘left-right’ cleavages – as was also noticeable in the discussions around the so-called ‘Bolkestein directive’ – appear more regularly. It is just important not to conceal these divisions and their resolution from the general public,

which has to understand what is at stake in the policy debates taking place at the European level.

Agriculture is obviously again another story. What needs to be concluded during the French presidency is the process that has been described as the ‘health check’ of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which is ‘only’ a mid-term review before the tougher negotiations that should take place later on in order to prepare the post2013 financial perspectives. To a certain extent, one could conclude that the stakes are not as high as for the other priorities.

But the opposite could also be true, to the extent that the next six month might be a real window of opportunity. Indeed, France has always been a key country in negotiations on agriculture at the European level, rather as a conservative element wanting to preserve the acquis.

Today, the French position seems to have changed, Sarkozy having declared that France was ready for a re-foundation of the CAP. The international context of rising food prices also transforms the terms of the debate.

The French Agriculture Minister, Michel Barnier, previously an EU Commissioner, is also someone who understands the European culture of compromise very well. His ambition is to use the French presidency to address the issue of agricul-

181 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

ture globally, away from the restrictive angle of financial considerations. One can only welcome a debate on the objectives of this policy before opening the budget issue.

Defence might be the French presidency’s priority that suffers most from the difficult context the EU finds itself after the Irish referendum. Defence is a sensitive issue for Ireland. At the same time, Sarkozy’s approach on defence seems to be, above all, pragmatic and could therefore be more easily adapted to the new context. While most of the French proposals concentrate on reinforcing the EU’s military capabilities, Sarkozy has indeed announced that France was ready to completely reintegrate into NATO provided there is some progress in European Security and Defence Policy. It has been ten years since the Saint Malo summit tried to give a push to European Defence and Security Policy and France considers that time is ripe for another step to be taken. While the UK is looking positively at France’s move towards NATO, it is not, however, supporting the proposal of a new operational planning centre. Germany, on the other hand, is cautious on every issue that relates to the European budget.

Although the French Minister for Social Affairs, Xavier Bertrand, has always presented social issues as an important part of the French presidency, it must be acknowledged that it has been brought to the fore more forcefully since the Irish ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty.

Bringing back memories – perhaps too hastily buried – of the 2005 French ‘no’, the crisis seems to have prompted French

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politicians to suddenly remember that one of the lessons drawn from the French rejection to the Constitutional Treaty was that France should be more proactive in defending a vision of European integration that would balance economic and social commitments. Good for them: the European Commission has just come up with a new social agenda which will be discussed during the French presidency.

Finally, the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ project is of another kind when compared to all of the priorities mentioned above. First, there is the way it has come up onto the European agenda: in a chaotic way to say the least. Announced by Sarkozy on the day of his election, the Mediterranean Union idea has suffered some severe

blows, being firstly rejected by the Germans and received with suspicion by other member states and some Mediterranean partners. Secondly, there is the form that it has finally taken: the Union for the Mediterranean has shrunk down into an improvement of the Barcelona process by the setting up of a Heads of States and Ministerial Conference. The nature of this French initiative which will mainly materialise in a first meeting of this Conference on 13 July 2008 is therefore only political. But if it succeeds in bringing some new political dynamism to the Barcelona process, it can already be seen as a form of achievement.

France and Europe: a Remaining Ambiguity

To a certain extent, the French

182 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

government motto ‘France is back in Europe and Europe back in France’ is a reality. Sarkozy fought hard to save part of the Constitutional Treaty after the French and Dutch ‘nos’. JeanPierre Jouyet, the very competent Secretary of State for European affairs, has also tried to demonstrate it by spending most of his time outside France listening to his European counterparts or Members of the European Parliament. The way Ministers such as Brice Hortefeux or Jean-Louis Borloo have anticipated the French presidency by consulting their European partners to prepare the ground in the field of immigration or environment also shows that there is, at the political level, a realisation that things will not get done just because France so wishes.

But the relationship between France and its European partners remains as always ambiguous. France is stating that it will lead a humble presidency while at the same time presenting a series of very ambitious priorities and starting its presidency by criticising the Commission or some of its members as well the European Central Bank. On the other side of the coin, the EU is looking at France with the great expectations one can have about a major founding country and at the same time feeling the fear of a dominating attitude that will not respect the European tendency to compromise. But it is of course no use trying to establish a clear assessment of a presidency at the very beginning of it. The exercise of a presidency is a wonderful learning experience for the country holding it. Let us hope that France will come out of its presidency with the desire to finally anchor Europe in national political speeches, attitudes and actions. It is a democratic requirement of an urgent nature.

‘The EU is looking at France with the great expectations one can have about a major founding country and at the same time feeling the fear of a dominating attitude that will not respect the European tendency to compromise’

183 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

Could Sarkozy’s Controversial Style Be Just What Europe Needs?

C Jacques Reland Head of European Research at the Global Policy Institute at London Metropolitan University

OULD SARKOZY BE the right man at the right time? Can he help Europe overcome its latest crisis? Like most committed Europeans, he was certainly hoping that the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty would herald the end of a long and protracted period of navel gazing in the EU. With a new set of institutions and rules better suited to an ever-growing Europe, the Union would at last stop debating its house rules and start to look forward and outward, in other words to agree on concrete policies relevant to its citizens and to focus on its relations with the rest of the world.

France had promised a humble, but ambitious presidency. The Irish thunderbolt has been widely seen as a blow to such hopes. Since then, the Polish and Czech reluctance to ratify has complicated matters even more. Many commentators have concluded that the EU would again be bogged down in institutional issues at the expense of policies, thus reducing France’s ambitions, especially in the field of defence. France’s margin of manoeuvre has certainly been reduced, but French humility will be the main casualty of the ratification hitches.

France’s official strategy is becoming

‘France had promised a humble, but ambitious presidency. The Irish thunderbolt has been widely seen as a blow to such hopes.’

184 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

clear: the institutional imbroglio must not prevent the French presidency from making progress on its four priorities.

Dismiss Czech and Polish hesitation as an internal problem, but warn them that further enlargement, on which they are very keen, is out of the question until the Lisbon Treaty is ratified. Keep negotiating in the background with the Irish for some opt-outs and reassurances, with a view to a second vote, but, in the meanwhile, concentrate even harder on concrete policies to show to the Irish and to the rest of an increasingly Eurosceptic Europe that Europe can respond effectively to its citizens’ concerns. But can France steer Europe away from the legal and constitutional dimension into the political action sphere?

The political animal in Sarkozy will easily have overcome his initial disappointment and will see his presidency as a challenge and an opportunity. A crisis requires leadership and a new approach based on a break with conventions and traditions. As luck would have it, it just happens to be the brand he so successfully sold to the French electorate. ‘We must operate a radical change in the way we build Europe’, he has asserted many times since.

Judging by the way he has tried to implement change in France, his wary partners will be in for a quite a ride.

His approach will be quite a departure from the cautious and consensual approach of the Commission and of Frau Merkel. While his diplomats and ministers work with their partners on the consensus and the deals, the

President will work on the people, who keep on voting ‘no’ each time Europe is put to the vote. He will see it as his mission to reconcile the citizens with the Union through a different approach to European construction, but it will be more a change of style and method than of content and policies.

After first dismissing the Irish ‘no’ as a mere ‘incident’, he quickly remembered the political conclusions he had drawn from the French rejection of the Constitution, which he had interpreted as a symptom rather than a cause of the confidence and identity crisis Europe has been going through since the Iraq war and the 2004 enlargement.1 He conceded that France is not in a position to lecture a country which voted ‘no’, but is well placed to understand the reasons for this rejection. He reiterated in a French television interview on the eve of the French presidency that the Irish ‘no’ is the result of ‘a mistake in the way we are building Europe’ before adding that ‘today people are expecting Europe to protect them against the dangers of globalisation, but it does not do it’.

To Sarkozy’s credit, it must be said that he has long been aware of people’s concerns about a Europe ‘which frightens rather than reassures’, as he had often said in his highly successful presidential campaign. That is why, when helping to negotiate the Lisbon Treaty, he had insisted on removing the words ‘free and undistorted competition’ from the text, even if the principle remains in many of its articles, and had stressed that ‘the word “protection” is no longer taboo’. However, too busy trying to reform the French social model, Sarkozy seemed to have forgotten about the need to promote the social dimension of Europe, and had not made it part of the French presidency’s four priorities, until it was hurriedly added to the mix in the week following the Irish vote.

But, in that respect, one should expect more rhetoric than action from a man who has embarked on a mission to convert the French to the merits of indi185 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

vidualism and capitalism and to make them more anglo-saxon. That is why we will hear yet more criticisms of leading Eurocrats and of the strong Euro, more calls for the European Central Bank to be as concerned with growth as it is with inflation, for an economic government for Europe, for a cut in the VAT rate on fuel when oil prices reach too high a level, etc. These will probably fall on deaf ears, given the opposition of the Commission and Germany among others, but they will spark debates, which could lead the Commission to be more reactive to public concerns, as already shown by its decision to allow national governments to provide limited and temporary subsidies to the hardesthit professions, such as fishermen, farmers and transporters.

It would, however, be wrong to attribute the divorce between Europe and its citizens solely to the paucity of its social agenda, which remains, for the overwhelming part, in the hands of national governments. Many other factors explain why a growing number of citizens are feeling estranged from a Europe, which they perceive as not only divided and business-driven, but also aimless, legalistic and passionless.

Europe has become too complex, too technical, too esoteric for most people who find it hard to see the wood for the trees, to understand its politics.

Before the Irish referendum, the French authorities had limited their political ambitions to the delivery of policies relevant to people’s concerns.

They felt that if the Europeans managed to agree and make progress in the four priority areas they have outlined, citizens would realise that Europe matters. They argued that energy and climate change, immigration, reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and European defence are concrete and relevant issues on which progress can be made, even within the framework of the Nice Treaty. These are indeed important and urgent challenges and, in spite of divisions on some key

‘It is time to make Europe controversial again, as it was in the good old days of the Euro debate’ points, French diplomatic efforts should help to engineer some satisfactory compromises and advances in the fields of energy and climate change and of immigration. But, however successful the French presidency is in these areas, I am not sure that it will be sufficient to reconnect the people with Europe. In spite of their political undercurrent, energy and climate change will not find much of an echo in the public because they are technical and concern the future and not the ‘here and now’. As for the ‘pact on immigration’, it is to be hoped that it will be approached in a highly legalistic and cold-headed manner and will not be used as a political tool.

Progress in these areas is required, but it will not lead many Europeans to recover their faith in Europe. They need to be challenged and excited or at least heated about Europe. It is high time to take Europe out of committee and seminar rooms and onto the papers and TV, where, as surveys show, coverage amounts to under 2 per cent of the news output. It is time to make Europe controversial again, as it was in the good old days of the Euro debate.

CAP and defence are more obviously divisive and therefore political issues, but the key points of ongoing negotiations between European partners are also very technical and remain hostages to national traditions and prejudices.

They however have a strong political dimension, because they concern the EU’s ability to defend the physical, economic and social interests of its citizens in the potentially conflictual and dangerous multi-polar world, which is shaping up while we worry about our institutional toolbox. That is also the case for Sarkozy’s pet project: his presentation of 186 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

the Mediterranean Union plan was indeed calamitous and has now been downgraded, under German pressure, to a Union for the Mediterranean, which can still be dismissed as a pipe dream, but it raises the crucial issue of Europe’s relationship with its poor and dangerous backyard, so important for our security and that of our children.

The lull provided by the uncertainties over our institutional future should be used to ponder Europe’s position and role in the world before we appoint our President and External Relations Representative. There is currently no vision, no leadership in a Europe where heads of governments seem only concerned about their narrow and shortterm national interest. A pan-European debate about the values and purpose of Europe in the globalised world is needed if we are to answer the question Joschka Fischer asked back in 1999: ‘Quo Vadis Europa?’

Is Europe content with being just an ever-enlarging market with no borders or should it aim to become a global political power? Should Europe stick to its technical and dogmatic approach to economic policy-making or should it try to make it more political and social? Have European countries got common foreign and trade policy interests, and, if so, what are they? Should Europe become a strong and assertive political power able to promote and defend its interests independently or should it just rely on its soft and normative power or on its image as a potential blueprint for the future evolution of the world? Should it remain the junior partner in a transatlantic alliance or should it develop the military capabilities required for a more independent foreign policy stance? Should it play a bigger role in the Middle-East?

What about its relations with Russia, China, Indian and especially Africa?

How far down the road of integration is each country ready to go? Etc. These questions run at the heart of the identity crisis of the Union, torn as it is between its economic might and

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political impotence. It is the debate, which France, long convinced that Europe should become punch politically at its economic weight, should initiate during its presidency. Until answers are articulated, it will be difficult to agree on the policy details currently blocking further construction, let alone integration. It would be naïve and foolish to think these questions will find an answer in the next six months, but they must be asked and debated as a matter of urgency. And that is where Sarkozy should come in.

He should use his six months in the European sun as a platform to wake Europeans up and remind them that the world will not be waiting for them to sort out their internal problems if they want Europe to be an actor and not just a spectator in the 21st century global order. He proved in his presidential campaign that he has a remarkable ability to connect with the people. His plainspeaking, his energy, his pugnacity and, 187 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

above all, his ability to put complex issues in simple and often simplistic terms are precious assets at a time when so many of Europe leaders are bland and evasive. He justified his recent spat with Peter Mandelson by arguing there was not enough debate in Europe. Trust him to launch a few in the coming months.

He and France have not got all the answers, far from it, but they must ask the questions, which Europeans should fruitfully discuss before next June’s European Parliament elections or, as some suggest, in a Europe-wide referendum on a short European text akin to a mission statement.

Endnotes 1

See Jacques Reland, ‘French Consensus on Europe’s Crisis, but not on the Remedies’, Social Europe Journal, Winter 2007, pp.106-108.

(Beyond) the Social Agenda of the French Presidency

I

Michel Delebarre First Vice-President of the Committee of the Regions. He is a former French Minister of Labour, Employment, and Vocational Training

T IS A fact that for some time now the social sector has ceased to be considered a priority issue by the presidencies of the Council of the European Union. A quick look at the record of recent presidencies reveals meagre results: the fiasco of the British presidency over the working time directive, a tentative mention of a European social model in the Berlin Declaration of 25 March 20071, agreement on some common principles of flexicurity under the Portuguese presidency, an uncertain compromise under the Slovenian presidency on temporary agency work and working time2, etc.

Of course, the institutional introspection which has beset the European Union since the Nice Treaty largely explains why social questions have not been real ‘presidency’ priorities

‘The institutional introspection which has beset the European Union since the Nice Treaty largely explains why social questions have not been real ‘presidency’ priorities and are no longer centre stage in Europe in general’ 188 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

and are no longer centre stage in Europe in general.

It is also frequently the case that the social field is not a leading priority for a presidency for the reason that it is at the top of the national agenda. This will probably be the case during the French presidency of the EU where the French government, and especially Xavier Bertrand, Minister for Labour, Labour Relations, the Family and Solidarity, is likely to be heavily occupied with the reform of the régimes spéciaux (preferential pensions benefits for public sector workers), revising the rules for the unemployment insurance scheme, the introduction of revenu de solidarité active (RSA) (inclusion income support) and the question of purchasing power, which is certainly more far-reaching than the challenges of social policy.

It is therefore not very surprising that not one of the six priorities of the French presidency – institutions, immigration, energy, environment, defence and Euromed – has a particularly social connotation.

And yet the French presidency is at the crossroads and could be a presidency where anything is possible in the area of social policy.

In fact, the French presidency comes at a crucial time for a

matter of pressing concern: the negotiation of the future social agenda covering the period 2011-2016, the broad outlines of which will be adopted in autumn 2008 following the presentation of a Commission proposal before the summer holidays3.

It is also worth pointing out here that the definition of a European social agenda was one of the main priorities of the last French presidency in the second half of 2000. In line with the thinking of the government of the time, the social agenda was to be a document setting out the objectives, methodology, way of working and working timetable for the key elements of a social Europe built around five strategic planks:

• creating more and better jobs; • anticipating and capitalising on change in the working environment; • modernising social protection; • promoting gender equality; • strengthening the social policy aspects of enlargement and the European Union’s external relations.

The social agenda was designed as an initiative that would bring a new balance to EU affairs: ‘The social chapter is the necessary complement to the Lisbon European Council, which focused more on the economy.’ It was about the need to ‘anchor social issues at the heart of Europe, fostering a Europe which is closer to the people and more conducive to social progress’4.

But the approach of the European Commission eight

years later seems to be more one of watering down and subordinating social and employment policy to the benefit of competitiveness. Just as in cohesion policy, 60 to 75 per cent of funds must now be allocated to the competitiveness objectives of the Lisbon Strategy (the much talked about ‘earmarking’); the consultation on the review of the social agenda, launched in November 2007, would seem to be no more than a minor part of the debate on the review of the internal market5.

What is more, the consultation on the new social agenda focuses on a narrower range of subjects (youth, fulfilling careers, longer and healthier lives, gender equality, active inclusion and discrimination, mobility and successful integration, and civic participation, culture and dialogue), in comparison with the wish expressed by numerous European associations (including the European Social Platform) to see more attention paid to social questions in their entirety and to address subjects, such as the quality of employment, wages, social protection and housing, which are considered crucial from the point of view of responding to the concerns and needs of people faced with growing insecurity of life and a changing society. Several of these subjects, which until now have been regarded as non-priority, have a clear local and regional dimension. This is the case, for example, with housing, which local and regional elected representatives feel must be made part of the social agenda as it is a policy which provides a real link between social policy, sustainable development

189 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

policy and spatial planning policy. The emergence of the phenomena of housing-related spatial segregation and social specialisation in regions must be countered in the interests of the social and territorial cohesion of the European Union.

The last cause for concern is the Commission’s lack of enthusiasm in the legal field since the renewed social agenda will probably contain only two legislative initiatives: a proposal for a directive on non-discrimination in all areas of life and another, the preliminary draft version of which is already the subject of dispute, on cross-border healthcare.

For their part, the socialist members of the Committee of the Regions, in their contribution to the platform of the European Socialist Party for the European elections of June 2009, have formulated three demands concerning the future European social agenda which in their view have not been given sufficient consideration to date, namely6: `

• A genuine European agenda for social inclusion must also take into account the phenomenon of working poor and unstable employment. A social inclusion policy cannot focus exclusively on access to the labour market; it must also work towards quality employment. There is a need for European coordination in the campaign to defend conditions of employment, wages and salaries. The rise in insecure forms of employment (short-term or temporary contracts, self-employment, work placements)

jeopardises freedom of and at work, as well as the sharing of risks, costs and benefits among individuals, companies and authorities. On this basis, common principles on active inclusion should be adopted, acknowledging that adequate income and access to quality services and housing are preconditions for successful social integration and insertion into the labour market.

Quantitative targets for the campaign against exclusion should be set so as to make social inclusion clearer for European citizens.

• Many member states have introduced the concept of a minimum wage and their fund of experience must be made available. We therefore call on member states to provide for arrangements such as a minimum wage or other legal and binding provisions or collective agreements in line with national traditions enabling workers in full-time employment to earn a decent living.

• For the moment, the position assigned to local and regional authorities in shaping the new social agenda remains very marginal; according to Marjorie Jouen of Fondation Notre Europe, ‘the overall architecture rests on the preeminence of national tiers, underestimating current and future changes. Their immense capacity for innovation often goes unrecognised and is always underappreciated’. But ‘greater recognition of the role played by these players in a

way which complements and sometimes overlaps with traditional players, i.e. the social partners and national authorities, would substantially change the social context in financial, legal and organisational terms’7.

Looking beyond the social agenda, the Socialist Group of the Committee of the Regions shares the belief that the European Union cannot maintain the status quo in the field of public services, a policy area which is largely social, as market forces alone cannot guarantee an adequate level and quality of service provision. It is therefore right that five French associations of elected representatives (ADF, AMF, AMGVF, FMVM and APVF) believe it is ‘priority of priorities’ under the French presidency to adopt a European legislative framework for public services which would make it possible to consolidate the boundaries between the remits of national, regional and local public authorities and ensure the legal consistency of roles and definitions within these remits since, over the years, the liberalisation of the various public service networks

has been based on different rules.8 While the new Protocol on services of general interest annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon confirms that the EU cannot interfere in the provision of these services, this demand is now easier to fulfil than in the past owing to the fact the future Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows for co-decision legislation in the field of services of general economic interest (SGEI).

More specifically, we believe that the legal framework which we are calling for could take the form of a draft regulation on SGEI that, without aspiring to be an absolute solution, could pave the way for what could genuinely result in a consistent and innovative legislative ‘package’ on services of general interest in Europe, focusing mainly on users rights; SGEI quality and assessment; the award of public service contracts; SGEI funding; relations between the SGEI regulating authorities; and the status of social services of general interest (SGSI), in regard to which the European Commission indicated in a communication presented in December 2007 that it refused

‘The European Union cannot maintain the status quo in the field of public services, a policy area which is very largely social, as market forces alone cannot guarantee an adequate level and quality of service provision’

190 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

‘As pointed out by Odile Quitin and Brigitte Favarel, EU social policy is not the replication – on a larger scale – of the social policy of individual member states’

to legislate in this area since SGSI were currently evolving in a legal ‘no man’s land’ between services of general interest (SIG) and classic economic activities (SGEI).9 Can the French presidency make the Commission switch its position before the European elections in 2009? ‘We haven’t given up hope of bringing about a change in the Commission’s position’, say the staff of JeanPierre Jouyet, French Secretary of State for European Affairs, recognising however, that ‘at this stage of the negotiations there is little leeway in the Commission’s position’10.

The French presidency is also at the crossroads in that it must lay the groundwork for exploiting the potential offered by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of European social policy.

In the present circumstances, I am convinced that the Lisbon Treaty offers the best legal basis, opening up very interesting prospects for a more social Europe, particularly through the implementation of the horizontal social clause and the legal basis for legislating on public services at European level.

The implementation of the horizontal social clause11, which to date has attracted little debate, represents, in my opinion, a challenge for both gover-

nance and the exercise of competences.

It is a challenge for governance insofar as the Commission will in future have to anticipate the social impact of its legislation at a time when the work undertaken by it on prior impact assessments is still in its infancy12.

And it is a challenge for the exercise of competences in that we find ourselves faced with two pitfalls: fired with European idealism we can assert that Europe can achieve everything in this area, or we can say, in a disillusioned tone, that it can achieve nothing.

Every time a European election – including referendums on ratification of treaties – comes round it brings with it the temptation for our socialist family to put the social Europe at the heart of the electoral project without making the effort to set out the objectives to retain for a more social Europe of 27.

Touching on the subject of social dumping and the fear of the consequences, real or imagined, of the European venture only goes half-way. There is also a need to address the social question at European level: how to organise the coexistence of several social models in Europe; what is the potential and desirable magnitude of Community

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intervention in the social field and what is the division of powers and responsibilities between the subnational, national and supranational levels?13 As pointed out by Odile Quitin and Brigitte Favarel14, EU social policy is not the replication – on a larger scale – of the social policy of individual member states. It is not founded on the same principles; its field of activity and instruments are more limited.

While most social standards continue to be of national origin, EU action is bound by double subsidiarity: one dimension is horizontal and means that the European lawmaker only intervenes when the social dialogue between the European social partners breaks down; the other is vertical and implies that the European labour law does not set rules making for uniform social conditions but rather enacts minimum standards for the whole of the EU, which it is the job of national governments to apply. In a nutshell, it would be pointless to expect Europe to come up with a policy that it would not be empowered to conduct.

The challenge for governance and competences has another aspect as well: recognition at European level of the role of local and regional authorities in the field of social policy.

Thus, the rationalisation of social systems at national level, in response to the constraints on public finances, and the widespread trend towards decentralisation mean that the burden of ensuring social cohesion and inclusion of more disadvantaged groups has increased for local and regional authorities.

Local and regional authorities are faced on a daily basis with problems of social exclusion, migration, ageing and organisation of collective services which completely escape the attention of national systems. It is not ‘over the top’ to believe that if our societies are still holding together today, it is because these authorities have been able to identify solutions and devise new working methods and original methods of funding. One figure illustrates this strong trend: in 2005, social protection, education and health accounted for more than 52 per cent of expenditure by sub-national authorities in Europe.15 This is also a factor which we hope will receive better recognition from the French presidency.

Endnotes 1

‘We are facing major challenges which do not stop at national borders. The European Union is our response to these challenges. Only together can we continue to preserve our ideal of European society in future for the good of all European Union citizens. This European model combines economic success and social responsibility.’

2

http://www.euractiv.com/ en/socialeurope/ministersagree-agency-workers-workingtime/article-173192.

3

For a methodological critique of the consultation held by the Commission on this subject, see ‘Agenda social: “Opportunités, accès et solidarité” ou opportunité ratée’, Gauche réformiste européenne, May 2008, www.g-r-e.be.

4

Speech delivered by Elisabeth Guigou to the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 12 December 2000.

5

See the Commission press release of 20 November 2007, IP 07/1728.

6

http://ariel.qwentes.be/ presentation/down/pes/ social.html.

7

See Marjorie Jouen: ‘Pour un agenda social ambitieux’ in Think Global Act European: www.tgae.eu, May 2008.

192 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

8

Localtis info, 4 June 2008: ‘Les associations d’élus font bloc à Bruxelles’.

9

See the CoR opinion drawn up

by Jean-Louis Destans (PES/FR), 6 December 2006 (CdR 181/2006).

10

Localtis info, 4 June 2008: ‘Les associations d’élus font bloc à Bruxelles’.

11

Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of public health.’

12

See the 2007 annual report of the Impact Assessment Board: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/i mpact/docs/key_docs/sec_2008_ 0120_en.pdf.

13

Inspection générale des affaires sociales (Social Affairs Monitoring Department), 2006 annual report: La dimension européenne des politiques sociales (The European dimension of social policy).

14

L’ Europe sociale, enjeux et réalités. La Documentation Française, Paris 1999.

15

DEXIA, finances publiques territoriales dans l’Union Européenne 2000-2006, 2007.

The Irish ‘No’ to the Treaty of Lisbon: Lessons to be Learnt for the Way Ahead

T Jo Leinen Member of the European Parliament

Jan Kreutz Jo Leinen’s parliamentary assistant

HE ‘NO’ IN Ireland was a shock for many of us, but it will not be the end of the European integration process. In the coming months, two challenges need to be solved: on the one hand the fears of citizens in the member states of the EU have to be taken seriously and need to be addressed, on the other hand the urgently needed EU-reform needs to go ahead.

The Irish voters have bitten the hand that feeds them. Not because the Irish economic growth was financed through the solidarity of the other member states, but because the expectations the Irish citizens have for the European Union can only be fulfilled with the new treaty. Citizens in the member states want the EU to deliver in the fields of internal security, environmental policy, defence and foreign policy, energy, migration and protection from crimes and they want to see efficient and democratic measures. Without claiming that the Lisbon Treaty solves all problems in Europe, it is a much better base for facing the challenges ahead of us than the current Treaty of Nice.

Over the summer, the Irish government will look more into the real reasons for the ‘no’ vote and analyse the referendum.

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The government must admit that it has failed to properly campaign and to point out that the Treaty is not part of the problem, but part of the solution. In autumn, more concrete proposals for the way ahead will be put forward. Currently there are strong signs that the Treaty of Lisbon can be saved while at the same time addressing the fears expressed. The European social democrats have to play a leading role in ensuring that the concerns of citizens are taken seriously. A political declaration on social Europe annexed to the treaty, a more ambitious social package as well as an adjustment of the posted workers directive has to be part of a solution to the declining support for European integration.

It is likely that the Lisbon Treaty will enter into force in summer 2009. We as social democrats should not wait and see but properly prepare for the implementation of the new Treaty. In the run up to the European elections we should also emphasise the need for a more social Europe, which did play a role in the result in Ireland.

Options for the way ahead

One of the options to deal with the Irish ‘no’ is to bury the

Treaty of Lisbon and put an end to the reform process of the EU. After more than seven years debating about how to make the EU more democratic and more capable to act, this is no acceptable solution, especially if one keeps in mind that the problems and challenges would remain unsolved. Alternatively one could try to renegotiate the Treaty of Lisbon to reach a ‘better deal’, which was promised to the Irish citizens by the ‘no’ camp. This process would take several years and could not possibly come up with better results, especially from a social democratic point of view, considering the number of governments we have lost since the end of the Constitutional Convention. Another option brought forward by some politicians was finalising the ratification process and putting the Treaty into force without Ireland.

Judicially it would be possible for the 26 member states to found a new European Union, based on the Lisbon Treaty. But neither would all governments accept such a step, nor would the Irish citizens – which are still amongst the most supportive towards the EU – appreciate it. This option is therefore rather academic speculation.

A proposal coming mostly from the conservative side is that of a two-speed Europe or a core Europe. This is not the right solution for the problem we face today. All governments have agreed to the numerous reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty and in the light of new challenges arising, the EU cannot afford to give up those reforms. For any form of differentiated integration, there needs to be a common framework,

‘This leaves us with only one realistic option, which the Irish and the other member state governments are likely to put forward: A second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, but including new parameters’ including clear rules on competences, institutions and policies, which is the case with the Lisbon Treaty.

This leaves us with only one realistic option, which the Irish and the other member state governments are likely to put forward: A second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, but including new parameters. The Treaty should be complemented with a political declaration or if needed a protocol. Both should address the concerns of those Irish citizens who voted ‘no’.

While the political declaration could contain clarifications of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, a protocol would include unilateral opt out provisions for Ireland for certain policies (both procedures have been used before, when referendums in member states about new treaties had failed). Although most of these issues are already clearly addressed in the Lisbon Treaty, the following aspects could be emphasised in a declaration and in a protocol: the non-interference of the EU in tax policy, the right of Ireland to remain neutral in international affairs and the non-interference of the EU in issues such as abortion and euthanasia.

Crucial will be an answer to concerns of citizens in Ireland

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and other EU member states concerning the social dimension of the EU (see the following chapter).

Another item that will be discussed is the size of the European Commission. The provision that in the future European Commission not every member state will have a Commissioner in each legislature was used by the ‘no’ camp to raise fears about Ireland loosing influence in the EU. The discussion about the European Commission is another proof for the absurdity of the debate: By ratifying the Nice Treaty in a referendum in 2002 the Irish approved that there will be less Commissioners than member states from 2009 on. With the Lisbon Treaty, the number of the Commissioners would have only been reduced in 2014.

However, the concerns of loosing influence if a rotation system is introduced in the European Commission are shared in other member states and must be taken seriously.

The European Council should debate about a model in which each member state has a high political personality in the European Commission. Based on an equal rotation system, all member states could have Commissioners (with voting

rights) and quasi ‘StateSecretaries’ (without voting right) in turn. This way the size of the Commission College would be reduced to a more workable size, while every member state retains a key political personality in the European Commission.

The communication deficit

On Friday the 13th of June, when there was no doubt anymore that the majority of the Irish citizens had rejected the Lisbon Treaty, media and politicians were keen to answer the question: What had happened and why? Without being able to find out the reason of each of the 862,415 Irish ‘no’ votes, it is clear that the result was first and foremost due to the deficit of the ‘yes’ campaign that was run too late and not enthusiastic enough.

According to Eurobarometer, the most important reason to vote ‘no’ was the lack of information. People were not ready to vote in favour of something that they did not understand.

The ‘yes’ camp did not exist several months before the referendum. The government did not feel obliged to support the Treaty they had negotiated and signed. The ‘no’ side had a lot of time to spread myths and lies about the EU in general and the Lisbon Treaty in particular. At the time when the Irish government parties started their campaign, the wave of the ‘no’ going through the country was already very strong. The slogans of the ‘no’ camp fell on fertile ground.

For years the governments in Ireland have claimed the extraordinary economic success for themselves and made the EU responsible for negative devel-

opments. Many of those from the government parties who campaigned did not try to convince but simply stated that the voters should trust the government and support the Treaty. By contrast, the Irish Labour Party organised a remarkable campaign in favour of the Treaty.

But also many comrades in Ireland had done little in recent years to bring Europe closer to citizens. By the way, this is true for almost all of our parties in the EU. We need to offer solutions to the problems of the citizens not only at the national, but also at the European level.

The EU competence in all of our European social democratic, socialist and labour parties needs to be strengthened. This does not mean that we will approve everything that is coming from the European level.

But we need to be better able to explain EU politics to citizens and we must convince our voters that a different, more social and more democratic Europe is possible and will contribute to a much better living standard for all Europeans.

Strengthening social Europe and rebuilding trust is part of the solution

But it would be too easy to explain the ‘no’ with a bad communication strategy only. There are several underlying reasons which have led to the ‘no’ for the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland and to the ‘no’ for the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in France and the Netherlands. There is a negative feeling towards the EU in general and to the national political establishment in particular.

In the last years we have seen a decrease of support for the European and national political

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institutions. Increasing pressure to limit public spending, economic difficulties and high unemployment rates in many member states have limited the ability to act for the governments in recent years. Due to the restructuring processes in the member states, due to stubbornly high numbers of unemployment and increasing poverty, many citizens increasingly fear for their future and a social decline. Corruption and other misconducts of leading politicians contribute to distrust in the political class. As a result, populist and extreme parties on the right and on the left gain support for their seemingly easy solutions. The traditional big parties – mostly those in the social democratic and conservative party family – lose members as well as voters and are mostly forced into coalitions, in which they have difficulties in implementing their political programmes.

For much of this development the European Union is made responsible. The limited capacity of national government to act and to offer solutions is blamed on European integration. Too little was done in the past years to convince the European citizens that they benefit from the integration project. Much of the legislation coming from the EU gives the impression that it is foremost for the benefit of businesses. However, economic growth does not automatically lead to more employment, higher wages, more social inclusion, more security and an intact environment. Until now, the European Union has not been successful enough in putting the human being at the very centre of its activity.

The globalisation process has led to a faster and less secure world. People fear being left behind, losing their current status or being excluded. Most Europeans, especially the Irish, do not deny that the EU has been very successful in bringing peace to the European continent and strong economic growth to all EU member states. But still many people have the feeling that they do not directly benefit from the EU. The social dimension is missing. Ironically, this would change with the Treaty of Lisbon. With the new Treaty, the objectives of the Union will be the respect for human dignity, solidarity, equality and democracy. Social objectives such as full employment, the combat of social inclusion and discrimination, social justice and protection, improving the quality of the environment and antidiscrimination will become as important as economic objectives such as the completion of the internal market, a balanced economic growth, price stability and the establishment of an economic and monetary union. Socalled horizontal clauses will furthermore bind all institutions to contribute to social inclusion, full employment and non-discrimination. However, all this social progress in the Lisbon Treaty was not apparent.

To ensure broader support for the European Union, but also for the Treaty of Lisbon, more must be done to ensure citizens

that their social concerns are taken seriously. In this respect, the recent verdicts of the Court of Justice have taken us in the completely wrong direction.

The European Court of Justice seems to prioritise the fundamental freedoms over the fundamental rights. The European Court of Justice, but also the European Commission and the member states governments, often see the economic objectives of the EU as being more important than the social problems of European citizens.

The integration project has always been pushed forward by big projects: peaceful relations between Germany and France, food security through a common agricultural policy, abandoning the borders, the introduction of the four free movements, a common currency and the enlargement. In the past, there was an agreement found on those projects amongst the member states and amongst the different political families. The next big project has to be that of a social Europe. A clear and convincing answer to social fears needs to be part of the solution for the crises of confidence in the EU, expressed by the ‘nos’ in France, the Netherlands and Ireland. On the one hand, European legislation and its implementation must allow social progress in the EU. A revision of the posted workers directive, which will be advocated by the European social

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democrats, can be one element of this strategy. On the other hand, a legal foundation for a social Europe in primary legislation is necessary. As mentioned before, this is provided for in the Lisbon Treaty and could be strengthened in a political declaration or even in a protocol on ‘Social Progress in the EU’.

The ratification method needs to be overcome

Another painful but important lesson must be learned from the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty. In a Union of 27 and soon more member states we cannot always wait for the slowest to agree. If the ratification procedure will not be changed in the future, there is the risk that no more treaty revisions will be able to enter into force. As the Austrian and the French discussion shows, it is very tempting for governments to promise to hold a national referendum on European treaties. As the results in France, the Netherlands and Ireland show, it is nearly impossible to ensure that the voters are actually voting on the text of the treaty and not on other things. Furthermore it is impossible to explain the content of a 300 pages document in detail to all citizens (which should also teach the governments to agree on shorter and easy-to-understand texts in the future, which was partly achieved with the first part of the Constitutional Treaty and the Fundamental Rights Charter).

The ratification process for the Lisbon Treaty also demonstrated very well that parliamentary ratifications can be problematic too. The ratification methods in the member states

differ strongly. In many countries, qualified majorities are needed to successfully ratify treaties. This makes it possible for opposition parties to make the success of a European treaty dependent on concessions of the government parties on national legislation, as we have seen in Slovakia. This way, small parties holding only a few seats in national parliaments can blackmail the entire European Union.

With the need for 27 or more successful ratifications there is the threat that the European integration process will always come to a halt, once a Eurosceptic party takes over a national government. If the Tories had come to power in the UK or if the Law and Justice Party had remained in power in Poland, the ratification process would have most likely been put to an end. Furthermore the Euro-sceptic presidents in Poland and the Czech Republic try everything to block the ratification process, even though their governments have already ratified or are likely to ratify.

For future treaty changes we should seriously consider alternatives to the present ratification procedure. There are two options to overcome the vetopossibility in treaty reforms: a super-qualified majority voting for the ratification of European treaties could be introduced: a treaty is ratified, if it is aproved by three quarters of the member states representing three quarters of the EU citizens (independent on whether the ratification has been conducted by parliamentary means or in a referendum). Alternatively a real European referendum could be held on new important treaties:

a referendum is held in all member states on the same days and with the same question. If a majority of the citizens participating vote in favour and if the referendums have been positive in two thirds of the member states, the referendum is successful. In both cases, the EU could be considerably strengthened and deepened. Those member states who consistently oppose further integration and the ratification of agreed reformtreaties and in which a majority of the citizens opposes membership, should make use of the new exit-clause.

Indeed, the question remains in how far applying such a procedure would increase the support of citizens for the European Union and whether citizens would not see this as a betrayal of their right to decide about the future of the Union on a national basis. However, the European Union is doomed to failure, if it is not able to reform itself and adapt to new challenges. In the future we will have to decide which element of democracy we want to prioritise in the European Union of 27 and soon more member states: allowing the majorities to take decisions or the right of minorities to block them. But one thing is more apparent than ever before: a European democracy is not possible without overcoming veto rights.

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After the Irish Referendum T Brendan Donnelly Director of the Federal Trust for Education and Research. He is a former Member of the European Parliament

HERE ARE OBVIOUS points of similarity between the French and Dutch referendums of 2005 and the Irish referendum of 2008. In all three cases, the advocates of the new European Treaties fought a lacklustre and often complacent campaign.

Jaundiced electorates in all three countries took the opportunity to rebuke their unpopular political elites on what seemed to many a marginal and technical issue. Public discussion of the Treaties was, in France, the Netherlands and Ireland, frequently centred on matters unrelated to the Treaties at issue. On the day after the results of the French, Irish and Dutch referendums were announced, political leaders of these countries had been given by their electors no politically or intellectually coherent critique of the Treaties proposed. This last factor was an important reason why the French and Dutch governments were unable for many months after their national referendums to devise any politically or intellectually coherent response to the rebuff they had suffered.

There are, however, important differences between the circumstances of 2005 and those of 2008. Other referendums, of uncertain outcome, were due to follow the French and Dutch referendums. National governments were unwilling to press ahead with these further referendums until the French and Dutch difficulties had been surmounted. The British government in particular was swift to suspend its ratification procedures for the European

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Constitutional Treaty, a step which of itself probably marked the demise of that Treaty. By contrast, in 2008, the United Kingdom demonstratively concluded its parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty shortly after the Irish referendum. No further referendums are envisaged. There is a real prospect that in two or three months time twenty-five countries will have ratified the Lisbon Treaty. Ratification in the Czech Republic may, partly for internal legal reasons, take somewhat longer. Even so, the Czech government is unlikely to wish to enter upon its first presidency of the European Union, which begins in January 2009, with this matter unresolved. It may also see rapid ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon as smoothing the way for Croatian accession to the European Union, which the Czech government greatly favours.

Twenty-five or twenty-six countries will therefore be in a position, before the end of the year, where they can reasonably ask the Irish government what it is going to do to remedy the anomalous situation whereby 110,000 thousand Irish voters, the margin of victory in their referendum, are in effect preventing the implementation of a decision painfully negotiated and ratified by the democratically-elected representatives of hundreds of millions of voters throughout the European Union. The Irish government is aware of the delicacy and complexity of the situation in which it finds itself. It has not said, as it might have done, that Ireland will withdraw from the Lisbon Treaty. It has not said that the Treaty

‘The Irish government rightly believes that a number of misconceptions and misunderstandings about the Lisbon Treaty contributed to the negative outcome of the referendum in June’ should be abandoned. The Irish government was a full participant in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty, it believed the Treaty was advantageous for Ireland and it knows how fragile is the compromise it represents. Its preferred option now would clearly be to find a way in which Ireland can remain part of the Lisbon Treaty. Essentially, the Irish government has spent the ten days since the referendum asking to be given more time to find a solution which will bring this about.

Understandable although it is that the Irish government should wish to avoid any hasty commitments on the subject, it is very difficult to see what that solution could be, other than a second referendum, superseding the result of the first. For the Lisbon Treaty eventually to come into force, it is necessary that all signatories of the Treaty should complete their national processes of ratification. The Irish government is currently unable to complete its ratificatory process for the Treaty. If it cannot complete this process, the Treaty falls. Logically, the Irish government must either accept this destruction of the Treaty, or find a way in which it can complete its ratification procedure. In June 2008, the Irish government accepted that the way to this ratification lay through a referendum. If Irish ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is still to be accomplished in late 2008 or early 2009, it can only plausibly be achieved by the route of another referendum.

This is a prospect which understand199 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

ably fills the Irish government with great apprehension. There is no guarantee that a second referendum would be won. The government would fear from its critics accusations of arrogance and bad faith if it refused to accept the popular decision expressed in the referendum of June. A second referendum might fuel whatever sense may currently exist in Ireland of estrangement between the institutions of the European Union and the average European voter, who supposedly finds his concerns and aspirations ignored by the purblind elites of Brussels and Strasbourg. It may well be that towards the end of the year the Irish government concludes that a second referendum is simply unwinnable. In that case, the Treaty of Lisbon cannot be implemented in its present form.

The possibility of a second referendum in Ireland should not however be discounted entirely. The democratically elected Irish government freely signed the Lisbon Treaty on behalf of its fellow citizens. The Treaty was not in any sense a document imposed on the Irish government by the European Commission or other national governments. The Irish government rightly believes that a number of misconceptions and misunderstandings about the Lisbon Treaty contributed to the negative outcome of the referendum in June. There is nothing democratically inappropriate in the government’s now making a further effort of explanation and persuasion about the Treaty it signed in what it believed were its country’s best interests. Other European governments would no doubt wish to be helpful in this regard. The European Councils in October and December of this year would almost certainly be willing, if the Irish government thought it useful, to provide reassurances that Irish corporate tax rates, divorce, the WTO, Irish neutrality and other issues raised during the referendum campaign would be unaffected by anything in the Lisbon Treaty. It might

even be possible for the European Council to agree not to apply in 2009 the reduction in the number of Commissioners envisaged by the Nice Treaty, a reduction which many voters during the referendum campaign feared would work to Ireland’s disadvantage. This latter step would be politically and legally controversial, but it would respond to one of the few specific complaints widely voiced in the Irish referendum and might be a price the European Council thought worth paying to encourage the desired result in a second referendum. To any accusations that the Council was attempting in this way to ‘bribe’ the Irish electorate, its members could justly retort that they were listening to the concerns of ordinary Irish electors, a practice of which their critics frequently complain that they are incapable.

The relative coherence of view among Ireland’s partners makes it unlikely that they will be willing to allow matters to continue for long without resolution. The Irish government will be under pressure from its partners by the end of the year to give a clear indication of its intentions, either to hold a second referendum or to force the abandonment of the Lisbon Treaty in its present form. In the intervening months, the Irish government will no doubt be hoping to find some intermediate position between these unpalatable alternatives. Its scope for further manoeuvre, however, seems very limited. If it does conclude that a second referendum is in any foreseeable circumstances unwinnable, then Ireland’s partners are likely to accept that decision with whatever good grace they can muster. There is no chance, however, that they will acquiesce in the wholesale abandonment of the reforms envisaged by the European Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. Ironically, they will be under no pressure to do so from the Irish government, deeply conscious of the blow to its standing within the Union caused by recent events.

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Any announcement over the next twelve months that the European Council has given up hope of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty will almost certainly be accompanied by a blueprint whereby many of its proposed innovations can be introduced without a formal treaty. Central to this blueprint will be changes in the Rules of Procedure of the European and other Councils and a range of interinstitutional agreements, whereby Council, Parliament and Commission come to arrangements which will effectively implement specific elements of the Lisbon Treaty.

Greater continuity in the work of the European Council, the ‘team presidencies’ of the Council, the Protocol on the role of national parliaments and much of what is envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty in the field of the Union’s external action could certainly be implemented in this fashion. The member states that wish to could probably make good use of existing provisions of the Nice Treaty to institute between themselves a system of ‘enhanced cooperation’ in the domain of internal security, another central area of the Lisbon Treaty’s changes. In the latter context, Ireland was anyway intending to take up the British opt ins/opt outs for legislation bearing on this sensitive area. The European Council could also, if it wished, unilaterally undertake to make its nomination of the next President of the European Commission dependent upon the results of the European elections, another provision of the Lisbon Treaty which its advocates saw as a democratising element of its reforms. It is worth pointing out that none of the above proposed changes played any significant role in the negative referendum votes in France, the Netherlands and Ireland.

They were either uncontentious, or of concern only to a small minority of those voting.

There are on the other hand elements of the Lisbon Treaty which probably cannot be salvaged other than by formal

treaty. They are, in particular, the extension of Qualified Majority Voting, the reweighting of votes in the Council and the extension of co-decision. The impact of the first of these should not be over-stated, since the extra areas envisaged for QMV by the Lisbon Treaty were limited in scope and number. Both the Treaty’s critics and supporters were inclined to overestimate their importance. The second loss touches a certain kind of national prestige which only has a very limited relevance to the real working methods of the Council of Ministers. It was a matter of considerable symbolic importance to earlier Polish governments, but may not be so to the present Polish administration.

The third loss is a substantial, regrettable difficulty. One of the few unambiguously simplifying and democratising provisions of the Lisbon Treaty was this standardisation of much decisionmaking in the Union and the greater involvement of the European Parliament in this decision-making. It might be possible in the context of the forthcoming Croatian accession treaty to restore the extension of the co-decision procedure contained in the Lisbon Treaty. If this extension of the remit of the accession treaty created the necessity for a further referendum in Ireland, it then would be a matter of considerable piquancy to observe public and political reactions. A leading figure of the recent Irish ‘no’ campaign, Declan Ganley, wrote after

‘Laudable although its original goals undoubtedly were, the concept of a general institutional treaty has shown itself an overambitious one at this stage of European integration’ 201 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

the referendum that he favoured a ‘much stronger European Parliament’ to guarantee the democratic accountability of the Union in future. He would presumably be campaigning for a positive vote in any future Irish referendum where the powers of the European Parliament were a central issue.

If the Treaty of Lisbon cannot be saved in its present form, there will be definite advantages to a piecemeal process of reform. Laudable although its original goals undoubtedly were, the concept of a general institutional treaty has shown itself an overambitious one at this stage of European integration.

Widely differing analyses and perceptions of national interest between twenty-seven member states inevitably lead to carefully-crafted linguistic and political compromises which satisfy the specialist observer, but which are difficult to render palatable to the electorate as a whole. The sympathies of the European electorate are more likely to be engaged by proposals which are demonstrably necessary to make specific policy areas work better, such as internal security, environmental policy and external relations. General institutional discussions, especially when they are conducted by non-specialists, tend to generate more heat than light, as the French, Dutch and Irish referendums have all shown.

Much of the European Union’s institutional debate over the past five years has unfortunately fallen between two stools. It has been on the one hand too detailed to be easily accessible to the average European voter. It has been on the other too general to persuade the electorate that its real interests were directly affected by this rarefied discussion. To the extent that there has been a widespread failure of communication between European elites and electors over the past decade, its roots have lain in this unresolved conundrum.

Frustrating though it would be in some respects, the disappearance of the Lisbon Treaty might be an opportunity now to develop a European rhetoric in

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which proposed institutional change and the pursuit of agreed policy goals are brought into better focus with each other. Since the Laeken Declaration of 2001, those most involved in European questions have by and large failed to provide any such sharp focus for their communications with the general public. This public is by no means unsympathetic to the underlying philosophy of the European Union, that the nationstate is for many contemporary political challenges an inadequate, even dangerous framework for decision-making.

This European public does however expect of its leaders a more emotionally engaged and intellectually rigorous approach to European issues than, for instance, the Irish political establishment has demonstrated over the past three months. If the deconstruction and reconstruction of the Lisbon Treaty are an occasion to encourage development in this direction, then the European Union will emerge strengthened rather than weakened from a turbulent decade.

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Limits to Good Economic Policy-Making

T Hermann Kepplinger Member of the Upper Austrian Regional Government

HE EUROPEAN UNION is undoubtly a secular project in terms of common and coordinated policymaking. As such, the EU is to be improved continuously. In spite of this reservation, there are still serious and grave concerns about the politics of, and in, the EU. Particularly when we want to be able to back a united Europe, we must not refuse to acknowledge three interrelated phenomena:

• The Lisbon Treaty has not yet been approved. Apart from bleak nationalism and populism, this is supposedly due to reasons justified in content. People fear for their economically and socially vital interests and doubt the optimality of the political strategy on which we have embarked. Obviously, they do not feel that they have been

‘The neo-liberal mainstream of academic economics and economic politics do not leave alternative approaches a real chance to articulate themselves and be accepted’ 203 Social Europe Journal Summer 2008

given a cause big enough to believe and trust in.

• The social situation has not been satisfying, even in the wealthy West European region, if one considers the distributive aspects of wealth and the qualitative conditions of living such as labour-market and labour conditions. This is what Roger Liddle and Frederic Lerais stated in their ‘Consultation Paper from the Council of European Policy Advisers. Europe’s Social Reality’ in 2007.

• The neo-liberal mainstream of academic economics and economic politics do not leave alternative approaches a real chance to articulate themselves and be accepted.

The neutrality of economics that has already been called for by John Kenneth Galbraith in his 1973 contribution to The American Economic Review, well before the heyday of neo-liberalism, is even less developed today than at that time. In terms of equal respect for alternative research programmes and making use of methodical plurality, there is urgent need for scientists and politicians to act.

The Challenge of NeoLiberalisms and the New Social Market Economy

Many politically interested and active persons have become tired of the unceasing objections to neo-liberalism and its politics. Nonetheless, this resistance seems to me justified and important, even indispensable in the interest of constructive debates. Assertions that the system would already head for a, though novel, but still social type of market economy, as the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (‘Novel Social Market Economy Initiative’)1 holds, clearly miss the adjective ‘social’ in content, at least referring to traditional European standards such as the ‘Scandinavian model’ and the ‘Bismarckian concept’ as well.

From this perspective, the part of the population critical towards the EU ought not to be equally labelled as categorical obstructers of the EU. They are not wrong in viewing the EU as an institution of continuing attempts at economic liberalisation, putting a heavier burden on many people. For them, the freedom resulting from economic liberalisation means a limitation rather than an opportunity.

In this respect, it is sufficient for us to acknowledge that the economic and social burden is felt subjectively and thus causes frustration. The consequent resignation is obviously difficult to disperse as long as the dissatisfying social reality is perceived as being miserable and inescapable. Viewed like this, the freedom which we favour has to be one in content instead of one in form and a factual instead of a hypothetical one.

This is to say that, due to eco-

nomic policy measures, the freedom of choice should be minimally affected by resource and income restrictions. On the collective level, this implies a basically expansionist economic policy rather than an economic austerity policy that has come to be commonly labelled as ‘stability policy’. Neo-liberalism is the firmly established mainstream to the present day.

Taking a closer look, the inclination towards neo-liberalism can be traced, beside the basically liberal intention of the EU, to respective political circumstances on the national level, expressing themselves (even more pronouncedly) in the European Council and the Council of the EU, and not least in the European Commission that is evidently an unceasing promoter of the neo-liberal project.

If Europe, particularly a fully united Europe, wants to avoid being compared to Margaret Thatcher and to a USSR-type propaganda that have one message in common, namely that austerity has to be increased presently so that some time our children will benefit from it, we must earnestly, basically and open-mindedly reconsider the hegemony of neo-liberalism and our relationship to it. In this sense, for example, Alain Supiot contends that the EU has been moving in the direction of a ‘communist market economy’; ‘it builds on the similarities of capitalism and communism (primacy of the economic sphere and abstract universalism). Such a hybrid system contains elements of the market, such as the all-against-all competition, free trade and individual profit maximisation. From communism it borrows the idea

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of “limited democracy”, the instrumentalisation of the law, the obsession with quantifying anything and the complete separation of the fates of those governing from the fates of those being governed. It enables the ruling class to get extensively rich at others’ expense ... while the middle and lower class stop showing solidarity. In this way, a novel nomenklatura, owing a large part of their fortune to the privatisation of public capital goods, utilises the liberalisation of markets to retreat financially from the system of nationwide solidarity.’2 Taking up this challenge means, in my opinion, that policy has to be made in an immediate, effective and prompt way to the benefit of all of the people instead of favouring more competition in all respects and abetting the seemingly unavoidable acceptance of the resulting social polarisation through inactivity towards, or partisanship with, the mainstream.

People’s resignation and submission fortify a system that, however, is unlikely to be sustainable in economic, social and ecological terms in the long run. In such a way, one cannot win people over for politics and democratic participation. They seek more radical solutions to still try to break free rather than returning to a genuine social market economy.

What is more, we serve the purpose of clarity and problemsolving by agreeing to the notion that social issues in a broad sense, even including labour conditions, have been far less bindingly codified in and by the EU than economic concerns which may turn out problematic in social terms when

accompanied insufficiently by policymaking. The common figurative argument that the economic motor has to be spurred before its performance can be utilised for social needs is to be criticised not only for its onesided supply-side foundation.

Also the following reasoning should be heeded:

• Either neo-liberalism, with its principal components of deregulation (or rather insufficient regulation), privatisation and binding rules for government, is an aim in itself, a categorical, ideological aim, an aim serving particular interests, and an aim that is in no way open to scientific qualification.

• Or the neo-liberal concept is one for elites as it does not produce enough value added for benefiting the population equitably, arising from the premise that considerable welfare is reserved for certain classes.

• Or neo-liberal policy is efficient in terms of production but prevents skilfully any outcome-oriented shaping of society, that is preferably to the benefit of each and every person, especially the weak, and in the interest of the natural environment and a sustainable aggregate demand for goods, production and incomes.

• Or, by its nature, government is in fact an adversary of efficient production and commonwealth orientation and hence deserves to be minimised as a resourcedevouring ‘black hole’.

‘“Lean government” is a discursive structure that is particularly effective in our society where leanness has been idealised, equated to easiness of living and looked upon favourably, without recognition of the danger of anorexia’ All that may appear platitudinous, but in the dissidents’ judgement it is highly relevant, in analytical, political and social terms. In their 1979 introductory textbook, William Baumol and Alan Blinder wrote of ‘dissidents’ as early as the beginning of the neo-liberal era that many of them were no fanatics and polemicists but were serious thinkers worried by the economic system or academic economics. In my opinion, it is not so much the theoretical and political details struggled for in everyday life but rather the basic questions concerning the scientific and political system that are imperative. Their fresh consideration and unprejudiced answering are of paramount importance to remedying the prevailing sullenness in terms of politics, the EU and international economic integration.

Privatisation and the European Social Model

Within the concept of neo-liberalism, privatisation ranks as similarly prominent as economic deregulation and rule-based policymaking. The general thrust is restricting government’s capability to act. Its advocates justify it either by pointing to the political success

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of a malevolent government or to benevolent politicians failing because of the problems with information and monitoring visà-vis their malevolent agents (public servants and employees with public enterprises under private law). Endowed with fewer means of production, fewer means to patronise the economy (in regulating private production) and little scope for discretion (narrowed by constitutional norms), egoistical politicians and bureaucrats, it is claimed, can cause less damage to the economy and society.

This is the principal message of neo-liberalism that is directed at freedom from public influence, but striving in content for the preservation and fortification of the distribution of economic power. In this sense, privatisation has often been combined with deregulation, and deregulation has not happened seldom without giving up public productive property in the relevant sector.

‘Lean government’ is a discursive structure that is particularly effective in our society where leanness has been idealised, equated to easiness of living and looked upon favourably, without recognition of the danger of anorexia. Slimming is especially attractive when we

can approach the established ideal of beauty without big efforts. We just have to cast our votes for political parties with privatisation included in their programmes. In doing so, we will allegedly save on interest payments and taxes. So privatisation seemingly provides economic trade-offs in improving everybody’s situation. Thereby, one disregards that the wealth transaction termed privatisation does not enrich the state but merely renders its wealth more liquid, though sometimes at excessively high cost. After all, privatisation (under sometimes extremely favourable conditions for buyers) improves the economic situation by and large of those who are able to revert to adequately high wealth to make a bargain and to use it as the basis for further increases in income and wealth justified by economic ability or by claim that fortune favours the bold. In this respect, one has to address the issue whether the meaning of performance in our economic and political system is to be confined to proceeds from labour and production or extended to the outcomes of speculation in financial markets. The high and growing proceeds from financial investments, in particular, are the reason for the rising gap in the distribution of wealth and rightly provoke debates on taxing wealth, wealth transactions and wealth increases.

The general notion is that liberalisation, including privatisation, induces supply-side growth. This has not remained undisputed by those economists who take the demand side of the economy seriously, but the objection has been left uncon-

sidered by supply-side economists. The polarisation of wealth, however, cannot be concealed and disregarded. Again and again, this fact has been confirmed empirically in the era of neo-liberalism. We can judge from it that liberalisation has increased true freedom only for those already powerful. Ordoliberal competition policy (that is general, uniform, non-interventionist regulations) does not come near to matching the effectiveness of special, direct interventions in certain markets and is evidently incapable of balancing power.

From this perspective, we are not at all puzzled by findings like the following: ‘Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency (note: in terms of the overall economy) still remain uncertain.’3 Economic efficiency (that is efficiency in the business sphere) does not significantly differ between public and comparable private production. Hence, privatisations do not promise increases in economic efficiency that are high enough to raise the selling price sufficiently in order to more than compensate the relatively huge transaction cost as well as the meta-economic cost of such a financial transaction.4 Privatising public enterprise implies a kind of privatisation of economic policy if government suffers by it a loss of competency and cannot any longer fulfil a hitherto-performed political function. Henceforth, government could obviously rely on competition and market regulation policy, but choosing such an alternative would ren-

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der the fulfilment of the relevant government functions more complicated, difficult and expensive, involving an increased need for information and monitoring. The ‘principalagent problem’ (transaction cost raised by the bounded controllability of executers by leaders) is larger between organisations than within them.

Privatising public enterprise as a form of privatising economic policy matters results, though intransparently, in a depreciation of government functions (allocation, distribution, stabilisation). In any case, this aspect must not be overlooked: privatisation is also a measure to release government from its responsibility for the social results of private business (that is results in the sense of being crucial to general well-being).

One contribution to the total system of the European Social Model (ESM), however vaguely defined, are the merits of the public and cooperative economy: nota bene in terms of metaeconomic targets. What is to be achieved are social outcomes for which the much-highlighted (micro-)economic efficiency is merely of minor importance.

The public and cooperative economy has to operate only on condition that cost is minimised while maintaining a given social outcome and cost is recovered (even by help from private sponsors or government subsidies). Firm-level targets have to become auxiliary conditions.

Following the history of privatisation during the past three decades or so which has been impressive in quantitative terms, we can see that the impetus toward privatisation has not decreased substantially – as is

illustrated by the World Trade Organisation, the principal present-day promoter of liberalisation, where also the EU does much of the talking. In the traditional industry (the production of ‘private goods’), the intention to privatise has been approaching the limit bound marked by the vanishing of public property. The latter may be of some advantage, but on the other hand advocates of privatisation consequently knock on the doors of the public cooperative economy. Thereby, legitimate interests of private business in terms of rate of return and growing wealth necessarily come into conflict with metaeconomic, that is economic and social policy concerns. Such public concerns rooted in the realm of ‘public goods’ and private market failure cannot be given over safely to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of private enterprises, not even if competition were perfect.

Adherers to the neo-liberal mainstream hold that market competition would operate inexorably enough to prompt enterprises to serve stakeholders’ interests and, in the end, common interests. Even if imperfect competition made discretionary firm behaviour possible, they say, enterprises would live up to true CSR and perform meta-economic functions in order to make the public remain loyal to them and to position their firms firmly and enduringly in the market. Thus, from the neo-liberal view, privatisation can be performed with a clear conscience.

On the other hand, there are some arguments against it.

Perfect competition merely exists as an unrealisable, not even desirable fiction and does

not serve as a helpful signpost for the demanding, case-specific competition policy. This is what the much-neglected Theory of the Second-Best of Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster points out. Under imperfect, but fairly lively competition, CSR is the result of a business calculus telling whether or not the cost of CSR would finally augment the profits. Economic targets based on public goods (that is meta-economic impacts) cannot be reached in this way.

Moreover, with regard to share options that can be part of top managers’ gratifications, CSR can be challenged (as a ‘Potemkin Village’) just like the sometimes utterly questionable financial reporting by big corporations (as shown by various financial scandals). Considering additionally the pressure for high short-term dividend payments exerted by shareholders, true CSR is at odds with legitimate private interests. This is perhaps why Milton Friedman wrote in The New York Times Magazine on 13 September 1970: ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.’ Under insufficiently workable competition, CSR can be regarded as the product of ‘the ethics of Narcissus’5, solving problems neither comprehensively nor effectively. Hence,

there is indeed a need for scrutinising the meta-economic impacts of privatisation.

Private production interests naturally concentrate on profitbearing domains (‘cream skimming’). Once government has become a mere competitor in the market as a consequence of liberalisation or, following privatisation, just a political observer responsible for the desired social outcomes authority, will have to perform harder in securing common interests within the ESOM than when established as a sole proprietor.

A prominent and topical example is the economically and socially highly relevant development in the energy, and especially the electricity, markets.

Privatisation in interaction with liberalisation (in the form of general competition rather than specific intervention policy) has been much shaped by lobbyistprone studies and sugar-coated interpretations of social reality.6 This has been neither helpful to the political design nor conducive to creating a common attitude toward politics.

Specifically in a market like the one for electricity, a more liberal regulation of competition is not necessarily associated with more competition. And more competition does not unconditionally mean better supply. Such cir-

‘Perfect competition merely exists as an unrealisable, not even desirable fiction and does not serve as a helpful signpost for the demanding, case-specific competition policy’

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cumstances heighten the risk that the adverse experiences with energy market liberalisation are attributed to the incomplete realisation of the liberalisation project instead of taking earnestly into consideration that this kind of policy might not be the second-best after the unrealisable first-best solution. Seeing things through neo-liberal spectacles, neo-liberal diseases cannot be diagnosed. The dose of the medication will be further increased and can thus become poisonous, as Paracelsus has stated long ago. Even in the United States, the well-staged idol country of economic liberalism par excellence, most of the states find their way back to interventionist regulatory policy under the pressure of economic and social problems. Despite of their general dogmatic rhetoric, the United States – in contrast to Europe and the EU – turns out to be more pragmatic in finding concrete solutions.

In addition to the expected, extremely uneven distribution of benefits from privatisation and liberalisation hitherto (for example consider large versus captive customers) and in addition to the increased profit margin and the mirror-inverted decrease in investment and employment rates, reservations against privatisation point to the long-term disadvantages to public households and their broader societal mission. The energy sector as a core sector in economic and social terms, a sector with considerable prospects for growth and profit at the potential expense of consumers, employees and nature, is going to be privatised whereas the social losses are externalised and socialised (that is shifted

onto consumers, employees and public households, respectively).7 In this respect, we observe that privatisation, organising public performance under private law outside the government sector and outsourcing public works to the private sector also render labour relations more precarious for employees.8 In privatising parts of the public cooperative economy, government consequently harms the state, viewed as the entirety of stakeholders, in several respects. This is why resistance is being offered, but why is it appearing so late and so comparatively timid by?

The Mainstream and the Deployment of Countervailing Power

According to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, privatisation and liberalisation, accepted as nearly universal remedies, have turned to self-propelling issues, forming an integral part of the neo-liberal communication of what good governance is.

Employing discursive structures, contents are communicated that are not only internalised and reiterated but also lived up to by the addressees, consciously or subconsciously. Such simply formulated, slogan-type messages (neo-liberal ‘discourses’) appeal to commonsense, that is the isolated, legitimately selfish attitude of the private household and the business firm, each in its own ‘tiny’ (microeconomic) world.

As Meinrad Ziegler has written: ‘Humans cannot live in their natural environment; they make it inhabitable through their concepts. This human performance is based on the discourses that suggest us through

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their constructions how the world of things “really” is, how we have to perceive and consider them. The persuasiveness and power of the discourses are based on three principles (Foucault 1974): Discourses apply procedures of excluding and prohibiting – we would not be allowed to say anything at every opportunity. Secondly, they operate with the help of demarcation and rejection – there would be reasonable and lucid modes of speaking; what the “insane” have to tell us, would be meaningless. And, thirdly, discourses communicate notions of what is false and what is true, or perhaps more exactly: what we want to consider true and what institutional mastery warrants us that one truth is the highest truth.’9 Based on that, the broad support of the economic and political mainstream can be explained triply:

• as a grasping at straws, hoping to be able to contribute oneself substantially to preserving one’s job through any kind of flexibility (in terms of wage, place, labour conditions, labour contents, hours) and to the business success of ‘one’s enterprise’ and ‘our economy’ in accepting and supporting cost minimisation through lean management, • as a pure reflex to economic policy questions that has been learned perhaps unconsciously, as a consequence of absorbing discourses which the mainstream has been repeating with a strategic intention,

‘There has been a tendency to shift from public government (with politics directed at social outcomes) to private governance (based on the ostensibly process-oriented “laws” of the market)’ • as the satisfaction of being able to realise, accept and represent the truth by help of relatively simple concepts and with rather little effort, at that pleased to be backed by most people even when the truth might be hard for many of them.

Discourses do not become true by being reiterated, but operating under the sketched premises they work at their proliferation and re-enforcement. In this way, we can explain many a statement by conservative politicians communicating that they were open to objective, but not to party political dialogues. In doing so, the formulation ‘objective’ is employed as a stark contradiction to ‘party political’. In this process, it is problematic that an objectively-founded policy is always associated clearly with the policy of one’s own party, as the latter seemingly does not make party policy whereas the opposing party mainly does so. Party policy (the policy made by the opponent political party) is evidently equated to tactical, opportunistic, manipulative behaviour, instead of being viewed as a sound policy on the basis of values that cannot be excluded anyway for epistemological reasons and are expressed as an

ideological attitude through the programme of the relevant political party. Liberals and conservatives – the latter using liberalisation to factually preserve their economic and social power – assert the authority of such a political strategy through their political success. They have succeeded in shifting the responsibility for weal and woe onto the individuals’ shoulders (‘you can achieve if you only want to’), and people have come to take this for the truth or else a social norm that cannot be altered. In their would-be or desired selfempowerment to decide their fate individually they are sometimes overready to hold and reiterate this view vis-à-vis others.

The neo-liberal project is ‘by no way “forced on from above”, but it counts on the individuals’ active participation and ties in with existing cultural politics and politics of identity. In this sense, no clear demarcation exists between neo-liberal forces and political movements.

Rather, it should be asked how neo-liberal forces can establish themselves within the movements and how the knowledge of the movements finds its way into neo-liberal discourses. For this sake, Foucault’s concept of governmentality is helpful in that it emphasises not only the inescapable integration into

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power relations (Foucault 1983) but, beyond that, points to forms of behaviour that impact on other people, not in forcing them but in activating their spontaneous activities.’10 On these grounds, there has been a tendency to shift from public government (with politics directed at social outcomes) to private governance (based on the ostensibly process-oriented ‘laws’ of the market).11 In spite of all that, there are limits to the cognitive dissonance between rhetoric and reality. Like in his 1997 book ‘Has Globalization Gone Too Far?’, Harvard economist Dan Rodrick is anxious about globalisation because of its adverse social side-effects; the EU and, above all, the Party of European Socialists would have reasons to fear for their credibility and acceptance and, hence, should act accordingly.

Burying one’s head in the sand and letting things happen would not arguably pave the road to success. Time is short, and things are developing that are less and less reversible.

Particularly in terms of the public and cooperative economy that is strongly associated with infrastructure (such as human capital for personal services and physical capital for mains etc.), amortisation periods are pretty long so that the damage caused by neglect cumulates latently for a long time before it gets acute. Then, again, it will last long and need a lot of resources until the damage is eliminated. Similar cost barriers arise when re-socialising privatised establishments.

Even in our present-day information society, asymmetries of knowledge have still been a major reason why economic and

political power with their mostly unfavourable social outcomes remains, requiring better legitimisation. So it is essential to make up for knowledge arrears in communicating the relevant knowledge in a useful way.

Only the translation of complex interactions into all vocabularies of concepts within the population can achieve the transparency necessary for balancing powers. Such ‘translators’ and communicators are likely to codetermine the results essentially. But they will have to restrict themselves and their efforts to the rather ineffective action levels of amateurishness in civic organisations unless they are not demanded from, and advanced by, progressive, left policy. It is up to the much vilified politicians to help progressive ideas to break through.

Endnotes 1

www.boeckler.de/pdf/ fof_insm_studie_09_2004.pdf.

2

Alain Supiot, ‘Voilà l’ “économie communiste de marché”, Le Monde, 15 January 2008, quoted from Public Observer, vol. 6, no. 49, 15 February 2008, www.publicopinion.at/wordpress/wp-content/2008/02/public-observerausgabe-20080215.pdf.

3

Alberto Cavaliere and Simona Scabrosetti, ‘Privatisation and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to Political Economy’, Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 22, 2008, www.blackwell-synergy.com/ doi/abs/10.1111/ j.1467-6419.2007.00546.x.

4

Rainer Bartel, Hermann Kepplinger und Johannes Pointner, ‘(Teil-)Privatisierung der Gemeinwirtschaft in Strombereich und das Beispiel der Energie AG Oberösterreich’, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 215-253.

5

John Roberts, ‘Corporate Governance and the Ethics of Narcissus’, Judge Institute of Management Working Papers, no. 3, 2000.

6

Steve Thomas, ‘Recent evidence on the impact of electricity liberalisation on consumer prices’, 2006, www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/EN_PSI RU_paper_Elec_prices-2.pdf.

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7

Rainer Bartel, Hermann Kepplinger und Johannes Pointner, ‘(Teil-)Privatisierung der Gemeinwirtschaft in Strombereich und das Beispiel der Energie AG Oberösterreich’, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol.

34, no. 2, pp. 215-253.

8

Roland Atzmüller and Christoph Hermann, Zur Zukunft öffentlicher Dienstleistungen.

Liberalisierung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen in der EU und Österreich. Auswirkungen auf Beschäftigung, Arbeitsbedingungen und Arbeitsbeziehungen, AK Wien, 2004.

9

Meinrad Ziegler, ‘Einleitung: Heteronormativität und die Verflüssigung des Selbstverständlichen – theoretische Kontexte’, in Rainer Bartel (eds), Heteronormativität und Homosexualitäten, Wien Studienverlag, 2008, p. 17.

10

Antke Engel, ‘Gefeierte Vielfalt.

Umstrittene Heterogenität.

Befriedete Provokation. Sexuelle Lebensformen in spätmodernen Gesellschaften’, in Rainer Bartel (eds), Heteronormativität und Homosexualitäten, Wien Studienverlag, 2008, p. 51.

11

Demetrios Argyriades, ‘Good governance, professionalism, ethics and responsibility’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 72, no. 2, 2006, pp.155-170.

Social Europe Journal • Volume 3 • Issue 4 • Summer 2008

Endnotes

All the views expressed in the articles of this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Social Europe Forum.

We would like to thank Dr David Carlton and Chloe Frenzel for their help in producing this issue.

All rights reserved Social Europe Forum © 2008