THE NEW GUINEA OFFENSIVES

When the Australian 9th Division landed east of Lae on 4 September 1943, it was the first Australian amphibious landing on a hostile shore since Gallipoli in 1915. It was also the start of a series of offensives that would take the Allied forces of General Douglas MacArthur’s South-West Pacific Area command beyond New Guinea shores some eight months later. Carrying out and supporting that series of operations – involving ten separate amphibious landings, an airborne landing and a series of land campaigns – took considerable resources and planning.

General MacArthur’s aim had not changed since he landed in Australia in March 1942, when he had famously vowed to return to the Philippines. In March 1943, that aim was still a long way off, and although the Papuan campaign had ended, both the Australian and American ground units required extensive rebuilding before any further operations. MacArthur’s orders at this time were to capture Rabaul in a series of offensives known as Operation Cartwheel. However, any advance into New Guinea would have to take place in stages, building air and naval bases as the advance progressed. To achieve this, MacArthur would need to expand his air arm and build an amphibious blue water naval capability from scratch. At a time when air and amphibious resources were in great demand worldwide, there was probably no one else who could have garnered such resources for the SouthWest Pacific Area.

The key to this development would be “MacArthur’s airman”, the 5th USAAF commander, Lieutenant General George Kenney, and the commander of the Seventh Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey. Both men were given free rein in utilising those resources that MacArthur was able to obtain, and they would achieve remarkable results in the following months.

BY PHILLIP BRADLEY

Salamaua

For the Japanese, unaware of the growing Allied amphibious capability, Salamaua was now the key battlefield, and the battles there were crucial in holding back the Allied advance into New Guinea. General Adachi wanted Salamaua “held till the very last, just like the Soviet Army did at Stalingrad.” It would be Allied air power that would make the first major impact, using General Kenney’s “attack aviation” concept to sink a Japanese convoy of eight merchant ships bound for Lae and four of the escorting destroyers during the battle of the Bismarck Sea on 2–3 March 1943. Lieutenant Kitamoto Masamichi watched some of the survivors come ashore. “All were jittery and full of fear as if they were seeing a horrible dream,” he wrote. “A pitiful scene of a vanquished and defeated army.” Some 3000 to 4000 Japanese troops were lost in the battle, although a similar number were rescued. However, MacArthur claimed higher losses both in enemy ships and personnel. As photographer Damien Parer put it, “The war’s a phoney MacArthur-made one. He’s blown up a big balloon full of bullshit and someone will prick it one day.”

Despite the loss of most of the troops and extensive supplies in the Bismarck Sea battle, the Japanese used fast destroyers, motorised landing craft and even submarines to reinforce Salamaua and hold the Allies at bay there. Little did they know that the Allied intention was not to capture Salamaua but to draw in more Japanese troops, leaving Lae relatively undefended. Salamaua was to act as a magnet. By the end of the campaign, the magnet strategy had drawn in the three regiments of the Japanese 51st Division and elements from the 20th and 41st Division. These three divisions had been sent to reinforce New Guinea in early 1943.

The Japanese concentrated their defence around a series of ridges and hills inland from Salamaua. Following the earlier low-scale actions against Bobdubi Ridge and above Mubo, a major series of operations under the codename Doublet were planned to begin on 30 June. Major General Stanley Savige’s 3rd Australian Division would have the major role, with a series of attacks against Bobdubi Ridge using the fresh 58/59th Battalion, and an attack against Mubo using the 17th Brigade. The 2/3rd Independent Company had the aim of securing the Goodview Junction area and thus linking the two fronts. The American 162nd Regiment would also take part, making an amphibious landing at Nassau Bay and then moving up the Bitoi River valley to cut off those enemy forces retreating from Mubo.

Although Mubo fell, parts of Bobdubi Ridge remained in Japanese hands until August. Meanwhile, the American landing at Nassau Bay, although successful, saw the loss of most of the landing craft in the heavy surf. The front then coalesced around Mount Tambu and Goodview Junction. It was only a brilliant Australian operation that got in behind the Japanese defences on Komiatum Ridge, which led to the fall of that stronghold and forced the Japanese back towards Salamaua; this would not fall until after Operation Postern, the attack on Lae.

Preparing the attack

Operation Postern would require largescale sea and air transport movements, so General Kenney’s 5th USAAF needed to establish air superiority over New Guinea prior to that operation. This meant attacking the newly built Japanese airfields around Wewak on the north-west coast. An intermediate airfield was secretly built by US airborne engineers at Tsili Tsili to enable escorted bombing raids which soon degraded Japanese air strength. Lowlevel strafing and the use of “parafrag” bombs (small bombs on parachutes) were particularly effective against Japanese aircraft on the ground. By the end of August 1943, the threat of air attack from Wewak against Lae had been nullified. This would also enable the dropping of US paratroopers northwest of Lae in support of the planned amphibious landing on the coast.

On the naval side, American Rear Admiral Barbey had cobbled together an effective amphibious force. In August, a landing was carried out on the undefended Trobriand Islands to iron out some of the operational difficulties involved. Meanwhile, the men of the Australian 9th Division, which would make the Lae landing, had been busy learning the ins and outs of landing craft operations.

Operation Postern: the attack on Lae

At dawn on 4 September 1943, the Australian 20th Brigade landed 20 kilometres east of Lae. However, with a number of river crossings between the beachhead and Lae, including the imposing Busu River, it would take time to reach Lae. The 24th and 26th Brigade, along with considerable artillery support, were also landed over the following days. On 5 September, the US 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, with an Australian gun detachment attached, was dropped on the undefended Nadzab airfield, 30 kilometres north-west of Lae. Australian pioneers and engineers then crossed the Markham River south of Nadzab and prepared the captured airfield for use. The 25th Brigade was flown in and began the advance on Lae. Caught unaware by “the wolf at the back gate” the Japanese scrambled to put defences in place along the road into Lae. The air supply operation was not without its dangers, typified when a Liberator bomber crashed into a 2/33rd Battalion truck convoy at Jackson’s airfield in Port Moresby, killing 60 Australian troops waiting to fly to Nadzab and 11 American aircrew.

Lae on 16 September, followed soon after by the 9th Division. The troops found Lae empty, just “one vast, crazy rubbish heap”.

The 8,650 Japanese army and naval troops in Lae had begun withdrawing on 12 September, heading north-west into the imposing Saruwaged Range, following a precipitous route across the mountains to the northern coast. The Japanese were led by hard-working engineers who managed to bridge the Busu River and construct a track of sorts across the range. At one point below the highest pass they set up a vine ladder so the men could climb the sheer rock face to the icy plateau beyond. As one survivor later wrote, “It was a sense of hell.” Despite the challenges, 75 per cent of the men reached the north coast.

Kaiapit

Meanwhile, the 9th Division had closed up to the Busu River and, despite losing men and equipment in doing so, the 2/28th Battalion was able to get across the river and establish a bridgehead on the Lae side. It would take time to bridge the mighty river but the Australians were now closing in on Lae from two directions. Troops from 7th Division entered

The rapid capture of Lae opened up opportunities for the Allied command, with airfield sites and anchorages at the top of the list. Engineers were already constructing new airfields around Nadzab, ultimately five in all. This was the first step in projecting air power further forward, and the flat grasslands of the Markham and Ramu valleys north-west of Lae promised more sites. The first target would be Kaiapit, a grass airfield 65 kilometres further up the valley from Nadzab.

Captain Gordon King’s 2/6th Independent Company was given the task. After being landed on the river flats on the west side of the Leron River by C-47 transports on 17 September, the unit consolidated at Sangan and then marched on to Kaiapit on 19 September.

The main village was captured that afternoon and the commandos formed a perimeter for the night. Unknown to them, a Japanese force of some 500 men was moving down the Markham Valley to attack Nadzab, and it reached Kaiapit just on dawn the next morning. The strung-out Japanese were taken by surprise by the Australians, who immediately went on the attack; although 14 commandos were killed in the battle, the Japanese force was cut to pieces, losing about 300 men. A grass airfield was soon prepared for operations, and the first units of 21st Brigade from the 7th Division flew in to continue the advance up the Markham Valley.

When he later met Captain King, Major General George Vasey told him, “We were lucky, we were very lucky.” “I don’t agree with you, sir,” King replied. “We weren’t lucky, we were just bloody good.”

Finschhafen

Before dawn on 22 September, only six days after the fall of Lae, the 9th Division’s 20th Brigade landed at Scarlet Beach, north of Finschhafen, about 100 kilometres east of Lae. The capture of Finschhafen would provide an excellent anchorage and another airfield but, with some 4,000 Japanese troops in the area and another 3,000 on the way along the coast from Wewak, some difficult fighting lay ahead. The Japanese had fortified the Kakakog heights overlooking Finschhafen and, as Peter Hemery observed, “It was literally a jungle Gallipoli” with steep approaches and narrow gullies surrounding the fortress. It was not until 2 October that Finschhafen and Dreger Harbour were secured and contact made with the 22nd Battalion, which had advanced overland from Lae. The Japanese pulled back to formidable positions up in the ranges around Jivevaneng and Sattelberg. Then, when reinforcements arrived in mid-October, the Japanese counterattacked and put considerable pressure on the Australian lines. The attack included a landing at Scarlet Beach, but the defenders held firm and by mid-November the Australians had advanced up the Sattelberg road. However, the enemy held out in their mountain fortress even after Matilda tanks had been employed. In the end, it was the inspired action of Sergeant Tom Derrick, leading his section up steep jungle paths, that caused the Japanese to abandon Sattelberg on the night of 24 November. The lack of supply also played its part. “We dream of good food,” one starving Japanese soldier wrote. “Friends die every day. I want to return alive from this war.” The Australians now began a slow advance westwards along the New Guinea coast as the Japanese withdrew west towards Madang: “the sideways crawl of the crab” as one Japanese officer put it.

Ramu Valley

Meanwhile, the two brigades of Major General Vasey’s 7th Division advanced rapidly into the Ramu Valley and captured the small airstrip at Dumpu on 5 October. A suitable site for a new airfield complex had also been

Above: The fighting to capture Mount Prothero was particularly grim, with one veteran reflecting that “Tobruk was a picnic” when compared with his battalion’s experience on Shaggy Ridge. Photographer: Colin Thomas Halmarick. AWM 064187

Below: A lone Japanese prisoner is surrounded by Australian and American soldiers shortly after the landing at the Finschhafen beachhead. AWM 057472 found at Gusap. From Dumpu the Australians moved into the Finisterre Range, intent on forming a perimeter to prevent any enemy observation of the valley. There were a number of clashes among the knolls and ridge lines before the Australians moved up onto the southern shoulder of the most imposing terrain feature in the area, Shaggy Ridge. The Japanese dug in around a group of knolls, from where the Ramu Valley could be observed, while the forward Australian units were targeted by mountain guns from further back along the ridge.

Despite operating on a one-man front, the 2/16th Battalion made a bold attack on the Pimple feature on 26 December 1943 and the southern end of the ridge was secured. Considerable air and artillery support was laid on for the assault, but it was the adaptability of the Australian infantry who climbed up the steep side of the ridge that led to the fall of the Pimple. Sergeant Jack Longman played a key role: boosted up on other men’s shoulders, he scaled a sheer rock face to place a grenade into an enemy bunker.

However, it took until the end of January 1944 before Shaggy Ridge finally fell to a coordinated three-battalion attack by Brigadier Fred Chilton’s 18th Brigade. While the 2/9th Battalion advanced along the narrow crest, the 2/12th Battalion moved along the Mene River valley on the western side of the ridge and managed to climb up a narrow spur onto the dominant Mount Prothero position at the northern end of the ridge. The battalion suffered 58 casualties in this operation, most as a result of close-range fire from an emplaced Japanese mountain gun. Evacuating these casualties back down the ridge and along the river valley tested the stretcher-bearers, with up to 16 men required for each stretcher in some areas. At the dressing station, Captain Clarrie Leggett worked for three days and nights, carrying out 45 separate operations and saving the lives of many men.

After the fall of Shaggy Ridge, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer’s 15th

Brigade took over for the difficult advance through to the north coast to capture Madang on 24 April 1944.

New Britain, Saidor and the Admiralties

After Finschhafen fell, the Allied naval force had ready access to the Vitiaz Strait, but it would not be secure until the eastern side on New Britain was also in Allied hands. Amphibious landings were therefore undertaken at Arawe on 15 December and at Cape Gloucester on 26 December 1943. General MacArthur used US troops for these operations, putting in place Alamo Force under the command of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger and thus sidelining General Sir Thomas Blamey, the Allied land forces commander. The US 112th Cavalry Regiment landed at Arawe while the US 1st Marine Division was used at Cape Gloucester. The Royal Australian Navy landing ship Westralia took part in the Arawe landing while the RAN warships Australia, Shropshire, Arunta and Warramunga provided fire support. Both operations were successful, and a series of costly and fruitless Japanese counter-attacks at Arawe at the end of January 1944 were easily held.

Using Finschhafen as a base, the American amphibious force was kept busy with a landing at Saidor on the northern coast of New Guinea on 2 January 1944. Although the US 126th Regiment was in a position to block the Japanese retreat from Finschhafen, MacArthur was only interested in setting up a perimeter centred on the airfield, which could now be used to project air power even further forward. This would be important to the next operation, a landing on the Admiralty Islands, which would provide another excellent anchorage as well as an airfield complex. The landing took place on 29 February 1944 and, despite heavy fighting, the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments had secured the key objectives by midMarch. On 20 March, Emirau Island was occupied unopposed, while an American landing at Torokina on Bougainville on 1 November 1943 and heavy air attacks against the Rabaul airfields and anchorage meant that Rabaul was now completely isolated. The aim of Operation Cartwheel had been achieved without having to actually capture the well-defended Japanese base.

The great leap

At Salamaua, Lae, Kaiapit, Finschhafen and in the Ramu Valley, the Australian army had broken the back of the Japanese army in New Guinea. However, one of the most vital contributions to the New Guinea offensives took place as Australian engineers swept for mines around the former Japanese base at Sio on the northern New Guinea coast.

When the Japanese 20th Division headquarters left the area, they had buried a metal trunk containing code books and other cipher material – and the Australian engineers had now found it. The papers were sent back to Australia where they were dried out and analysed, enabling the Japanese army code to be broken and giving crucial intelligence on enemy dispositions and plans. MacArthur now knew that Japanese strength was considerable in the Wewak area but, further west, Aitape and Hollandia were relatively undefended. With the temporary help of carrier air support, the last stage of the New Guinea offensives took place on 22 April with a landing at Aitape and two at Hollandia. The two RAN transports Manoora and Kanimbla played a role in the landing while Australia and Shropshire provided support fire. Within a week the anchorage and airfield complex at Hollandia had been secured.

In less than eight months since the landing at Lae, the New Guinea offensives had enabled the forward Allied airbase to move from Dobodura to Hollandia and the forward staging ports to move from Milne Bay and Buna to Hollandia and the Admiralty Islands. It was a huge leap and within another six months the first landings in the Philippines would take place and MacArthur would fulfil his promise. The Australian army was sidelined from the Philippine operations but would soon get the job of mopping up the bypassed Japanese garrisons around Wewak and on Bougainville and New Britain. Therefore, another series of more limited New Guinea offensives would take place in 1944 and 1945. •

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