EXPLAINING OUR SERIES: “THE MEN SPEAK”
Being an e-magazine focused on the preservation of the proud history of our South African Forces, we know that such history consists of much more than just cold facts, like dates and statistics. History is made by human beings. As human participants, we all quite naturally (and unavoidably) experienced events subjectively – individually living what is nowadays referred to as “my truth”. Which was unique to each participant. This applies particularly to how we understood events – then, and maybe quite differently now. How we each personally try to make sense of it all.
Historians are evidently very much interested in these perceptions of participants, to try and comprehend what motivated the protagonists at a given time, place and event. What did they see as the goals they were trying to achieve? What were the justifications they believed in? The threats they perceived, and fought to guard against?
Very importantly, too – how do they NOW see history’s chain of events, what do they now identify as the important role-players, issues, and actions that interacted to bring us to where we are today? In other words: CONTEXT.
Our series “The Men Speak” is modelled on campfire chats among friends and family, with the younger generation inquisitive to know from the “ou manne” (and “tannies”) how they had lived and perceived (then and now) the historic events and trends that shaped our current reality.As one sees during such campfire chats, it is about participants’ personal perspectives. How they now rationalize things in their own, naturally subjective minds…
In line with NONGQAI’s general editorial policy of not messing with orcensoring the content received from our contributors (principally to preserve its authenticity) what applies in this series in particular is that we publish as received. The perceptions shared and the way a particular contributor treats historical fact in his version of what happened (sharing his “own truth”) is the responsibility of that contributor alone. NONGQAI and its editors do not pretend, by publishing “as is”, that purported facts are verified and correct or that perceptions shared are historically well founded or objective. That would be presumptuous on our part and would defeat the object of this particular exercise in historiography, in the oral tradition.
What is clear, though, is that these personal memories of how things factually occurred, what they meant and how they are contextualized by the contributor, are REAL. It is his/her TRUTH, as perceived by those participants themselves. Please read these valued contributions in that light.
Link:
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FROM THE LUTHULI DETACHMENT TO OPERATION CRUISER – PUISSANCE TO POUVOIR – THE EVOLUTION OF COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED STRUGGLE
Dr Anthony Turton
Founding Member of the Chief Directorate Covert Operations
South African Secret Service
Asmall NIS covert operations team moving from a bush airfield to their base during a deep penetration operation in 1993
From the Luthuli Detachment to Operation Cruiser – Puissance to Pouvoir – The Evolution of Covert Operations in the South African Armed Struggle
Dr Anthony Turton
Founding Member of the Chief Directorate Covert Operations
South African Secret Service
Introduction
The 1970s was a decade of major change in South Africa. One way to understand that period is through the lens of national security, where we can examine how the state responded to escalating threats posed by the various liberation movements active across the southern african region in general, but in SouthAfrica specifically. To set the scene for the 70’s, we must understand that during the previous decade, the African National Congress (ANC) had been grappling with the effectiveness of the strategy of passive resistance so eloquently articulated by Mahatma Ghandi1 . This had caused the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)2 to split from the ANC, with both organizations creating their own armed wings. This was the birth of the Armed Struggle3 in South Africa, and all parties to the process were woefully unprepared for the consequences of the transition from the dynamic engagement of passive resistance to the logistical complexity of violent confrontation4 . Consequently, the 70’s was a decade in which the strategic objectives of the various liberation movements, and the security organs of the state, were forced to change. The central feature from an analytical sense therefore focuses on the capacity of each actor to effect appropriate institutional and operational change in the face of a fundamental shift in the policy environment and perception of threat. This paper will use Operation Cruiser as an empirical example of the capacity of the South African state to respond to a fundamental policy shift by the ANC, because the implications of that event had profound consequences.
Areview of the literature indicates that little credible analysis has been published, a fact exacerbated by the highly classified nature of covert operations conducted by the state. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to filling the lacuna in our knowledge of national security. I served within deeply sensitive covert structures of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), most notably during the turbulent 1980s and 1990s, and have written somewhat superficially in my book Shaking Hands with Billy about those experiences5. That superficiality was because I was testing the water to determine
1 Hollister, R.W. 2023. The Sharpeville Massacre, Violence and the Struggles of the African National Congress, 19601990, in Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History. Vol.13. Issue.1. Available online at The Sharpeville Massacre, Violence, and the Struggles of the African National Congress, 1960-1990 (georgiasouthern.edu)
2 Lodge, T. 1994. The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959 - 1990. In Liebenberg, I., Lortan, F., Nel, B. & van der Westhuizen, G. (Eds.) The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa. Pretoria: HAUM. Pp. 104 – 124.
3 Simpson, T. 2016. Umkhonto we Siswe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle. Cape Town: Penguin Books.
4 Du Toit, A. 1994. Fragile Defiance: The African Resistance Movement. In Liebenberg, I., Lortan, F., Nel, B. & van der Westhuizen, G. (Eds.) The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa. Pretoria: HAUM. Pp. 96 – 103.
5 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
if any state pushback might occur. To my surprise there was none. On the contrary, the book was read widely within the upper ranks of the State Security Agency (SSA) that superseded the South African Secret Service (SASS) and National Intelligence Agency (NIA). I was invited as a NIS and SASS veteran to give talks within the SSA, where I was always warmly received. Copies of the book are now in their library and can be used for training purposes where appropriate. Now that time has passed, and our democracy has hopefully matured to the point where we can speak more freely about those days, it is appropriate to start recording the NIS history in greater detail. I have begun writing about NIS where appropriate6 and have been interviewed on the Legacy Program series7 These have also mostly been well received by veterans of both NIS and BOSS, so I will continue to expand this base of knowledge in this paper.
The Changing Threat Perception of the National Intelligence Service
The NIS was created in February 1980 out of the chaos of the Info Scandal8. It played a major role in South Africa during the latter part of the Cold War, most notably dealing with the strategic issues associated with a liberation struggle internally, while various external paramilitary operations9 were taking place in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and in other Frontline States10. It played a pivotal role in the peaceful ending of hostilities that characterized the transition to democracy in 1994, and it ceased to exist in 1995 when it was absorbed into the newly created SASS and NIA11 Little credible information has been written about their operations, all of which were protected by a culture of secrecy, and where it does exist, it tends to be a demonized version of the perceptions of the writer12 , always an outsider, about the evils of the apartheid state. Nowhere in that narrative is there space to analyze the effectiveness and/or appropriateness of the operational responses, to a changing risk landscape, by an important organ of national security. This paper contributes to filling that void.
6 See https://issuu.com/hennieheymans/docs/nongqai_vol_12_no_2/s/11688796
7 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xv6IiNsi7wI
8 Rees, M. & Day, C. 1989. Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal. Johannesburg: MacMillan
9 Geldenhuys, D. 1982. The Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa. In Politikon, Vol. 9. No. 2; 16-31. Reprinted as Geldenhuys, D. 1983. The Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa. In Conflict Studies, No. 148; 11-26. In Gutteridge, W. (Ed.) 1995. South Africa: From Apartheid to National Unity, 1981-1994. Pp 42-57. Aldershot, Hants & Brookfield, V.T.: Dartmouth Publishing.
10 Turton, A.R. 2021. Understanding the Evolution of the National Intelligence Service and its Contribution to South African Democracy. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 4. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 4 by Hennie Heymans - Issuu
11 NIS. 1994. National Intelligence Service: 1969 - 1994. Special Commemorative Book given to all serving officers of the National Intelligence Service. Pretoria: National Intelligence Service.
12 Winter, G. 1981. Inside B.O.S.S.: South Africa’s Secret Police: An Ex Spy’s Dramatic and Shocking Expose. London: Penguin Books.
Arguably the single most important strategic operation ever run by NIS was Cruiser, yet few have ever heard of it It captured the essence of what NIS was all about in terms of strategic level operations. It shows the fundamental difference between NIS and the other security force structures dominant at the time – the SAP and SADF – each responsible for different parts of the overall risk landscape More importantly, Operation Cruiser was never compromised, so it ran silently in the background for many years, even to the point that Google has no mention of it, a tribute to exceptional levels of operational security In the final days of transition to democracy, a process known as revaluation occurred before amalgamation of the various services, when all official records were destroyed13. This means that all we have left is anecdotal evidence from a diminishing cohort of people with direct knowledge.
Before we can assess the impact, we first need to understand the genesis of Cruiser, and the national security milieu in which it was conceived and had to operate. This can be found in three separate events. The first was the stunted nature of intelligence structures before independence in 1961 The second was the assassination of HF Verwoerd and the third was the attempted incursion of a large armed force into South Africa by what became known as the Luthuli Detachment.
Let us examine each in more detail.
The Stunted Nature of South African Intelligence Structures
The South African intelligence structures were always stunted, until they collectively began to find their own identities over time. This somewhat startling fact can be traced back to the reluctance of the British government to give any assistance to the creation of an independent intelligence structure inside SouthAfrica14. To understand this, we need to go back to 1938 when Colonel Pierre de Villiers, in his capacity as Chief of the SouthAfrican Police (SAP), launched an official request for assistance.
The British government was fearful that the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism15, strongly articulated by the Nationalist Party (NP) after coming to power in 1948, would infiltrate such a structure, so they were not enthusiastic about the creation of an independent intelligence capability. It must be remembered that when war was declared by Britain against the Axis forces in 1938, the Union Defense Force – forerunner of the South African Defense Force (SADF) – immediately responded
13 See Turton, A.R. 2010.
14 See Turton, A.R. 2021. The Genesis and Contribution of Republican Intelligence and Bureau for State Security to South African Security. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 2. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 2 (February 2021) by Frans Bedford-Visser - Issuu
15 Giliomee, H. 2003. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
in full support of Britain. However, there was significant internal resistance in the form of the Ossewa Brandwag (OB), a paramilitary group of right-wing supporters that were mostly survivors of the British concentration camps during the Anglo Boer War16 , some of which were supportive of Hitler’s Germany. One of those supporters was BJ Vorster, who was set to become a major figure in the future, first as minister of justice, and later as prime minister
The first civilian intelligence service was therefore only created in 1963, a fact made possible because of South African independence from Britain in 1961, but after the launch of the Armed Struggle. That organ of state security became known as the Republican Intelligence Service (RIS)17 , which was an offshoot from the SAP-SB, and it started off well behind the curve so to speak, always needing to play catch-up. The RIS was somewhat stunted in its capacity, with a distinct bias towards the gathering of evidence so that the SAP could prosecute individuals deemed to be conspiring to commit the crime of treason. It had no institutional memory and lacked a legal framework to define its role and function, so it failed. One of its obvious blind spots was the inability to provide forewarning of the Verwoerd assassination, which will be dealt with in the next section.
The stunted nature of the intelligence structures was also manifest within the Bureau of State Security (BOSS)18 , which grew out of the failed RIS. After the treason trial, where the evidence of an undercover operator Q018 named Gerald Ludi19 was pivotal, it was somewhat arrogantly assumed within the NP government at the time20, that theANC/SACP/MK had been obliterated. This was not the case however, manifesting as a sabotage campaign21, so BOSS launched an operation known as Olyfberg. The purpose of Operation Olyfberg was to provide an inventory of where ANC/SACP/MK members were physically located after the treason trial had driven many into exile.
Great was the surprise when it became evident that these structures had not been smashed at all, but had rather moved underground, and into safe havens outside of South Africa. The largest clustering of the underground in Europe was in London, where the Communist Party of Great Britain
16 Hobhouse, E. 1901. Report of a visit to the camps of women and children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies London: Friars Printing Association Ltd.
17 Turton, A.R. 2021. The Genesis and Contribution of Republican Intelligence and Bureau for State Security to South African Security. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 2. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 2 (February 2021) by Frans Bedford-Visser - Issuu
18 Turton, A.R. 2021. The Genesis and Contribution of Republican Intelligence and Bureau for State Security to South African Security. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 2.
19 Secret Agent Q018 Unmasked: A Vetwoerd Spy; Security Branch Increasingly Infiltrates South African Red and Other Groups - The New York Times (nytimes.com)
20 Geldenhuys, D. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa.
21 Liebenberg, I. 1994. Resistance by the SANNC and the ANC, 1912 – 1960. In Liebenberg, I., Lortan, F., Nel, B. & van der Westhuizen, G. (Eds.) The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa. Pretoria: HAUM. Pp. 8 - 21.
(CPGB) provided sophisticated infrastructure and support. There was also substantial support being provided from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As a result, Operation Olyfberg captured masses of information about these support systems, often with the assistance of other intelligence services with whom BOSS was aligned. The Cold War dynamics played a major role in this liaison process, because while South Africa was condemned over its apartheid policies, it was also seen as a strong ally against the expansion of communism in Africa. This meant that friendly relations existed with services in countries that might have had governments hostile towards South Africa. This is an important nuance that becomes relevant to the future evolution of Operation Cruiser.
The Assassination of HF Verwoerd
This leads us logically to the second factor – the assassination of HF Verwoerd. The first attempt on Verwoerd’s life was made by David Pratt on the 9th of April 1960, a day after the ANC and PAC were banned under the Unlawful Organizations Act. Pratt was arrested and the assassination plot was thwarted, but an obvious blind spot had been identified in the weak capability of RIS to provide foreknowledge of the plot (see previous section) This issue of foreknowledge started to become increasingly relevant from this moment onwards and became a key factor in the decision to launch Operation Cruiser
During the Commonwealth Conference of 1961, HF Verwoerd was harshly criticized for his proposed policy of apartheid, so he withdrew the official application for an independent SouthAfrica to become a member. Thus began the descent of the South African government into the status of an international pariah22, but it also removed all constraints that the NP had experienced from the international community until then. This accelerated the implementation of the policy of apartheid by Verwoerd, and so the response by the combined liberation movements became focused on his removal. In 1962 the newly formed PAC, launched what became known in security force circles as Operation Rattlesnake23. This operation was centered on a planned armed uprising scheduled for 8th of April 1962, known as the Night of Death during which members from 150 clandestine cells were ordered to carry out the indiscriminate killing of any racially defined men, women and children they could find. The action was prevented when an SAP operation in Maseru yielded documents from the PAC office. All border crossings were immediately placed under SAP surveillance, and the
22 Geldenhuys, D. 1990. Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.
23 See page 767 of Volker, W. 2010. Signal Units of the South African Corps of Signals and Related Signal Services. Pretoria: Veritas Books. ISBN 978-0-620-45345-5
members of staff of Potlako Leballo (a PAC leader operating out of Lesotho) were intercepted as they tried to cross into the Free State. Confiscated documents revealed the existence of POQO, the armed wing of the PAC network, yielding around 3,000 names in total, all of whom were arrested in a nation-wide operation24 . Despite this, five white civilians were murdered by POQO, near the Bashee River Bridge bordering the Transkei. This mass arrest was a setback from which the PAC was unable to recover for many years, until they could create APLAas their new armed wing25 . This left the ANC/SACP as the firm front runner among the competing liberation movements at the time, but it also caused the ANC/SACP to postpone the launch of Operation Mayibuye. During March 1963 both MK and POQO were banned, driving both movements underground.
On 6th September 1966 Verwoerd was assassinated, driving the country into the grip of deep apprehension. BJ Vorster, a former member of the OB, and the hawkish minister of justice who tried to smash the ANC/SACP during the treason trial, became the new prime minister. These events were all deeply traumatic to the South African citizens, while also exposing the glaring weakness of the intelligence services at the time, most notably their inability to generate accurate foreknowledge of strategically significant events. It was in this context that Vorster met with Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho in January 1967 as he launched his Détente initiative. Vorster was cognizant of the PAC forces operating out of Lesotho, having been briefed on the Night of Death planning. Vorster initiated a new dual track strategy in which he offered the carrot of cooperation in the form of infrastructure development, and the stick of reprisal should the host government continue to allow liberation movement forces to use Lesotho as a launch pad for hostile operations into SouthAfrica26. This was the origin of what later became known as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project27. The significance of the series of events culminating in the assassination of Verwoerd, was the decision to accelerate the creation of a competent civilian intelligence service capable of providing forewarning in the face of what appeared to be an escalation of hostilities by the various liberation movements.
Opening the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” of South Africa – The Luthuli Detachment
24 See Volker, W. 2010:766.
25 Williams, R. 1994. The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK. In Liebenberg, I., Lortan, F., Nel, B. & van der Westhuizen, G. (Eds.) The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa. Pretoria: HAUM. Pp. 22 - 34.
26 Gutteridge, W. 1981. SouthAfrica: Strategy for Survival? In Conflict Studies, No. 131; 1-33. Reprinted in Gutteridge, W. (Ed.) 1995. South Africa: From Apartheid to National Unity, 1981-1994. Page 1-32. Aldershot, Hants & Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing. Pp 85 – 122.
27 See Ashton, P.J., Earle, A., Malzbender, D., Moloi, M.B.H., Patrick, M.J. & Turton, A.R. 2005. A Compilation of all the International Freshwater Agreements entered into by South Africa with other States. Water Research Commission Report No. 1515/1/06. Pretoria: Water Research Commission (WRC).
The third factor now comes into focus as MK launched its first incursion into South Africa with a unit known as the Luthuli Detachment. At headline level, the following facts are pertinent.
TheANC had been somewhat marginalised by the more militant PAC, but with the demise of POQO, they could now reassert their hegemony in the liberation of South Africa. Nelson Mandela, in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the recently established but still intact MK, attended the inaugural conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in February 1962. As a result of this, Morocco, Liberia and Algeria made training camps available to guerilla fighters. A year later the OAU established a Liberation Committee to funnel resources to the ANC in South Africa, FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA in Angola, and PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. ZAPU had been marginalised by ZANU, who had created strong internal support bases within Rhodesia, so they were keen to reassert their own relevance, much in the same way that the ANC was keen to do in South Africa. The ANC and ZAPU formed an alliance of USSR-backed liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia, bringing the Soviet factor firmly into the regional political dynamics The centre of USSR operational support to the liberation movements was from their embassy in Lesotho, further raising the profile of that country as a target for South African intelligence surveillance into the future (refer to the previous section)
The ANC leadership had been influenced by the prosecution of the Vietnam War, so they started to focus on lessons learned that might be replicated successfully in SouthAfrica. One such lesson was the need to create a secure corridor between their safe rear bases in Zambia and Tanzania, and their internal areas of operation inside South Africa. This sparked the desire to replicate the Ho Chi Minh Trail that had successfully sustained the communist Viet Cong guerillas in their brutal but victorious war against the nationalist south and the Americans. This meant that a trail had to be blazed through either Mozambique, Rhodesia or Botswana. This factor became a serious focal point for Joe Modise, commander of MK, who ordered the reconnaissance of various routes in April 196728. The first attempt was made when a group of MK members under the command of Josiah Jele were sent to Niassa Province, bordering on Tanzania (a friendly country) and Malawi (a hostile country) where they linked up with FRELIMO fighters. After six weeks of trying to move south towards SouthAfrica, they were brought to contact and destroyed as a fighting force.Asecond group was deployed to Cabo Delgado in the north of Mozambique, bordering on Tanzania.After five weeks they were forced to return to Tanzania where they reported that it was impossible to open a trail
28 See page 28 of Van Driel, N.M. 2003. The ANC’s First Armed Military Operation: The Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie Campaign, July – September 1967. MA Thesis in the Department of History, University of Western Cape. Available online at sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files3/the20030600.030.000.pdf
through Mozambique under present circumstances. This informed the decision to forge an alliance with ZIPRA, the armed wing of ZAPU, who also wanted to create a presence inside Rhodesia because they were being marginalised by ZANLA, the armed wing of ZANU operating out of Mozambique. Modise proposed an infiltration plan via Rhodesia, considering the two failed initiatives in Mozambique. This was approved by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC in June 1967.
On 31st July 1967 a combined force of around 80 guerilla fighters from both MK and ZIPRA crossed the Zambezi River into Rhodesia, with the stated objective of ultimately building underground structures in Cape Town, Durban, Umtata, Stutterheim, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Zeerust29 From an MK perspective this was an important operation, because from the date of their creation in December 1961 until 1963, the only actions it had launched were symbolic acts of sabotage. Consequently, from an MK perspective, this was the first military initiative designed to take the fight to the enemy – the white minority government inside South Africa.
They were tasked to avoid detection and achieve two objectives:
• To establish a base at Lupane in the north-east of Rhodesia where they must create a ZIPRA counterforce to the increasingly successful establishment of a permanent presence by ZANLA forces operating out of Mozambique.
• The MK members must create a form of Ho Chi Minh route through Rhodesia, avoiding Botswana, into South Africa, like the Viet Cong logistical trail through Cambodia during the Vietnam War.
A participant later describes the actual crossing of the Zambezi as follows30: “Prior to the crossing anANC-ZAPU reconnaissance team had preceded the [Luthuli Detachment] to select the best route possible to Rhodesia. On the morning of 31st July 1967, Oliver Tambo, along with Thomas Nkobi the Secretary General of the ANC, Joe Modise Commander in Chief of MK and Ndlovu of ZAPU stood on the cliff-like banks of the Zambezi River to witness the crossing of the main ANC-ZAPU force. John Dube, the overall commanding officer of the Luthuli Detachment, gave a speech before the river crossing commenced. “Today we are beginning the long journey home, home to those we left behind with a promise to return. We must each be determined to see our task through to the end.
29 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:34
30 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:36.
The enemy is strong, we must not underestimate his strength; but we too are strong. We are now trained, and we will meet their bullets with our own.” Before deployment each guerilla was issued with 300 rounds of ammunition and an AK assault rifle. Some were also issued with a pistol and an additional 90 rounds of ammunition. In addition, each carried two hand grenades. There were apparently no known plans for replenishment, so in the event of contact, the resources of the Luthuli Detachment would be rapidly depleted, literally in a few minutes.
Once the entire Luthuli Detachment was safely on Rhodesian soil on 1st August, after a hazardous crossing of the Zambezi River that took all night to execute, they rested and consolidated. A small force of approximately nine guerillas was sent out to do a reconnaissance of the area. They became lost and were unable to locate the main group again, so they exfiltrated into Botswana31. The rest of the group moved through the thick bush where they saw almost no human settlements. They ate all their food and starvation set in. The anticipated supply of water from streams did not materialise, so they began to succumb to thirst. Deviating from the plan, they contacted a village elder in the Wankie area. In the northern portion of the Wankie Game Reserve, the group split into two. The larger group of 56 men under the command of Lennox Lagu, were destined for South Africa. This group included Chris Hani, Peter Mfene, Douglas Wana, Mbijana, Victor Dlamini, Castro, Mashigo, Paul Sithole, Desmond, Wilson Msweli, Shooter Makasi, Eric Nduna, Basil February and JamesApril. The second group of 23 men under the command of Madzimba Matho of ZAPU, with Andries Motsepe from MK as his deputy, headed east towards Lupane. Their orders were to blow up a bridge32 (Note: The preparation for this mission was fraught with failures leaving the force ill prepared for the arduous journey. The order to blow up a bridge was inconsistent with being an advance party tasked to establish a safe base, as such an action would obviously elicit retaliation from the better supplied Rhodesian security forces.)
The first capture of a member of the Luthuli Detachment, presumably one of the reconnaissance team that became lost on 1st August, was recorded in a Rhodesian Security Force SITREP that reads as follows33: “One guerilla was captured south of Wankie. Interrogation revealed that he was part of a gang of 6 consisting of 3ANC and 3 ZAPU men. TheANC was heading for Johannesburg”. This triggered a response by the Rhodesian security forces. A second member of the Luthuli Detachment was captured near Dett, approximately 48 km from where the first capture was made on 7th August. A man with him evaded capture and escaped in a stolen car but was killed in a police
31 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:38.
32 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:40.
33 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:42.
shootout near Figtree, between Bulawayo and Plumtree. By this time the Rhodesian security forces were fully aware that a large guerilla incursion had occurred, so Operation Nickel was launched
Despite all attempts to avoid detection by the Rhodesian security forces, the Luthuli Detachment was first brought to contact by the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) during the Battle of Nyatuwe on 13th August34. The battle lasted about 10 hours, as part of Operation Nickel so named by the Rhodesian forces, and later Operation Chinaman from the SADF side. (Note: The low levels of ammunition carried by the guerillas would not sustain them for any intense firefight longer than 10 minutes, so this initial engagement must have been sporadic and drawn out, until replenishment was possible from captured materiel on 22nd August). The South African Air Force (SAAF) component became known as Operation Supercharge. These skirmishes took place in the Zambezi Valley west of Kariba, in the Wankie Game Reserve, in the Hartley / Gatooma area and the Tjolotjo area, lasting until 4th September.
The SAP Task Force mobilized under Operation Chinaman immediately became involved in interrogating captured members of the Luthuli Detachment. This was the first time that credible information was received by the South African intelligence structures of a change in strategy by the ANC, indicating a glaring gap in prior knowledge of the intention of the liberation movements to escalate. Significantly, this merely reinforced the intelligence gap indicated by the PAC mobilization referred to earlier in this paper. This subsequently fed into the planning for Operation Cruiser in the 1980’s. Extracts from the SAP Task Force report reveal the following35: Two ANC guerillas were arrested and 4 were killed during a skirmish, of which 2 were ANC. Their names were James Masimani and David Sibojeni. Three guerillas were arrested in Botswana and were thought to be members of the ANC or PAC. One was named George Muuyane. During interrogation it was revealed that a group of 30 guerillas, of which 16 to 20 were ANC members, were told on 3rd August to prepare for a journey to South Africa. On Friday 4th August a Land Rover transported them from Linanda near Lusaka to a farm close to Livingstone where they received military equipment. They were immediately returned to the river which they crossed the next morning. They were instructed to travel to Bulawayo where they would be given further instructions and explosives. One guerilla told the Rhodesian police that a group of 30 consisted of 29 ANC and 1 ZAPU member, were instructed to travel to South Africa by avoiding contact with people in Botswana as they were not sympathetic to the cause. The farm was believed to be Drummond Park Farm, 7 km west of Livingstone and 6 km north of the Zambezi River.
34 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003.
35 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:46
On 19th August 1967 a joint communique was issued by Oliver Tambo of the ANC, and James Chikerema of ZAPU, announcing the military alliance between MK and ZIPRA, in response to the contact reports coming out from the Rhodesian security forces and making their way into the media. It read as follows36: “Furious fighting is taking place in various parts of Southern Rhodesia. From the thirteenth of this month, the area of Wankie has been the scene of the most daring battles ever fought between freedom fighters and the white oppressor’s army in Rhodesia… We wish to declare here that the fighting that is presently going on in the Wankie area is indeed being carried out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into the country as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound for its own destination. It is the determination of these combined forces to fight the common settler enemy to the finish, at any point of the encounter as they make their way to their respective zones”.
Showing considerable skill and growing confidence, an RAR force was ambushed by the Luthuli Detachment on 22nd August. This is how Chris Hani described the engagement37: “The enemy got impatient. They stood up and began to ask, ‘where are the terrorists?’ This was when there was a fusillade of furious fire from us…They simply ran for their dear lives leaving behind food, ammunition and communication equipment… This was the first time we had what I can call a civilised meal –cheese, biltong, meat and other usual rations carried by the regular army… For us that day was a day of celebrations because with our own eyes we had seen the enemy run… A feeling of faith in one another and recognition of the courage of the unit developed... There was no going back… It was a memorable victory, and to every soldier victory is important. This was a virgin victory for us since we had never fought with modern weapons against the enemy. For us that day was a day of celebrations because with our own eyes we had seen the enemy run. We had seen the enemy frozen with fear… We had also seen and observed each other reacting to the enemy’s attack. A feeling of faith in one another and recognition of the courage of the unit developed.”
On 23rd August a follow-up was initiated by the RAR, this time tracking members of the Luthuli Detachment heading towards Botswana after the skirmish the previous day, some of whom were wearing captured RAR uniforms.An airstrike was called in but was ineffective.Anticipating a second attack the MK unit doubled back on its track and skilfully laid an ambush. Nkosi, one of the MK
36 See Van Driel, N.M. 2003:47.
37 See Hani, C. The Wankie Campaign. Pages 2-3. Available online at www.anc.org/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html cited by Van Driel, N.M., 2003:39.
members, later stated the following38: “On that day we heard that there were some people nearby us. Our commander moved out to find out who those persons were. He was wearing one of the Rhodesian security uniforms – one of those we had picked up – he came back running towards us and told us that the Rhodesian forces have come down near us, and he gave us an order to move forward in a line towards them. We were sitting, waiting in that position. Our light machine guns were on the flanks and in the centre was another light machine gun, and in between those there were the sub-machine guns and the carbine.” Chris Hani, accompanied by JamesApril, Douglas Wana, Jack Simelane, Victor Dlamini and others later recalled these events as follows39: “We crawled towards the enemy’s position and first attacked their tents with grenades and then followed with ourAK’s and LMG’s. The enemy fought back furiously and after fifteen minutes we called for reinforcements from the rear, and within ten minutes we overran the enemy’s position. The enemy fled leaving behind supplies, weapons, grenades, uniforms and communication radios.” Another skirmish occurred when an MK group encountered a different RAR patrol later that night. This was later described by Morodi as follows40: “Just as we walk – it was full moon – we saw four black soldiers coming. And when they saw us, they say, ‘No! Don’t kill us because we are also black’. We opened fire! We didn’t waste time. We were afraid if we capture them then they are going to see our number and they are going to see how we are armed, and they may escape and give a proper report to that side… Within two, three minutes, we hear firing at the river”. This was a carefully laid ambush by the RAR, but the stopper group had become confused by the uniforms being switched and engaged the ambush group in a friendly fire incident. In the confusion, the MK group slipped away through a donga, where they concealed some of the weapons taken from the RAR. They then sought shelter at Sithole’s shop at Gulakabile where they rested for a few days.
On 1st September 1967 the SADF-SF committed ground forces (1-Para) 41 as part of Operation Chinaman, after the Airforce elements supplied under Operation Supercharge were unable to stem the tide42. This elevated response brought Operation Nickel to a new level capable of destroying the Luthuli Detachment as an effective fighting force. Leonard Nkosi, the MK Chief of Staff responsible for the operation, escaped to South Africa, where he was captured in Durban and turned as an Askari. He was later assassinated.
38 Van Driel, N.M., 2003:42 citing The State vs James Edward April, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division, Case No 84/71, 10 – 15 May 1971.
39 Van Driel, N.M., 2003:42 citing Hani, C. The Wankie Campaign. Pages 2-3. Available online at www.anc.org/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html
40 Van Driel, N.M., 2003:46.
41 See Volker, W. 2010:322
42 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:60.
On 4th September 1967 the final clash with the Luthuli Detachment took place. The presence of SA security force personnel was now noted by the guerillas, so the 34 strong SouthAfrican bound group decided to disengage and cross into Botswana where they were arrested over the next few days and charged with illegally bringing weapons into the country43 .
On 14th September, the British Foreign Office issued a formal protest at the presence of SAP and SADF personnel in Rhodesia, stating that “no foreign security forces have the right to enter or operate without the consent of her Majesty’s government”44
On 26th September, the Rhodesian high command held a formal debriefing to capture lessons learned from Operation Nickel. These lessons were summarised as follows45:
• No prior intelligence was received about the size of the MK/ZIPRA group, so incorrect assumptions were made when deploying air and ground units.
• FN rifles on full auto consumed a lot of ammunition, so preference was again given to a MAG in each stick. Both RAR and RLI would now carry 150 rounds per person.
• On all occasions the lack of intelligence led tactical commanders to underestimate the size of the Luthuli Detachment.
• Operational security needed to be improved as official reports made their way into the public domain, creating panic and feeding rumours, and falling into the hands of the enemy.
• Thick bush aided concealment, so the use of napalm or chemical defoliant would be considered in future operations.
• CASEVAC response was inadequate so procedures would be revised to speed up the process.
MK high command also held their own debriefing Of the original 80 strong Luthuli Detachment, 74 were killed in action, and of the six survivors, one made itback to SouthAfrica where he was arrested and turned as an Askari, while others went to Zambia and Swaziland where little was known of their whereabouts46. Anxious to keep the momentum going, MK leadership decided to deploy a second unit of MK/ZIPRA forces in December 196747. This force was known as the Sipholilo Campaign48 , it was larger than the Luthuli Detachment, and was under ANC command. It remained undetected
43 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:47
44 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:92
45 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:67
46 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:87
47 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:93.
48 Lodge, T. 1986. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
until March 1968 when the first engagement took place with a combined Rhodesian and South African security force. This triggered a series of skirmishes that ended in June 1968. Rhodesian security forces claimed 55 KIA in this series of engagements. A third combined MK/ZIPRA force infiltrated into Rhodesia in July 196849, once again learning from the previous two operations. In 1969 the ANC planned Operation J, a daring amphibious mission to transport MK cadres to the Transkei by ship50, given that infiltration over land now appeared to be impossible. This gave a clear indication that the risk landscape had changed in a fundamental way since MK had gone on the offensive in 1967.
In August 1968 BJ Vorster appointed General Hendrik van den Bergh to form BOSS, after the shortcomings of RIS became patently obvious51. Part of this decision was informed by the military escalation of theANC noted previously, but another part of the regrouping of the PAC, who launched the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) in 1968, to replace POQO that had been effectively neutralised by the SAP. This was followed in 1972 by the Potgieter Commission, which tabled a report that became the foundation for the subsequent Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, belatedly giving BOSS its legal mandate52. To place this in context however, it must be noted that SADF Special Forces (SADF-SF) were also in a state of vigorous and rapid change, since the Battle of Ongulumbashe that took place against SWAPO in 196653 had shown the inappropriateness of deploying the SAP against armed guerillas with a strong willingness to fight. This was the first action against SWAPO and was called Operation Blou Wildebeest54, replicating the experience of Operation Chinaman in Rhodesia.
In summary, between 1967 and 1969, the ANC had launched no less than five armed formations –two in Mozambique and three in Rhodesia – collectively tasked to open a logistics route from safe rear bases into SouthAfrica, consistent with the successful strategy adopted by the Viet Cong when they created the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Cambodia and were seriously considering an amphibious landing in the Transkei. In none of these operations was foreknowledge available to the South African security forces. This raised the need to create two specific capabilities within the South African security force cluster:
49 See Van Driel, N.M., 2003:93
50 See Volker, W. 2010:765.
51 See NIS, 1994.
52 See Turton, A.R. 2021. The Genesis and Contribution of Republican Intelligence and Bureau for State Security to South African Security. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 2. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 2 (February 2021) by Frans Bedford-Visser - Issuu
53 See Volker, W. 2010:322.
54 Scheepers, M. 2012. Striking Inside Angola with 32 Battalion. Pinetown: 30° South Publishers (Pty) Ltd., Pp 20.
• The strategic-level capacity to generate accurate foreknowledge of all decision-making processes taking place within the leadership cohort of the liberation movements. From this we can trace the subsequent evolution of Operation Cruiser.
• The tactical-level capacity to interdict, neutralise, capture and turn members of the armed wings of the various liberation movements. From this we can trace the subsequent evolution of the Askari capability at Vlakplaas
Van Driel provides a credible summary of events, and notes that the Wankie Campaign was important because all parties were forced to reassess their strategies and positions. I concur with this observation. The ANC did this at the Morogoro Conference in 1969; the South African government did it by consolidating cooperation with the Rhodesian and Portuguese governments; and the Rhodesian security forces introduced new protocols into their standard operational procedures
The South African Dilemma Arising from the Regional Security Milieu in the 1970s
The New York times spoke of the evolution of the South African intelligence structures in an article published about the activities of Gerald Ludi55. In this regard they were completely correct in their observation. But this is only part of the story, because in the 1970’s there was massive change afoot. Escalation by the ANC through the actions of the Luthuli Detachment brought South African security forces into Rhodesia where a policy of containment was successfully implemented. The South African security forces underwent rapid change, with the emergence of a highly innovative special force capability on the one hand, and the evolution of RIS into BOSS on the other. The two overlapped in the skills needed to turn enemy combatants into assets under control. This was spearheaded in Rhodesia by Selous Scouts56, and these skills were rapidly diffused into all the South African security structures.
The capacity to turn the enemy into assets was taken to a high level of sophistication by BOSS, who were actively experimenting with operational tradecraft. This was based on the observed propensity for self-enrichment among some of the liberation movement elite. The
55 Secret Agent Q018 Unmasked: A Verwoerd Spy; Security Branch Increasingly Infiltrates South African Red and Other Groups - The New York Times (nytimes.com) 56 Stiff, P. & Reid-Daly, R. 1983. Selous Scouts - Top Secret War. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
internal debate was about the most appropriate tactical platform to neutralize the threat posed by an increasingly aggressive ANC and PAC, with two sides evident:
• The one side favoured penetration by turning selected individuals within the enemy organization into assets under control. This was a relatively quick process, relying on an accurate identification of the psychological need of the person of interest, but it required highly skilled agent handlers with the capacity to consistently exploit weakness in the person of interest.
• The other side favoured infiltration into the enemy, must like had happened in the highly successful Gerald Ludi case.
BOSS experimented with both, but lacked the institutionalized analytical capability needed to support a sophisticated assessment of persons of interest, so they initially leant towards the second option – infiltration. To this end Operation Daisy57 was launched as a joint effort between BOSS and the SAP-SB. This was under the command of a BOSS officer, who later became the author’s senior in chain of command, with the nickname of “Koos Daisy” because of the successes in the infiltration of professional agents into the target organization. Within the SAP-SB domain, this evolved into Operation Long Reach; and the successful use of askaris such as Leonard Nkosi, the MK Chief of Staff from the Luthuli Detachment
Then, in the mid 70’s, the entire regional balance of power changed when the Portuguese government was challenged by the Carnation Revolution in 1974. This created a ripple effect across southern Africa. In 1975 SWAPO launched an attack against five SADF bases in one day58 , announcing their arrival as an effective combat force. In July 1975 the Portuguese army was withdrawn from Calueque, leaving a South African engineering contingent working on the hydropower project highly exposed. This triggered an SADF intervention to initially protect the Ruacana Hydro Power plant. On 28th July Operational Order 8/75 was signed by PW Botha in his capacity as Minister of Defense, authorizing SADF support to the FNLA with the intention of halting MPLA advances in Angola59. On 29th September 1975 the SADF approved a formal plan which
57 Not to be confused with the SADF operation with the same name launched in 1981. See https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Operation_Daisy&oldid=1002202392 and Scheepers, M. 2012:22.
58 See Volker, W. 2010:745.
59 Nortje, P. 2003. 32 Battalion. Cape Town: Struik Publishers.
converted the de facto presence of SADF troops into the officially designated Operation Savannah60 . Over a period of 33 days, the SADF covered 3,159 km, engaged in 14 full-scale battles and 21 skirmishes, leaving 210 known enemy dead, 96 wounded and 56 captured prisoners of war. In response to this escalation Operation Carlotta was launched by Cuba61 on 4th November 1975, in an escalation that eventually brought 300,000 foreign troops into Angola62 During the Battle of Quifangondo on 10th November 1975, the CIA abandoned the South African force operating near Caxito, leaving the SADF stranded and surrounded. This triggered Operation Rubber Duck, which brought the South African Navy into the Angolan War with the deployment of SAS President Kruger. The entire SADF force abandoned by the CIA was successfully rescued by the navy on 27th November 1975 atAmbrizete. TheAmericans were never trusted again by the SouthAfrican security force elites from this moment onward63. On 25th December 1975 the Clark Amendment was approved by the US Senate, ending support for any allies in Angola.
In 1976 PLAN became very aggressive, launching 21 operations against the SADF in one year64 . Foreign governments took sides inadvertently escalating the conflict. For example, Great Britain and Germany gave significant development aid to the liberation movements operating out of Lesotho, bringing even more attention by the SouthAfrican security force community to that country. At the same time Zambia allowed its territory to be used by PLAN and MK guerillas. As part of this program a SWAPO cadre named Tangeni Nuukuuawo returned to Zambia after spending time in Europe. He was arrested and taken to Nampundwe camp where he was interrogated as a suspected spy65 . This aggressive tendency by the counterintelligence personnel of the liberation movements was observed by BOSS, so they sought to better understand it for consideration in their future operational strategy.
The SADF withdrew its forces fromAngola after Operation Savannah in 1976. The order to withdraw demoralized the SADF troops, some of whom were in sight of Luanda, the Angolan capital city. In May 1976 around 1,000 SWAPO cadres were arrested for alleged insubordination and detained at a camp known as Mborama near Kabwe, Zambia. One of those prisoners was named Cornelius
60 Nortje, P. 2003:9.
61 See Gleijeses, P. 1997. Havana’s Policy in Africa, 1959 – 76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars: Washington DC; Pp 5-18. Available online at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp
62 See Volker, W. 2010:748.
63 Turton, A.R. 2021. Geopolitical Background to the War in Angola 1975 – 1989: An Intelligence Officers Perspective. Paper presented at the Second Watercourse History Festival, Plettenberg Bay, 25 February 2021. Available online at (99+) Turton Public Release Plett History | Anthony Turton - Academia.edu
64 See Volker, W. 2010:745-747.
65 Groth, S. 1995. Namibia, The Wall of Silence: The Dark Days of the Liberation Struggle. Wuppertal: P. Hammer. Pp. 49.
24
Motinga who later described the conditions in this camp66 . BOSS noted that the liberation movements at the time (SWAPO, ANC, PAC) were paranoid about infiltration by the South African security services, so they generally all had an aggressive approach to weeding out suspected agents. This greatly assisted the security forces in the process of turning guerillas into assets under control
SWAPO prisoners were released from detention on 5th August 1976 and then massacred by their own forces in an event reported by the BBC. Sam Nujoma announced, during an event to celebrate the independence of Mozambique, that an internal investigation would be launched, and the perpetrators punished by execution67 In 1977 PLAN launched 18 attacks against the SADF68 On 20th April 1978 a decision was made by SADF high command to create a specialized airborne operational entity in the Citizen Force capable of providing a balanced all-arms capability as needed. This resulted in the establishment of 44 Parachute Brigade (44-Para), located at Orange Free State Command alongside the old Tempe Airfield in Bloemfontein. Brigadier M.J. Du Plessis, OC Free State Command, was tasked to coordinate the creation of this unit with Colonel J.D. Breytenbach, founding commander of 1-Para, 32 Battalion and Reconnaissance Commando as his Parachute Staff Officer69. Within a month of this event 44 Parachute Brigade was deployed for the largest ever airborne assault since WW II – Operation Reindeer – the attack on Cassinga. This gave an indication of just how capable the SADF was at this time. In response to this PLAN established a special operations unit based at Lubango and Dongo. Their targets were the commercial farming areas of South WestAfrica70. The SAAF launched a strike to neutralize the MK camp based at Novo Katenga on 14th March 197971
On the Rhodesian front, ZANLA developed a strategic plan to infiltrate armed forces into Matabeleland and to sever Rhodesian rail links to South Africa. This raised the tactical significance of Pafuri, where the borders of South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique are linked. An agreement was reached in Rhodesia on 12th November 1975 to combine the two liberation movements, ZANLA and ZIPRA, into a single united force named ZIPA. A group of 90 ZIPA guerrillas infiltrated from Mozambique into Rhodesia, at a point south of Nyamapanda, on 21st January 1976. A day later
66 See Groth, S. 1995:57
67 See Groth, S. 1995:60
68 See Volker, W. 2010:745-747.
69 See Volker, W. 2010:313
70 See Nortje, P. 2003:7
71 See Scheepers, M. 2012:41
they were brought to contact, with the killing of 4 and the capture of 1, who revealed under interrogation that there was a simultaneous three-pronged infiltration into Rhodesia. This triggered Operation Thrasher covering the Eastern Highlands to defend the second front caused by withdrawal of Portuguese forces from Mozambique.
Another mass infiltration of around 500 guerrillas occurred into the Eastern Highlands of Rhodesia from Mozambique during April 1976. This triggered Operation Repulse in the South-East of the country as the balance of power shifted During June another group of 300 guerrillas was infiltrated into the south-east Lowveld areas of Rhodesia. It was now evident that the second front in Mozambique was becoming a major infiltration route. To counter this Selous Scouts launched Operation Long John to attack the ZANLA base at Mapai inside Mozambique. On 9th August 1976 Operation Eland was launched by Rhodesian SF to neutralize the ZANLA base on the Nyadzonya River in Mozambique72. This was a daring raid in which the strike force dressed up like FRELIMO soldiers and entered the base during a formal parade with a concentrated ZANLA force assembled in one place. They were mercilessly engaged by ground fire, and later intercepts revealed that 1,028 guerrillas were killed, 309 wounded in hospital with 1,000 missing. Civilian casualties caused tension with South Africa where John Vorster was engaged in Détente, so Operation Polo was cancelled73
On 24th October 1976 an SADF team of senior officer’s travelled to Rhodesia tasked to do a strategic assessment of the security situation. To demonstrate the continued viability of the Rhodesian armed forces Operation Mardon was launched into Mozambique. This short, sharp deep-penetration operation lasted four days, attacking ZANLA targets at Massangena, Maxaila, Jorge do Limpopo and Chigamane; and FRELIMO targets in the Tete Province. In a desperate bid to demonstrate viability, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) gave official support to RENAMO on 25th December 1976. Some scholars say this is the date that RENAMO was officially founded, but it had been running before this. The CIO selectedAndré Matangaidze as the commander. In October 1977 the Selous Scouts handed over operational responsibility to the Rhodesian SAS for securing ZANLA infiltration routes from the Gaza Province of Mozambique. The Rhodesian SAS lacked the manpower to execute this task, given the vastness of the area, and the sheer weight of numbers (ZANLAand FRELIMO) pitted against them. On 23rd November 1977 Operation Dingo was launched by Rhodesian security forces against ZANLA bases around Chimoio in Mozambique, killing around 2,000 guerrillas. In December 1977 a force of fifty operators from 1-Recce in Durban was deployed to Rhodesia, where they formed D Squadron SAS. This provided valuable reinforcement to the
72 Stiff, P. & Reid-Daly, R. 1983. Selous Scouts - Top Secret War. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
73 Geldenhuys, P. 2007. Rhodesian Air Force Operations: With Air Strike Log. Durban: Just Done Publications. Pp 113.
embattled Rhodesian security forces and gave South Africa a springboard into Mozambique from where it was anticipated that ANC infiltrations would also occur into South Africa. D Squadron SAS was based at Buffalo Range.
As the Rhodesian Bush War ground to an end in 1978, MK again made an appearance in Matabeleland where they were deployed to assist ZIPRA (ZAPU) in its internal power struggle against ZANLA(ZANU). This was their first appearance in Rhodesia since being neutralized in 1967 during Operation Nickel On 28th January 1978 Lieutenant “Kokkie” du Toit, a 1-Recce operator in D Squadron SAS, was killed in action near Mapaiin Mozambique. InApril 1978 General Magnus Malan led a team of senior SADF officers on a liaison visit to Rhodesia. At a meeting with their Rhodesian counterparts, Malan announced South African intentions to escalate UNITA activities in Angola and they stated that South Africa will stay in SWA/Namibia for ten more years. These prophetic words later coincide with the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988. Discussed at that meeting was the strategic risk of future ANC infiltrations into South Africa from Mozambique. (Note: An element of the mythology in Liberation Movement circles is that the SADF was defeated at the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. This does not stand up to rigorous scrutiny when facts such as these are placed in the public arena. If the SADF was beaten, which allegedly forced the withdrawal in 1988, then why would there be plans at such an early stage to withdraw well before the battle?)74 In June 1978 the SADF formulated a plan to provide a safe haven to Rhodesian SF in the event of state collapse and a bloody retaliation against those soldiers and their families.
On 3rd September 1978 ZIPRAshot downAir Rhodesia Flight RH 825 (Hunyani) with 48 passengers on board75 using a SAM-7 Strela 2 rocket76. Eighteen people survived the crash, but 10 were murdered on the ground, mostly by being bayoneted by ZIPRA forces anxious to make their presence felt in the dying phases of the Rhodesian Bush War. This was the first terror incident of its kind in the region, and it sent shock waves throughout society77. This was not a legitimate act of war, and it changed public opinion against ZIPRA On 19th October 1978 Operation Gatling was launched to neutralize several ZIPRAtargets in Zambia. This led to the now famous incident in which Green Leader contacted Lusaka Tower, informing them of the operation. Lusaka tower leaves all air traffic control to the RhAF for the entire duration of the operation, including the granting of permission to a Kenya Airways pilot to land after the operation had been completed78. As part of Operation
74 See Mills, G. & Williams, D. 2006. Seven Battles that Shaped South Africa. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
75 See Air Rhodesia Flight 825 - Wikipedia
76 See http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Strela_2
77 Nell, K. 2010. Viscount Down: The Complete Story of the Rhodesian Viscount Disasters Told by an SAS Soldier. Publisher unknown. Available online at www.viscountdown.com
78 See Geldenhuys, P. 2007:162-164
Acrobat, SADF-SF under the command of Lieutenant Douw Steyn, supported the Rhodesian SAS in a mission to identify and neutralize crossing points on the south bank of the Zambezi River 20 km from Victoria Falls in November 1978. Four boat loads of ZIPRA forces were engaged and destroyed79 . As the year came to an end the petrol depot in Salisbury was attacked by ZIPRA and left blazing for days. This was a major attack on a strategic target and indicated that the Rhodesian liberation struggle was entering its final phase of internal operations.
On 12th February 1979 ZIPRA shot down a second Air Rhodesia Viscount (Umniati) with a SAM 7 Strela 2 missile80, killing all 59 passengers on board. This attack on civilian targets confirmed that terrorism had become the modus operandi of the various liberation movements81. In retaliation for the downing ofAir Rhodesia RH 827 by ZIPRA, the RhodesianAir Force (RhAF) launched Operation Vanity by striking the ZIPRAbase at Villa da Luso, close to the Benguela railway line. On 22nd March the Selous Scouts captured a ZIPRA Intelligence Officer by the name of Elliot Sibanda82 . He revealed Russian plans to provide ZIPRA with a conventional military capability consisting of five battalions of mechanized infantry and armoured formations. This was the first evidence of a tactical change from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare in Rhodesia, which reflected the changing strategic landscape. This intelligence provided additional evidence that the various wars of liberation being fought in Southern Africa were localized theatres of the Cold War, because an element of this planned capability was the desire by the Russians to neutralize the communist Chinese surrogates (ZANLA) in a post-Bush War Zimbabwe. In May 1979 a select group of SADF-SF soldiers joined the Selous Scouts for training at their base near Kariba called Wafa Wafa Wasara Wasara. In August the Commonwealth Conference took place in Lusaka to discuss the future of Zimbabwe. The FrontLine States placed pressure on Britain to recognize both ZANU and ZAPU.
On 2nd September 1979 Operation Uric was launched after intelligence assessments revealed that between April and July alone, 3,149 war deaths had occurred in Rhodesia, consisting of 1,808 guerrillas, 1,192 civilians (1,161 black and 31 white), with SF losses at 14183. This assessment revealed that a staggering 10,800 armed ZANLA guerrillas were currently operational inside Rhodesia, with a further 17,000 in the infiltration pipeline, of which around 50% would be inserted via the so-called Russian Front from Gaza Province in Mozambique. Recent captures confirmed that 200 FRELIMO were also operating inside Rhodesia. Operation Uric was thus designed to deal
79 See Volker, W. 2010:570
80 See http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Strela_2
81 See Nell, K. 2010.
82 Stiff, P. & Reid-Daly, R. 1983. Selous Scouts - Top Secret War. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
83 See Geldenhuys, P. 2007:178.
a decisive blow to the transport infrastructure needed to sustain those infiltrations. Five tactical bridges were targeted along with a pre-emptive strike against Mapai, Barragem and Maxaila. The entire RhAF was committed to this one operation as were several SADF-SF elite specialists84. All five bridges were assaulted simultaneously by the SAS and prepared for demolition, which took place at 16h30 dropping four (Barragem failed to fall). (Note: Operation Uric was the Rhodesian name for this event, with Operation Bootlace denoting the SADF aspect). On 6 September a SAAF Puma helicopter (Number 164) under the command of Captain Paul Velleman transporting SF troops was shot down near Mapai during Operation Bootlace, killing the aircrew and all 11 soldiers on board. Some commentators called this, “the worst single military disaster of the Rhodesian Bush War”85 The KIA’s were as follows: Captain Paul Velleman, Captain Joey du Plooy, Captain Charlie Small (the Operation Uric Demolitions Officers), Lieutenant Bruce Burns, Sergeant Michael Jones, Corporal Le Roy Duberley, Corporal Hugh Fry, Corporal Peter Fox, Trooper Jacobus Briel, Trooper J.M. Crow, Trooper Brian Enslin, Trooper Stephen King and Trooper David Prosser. This caused the South African Government to rethink its support to Rhodesia.
On 7th September Operation Bootlace II was an attack on the Mabalane Prison in Mozambique. The task was given to SADF-SF (D Sqn SAS) under the command of Captain Hannes Venter, but it was cancelled because of the downing of the SAAF Puma the previous day, and the sudden loss of appetite for risk by the South African political leadership86. The reason for the prison attack was to free potential RENAMO supporters and thus build their effective strength as a surrogate force. The SADF-SF component of Operation Bootlace returned to their base at the Durban Bluff. General Walls regarded this as the first tactical repulse of Rhodesian forces on external operations during the entire Bush War. On 18th September two dredgers were sunk in Beira harbour by a combined SADF-SF (4-Recce) and Rhodesian SAS team, as part of Operation Acrobat, to close the harbour to shipping, and thus raise the stakes for Mozambican support to ZANLA and MK87
In September fighting between ZANLA (with FRELIMO support) and ZIPRA (with MK support) started in Matabeleland. Heavy fighting was reported from Beit Bridge, Filabusi, Gwanda and Motopos. The SADF gave air support in the form of Operation Bowler88, which was based at Gwanda and formed the main support platform for Fire Force Zulu. On 24th September 1979 senior officers in the Rhodesian Armed Forces were briefed by General Peter Walls that they should expect an
84 Diedericks, A. 2007. Journey Without Boundaries: The Operational Life and Experiences of a SA Special Forces Small Team Operator. Durban: Just Done Publications.
85 See Geldenhuys, P. 2007:179.
86 See Volker, W. 2010:571.
87 See Volker, W. 2010:571.
88 See Geldenhuys, P. 2007:183.
announcement from Ian Smith89 regarding what was called “capitulation” by some90 . The Rhodesian Bush War was now technically unwinnable without USA and South African support, since the opening of the second front in Mozambique, but most of the Rhodesian officers had not yet accepted this inevitability. The RhAF was informed of the decision to end Operation Polo and withdraw the SAAF pilots, which reduced their combat capacity considerably. In November 1979 Operation Dice was launched as a joint operation between SADF SF (1-Recce) and the Rhodesian SF (SAS). The objective was the destruction of bridges in Zambia to prevent a conventional invasion of Rhodesia by ZANLA. The commander of the SADF-SF was Major Bert Sachse, and he had a team of 25 operators. The operation was successful with the destruction of 5 of the 9 bridges originally targeted91
On 21 December 1979 the Lancaster House Agreement was reached, effectively ending the Rhodesian Bush War.
The South African Front in the 70’s
Against the background recorded above, we can now focus on SouthAfrica to assess the relevance of the security dilemma being presented to the government. On 16th June 1976 the Soweto Riots leave 575 dead, but exact estimates vary. This launched a new phase of the armed struggle inside South Africa as unrest started to spill over into the rest of the country. In effect, the buffer zone that used to exist because of the wars of liberation inAngola, Rhodesia and Mozambique, was no longer present. South African security forces were now thinly spread externally but were suddenly facing a growing internal uprising as well92 .
In 1977 masses of disaffected black South Africans migrated across the borders to join the armed struggle after the Soweto Riots. Refugee processing centres were established in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland for the purpose of channelling people into the ANC and PAC. These refugee centres became legitimate targets for intelligence gathering because they were also recruiting grounds for MK and APLA cadres. MK activity inside South Africa consequently increased. The first victim of security force retaliation was Solomon Mahlangu, an MK operative that was captured, tried and given the death sentence. He later became a hero of the struggle with a school in Tanzania being
89 Wilkins, P.I. 2000. Chopper Pilot. Durban: Just Done Publications.
90 See Geldenhuys, P. 2007:114.
91 See Volker, W. 2010:572.
92 Turton, A.R. 2021. Understanding the Evolution of the National Intelligence Service and its Contribution to South African Democracy. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 4. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 4 by Hennie Heymans - Issuu
named after him, known in intelligence circles as SOMAFCO (Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College). In a general election in South Africa, the Nationalist Party won 134 seats out of 164. The United Party lost credibility, and the Progressive Federal Party became the official opposition with 17 seats. An emboldened NP published The Defence White Paper which became part of the total national strategy93 as the country was mobilized on a war footing under a new ideology of the total onslaught94, with the cold war as a strategic backdrop and South Africa, Israel and Taiwan seen as pivotal states in this global balance of power95 National service (conscription) was extended for all white males from 12 months followed by a series of three military camps, to 24 months followed by a minimum of 10 years camps alternating between a 30-day training camp and a 120-day operational camp. As part of the total onslaught strategy, the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) was mooted, embracing all states south of the Zambezi, united by a nonaggression pact and enjoying a common economic market. InApril 1977 theAuditor General started an audit of Operation Senekal which triggered a growing scrutiny of BOSS activities96 .
In February 1978 the Auditor General released the report on Operation Senekal. The Info Scandal took on new energy as this report is debated in public as BOSS activities were placed under such intense scrutiny that BOSS slowly became paralysed97 In April MK infiltrated into Bophuthatswana from Botswana where they were intercepted in a fierce fire fight. As the public pressure ratcheted up over the Info Scandal, John Vorster resigned as prime minister on 20th September, ending the period of détente and opening the door to the hawks in Pretoria under PW Botha. Sensing the taste of victory, a group of senior MK officers, including Joe Slovo (MK Chief of Staff) and Joe Modise (MK Commander), travelled to Vietnam to consult with General Giap. The advice given was for MK to develop a coherent strategy. This later became known as ‘Armed Propaganda’ with three phases to it: the Year of the Spear (1979) commemorating the centenary of the Zulu victory over the British at Isandlwana; the Year of the Charter (1980) to popularize the 25th anniversary of the Freedom Charter; and the Year of the Youth (1981) to commemorate the 5th anniversary of the Soweto uprising. These would lay the foundation for a subsequent people’s war. With the resignation of Vorster, PW Botha was elected by the NP Caucus as the new leader in September. The era of
93 Geldenhuys, D. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa.
94 Frankel, P.H. 1984. Pretoria’s Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa. London: Cambridge University Press.
95 Turton, A.R. 2003. The Political Aspects of Institutional Development in the Water Sector: South Africa and its International River Basins. Unpublished draft of a D.Phil. Thesis. Department of Political Science. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.
96 See Rees, M. & Day, C. 1989. Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal. Johannesburg: MacMillan.
97 NIS. 1994. National Intelligence Service: 1969 - 1994. Special Commemorative Book given to all serving officers of the National Intelligence Service. Pretoria: National Intelligence Service.
détente was over, and the coming dawn of the total onslaught was thrust upon South Africa as the hawks ascended to power98
This was ushered in by the testing of South Africa’s first nuclear weapon in 197999 . Simultaneously the SouthAfrican Government provided proof of MK activities in Botswana and asked that measures be taken to prevent this from occurring in future. In response MK activities inside South Africa included an attack on Police Stations in Booysens, Moroka and Orlando. On the foreign policy front, Minister Pik Botha announced that the South African Government’s vision for a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) embraced the population south of the Zambezi and Cunene Rivers all joining forces to design a common approach to security, economic development and regional politics. This represented the carrot of development within the prevailing total onslaught threat perception. It was in this light that the subsequent economic development agreements, specifically those involving water resource management100, should be interpreted101 .
In April 1979 the General Officer Commanding SF (GOC-SF) decided to start a pseudo-operations unit. He appointed Major Neil Kriel from Selous Scouts to start what became known as D40 and then Project Barnacle. The unit was based at Renosterspruit Farm near Hartebeespoort Dam. In May 1979 Operation Latsa was launched bySADF-SF. The objective was the creation of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) as the armed wing of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) to counter the actions by Leabua Jonathan of the Basutoland National Party (BNP) 102 A month later Koevoet was created as a special operations unit active in the border area between SWA, Angola and Zambia. This was called Ops-K with their operational headquarters in Oshakati, also known as Zulu-Base, because of their radio callsign103. They operated out of Sector 10 into Angola up to Namacunde104 .
98 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
99 Venter, A.J. 2008. How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs (And Then Abandoned its Nuclear Weapons Program). Johannesburg: Ashanti Publications.
100 Turton, A.R. 2008. The Southern African Hydropolitical Complex. In Varis, O., Tortajada, C. & Biswas, A.J. (Eds.) Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes Berlin: Springer Verlag. Pp. 21 – 80. Formerly entitled A Critical Assessment of the River Basins at Risk in the Southern African Hydropolitical Complex. Paper presented at the Workshop on the Management of International Rivers and Lakes, hosted by the Third World Centre for Water Management and the Helsinki University of Technology. 17-19 August 2005. Helsinki, Finland. CSIR Report No. ENVP-CONF 2005-001.
101 Ashton, P.J., Earle, A., Malzbender, D., Moloi, M.B.H., Patrick, M.J. & Turton, A.R. 2005. A Compilation of all the International Freshwater Agreements entered into by South Africa with other States. Water Research Commission Report No. 1515/1/06. Pretoria: Water Research Commission (WRC).
102 See Volker, W. 2010:571.
103 Stiff, P. 1998. Nine Days of War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia: 1979 – 1989. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
104 Hooper, J. 1990. Beneath the Visiting Moon: Images of Combat in Southern Africa. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co.
From this data we conclude that the 1970’s was a turbulent decade. From a national security perspective, we can summarize it as follows:
• The Portuguese coup d’état had fundamentally altered the regional security dynamics, with rapid transitions in Angola and Mozambique where liberation movements became the government.
• The USA defeat in Vietnam caused them to have little appetite for foreign adventures in southern Africa, so their withdrawal from Quifangondo became a defining feature.
• The victory by the liberation movement in Rhodesia was unavoidable after the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa.
• The Soweto Riots had opened an internal front inside SouthAfrica, stretching security forces to the limit.
• BOSS was paralyzed by the Info Scandal and thus became dysfunctional.
• PW Botha ousted BJ Vorster over the Info Scandal, and the total onslaught mentality gained traction as the hawks prevailed over the doves.
• MK presence inside South Africa was growing
• SADF-SF capacity had grown dramatically.
National Intelligence Service as a Rational Response
In November 1979, PW Botha appointed Dr Niël Barnard to create the NIS105 Conscious of the vulnerability of being unable to generate actionable foreknowledge demonstrated by the Verwoerd assassination, Dr Niël Barnard was fundamentally a man of law, reflecting the long-held Afrikaner tradition of finding political expression within legal frameworks106 He systematically set about creating a world-class intelligence structure out of the remnants of BOSS, and its short-lived successor the Department of National Security (DONS)107. Anxious to avoid the pitfalls highlighted by the Info Scandal, he systematically implemented a rigorous procedure for the authorization of all operational activities and expenditures. His immediate attention was to create a robust analytical
105 Barnard, N. & Wiese, T. 2015. Secret Revolution: Memoirs of a Spy Boss. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
106 Turton, A.R. 1999. Statutory Instruments for the Maintenance of Ethnic Minority Interests in a Multi-Cultural Community: The Case of the Afrikaners in South Africa. Translated into Russian as "Pravovye mery zashchity interesov etnicheskih menshinstv v mnogonatsionalnom obshchestve: afrikanery Yuzhnoy Afriki (Legal measures of defending interests of ethnic minorities in a multinational society: The Afrikaners of South Africa) in Novikova, N.I. & Tishkov, V. (Eds.) Folk Law and Legal Pluralism. (Proceedings of the 11th International Congress on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, August 1997, Moscow). Moscow: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. (pp. 38-47).
107 Turton, A.R. 2021. Understanding the Evolution of the National Intelligence Service and its Contribution to South African Democracy. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 4. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 4 by Hennie Heymans - Issuu
capability which was glaringly absent in BOSS108. Knowing that the hawks would constantly hamper his work (he was a dove by nature), he launched the Rationalization Committee in 1980, tasked with improving the coordination and analysis of intelligence between the different stakeholders in the State Security Council (SSC). This resulted in the Simonstown Agreement that gave NIS the responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), thereby forcing all agencies to channel their intelligence products through one service. This dramatically improved the quality of actionable intelligence and became a feature of his leadership. He also set out to improve the diplomatic engagement between NIS and other foreign services, with members being placed in all embassies with the task of liaison with the host service. This built on the earlier capture of Yuriy Loginov109 in 1969, which resulted in a growing number of combined operations. One led to the capture of Major Alexei Mikhailovich Koslov110 in 1981111 (see image right). This significantly enhanced the prestige of NIS, creating a clear distinction from the more aggressive but unconstrained culture of BOSS. It also confirmed the Soviet support for the ANC and the Cold War backdrop to the local power struggle When Koslov112 was swapped in 1982 in exchange for the release of Sapper van der Mescht and other western spies held in Russia, there was also the transfer of sophisticated satellite communications interception technology, a gift from one of the major services who also benefitted from the swap. This became increasingly significant and built on the cryptographic capability originally created by the SADF through Project Meulsteen, supported by the robust scientific capabilities of the CSIR113. In a short time, NIS had assimilated all the best practices of BOSS, corrected the shortcomings, enhanced the quality of actionable intelligence by improving analytical capabilities, and forged a formidable network of liaison partners with some of the most sophisticated services of the world.
108 SASS. 1996. SASS Newsletter: Special Edition. (Farewell Messages for M.J.M Louw). Pretoria: SouthAfrican Secret Service.
109 Carr, B. 1969. Spy in the Sun: The Story of Yuriy Loginov. Cape Town: Howard Timmins.
110 Alexey Kozlov (intelligence officer) - Wikipedia
111 WAPO. 1982. South Africa, Soviet Union Swap Spies. In The Washington Post, 12 May 1982. Available online at SOUTH AFRICA, SOVIET UNION SWAP SPIES (cia.gov)
112 Deep Cover in South Africa | Espionage History Archive
113 See Volker, W. 2010:637.
More importantly, Dr Barnard initiated an internal process of reflection about the core mission of NIS. His thinking was strongly influenced by Dr Barry Buzan114 and his concept of regional security complexes, and these ideas were infused into the operational and analytical culture of the embryonic service through formal training provided by the Intelligence Academy115 . He asked some fundamental questions that needed answers116. What is the nature of the threat we are facing? Who or what is being threatened? Who or what is posing the threat? What is the exact nature of the existential threat we face? Central to this thinking was the intellectual distinction between power as military or economic might (puissance in French) versus power as engagement or influence (pouvoir in French)117. This intellectual distinction became a defining feature of the 1980s, as a dichotomy emerged between the proponents of puissance (the SADF-SF and SAP-SP) and the proponents of pouvoir (NIS). Through this iterative process Dr Barnard came to a startling conclusion early in his career as DG of NIS – if the driver of insecurity is the growing challenge to an increasingly embattled government by a militant society willing to take up arms – then the solution to that security problem is to create a legitimate government through constitutional reform.
South African intelligence had come of age, but there was a significant difference in the choice of strategy between the SADF, SAP and NIS. The former preferred the strategy of turning guerilla fighters and redeploying them against their former organizations (power as puissance). This capacity was greatly enhanced after former members of Selous Scouts travelled to SouthAfrica and became 6-Recce, based at Renosterspruit Farm near Hartbeespoort Dam. This had already been through a transition phase as D40, from which Project Barnacle was spawned. Barnacle was a special external operational capability focusing on urban targets in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia using the Selous Scouts tried and trusted pseudo-operations experience118 Some commentators, including the author119 , were critical of this approach120
114 Buzan, B., Rizvi, G. 1986. South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers. London: Macmillan.; Buzan, B. 1988. The SoutheastAsian Security Complex. In Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 10, No. 1; 1-16.; Buzan, B. 1991. People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.; Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & de Wilde, J. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
115 Buzan, B. 1994. National Security in the Post Cold War Third World. Paper presented at the Conference on National Security in Developing Countries, 26 January 1994, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa.
116 Turton, A.R. 2021. South African Secret Service as a Caretaker Structure: The Evolution of the Civillian Intelligence Services Under Democracy and the Lessons Learned. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 5. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 5 by Hennie Heymans - Issuu
117 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
118 Stiff, P. 2001. Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
119 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
120 Geldenhuys, P. 2007. Rhodesian Air Force Operations: With Air Strike Log. Durban: Just Done Publications. Pp 111.
With the independence of Zimbabwe, APLA began to operate across the border into South Africa. Robert Mugabe was sympathetic towards the PAC by virtue of their joint connection with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a factor that had played out in the final power struggle between ZANU and ZAPU a few years earlier. The PAC also started to operate out of the Transkei121 In 1980 MK attacks inside South Africa escalated with a total of 19 recorded incidents, mostly the sabotage of low value targets, over the year. For example, in January MK attacked the Soekmekaar Police Station. Three guerrillas were captured - Ncinbithi Lubisi, Petrus Mashingo and Naphtali Manana - and later sentenced to death for this action. On 25th January 1980 a three-man MK team took hostages in the Nedbank branch in Silverton.The Police Task Force retookthe bank, but civilian casualties occurred, resulting in a propaganda debacle for the ANC, but a tactical defeat for MK. It became an open question whether the taking of civilian hostages in a commercial bank was a legitimate act of war, or simply an act of terrorism. This albatross would continue to hang around the neck of theANC elite over the next two decades.
While NIS was being established, and thus unable to effectively respond, PW Botha’s policy of offering the carrot of cooperation versus the stick of retaliation became institutionalised inApril 1980, when the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was established as a regional countermeasure to CONSAS122, being dubbed as the “counter-constellation”. Robert Mugabe became a staunch supporter of SADCC, reaping many rewards in terms of development finance from foreign donors opposed to apartheid. On the stick side of Botha’s policy, SADF-SF launched Operation Cat, tasked with the destruction of the ANC HQ in Mozambique. An electronic warfare (EW) mobile post was deployed during this operation, responsible for electronic surveillance123. On 29th January 1981 Operation Beanbag was launched against MK targets based in three houses at Matola outside Maputo124. One house was used by the MK Police Machinery to attack SAP targets, another by the MK Sabotage Machinery to attack tactical targets, and the third as an HQ facility. Intelligence was supplied by Project Barnacle. Joe Slovo was known to use the facility on occasion in his capacity as MK Chief of Staff, but he was not the primary target. This was the first offensive cross-border raid mounted by SADF-SF out of South Africa, into neighbouring states, representing an escalation of hostilities as an expression of power as puissance. It was also the first offensive operation by 6-Recce made up mostly of former Selous Scouts members under the command of Colonel Garth Barrett. Three operators were killed in action – Sergeant Ian Suttill,
121 See Volker, W. 2010:766.
122 Baynham, S. 1989. SADCC Security Issues. In Africa Insight, Vol. 19, No. 2; 88-95.
123 See Volker, W. 2010:573.
124 See Volker, W. 2010:573.
Sergeant Rob Hutchinson and Corporal Jim Parks. Fallout from the operation was significant, resulting in the disintegration of 6-Recce after the commanding officer resigned, taking with him several former SAS operators. The experiment to absorb an entire unit from another country had failed. Later analysts like Peter Stiff ascribe this failure to cultural differences between the SADF and Rhodesian SF units125 As a result of this failure, pressure was mounted on NIS by the SSC to create a special operations capability to function in any foreign hostile environment with surgical precision and no collateral damage. This was the genesis of the Chief Directorate Covert Operations (CDCO) (K1), and more specifically K4 (special operations directorate)
The reader needs to understand the fundamentally different culture that existed between Rhodesian SF members and those of the increasingly competent SADF-SF in the early 1980s. This played out at two levels:
• Within the SADF power was seen as military might or force (French - puissance). On 18th February 1981 General Fritz Loots issued a classified directive stipulating that Project Barnacle would be responsible for the elimination of ‘own forces’ who had become a threat to clandestine operations126 Note: This was a significant turning point, because in essence it involved murder by the state, of operatives and soldiers who might be questioning orders. The personal dilemma confronting every member of CDCO – the Silent Few – when they were later involved in sensitive special covert operations, must thus be interpreted in this light. In essence, Project Barnacle became prosecutor, judge and executioner with no checks and balances, from this moment on. This meant that if an operator decided to follow their conscience and refuse to obey an order they regarded as being illegal, then they could expect to be murdered by elements of the state security apparatus as a direct result. This happened to Colonel Corrie Meerholz127, a highly decorated SF officer, who was killed mysteriously in a car fire on 21st November 1989128 Project Coast, under the command of Dr. Wouter Basson, was also formally brought under the overall command of GOC-SF. Projects Barnacle and Coast were now poised to commit a series of crimes that would subsequently become relevant to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and be investigated by the Harms and Goldstone Commissions of Enquiry.
125 Stiff, P. 2001. Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
126 Stiff, P. 1999. The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969 - 1994. Alberton: Galago Publishers.
127 Stiff, P. 2001:413 puts the date as 24 November 1989.
128 See Truth Commission - Special Report - TRC Final Report - Volume 2, Section 1, Chapter (saha.org.za)
• Between the SADF and NIS, where the latter regarded power as the capacity to influence (French – pouvoir)129 The former were hawkish and favoured the projection of power as a function of military capability, whereas the latter were dovish and favoured the projection of power as a function of control through penetration, foreknowledge and the use of trojan horse tactics. This was best manifest in Operation Cruiser dealt with later
These tensions became relevant after the collateral damage from Operation Beanbag. This was ratcheted up a notch in August 1981 when Voortrekkerhoogte was attacked using munitions launched by an MK detachment from a location in the Laudium area around 7 km away. Two munitions fell on the Secondary School Voortrekkerhoogte causing some damage and injuring a domestic worker130. In the ensuing exfiltration action, the MK unit shot a 17-year-old boy named Zahed Patel as they escaped to their hideout at Mooiplaas, where they intended to evade the ensuing manhunt before returning to Mozambique. It was clear that something had to be done about the MK threat.
The swapping of Alexi Koslov had significantly boosted the confidence of NIS to the point where they were now recognised by other services and were starting to develop their own operational culture that differed from that of BOSS and the SADF units they worked alongside. The newly created capability within the Chief Directorate Technology (T1) was also a significant factor, because this enabled NIS to liaise with many African services, and support them, were mutually beneficial. The election of Ronald Reagan as president of the USAcreated the opportunity for a reset in strategy at a time when the threat of international sanctions was high
It must be noted that while South Africa had a formidable military capability in the 1980’s, arguably with the most competent armed force in Africa, it also faced serious constraints. Any military capability is only as strong as the economy that sustains it, and from the mid 1970’s, investor confidence was deteriorating. From the mid 1980’s, the outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) remained steady at -5% of GDP (Figure 1). In effect South Africa was bankrupt. The largest component of the SADF was conscripted, so the longer those soldiers were away from home during operations, the greater the economy suffered. In effect, South Africa was fighting an external war in Angola and Namibia, but it was also being drawn into Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana131 and
129 Turton, A.R. 2021. The Genesis and Contribution of Republican Intelligence and Bureau for State Security to South African Security. In Nongqai, Journal of National Security History in Southern Africa, Vol. 12; No. 2. Pp. Available online at Nongqai Vol 12 No 2 (February 2021) by Frans Bedford-Visser - Issuu
130 See Scheepers, M. 2012. Striking Inside Angola with 32 Battalion. Pinetown: 30° South Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Pp 17.
131 With reference to the “Guns of Gaborone” raid in 1985 African Oral Narratives (aodl.org)
elsewhere; and an internal war in the townships, so resources were under severe pressure, much like the final days of Rhodesia a decade earlier The cost of maintaining the chemical, biological and nuclear program was also a factor. Exacerbating this problem, was the growing risk of losing all diplomatic support, mostly in response to growing foreign perceptions of state repression.
Figure 1. The national security dilemma was fundamentally framed by the loss of investor confidence, the outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), and the diplomatic isolation of the South African state as embassies were being forced to downsize in the 1980’s.
The gold industry, which lay at the very heart of the SouthAfrican economy, reached peak production in 1970132 and began a long steady decline that we now know, with the gift of hindsight, was unstoppable133 (see Figure 2). This was not known at the time, so it was believed that the shock to investor confidence caused by Operation Savannah, could be managed. This was done when the government, in its role as regulator of the mining industry, reached an agreement with mine operators known as the Fanie Botha Accord134. The objective of this agreement was to maximize mining profits to provide a sustained flow of revenue to the fiscus. In effect, the state nationalized the environmental liability caused by the uranium contaminated tailing disposal facilities, thereby
132 Hartnady, C.J.H. 2009. South Africa’s Gold Production and Reserves. In South African Journal of Science, No. 105. September/October 2009. Pp 328-329.
133 Turton, A.R. 2015. Untying the Gordian Knot: Unintended Consequences of Environmental and Water Policy for the Gold Mining Industry in South Africa. In Water International, Vol. 41; Issue 3. Pp 330 – 350.
134 Turton, A.R., Schultz, C., Buckle, H, Kgomongoe, M., Malungani, T. & Drackner, M. 2006. Gold, Scorched Earth and Water: The Hydropolitics of Johannesburg. In Water Resources Development, Vol. 22., No. 2; 313-335.
removing a significant impediment from the balance sheet135. In so doing the state ceased being regulator, and a collusion emerged between the gold mining industry and the state, creating a legacy that would persist for decades to follow136 as the uranium hazard later became quantified137. On the innovation side, the CSIR was the institutional home from which many critical components of the increasingly sophisticated weapon systems would emerge. The CASSPIR mine resistant vehicle derived its name from an amalgamation of the acronyms CSIR and SAP, becoming a potent symbol of South African security force resilience in the face of comprehensive economic sanctions. The Buffel MPV, the Ratel IFV, the hopper radio system, the G5 and G6 artillery systems, and the nuclear program, all had critical components of their engineering design in that specific national science council. But, in the face of a deteriorating economy, that too was unsustainable, so the CSIR reached its absolute peak in terms of highly skilled manpower in 1985, after which it followed the same trajectory as gold production in a near linear collapse over time138 (see Figure 3)
Figure 2 (left).Gold production hit its peakin 1970, and despite efforts by the state to remove environmental liabilities off the balance sheet after Operation Savannah, the decline has been linear and unstoppable (image from Hartnady, 2009). Figure 3 (right). A similar trajectory has occurred in the CSIR, institutional home to many of the core technologies used in the weapon systems (image redrawn from Walwyn & Scholes, 2006). The collapsing economy and loss of national capacity for technological innovation underpinned the national security dilemma shown in Figure 1.
These harsh realities framed the national security dilemma that NIS was confronted with.As a direct result of this, a decision was made to create a special operations capability within the service,
135 Turton, A.R. 2009. South African Water and Mining Policy: A Study of Strategies for Transition Management. In Huitema, D. & Meijerink, S. (Eds.) Water Policy Entrepreneurs: A Research Companion to Water Transitions around the Globe. Netherlands: Edgar Elgar. Pp 195 – 214.
136 Turton, A.R. 2015. When Gold Mining Ends – an Environmental Catastrophe for Johannesburg? In New South Africa Review (5). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
137 Coetzee, H., Winde, F. & Wade, P.W. 2006. An Assessment of Sources, Pathways, Mechanisms and Risks of Current and Potential Future Pollution of Water and Sediments in Gold-Mining Areas of the Wonderfonteinspruit Catchment. WRC Report No. 1214/1/06. Pretoria: Water Research Commission.
138 Walwyn, D. & Scholes, R.J. 2006. The Impact of a Mixed Income Model on the South African CSIR: A Recipe for Success or Disaster? In South African Journal of Science. No. 102. Pp.239-243.
capable of operating with precision in any foreign hostile environment, for an extended period, without any support from embassy resources. This was named the Chief Directorate Covert Operations (CDCO) (Hoofdirektoraat Koverte Operasies in Afrikaans – HDKO). Leadership was given to the late Mike Kühn, a highly competent strategist and visionary thinker, designated K1. Two directorates fell line functionally under Mike Kühn – K2 (internal covert operations) and K3 (external covert operations) – but a third existed without being on the official organogram (K4 - special operations). In effect CDCO became a service within a service, staffed by highly trained specialists, capable of operating independently of any normal support structures typically provided by an embassy on foreign soil.
Operation Cruiser
Learning from past observations, the propensity of the liberation movement elite to favour selfenrichment became an obviously exploitable weakness within the ANC. This, along with the observed paranoia displayed by counter-intelligence elites as they ruthlessly sniffed out imaginary spies in their midst, became self-evident as a viable strategy for the newly created CDCO to operationalise. Relying on the sophisticated analytical capability within NIS, a comprehensive assessment was done of the ANC, with the objective of neutralising their capacity to launch military operations through MK The germ of an idea began to grow within CDCO. What if we could insert a trojan horse into the senior decision-making structure capable of intercepting all communications into, and out of, that structure? What if we could intercept all communications going out to MK units in the field? What if we could neutralise MK through accurate foreknowledge of who was being deployed in time for effective interdiction?
And so, Operation Cruiser was conceived, in the corridors of the CDCO, cloistered in the embrace of secrecy, and protected by layer upon layer of operational security such as compartmentation, plausible deniability and the strict application of the need-to-know principle.
The architect of Cruiser was a legendary operator with deep experience of the Rhodesian bush war dating back to the times of Operation Nickel and the subsequent Operation Chinaman in 1967. Using a small team he accurately identified a key point of entry into the MK chain of command. After intricate planning, using all available information about exploitable weakness, he made the approach and recruited the first agent in place. Pioneering a procedure that was to become the standard modus operandi for CDCO in the future, his first action was to compromise the source, to firmly bring him under the control of the handler. Then, almost immediately, a substantial reward was given in
return for hard information. By hard, what is meant is irrefutable information that confirmed access by the source to the classified material needed. This set the hook, enabling the handler to bring the agent under total control. Information started to flow as the agent was developed further. On evaluation of the information, it became clear that CDCO was into the motherlode, as intricate details of planning for MK deployment started to flow.
Now the reader must appreciate that a fundamental problem exists in all covert operations, irrespective of where they are run, and who is in control. This Achilles heel relates to the isolation of the operator, and the need to communicate in two directions, to give orders and receive feedback on their execution. In the 1980’s the world was analogue, so clandestine communications were mostly in the form of written material reduced to some type of concealment and rendered safe by some form of encryption. All services face this problem, and each deal with it in a unique way. The ANC was heavily influenced by the KGB, so they favoured clandestine communications using their methodologies. Fortunately for NIS, that methodology was well understood by all the major services with whom there was a liaison relationship though the Koslov affair, and so a deeper understanding of the vulnerabilities of such a system could be developed. While this was happening, the ANC internal communication channels were being systematically identified by Cruiser, and wherever appropriate, another trojan horse was planted. This meant that the agent in place became increasingly irrelevant over time and could eventually be removed from the network without any loss of access by the CDCO. This was done as a form of protection, because it was possible that the agent could be redeployed by the ANC hierarchy, to a different role, thereby shutting down access. Or it could be that the agent experienced remorse for their betrayal and decided to stop cooperating with the handler as an act of repentance. This was always anticipated by the handler, so standard operational procedures dictated that a two-step process would always be applied. Step one was to recruit and compromise the agent to bring them under control. Step two was to immediately create redundancy by finding alternative sources of information using the intelligence generated by the first recruitment. The agent in place would be unaware of this, always thinking that they were the sole source of information. Once this approach had been implemented, multiple points of interception would arise, like a vacuum cleaner silently sucking up every morsel of information available. These alternatives created redundancy, slowly reducing the leverage of the original agent in place, but they also enabled the quality and accuracy of the information to be monitored and verified. This was a vital function as actionable intelligence must be both timely and accurate.
Once the initial penetration had been made, a stroke of absolute luck occurred. Somewhere within the ANC membership, an awareness arose about the benefits of a digital platform. The Sanyo
MBC555 computer was the first MS-DOS system to enter the market at an affordable rate, and the ANC began using them. This became the opportunity to take Cruiser to the next level, because the natural inquisitiveness of any new user of computer technology invariably meant that they start to capture all sorts of valuable information, thinking that the computer issafe. Within theANC Operation Vula was launched139, using acoustic modems to communicate what were thought to be safe messages140. Unbeknown to the ANC Technical Committee, NIS had the capacity to intercept all telephone communications between London and Lusaka using the technology yielded by the Koslov affair. Also unbeknown to them, was the fact that all intelligence services responsible for Europe in the 1980s were also becoming aware of the use of the internet for activities that could harm national security. For that reason, they launched what was known as Echelon141. The fact that encrypted communications were being originated in Europe142 became a subject of interest to some of those services, and this was passed on through liaison to NIS It must also be remembered that since Project Meulsteen had been launched, T1 had grown a formidable crypto capability, so the decryption of intercepted digital communications became a matter of routine.
In effect the ANC technology generators were enthusiastic amateurs when it came to digital communications and encryption security, because they were up against the combined capability of every cooperating intelligence service, adequately staffed by mathematicians, engineers and cryptographers who as a matter of routine, share information about emerging trends, technologies and vulnerabilities.
As a direct result of Operation Cruiser, MK activities were dramatically attenuated. In 1988 Ronnie Kasrils, in his capacity as MK Chief of Staff, did a strategic assessment of the effectiveness of MK. He concluded that a “revolutionary army” was unlikely to be viable inside South Africa and called for the establishment of a cadre called “revolutionary armed people” instead. Central to this was what he called “military combat work” that would be designed to undermine the security forces, specifically within the Bantustans, in preparation for them to defect or mutiny in the future. This became significant during the Battle of Mmabatho on 8th March 1994, when theAWB combined with elements of the SADF leadership team in mobilizing a paramilitary force for the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), hoping to end the CODESA process then underway. South Africa was the closest
139 Tim Jenkin: Talking with Vula - The O'Malley Archives (nelsonmandela.org)
140 Operation Vula acoustic modem - Google Search
141 Piodi, F. & Mombelli, I. 2014. The Echelon Affair: The EP and Global Interception System 1998 – 2002. Brussels: Historical Archives Unit of the European Parliament. ISBN: 978-92-823-6260-0. Available online at EPRS_STUDY_538877_AffaireEchelon-EN.pdf (europa.eu)
142 Braam, C. 2004. Operation Vula. Johannesburg: Jacana.
to full-scale civil war in March 1994, and it was unclear whether the SADF leadership would support the CODESA process, and there was credible evidence of a potential coup d’état 143
The important issue to note, in the context of this paper, is that Operation Cruiser severely degraded MK capacity to build sufficient resources inside SouthAfrica. This became a major factor in the early 1990s when internal unrest ravaged the country as armed members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) fought against armed formations of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) that had been trained by Operation Marion Just one example of many was the Seven Day War144 that took place in March 1990. This is a long and complex story, outside the scope of this paper, save to say that on 6th August 1990, Nelson Mandela announced the ending of the armed struggle by calling for a ceasefire145 . Significantly, at that time, the IFP and the UDF had more paramilitary capacity inside South Africa than MK ever had
Attention now shifted to the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1991146, for that is when the true value of Operation Cruiser became relevant. Dr Barnard had been working in the background to determine the viability of a negotiated ending of the armed struggle. This was of great strategic importance to South Africa, given the perilous financial condition in which the country was in during the 1990’s (see Figure 1). When the USSR collapsed, it became evident that Russia no longer had the capacity to intervene militarily, so a window of opportunity had opened for the negotiated resolution of the conflict that had consumed South Africa since the 1960’s147 . Within CDCO a strategic operations unit was formed under the innocuous name of the Special Work Group (SWG) of which the author was a member. This was tasked to develop the intelligence platforms needed to support CODESA, which brough Operation Cruiser directly into the process The SWG was the invisible component of what became known as the War Room148
CODESA was immediately opposed by APLA when they launched Operation Great Storm149 in 1991. This consisted of a series of attacks on white farmers, schoolteachers and other carefully selected soft targets consistent with their thinking since the failed Night of Death on 8th April 1962. Between 1991 and 1992 this resulted in 15 attacks on the police, 13 attacks on farmhouses, 3
143 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
144 Truth Commission - Special Report - (saha.org.za) and The Scars of Seven Day War - FilmFreeway
145 Welsh, F. 2000. A History of South Africa. London: Harper Collins Publishers. Pp 508.
146 Negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa - Wikipedia
147 Turton, A.R. 2024. Reflections of a Cold War Intelliegnce Officer: Putin, Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR Paper presented to SAMVOA, RSL Belmont, Perth, WA. 13 August 2024.
148 Barnard, N. & Wiese, T. 2017. Peaceful Revolution: Inside the War Room at the Negotiations. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
149 SAPA - 27 Aug 97 - APLA MEMBERS CLAIM AMNESTY UNDER PAC'S "OPERATION GREAT STORM" (justice.gov.za)
attacks in the Ficksburg area of the Orange Free State, 1 attack on the King Williams Town Golf Club, 1 attack on a Cape Town restaurant, 1 attack on a Queenstown restaurant and 16 murders150
Part of the CODESA process involved secret talks between Nelson Mandela and Dr Niël Barnard, so it was important to move the venue to a safer place. This was the reason behind transferring Mandela from Robben Island to Victor Verster Prison, because journalists held constant vigil at the ferry transporting people to and from the island, and they could get wind of the talks. This was where the true importance of the secret communication system that had been developed by Tim Jenkins for the ANC became relevant. It was vital that Mandela was able to communicate in safety with the ANC/SACP leadership in exile, to ratify their support for a negotiated solution. Given that NIS had access to those encrypted communications, it provided a reliable way to verify Mandela’s commitment. For this reason, Cruiser was metastasised, and a targeted intervention was launched via Operation Hardekool. The latter had grown from Operation Spaghetti, a highly successful technical surveillance of the SACP leadership in exile, initially launched by K44 to get a lead on Joe Slovo, who had been given the code-name of Billy151, and was wanted by the South African criminal justice authorities for his role as MK chief of staff in the Pretoria car bomb. Spaghetti targeted selective members of the SACP leadership and was partially compromised when Harold Wolpe reported the presence of a telephone “bug” to the British authorities152 . Given the high profile of the Wolpe case – it was debated in the House of Commons – that portion of Hardekool was shut down, but the rest remained intact and continued to provide valuable intelligence.
As the CODESA process unfolded, a decision was taken by the ANC/SACP leadership to launch Operation Vula153 . The purpose of Vula was to use the hiatus created by CODESA to establish the military capability within the country that had been denied because of Cruiser. This followed the KGB pattern that had already been implemented by ZAPU in Zimbabwe, and later by SWAPO during the Nine Day War154 triggering Operation Merlyn155 From a strategic perspective the known planning of Operation Vula provided a valuable negotiation weapon to the government, because it could be used to demonstrate that the ANC/SACP was acting with mala fides if and when such an announcement would be advantageous. For this reason, NIS did not respond to the Vula planning
150 See Volker, W. 2010:767.
151 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
152 Campbell, D. 1990. Carry on Spying? De Klerk and Mandela are talking but intelligence operations against the ANC seem to be continuing. In New Statesman & Society. Pp 16-17. Available online at carry on spying.pdf (duncancampbell.org)
153 See Volker, W. 2010: 765.
154 Stiff, P. 1998. Nine Days of War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia: 1979 – 1989. Alberton: Galago Publishers
155 Operation Merlyn - Wikipedia
in an overt way. However, the SAP-SP got wind of it and decided to close it down. CDCO cooperated and successfully turned one of the Vula insiders.
To grasp the significance of these two operations, Cruiser and Vula, we can think of each as being the flip side of the same coin during the armed struggle, each seeking to develop secure communications while simultaneously applying effective countermeasures. One commentator writes as follows156: “Possibly the biggest success story of theANC’s communications efforts did not come from traditional military radio equipment and manual code books supplied by the Soviets, but rather by the development of a simple system of transmitting encrypted data via the public telephone network. The system was developed over a period of years in London by Tim Jenkin and Ronnie Press, and eventually consisted of using a set of acoustic modems, tape recorders, and a unique in-house encryption algorithm whose one-time keys were transported on a computer disk to the receiving party (generally by the head of the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement, Connie Braam). The system really came into its own during Operation Vula from 1988 to the mid-1990s, when for the first time theANC was able to achieve effective communication links between its underground operatives on the ground (in this case Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda / “Gebuza”) and the ANC headquarters in Lusaka – via the London communications centre. The system proved to be very effective and was not compromised, until the end of the operation when the SAP accidently came across some of the encryption disks in the possession of assistants to Maharaj and Nyanda. ... The system worked so well, in fact, that towards the 1990s it was expanded for broader use inside South Africa, although later normal e-mail services were used, rather than public telephones, as it was easier to encrypt/decrypt files and attach them to the mail. At this time Janet Love was appointed “Chief Communications Officer” for all internal communications. It was also by means of this system that Nelson Mandela was able to establish effective and secret communications from the Victor Verster Prison with Oliver Tambo in Sweden or wherever he was at the time” (emphasis added)
(Note: This commentator was unaware of Operation Cruiser, so he did not know that the ANC communications platform had become an asset for NIS through the trojan horse).
While CODESA was playing out, Dr Niël Barnard engaged in secret diplomacy with foreign actors, including the KGB which he met in 1991157, trying to build consensus on the need for ending the armed struggle. This included secret meetings with theANC leadership in exile, as a prelude to what became known as the Dakar Safari158 in intelligence circles, an event of great strategic importance
156 See Volker, W. 2010:764.
157 Barnard, N. & Wiese, T. 2017. Peaceful Revolution: Inside the War Room at the Negotiations. Cape Town: Tafelberg. 158 True Confessions, End Papers and the Dakar conference: a review of the political arguments (scielo.org.za)
organised at arm’s length by K2
159 . Operation Cruiser, and its metastatic derivatives, continued to service the intelligence needs of the CODESA negotiators, eventually becoming the most trusted source of intelligence for all parties after the Harms and Goldstone Commissions of Enquiry effectively shut down key SADF and SAP organs engaging in extrajudicial retribution. The NIS had served its purpose by providing security through the legitimization of government through legal means, and the CDCO had reached the pinnacle of its achievements by preventing MK from establishing an internal presence capable of shifting the outcome of a negotiated peace. What had started out as a deliberate attempt to create a Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Africa by the Luthuli Detachment, was ended by CODESA after Operation Cruiser had so degraded MK capacity that they were eventually rendered irrelevant in the Seven Day War in Natal by virtue of their nonparticipation.
Conclusion
The collapse of the economy, initially triggered by comprehensive economic sanctions in response to foreign perceptions of state repression against the activities of the increasingly aggressive liberation movements, has never been reversed. The net negative 5% FDI as a function of GDP, underpinned by the collapse of the gold mining industry and loss of innovation capacity, became the major driver of regime change in 1994, not the armed activities of MK and APLA, despite popular rhetoric to the contrary. On a serious note, however, a sensitive question will soon need to be answered. If -5% FDI caused regime change in an African state with the strongest army in the 1990’s, then what of the -25% FDI that resulted from the plunder of the Zuma presidency in the 2020’s? The yet ill-defined role of the MK Party in terms of regime change is likely to dominate the discourse on national security for the next decade. The good news is that the institutional memory of the South African intelligence services is now robust enough to respond adequately to this complex risk landscape.
It is ironic that the observed propensity by certain liberation movement elites to favour selfenrichment opened the door through which a trojan horse could be inserted to destroy the very objective that the same liberation movement was trying to achieve – a revolutionary transfer of power through the force of arms – now manifest in the 21st century as simple corruption and jobless economic stagnation With the perfect vision of hindsight, scholars can now debate the relative benefits of articulating power as military might (puissance) or power as persuasion and negotiated
159 Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy: The Private Memoirs of Anthony Richard Turton. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
engagement from a position of strength (pouvoir). The CDCO motto was Ab Obscuro in Apertum
from darkness into the light – and for this the Faceless Few risked life and limb for something bigger than any individual. This paper is offered in their honour and has been written with the sole intention of recording some of their rich history for posterity. Other papers will be produced to deal with specific operations that have of necessity been excluded from this document given space constraints.
Glossary of Abbreviations Used
1-Para – 1 Parachute Battalion, South African Defense Force
44-Para – 44 Parachute Brigade, a Citizen Force unit of the South African Defense Force
1-Recce – 1 Reconnaissance Commando, South African Defense Force
4-Recce – 4 Reconnaissance Commando, South African Defense Force
6-Recce – 6 Reconnaissance Commando, South African Defense Force
32-Bn – 32 Battalion, a special force unit in the South African Defense Force
AK – Assault rifle Kalashnikov, weapon of choice for the liberation movements
ANC – African National Congress, a pro-Russian communist liberation movement in South Africa
APLA – Azanian People’s Liberation Army, armed wing of the PAC
BBC – British Broadcast Corporation
BOSS – Bureau for State Security, created from the Republican Intelligence Service
AWB – Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging, a Christian national political movement
BCP – Basutoland Congress Party
BNP – Basutoland National Party
CASEVAC – Casualty Evacuation from a battlefield
CASSPIR – Mine resistant ambush protection vehicle developed by the CSIR
CDCO – Chief Directorate Covert Operations, English name for HDKO
CONSAS – Confederation of SouthernAfrican States, a regional peace policy proposal by the South African government under PW Botha
COSAG – Concerned South African Group, a coalition opposed to CODESA
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency, the American intelligence service
CIO – Central Intelligence Organization, the Rhodesian intelligence service
CPGB – Communist Party of Great Britain
CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSIR – Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
D40 – Temporary pseudo-operations unit consisting of former Selous Scouts
DG – Director General
DONS – Department of National Security, predecessor of NIS
EW – Electronic Warfare
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FN – Fabrique Nationale assault rifle used by non-communist forces
FNLA – Frente Nacional de Liberação de Angola, a pro-western liberation movement in Angola
FRELIMO – Frente de Liberação de Moçambique, a pro-Russian communist liberation movement in Mozambique
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GOC-SF – General Officer Commanding Special Forces
HDKO – Hoof Direktoraat Koverte Operasies, Afrikaans name for CDCO
IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle
G5 – Towed howitzer that was developed by the SADF and CSIR in response to sanctions
G6 – self-propelled variant of the G5 developed by the SADF and CSIR
K1 – Chief Director Covert Operations in the South African National Intelligence Service
K2 – Director Internal Covert Operations in the South African National Intelligence Service
K3 – Director External Covert Operations in the South African National Intelligence Service
K4 – Director Special Covert Operations in the South African National Intelligence Service
K44 – A special operations division in the Chief Directorate Covert Operations
KGB – Committee for State Security, the Russian intelligence service
KIA – Killed in Action
LLA – Lesotho Liberation Army
LMG – Light Machine Gun, an infantry platoon weapon
MAG – General purpose machine gun
MK – Mkhonto we Sizwe, armed wing of the African National Congress
MPLA – Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola, a pro-Russian communist liberation movement in Angola
MPV – Mine proof vehicle
MS-DOS – Microsoft Disk Operated System, a software package for portable computers
NIA – National Intelligence Agency, the South African domestic intelligence service
NIE – National Intelligence Estimate, the official risk assessment for a country
NIS – National Intelligence Service, the South African intelligence service domestic and foreign
NEC – National Executive Committee, decision-making body in the African National Congress
NP – National Party, a Christian national political party in South Africa
OAU – Organization of African Unity
OB – Ossewa Brandwag, a pro-Nazi Afrikaner movement before 1948
OC – Officer Commanding
OPS-K – Koevoet, a special operations unit of the South African Police
PAC – Pan African Congress, a pro-Chinese communist liberation movement in South Africa
PAFMECSA – Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa
PAIGC – Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, a liberation movement in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde
PLAN – Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, armed wing of SWAPO
POQO – Original armed wing of the Pan African Congress in South Africa
RENAMO – Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, a pro-western Mozambique resistance movement
RhAF – Rhodesian Air Force
RAR – Rhodesian African Rifles
RLI – Rhodesian Light Infantry
RIS – Republican Intelligence Service, the first South African intelligence service
SAAF – South African Air Force
SACP – South African Communist Party
SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference, a foreign donor-led international structure established to isolate South Africa and counter CONSAS
SADF – South African Defense Force
SADF-SF – South African Defense Force Special Forces
SAM-7 – Surface to Air Missile known as “Strela” used by communist liberation movements
SAP – South African Police
SAP-SB – South African Police Special Branch
SAP-SP – South African Police Security Police
SAS – Special Air Service, a Rhodesian special force unit
SASS – South African Secret Service, the foreign intelligence service created from NIS
SF – Special Forces
SITREP – Situation report sent from a combat unit to a higher authority
SOMAFCO – Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College
SSA – State Security Agency, the South African intelligence service created by Jacob Zuma
SSC – State Security Council, an organ of national security management in South Africa
SWA – Southwest Africa, UN mandated territory that became Namibia
SWAPO – Southwest Africa People’s Organization, a Namibian liberation movement
SWG – Special Work Group, the intelligence coordinating structure in CDCO created to support the War Room during CODESA negotiations
T1 – Chief Director Technology in the South African National Intelligence Service
TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa
UDF – Union Defense Force, the South African armed forces before independence
UDF – United Democratic Front, a coalition of pro-ANC opposition interest groups in South Africa
UNITA – União Nacional para a Independência Total deAngola, a pro-Western liberation movement in Angola
USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a coalition of East European countries domnated by Russia in the Cold War
WWII – Second World War
ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union, a pro-Russian communist liberation movement in Zimbabwe
ZANU – Zimbabwe African National Union, a pro-Chinese communist liberation movement in Zimbabwe
ZANLA – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the pro-Chinese armed wing of ZANU
ZIPA – Zimbabwe Independence People’s Army, a temporary coalition of ZANLA and ZIPRA
ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, the pro-Russian armed wing of ZAPU
List of Campaigns, Operations and Battles Cited
Acrobat
Barnacle
Beanbag
Bouw Wildebeest
Bootlace I
Bootlace II
Bowler
Carlotta
Cat
Chinaman
Coast
Cruiser
Cuito Cuanavale
Dice
Echelon
Fire Force Zulu
Daisy
Dingo
Eland
Gatling
Great Storm
Isandlwana
Latsa
Long John
Long Reach
Mardon Marion
Mayibuye
Merlyn
Meulsteen
Mmabatho
Nickel
Night of Death
Nine Day War
Nyatuwe
Olyfberg
Ongulumbashe
Operation J Polo
Quifangondo
Rattlesnake
Reindeer
Repulse
Rubber Duck
Savannah
Senekal
Seven Day War
Sipholilo Campaign
