32 minute read
Daniel Levy, Senior School Discussing the philosophy of history Page
However, to speak of a historical fact presupposes selection and judgement, and so defining historical facts as objective mind-independent reality becomes problematic. Consider the statement: “The Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588.” On the surface this appears to be objective and wholly impersonal since there is no real dispute amongst historians as to the accuracy of this fact. However, the only reason we are interested to know that the Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588 is that historians regard it as a major historical event. The fact that you had breakfast this morning, or went to work by train, car, bicycle etc… is a fact about the past, but it is hardly a historical fact. A historian is necessarily subjective and must choose to include certain facts that enhance their perception of particular issues. This is what R.G. Collingwood meant when he remarked “in actual experience we never get a pure datum: whatever we call a datum is in point of fact already interpreted by thought.”
In the same way, Karl Popper argued that our picture about the past has been preselected and predetermined for us, not so much by accident as by people who were consciously or unconsciously imbued with a particular view and thought the facts which supported that view worth preserving. He observed that “the so-called ‘sources’ of history only record such facts as appeared sufficiently interesting to record.” For example, consider the illustration given by E.H. Carr of Gustav Stresemann, the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic. When he died in 1929, he left behind an enormous mass of papers relating to his tenure as Foreign Minister. These documents were later published by his faithful secretary Bernhard as “Stresemanns Vermächtnis.” However, what is interesting is that when Stresemann died, his western policy seemed to be the most important and rewarding part of his foreign policy - with his negotiation of the Locarno Treaties, the admission of Germany to the League of Nations, the Dawes and Young plans, and the withdrawal of the allied occupation armies from the de-militarised Rhineland. His eastern policy, on the other hand, seemed to lead nowhere, with masses of documents which were not particularly interesting and added nothing to his reputation. As a result, his eastern policy was significantly under-represented in the publication, and Stresemann is largely judged by his relations with the west, despite the fact that he devoted a far more constant and anxious attention to relations with the Soviet Union, and they played a far larger part in his foreign policy as a whole. This example demonstrates Popper’s argument that in history, it is incredibly difficult to separate subject from object and so to speak about history as the study of a wealth of objective mind-independent ‘real’ events is problematic. Both the process of recording and interpreting events is an active selection and evaluation rather than a passive activity.
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However, the descriptions of historical procedures proposed by Popper and others that make similar criticisms, do not correspond with what most historians think they are doing, or find themselves to be doing in practice. E.P. Thompson noted in “The Poverty of the Theory” that “by far the greater part of historical evidence has survived for reasons quite unrelated to any intention of the actors to project an image of themselves to posterity.” For example, the records of administration, taxation, legislation, religious belief and practice, the accounts of temples or of monasteries, and the archaeological evidence of their sites. The intention of none of the actors involved in these sources was to record interesting facts to some general posterity. It was simply to unite and to secure property in particular ways, to negotiate a human relationship, to show appreciation for a deity, and so on. Moreover, Popper ignores what historians are actually interested in when he criticises the difficulty to separate subject from object. An important concern historical study is, precisely, the intentions of the recorders and through this their interests. The intentions themselves are an object of enquiry from which can be derived explanations and important evidence about the past. For example, when we reconsider the example given by Carr of the foreign policy of Gustav Stresemann, we can see that it is of
interest to a historian that his western policy is more heavily reflected by Bernhard in his publication because it indicates something about the relative success of his eastern policy. Bernhard’s intentions, as a loyal and faithful secretary, play a critical role in understanding this source and from this there is important evidence that we can discover.
Through this mistake, Popper neglects to focus on what historians are actually concerned with. Any serious historian knows that ‘facts’ are liars, and that they carry with them their own ideological loads. Historical evidence is there, in its primary form, not to disclose its own meaning and be blindly accepted, but to be interrogated by minds trained in a discipline of attentive disbelief and scepticism. The discrete facts must be interrogated with care and thoughtful application developed to detect any attempt at manipulation. As E.P Thompson further developed, “facts will disclose nothing of their own accord. The historian must work hard to enable them to find their own voices.” The mistake of the criticism proposed by Popper and his school of thought is that it is not the historian or perceiver’s voice, but the own, independent voices of the facts that the historian is tirelessly endeavouring to discover, even if what they say and some part of their vocabulary is determined by the questions which the historian proposes.
Ultimately however, there is an important lesson to be taken from Popper’s criticism, as it rejects the common-sense view of history. Even the positivists who hold that there are highlysophisticated supposedly-neutral empirical research techniques – techniques which are as of yet undiscovered and which would deliver history to us packaged and untouched by the human mind through the automatic ingestion of the computer – are mistaken. The facts of the historian cannot be purely objective, and the empiricist model of knowledge with a clear divide between subject and object, between man and the external world is unpersuasive and needs careful rethinking.
Jonathan Gibson, Senior School
A moral action is defined as an action following the accepted standards of behaviour. I would suggest that we should not judge historical figures by the morals of today for two reasons. Firstly, possibly aside from religion (which is debatable), there is no absolute morality independent of time and place. And secondly by adding our judgement to history, we are not viewing evidence in a distinctly historical way. In 2017, a huge controversy emerged surrounding Nelson’s statue in Trafalgar Square. Lord Horatio Nelson was a British naval commander, most famous for his naval victories against the French in the Napoleonic Wars, turning him into a national hero. He was born in 1758 and died in 1805 killed by a French sniper when leading an attack.
The controversy emerged when a journalist published an article saying how since Lord Nelson was a white supremacist and strong supporter of slavery, his statue and his status should be torn down. I want you to imagine that the person driving you to school last year was driving at 40mph in a 50mph zone. Now, however, a year later, the speed limit on that road has changed to 30mph, possibly due to safety concerns. Would you judge the quality of the person’s driving by his adherence to the driving standards he was driving at a year ago, or by the safer but slower limits of today? Just as it makes no sense to admonish this driver for breaking a law that hadn’t yet come into force, it makes no sense to judge historical figures by today’s moral standards. The slave trade in England was abolished in 1807, two years after Nelson died, with slavery only being fully abolished in 1833. Therefore, in his time, against the set of moral values prevalent then, Nelson was acting in a reasonably moral way. And Nelson doesn’t stand alone; we could levy similar moral judgement on Cecil Rhodes, William Gladstone or Mahatma Gandhi. We have moved the moral goalpost so many times that it would be impossible to find historical characters fulfilling every single moral position across time.
In case any of you believe our morals today are absolute and the best morals possible so we should hold historical figures to them, people in 50 years’ time may look back and think we are barbaric for slaughtering animals! Spending money on holidays which could have been spent saving lives in Africa may repulse them! They may question how we can possibly drive around in carbon spewing cars, destroying our planet. Having explained how judging historical
figures is wrong since morals are constantly changing, I will now move onto my next point. The historical philosopher, E.H Carr wrote ‘Study the historian before you begin to study the facts’. He says ‘facts are like fish on a fishmonger’s slab. The historian collects them, takes them home and cooks and serves them.’ Different historians will cook the ‘facts’ in different ways, based on their morals, whether consciously or subconsciously, and judge historical figures based on this. A contemporary historian might have described Nelson as a mighty and powerful figure, focusing on his victories and courage, fighting for what he believed in. Another historian, living at a different time may see him as a racist and villain, whose active support of slavery is disgusting and abhorrent. Hence, it is important to understand a historian’s environment, to learn in what way he is cooking the evidence.
However, it is also crucial to note that by the historian doing so, it leads to distortion, adding the historian’s own judgement and feelings to their tale of history. My argument centres on the idea that there is no absolute morality and by interpreting history through the lens of their own morality a historian imposes their own subjective opinions on the historical facts. Our morals are constantly changing and the product of a particular point in history and geography that we inhabit. It would be foolish to say that our morals are ‘superior’, rather they are just different. For those who are cynical, maybe it is because you are subjectively looking at this question from a modern Western perspective ‐ do you not think someone living 100 years ago would also be subjective saying their morals are superior? You would say they are biased, as are you. Morality today is simply different to morality in history, and judging historical figures by today’s morality makes about as much sense as prosecuting your driver because the speed limit has subsequently changed on the road he was driving on.
Lucas Valladares, Senior School
“A big cult (where) the children are... forced to steal” with “a parasitic lifestyle” and “a total inability to integrate into modern society”. These comments were all collected from a thread on the social media platform ‘Reddit’ and originated from users from Poland to Belgium, demonstrating the harsh perspective against the most populous trans-national ethnic minority in Europe, the Roma. The Roma are overwhelmingly the victims of hate speech, crimes and a terrible reputation and were declared by the Global Minorities Alliance to be ‘The Most Persecuted Minority in Europe.’ In fact, even the official legal term ‘Gypsy’ in the UK is considered a slur according the World Romani Congress. So why, in an era where we push against racism, are Roma so stigmatized and their discrimination so normalized?
The stereotype of the Roma being unhygienic can be linked to their exclusion from urban communities with Roma culture actually focusing on purity and the avoidance of being ‘marime’. The MORI survey discovered 32% and 42% of interviewed people cited newspapers and television as the primary source through which they gained/justified prejudice. Although Roma have higher rates of heart disease, this is largely due to nomadic or rural lifestyles, lack of accessible affordable healthcare and higher rates of poverty and their levels of infectious diseases are broadly average. The antiziganist stereotype is a consequence of the life Roma are forced to live in oppressive states. Resultantly, Roma are considered unhygienic due to their impoverished, rural lifestyles whichoriginate from exclusion from urban culture and accessible healthcare.
Ironically, another Roma stereotype regarding their aversion to education and high crime rates can be linked to modern discrimination and exclusion from mainstream education. Historically, they formed the working classes and resultantly lacked significant education and in the modern world many Roma are sent to special-education schools due to their ethnicity. Even those who attend experience disproportionate levels of exclusion due to teacher bias, bullying due to racism and low motivation due to the common attitude of disinterest towards education among Roma communities. Furthermore, many Roma parents are sufficiently poor that they take their children out of school early to assist with family trades which typically don’t require formal qualifications. Thus, another Roma stereotype originates from the segregation and racism within many European education systems and the resultant distrust of the education system among Roma communities alongside the high levels of poverty often forcing Roma to leave school early.
Some more of the most ironic and prominent antiziganist stereotypes are the simultaneous beliefs that Roma are dirty thieves and that many are rich barons with fast cars. Although Roma do typically have a higher rate of crime, this is linked to historical oppression - 400 years of slavery in Romanian principalities, alongside expulsions from other European countries ensured widespread poverty among Roma by the 20th Century. The Porajmos or ‘The Devouring’ between 1933-1945 killed over one quarter of the Roma/Sinti population within Europe and primarily killed the documented since they were easier to find – This led to a higher proportion of the surviving Roma to be stateless and caused many Roma to flee their native country and become stateless. Under socialism, they were concentrated into dangerous labour and resultantly modern Roma are predominantly impoverished and uneducated with few transgenerational skills and racism in employment. Consequently many Roma are forced into crime as an impoverished class as they face systematic barriers in applying for jobs and renting property. Although non-Roma earn 27% more than Roma adults in Romania, there’s still a stereotype of the Roma being greedy and rich which is partially due to some influential Roma collecting money from poorer members of the local community and hence the stereotype could be resolved by an emancipation of Roma women. Thus, the stereotypes of Roma as dirty thieves and rich comes from the extremes reported in the media and the both historical and modern institutional oppression of Roma working through legal means.
To conclude, the historical oppression of the Roma from their first arrival to Crete in 1322 can be directly linked to their impoverished conditions today. Persecution and deportation caused a growth in nomadic employment with musical entertainers like Lautari and low-skilled crafts like metal-workers. Wealthier Roma were easier to identify and hence targeted in the Porajmos, Austria-Hungary's abolition of Roma lifestyles and Poland’s anti-nomad legislation in 1964 which led to Roma being primarily working-class all-over Europe. The ideas of Roma as dirty, uneducated and poor partially originate from their sustained exclusion from urban environments with the Italian police evicting over 300 Roma from a camp in Rome in July 2018 despite the Europe Court of Human Rights specifically ordering to suspend the action. The best method to re-integrate Roma into society and prevent their marginalization is to reeducate the Roma population and resultantly accumulate a Roma middle class once again to combat the outdated antiziganist archetypes. The combined efforts of Roma-led education desegregation in Eastern Europe and the European Union set an optimistic tone for the future of the Roma, however it is imperative the Roma are protected at every step.
Milo Sinclair, Junior School
‘Weather and climate and how it shaped the past’
Today we see extreme weather all over the news and we hear stories about how the world’s heating up and the climate is changing. We see on our TV how the climate impacts us now, and even how it will get worse in the future and now. But extreme weather and extreme climate has been important throughout history.
In this essay I will review some example of how the weather and climate affected the past. One occasion where the weather has changed outcome of history – and one all Habs boys will know well as we seemed to learn about it every couple of years in the Prep - is when in 1588 Britain was saved by the wind. On a windy day 130 ships with 30,000 soldiers and sailors fitted with 2,500 guns sailed to England with the plan to invade it and punish the people who had stolen from loot from Spanish ships. If they had succeeded in reaching England and invading it many of us would not be alive now and our country as we know it would be very different. Following the battle of Gravelines the Spanish ships where forced into the North Sea by a strong southwesterly wind. The ships were unable to sail back due to the wind. The Spanish Armada was ended as boats were lost at sea or smashed into rocks.
This is a very well known example because it was a decisive defeat. But also because the effect of weather was easy for everyone to see. There was a storm and as a direct result the Spanish Armada failed to invade England.
However, weather can also have long term impacts, which are much harder to see. Those of us who have been learning our American history through rap musicals, we will recall that Alexander Hamilton brought Alexander Hamilton to New York. In the words of Lin Manuel Miranda:
“Then a hurricane came, and devastation reigned
Our man saw his future drip, drippin down the drain
Put a pencil to his temple, connected it to his brain
And he wrote his first refrain, a testament to his pain
Well the word got around, they said this kid is insane, man
Took up a collection just to send him to the mainland”
The story behind this passage is that a hurricane hit the Island of Nevis in 1772. The young Hamilton, who was born there, wrote an essay explaining the devastation, and he was so eloquent that word spread around the island and impressed all the islanders, they then put together enough money to send him to New York. Now the effect of weather here is not the instant devastation of Nevis. Nor the personal impact on Hamilton as at the time no one knew if Hamilton would do something great or not. However, in the long run Hamilton went on to play a crucial role in the War of Independence, the debates on the constitution, and the establishment of a federal government. Hamilton created the banking system in New York and the coast guards. These massive impacts and it all started because one hurricane hit his exact island in that exact year.
In contrast to one-off events like hurricanes, climate which is the average weather for an area over a period, is also important. Winters in Russia are very cold. This is well known. But twice in the last 200 years generals who have conquered much of Europe have been defeated by the Russian winter, not thinking to prepare for it. In June 1812 in Napoleon started the greatest of his campaigns into Russia. But Russia is very large, and his men were still fighting across the country as winter came. In the cold and bloody war 500,000 French died, as well as 400,000 Russians defending Russia. Just over 100 year later Hitler made the same mistake. Hitler also started his invasion in June, but again this was not early enough and he did not give himself enough time. He nearly made it to Moscow. In December mid-winter operation Barbarossa came to an end. But men learned it is extremely hard to invade Russia due to its climate.
They serve to remind us that extreme weather and challenging climate is not just making headlines today. It is something that has made history throughout history.
Aria Hashemi, Senior School
Firstly, this particular book was chosen for review because I found fascinating the degree to which there was a great fervour surrounding the surrounding the Revolution as a whole and the independent processes of drafting new constitutions, yet how Wood could so succinctly contrast this with the issues the colonists encountered by way of disillusionment of ideals and personal squabbles uncharacteristic of the Republic they sought to create. These conflicts
between the ideals of the colonists and what was evolving around them in reality raised interesting notions of ideas blinding people from the true real reality of what could be achievable, with Americans not possessing the civic virtues to create such a state, and it is for this reason that I wish to review this book.
As a university professor and historian, Wood is writing with the purpose of informing with his analysis of the processes of constitution-making in the Revolutionary era. Ultimately his thesis, in the final copy of the text produced, was that Americans had effectively blinded themselves with their own agendas. They had effectively convinced themselves that all men are in nature and that the legislative supremacy of the people was the most important method by which to prevent executive tyranny, and it was ultimately this that created the revolution. This was not his thesis to begin with however, and only began to develop as he began to gain a glimpse of what Americans in the 18th century truly meant when they spoke of living in an enlightened age. Initially, he sought to write ‘a monographic analysis of constitution-making in the Revolutionary era.’ Yet he adapted his approach to what he was writing as his ‘reading opened up an intellectual world I had scarcely known existed.’ This very instance reminds us that we must avoid dogmatism in our approach to history, we must be receptive to new ideas, and willing to absorb information that could perhaps change the arguments around which works of history revolve.
This particular book of Wood’s, in its earlier days, did not seem destined for any direction where it would challenge existing arguments or notions that have been asserted by various historians on the American Revolution. Yet the pattern of beliefs amongst the Americans that Wood explored over the course of his writing of ‘The Creation of the American Republic’, seemed to ‘solve’ ‘many of the historiographical problems involved in interpreting the revolution’ which initially stemmed ‘from a failure to appreciate the distinctiveness of the culture in which the Revolutionary generation operated’, with Wood citing the approach of many historians studying this period as ‘ahistorical’. It was the failure of these historians to perceive the Revolutionary period as driven by Americans’ ‘habit of thinking’, as Wood argued, that had caused inaccuracies in the analysis of constitution-making hitherto.
In his use of primary sources, Wood found himself having to frequently resort to newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and private correspondence in the meagreness in the availability of official records prior to the ratification of the national constitution. He would use the newspapers to gain as close as an approximation as was possible of personal debate. He was cautious in his use of private correspondence so as to not have his interpretation of the period shrouded in inaccuracies by taking the thoughts of elitist individuals as factual evidence. As far as secondary sources were concerned, Wood admitted to being spoilt for choice, with many possible interpretations, with him especially frequenting books on 18th Century English thought so as to help him understand ‘the Enlightenment’s concern with health and sickness.’ He admits that he was rather starved for sources on the politics of the Southern-most states, with a greater focus on ‘colonial jurisprudence’ being crucial.
Wood has both caused me to question ideas that I had previously thought rather irrevocable in my understanding of them, namely democracy, and has also introduced me to new questions and debates. His argument that democracy only existed in the early years of the Pennsylvanian constitution-making process, as legislative powers were vested in each individual and not merely representatives, was a bewildering concept to grasp at first. From this, it would then have to be argued that no state containing a representative body can truly be democratic, for even in governments were representatives can be held accountable, the degree to which they
can be held accountable can never supersede the possibility of their manipulation of their position for their own personal benefit perhaps. Wood has also introduced me to the corruptive effect of ideas, such that the Americans had acquired this notion of Republicanism as the ideology that could best protect their rights and liberties, yet they became subsumed by this. Ultimately, the prospect of such a Republican state distracted them from the unfeasibility of establishing such a system, which is a consideration that I think could be raised towards idealists in modern society, who seek to establish grand social change, yet fail to recognise the numerous obstacles that prevent such an occurrence.
Wood has influenced my approach to ‘doing history’ in such a way that I have come to understand that it would be anachronistic to use particular words like ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’ and ‘virtue’ in the context of their 21st century meaning. The meaning of these words is constantly evolving, and it is not appropriate to use a person in the 21st century’s notion of democracy when talking about society in the 18th century. One must seek to discover what these terms meant to individuals in the relevant period that they are studying and from there, expand from there to see, in the case of the American Revolution, the type of ‘democracy’ that the colonists strove for.
I would undoubtedly recommend this book to another in the room as it is certain to provide challenges to what we think we know about our ideas, and the gap between ideas, and reality. Living in a world that is evolving so rapidly in a social sense, one could certainly draw parallels between the world we live in now, and the world that Wood sought to analyse, with similar themes appearing in both timelines, which may contravene both what we think we know, and what we wish to hear.
George Chadney, Senior School
E.H. Carr’s ‘What is History?’, comprising of a series of lectures given by Carr, is undoubtedly a highly influential book with regards to the practice and philosophy of history, being described by Richard J. Evans as a “classic” which in some respects has “never been superseded”. Carr addresses the role of facts and ‘objectivity’ in history, ideas surrounding ‘accidents’ in history, inevitability in history and a wide range of other issues. To summarise all the arguments made by Carr briefly would be difficult, as each lecture addresses somewhat different topics, but perhaps the chief argument made by Carr, and the one I found the most engaging, concerns facts and ‘objectivity’.
Carr strongly rejects the notion that the historian can look at the past from an entirely rational and objective standpoint, with all judgements being arrived at only from the “hard core of facts” and interpretation being kept to a minimum. The first argument presented is that even in the selection of “historical facts”, a historian is implicitly making judgments and interpretation; the “hard core of facts” is one which is chosen by each historian when determining which facts are relevant, and which are irrelevant and “unhistorical”. This was thoroughly persuasive to my mind. If a historian were writing about, for example, 18th and early 19th Century radicalism, and chose to exclude the experience of parishes which tended towards popular loyalism but extensively discussed the Pentrich Rising, while the account might still be ‘factual’, by excluding the loyalist parishes there is an implication that they are in some way less important, and therefore the historian has already engaged in interpretation. As Carr puts it, facts are hardly the “hard core” of history, they are the “shifting sands”.
The second, perhaps more common, argument Carr presents against the notion that we ought to pursue a purely factual “ultimate history”, is that the historian will inevitably be affected by the influences of their time. What I found particularly enlightening in this regard was not just this argument, but Carr’s contention that this is not necessarily a bad thing. He argues that as our understanding of society improves over time, this results in more sophisticated ways of analysing history, and therefore that a historian being the product of their time means that their outlook on history will be an improvement upon previous outlooks. Indeed, a historian influenced by the attitudes of the 18th Century would likely have a far cruder and less nuanced view of society and history than a historian influenced by the attitudes of the 21st Century, and it is this argument which I found perhaps the most illuminating in ‘What is History?’; the idea that the influence of the present day upon a historian is not something which necessarily needs
to be fought or overcome, but something which results in our outlook on history becoming more and more sophisticated.
Geoffrey Elton has criticised Carr for this view, describing the view that historians would inevitably be significantly influenced by their time as “pernicious nonsense”, charging Carr with taking a “purely relative” approach to history. This seems to be rather unfair, as Carr repeatedly attacks the “sceptics” who do take a “purely relative” approach, regarding all ways of looking at history as equally valid; as described above, Carr, though he does argue all historians are shaped by their time, does not regard all ways of looking as history as merely different, believing our outlook on history to be not just changing but improving over time. Elton also attacks Carr’s division of facts between those which are “historical”
(those which are valuable enough that historians have “given them the floor”) and those which are mere facts about the past which have not been used by historians, on the grounds that a historian should not be able to “invent or construct the object of his study”. However, Carr is not asserting that facts which are “unhistorical” did not, as Elton puts it, “actually once happen… to real people” - he still regards them as “facts of the past” – he is only distinguishing those facts which historians have decided are not significant or relevant.
Though this review has only been able to discuss one aspect of ‘What is History?’, on all the subjects it covers the book is compelling, succinct and illuminating, and to my mind particularly enlightening on this subject of facts and objectivity.
Oliver Mosheim, Senior School
Nietzsche’s On the Use and Abuse of History for Life is a lampoon against modern society. It condemns the overly-historical approach of his 19th century contemporaries as they studied the past, as Ranke was urging them to do at the time, ‘to understand it for what it was’. Nietzsche’s central argument is that historical knowledge is not inherently valuable and should only be accumulated if it aids living. A rousing argument, it decries knowledge for its own sake as knowledge only has any value if there is life; thus, living takes precedence over knowledge.
Nietzsche provides three methods of studying history that can enliven our existences. The first is monumental history which examines the life of great men (and for Nietzsche his list probably would have only included men) to instruct others to be able to imitate them. As contemporaries lacked greatness, one could look into the past to find proof and inspiration of humanity’s potential. The past is also valuable if studied by an antiquarian historian who will find contentment in exploring their ancestry and traditions. People who live monotonous lives can find encouragement from this approach to history as the study of their people and traditions provides meaning to their everyday existence. The final use of history is studying it critically: evaluating and critiquing the past in order to improve and better understand the present.
Nietzsche identified some risks that these approaches to history contained. For instance, monumental history was dangerous for people who were not able to emulate the actions of the great. This was aptly demonstrated in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, greatly influenced by Nietzsche, in which Raskolnikov thinks himself one of humanity’ great men and thus believes he transcends the rules of society and is able to forge his own. Hence, he he can commit murder as it will serve the purposes of a great man; however, the only flaw in this thinking for Dostoevsky was the fact that Raskolnikov was not a great man so could not act imperviously. His remorse after committing the crime demonstrated his weakness and therefore made it wrong for him to murder. Similarly, practising monumental history is dangerous to those who are not themselves great and should not be emulating great men. Moreover, antiquarian history poses a risk if one reveres the past over the present and hence stops living and innovating as they are too in awe of tradition. Nietzsche, regarded by some as the founder of existentialism, would have agreed with Jefferson’s belief that ‘the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’. Consequently, when antiquarian history intrudes on forging one’s own identity it becomes a subversive discipline. Critical history also has its dangers: particularly because we are all
derived from the past, hence criticising it can prove self-defeating as our views are shaped by it.
Nietzsche’s central thesis is an exhortation for action and living. In a secular and mainly existentialist society, it provides a compelling argument that living is what matters most and therefore the study of the past is only valuable if it enriches our present. Yet, history can be studied in many ways to make it valuable – not just the in the three approaches Nietzsche prescribes. For example, exploring the contrasting worldviews of different societies emphasises how our perception of reality can be readily challenged and reformed which in turn makes us more receptive to change.
Furthermore, Nietzsche decries the historical trend towards micro-histories (and if he were living today he would presumably reproach cultural and minority histories) as they focus on the ‘mediocre man’. Thus, we learn little of about greatness from them and the only ‘laws’ we can derive are those which are animalistic such as what hunger, love and passion do to men. Yet, this view of the past is too limited and neglects the great value that can be gained from studying these people and different perspectives their stories provide. While to understand freedom one should study the work thinkers such as Locke, humanity can gain valuable insights on what it is to be free by exploring the existence of slaves and others denied their freedom. History is too narrow if constricted only to a few ‘great men’.
However, Nietzsche does provide an interesting argument that the factual accuracy of our histories are not particularly important. Their purpose is to enrich living, hence understanding the cause of an event is far less important than the effect. Monumental history is intended to inspire greatness, going into extreme detail over how something occurred does not achieve this and in fact does the reverse by underlining how singular and inimitable an action was. Brutus murdering Caesar is not an event that can be replicated nowadays. Instead, history should be distorted so as to make it more generalisable and the specific details of the past discarded in favour of more inspiring (and general) impressions. This seems to blur the line between history and fiction and is a dangerous way of viewing the past as it makes historians extremely powerful in determining what actions should be encouraged and what narratives highlighted. Yet, in our post-modern society, with an increasing acceptance that an objective account of the past can never be written, is it so outlandish to view the past as inspiring tool rather than a dead narrative?
On the Use and Abuse of History for Life can certainly enrich our study of history by providing different methods of approaching the past which can enliven our existence and also by dissuading historians from accumulating historical knowledge with no view of enriching the present.
Epilogue
I hope that you have enjoyed reading through the excellent submissions submitted by other students. In this section of the magazine are some miscellaneous bits of news and insights on different things.
The first thing to say is if you enjoyed reading this at all in any way you should absolutely go to History Society. It has some brilliant speakers talking about all kinds of fascinating topics. It is after school (on Mondays) but that doesn’t matter- it is still worth going.
There were some things I wanted to add to the magazine- interviews with historians, regular updates on History Society, an editorial from some of the history teachers- that just didn’t work out due to lack of time and, mainly, Coronavirus. Next year, hopefully, the latter issue will go away and the next team of editors will be able to make Timeline as impressive as it can be. The editors can be anyone who shows enough enthusiasm- it could even be you. If you’re interested, please write to Dr StJohn. Don’t think of it as extra work to do- it’s honestly amazing to have the responsibility to judge people’s submissions and determine prizewinners, and to compile them into a magazine that looks however you think is best. It’s a privilege, not a chore. Whether you want to be an editor or not, however, any constructive feedback is welcome and encouraged.
Thank you for reading this far. All the entrants will no doubt be pleased to hear you’ve read their work, and as the editor-in-chief it’s gratifying that someone has read the messages I’ve written.
Thanks again for reading, and have a nice day.
-Daniel