FOREWORD

CONSIDER YOUR VERDICT

Brig HB Heymans

As a proud, former professional, SAP Special Branch officer, intelligence operative, and seconded official to the former Secretariat of the State Security Council, I look back on 20 years’ service in the SAP-SB environment. My first Divisional Commander, in Durban – Lt-Col FMA Steenkamp – was an intelligent and far-sighted officer. I served at various Security Branch offices and came into contact with the following commanders of the SB at Head Office: Generals “Tiny” Venter, Christi Zietsman, Mike Geldenhuys, Johann Coetzee, Frans Steenkamp and Johan van der Merwe. Most were deeply religious and principled officers, as were the vast majority of my colleagues. They were loyal servants of the State and nation, under authority of the constitutional government of the day. We were policemen and not politicians; we swore an oath to uphold the law! I can, therefore, introduce this special edition of Nongqai (which is dedicated to the SAP-SB) from the perspective of someone with extensive first-hand knowledge of its statutory functions and goals, operational doctrines, the context in which the SAP-SB performed its functions, and the character of the officers who were proud to be part of this elite unit. The purpose of this special edition of the Nongqai is fourfold: • to help our readers understand the motivations and operational doctrines of the opposing parties in South Africa’s erstwhile internal conflict; • to shine a light on the complex question of who had “just cause” and how and why the armed struggle came about (letting ANC-aligned researchers speak, instead of presenting just our views); • to look at the “scoreboard” of comparative data, thereby to place the SAP-SB in its global context, so that you as reader can decide whether the “single story” about us is truly justified; and • why we are now, after many years, again being vilified and threatened with proosecution. We explain why (at who’s instigation and on who’s behalf) there was an armed conflict from 16th of December 1961. We, as Peace Officers, were drawn into what the other side called a war, against our will, in an armed struggle they often waged with singular brutality, mostly impacting the civilian population. Our first legal duty (as would be the case for policemen anywhere, under similar circumstances) was to combat the armed onslaught so that the Rule of Law could be maintained and politics be conducted non-violently. This is our story, and we try to explain WHY the police got involved in this armed conflict. Not to promote ‘white supremacy” , but to fulfil our constitutional function and legal duty. To protect the peace, against a “people’s war” that was unilaterally declared, with the aim to establish a Marxist, one-party “people’s republic” in our country by revolutionary force of arms – remember we were fired on by Soviet made firearms like the AK 47 and Tokarev pistols. We had to face communist made explosives – Why?

This is our story and we used the statistics of our opponents, as well as let their own speak about what the “armed struggle” really amounted to. This is our first-hand account of the revolutionary onslaught. Please note that we kept our promises never to reveal who worked for us as agents and sources of information (which principle we maintain in this e-book). We performed our legal duties as policemen in an objective and professional way. We were not the “armed wing” of the National Party. We arrested people of different political groupings and skin colour – from the revolutionary Left as well as the radical Right – when they broke the law and tried to advance their political ideals by means of violence.

Without us maintaining the essential level of stability and peace that the negotiation and transition phase from 1990 – 1994 required (doing so under exceedingly difficult circumstances), the new South Africa could not have been born. And, to be logical – if we, the security forces (with our vast physical superiority), had at any moment desired that a black majority government not be allowed to come to power, we could easily have stopped it. So, does it make sense to always typify us as having been white racist supremacists? We hope that you will find this special e-book edition of Nongqai on the SAP-SB a valuable resource in completing and balancing the “single story” that had emerged out of the propaganda that had so marked the years of South Africa’s internal conflict, and which now again surfaces. If you were a member of the SAP-SB and you want your children, grandchildren, friends and family to understand what the unit truly was all about, then this detailed study can be a gift that you can put in their hands, to help them comprehend the honourable role that the SAP-SB played in South Africa’s transition to a non-racial democracy. My co-editor Dr. Willem Steenkamp (the son of the late Maj-Gen Frans Steenkamp, a former C.O. of the SAP-SB) points out in the main study anchoring this special edition – which he researched and wrote – that the SAP-SB is once again being vilified as if the whole institution was manned by racist thugs. This, based on certain incidents between 1961 - 1990 when undeniably, tragic but isolated atrocities were indeed committed. But is it justified to besmirch the name of the whole institution and all who served in it?

I recently read an article by the historian Leopold Scholtz, in which he addressed the question: should the Afrikaner be defined by a Eugene de Kock, or by a Christiaan de Wet? Both are equally real as historical figures, and for the sake of a balanced and complete presentation of history, with no part of the historical record being arbitrarily silenced, neither can be ignored. But which of the two is most representative? In the same vein, Dr. Steenkamp is asking that about Col De Kock and his own father: who truly reflects the typical SAP-SB officer? (As we say, doing so without malice, given that the Nongqai Trust actually has contributed financially to the maintenance and care of Col De Kock in his old age). But, for the sake of justice, there are questions of a comparative and holistic nature that need to be answered, since media attention has been too much focused on the details of notorious individual cases, which are then presented as if typical of all. For example: How does the SAP-SB’s record compare to that of other similar institutions, if one merely objectively compare the cold statistics? Between 1960 and 1990, only 67 people died from all causes in SAP-SB detention, compared to: • 474 Australian Aboriginals who died in police custody there, during a similar 30-year period. • The 214 prisoners who in the year 2019 died in the custody of the new S.A. Police Service? • The “approximately 900” MK members who, according to the TRC, perished abroad under the care of the ANC?

• The 11,000 deaths in custody in the state of Texas over the past 15 years? (Texas has about half of SA's population) • The 350 people killed by British Security Forces during the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland (from a total population of only 1.5 million, i.e., 1/30th of that of the RSA, or • the 50,000 deaths, 30,000 "disappearances" and 400,000 detentions by South American security forces (with training and technical assistance from the USA) during the so-called "Dirty War" waged against the Left there, during the Cold War. Even a single suspicious death in custody is, of course, regrettable. Morally speaking, the aim here is not to point the finger in a “yes-but” way, thereby trying to decide who is the blackest, the pot or the kettle. Therefore, the focus here is on the SAP-SB, and on comparing its operational doctrines to those of other forces. Also, on understanding that it was a propaganda-driven political conflict. From the SAP-SB side, there were clear instructions to avoid violent interrogations (because they were ineffective, politically counterproductive, illegal and morally reprehensible) with a firm policy that not the policeman, but the courts, would decide guilt or innocence. Also, as I earlier stated, we knew that the SB enforces the laws of the land, but does not make the laws. Fortunately, the policeman on the spot has a discretion and many potential accused know we were not over-zealous. On the other hand, the doctrine of "power grows from the barrel of the gun" and the conduct of a revolutionary war with violent terror as leverage, was the warp and weft of the Marxist-inspired onslaught. This is what the SAP-SB was obliged to oppose, in order to maintain public order, the safety of all and the peaceful, lawful conduct of politics. And, let’s face facts: when the revolutionaries are constantly upping the ante by screaming “War! War! War!” and you know that they aim to kill you if they get the merest chance, then it takes strong self-discipline and a very clear comprehension of what is at stake, to matter-of-factly see the challenge to the State not as war, but as crime that needs to be prosecuted. Instead of (as would be typical in war) to fight fire with fire – as was done by so many other security forces elsewhere in the 3rd World, during the Cold War. Logic is also against the propagandistic portrayal of the SB as racist thugs who would enjoy murder and torture. Knowing that every case would be adjudicated in public hearing by the country's higher courts, with the best lawyers to assist the “political accused”, plus the media who would keep a hawk's eye on proceedings, and questions that would for sure arise in parliament – which security policeman could not have worked out for himself that torture would very publicly boomerang? If we were such scoundrels, why have we kept our word never to divulge the names of those who were our paid informers? If we were such racists, why did we solve the murder of Mr Chris Hani and detain and prosecute the white right-wing bomb planters who tried to prevent the transition? Furthermore: if the SAP-SB were so racist, by what logic did they protect the transition process to a non-racial democracy in such a disciplined, law-abiding and conscientious manner and maintain the all-important stability that allowed the negotiations and transition to proceed, against attacks by both left and right? (When it was already clear to most, that a black majority government would be elected!) If truly such racial haters, then surely, we could have heeded the late General Constand Viljoen's calls for armed resistance to retain white control? That is, if racism was really our driving motivation? (It was in fact the then SAP commissioner, himself a former SAP-SB C.O., who made Viljoen realize that law and order would be maintained, also against him and his supporters). Know a tree by its fruit - it can rightly be said that, without the stability created by the security forces, the transition to a non-racial democracy could not have been negotiated and implemented. We recognise that some of our own, like Capt Dirk Coetzee and Col Eugene de Kock, have committed crimes – after all, we as police were the ones who investigated and charged them. We do not here attempt to ignore that reality, or them. Both were exceptional policemen. Coetzee was 13

the best recruit of his intake, in the Police College. He and the police authorities had a serious difference. I was so surprised when the commander of the SB charged him in a Magistrates’ court. Col de Kock was the person with the most medals for gallantry – our highest decorated officer ever. I want to state emphatically that he never had the nickname of “Prime Evil”. He performed many covert acts for the SAP-SB and unfortunately, he also performed acts for private gain, for which he received no amnesty. He reconciled with the families of those with whom he came into violent conflict. He has repented and is on parole. We also charged our own people like Sgt Van As (from SB-Soweto), who had accidentally killed a detainee. We knew we were in the spotlight of the media, of parliament, and of the judiciary, to whom we had to account (in public proceedings) for every step. But is it just and fair to elevate these isolated examples and the reprehensible deeds they committed, to being supposedly representative of the entire institution? The detailed study by Dr. Steenkamp (himself a lawyer, National Intelligence Service analyst and former ambassador) puts evidence before the “court of public opinion” which has never before and nowhere else been gathered and presented in such an over-arching manner, so that you as reader, can reach your own informed verdict. He doesn’t shy away from the deeds of the “bad apples” (that most baskets do contain). You will agree that he is putting forward hard facts and cold logic – the case for the other side – as if the SAP-SB’s advocate. Because humankind knows that, to find the truth, that is how real courts work: have both sides present their evidence. That is what has hitherto been lacking on the SAPSB side (letting the “single story” stand unchallenged, and which this Special Edition of Nongqai wishes to address.

Having known the man as my commander, at both the divisional level in Durban and at SB-HQ in Pretoria, I can attest to the fact that the late Maj-Gen Frans Steenkamp is a valid example to use, of that which we as SAP-SB officers aspired to be. Dr. Willem makes some references to his father in his detailed comparative study: not to glorify him, but simply because he was the Security Branch officer that Dr. Willem obviously knew best. General Steenkamp fully understood that South Africa’s internal conflict was first and foremost political, with propaganda a key element and the revolutionary forces trying to gaud us into overreaction, which they could then exploit – hence his very instructive circular about interrogation methods (from which Dr. Willem quotes extensively), and of which I had always kept my own treasured copy. General Steenkamp was the C.O. who had called me into his office when I was still a relatively young Major, invited me to sit down, and then asked me if I would agree to represent the Commissioner of Police at the Secretariat of the State Security Council (his was not the brutish style of parading you at attention in front of him, and barking orders at you). Having known the man so well, I therefore wholeheartedly endorse my co-editor’s references to his father, as a counter-point to the wholly negative image that is so often portrayed in the media of us: the dedicated men and women who served with integrity in the elite SAP-SB. So, how should the renewed propaganda attack (and real threats of prosecution) against former members of the SAP-SB be understood? One has to look at the historical and global context of the struggle, but especially at the political gain that the politicians in power today, are now trying to achieve. This special edition examines all these aspects in a balanced and honest way. Because truthful, balanced historiography requires it. And the overwhelming majority of police members who served honourably and proudly in the SAP-SB (and their descendants – the latter who may be forced to question us, because of the renewed onslaught) deserve it! Being fair and balanced, we wish also to pay our respects to all those – from different sides – who sacrificed so much in our beloved country’s various conflicts of the past.