Nongqai Vol 15 No 11 by Hennie Heymans, Nongqai Publications

DIE SKAKEL – THE LINK

https://nongqaimy.sharepoint.com/personal/archive_nongqai_org/_layouts/15/guestaccess.aspx?share=EXPb woETBldGuTBZrazdZF0BXhOQwNSGEZ-iAL37-c0fww&e=n2I7mK

Klik op die skakel om oop te maak en af te laai. Click then on the link to open.

Generaal Jannie Geldenhuys – Hoof van die SAW (Foto – HBH)

ELEKTRONIESE BEDIENING: VERTROU OP GOD SE ONVERANDERLIKE KARAKTER

Pastoor Koot Swanepoel (082-041-9123)

“.. Die dag wanneer ek bang word, sal ek net op U vertrou.” (Ps 56 vers 4 NLV)

As jy lank genoeg lewe, sal jy slegte nuus ontvang. Dit mag dalk die verlies van 'n geliefde, jou gesondheid, jou inkomste, jou huwelik, jou reputasie, ensovoorts, wees. Die Psalmdigter het geskryf: 'Die dag wanneer ek bang word, sal ek net op U vertrou.' Wanneer slegte tye kom, moet jy aan alles wat jy weet oor wie God is, vashou. Jy moet jouself daaraan herinner dat Hy liefdevol en barmhartig is en jou volle vertroue verdien. Soms sal God jou die antwoord gee, ander kere sal Hy vir jou die gerusstelling van sy teenwoordigheid gee.

In tye wat verander, moet jy aan die onveranderlike karakter van God vashou. Soos die gesang sê: 'When all around my soul gives way, He then is all my hope and stay.' Beteken dit dat jy jou gevoelens en emosies moet onderdruk? Nee. Dawid het gesê: 'Ek stort my klagtes uit voor Hom en vertel Hom van my kwellinge' (Psalm 142:3 NLV). God vra jou nie om die pyn, verlies en realiteit van jou omstandighede te ontken nie. Self Jesus het: '...hard uitgeroep en met trane by God gesmeek en gepleit...' (Hebreërs 5:7 NLV).

As jy nie jou hart voor God uitstort nie, loop jy die risiko om jou hart teen Hom te verhard. Dis wanneer jy die bodem tref en na God toe draai dat jy ontdek dat Hy reeds daar is. Dit is deur 'n groot skok te kry wat jy 'n onwrikbare geloof in God ontwikkel. Wanneer dit gebeur, kan jy op Sy Woord staan wat sê: 'Ek sal by jou wees en jou beskerm waar jy ook al gaan...' (Genesis 28:15 NLV).

Koot Swanepoel.

082 041 9123

Fanie van Vuuren

Heavenly Father, we come to You in the name of Jesus. We thank You for Your love, mercy and grace.

Father, we know that we are living in the last days, before Your Son returns as we can see Bible prophecy being fulfilled day by day.

Father, please help us to be ready when the trumpet sounds, to have enough oil in our lamps and to be found worthy to escape all that is coming. Father, please open the eyes of our police officers so that they too can be ready. Help them to stay strong and not to give in to temptation. Please give them wisdom and guidance concerning all the new laws and regulations coming out to enslave humanity.

We know that it has been prophesied and it is going to happen but please help them not to participate in evil.

We ask that You give them strength to stand up for the truth and righteousness. When the time comes for the antichrist to rule, please help them to say NO to the mark of the beast, no matter what the cost, even if they lose their jobs. Father, please fill us with Your Holy Spirit, and open our eyes to the truth.

Help us to repent, to forgive those who have hurt us and to live holy lives. As there is so much deception going on, especially in the churches, help Your children to understand what is busy happening in the world and that Jesus is coming soon to take His bride home. We are looking forward to meeting Jesus in the air, with the last trumpet together with those who have gone before us. Maranatha, come quickly Lord. Amen.

Calling all police officers, traffic officers and security officers who love Jesus Christ with their whole heart, body and soul and accepted Him as their personal Lord and Savior, to come and join this new movement, Police for Christ. https://police4christ.yolasite.com/

Kol William Marshall se artikel-reeks oor die 6 SA Div in Italië tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog word voortgesit. ‘n Latere kommissaris van die SAP, genl RJ Palmer (CVO, KPM, DSO.) was ‘n brigadier in die 6de SA Div.

WELCOME & FOREWORD | VOORWOORD & WELKOM

Hennie Heymans

Welkom Welcome

Hartlik welkom by hierdie besondere uitgawe –besonder as gevolg van ons lesers se deelname met artikels en foto’s

A warm welcome to this special edition –especially because of our readers’ participation with articles and photos.

TROU TOT DIE DOOD TOE: PROBLEME MET DIE GOLDSTONE-KOMMISSIE (2)

Reeks deur genl JV van der Merwe

Ek het daarna met mnr. Jan Wagener van die staatsprokureur se kantoor beraadslaag, wat op sy beurt oorleg gepleeg het met mnr. Piet Kleynhans van Justisie, wat met die verlening van vrywarings gewerk het. Volgens mnr. Kleynhans was die enigste moontlike vorm van vrywaring wat aan lede van die veiligheidsmagte verleen kon word, die bepalings van Goewermentskennisgewing R936, wat op 24 April 1991 in Staatskoerant nr. 13202 gepubliseer is. Kragtens hierdie bepalings is omvattende amnestie aan ANC-lede verleen, mits hulle sekere besonderhede verstrek het. Die bepalings het nie vereis dat spesifieke dade blootgelê word nie, maar bloot die soort misdryf waarvoor vrywaring verlang word.

Die saak is daarna op ŉ vergadering van die Staatsveiligheidsraad onder voorsitterskap van mnr. De Klerk bespreek en het ook op ŉ vergadering van die Veiligheidskomitee te berde gekom. Daar was algemene konsensus dat dit in daardie laat stadium die enigste moontlike beskerming was wat

nog aan Kabinetslede en die veiligheidsmagte verleen kon word. Mnr. Kleynhans van Justisie het opdrag gekry om ŉ aansoekvorm voor te berei wat aan al die regsvereistes voldoen. Genl. Magnus Malan, mnr. Adriaan Vlok en 3 600 lede van die veiligheidstak het ingevolge hierdie bepalings vrywaring verkry nadat aan al die vereistes voldoen is. Die vrywaring het onder meer ook poging tot moord ingesluit waar daar nie ŉ gevaarlike wond toegedien is nie.

Nadat die ANC-regering ná die verkiesing in 1994 oorgeneem het, het mnr. Dullah Omar, Minister van Justisie, bewus geword van die vrywaring en histeries daarop gereageer. Mnr. Mandela het te kenne gegee dat hulle die vrywaring nie erken nie en nietig gaan verklaar. Daar het egter niks van gekom nie.

In Maart 1994, kort voor die verkiesing, het mnr. De Klerk my een oggend na sy kantoor ontbied. Sy sekretaris het ŉ konsepverslag van die Goldstone-kommissie aan my oorhandig en gesê mnr. De Klerk wil die verslag met my bespreek. Die verslag het gegaan oor beweringe deur ŉ geheime informant dat drie polisiegeneraals, lt.genl. Basie Smit, lt.genl. Johan le Roux en genl.maj. Krappies Engelbrecht, by sekere onwettige bedrywighede betrokke was. Volgens die beweringe was die Vlakplaaseenheid by bedrywighede betrokke wat daarop gemik was om die land te destabiliseer. Dit het geweld op treine en in hostels ingesluit. Die eenheid sou ook betrokke gewees het by die vervaardiging van tuisgemaakte vuurwapens, wat aan Inkatha verskaf is om geweldpleging aan te blaas. Volgens die beweringe het die eenheid ook vals paspoorte in sy besit gehad. Geen datums of tye waarop die beweerde oortredings gepleeg sou gewees het, is genoem nie. Volgens die aard van die beweringe moes dit egter van 1989 tot 1993 gewees het.

Die onwettige bedrywighede sou gepleeg gewees het toe genl. Smit hoof van Misdaadbestryding en -ondersoek was en genl. Engelbrecht hoof van teeninligting van die Misdaadinligtingsdiens. Genl. Le Roux, destyds hoof van Doelmatigheidsdienste van Misdaadbestryding en -ondersoek, sou volgens die bewering volledig kennis van die bedrywighede gedra het. Hy sou ook by die moord op Japie Maponya, ŉ politieke aktivis en ANC-lid, betrokke gewees het. Maponya is in 1985 deur kol. Eugène de Kock en ander lede van die Vlakplaaseenheid om die lewe gebring. Genl. Le Roux was in 1985 ŉ kolonel en afdelingsbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak aan die Wes-Rand. Die voorval het heeltemal buite die mandaat van die Goldstone-kommissie geval.

Die konsepverslag het geen feite bevat nie, geen name van getuies of die bronne waarop die beweringe gegrond was nie. Regter Goldstone het tydens samesprekinge met mnr. De Klerk, asook met my en mnr. Hernus Kriel, as verontskuldiging aangevoer dat die beweringe so ernstig is dat hy

genoodsaak is om dit in dié vroeë stadium onder die Staatspresident en die breë gemeenskap se aandag te bring en dat dit nie kan wag tot ŉ vollediger ondersoek gedoen is nie.

Mnr. De Klerk het in sy gesprek met my gesê hy het regter Goldstone gevra om mnr. Kriel en my volledig oor die saak in te lig. Ek het aan mnr. De Klerk gesê dat tensy regter Goldstone meer inligting het as in die verslag, daar myns insiens geen betroubare getuienis is wat oorweeg kan word nie. Geen feite word verstrek nie en dit lyk of die beweringe bloot op hoorsê gegrond is. Ek het die beweringe teen my drie kollegas ernstig bevraagteken en was ontsteld omdat ŉ ervare regter aan die hand van sulke twyfelagtige beweringe ŉ verslag aan die President kon voorlê.

Die beweringe het vir my geen sin gemaak nie. Ek het reeds besluit dat ek voor die verkiesing met pensioen wil aftree en genl. Basie Smit was bestem om my op te volg. Generaals Le Roux en Engelbrecht was albei bekwame en ervare bevelvoerders en ŉ belowende toekoms het op hulle gewag. Hulle was gretig om hul loopbane in die Polisie voort te sit, was volstrek lojaal teenoor my en sou beslis niks gedoen het wat nie my goedkeuring sou weggedra het nie.

Waarom sou drie ervare, lojale en hoogs intelligente generaals hulle in sulke dwase dade begewe het? Dit kon vir hulle geen voordeel van enige aard ingehou het nie. Al drie was nou by die staatkundige onderhandelinge betrokke, het deurgaans ŉ goeie verhouding met lede van die ANC en ander organisasies gehad en het ŉ reusebydrae gelewer tot die bekamping van pogings om die komende verkiesing te verongeluk. (Word vervolg)

1965: SA WEERMAG-AANVAL OP SAP KING’S REST

Hennie Heymans

In die 1965 was die bekende aktivis (wyle) mnr Griffiths Mxenge te King’s Rest aangehou (180 dae) As aanklagkantoorsersant (AKS) was daar spesifieke opdragte van Hoofkantoor (Kompol x 94) wat streng nagekom moes word. Ek kan onthou dat ons die opdragte van die kommissaris baie noukeurig nagekom het. (Ons wou ook nie moeilikheid met die veiligheidspolisie gehad het nie.)

Ou Griffiths kan ek goed onthou. Hy sal my hierdie staaltjie vergewe. Eendag laat ek hom uit vir oefening en hy sit in die son en niks doen! Ek wys hom die aanhoudingsbevele, nogal persoonlik deur die kommissaris van polisie, genl JM Keevy, geteken. Daar staan swart op wit hy moet “exercise”. As die kommissaris sê oefen, is dit oefen! Hy vra hoe en wat moet hy oefen? Ek het hom toe ingewy in die duistere geheime van ‘physical training’ soos ons in die SAP Kollege geleer het! Griffiths Mxenge het later sy studies voortgesit en ons twee King’s Rest-manne het saam dieselfde aand aan die Universiteit van Natal graad gevang. Die mense het vir hom ‘n applous gegee en vir my niks nie! Later het ek gelees dat Mxenge deur Vlakplaas se manne onder bevel van kapt Dirk Coetzee vermoor is.

Een oggend kom ek “op” diens – polisiemanne tree aan diens, maar is altyd “op” diens – en die hele stasie is in rep en roer en ruik na Guy Fawks!

Soldate van die SAW besluit om hul gevegsparaatheid op die proef te stel en reël met die SA Spoorweg en Hawe Polisie om King’s Rest halt aan te val. Die ‘army’ maak toe ‘n berekeningsfout (hulle werk nie op adresse nie maar op ruitverwysings!) en val die niksvermoedende polisie aan te SAP King’s Rest.

Die SB se huis het destyds skuiframe gehad. Die huis dateer uit die dae van die Natal Police. Die stasie en SB-huis is tans in SAPS besit. Ek het, toe ek in die Mag was, met brig SJP du Toit (AK Port Natal) ‘gereël’ dat die SAP weer die stasie oorneem – na Brighton Beach geopen is het die stasie gesluit en die SA Vloot-polisie het die stasie oorgeneem. Hulle het later die geboue ontruim en die plek het leeggestaan.

Die SB, AO Mof Marais – alias ‘Ou Mof’ - vertel my later dat sy vrou so groot geskrik het toe die knetterwetters (thunder flashes) afgaan het, dat sy parallel met die bed in die lug opgaan en op die vloer val. Dapper Mof skuif die ou woonhuis se rame op en daar trek hy na die gevaar sonder ‘n wapen.

Twee ouens in swart sweetpakke klap hy plat en twee swart besmeerde soldate met swart sweetpakke ander peil op hom af! “Stop ons is die ‘army’”, skree hulle.

“Waar is julle offisier?” vra Mof.

“Daar lê hy !” se die soldate benoud wat hulle sien HKGK al is Mof nie gewapen nie.

Die polisieman in Mof word stadig wakker: “Identiteit” sê Mof.

Die soldate gee hulle soldyboeke aan Mof.

“Dit is geen ID nie!” sê Mof.

Die soldate sê dis al wat hulle het en Mof sê toe dat dit nie goed genoeg is nie. Hy soek iets met ‘n foto daarop. Die dag het ou Mof heeldag getik en getik. Hy sê toe dat die verslag deur is na die afdelingskommissaris met die versoek dat alle soldate ID moet kry want soos die leser kon begryp kon die hele episode afgryslike gevolge vir die SAP en SAW ingehou het.

Wat in die aanklagkantoor gebeur het, kon ek nooit bepaal nie, alhoewel ek gevra het. Ek kon maar net raai aangesien kommentaar ontbreek het.

Ou Mof het die situasie gered want hy was altyd net na ses op kantoor en dan het hy die “OB and registers peruse” (alles was in Engels) en as die possak met die trein ingekom het, het hy weggeval en alle korrespondensie dadelik afgehandel. Smiddae moes ons na die DK se kantore – eintlik na die distriksklerk se kantoor – om die pos daar af te gee en die nuwe pos te kry. Die distriksklerk was ‘n magtige man in die polisie onder die ‘stasie-hase’. Hy was ‘n man met invloed en kon dinge reël as dit moet. Hy het jou ook voor die DK paradeer wanneer nodig!

1967:

SAP SOMERDRAG: BLINK EN SKOON

Sersant KW Ndoyana en konstabel PSR Tshilwane demonstreer die nuwe somerdrag vir nie-blanke lede. Hulle was op Hoofkantoor werksaam en verwelkom die koel gemaklike drag.

PASSING OF A POLICE LEGEND

Lieutenant-Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay

Funeral Notice

On behalf of the Admin of Police Legends I sadly announce the passing of a Legend of the KwaZulu Natal Midlands, Captain Ronnie Cattigan (SA Police, Loop Street, Pietermaritzburg).

I had the honour of meeting this Icon, once in my lifetime ... in Counter Insurgency Training, before we left for the Border.

Image

He survived one of the most severe punishments on the notorious Mount Boleu, carrying a full pack and ammunition box for weeks on length and it did not diminish his spirit. He served in the SA Police, during the civil and sectarian war of the 1980’s in Kwa-Zulu Natal, continued with the SAPS, was later Commissioned continued to serve the Nation. He was a Legend.

Go Well my Friend. Aum Nama Shiva (Courtesy of Police Legends Facebook)

NOG

‘N UNIEKE WEDERVARING

Lt.genl. Chris Serfontein

Gedagtig aan my vorige stelling dat enige gesoute polisiebeampte aan die einde van sy loopbaan, kan vertel van ‘n ervaring(s) van so ‘n unieke aard dat dit waarskynlik/ongetwyfeld as die ENIGSTE van aard, beskou/ beoordeel kan word, roep ek die volgende verdere (UNIEKE?) voorbeeld in herinnering:

Lt.genl. Chris Serfontein

Dit is Junie 1965 in Vereeniging. Saterdag 21h00. Ek word as jong konstabel, uitsluitlik gekleed net in die tipiese "twyfelagtige" agterstevoor lang japon gedoente wat weerskante van my lyf met die twyfelagtige bandjies toegebind word, op ‘n hospitaalbed, die operasie teater van die hospitaal, ingestoot. Direk as senter van die rugbyveld af vervoer. Diagnose: Gebarste (of dreigende) blindederm. Dokters word ingeroep. Noodoperasie. (Die tyd wanneer mens mos voel of jy nou "kaart en transport" van jou eie lyf, verloor het!)

Het reeds die voorlopige halfbedwelmende inspuiting ontvang toe ek op die operasie tafel oorgeplaas word.

Die dokter en assistente kom nader. Hy gesels ‘n paar gerusstellende woorde met my en dan skielik opgewonde, asof ‘n blink gedagte hom te binne skiet, speel die volgende binne een minuut af: "Ou maat, jy is mos ‘n polisieman, het ek gesien! (seker op bedkaart, dink ek) Hoe voel jy? Nog okay?" "Ja, ek’s okay!"

Photograph 01

Lieutenant-Colonel T (Aurry) Pillay

Hy vlieg om en haas hom in die rigting van ‘n deur vanwaar hy binne sekondes terug draf en met ‘n dokument in sy hand geesdriftig beduie.

"Ou maat, ek moet hierdie ding voor ‘n Kommissaris van Ede sweer en teken en dit is so ‘n beslommernis. Kan jy nie gou my help en die ding beëdig nie, asseblief man?!" Vir ‘n oomblik maak ek ‘n "waardering" van die krisis. Waarom nie, besluit ek.

Ek word van my ruglêposisie op my linkerheup (linkersy en -elmboog) gedraai en gestut. ‘n Pen word in my regterhand geprop (bedink hierdie toneeltjie!!!) en ek sien duidelik die slotparagraaf onder aan die dokument wat hier voor en langs my op die smal spasie van die operasietafel neergeplak word : " Beëdig voor my op hierdie dag van ......". Ek vra die dokter, "Sweer u dat hierdie inhoud die waarheid is, die hele waarheid en .... ? Se, So help my God". Opgewonde sê hy so en teken die dokument. Ek teken: CPJ Serfontein Nr. 41801 Konst. SA Polisie Meyerton.

Ek "val" terug in my rugposisie terwyl die dokter "dankie, dankie, ou maat, dit help my baie, kom ons doen jou!"

Die operasie was ‘n sukses. Nooit weer enige terugvoer van enige aard rakende hierdie blindederm of die eedswering ontvang nie.

Lt.genl. Chris Serfontein Junie 2024

• Met erkenning aan “Die Generaal” en luit-genl Johan Ferreira

ONTMOETING MET DIE KOMMISSARIS – MAART 1963

Lt-genl Johan Ferreira

Die polisiestasie in Brooklyn, Pretoria was nog in 1963 ‘n groot ou huis, in Duxburyweg - reg oorkant die bekende Hillcrest swembad. Vandag staan daar op dieselfde perseel, ŉ pragtige moderne polisiestasie.

Die woning net langs die polisiestasie, Duxburyweg 123, was die ampswoning van die Kommissaris van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie. Destyds was dit generaal John Keevy.

Die manne wat nagskof gewerk het, was gemaan om so stil as moontlik te wees, want dit sou ‘n doodsonde wees om die Kommissaris en mevrou Keevy se nagrus te versteur. Daarom was die vangwa se radio altyd afgeskakel wanneer daar in die nag by die stasie “afgestaan” is.

As jong student-konstabel, nog nat agter die ore, het ek maar net gehoor dat daar ‘n grootkop langs die polisiestasie woon en dat ek uit sy pad moes bly.

Een aand, om ongeveer 23:30 tydens die nagskof, terwyl ek in die aanklagkantoor besig met een van die registers (onder die wakende oog van sersant Kleynhans), kom daar ‘n oubaas by die

aanklagkantoor in en groet baie vriendelik: “Naand, kêrels ..... kan julle my dalk help, asseblief. Ek en my vrou kom nou van ‘n funksie af en die huis se sleutels is weg. Kan een van julle jong manne nie gou ‘n venster kom oopbreek om die huis van binne af oop te sluit nie?”

Ek het die man taamlik streng aangekyk en agteroor op die stoel geleun en hom ewe kordaat meegedeel dat ons juis daar is om misdaad te voorkom, nie om dit te pleeg nie .... toe ek egter uit die hoek van my oog merk dat die hele personeel soos besemstokke op aandag staan ..... en die sersant hom boeglam skrik het vir die simpel student wat nie besef hy praat met generaal John Keevy (foto links) nie ....

Toe ons met ‘n harde stem deur die sersant beveel is om op aandag te staan, het sersant Kleynhans flink gesalueer en “Goeienaand Generaal” gesê. Ek het toe eers besef dis die grootkop van die huis langsaan .....

Gelukkig was die generaal in ‘n goeie bui en was hy tevrede toe ek met ‘n Okapi mes uit die SAP13 stoor die stopverf verwyder en ‘n vensterruit uitgehaal het.

Die feit dat ek my vinger met die skerp rand van die ruit raak gesny het, het dalk ook mevrou Keevy se simpatie in my guns laat swaai.

Sersant Kleynhans het my daarna baie streng uitgetrap en my vertel dat ek myself baie gelukkig kan ag dat ek nie daardie aand my loopbaan verwoes het nie ...

Ek was omtrent vir ‘n maand lank my rusdae kwyt .... maar vir ‘n jong student wat vir elke oomblik geleef het om aan diens te wees, was dit eintlik ‘n bonus ....

• Met erkenning aan “Die Generaal” en luit-genl Johan Ferreira

‘N POLISIEMAN KAN OOK ‘N PLAN MAAK

Lt-genl Johan Ferreira

Ek was in die tagtigerjare die werwingsoffisier in afdeling Oos-Transvaal. Dit was my taak om in die distrikte Middelburg, Nelspruit, Ermelo en Standerton nuwe studente vir die Polisie te werf. Ek moes al die distrikte en polisiestasies gereeld besoek om die applikante te keur, die nodige vorms in te vul en te sorg dat hulle aansoeke so spoedig moontlik na Hoofkantoor gestuur word.

Omdat ek die junior kaptein op die Afdelingskommissaris se personeel was, is die oudste motor op die inventaris aan my toevertrou om die werk te doen. Dit was ‘n ou 1972 Chevrolet wat al meer as 100,000 kilo’s op die klok gehad het. Behalwe vir ‘n paar skrape, was die motor nog heeltemal goed genoeg vir my taak..... behalwe vir een lastige kwessie....

Die motor het ‘n snaakse geluid begin maak en dit was duidelik dat die wiellaers aan die agterwiele vervang moes word. Dit het veroorsaak dat ‘n hinderlike geknars vanuit die agterwiele ontstaan het. As mens stadig gery het, was die geraas skaars hoorbaar, maar teen 60-plus km/h, was die geluid duidelik hoorbaar.

In die Middelburg distrik was daar ‘n polisie motorhawe.

Die twee “werktuigkundes” moes sorg dat al die voertuie in die distrik op die pad bly. Dit was beman deur twee sersante; ‘n lang skraal een en ‘n kort dikke. Onder die lede het die motorhawe bekend gestaan as “Laurel en Hardy Motors”, weens die twee sersante se liggaamsbou. Hulle was ook nie juis bekend vir hul fluksheid nie en was maar traag om enige “onnodige” werk aan ‘n voertuig te doen.

Ek het die motor by die polisie-motorhawe ingeboek met die versoek dat die wiellaers vervang word. Sersant Shorty het die Chev vir ‘n baie stadige toetsrit geneem en my verseker dat daar niks fout was nie, en dat ek nog baie kilometers so kan ry.

Weens my vorige ervaring as die stasiebevelvoerder op Phalaborwa, het ek geweet dat polisiestasies wat ver van die polisiemotorhawe op distriksvlak geleë was, magtiging gehad het om klein herstelwerkies aan voertuie by ‘n plaaslike motorhawe te laat doen ..... mits dit nie meer as R200 of R300 (ek kan nie die presiese bedrag onthou nie) sou kos nie. In daardie jare was so ‘n bedrag genoeg om ‘n stel agter-wiellaers te vervang.

‘n Polisieman maak toe ‘n plan.....

Met my volgende werwingsbesoek aan Standerton, stop ek by my vriend en kollega kaptein (later genl.maj.) Johann Fourie, die stasiebevelvoerder op Bethal en rapporteer dat die motor se wiellaers kapoet is en nie verder kan ry nie.

Hy ontvang telefonies goedkeuring van die DK vir die diens en stuur die motor na die plaaslike motorhawe en versoek hulle om die laers te vervang.

Terwyl ek wag om die motor terug te kry, sit en gesels ek lekker by kaptein Johann Fourie; hou hom uit die werk uit en drink een of twee koppies koffie terwyl die motor herstel word.

April 2024

• Met erkenning aan “Die Generaal” en luit-genl Johan Ferreira

In Memoriam: “Die Generaal”

Sedert ons vorige nuusbrief het die volgende lede ons ontval. ’n 1972 Chevrolet

Johan Ferreira

Mev. Baby Engels was ons oudste lid met haar heengaan en was tot die einde ‘n ware dame en ‘n voorbeeld om na te streef. Soos dit op haar huldigings brief tereg gemeld is: “To celebrate a life well-lived.”

Ofskoon generaal Craemer nie ‘n lid van die generaalsklub was nie, was hy ‘n gerespekteerde kollega en vriend.

Ons eer hul nagedagtenis en die bydrae wat hulle op hul onderskeie gebiede tot die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie gelewer het.

Ons innige meegevoel ook aan hul naasbestaandes. Ons vergeet hulle nie.

Mev Baby Engels 15-07-1927 – 10-09-2024

K.L. Craemer 19-08-1949 – 16-09-2024

• Met erkenning aan “Die Generaal” en luit-genl Johan Ferreira

Lt.genl.

SAP: DETACHMENT

Mark Atkins

DUTIES: UNIT 9, RIOT UNIT: DURBAN

(Source, Facebook, Riot Unit No 9, Durban, posted by Mark Atkins on 24th July 2024)

Photograph 01

The photo was taken in the Donnybrook area 96/97

From left to right Mark Atkins (Sgt), Gerald Gounden (Cst), Heinz Hiestermann (Sgt)

“This picture was taken during our deployment in Unit 40 uMzimkhulu area; we worked a very big area, and this was taken on one specific day when we got called out to a specific area, as we were a very small unit as often was the case the people that where off duty often where called to assist, that is why Cst Gerald Gounden was in civilian clothes

On the picture you find Sgt Mark Atkins (W/O) retired and immigrated to New Zealand

Cst Gerald Gounden. (Was murdered on an off-duty incident) later in Durban

Sgt Heinz Hiestermann, now serving as Captain at the Chatsworth Academy. This was in the Bulwer/ Donnybrook area.” – Insert by Captain Heinz Peter Hiestermann.

Comments

Mark Atkins

Author

Rising contributor

Logan Govender Mark Atkins (Sgt), Gerald Gounden (Cst), Heinz Hiestermann (Sgt). As far as I'm aware Gerald was shot and died in an off-duty incident. The photo was taken in the Donnybrook area 96/97.

“Agnoscere et honorare servientibus” – “to acknowledge and honour those who served”

“Soli Deo Gloria” - “To God Alone Glory”

Logan Govender

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE: WILLIE JOUBERT

Col Logan Govender

Photograph 01 Constable Willie Joubert

Photograph 02

SA Police, Pinetown old station

Photograph 03

SA Police, Pinetown old station, Sergeant Rodney Torr, late standing in the front porch

Willie Joubert – “The station commander when I first arrived (1977) there was Lt Col Trout could also be spelt as Traut then 2nd in charge was Major Andries Kuhn then W/O Coetzee. I cannot remember a captain or lieutenant (uniform branch) being stationed there during my time from 1977 to 1980. If I remember correctly the detective commander was Captain de Jager. Whilst stationed at SA Police, Pinetown, the old station during 1978, Willie Joubert was summoned to accident, one late afternoon going down Field's Hill just before the Old Main Rd turn off into Pinetown where a fully laden truck of Escort Meats was involved. The brakes failed and the driver lost control of the truck, and it went off the road. The driver passed on. The traffic officer in the accident scene photo was Neville Slaughter. A friend of the police members. Neville was with the NPA traffic department.

Photograph 04

Constable Willie Joubert attending the scene of accident. Traffic Officer Neville Slaughter on the bottom left of the photograph (obscured)

Photograph 05 SAP 41838 and Willie’s first car, parked on the side.

Photograph 06 Patrol van with convicts chatting to the driver

Photograph 07 Photograph was taken outside Pretoria when I was with Pretoria Flying Squad in 1983.

Then 1986 I became a detective.

“Agnoscere et honorare servientibus” – “to acknowledge and honour those who served”

“Soli Deo Gloria” - “To God Alone Glory”

“The Nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten” – Calvin Coolidge

Logan Govender

AFSTERWE:

GENL.

MAJ. BERTUS STEYN

Lt-genl Johan Ferreira

AFSTERWE:

Dit is met innige leedwese dat ons die afsterwe van genl.maj. J.A. (Bertus) Steyn - (30 September 1939 - 21 November 2024) moet aankondig.

Hy het 'n lang en moedige stryd teen kanker gestry, maar die oormag was te groot.

Ons dink in hierdie tyd aan Hestermarie en namens die Generaalsklub wens ons vir Hestermarié en sy geliefdes sterkte toe vir die tyd wat voorlê.

GENL. MAJ. BERTUS STEYN

Sarie van Niekerk

Een van die groot bome van die voormalige generale staf van die destydse Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiemag is vroeg vanoggend ontwortel met die afsterwe van genl. Bertus Steyn (afgetree). Hy is na 'n lang stryd teen ondermeer kanker en ander siektes oorlede. Genl. Steyn was nou ook betrokke by die groep voormalige lede van die veiligheidstak van die polisie wat tans weer aangekla word. Bertus, my ou maat, dankie vir al die heerlike kuier ure waar ons kopstukke gesit en gesels het. Die tye wat ons saam besig was met die gedenkblad van die polisiemag met hul 100ste herdenking van hul stigting. Al die lekker kuiertjies en die baie koppies tee wat ons saam daar rondom daardie ronde tafeltjie in jou huis gesit en om gesels het as ons klaar gewerk het. Al die sommer net die inval kuiertjies daar by jou, dit is vir my so kosbaar, ek sal dit altyd onthou. Dankie my ou vriend vir jou jare diens aan ons land, baie daarvan onder moeilike omstandighede. Mag jou dogter en ander familielede vrede en genade van ons Hemelse Vader ontvang vir die moeiliker tyd wat voor le. Ek sê totsiens my vriend, maar nie vaarwel nie, net tot ons mekaar weer eendag in ons ewige huis gaan ontmoet. SHALOM.

DURBAN: BOROUGH POLICE | CITY POLICE | GEMEENTELIKE

STADSPOLISIE

Darryn Newcombe

• Durban Borough Police

The Borough Police Station in West St, in 1897, use to stand on the site where Medwood Gardens is today (opp the Durban City Hall)

Postcard. Durban. Grey Street. No Postmark. Estimated Early 1900s. – Frans Erasmus. Note Constable on point duty in centre of the street.

• Durban City Police

City Police Headquarters: Durban

CAPE POLICE

Cape Police: East London

SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTABULARY

(SAC): ABRAHAMSKRAAL

Dr Garth Benneyworth

Dear Hennie,

Trust all is well with you.

Re your enquiry, the SAC post at Abrahamskraal consisted of the farmhouse itself and a nearby fort on a hillock.

There is a graveyard near the farmhouse with SAC graves.

The fort is at 28°53'47"S 25°39'33"E

All the best,

Garth

ZUID-AFRIKAANSE REPUBLIEK: ZARPS

HULP VERLANG: LUIT PETER JACQUES THEODOR COMPLOIER

Silvio Luiz da Rocha

Geagte Menere,

Ek is baie dankbaar vir u aandag. Ek doen al meer as 20 jaar navorsing oor genealogie en doen tans navorsing oor die Comploier-familie van Oostenryk op versoek van 'n vriend by die werk.

Die Comploier-familie van Wene was prominent in die samelewing in die 19de eeu. Ek het baie dokumente in my navorsing gevind. Ek sukkel egter om toegang tot die webwerf van die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Argief te kry.

Peter Comploier se storie is baie interessant en ek probeer die kolletjies verbind om 'n volledige verhaal van sy lewe te vestig. 'n Paar inligting oor Peter Comploier:

Naam: Peter Jacques Theodor Comploier

Geboortedatum: 24 April 1862

Plek: Wene-Oostenryk

Vader: Peter Paul Mathias Comploier

Moeder: Anna Rosalia Jacobina Comploier (née Lilienthal)

Hy was 'n luitenant in die Transvaalse polisiemag van 1889 tot 1891:

DEPOT TAB

BRON KG

LEER TIPE

VOLUME_NO 0

VERWYSING CR775/89

DEEL 1

BESKRYWING ARTILLERIE EN POLISIEBEVOEGDE. STUUR 'N VERSOEK PETER COMPLOIER BEVAT 'N ADMINISTRATEUR SE AANBEVELING VIR DIE VAKANTE POS VAN EERSTE LUTENANT VAN DIE ARTILLERIE EN POLISIE AAN BEWEG. BEGIN 18890703

AFWERKING 18890703

Hy het gesterf in die Suid-Rhodesiese Rebellie van 1896-7 op 26 Maart 1896. Ek het sy doodsertifikaat en dit meld dat 'n inventaris van sy besittings tussen 1897 en 1898 gemaak is.

Kan jy my help deur my te vertel waar ek die volledige inventaris of enige ander dokumente van Peter Comploier kan vind?

As jy toegang tot die lêers deur jou stelsel het, sal ek baie dankbaar wees as jy dit met my kan deel.

Ek is tot jou beskikking om jou op dieselfde manier te help.

Die uwe, Silvio Luiz da Rocha

• Onveranderd geplaas! U Afrikaans is goed! – HBH.

ZARPS AND HARPS

John Elsegood

The policing traditions of South Africa are dramatically different to most Commonwealth countries because of the para military duties of the former.

Their heroic but ultimately doomed defence in the last set piece battle of the Anglo Boer War saw them eliminated as a fighting unit in the Battle of Bergendal. It was here that the battered Zarps won acclaim in trying to hold a rocky outcrop against the much-maligned General Buller, (the first CIC of British forces at the start of the war), who had, in fact, perceived a weakness in the Boer defence, at this point and pressed his attack home, successfully.

Buller’s force of 8000 were opposed by a total 1000 Boers with the Zarps contingent of 74 taking the brunt of the fire from their forward kopje with between four to five shells, per minute, raining down on them for some three hours.

Buller described his Zarp foes as men of ‘great gallantry’ and they took the blows while giving plenty. John Stuart (Churchill’s successor at the Morning Post) wrote, ….“the Boer dead lay where they had fallen. They were massive in their repose, those dead Vulcans….Peace unbroken, peace to their souls for they were brave men.” Thomas Pakenham, the best-read author of the ABW, was not unsympathetic to the Boers and he also wrote about the ZARPS, ‘’ that yesterday’s ‘bullies’ were now regarded as ‘heroes.’ But were the Boers the bullies of the past, as Pakenham mentioned? Accusations like that are commonplace for most police forces around the world, past and present, particularly so in the period after the Jameson Raid that had left some Uitlanders disappointed that President Kruger’s government had not been overthrown. It was the High Commissioner to the Cape, Sir Alfred Milner, who was determined to exacerbate tensions with the ZAR and Britain and the Edgar Affair with the ZARPS, as the whipping boys, made a good target. The ‘Harp of the Cape,’ (Milner) was determined to extract maximum political mileage from the incident of the shooting death of Thomas Edgar, by the police.

Indeed, on the 30th December 1898, the Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, wrote to Milner thus:”The Edgar Affair may be very important and may give us the right of remonstrance and action which under the Convention we have not hitherto had. But at present we have no details and the case may assume a very different aspect after judicial inquiry.” Unfortunately for the two High Imp intriguers they were given no joy from the case.

What had happened on the night of 18th December is that Edgar had quarrelled with Foster, a fellow Englishman, and knocked him out, ultimately causing his death. Spectators called the police and when one of the police officers (Jones), who sought to arrest Edgar in his home, was attacked, (being struck twice with an iron shod stick), he then shot Edgar dead. Jones was later charged, tried and acquitted.

However, the smooth administration of the law didn’t stop Milner from trying to make capital from the affray. In writing to Lord Selborne (5/4/1899), he wanted a Bluebook published so that the Edgar shooting and Jones trial was thoroughly “rubbed into the public mind.” A month earlier in another letter to Selborne (8/3/99), Milner was railing against injustices to British subjects, presumably the same ones he was trying to get become ZAR citizens by demanding a reduced qualifying period for the franchise. This ‘shocking story’ of the ‘lack of adequate protection’ was so bad that “it had to be well noted up and kept in reserve against the day…when we shall be obliged to take the bull by the horns.”

So, a Johannesburg street altercation between two English speaking imbibers was something that had to be given exposure to defame the ZAR administration and its police force. In fact, it says much

more about the venal nature of the British elite than about a micro domestic matter that could have happened in any other mining town. If it had happened across the Indian Ocean, at another famous raunchy gold mining town, at Kalgoorlie WA, it most certainly would not have been part of discussions by Westminster plotters.

When the incident took place, the acting High Commissioner, at the Cape, General Sir William Butler, (Milner was on leave, in London), rightly declared it as a drunken brawl and that the press and South Africa League were simply engaged in attempting to make political capital out of it.

Milner, on his return, was furious at Butler, resulting in Butler resigning as CIC and returning to England. If it had been the other way around, (ie Milner being recalled), there would have been no war. Butler was correct when he said, “what South Africa needs is rest and not a surgical operation.” It got neither but instead a ratcheting up of tension and a butcher conducting operations!

As for Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary continued to harp on about the ‘murder of Edgar’ and in his dispatch of May 10, characterised the case thus: “But perhaps the most striking instance of arbitrary action by officials and the support of such action by the state, is the well-known Edgar case. The effect of the verdict of the jury, warmly endorsed by the judge, is that four policeman, breaking into a man’s house at night without a warrant, on the mere statement of one person, which subsequently turned out to be true, that the man had committed a crime, are justified in killing him there and then, because according to their own account, he hits one of them with a stick.”

There is a historical irony in all this: the Zarps were to be the ‘whipping boys’ (as they would be later, in the war), by the two intriguers, something the British economist J.A. Hobson was not slow in attacking.

During the (European) summer and autumn of 1899 Hobson spent some months in South Africa and he spoke to the leading luminaries of the time. He was scathing at Chamberlain’s dissembling, describing it as completely ‘misrepresenting the evidence.’ (See his War in South Africa, p57, Howard Fertig. 1969, first printed 1900). Hobson makes a number of points, stating that when Chamberlain made that claim, “ he had in his possession a full report of the trial.” This stated that English Uitlander witnesses said Forster was drunk, Edgar was not (both British); that acting on public information fourpolice officers entered Edgar’s home where one of them (Jones) was instantly attacked with the said weapon. Jones, expecting more blows then fired his pistol, killing Edgar. Two surgeons testified on the injuries to Jones who nevertheless was still charged with murder, at first, later reduced, by the State prosecutor, to one of culpable homicide. The jury after a long deliberation found in favour of the accused by acquitting him, a decision approved of by the judge. Hobson has much more to say on the attitude of Zarps and English condescension toward them. He says, “My sober judgment, formed upon careful consideration of the kind of Englishman who was working up to these grievances, is that this insolence imputed to the Boer simply consisted in his assumption of equality and refusal of deference or recognition of superiority which the British have come to expect

in other parts of South Africa. Britishers coming from the colonies had been accustomed to despise ‘the Dirty Boer’ and regard him as a social inferior; in the Transvaal they found him in power and refusing to accept the role of inferior; hence their indignation.” (Hobson, p.62).

That in a nutshell is what Chamberlain and Milner objected to- the lack of deference to British customs and desires but in fact, the London Convention (1884), which the British had agreed to, had given them no say in domestic ZAR policies.

As for the Zarps, Hobson in his cross examination, of many Uitlanders, did not elicit any accusations, from them, of an oppressive police force and nor indeed of any great contact with Boers. Eventually, the Zarps, like their Boer Republic, (and also the Orange Free State) would be destroyed by an unnecessary war, rightly described by British historian, Godfrey Le May, as Milner’s War.

PRO-PATRIA-MUSEUM

Vandag (Saterdag23 Nov 2024) die uitstalling voltooi by PPM.

Paul Els

DIE EINDE VAN ‘N ERA

Dr Coert Mommsen

Beste Brigadier,

Ons vyfde kontak verjaardag is om die draai (17 Desember 2020 - 24). My verpligtinge (Navorsingsdivergerende skryfwerk en skilderwerk het nou baie toegeneem. Dis nie meer moontlik vir my om maandeliks ’n artikel te lewer nie. Ek sal waarskynlik steeds elke 2/3 maande ’n artikel kan lewer vir Polisiesielkunde. Ek is jammer oor die laat kennisgewing, maar kan waarskynlik eers in Februarie 2025 (DV) weer kan lewer.

Baie dankie vir hierdie groot leer-en verrykende geleentheid, u het gehelp om my lewensideaal te verwesenlik!

Baie groete en voorspoed, Coert Mommsen, Potchefstroom 19 Oktober 2024 10:49

• Baie dankie Doktor Mommsen!

DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN ‘N EIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INTELLIGENSIEKUNDE (VEERTIEN): HOE SAM NUJOMA SWANIE SWANEPOEL SE EGGENOTE MARINA SE KOFFIEFLES GEHOU HET

In Windhoek het Republikeinse Intelligensie (RI) ’n nuwe “vuurwapenlisensiekantoor” bokant die aanklagkantoor van die SAP geopen. Dié kantoor is deur Pieter Swanepoel, Ben Burger en M.C. Swart beman. Die Afdelingskommissaris van die SAP in Windhoek het kennis gedra van die RImanne se nuwe take, en verantwoordelikhede en kanaliseer opdragte vanaf die Wit Huis in Johannesburg na hulle. Die insamelingsverslae wat die RI-kantoor insamel, word via die SAP na

brig. Van den Bergh se personeel in die Wit Huis gestuur vir analise, evaluering en vertolking. Die kantoor het waardevolle inligting oor SWAPO se bedrywighede in Suidwes-Afrika ingesamel en ook oor die joernalis Ruth First, die vrou van Joe Slovo. Slovo en First was bekende kommuniste en hul bedrywighede was deel van die intelligensieprioriteite van RI in sowel Johannesburg as Windhoek. Joe Slovo was eerste hoof van staf van MK en later algemene sekretaris van die SAKP. Pieter (Swanie) Swanepoel inisieer ’n vindingryke intelligensie-operasie deur een van die twee grootste koerante in Suidwes-Afrika te subsidieer en ’n penetrasie-agent op die personeel van die ander te werf. Swanepoel skryf aan Hennie Heymans van Nongqai:

‘Van 1963 tot Desember 1967 was ek en my kollega Ben Burger die twee lede van die Vuurwapeneenheid, wat eintlik net die dekking vir die SWA-tak van die Republikeinse Intelligensiediens (RI) was. Na ons wete was daar daardie jare geen kommuniste in SWA nie. Hier en daar was daar wel mense met vêrlangse bande met kommuniste soos advokaat Israel Goldblatt, wat ’n vriend van Bram Fischer was en ’n eerw. Haythornthwaite wat net na die oorlogsjare lid was van die Friends of the Soviet Union. Advokaat Israel Goldblatt se suster Sarah Goldblatt was die skrywer C.J. Langenhoven se jare lange vertroueling en kuratrise van sy skryfnalatenskap op Oudtshoorn. Toe ewe skielik verskyn Ruth First in Windhoek. Sy besoek die Argiewe, koerantkantore, die Administrasiegebou, swart leiers van die SWAPO en SWANU organisasies en ’n menigte ander mense. Ons was bewus van die feit dat Ruth First en haar man, Joe Slovo, voormalige lede van die Kommunistiese Party van Suid-Afrika (KPSA) was. Ons het ook geweet dat sy steeds ’n leidende rol in die buiteparlementêre opposisie teen die regering gespeel het en veral dat sy waarskynlik die gevaarlikste joernalis in daardie geledere was. Ons het begin navrae maak oor wat die doel van haar besoek was en ons het die swart kollegas opdrag gegee om haar versigtig dop te hou. Later het ons blankes haar ook probeer dophou, maar in Windhoek daardie jare kon jy nie iemand soos Ruth First ongesiens dophou nie. Lede van die publiek het begin saamspeel en First kort-kort uitgewys wanneer hulle ’n speurder in die omgewing gesien het. Al wat die dophouery ons in die sak gebring het, was om vas te stel dat haar belangrikste steunpilaar in die stad die Amerikaanse biskop van die Anglikaanse Kerk in Windhoek, biskop Robert Mize was. Sy het hom daagliks besoek en dit was vir ons duidelik dat hy haar “gasheer” was. Sy het net in die Stadt Windhoek hotel geslaap, maar al haar skryfwerk in Mize se woning gedoen. Ek het besluit om die spreekwoordelike bul by die horings te pak. Ek het openlik agter haar gestap op pad na haar hotel. By die hotel het ek in die sitkamer gaan sit terwyl sy na haar kamer gestap het. Na ’n paar minute het sy uitgekom en my bestorm. “Wat dink jy doen jy?” wou First bitsig weet. “Hoekom loop jy agter my aan?” “Dame,” het ek geantwoord, “Ons is bekommerd oor wat jou besoek aan ons stad kan beteken. Jy is ’n bekende kommunis en ons is nie gewoond daaraan om kommuniste in die stad te sien nie.” “Nou luister mooi,” het sy geantwoord. “My besoek hier het niks met kommunisme te

doene nie. Ek doen navorsing vir ’n boek wat ek in opdrag van Penguin Books skryf. Dis ’n bekende uitgewery wat niks met kommunisme te doene het nie. Sal jy nou ophou om van jou en jou manskappe idiote te maak en my in ’n verleentheid te plaas?” Ek het geantwoord dat ek haar woord sal vat dat die boek niks met die kommunisme te make sal hê nie. En sy was reg. Toe die boek in 1963 verskyn het, het dit weliswaar ’n paar snedige klappe na die Windhoekse polisie wat haar gepla het, bevat, maar dit was nie ’n pro-kommunistiese boek nie. Die feit dat die redakteur van Penguin Books wat vir Ruth First die opdrag gegee het om die boek te skryf ene Ronald Segal was, was vir my van geen belang nie. Presies wat die doel met die boek was, wat bloot die titel South West Africa gedra het, kon ek nie op daardie stadium agterkom nie, maar toe besef ek dat dit ongetwyfeld deel was van die voorbereidings vir die saak oor die administrasie van Suidwes-Afrika, wat in die Wêreldhof in Den Haag teen Suid-Afrika aanhangig gemaak was. Die klaers was Ethiopië en Liberië, maar dit was geen geheim nie dat die VSA die eintlike dryfveer was. Die klaers se advokate was dan ook Amerikaners.’

Die bevelvoerder van SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, word in 1966 vlugtig deur die SA Veiligheidspolisie in Suidwes-Afrika gearresteer en oornag in Windhoek aangehou. RI-lid Swanie Swanepoel skryf hieroor aan Hennie Heymans: “On 20th March 1966 Sam Nujoma landed in Windhoek, ‘to challenge the Boers’, but more possibly to foment an uprising, and was forced to leave the next day. At that time, I had already been following up reports of six ‘freedom fighters’ who had returned to Ovamboland. Soon after this date we began to obtain information that SWAPO insurgents were beginning to train locals in remote areas in guerrilla warfare.”

Bring terug my koffiefles

Swanepoel, Burger en Crous (die afdelingskommissaris) het inligting ontvang dat Nujoma ’n verrassingsbesoek per vliegtuig aan Suidwes-Afrika sou bring en op Windhoek-lughawe sou land. Herero-ondersteuners van SWAPO sou Nujoma op die lughawe inwag en toejuig met die doel om aan die wêreld te wys dat SWAPO in beheer is van Suidwes, en nie die Suid-Afrikaanse regering nie. As gevolg van ’n stukkie vernuftige voetwerk van Swanepoel en Crous het die Herero’s en die loods van Nujoma se vliegtuig mekaar misverstaan oor die beplande landingstyd. Teen die tyd dat die Herero’s na ’n lang en uitputtende dagreis te perd by Windhoek-lughawe opgedaag het, was die vrygelate Nujoma stert tussen die bene weer vort na Lusaka, Zambië. Swanie Swanepoel se eggenote Marina het die oggend voor Nujoma se vrylating vir hom en die vliegtuigbemanning ’n Tupperwarebak met toebroodjies en ’n fles koffie gemaak, wat Swanie saamgeneem het polisiekantoor toe. Nujoma is met die Tupperwarebak en fles koffie in die hand vanaf Windhoeklughawe vort na Lusaka, Zambië. Tant Marina Swanepoel, wat naby Pretoria woon, is nou nog vies omdat SWAPO nie haar pragtige koffiefles terugbesorg het nie. Sy sê die Tupperwarebak “kan hulle maar hou.”

Joe Slovo se vriend, die Johannesburgse advokaat en SAKP-leier Bram Fischer, wat deel van die Rivonia-aangeklaagdes se regspan gevorm het, is in Junie 1964 gearresteer vir sy betrokkenheid by kommunistiese aktiwiteite. “In June 1964 the Communist Party was dealt a shattering blow when the Security Police arrested fourteen members of the Central Committee of the Party, including advocate Bram Fischer, the leader of the Party in the Republic of South Africa.” Fischer, in daardie stadium die waarnemende voorsitter van die SAKP, word beskou as een van die bekendste en invloedrykste struggle-aktiviste uit Afrikanergeledere. Daarteenoor was Hendrik van den Bergh hoof van die Veiligheidspolisie wat oor wetstoepassingsmagte beskik het om teenoor enige bedreiging vir die staat se veiligheid op te tree. Groot hoeveelhede “inkriminerende kommunistiese lektuur” is in die huis gevind waar Fischer gewoon het. Ten tye van sy inhegtenisname het Fischer onder meer ’n dokument met die naam “the SACP Programme” in sy besit gehad, wat die omverwerping van die Nasionale Party-regering bepleit het. Dié dokument het ’n plan vir ekonomiese rewolusie in Suid-Afrika bevat. Fischer was voorts direk betrokke by die opstel van die “Operation Mayibuye”-dokument wat onder meer “die weg na oorwinning deur geweld” uiteengesit het.

Abram Fischer was die kleinseun van die gesiene Vrystaatse Afrikanerleier en president, Abraham Fischer. Pres. Kruger se wanhopige pogings om buitelandse steun vir die soewereiniteit van die Transvaal tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog (1899–1902) te werf, het die stuur van ’n driemandeputasie na die VSA, Rusland en Europa ingesluit. Die deputasie het bestaan uit A.D.W. Wolmarans van die Transvaal en twee Vrystaters, C.H. Wessels en Abraham Fischer, ironies die pa van die latere leier van die SAKP, adv. Bram Fischer. Bram Fischer se pa en regterpresident van die Vrystaat, Abraham Fischer, was saam met J.B.M. (Barry) Hertzog en C.R. de Wet die belangrikse Afrikanerleiers in die Vrystaat. Saam stig hulle die Orangia Unie in Mei 1906 wat hom beywer vir “verantwoordelike selfregering”. Die Orangia Unie het geglo dat die eerste stap om verwydering van die Britse gesag in Suid-Afrika die onvoorwaardelike toekenning van selfregering aan die Transvaal en die Oranjerivierkolonie moet wees. Die Orangia Unie was nie ten gunste van ’n geleidelike proses van konstitusionele ontwikkeling nie en in sekere opsigte was hul standpunt suksesvol toe die Britse regering in Junie 1907 by wyse van oktrooie verantwoordelike selfregering aan die Oranjerivierkolonie toeken. “Teen einde 1911 en in die loop van 1912 het die politieke partye wat die Afrikaners in die Kaap, Transvaal en die Vrystaat verteenwoordig het – die Afrikaner Bond, Het Volk en Orangia Unie – hulself ontbind en die Suid-Afrikaanse Party (SAP) gevorm.”

Tydens nagraadse studie aan die Universiteit van Oxford se New College word Bram Fischer ’n bekeerling tot kommunisme. Op Oxford was Fischer ’n medestudent van die latere Leier van die Opposisie in die Parlement, sir De Villiers Graaff. Graaff vertel in sy outobiografie dat Fischer ’n Rhodes-student was wat te Oxford as voorsitter van die filantropiese groep, The Raleigh Society,

gekies is. Graaff vertel dat Fischer een somer, net na sy besoek aan Duitsland en die Sowjetunie, skielik as voorsitter van die Raleigh Society bedank het en dat sy hele houding en manier van dinge doen, verander het. Gevul met kommunistiese dogma keer Bram Fischer in 1934 na Suid-Afrika terug en registreer in Johannesburg as prokureur. Sy kantoor is reg oorkant die Johannesburgse hooggeregshof en twee jaar later trou hy met Susanna Johanna (Molly) Krige, ’n kleinniggie van gen. Jan Smuts se eggenote, Isie Smuts. Fischer se huis en swembad te Beaumontstraat 12, Oaklands, was ’n bymekaarkomplek vir Johannesburg se linksgesindes en kommuniste wat dikwels om die blok parkering moes soek omdat Fischer se wit Mercedes Benz en Molly se wit- en geel Anglia die oprit blokkeer het. Net soos Hilda Watts stel Molly haarself openlik as kommunis vir die Johannesburgse Stadsraadverkiesing in 1944 verkiesbaar, maar word nie verkies nie.

Fischer word die ondergrondse leier van die SAKP en ’n gevaarlike opponent van die regering, omdat hy geweldpleging voorstaan en in die geval van die African Resistance Movement, ook finansier. Nadat die hof borg aan hom toegestaan het, het hy ondergronds verdwyn. Hy is weer op 11 November 1965 gearresteer. Sir De Villiers Graaff, op daardie stadium leier van die opposisie, vertel die staaltjie van genl. Van den Bergh wat aan hom (Graaff) gesê het die Veiligheidstak het Fischer op ’n keer gearresteer en hom met voorbedagte rade ná 48 uur weer vrygelaat het. Die Veiligheidstak het aan ander gearresteerde kommuniste vertel dat Fischer gou vrygelaat is, omdat hy “alles” aan die VT vertel het en nou met hulle saamwerk. Volgens Van den Bergh het sommige kommuniste die storie geglo, moed opgegee en met die hele mandjie patats oor Fischer se ondergrondse bedrywighede vorendag gekom. Hierdie stories het, volgens Van den Bergh, tot Fischer se ondergang gelei.

Die aanklagte teen Fischer was gewigtig en hy is in 1966 van sabotasie aangekla. Op 9 Mei 1966 word Fischer tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf veroordeel op aanklagte ingevolge die Wet op die Onderdrukking van Kommunisme en die Sabotasiewet. Wat Fischer nie geweet het nie, was dat ’n vernuftige RI-infiltrasie-agent, Gerard Ludi, daarin geslaag het om die ANC en SAKP in Johannesburg binne te dring. “Everything changed in 1963, when a plausible police spy, Gerard Ludi, after a few years on the fringes, was invited to join a cell – of which Bram Fischer happened also to be a member. Ironically, Fischer warned the cell, in Ludi’s presence, of police attempts at infiltration and urged the cell members to take special care to recognise and to isolate these people as soon as they come near us.” Ludi was ’n polisieman, maar sy dekking as joernalis by beide die Rand Daily Mail en Johannesburg Star was rotsvas omdat hy ’n uitstekende joernalis was. Sy bona fides en geloofwaardigheid as linksgesinde joernalis en lid van die Congress of Democrats was bo verdenking.

* In DIE BURO: Genl. Lang Hendrik van den Bergh en die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid, wat deur Imprimatur Uitgewers gepubliseer word, is daar ware Suid-Afrikaanse spioenasieverhale wat die waarde van agente en spioene illustreer (HUMINT), en ook die enorme skade wat hulle somtyds aanrig, onder die soeklig plaas. Die enigste werklike meetinstrument van die sukses van ’n spioenasiediens is die mate waarop hy of sy die geskiedenis beïnvloed het, of nie. Die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid het ’n invloed op die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis gehad en verdien om onthou te word. Indien enige van ons lesers oor relevante inligting oor die ontwikkeling van spioenasie in SuidAfrika, beskik, word u hartlik uitgenooi om enige inligting en foto’s aan intel@nongqai.org te stuur.

* Die artikelreeks Intelegere bevat 982 bronverwysings en voetnotas, wat op aanvraag van die skrywer bekom kan word. ‘n Verkorte weergawe van die verhaal van Dieter Felix Gerhardt en Ruth Johr verskyn in die boek Spioenmeesters, wat op Amazon verkrygbaar is.

* Word in die volgende Nongqai vervolg.

* Voorafbestellings vir DIE BURO kan by Imprimatur Uitgewers geplaas word.

DEEL 1: DIE NOODSAAK VIR INTELLIGENSIEWERK IN ‘N VERANDERENDE

BINNELANDSE EN INTERNASIONALE OMGEWING

Johan Mostert

Dagsê Hennie en Henning,

Mense buite die veiligheidsgemeenskap het gedurende die tagtigerjare dikwels smalend verwys na die eenogigheid van intelligensie wat 'n kommunis agter elke bos gesien het.

Min het hulle die diepgang van die interne besinning rondom alle fasette van die bedryf van intelligensie besef.

Die aangehegte twee artikels dien as voorbeelde. Die dokumente is geskryf deur ongeïdentifiseerde outeurs van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NI). Dit was nie amptelike dokumente nie.

(Die rekenaar het geweier om die pdfdokumente om te skakel na word.docx.

Ons is dus verplig om die .pdf om te skakel na .jpg en as .jpg’s in tabelle te plaas.)

Waterpolisie: Durban

SARP - Durban, 1980. Railway Police. Hippo police vehicle – R van Wyk.

SARP - Johannesburg, circa 1944. Policeman on duty on station platform. THL pic

Water Police: Durban – J & J Wepener

COMMANDANT ‘ROOI-MACHIEL’ PRINSLOO AKA ‘THE RED DEVIL’

Jennifer Bosch

Rooi-Machiel Prinsloo was a prominent figure during the Anglo-Boer War, known for his bravery and leadership. Joining the Bethlehem Commando at the outbreak of the war, his fearlessness earned him a swift promotion to Commander by February 1900. He became famous for his actions during the British attack on Colesberg, where, despite being severely wounded, he continued to assist fellow soldiers and helped sabotage British advancements by destroying the Norvalspont bridge. Prinsloo fought alongside General Christiaan de Wet, conducting raids in the Cape Colony, and was promoted to General of the Northern Free State Commandos in 1901. De Wet praised Prinsloo’s courage, remarking that 100 men like him could drive the English out of their own country.

After the war, Prinsloo returned to his farm in Bethlehem, which had been destroyed by the British. Financially ruined, he resumed his role as District Commander and later served on Bethlehem’s City Council from 1927 to 1931. Tragically, he was shot in 1931 by a mentally disturbed young man while supervising tree plantings. His death was a great loss, and a monument was erected at the site where he was killed. He was buried in Bethlehem with over 3,000 mourners in attendance, and his

Text Source - Extracted, summarised and translated from https://monument-sa.co.za/generaal-rooimichael-prinsloo-abo-held-bethlehem

Original Photo developed by Nico Moolman

wife Maria Catherina rests beside him.

ZARPS AND HARPS

John Elsegood

The policing traditions of South Africa are dramatically different to most Commonwealth countries because of the para military duties of the former.

The Zuid Afrikaansche Reidende Politie (South African Mounted Police) or Zarps epitomised the history of the force, although to the cynics it would appear the Zarps were more honoured in death than in life, by English speaking critics. Their heroic but ultimately doomed defence in the last set piece battle of the Anglo Boer War saw them eliminated as a fighting unit in the Battle of Bergendal. It was here that the battered Zarps won acclaim in trying to hold a rocky outcrop against the much-maligned General Buller, (the first CIC of British forces at the start of the war), who had, in fact, perceived a weakness in the Boer defence, at this point and pressed his attack home, successfully.

Buller described his Zarp foes as men of ‘great gallantry’ and they took the blows while giving plenty.

John Stuart (Churchill’s successor at the Morning Post) wrote, …. “the Boer dead lay where they had fallen. They were massive in their repose, those dead Vulcans…. Peace unbroken, peace to their souls for they were brave men.” Thomas Pakenham, the best-read author of the ABW, was not unsympathetic to the Boers and he also wrote about the ZARPS, ‘’ that yesterday’s ‘bullies’ were now regarded as ‘heroes.’ But were the Boers the bullies of the past, as Pakenham mentioned? Accusations like that are commonplace for most police forces around the world, past and present, particularly so in the period after the Jameson Raid that had left some Uitlanders disappointed that President Kruger’s government had not been overthrown.

ZA Republiek

Great Brittain Oranje Vrij Staat

It was the High Commissioner to the Cape, Sir Alfred Milner, who was determined to exacerbate tensions with the ZAR and Britain and the Edgar Affair with the ZARPS, as the whipping boys, made a good target. The ‘Harp of the Cape,’ (Milner) was determined to extract maximum political mileage from the incident of the shooting death of Thomas Edgar, by the police.

Indeed, on the 30th of December 1898, the Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, wrote to Milner thus: “The Edgar Affair may be very important and may give us the right of remonstrance and action which under the Convention we have not hitherto had. But at present we have no details, and the case may assume a very different aspect after judicial inquiry.” Unfortunately for the two High Imp intriguers they were given no joy from the case. What had happened on the night of 18th December is that Edgar had quarrelled with Foster, a fellow Englishman, and knocked him out, ultimately causing his death. Spectators called the police and when one of the police officers (Jones), who sought to arrest Edgar in his home, was attacked, (being struck twice with an iron shod stick), he then shot Edgar dead. Jones was later charged, tried and acquitted.

So, a Johannesburg street altercation between two English speaking imbibers was something that had to be given exposure to defame the ZAR administration and its police force. In fact, it says much more about the venal nature of the British elite than about a micro domestic matter that could have happened in any other mining town. If it had happened across the Indian Ocean, at another famous raunchy gold mining town, at Kalgoorlie WA, it most certainly would not have been part of discussions by Westminster plotters. When the incident took place, the acting High Commissioner, at the Cape, General Sir William Butler, (Milner was on leave, in London), rightly declared it as a drunken brawl and that the press and South Africa League were simply engaged in attempting to make political capital out of it. Milner, on his return, was furious at Butler, resulting in Butler resigning as CIC and returning to England. If it had been the other way around, (ie Milner being recalled), there would have been no war. Butler was correct when he said, “what South Africa needs is rest and not a surgical operation.” It got neither but instead a ratcheting up of tension and a butcher conducting operations!

During the (European) summer and autumn of 1899 Hobson spent some months in South Africa and he spoke to the leading luminaries of the time. He was scathing at Chamberlain’s dissembling, describing it as completely ‘misrepresenting the evidence.’ (See his War in South Africa, p57, Howard Fertig. 1969, first printed 1900). Hobson makes a number of points, stating that when Chamberlain made that claim, “he had in his possession a full report of the trial.” This stated that English Uitlander witnesses said Forster was drunk, Edgar was not (both British); that acting on public information fourpolice officers entered Edgar’s home where one of them (Jones) was instantly attacked with the said weapon. Jones, expecting more blows then fired his pistol, killing Edgar. Two surgeons testified on the injuries to Jones who nevertheless was still charged with murder, at first, later reduced, by the State prosecutor, to one of culpable homicide. The jury after a long deliberation found in favour of the accused by acquitting him, a decision approved of by the judge. Hobson has much more to say on the attitude of Zarps and English condescension toward them. He says, “My sober judgment, formed upon careful consideration of the kind of Englishman who was working up to these grievances, is that this insolence imputed to the Boer simply consisted in his assumption of equality and refusal of deference or recognition of superiority which the British have come to expect in other parts of South Africa. Britishers coming from the colonies had been accustomed to despise ‘the Dirty Boer’ and regard him as a social inferior; in the Transvaal they found him in power and refusing to accept the role of inferior; hence their indignation.” (Hobson, p.62).

Silvio Luiz da Rocha

Geagte Menere,

Ek is baie dankbaar vir u aandag. Ek doen al meer as 20 jaar navorsing oor genealogie en doen tans navorsing oor die Comploier-familie van Oostenryk op versoek van 'n vriend by die werk.

Peter Comploier se storie is baie interessant en ek probeer die kolletjies verbind om 'n volledige verhaal van sy lewe te vestig. 'n Paar inligting oor Peter Comploier:

Naam: Peter Jacques Theodor Comploier

Geboortedatum: 24 April 1862

Plek: Wene-Oostenryk

Vader: Peter Paul Mathias Comploier

Moeder: Anna Rosalia Jacobina Comploier (née Lilienthal)

Hy was 'n luitenant in die Transvaalse polisiemag van 1889 tot 1891:

DEPOT TAB

BRON KG

LEER TIPE

VOLUME_NO 0

STELSEL 01

VERWYSING CR775/89

DEEL 1

BESKRYWING ARTILLERIE EN POLISIEBEVOEGDE. STUUR 'N VERSOEK PETER COMPLOIER BEVAT 'N ADMINISTRATEUR SE AANBEVELING VIR DIE VAKANTE POS VAN

EERSTE LUTENANT VAN DIE ARTILLERIE EN POLISIE AAN BEWEG. BEGIN 18890703 AFWERKING 18890703

Hy het gesterf in die Suid-Rhodesiese Rebellie van 1896-7 op 26 Maart 1896. Ek het sy doodsertifikaat en dit meld dat 'n inventaris van sy besittings tussen 1897 en 1898 gemaak is.

Kan jy my help deur my te vertel waar ek die volledige inventaris of enige ander dokumente van Peter Comploier kan vind?

As jy toegang tot die lêers deur jou stelsel het, sal ek baie dankbaar wees as jy dit met my kan deel.

Ek is tot jou beskikking om jou op dieselfde manier te help.

Die uwe,

Silvio Luiz da Rocha • BRIEF ONVERANDERED GEPLAAS. WIE KAN HELP?

UNION DEFENCE FORCE: 6 SA ARMOURED DIVISION: 6TH SOUTH AFRICAN ARMOURED DIVISION IN THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (PART 4)

Lt-Col WS Marshall (Ret)

The Advance from the Apennines

The first months of 1945 saw important changes in the organisation of the 6th South African Armoured Division. It was known that the 24th Guards Brigade would pass out of command after relief, and it was essential to have another South African Infantry Brigade in the division. On 13

Lt-Col WS Marshall

Above: Maj Gen William Henry Evered Poole, Commander 6 SA Armoured Division

6th South African Armoured Division (Part 4)

January 1945, the 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade came into being and Lt Col. J. Bester, battalion commander of the WR/DLR, was appointed Brigadier. The infantry battalions of the Brigade were provided initially by the RDLI and NMR/SAAF, who reverted to infantry and began training in infantry tactics. Artillery support was provided by the 15th Field Regiment, SAA, which was formed from elements of the divisional artillery and reinforcements from the Union. 5th Field Squadron, SAEC came under command, and the Brigade commenced training in the Prato-Pistoia area.

The 6th South African Armoured Division concentrated in the Lucca area at the end of February. The men were delighted with their new quarters, situated in a lovely countryside, and took advantage of the opportunity of having some leave and recreation. Enthusiasm waned, however, when an intensive training programme began. On leaving the line the 6th South African Armoured Division bade farewell to its comrades in the 24th Guards Brigade, and it was with genuine regret that the South Africans saw these splendid troops depart to the British Eight Army. Brig. M.D. Erskine said the Guards would always be proud to have served in the 6th South African Armoured Division.

The leave and training programme had been planned on a six week cycle, but this had to be curtailed. On 28 March 1945, the 6th South African Armoured Division issued detailed orders for the relief of the 1st US Armoured Division in the old sector between the Reno and the Setta. The great offensive that was to destroy the German armies in Italy was about to begin. Generalfeldmarschall A Kesselring’s successor, Generaloberst HGOR von Vietinghoff, was under no illusions about the coming storm, and the possibility of resisting it. He would have preferred to withdraw to the line of the Po River. The German High Command, so far from agreeing to this, would not even allow Von Vietinghoff to carry out a limited withdrawal on the Eighth Army Front, which would have effectually

Above: A map showing the advance towards Bologna

frustrated the Allied air and artillery programme. By insisting on the retention of the Apennine Line, Hitler had tied the German Army in Italy to an anvil.

During January and February four German Divisions were withdrawn from Italy to attempt to dam the Russian tide, and these included the old opponents of the South Africans the 16 SS Panzergrenadier Division “Reichsführer-SS” and 356 Infanterie Division. More would probably have been demanded, if the Allied Airforce had not played such havoc with communications in northern Italy that it took weeks to move a division through the alpine passes.

By comparison with their forces on other fronts, the German Army in Italy was still a formidable fighting machine, and on 10 April 1945 Generaloberst HGOR von Vietinghoff had under his command 21 German divisions of all types, supported by a powerful force of artillery. Although the Allied armies were now pouring into Germany, morale was still high

The greatest weakness was an almost total lack of air support. Generaloberst HGOR von Vietinghoff had only 260 tanks, and the petrol shortage compelled him to rely excessively on animal transport. The Allies planned to attack along practically the whole Italian front. Preliminary blows along the shores of the Adriatic and the Tuscan Sea were to be followed a week later by an all-out assault by the British Eighth Army in the marshy country between Lake Commachio and the Apennines. Three days later the US Fifth Army was to unleash the US II and IV Corps in an offensive aimed at Bologna and the plain to the northwest. The 6th South African Armoured Division was given an important role in the US Fifth Army plan.

Above: Field Marshal JC Smuts in conversation with Maj Gen WHE Poole during one of his visits

Above: A graphic showing the organisation of the 24th Guards Brigade

During the night of 31 March /1 April 1945 the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade began its movement back into the line, and on 4 April 1945 took over command of the brigade sector from Combat Command A of the 1st US Armoured Division. The 11th Armoured Brigade took over their sector from Combat Command B on 5 April 1945. The divisional sector laid between the rivers Reno and Setta and was held by the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade on the right and the 11th Armoured Brigade on the left. The river Torricella was the inter-brigade boundary. The 11th Armoured Brigade had the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles and two American units (19th Reconnaissance Squadron and 1st Battalion 135 RCT) under their command. The Americans were serving as infantry. The 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade was to move up later on the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade right. Certain regrouping would then take place between the two Brigades.

Early in March the Germans had withdrawn his line to the crest of the Sole-Caprara massif, and the South African forward defence lines were now about 1000 yards nearer to the enemy. The 77 Eastings Grid was the boundary line of two German divisions. The German 94 Infanterie Division held the sector to the west, and there was little activity apart from some scattered shelling and harassing fire. An outline plan had been drawn up by Maj Gen W.H.E. Poole at the end of March. The initial attack was to be made on Mt Sole-Caprara by the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade, which was to exploit to Mt Abelle.

Above: M4 Sherman 75mm tanks in a waiting area

On the capture of the Sole-Caprara-Abelle area, the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade was to advance along the ridge running northeast of Mt Sole, and capture Mt Santa Barbara. The 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade was to cover the right flank. Thereafter the 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade was to take Mt Giovule and Mt Baco and destroy any German forces remaining between the Setta and the Reno. When this phase had been completed 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade was to be prepared to cross the Reno. All attacks were to be supported by the divisional artillery and air support was promised on an unprecedented scale.

The 6th South African Armoured Division was the left-flanking formation of the US II Corps. The US IV Corps was to open the battle on the US Fifth Army front by attacking in the mountains west of the Reno, and then the US II Corps was to launch its assault. Detailed planning for the 6th South African Armoured Division’s attack began on 5 April 1945. The divisional commander met his Staff and brigade commanders, and they in turn had full discussions with their subordinates, and the commanders of supporting arms. The 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade carried out detailed patrolling to reconnoitre the enemy’s outpost positions, and to decide on suitable lines of advance. There was little interference from the enemy, but the area had been heavily mined, and a number of casualties were suffered.

On the night of 7/8 April 1945 the first of a series of full-scale artillery shoots was carried out against enemy positions on the 6th South African Armoured Division’s front. The intention was to deceive the enemy regarding the time of the main assault and to shatter his morale and to induce him to disclose his defensive fire tasks. The second and third objects were certainly not achieved, and the enemy showed little interest in the elaborate bombardments.

Meanwhile, the great offensive had already begun on other sectors of the front. On 1 April 1945 a brilliant commando attack on the Adriatic coast threw the 162. Turkoman Division into disorder. On 5 April 1945 the Japanese-Americans opened an offensive along the shore of the Tuscan Sea. The attack met with great success, and the threat to the naval base of Spezia brought German reserves from the Po Valley. On 10 April 1945 an artillery and air bombardment surpassing anything seen in Italy, heralded the advance of the British Eighth Army. The enemy made the mistake of anticipating an attack along Route 9, while the main weight of the British Eighth Army fell in the area south of Lake Commachio. The enemy was shaken by the intense air and artillery bombardment and disconcerted by the use of large numbers of flame-throwing tanks. On 10 April 1945 saw the British Eighth Army make deep penetrations and although the Germans rallied, and fought back with their usual skill and tenacity, they were never able to recover from the initial shock or amend their faulty dispositions. Retreat to the much-vaunted Genghis Khan Line brought no security, and on 15 April 1945 the British Eighth Army captured Bastia, and threatened the flank of all the German forces in Italy.

It had been intended that the US IV Corps should open the US Fifth Army attack on 12 April 1945, but the weather was unfavourable for bombers and the offensive did not begin until 14 April 1945. By the evening of that day advance units of the 1st US Armoured Division, on the left of the South Africans, had entered Vergato. Further to the west the 10th US Mountain Division had taken its objectives and was thrusting forward with great determination. On 15 April 1945, the US II Corps began its attack, and the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade was launched against Sole and Caprara.

Above: M10 Grouse tank destroyers of 1/6 Anti-tank Regiment, their main mobile weapon, being used as artillery for a bombardment of German positions, this was due to the fact the German tank threat had virtually disappeared

Although not as high as Mt Stanco or Mt Salvaro, the extremely steep, bush-covered slopes of Sole and Caprara presented a most formidable obstacle. The ridge running along the crest of Sole and extending northeast to Collina was a complete razorback, with no facilities for deployment. Mt Abelle was considerably lower than Sole or Caprara, but it gave depth to the defence, and enemy posted here could shoot up any troops advancing down the northern slopes of these two mountains.

The 6th South African Armoured Division regrouped for the attack. On 9 April 1945, the 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade moved up, with its HQ located at La Torre. On 10 April 1945 the RNC came under command of the 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade, and the brigade took over the sector between Mt Sole and the river Setta, to protect the right flank of the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade. The 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade now consisted of the NMR/SAAF and the RNC with one Squadron of the SSB under command. On 8 April 1945, the RDLI relieved two Companies of the FC/CTH in the centre of the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade’s front, thus releasing the latter battalion for the attack on Mt Sole. On the same day the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles came under the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade command and relieved the WR/DLR in the Brigades left sector. The latter were now available to attack Mt Caprara. The 12th Field Squadron, SAEC was ordered to support the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade, which had one Squadron of PAG under command.

On 11 April 1945, Maj Gen WHE Poole addressed the Officers and men of the 12th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade down to the platoon sergeants and put them in the picture. On 13 April 1945 the enemy broke contact on the British Eighth Army front southeast of Bologna and it was suspected that a general withdrawal had been ordered. Patrols were sent out, and one from the RDLI got within 200 yards of the crest of Sole. A blaze of fire established that the enemy was holding the position. Deserters confirmed this and stated that extra ammunition had been issued to meet the expected attack, and orders had been given to fight to the last man.

On the night of 14 April 1945, the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles made a successful two platoon attack on an enemy post (Casa Poggiolo) which would have threatened the left flank of the attack on Caprara. 15 April 1945 was fine and clear, and the blue sky augured well for the air bombardment and at 13h00 the heavy bombers started to come over. For an hour and a half, a steady stream of bombers in line abreast or Vic formation passed across the sky, but they dropped their loads well north of the divisional front. At 16h15 the first fighter bombers appeared and dropped special liquid fuel type bombs on the slopes of Mt Caprara. There was a terrific flash of flame in each case followed by billowing black smoke. Every fifteen minutes six aircraft swooped down on Sole and Caprara, coming in extremely low and letting lose a mixture of fire-bombs and high explosives. Some aircraft used rockets and cannon-shell. Apart from a little machine-gun and cannon fire there was no reaction from the enemy.

Indeed, although the bombardment was most spectacular and did much to encourage the troops, the results achieved were negligible. A few Germans suffered burns, but the enemy was well concealed in caves and dug outs and the attacks made little impression. One fighter-bomber strafed the FC/CTH dump area, nearly exploding the mortar ammunition. Casualties were caused and a panic started among the Italian porters. At 22h30 the artillery of the US II Corps and the divisional artillery supported by selected troops of tanks, opened the most violent bombardment that the South Africans had seen in the campaign. The fire was so concentrated that it seemed more impressive than Alamein or Cassino. Under cover of the guns the WR/DLR and FC/CTH went into the attack.

It was about a mile from FC/CTH assembly area to the crest of Sole, and the axis of advance lay along a ridge leading up to the mountain. “C” and “D” Companies, FC/CTH led the attack and crossed their start line at 23h00. The enemy fired his mortar in defensive fire, but casualties were light, and at 23h50 “C” and “D” Companies, FC/CTH started to climb Mt Sole. Nearing the crest “C” Company, FC/CTH was held up by mines, but without waiting for the mines to be cleared, a party of five men dashed through the mines and reached the summit. One of the men was killed, but the party caught the enemy coming out of his deep shelters and used their bayonets and grenades with good effect.

Above: M4 Sherman tanks crossing a river, possibly the Po

Passages were cleared through the minefields and “C” and “D” Companies, FC/CTH both got platoons on to the summit. By 04h30 hours Mt Sole was firmly held with the German mortar fire increasing in intensity, but the artillery and 4.2” mortars brought down counter-mortar fire and broke up weak attempts to counterattack.

Meanwhile, a grim struggle was being waged for Mt Caprara. So steep are the slopes of Caprara that the only suitable approach is from the direction of Caprara village. This meant that the WR/DLR had to make a long march from the assembly areas in the Mt Termine area, skirt the southern slopes of Mt Caprara, take Caprara village, and then assault up the steep, shaly slopes of the mountain. At 20h30 “A” and “B” Companies, WR/DLR moved off from their assembly area to the forming up point, situated in a valley south of San Martino. “A” and “B” Companies, WR/DLR had not yet arrived at the forming up point when their difficulties began with advance parties, laying lamps to indicate the start line, were fired on by the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles on the left flank.

As soon as the artillery barrage opened, the German artillery and mortars came to life, brought down their defensive fire tasks, and laid searching fire along the gullies. “B” Company, WR/DLR was caught in heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire when moving up from the forming up point and suffered many casualties. The advance of “A” and “B” Companies, WR/DLR continued Caprara village, but “B” Company, WR/DLR’s losses were so heavy, that at midnight “C” Company, WR/DLR received orders to take over their task. Throughout the night the start line was subjected to intense mortar and artillery fire, and the Italian stretcher-bearers became demoralised. Cape Corps batmen were improvised into stretcher-bearing parties. “B” Company, WR/DLR was soon reduced to 17 men and “D” Company moving up in support, had 32 casualties between the Start Line and the first bound.

At 02h00, “A” and “C” Companies, WR/DLR skirted Caprara village and began the assault up the precipitous mountain. At this stage communications became almost impossible. “A” and “C” Companies, WR/DLR for a time lost contact with each other but continued the advance meeting stiff resistance, wire obstacles were encountered and casualties suffered on Shu mines causing “A” Company, WR/DLR to move over to “C” Company, WR/DLR. Halfway up the mountain “A” and “C” Companies, WR/DLR were pinned down by machine-gun fire emanating from a pill-box.

As further progress could not be made after several attempts, and as daylight was fast approaching, in which event would leave the companies in a precarious situation, the company commanders decided to join forces and storm the obstacle. This they did, making a desperate bayonet charge up the steep almost precipitous slopes, and rooted the enemy out of pillbox, foxholes, and dugouts.

The area round the crest was found to be alive with mines, and small arms fire came from the Mt Sole direction. By 08:00 the firing died down, and “A” and “C” Companies, WR/DLR dug in on their objectives. Throughout the morning the enemy continued to mortar the axis of advance. Three PAG tanks succeeded in getting onto the neck between Sole and Caprara, but another troop which followed the track through San Martino ran into mines, and two tanks were immobilised. The attack on Mt Caprara cost the WR/DLR 168 casualties, of whom 24 were killed.

The enemy still contested the northwest slopes of the mountain, but the battalion held positions providing observation over Mt Castellino and the Caprara-Abelle valley. It was now possible for the FC/CTH to exploit to Mt Abelle. The morning of 16 April 1945 passed quietly with only intermittent mortaring by the enemy. At 17h30 “A” and “B” Companies, FC/CTH moved to the attack on Mt Abelle supported by artillery and mortar fire. A dangerous crossfire developed from Point 606 to the north east of Mt Sole, and this position was engaged by the artillery and battalion 3” mortars. Mt Abelle was captured after slight resistance, but machine-gun fire from Point 606 continued to be troublesome. During the operation “B” Company, RDLI moved on to the eastern crest of Sole to give flank support. Towards last light an enemy counterattack on the WR/DLR came in from the direction of Campodello. The artillery brought down defensive fire and the 4.2” mortars, which had been brigaded for the action, joined in with their heavy bombs. The infantry then charged down the slope and put the enemy to flight.

Thus, by the evening of 16 April 1945 the capture of the three main features – Mt Sole, Mt Abelle and Mt Caprara – had been successfully completed. The American divisions of the II US Corps were not so fortunate in their attacks east of the Setta. After violent fighting on 16 April 1945, the Germans still held Monterumici and Mt Adone. On the other hand, west of the Reno, both Vergato and Mt Pero were now in American hands. The success of the South African attack was due to the sheer determination of the assaulting infantry coupled with the sound tactical judgement of the battalion, company and platoon commanders.

The artillery support was heavy and accurate, but the German dugouts were so deep and wellconstructed that the enemy suffered little from artillery fire.

On the night of 16/17 April 1945, the RDLI began their task of exploiting along the ridge running northeast from Mt Sole. In their advance to the start line “A” and “C” Companies engaged and drove back an enemy counterattack force advancing on Mt Sole. Confusion was caused by having to fight for the start line and considerable machine-gun fire was encountered. Points 606 and 551 were occupied, but Collina was not reached. Towards dawn a counterattack on Point 606 was repulsed, while the FC/CTH beat off a raid on the northwest slopes of Mt Sole. During the night the RDLI took 30 prisoners for a loss of 12 wounded. Subsequent information showed that the advance of the RDLI had dislocated a strong attempt to recapture Mt Sole.

During the afternoon of 17 April 1945, patrols of the WR/DLR got across to Mt Castellino and reported that it was clear of the enemy. The RDLI, however, failed in its attempts to reach Collina. The Germans held the position in strength, and their mortar fire was heavy. The ridge was a complete razor-back with no opportunities whatsoever for deployment, while the enemy positions along the very crest of the ridge were largely immune to artillery and mortar fire which was ineffective if it fell either slightly short or slightly over. At 20:40 on the night of 17/18 April 1945, “C” Company, RDLI launched a set-piece attack on Collina. Despite concentrated artillery and mortar support, the

attack was repulsed. The Germns fire was heavy, and they launched several rockets at close range. One of these wounded the company commander and knocked out a whole platoon. It appears the 6th South African Armoured Division was in for a long and bloody struggle on the ridge leading to Mt Santa Barbara, but the morning of 18 April 1945, brought a miraculous change.

On 17 April 1945, the US II Corps had warned that a breakdown of enemy resistance might take place at any moment, and preparations should be made for a rapid follow-up. The stern resistance to the RDLI seemed to disprove this optimistic theory, and plans were considered for pushing the PR and the ILH/KimR down the Reno, in the hope of attacking the Collina - Santa Barbara ridge from the rear. At 08:00 on 18 April 1945, however, two deserters on the 13th South African Motorized Infantry Brigade front brought news that German 157 Gebirgs Division had received orders to withdraw during the night. Reports from 88th US Infantry Division stated that Monterumici and Mt Adone had been abandoned.

The RDLI at once pushed forward patrols and first Nuvoleta and then Mt Santa Barbara were reported clear. Several prisoners were picked up, who confirmed the order to retreat to the Genghis Khan Line. It was certain however, that the Germans would have to fall back to the Po River. The Germans had no alternative to a rapid withdrawal on US II Corps front. On 17 April 1945, the British Eighth Army captured Argenta and threatened a breakthrough to Ferrara. On US IV Corps front, the 10th U.S Mountain Division had made a remarkable advance and reached Mt Pastore, thus outflanking the so-called Genghis Khan Line. The Germans were on the run and the pursuit to the Alps had begun.

Credits: J.C. von Winterbach, Scott Sutherland, Mike Bersiks, Rex Barret and Barry Cooper, W.S. Marshall.

ARMY SIGNALS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE STORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPS OF SIGNALS AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

Compiled and edited by Walter V. Volker

3. EARLY SIGNALS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1652 – 1914)

First Signals in South Africa

When Jan van Riebeeck established a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope in April 1652, he concentrated all his people in the area where months later the first fort would arise. This initial group of settlers was so closely centralised that there were no problems related to communications

with regard to defensive concerns. This state of affairs changed, however, when the first Naval war between The Netherlands and England broke out in 1653, when the need arose to be able to communicate with approaching ships for security purposes. The strategically positioned trading post at the Cape could easily have fallen prey to English ships, and therefore the Lords XXVII gave instructions that ships belonging to them should transmit a coded message to the signals post upon arrival at the Cape. As soon as the guard on duty at the fort recognised the ship’sflag, he was to raise the Prince’s Flag and fire one cannon shot. To the the ship - or if more than one, the foremost ship – should immediately should waive its flag at the same time as firing its cannon (or in Dutch: "vlagge van achter ende de wimpel van de voorstengh laten waijen met een gelijcke donder van canon"). [247, pp 39, 64] In this manner distance communication was established which met one of the primary requirements tobe able to speedily transmit a specific message for security purposes. With flag and cannon the message was conveyed to the land forces that a ship was arriving; and to the ship’s captain the knowledge that The Netherlands were still in control of the Cape.

After the first Free Burghers (citizens) had taken posession of their allocated farms, the population started dispersing, which created the first communication challenges. The local Hottentotts would frequently damage the cultivate lands, attack guards at the outlying cattle posts, and raid the cattle. Specially planted bitter almond hedges did not really solve this problem and it soon became obvious that the only way to counter this attacks was through constant vigilance. As the garrison at the Cape was never substantial for economic considerations, the governor was never able to post soldiers at these outposts. In July 1657 he reviewed the existing defencive system and taking into consideration the interests of the Free Burghers he had the Coornhoop redoubt erected, which proved to be ineffective, however.

In 1658 all able bodied Free Burghers were organised into a Rifle Company (Dutch: Schieters Kompanjie). Van Riebeeck further also launched his more successful watch house plan, which consisted of erecting a number of Watch Houses at strategic points over the period August and September 1659. These he very aptly named Kijckuijt (Look Out), Keert de Koe (Intercept the Cow) and Houdt den Bul (Hold the Bull), as their sole purpose was to ensure that the colonists and herdsmen would not be surprised by cattle thieves. The system was further enhanced with the addition of a cavalry of thirty men which received their first instructions in May 1660. The signals function was allocated to the guard in the watch tower, with instructions to raise and lower the flag whenever he saw any danger, so that the cavalry, free burghers, garnison and company officials would all receive timeous warning. In the event of serious danger, a cannon shot had to be fired in order to summon the defenders. The signals function of the guard can therefore we regarded as a crucial communication link to ensure the effective coordination of the actions of the cavalry, the Rifle

Corps, guards and garrison in their defensive efforst agains the natives. In this way cattle theft was very effectively controlled for many years subsequent to the First Hottentot War in 1659.

Up until the outbreak of the Second Hottentot War in 1673 one can hardly talk of any military action at the Cape. Yet, during this period a fixed and effective pattern of communication had started to establish itself which would be replicated during the next century as the population further increased and dispersed into the interior. The system essentially consisted of establishing a series of very similar watch posts aund the use of cannon signals to altert the colonists of impending danger.

Since the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck the settlers were constantly alert to the possibility of a possible invasion by an unfriendly European nation. Despite four naval wars between The Netherlands and England, rumours that the new Portuguese viceroy of India had planned an attack on the Cape in 1655, and other similar rumours in 1677 regarding a planned invasion by a French fleet, the Castle and other fortifications were never actaully threatened by any European nation prior to 1780.

For the protection of the Dutch East India Company’s (DEIC) commercial fleet during visits to Table Bay, a number of hidden docking areas were constructed. At these locations watch houses were also erected which frequently, as was the case with the landing area behind Leeuberg (Lion’s Head) which had been built in August 1672, did not have a sufficient view of the open sea. Therefore, for the first time on South African soil, special signals posts were erected on the best and most convenient places to ensure the highest and furthest seaward view (or in Dutch “op d' beste en bequaemste plaatsen aan't hooge en 't verreste t' zeewaerts uijtkijkend gebergte” [241, p 89]. In this was the tower guards of the Castle and redoubts were informed of the indentity of approaching shipsby means of secret signals. This signal posts met the primary needs of the inhabitants of Table Bay and environs in a time when the guard and signaller also usually serve as a scout.

As the population further expanded into the interior and started clashing with the Bushman tribes as well, the watch post system was also expanded. Dragoons moved between the watch posts on a daily basis,and in this way an effective communication system was established between the outposts. The burghers were divided into dragoon and infantery battalions which carried the responsibility for the defence of the territory in conjunction with the garrison. In later years, as the territorial borders were pushed ever more deeply into the hinterland, the guardposts became impractical, and they were eventually officially disbanded in 1791. In the meanwhile, from time to time new resolutions were issued to establish signal posts on strategically located hills. A reliable burgher living in the immediate vicinity would then be appointed as signaller. In this capacity it was expected of him that any grass and trees growing in the immediate environment of where the cannon stood wouldbe regularly cleaned up. Should a veld fire break out, it was also part of his duties to ensure that the wooden parts of the cannon were not damaged. Citizen officers were also required

to inspect such cannon posts every three months and to report back to the magistrate and military council regarding its condition. The signaller was provided with five pounds of gunpowder, which was to be used for the cannon shot. The signaller also was requiredto be able to make a fire and smoke signals to sound the alarm. To ensure that the next signal station was passing on the signal, he had to continue shooting and making fire until he saw the next station doing the same. These signallers were exempted from actual military duties and were therefore not required to report for duty during mobilisation as they were regarded as being part of the reserve force for home defence.

Apparently these signals were not always heard or seen. Sometimes the signals post was robbed of its gunpowder and consequently the signaller was unable to execute his duties. A commission of enquirey which held talks with the military council in 1741 regarding thesematters, recommended that the signal posts should be disbanded and that citizens should rather be called up for service in person. These recommendations were, however,ignored, and in 1759 the whole signals service was reorganised in order to be more effective.

In 1780 and again in 1795 the citizens were called up for service in this way. A few hours after Admiral G.K. Elphinstone had landed at the Cape, alarm signals were sent at around 0200 hours to call up the inhabitants of the rural areas (Dutch: `ingesetenes ten platteland'), and by 1200 hours citizens from Swellendam, Stellenbosch, Drakenstein, Wagenmakersvallei, Koeberg and Tygerberg were already on the parade ground behind the Castle. During one such large scale mobilisation of citizen force and garrison troops, a bloedvlag (Blood flag) was raised as a sign that the attack should commence.

During battles against Bushmen and Bantu tribes, where Commando’s would usually engage as indipendent units, the trumpeter was generally regarded as the most important link. Whenever Commando’s would operate jointly under different commanders, there were generally very few coordinated attacks – as was the case when Johannes Cruywagen organised the 1739 Bushman Expedition.

Communication links back tothe base or with the government were achieved by means of despatch riders (Afr: rapportryers). To transmit a message across the vast South African territory was a significant challenge for any commander tasked with the security of the Cape. In 1785, in an effort to improve existing systems, comprehensive instructions were compiled regarding the transmission of an urgent message from Plettenberg Bay in the Eastern Cape to the government in Cape Town. A resolution in this regard made provision for the guards at Plettenberg Bay to have access to the services of any dragoons along the way to assist them in this task. A fuller Dutch version of this resolution... 'zullen toegevoegd werden eenige Dragonders dewelke vooral moeten dienen om alle rapporten herwaards die eenige spoed vereyschen van daar over te brengen na de drosdye van

Swellendam, en zal den Dragonder die daartoe afgezonder werd, moeten voorzien weesen van twee njpaarden, en zoo dikwels sulx nodig sal zijn te verwisselen tot op Swellendam, alwaar hy syn rapport vir ons zal moeten overgeven aan den Landdrost, en bij zijn absentie aan den sekretaris, die sorgen sal om het zelve verder met gelijke spoed herwaards te doen afkoomen.' [250, p 37]. By 1790 a few hundred men were required to man, service and defend these signal posts.

According to a Resolution of the Political Council in 1781 provision was also made for a Lijfwacht te Paard (Mounted Bodyguard) for the exclusive service as despatch rider for the governor and which in all probability represents the first permanent mounted despatch riders corps in South Africa. There is no evidence that the dragoons, who were also frequently messengers, were allocated to this task in any significant numbers. Generally only a limited few did service at guardposts and they were probably only called up out of the ranks of the guardposts for very specific tasks to deliver messages.

During the Batavian era the very imposing reorganisation scheme of Genl Jan Willem Janssens and Commissionar General Jacob Abraham Uitenhage de Mist also made provision for better communikation facilities with the interior. Especially the pastal route as the most prominent link with the interior was regarded as being of great importance. For the protection of the postal service a company of Ligte Veldruiters (Light Veld Riders) was called into being in 1803 which would take over the postal service. It was also expected of them to accompany senior officials or prominent personalities and to also dod any other military services as might be required from time to timeby the governor. For Janssens and De Mist the postman was often the bearer of information which were of great significance for defence purposes, and therefore it is not strange that the postal service was organised in a disciplined and on a semi-military basis. The national route in those days was from Cape Town, east to `Hottentots Holland, Het Warme Bad (Warm Baths), Groote Vlakte (Great Flats), Swellendam, Duyvenhok River, Gouritz River, Hagelkraal, Olifants River, Outeniqualand, Lange Cloof, Chamtousch River and Swartkops Bay. The Batavian management at the Cape was of short duration, and much of their planning was never implemented during the subsequent British occupation.

Mike Huxtable

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE (SADF): PLOFADDER MINE CLEARANCE VEHICLE

Compiled by Wolfgang Witschas

Introduction

The Plofadder is an armoured vehicle that was specially designed for the South African Defence Force (SADF) with specialised equipment for mine detection and clearance which was used during the last stage of the South African Border War, 1986 to 1989 for mine clearance purposes. It was still under the experimental stage of development when it first used during the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, 1987 to 1988.

Origin and Design:

The Plofadder was developed in the 1970s by the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and manufactured by Sandock-Austral.

The name "Plofadder" is Afrikaans for "blowing adder" or "puff adder," referring to the vehicle's special designed equipment for mine clearance.

The Plofadder armoured vehicle is based on the Casspir Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), a wellknown South African mine-protected APC, designed to withstand landmine blasts.

The Casspir APC was developed by the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) on the specific needs of the South African Police (SAP) Counter Insurgency (COIN) Unit. A partnership developed between the SAP, the requester/customer and the design and manufacture authority, the CSIR (DRU)"

The vehicle was named "CASSPIR" which is an anagram of the abbreviations of the "SAP and CSIR" and was first coined by Eddie Caromba, of the CSIR, in May 1979.

The Casspir was manufactured by Sandock-Austral, which also manufactured the Plofadder based on the Casspir APC.

Commonalities/Differences between the Casspir and the Plofadder:

Commonalities:

• V-shaped hull design for blast deflection

• Mine-protected armour

• Elevated driver's position• Similar dimensions and layout

Differences:

• Purpose: Casspir for troop transport

• Purpose: Plofadder for mine-clearance/EOD

• Plofadder has a more angular, box-like shape

• The Casspir has a front mounted engine

• The Plofadder has modified armour configuration

• The Plofadder has a different turret design (if equipped)

• The Plofadder has specialized equipment for mine detection and clearance

• Crew capacity: Casspir 12

• Crew capacity: Plofadder 4

• Weight and armour: Plofadder heavier, with enhanced armour

• Mine protection: Plofadder offers higher level of protection

Plofadder: Design and Features:

• V-shaped hull for blast deflection

• Armour-plated cabin

• Elevated driver's position

• Rear-mounted engine

• Specialized equipment for mine detection and clearance

• Crew: 2-4

• Capacity: 4 - 6 troops

Specifications

• Length: 5.5 meters (18 ft)

• Width: 2.5 meters (8.2 ft)

• Height: 2.5 meters (8.2 ft)

• Weight: 6-8 tons

• Speed: 80 km/h (50 mph)

• Range: 500 km (310 mi)

Armament

• 1 x 7.62 mm or 1x12.7x99 mm machine gun mounts

• Optional: 1 x 40 mm grenade launcher

Technical Data of the "Plofadder" Mine Clearance Equipment: 160AT Mkll

Plofadder Casing housing the explosive filled hose and rocked to release the hose and can be mounted on a variety of vehicles

The Plofadder mine-clearing system mounted on the modified Casspir APC consisting of a casing containing an explosive filled hose that is pulled over the minefield by a rocket. Once placed, it is detonated, the blast and overpressure detonate, disrupt or throw aside any mines in the immediate vicinity of the hose, creating a safe lane through the minefield

Description of the 160AT Mkll Plofadder

The rear compartment of the Casspir has been modified to fit the containerised Plofadder 160AT

rocket propelled mine clearing system. The system slides into the back of the Casspir on a retractable rail system. It is launched by rocket through the open roof.

Plofadder Mine - clearance System

The Plofadder 160AT MKII is a firehose/sausage-like string of explosives weighting 500 which is fired by a rocket over the minefield from a specially adapted Casspir APC. The Plofafder detonates automatically, exploding and throwing aside mines for several meters on either side of it, thus clearing a safe path through the minefield.

Service History with the South African Defence Force (SADF):

Specific Timeline:

• 1979: Casspir APC, the precursor (leading to the development) to Plofadder, was first produced.

• 1980-1982: CSIR began researching and developing a specialized mine-clearance vehicle.

• 1983: First prototypes of the Plofadder were built

• 1984-1985: Testing and evaluation phases

• 1986: Plofadder entered service with the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the South African Border War /Angolan Bush War (1966-1989)

Variants:

• Plofadder Mk I: (Casspir Chassis) Initial production model

• Plofadder Mk II: (Casspir Chassis)

Upgraded version with improved armour and engine/Casspir 2000, modernized variant with enhanced protection

Rheinmetall Denel Defence Day – The resultant explosion of 100+ metres of mine-clearing Plofadder 160AT MKII explosives

Plofadder fitted to a SADF SAMIL 50 Mine Protected truck.

Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) South Africa: Marketing the Plofadder 160AT Mk II minefield breaching system in Germany

Background

In 2004, Rheinmetall Defence (now Rheinmetall Defence and Security) acquire the rights and technology for the Plofadder system from Sandock-Austral, the original manufacturer of the Plofadder.

Rheinmetall's Acquisition:

• Acquired Sandock-Austral's intellectual property, including Plofadder designs and technology

• Integrated Plofadder into Rheinmetall's product portfolio

• Continued development and marketing of Plofadder-based solutions

Rheinmetall's Plofadder Variants:

• Plofadder 2: Upgraded version with improved armour and engine

• Plofadder 3: Enhanced variant with advanced mine-clearance capabilities

Current Status:

• Rheinmetall continues to offer Plofadder-based solutions for mine-clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

• Plofadder remains in service with various military and law enforcement agencies worldwide

Keiler Next Generation (NG)

Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) has successfully demonstrated its Plofadder minefield breaching system, launched from a Keiler NG highly protected armoured breaching system, on 14 August 2024 at the Bergen military training area in northern Germany.

"Keiler is German for Wild Boar"

• Rheinmetall’s Keiler NG first used a mine plough

• Then launching a Plofadder 160AT Mk II rocket-fired detonation cord. This can cut a breach 160 metres long and six metres wide in mine fields and obstacles. Fired in overlapping bursts, the Keiler NG’s two Plofadder systems make it possible to overcome deep enemy mine barriers, Rheinmetall emphasised.

The Keiler NG is based on the chassis of the Kodiak armoured engineer vehicle and thus belongs to the Leopard 2 family. On the one hand, this contributes to the high agility of this 63 ton platform: Top speed 65 km/h, climbing capability 90 centimetres, gradeability 60 percent, trench crossing capability more than 2.50 metres. On the other hand, being part of the Leoben family has a positive effect on interoperability, logistics and training. Existing Kodiak Army engineer tanks can be converted into a configuration like the Keiler NG using equipment kits, while existing Kodiak verification guides accelerate the operational readiness of the Keiler NG.

Keiler NG Demonstration:

• First section, the Keiler NG demonstrated the rapid creation of mine lanes in the field. The Pearson mine plough was used for this. The mine plough is over four metres wide and can clear mines at a speed of up to 250 metres per minute. The mine plough can be quickly replaced with a dozer blade. This means that the Keiler NG can also clear anti-tank obstacles, fill in trenches or create emplacements and prepared positions if required. In addition, an integrated crane, which it uses to establish clearing readiness and to load and unload the Plofadder ammunition boxes.

• The highlight was the second section, in which the rocket-supported ‘Plofadder’ detonation cord system was used. Plofadder from Rheinmetall Denel Munition can cut a breach 160 metres long

Keiler NG

and nine metres wide in mine fields and obstacles in a matter of minutes. Fired in overlapping bursts, the Keiler NG's two Plofadder systems make it possible to overcome deep enemy mine barriers.

• In addition to the mine plough and Plofadder detonation cord system, the Keiler NG is also equipped with a magnetic signature duplicator that detonates second-generation mines well before the plough. Furthermore, its integrated lane marking system marks the created lanes for the following forces, even in limited visibility or at night.

For self-protection, the Keiler carries the ROSY rapid smoke-screening obscurant system and the Remotely Controlled Weapon Station Natter 12.7 x 99mm. The crew of the Keiler NG consists of two soldiers. The possibility of remote-controlled deployment is already taken into account in the system’s concept, as is the fitting of an active protection system and interfacing on the digitalised battlefield.

Epilogue

South Africa had been on the forefront of the inventing of mine-clearance technology since WWII.

Major Abraham Du Toit a South African, member of the Union Defence Force (UDF), engineer and inventor who made significant contributions to military technology during the North Africa campaign in World War II by inventing and designing the flail tank.

The Flail Tank Contributions:

• Improved mine clearance capabilities

• Reduced mine-related casualties

• Enhanced mobility and tactical flexibility

• Influenced post-war mine-clearing technologies

Invention and Development of the Plofadder:

160 AT Mk II system:

• Operational experience gained by the SADF during the decades-long conflict in Angola and Namibia with landmines, necessitated the SADF the development of specialized mine-clearance capabilities

• South Africa's expertise in mine clearance, particularly with the innovative development of the Plofadder 160 AT Mk II system, positioned the country as a global leader in this field.

Legacy:

The Plofadder played a significant role in countering mine threats during the Border War. The Plofadder's development was driven by the need for effective mine-clearance capabilities during the South African Border War.

References:

Google:/https://www.rheinmetall.com/Rheinmetall%20Group/brochure-fownload/WeaponAmmunition/D563e0821-Minefield-breaching-system-Plofadder-160AT-Mkll.pdf Google:/https://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1851&Parameter3=1743 Google:/https://en.k.wikepedia.org/wiki/Mine-clearing_line_charge Books:

The War for Africa

Pages: 207, 297-8, 326-7'

1990: Ashanti Publishing Ltd

Cuito Cuanavale (Updated version)

Pages: 240-1, 255, 350, 383-6

2017: Johnathan Bell Publishers

Fred Bridgeland author of both books

Church of England: Robbert’s Heights

SOUTH AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH WAR CASUALTIES BURIED ACROSS THE WORLD – PART EIGHTY-TWO.

By Captain (SAN) Charles Ross (SA Navy Retired)

South Africans participated in almost every war theatre during the First and Second World Wars. According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Casualty Data Base 7 290 (includes 607 unknown) First World War casualties and 9 986 (includes 84 unknown) Second World War casualties are buried in 1 207 cemeteries. In contrast, 2 959 First World War and 2 005 Second World War casualties are commemorated on 48 memorials. This does not include the more than 2 700 South Africans not recently commemorated by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. A new memorial to commemorate these South Africans is being constructed in the Gardens in Cape Town and should be completed by November 2024.

• Niederzwehren Cemetery, Kassel – Germany

The cemetery was begun by the Germans in 1915 for the burial of prisoners of war who died at the local camp. During the war almost 3,000 Allied soldiers and civilians, including French, Russian and Commonwealth, were buried there.

In 1922-23 it was decided that the graves of Commonwealth servicemen who had died all over Germany should be brought together into four permanent cemeteries. Niederzwehren was one of those chosen and in the following four years, more than 1,500 graves were brought into the cemetery from 190 burial grounds in Baden, Bavaria, Hanover, Hesse, and Saxony.

There are now 1,796 First World War servicemen buried or commemorated in the Commonwealth plot at Niederzwehren. This total includes special memorials to 13 casualties buried in other cemeteries in Germany whose graves could not be found.

Graves from surrounding cemeteries were brought to Niederzwehren

In addition, in June 2018, five special memorial headstones were erected to five Second World War airmen who were known to have been buried in Ohrdruf Cemetery, but whose graves were later lost.

Five South African casualties from World War One, are buried in this cemetery.

• Staglieno Cemetery - Genoa

The Italians entered the war on the Allied side, declaring war on Austria, in May 1915. Commonwealth forces were at the Italian front between November 1917 and November 1918, and rest camps and medical units were established at various locations in northern Italy behind the front, some of them remaining until 1919. From November 1917 to the end of the war, Genoa was a base for commonwealth forces and the 11th General, and 38th and 51st Stationary Hospitals, were posted in the city. Staglieno Cemetery contains 230 Commonwealth burials of the First World War. There are also 122 Second World War graves, most of them garrison burials, whilst others were brought in from the surrounding country.

The 1939-45 plot was designed by Louis de Soissons.

Eight South African casualties from World War Two, are buried in this cemetery.

• Gilgil Cemetery - Kenya

Gilgil War Cemetery contains 224 Commonwealth burials of the Second World War. There is also one First World War burial and 31 non-war graves.

One First World War and seven Second World War South African casualties are buried in this cemetery.

• Nanyuki War Cemetery – Kenya

During the Second World War, Nanyuki was the rail head for the advance into Ethiopia, via Isiolo, Marsabit and Wajir, and was also an important advance base for the Royal Air Force. The war cemetery was started during hostilities by the Army, the first burial taking place in February 1940. In 2008 the nearby Civil Cemetery burials were transferred here. Nanyuki War Cemetery now contains 196 Commonwealth burials of the Second World War. There are also 36 non-war burials and one Abyssinian war grave in the cemetery.

32 Second World War South African casualties are buried in this cemetery.

Most of the First World War burials in Nakuru North Cemetery date from November 1918 and were made from the convalescent camps at Nakuru. During the Second World War there was a Royal Air Force Flying Training School at Nakuru and various camps and establishments in and near the town. These included an OCTU at Njoro and another at Londiani. The cemetery now contains 27 Commonwealth burials of the First World War and 45 from the Second World War. There are also two non-war burials in the cemetery.

13 (two First World War and 11 Second World War)

South African casualties are buried in this cemetery

WAR MEMORIAL: DURBAN

NUUSBRIEF: ERMELO: NEDERLAND

Ruud Slangen

• Een Suid-Afrikaner is hier gedenk. RSA-ambassade het bygewoon - HBH

(1) OPERATION NICKEL: AUGUST 1967

by Gerry van Tonder

As Rhodesia’s parliament sat for the first time in 1967, a concerned Minister of Justice, Desmond Lardner-Burke, put a damper on the just-ended festive season by requesting a continuance of the State of Emergency. He informed the House that one hundred terrorists had been accounted for during the previous nine months, adding a solemn warning that the armed activities of the two main banned black nationalist movements, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), were destined to escalate. Arms caches had been found both internally and in neighbouring Botswana.

In April Minister Lardner-Burke tabled a further extension of these emergency powers, as seemingly random acts of sabotage and outright vandalism cropped up in the countryside; arson, fence-cutting, tobacco-slashing, rail network interference. The Minister called for increased vigilance

by the Security Forces and the Police, especially along the country’s border with her northern neighbour, Zambia.

The following month, a routine BSAP roadblock just north of Karoi precipitated an unforeseen encounter with four ZANU terrorists hiding in a pantechnicon on its way from Zambia to Salisbury. The four heavily armed men had, according to the driver, forced their way onto the vehicle at Makuti, just above the Zambezi Valley escarpment. Trapped on the vehicle and with no avenue of escape, the four terrorists succumbed to a barrage of fire from the uniformed police at the scene.

By mid-1967, Security Force and Police intelligence, primarily gleaned from captured insurgents, confirmed that several hundred terrorists were now poised in Tanzania and Zambia, awaiting deployment to the Zambian border. War materiel seized along the Chirundu/Salisbury corridor added weight to concerns about an imminent incursion of large numbers of trained guerrillas into the north-west. But what was not initially known, was that at 0400 hours on 31 July, a large gang comprising ZAPU and South Africa African National Congress (SAANC) insurgents had already in fact entered the country between Kazangula and Victoria Falls and had gone to ground in the Deka River area of the Wankie Game Reserve. John Dube commanded the ZAPU element, while a Coloured man (mixed-race), George Driver (nom de guerre James April), headed up the SAANC contingent. The insurgents split into two mixed groups, the Luthuli group to be based in Tjolotjo, and the Lobengula group further east in Nkai.

Over the next few days, arrests of individual terrorists from the Lithuli group, the first on 1 August in the National Park itself, followed by one at a mission near Wankie, and a third at Dett, resulted in the deployment into Matabeleland North of elements of the Rhodesian Security Forces, drawn from the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR); 2 Commando, The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI); No’s 1, 4, 5 and 7 Squadrons of the Rhodesian Air Force; 1(Independent) Company, The Rhodesia Regiment; and the Police (BSAP), including the force’s Police Reserve Air Wing (PRAW).

A Joint Operations Centre/Command (JOC) was set up in Wankie, and the Forward Airfield FAF 1, moved from Wankie to Wankie Main Camp. Operation Nickel had commenced. Initially, the Air Force involvement was confined to reconnaissance flights and leaflet drops further east in the Makuti/Chirundu area.

A second Coloured member of the SAANC, by the name of Paul Petersen (nom de guerre Basil February), was arrested by a security guard and taken to the Dett Police Station. Unfortunately, the man was not searched, and upon entering the charge office, produced a pistol and opened fire on those around him, wounding one, before making good his escape in a vehicle parked outside and taking off in the direction of Bulawayo. He would die four days later in Figtree in a shoot-out on a farm where he had stopped to demand food and water.

Death Notice for SAANC terrorist Paul Petersen, killed on Auchmaldy Farm, Figtree.

Following the first Dett arrest, on Sunday 13 August, Captain Peter Hosking (31) of A Company, RAR, led a patrol, including tracking expert Section Officer Barry Tiffin of the BSAP, towards Inyantue Siding south-east of Wankie town. Another platoon under RSM Aubrey Korb and CSM Havahli Timitiya was also sent out in the same direction.

As Hosking followed fresh spoor, he approached the dry riverbed of the Inyantue River, where his patrol was fired on by terrorists from a nearby spur of land. Despite concerted attacks on the terrorist stronghold by a helicopter crewed by Squadron Leader Mick Grier and Sergeant Technician Bob Whyte, in which three terrorists were killed, the entrenched insurgents maintained a withering rate of fire against the Rhodesians. No 4 Squadron Flying Officers Prop Geldenhuys and Chris Weinmann provided valuable air support in their Wankie-based Provosts, flying sorties at 1,000 feet in order to optimise attack dive angles.

Encountering heavy fire from the strongly defended terrorist position, Hosking split his patrol, taking some half his men and a policeman on a flanking movement around the enemy position. Joined by two more sticks that had been dropped by helicopter, Hosking formed his men into a line, skirting the north of the spur where the terrorists were concealed. Even with the aid of the circling

The northern section of Wankie National Park, with the JOC based at Shapi Pan.

helicopter, however, nothing was sighted and Hosking started to withdraw to where he had left the rest of his men. On their way, Hosking came across the body of Acting Corporal Davison Mukombo, 1RAR. He had been shot during the on-going engagement.

RAR on early vehicle patrol in Mopane woodland, North Matabeleland (Photo Dave

Heppenstall)

Shortly afterwards, as they were crossing open ground they were spotted, and in the ensuing fire fight, Hosking was also shot. A bullet passed through his right thigh, striking the ground and peppering his chest with shattered rock. Hosking crawled about sixty metres into a patch of bush that afforded better cover. As he lay there, Private Koroni Kambante, 1RAR, also sustained fatal gunshot wounds as the terrorists continued their remorseless attack on the scattered groups of Rhodesian troops. Inspector Frederick Phillips, BSAP, had also been wounded. Overhead, the circling Provost pilot saw no movement from the Rhodesian positions.

By 1400 hours and having heard nothing from Hosking’s group, Platoon Warrant Officer Kephas, 1RAR, set out to find his officer, accompanied by Section Officer Barry Tiffin, BSAP. As they approached the likely position, they were also met by a hail of bullets, PWO Kephas falling down, wounded. Tiffin immediately returned fire, seeing a terrorist fall, then get up and shoot back. A second terrorist appeared less than ten metres away, and with instinctive reaction, Tiffin fired three shots over open sights. Tiffin himself reported later that he clearly had two of the terrorists

visible, one tending to the wounds of the other. He fired at the unwounded man who fell, but managed to crawl into what little cover was available, leaving his rifle behind. Inching forward again, Tiffin’s luck ran out as he was shot through the left thigh and buttocks, later saying, “It felt like a sledgehammer”. Two RAR privates bravely attempted to drag the wounded Tiffin into cover, but were driven back by heavy fire from the terrorist position. Tiffin lay exposed for one and a half hours, his comrades forced to stay back.

At this time the troops drew back to consolidate, take stock and attend to the wounded. Private Simon Chikafu, 1RAR, however, refused to withdraw, electing instead to try and reach the wounded and stranded Tiffin. With no care for his own safety, Chikafu fired off a full magazine of twenty rounds into the enemy position, before crawling over to the policeman. Turning him on to his back and coming under fire from the terrorists, Chikafu managed to drag the powerless Tiffin out of the kill zone. Once clear, he placed Tiffin on his back and carried him a quarter of a mile to a waiting casevac helicopter.

Late that afternoon, a section of National Servicemen from 1(Independent) Company, The Rhodesia Regiment (RR), were brought in to the contact area by helicopter from Wankie. RSM Korb and CSM

SO Barry Tiffin, left, still on crutches, thanks Pte Simon Chikafu

(Photo Dave Heppenstall)

Timitiya were then dropped off below the small hill where, according to Hosking’s radio operator, Private Kenias Tovakare, his wounded officer was hiding out.

As darkness fell, Korb was given permission by his company commander to start their search, utilising the RR troops for support. Upon reaching the spot where the radio operator presumed Hosking would be, they failed to find him, but instead found Inspector Phillips, a serious bullet wound to the head, and the body of Corporal Mukombo, the latter still with his rifle.

Finding the crest of the hill now clear of terrorists, Korb organised the RR troops in all-round defence positions. From this position Korb, knowing full well that he was about to compromise his position and therefore place his own life in danger, fired off an Icarus rocket, confident that Hosking will be able to identify the bright parachute-supported flare as being a sign that he had not been forgotten and that help was at hand. Hosking responded from the river bank just below the hill. Using BSAP details who could not be helicoptered out at last light as stretcher bearers, Korb moved the wounded Phillips and Hosking to the hilltop from where he contacted the overhead relay pilot to seek immediate casevac by air. This request was denied as it was still dark and the Rhodesian Alouette helicopters were not equipped with night-flight instrumentation. Instead, Korb was instructed to carry his casualties down to the railway line, and from there to a nearby siding where a BSAP-guarded engine and carriage would recover all of them back to Wankie.

At first light on 14 August, Lieutenant Ian Wardle, 1RAR, led a patrol through the area where, the previous day, the terrorists had created such havoc. The terrorists had slipped away under cover of darkness, but what he discovered was sobering. There had been no fewer than twenty-one terrorists concealed in the thick bush, members of the Lobengula group who had trained in Algeria. During the lengthy engagement, the Security Forces had killed five terrorists and captured a further two but lost two of their own with four wounded. That afternoon, Lieutenant Graham Noble encountered a wounded terrorist about a mile east of the previous day’s contact with the main group. Noble shot and killed him. Later that day, Railway Security arrested another group member at Intundhla Siding, while further west at Panda-ma-Tenga, the Botswana authorities arrested a further two.

On Thursday 17 August, the JOC was moved to Shapi Pan, south-west of Main Camp in the Wankie National Park, believing the group had moved into the area south of Wankie. Following a reported sighting by a National Parks pump attendant and reports of terrorist spoor near Gubalala Pan, two RAR platoons were deployed, 10 Platoon under Lieutenant Noble and 3 Platoon under Lieutenant Wardle. By the following morning, 18 August, the two platoons had established that they were looking for seven terrorists in the immediate vicinity. Noble’s platoon, together with Lieutenant Piers’ RAR Mortar Platoon, set up stop groups near Makona Pan, the likely route of the seven terrorists.

At lunch time, Wardle’s persistence paid off as, after a scout saw a terrorist crouching behind a fallen tree. As the man was challenged, the rest of the group appeared, quickly seeking defensive cover behind the same tree. Wardle and his men immediately engaged the terrorists, quickly killing two and capturing another three. Upon interrogation, one of the captures indicated that the remaining members of the gang had taken up a position in thick bush very close by. His repeated challenges to this revealed place of concealment going unheeded, Wardle opened fire into the thicket, which resulted in an explosion coming from the position.

As a fire ignited the dry winter grass and shrubs, Wardle continued firing, forcing a terrorist to come running out screaming, upon which he was promptly shot dead. Another surrendered. As the fire engulfed the bush, there were further explosions as terrorist munitions and grenades detonated. It would be a further five hours before the fire subsided and Wardle’s men felt it safe to sweep the terrorist position. As it turned out they had underestimated the number of terrorists, stumbling across five smouldering bodies. A final terrorist was seen hiding in a slit trench and captured. Wardle’s 3 Platoon had accounted for fourteen terrorists, eight killed and six captured.

Sunday 13 August 1967, still five years before the war significantly intensified in the northeast, Security Forces sampled the bitter taste of the all-out terrorist war that was to come. In the arid remote wildernesses of North Matabeleland, scattered combined groups of ZAPU and SAANC terrorists encountered and engaged the Rhodesian forces in a difficult series of contacts that would leave two men of the RAR dead, R41628 Acting Corporal Davison Mukombo and R43593 Pte Koroni Kambante, both of A Company, 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian African Rifles. Since then, A Company RAR have commemorated Inyantue Day, the beginning of Op Nickel.

The Rhodesians were not found wanting, however, as repeated acts of bravery were played out, mainly by men who were, without hesitation, prepared to lay their own lives on the line to assist fallen brothers-in-arms. Published in the Government Gazette of 23 October 1970, these were recognised for their actions on the day:

L-R: PDG; BCR (Army); MFC pick device on RGSM ribbon (Gerry van Tonder collection)

Inspector Frederick Jan Smuts Phillips, British South Africa Police, was awarded the Police Decoration for Gallantry (PDG), who during a fresh manoeuvre to establish the terrorist position, received a serious head wound. He displayed “…brave and gallant conduct above the normal call of duty during this action and has borne the subsequent medical treatment with great fortitude.” He was retired on medical grounds from the BSAP on 9 February 1969, permanently disabled. On page 158 of the book Contact, there is a photograph of Fred Phillips in his wheelchair being congratulated by Prime Minister Ian Smith.

Section Officer Barry Tiffin, British South Africa Police, was awarded the Police Decoration for Gallantry (PDG) who, despite sustaining a severe wound to his thigh, “…displayed brave and gallant conduct above the normal call of duty during this action.”

Lieutenant Ian Patrick Wardle, 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian African Rifles, was awarded the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia (BCR) for “…quick, fearless action and remarkable qualities of leadership.”

Radio Operator Private Kenias Tovakare, 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian African Rifles, was awarded the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia (BCR), for staying with his commander, Captain Hosking, during a fierce engagement with terrorists and under extremely hazardous conditions. He “…displayed gallantry and devotion to duty under extremely dangerous conditions”.

Squadron Leader Michael Grier, No. 7 Squadron, The Rhodesian Air Force, was awarded the Military Forces Commendation (Operational) (MFC) for “…helicopter action, carried out whilst under enemy fire, performed with determination and undoubtedly helped to hold Rhodesian casualties at a low level”.

Warrant Officer I Aubrey Korb, 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian African Rifles, was awarded the Military Forces Commendation (Operational) (MFC) for his selfless acts that night in recovering the wounded, displaying “…courage and determination”.

Sergeant Technician Robert Whyte, No. 7 Squadron, The Rhodesian Air Force, was awarded the Military Forces Commendation (Operational) (MFC); whilst directing attacks onto a terrorist position, “…his determination, under conditions of great personal danger, undoubtedly helped to keep Rhodesian casualties to a low level”.

Private Simon Chikafu, 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian African Rifles, was awarded the Military Forces Commendation (Operational) (MFC), for protecting a wounded police officer and eventually carrying him away to be casevaced to hospital, in which he displayed, “…courageous and exemplary action worthy of recognition”.

By the middle of August the Luthuli gang, under one John Dube, had set up a camp near Leasha Pan, ironically, not far from where Lt Peirson, commander of the 1RAR Mortar Platoon had stopped for the night. The following morning, stop groups from E Company 1RAR were dropped off by helicopter to cover the game fence from Ngulube Pan towards the Botswana border. At the same time, elements of the Mortar Platoon were approaching Leasha Pan, and as they were crossing a dam wall, a fleeting contact occurred, but it was only as the platoon moved back to their vehicles that a terrorist was shot and killed. Despite all the activity, the whole terrorist group, now numbering more than 40, simply moved to a new site two miles away. Over the next few days, the terrorists managed to avoid the Security Forces as they moved into the extreme north-west area of Tjolotjo TTL, where they established a well laid out camp on the Tegwani River, complete with camouflage and slit trenches.

On 22 August, 1 Platoon, A Company 1RAR, under 23-year-old Lieutenant Nick Smith, started following fresh spoor of seven terrorists along the game fence near the Nata River. The spoor headed south-east as Smith and his men inched forward, carefully scanning the surrounding bush. Next to Smith, and slightly out in front, was the 42-year-old Warrant Officer II Havahli Timitiya, a Malayan campaign veteran. What they could not have known was that the spoor was leading straight into a well-concealed terrorist camp.

Early that afternoon a camp sentry, observing the approaching soldiers, opened fire on Smith’s platoon. Flying Officer Prop Geldenhuys of No. 4 Squadron, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force, piloting an armed Provost over the area, was immediately alerted to the firefight taking place below, but every time he flew close, he was met by heavy groundfire. Geldenhuys’ aircraft took a hit, as an

AK47 round went through the port wing before striking his side of the canopy near his head. He was forced to return to base at Main Camp where his aircraft was quickly patched up, before returning to the contact area. On the ground, though, events would have more tragic results.

Lieutenant Smith and WOII Timitiya briefly huddled together to decide how to take on the terrorist positions. The platoon moved forward in an extended line, the exchange of fire fierce and prolonged. As Smith moved to rally his men, he was shot and killed. Timitiya had by this time swapped his rifle for an MAG and, bracing the machine gun on a branch of a tree, in a standing position he fired controlled bursts at the enemy. As he was bravely taking the fight to the terrorists, a bullet ripped through a branch of the tree before fatally entering Timitiya’s head. In a statement afterwards, platoon Lance Corporal Mavaradze stated that they had then run out of ammunition, and with the enemy about to overrun their position, they were forced to withdraw, leaving behind the bodies of Smith and Timitiya, their packs, rifles and radios. After initially taking up a defensive position some distance away, Mavaradze sent for help before moving to the Wankie National Park boundary road where they stayed the night.

seated on the right, as a member of the Army team Inter-Services Shooting Competition team. With the contact scene all to themselves, the terrorists moved in to claim the kit the Rhodesian troops had left behind. As they moved across the Nata River, they opened fire on elements of E Company 1RAR they have observed in a thicket of trees. Leaving their ambush position, Lieutenant Ken Peirson went out to investigate, but on his return, he was mistaken for a terrorist by one of his own men and shot and killed.

WOII Havahli Timitiya,

On 23 August, following the discovery of two terrorist weapons by an E Company 1RAR patrol, together with intelligence obtained from a SAANC terrorist captured at Siwuwu Pools, the Security Forces were able to confirm the existence of a large terrorist camp near the Tegwani River, situated in thick bush and holding more than 30 ZAPU and SAANC insurgents. Late that morning, fresh spoor was found by 13 Platoon and 15 Platoon, who immediately commenced a follow-up operation. They were accompanied by two British South Africa Police dog handlers, Patrol Officers Spencer Thomas and Robert Horn.

At 1600 hours that afternoon, however, Lieutenant Bill Winnall, commanding 13 Platoon was radioed and instructed to halt the two platoons to allow Hunters of the RRAF’s No. 1 Squadron to carry out cannon and rocket attacks on what was believed to be the terrorist position. After a fleeting 12 minutes of strafing by the Hunters, and before a scheduled bombing run by Canberras from No. 5 Squadron at 1800 hours, Winnall moved the two platoons into thick cover to prepare a safe night position. All their movements were being watched, however, and as the Rhodesians relaxed with no apparent sentries, terrorist leader Dube and one of his men put on captured Rhodesian combat jackets and nonchalantly sauntered over to the unsuspecting RAR platoons. Shortly afterwards, heavy fire was brought down on to the platoons by the hidden terrorists, wounding eight including PO Horn Winnall himself. PO Spencer Thomas died of gunshot wounds to the chest. Two terrorists were killed.

BSAP dog handlers leading an army stick away from a RRAF helicopter (Photo Ministry of Information)

Taken totally by surprise and under immediate threat of his position being overrun, Winnall organised a withdrawal as best he could, leaving behind weapons and kit. Light was fading so they would only be able to fully assess the situation at first light. Communications with the JOC had been lost, and it was not until 0130 hours the following morning that the platoons were able to raise the JOC and arrange for a casevac from the temporary forward airfield at Tjolotjo. Flight Lieutenant Chris Dixon of No. 7 Squadron, flying in hazardous conditions over dangerous territory, performed the mercy flight, recovering Lt Winnall and a Pte Jonas to Wankie Hospital.

North-west Bulalima-Mangwe and Tjolotjo, scene of the later stages of Op Nickel (Map Gerry van Tonder)

The JOC, now re-positioned at Tjolotjo, immediately deployed 48 men of A Company 1RAR, under Second Lieutenant ‘Butch’ Duncan, into the contact area, supported by Second Lieutenant John Pritchard with 13 Platoon and 15 Platoon. Platoons from D Company were placed south of the position and across likely escape routes in the Nata and Tegwani rivers area. By late afternoon, elements of 2 Commando RLI were also deployed a short distance north of the Nata River. Finally, stop groups from E Company RAR were placed along the Botswana border, effectively sealing off the last known terrorist position, now estimated to hold less than 30 terrorists.

As the month ended, the terrorist group commander, John Dube, accompanied by three of his men, were arrested by the Botswana police at Tutumi. A further 17 members of the SAANC, disillusioned with ZAPU and the turn of events, set out on their own in an attempt to reach South Africa, but the arid conditions in this part of the country slowed their progress as hunger and thirst took hold. Two members of the group were tasked to go and find food, but instead deserted, only to be arrested by the BSAP near Plumtree.

By 31 August, it had become blatantly obvious that the security forces’ cordon was being breached, necessitating a redeployment of E Company 1RAR to the north-west and south of the Tegwani River, close to the Botswana border. Early that morning, acting on a report received from a local of an insurgent presence, Lieutenant Charl Viljoen, commanding 7 Troop, 2 Commando, RLI, captured a terrorist by the name of Ncube. The man took the RLI troops and Lieutenant Schlachter’s 11 Platoon, D Company, 1RAR, to where his comrades were based. A brief firefight resulted, with four terrorists killed. A fifth terrorist escaped, eventually returning to Zambia.

2 Commando continued to patrol the area, knowing that there were about 17 terrorists of the original insurgency still to be accounted for. Lieutenant Peter Mincher had received vital information from a local tractor driver, who had informed the RLI officer that he had been given money by a large group of terrorists to buy them food. JOC Tjolotjo immediately deployed all the 1RAR companies and 2 Commando along a cutline, creating a barrier opposite the Botswana border. The tractor driver was asked to go through with the terrorists’ request and deliver the food. As the Security Forces closed in, however, they discovered the terrorists had already eaten and slipped through into Botswana. On 3 September, all 17 of them, members of the SAANC were arrested by Botswana authorities.

On the same day, a headman in the Lupane District reported to the police that Madziba, the leader of one of the terrorist gangs, the Lobengula group, had visited a local mission near St Paul’s Mission. He was found and arrested by the BSAP. Late that afternoon, Captain John Templer’s 1RAR patrol found a rhino carcass about 20 miles south west of Intundhla Siding, west of the village of Lupane; the spoor of five men led away into the bush. Early the following morning (4 September), 1RAR Lieutenant Graham Noble with 10 Platoon, D Company, set off along the spoor. At 1300

hours, Warrant Officer II Wurayayi Mutero (awarded the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia in 1970) challenged a terrorist he saw sitting in a thicket.

Dave Heppenstall)

The terrorist reacted by alerting his dozing comrade and opening fire on the soldiers. Mutero shot and killed one of them, before lobbing grenades into the terrorist position. As the fighting continued, Noble took some of his platoon and skirted the terrorist hideout, encountering a shallow trench as they crept forward. At this stage, a third terrorist, already wounded in the abdomen, opened fire with his AK and threw a grenade at the advancing 1RAR group. The explosion seriously injured Private Pedzisayi and killed Private Nyika Muchazorega. In a follow-up sweep, the bodies of all three terrorists were found.

Operation Nickel officially closed on 8 September, but the final outstanding member of the original group that entered Rhodesia, was only captured the following year by the SAP in Durban on 12 May 1968.

This ‘joint operation’ between the South African ANC and ZAPU drew considerable criticism from nationalist movements in both countries. On 15 August James Chikerema, Vice-President of Nkomo’s ZAPU, and Oliver Tambo, Acting President of the ANC, issued a statement in Lusaka declaring that the two organisations had established a military alliance. This fuelled inter-party discontent, the South African Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) referring to events in Matabeleland as ‘The Wankie Fiasco’, declaring in a leaflet that, “You cannot hope to gobble up a regular army, all at once in a conventional style war, as our brothers tried to do, and still claim to be waging guerrilla warfare”.

Sithole’s ZANU was equally outspoken, commenting in its party publication, Zimbabwe News, that the ANC should fight at home, thereby splitting the ‘colonialist, racist’ forces in the sub-continent,

CSM W. Mutero chatting with Prime Minister Ian Smith at the investiture of his BCR. (Photo

and essentially leave the Rhodesian nationalists to free their own country. Closer to the truth, possibly, is the fact that ZAPU and ANC subversive activities were wholly Soviet supported, whereas ZANU and the PAC were firmly entrenched in the Chinese orbit, following the Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare. In the 1970s, ZIPRA and ZANLA, the respective ‘armies’ of Nkomo and Mugabe, would have bitter clashes when their paths met along the poorly defined boundaries of the terrorist operational sectors within Rhodesia.

(2) THE LIFE AND DEATH OF BASIL FEBRUARY

Nicole van Driel | 28 October 2024

Nicole van Driel remembers the MK operative whose remains were recently repatriated to SA

A small group of former Rhodesian British South Africa Police (BSAP) members, now living in South Africa, have taken the unprecedented step of revealing the circumstances in which Umkhonto we Sizwe guerrilla, Basil February died.

Their dramatic account recalls a farm labourer alerting people to February’s presence on the farm and that his last words, actions and instincts were to protect a white farmer’s wife and children before he was shot dead in Figtree, near Bulawayo, on Tuesday August 15, 1967. (It may be that the death was only recorded in writing the following day, hence 16 August 1967 is recorded as the date of death.)

February was a brilliant student who had left the University of Cape Town’s medical school in his second year to join the military wing of the ANC. It was the early 1960s, and the repression of the apartheid government at Sharpeville and Langa had prompted most groups in the liberation movement to recognise that freedom was possible only through the barrel of the gun.

In 1964, February left the country with James April, his best friend and comrade. They trained together in the ANC’s camps in Africa and spent a year at a military academy in Czechoslovakia.

Much mystery had surrounded February’s death in Rhodesia. Adding to the mystique is the fact that February was the first ‘Coloured’ MK guerrilla to fall in the struggle for freedom.

He is remembered in popular history for the sacrifice he made and the fact that he transformed himself from an intellectual into a freedom fighter. February and April were the first armed ‘Coloured’ MK guerrillas and were part of the Luthuli Detachment.

Lennox Lagu, also known as General Tshali, was the commander of the Luthuli Detachment and Chris Hani was the political commissar. On 31 July 1967, the Luthuli Detachment joined forces with

the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) and crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia into Rhodesia.

ZAPU was fighting the white minority regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith and was en route to set up a base at Lupane (north-east of the Wankie Game Reserve) in Rhodesia. The ANC guerrillas were on a long march home to South Africa, where they hoped to resuscitate political activity after the severe repression of the 1960s.

Although the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas had entered Rhodesian soil on 1 August 1967, their presence was detected only on August 7, when one ANC guerrilla was caught near Lukozi Bridge.

The captured guerrilla, during interrogation at Wankie, gave the impression that he was one of a group of only seven. The Rhodesian authorities were thus initially unaware that 79 guerrillas had crossed the Zambezi River into Rhodesia.

After entering Rhodesian soil, the guerrillas marched through the Wankie Game Reserve, hoping to avoid detection. The guerrillas, although well trained and prepared, encountered two main problems: a lack of food and water, and poor compasses. After marching for about a week, the big unit split into two and pursued their separate goals.

February accompanied the Lupane-bound group and April the South African-bound group, and the two were meant to rendezvous in the Western Cape.

The last time ANC guerrillas saw February was when they assisted him to board a train at a siding. It was said that he had a special mission and would contact the ANC guerrillas in two months’ time. February boarded the train with a pistol and left his Uzi machine-gun behind with the other guerrillas.

This is what the former BSAP members said happened afterwards: “On a Saturday night, August 12, 1967, February asked the night railway guard at Dett railway station about trains into Bulawayo.

The railway guard became suspicious; February looked white, and something did not add up. The police constable on night duty was called, and after a discussion with February, they all agreed to go across to the Dett police mess, where a group of four Police Anti-Terrorist Unit (Patu) members were asleep on the veranda.

As the constable stepped onto the veranda, February drew his pistol, shot the unarmed railway guard twice in the stomach and then fired twice at the constable, who fell to the floor and feigned death. February then escaped.

Two of the Patu members awoke during the commotion and pursued February. Halfway down the road, the Patu member in first pursuit of February turned to his colleague behind him and said: ‘Let’s go back, this is a terrorist, he has mistakenly dropped a grenade in the road’.

The two returned to the armoury and fetched their weapons, which were locked away. On their return, they met a herd of buffalo in the road and could go no further. In the meanwhile, it seems February stole a bicycle. Later, the two Patu members saw a vehicle leaving Dett and the driver waved at them. Thinking it was a railway employee, they waved back, only to discover that the driver was February, in a vehicle he had stolen.

Thus, a roadblock was set up between Bulawayo and Lupane. On Sunday morning, February managed to burst through the roadblock and head for Bulawayo. Two highway patrolmen were dispatched in pursuit. At one stage they almost collided with him, but the description of the wanted vehicle and the one they narrowly missed differed, so the patrolmen decided to forgo chasing the errant driver. Only later did they realise it was one and the same vehicle they were looking for.

The police in Bulawayo and the surrounding areas were put on high alert. The stolen vehicle was found the following day in the lower end of Bulawayo, near the Mzilikazi township.

On Monday 14 August 1967, there were reports of a possible guerrilla presence towards the Matopas area. Patu was sent to do a follow-up. It was surmised that the guerrillas were moving towards the Figtree area - the boots they wore had a unique eight-pattern on the sole. Farmers in the Figtree, Marula and Matopas areas were alerted, and they commenced checking their farms.

On Tuesday 15 August 1967, a farm labourer in the Figtree area reported a suspicious spoor to the farmer. The local police and farmers joined in and commenced a search of the farm.

In the meanwhile, February had entered the homestead and demanded to know from the wife and young children where the farmer was, to which the farmer’s wife replied: ‘Out there looking for you!’ February replied: ‘I did not come here to kill women and children.’

He demanded that the farmer’s wife make him breakfast. By then, the search party realised that the eight-pattern spoor led back to the farmhouse.

As February finished eating, they heard the approaching patrol. He then told the farmer’s wife to take her children and go down the passage and hide. He then walked to the glass French doors, drew his sidearm and fired on the patrol. He was in full view and made no attempt to hide. One shot was fired in return by the senior policeman present and Basil February was killed.

The BSAP version of February’s death differs to that of Al J. Venter, who said: “He was killed by Rhodesian security forces after a day-long battle which involved hundreds of men, as well as jet fighters of the Rhodesian air force.”

Afterwards, the Rhodesians commented on the [Luthuli Detachment’s] group’s determination and in particular February’s bravery in the face of terrifying odds. (From Al. J. Venter, The Zambezi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa pp. 77-78).

If we are to believe the BSAP version, then the truth is that, when faced with a life-and-death situation, February’s first instinct was to protect the white farmer’s wife and children.

This was not lost on the BSAP members. At the end of my interview with Lionel Baker, who was a member of the Patu sleeping on the veranda at Dett, and another who chased February on foot, both said February was a hero who did not want the white farmer’s wife and children to be hurt, a true gentleman who had lived by the same standards used by the BSAP.

However, not all ex-BSAP members hold this view. After reading the written reconstruction of February’s death, Rob Hamilton, the chairperson of the BSAP Regimental Association (Natal), noted: “February was carrying arms of war in a foreign country, having entered illegally for the purpose of furthering the cause of the banned South African organisations. Being armed with a machine-gun and explosives, clearly his purpose was such that he could be expected to kill innocent civilians if confronted.

“Had he survived, he would have been charged and prosecuted with attempted murder, car theft and, of course, charges relating to his unlawful terrorist activities.”

Baker argues that February did not want to be arrested as he thought he had killed the police constable at the Dett police station. February was unaware that the railway guard had only sustained an abdominal injury.

At the end of August 1967, James April was arrested and convicted in Botswana for the illegal possession of weapons, along with Chris Hani and other comrades of the Luthuli Detachment. He later served a 15-year sentence on Robben Island from 1971 to 1986, for his participation in the Wankie Campaign.

February still lives on in the hearts and dreams of many people. One morning, April told me of his dream the night before: he met February, and they were overjoyed to see each other.

February told him that he had not really died in Rhodesia. Instead, he had got lost in the bush, where he had lived for the past 20 years or so. He had decided to come home after all.

Note: This article was published in the Sunday Independent, 19 December 2004

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/basil-february-a-hero-to-friend-andfoe?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=7d1b58de4dEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_10_28_06_00&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-7d1b58de4d%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D (Republished with Permission).

(3) BASIL FEBRUARY: FORMER RHODESIAN POLICE HELP FILL IN GAPS

Nicole van Driel | 31 October 2024

Nicole van Driel writes co-operation by BSAP members speaks of their need to tell their side of the story in their own words

(From the Sunday Independent, 19 December 2004)

There is a champion in all of us. I found one where I least expected to - in Lionel Baker, a member of the former British South Africa Police (BSAP). Baker convinced former members of the BSAP living in KwaZulu-Natal and Britain to reconstruct the final hours of ANC guerrilla Basil February’s life, and to help locate his grave in Zimbabwe. This was almost 40 years after February’s death.

Baker’s group has also offered new information on how James Masimini, another member of the Luthuli Detachment died, and a lead on where he and four of his comrades are buried. Baker was born in South Africa in 1939 and grew up in Durban. He moved to Rhodesia in 1957 and joined the BSAP.

In Rhodesia he met his late wife, Frances Bovington, a junior schoolteacher recruited from Britain. Baker was part of the BSAP support team for the Rhodesian army in Operation Nickel when it had to stave off a joint offensive by the ANC and the Zimbabwean African People’s Union in August 1967.

With the positive intervention of Baker, I entered into a dialogue via email with a small group of BSAP members. They eventually agreed to help with information on how February died, and with identifying the location of his grave.

Additional information supplied could also help locate the graves of other Luthuli Detachment guerrillas, thus bringing closure to something that happened 40 years earlier.

A big factor in their decision to help was that February was a medical student at the University of Cape Town when he left South Africa to join Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC’s armed wing.

This BSAP group has reconstructed the final hours of February’s life. They say their version is accurate. They are thereby helping to answer the question: what really happened? They have also revealed that February, Masimini and four of the other Luthuli Detachment members were given paupers’ burials.

What makes February and - to some extent - Masimini different to the other Luthuli Detachment members who fell during this episode is that they were both alone when Rhodesian security force

members killed them, so their ANC comrades could not definitively account for the circumstances surrounding their deaths, unlike those who fell during battle.

Of further historical significance is the fact that the BSAP members are willing to recount their experiences during August and September 1967. Many books have been published on “the bush war” in Rhodesia, but none significantly recounts the personal experiences of the Rhodesian security forces during Operation Nickel.

The co-operation by the BSAP members speaks of their need to tell their side of the story in their own words, and to give their account of events as they unfolded. This augurs well for the process of writing history in South Africa and enriches our understanding of the past.

In 2003 I nominated February posthumously for a national order. February was the first ‘Coloured’ MK guerrilla to fall during the struggle for liberation. The text motivating my nomination was largely based on my mini thesis, ‘The ANC’s First Armed Military Operation: The Luthuli Detachment and Wankie Campaign,

July-September 1967.’

In the early 1980s, the late Dullah Omar, then a practising attorney, first told me the story of February and James April. They were the best of friends and comrades, who so believed in their Marxist ideals that in 1964 they joined the ranks of the liberation movement.

February and April were so-called Coloureds of “slave descent”. They were politically associated with the Non-European Unity Movement in the Western Cape. Omar acted on their behalf when they were detained.

After the 1960 Sharpeville and Langa shootings and the banning of meetings of organisations such as the ANC, February and April decided to adopt the strategy of painting graffiti slogans. They were caught in the act in Wynberg, Cape Town, and charged with malicious damage to property.

Constant security police harassment followed, and in 1964 both men left the country without telling their families, fearing for the latter’s safety. They disappeared into Botswana and joined MK.

When next their families heard of them, it was 1967. Notorious security police officer Spyker van Wyk broke the news to the February family by saying: “Ek het net vir jou kom sê jou vark is dood.” (“I just came to tell you your pig is dead.”)

April was imprisoned in Botswana with Chris Hani and other MK members convicted of carrying weapons of war into Botswana. Later, in 1969, the Organisation of African Unity managed to intervene, and the guerrillas were released from prison and flown back to Zambia.

Meanwhile, overcome with grief at his son’s death, the late Paul February poured out his heart to Omar. His lament: I do not know how my son died, nor do I know where he is buried.

To mark the awarding of the posthumous national order to the February family, I wrote two articles for The Sunday Independent. I wrote about Basil February in heroic terms, which is the way he is remembered in popular history.

Lionel Baker then responded with a letter, “Setting the record straight about Basil February” (December 14, 2003). He argued that I should interview members of the former BSAP if I wished to know what really happened.

I responded by saying that no matter how February had died, the fact that he was willing to sacrifice his life for a free country made him a hero. So began my initially antagonistic relationship with Baker through the media.

When first I spoke to Baker on the telephone, however, my first remark to him was: Would he help me to find out the details of how February died and where he was buried?

After almost a year of correspondence via post, telephone and email, I flew to KwaZulu-Natal at the beginning of December 2004 to meet Baker. He was gracious and had arranged for me to meet another BSAP member at his home on the North Coast.

Although both were involved in Operation Nickel in August and September of 1967, neither was present when February died. Instead, they told me what had been told to them by the person who shot and killed February.

Baker emphasised that the BSAP had not fired a shot in more than 60 years before the fateful event involving February, on August 15, 1967 - a record unmatched by even the British Police.

Baker said the BSAP was a proud and honourable force dedicated to the people. The function of members of the BSAP was to fight crime and track criminals. The community respected Rhodesian policemen - a concept alien to most South Africans previously.

According to Kees Maxey in, Fight for Zimbabwe: Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia Since UDI (Rex Collings, London 1975), the BSAP played a military function during the Mashona uprisings of 1896 and 1897.

For the next 60-odd years, theirs was a policing function. This gradually changed as the bush war progressed, until the BSAP was once again playing a military support function.

Baker convinced his former colleagues to assist me with ongoing research on the Wankie campaign and Operation Nickel, and in finding the graves of Luthuli Detachment members interred in Zimbabwe.

The new information they provided gives us hope of identifying February and Masimini’s graves, and the graves of some of the others. Although we have some way to go, there is hope that we can give them a proper burial at home. Baker has given us the key to past mysteries and the chance to bring healing to the loved ones of some who fell far away from home so many decades ago.

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/former-rhodesian-police-help-fill-ingaps?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=fa5435020fEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_10_31_11_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-fa5435020f%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D (Republished with Permission).

(4) OPERATION NICKEL: SECURITY BRANCH: DURBAN

Brig HB Heymans

As a young Warrant Officer and a newcomer at the Security Branch in Durban during 1970, I remember when Mr James Edward April was arrested by Lieut Nelson Kabalamurthi Nayager (late).

One of this group of ANC-MK operatives (Luthuli-detachment) also joined the SAP-SB as a member (askari), he was Sergeant Leonard Nkosi During 1971 I attended a basic Security Course and Sergeant Leonard Nkosi was one of the speakers at the course. He was an eloquent and humorous speaker. He was later assassinated

I also remember a Court Case in Pietermaritzburg during 1971 which I attended. A member of the BSAP was allegedly shot and killed by this group. A member of the BSAP came down to South Africa and gave evidence in the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg. I will never forget he used the terms "nom de guere" and "coup de grace" in his evidence. I was impressed by his evidence, however to me it was new terms. As always, I learnt something by hearing his evidence.

Photos of the corpse of a member of the BSAP who had been killed in a skirmish by this group were handed in as evidence. The photos made an indelible impression on my young mind. I then realised that there were hard and difficult days ahead! (I was used as a PRO in the case.)

I would be pleased to receive more info from former BSAP-officers who were involved in this case.

• On 19 November 2024 I had the pleasure to speak to Mrs Nicole van Driel and her husband, Maj-Gen James April (SANDF – Ret). We had a “historical” chat. The General confirms that Lt

Nyagar arrested him. He still remembers many of the Durban Security Branch members – the ones he remembers, I told him, have all died. He confirms he was tried in Pietermaritzburg.

(5) THE CASE OF LEONARD NKOSI

TRC Final Report

Page Number (Original) 170: Paragraph Numbers 50 to 55

Volume 3: Chapter 3: Subsection 8

“55 Informers and ‘collaborators’ became targets of attack. The case of Leonard Nkosi illustrates how one-time heroes of the liberation struggle came to be hunted for betraying their own colleagues to the Security Branch.

Mr Leonard Nkosi left South Africa in 1963 to undergo military and political training with MK. He was a leader and allegedly a renowned sniper in the Wankie Campaign. He was captured by the Security Branch in 1967, and it is believed that he worked as an askari and later joined the Security Branch.

… a member of the Security Branch intelligence unit, revealed that Nkosi had been compelled to turn state witness against his former colleagues.

Daluxolo Luthuli [AM4057/96] claims that it was Nkosi who assisted in his December 1967 arrest in a sting operation in Messina. Nkosi subsequently testified against him and Luthuli was sent to Robben Island. Nkosi also testified for the state against other members of the Luthuli Detachment, including Mr James April who was tried in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court [CT00428/OUT].

On 9 September 1977, shortly after testifying against Harry Gwala and nine others in the 1976–77 treason trial in Pietermaritzburg, Nkosi was assassinated.

Security Branch amnesty applicants told the Commission that Nkosi was shot dead, and his wife injured with a single shot from a Tokarev and that ANC member Reverend Stanley Msibi (now deceased) was implicated in Nkosi’s death [AM3686/96]. The ANC claimed responsibility for the assassination in its second submission to the Commission”

Source: https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/reports/volume3/chapter3/subsection8.htm

Nicole van Driel and her husband, Maj-Gen James April (SANDF – Ret).

James April (1940-) also known as George Driver left Cape Town in 1964 with his best friend, Basil February (1943-1967) [Photo - left] also known as Paul Petersen. Their political involvement in anti-apartheid activities, including an arrest for slogan painting, had drawn the ire of the Special Branch. After much police harassment and detentions, April and February decided to go into exile. The two joined Umkhonto we Sizwe and stayed in ANC camps in Zambia and Tanzania. They underwent military training in Czechoslovakia in 1964-1965.

April and February were part of the Luthuli Detachment a joint MK-ZIPRA military unit who on 31 July 1967 crossed the Zambezi River into then Rhodesia. The unit split into two with one group headed to Lupane and the other group headed south to South Africa. February went with the Lupane-bound group and April was part of the South African-bound group led by John Dube (a ZIPRA leader) and Chris Hani (MK leader). April and February planned to rendezvous in Cape Town. This was never to happen.

On 13 August 1967, February had been caught on a train and detained by railway security guards. He subsequently shot one railway guard and a BSAP member. On 16 February 1967, February died on a farm in Plumtree in a shoot-out with the BSAP. In this incident, according to the BSAP, February protected the white farmer’s wife and son.

On the morning of 22 August 1967, Dube went to into a village to organise food for the hungry guerrillas. Whilst eating the porridge the guerrillas were attacked by the Rhodesian Security Forces and returned fire. The former retreated.

The next day, on 23 August 1967, the Rhodesian Airforce bombarded them from the skies but missed the guerrillas. Dube and his group eventually retreated to Botswana and surrendered to authorities there. April received a two-year sentence for illegal possession of arms, but on appeal his sentence was reduced and commuted to 12 months. The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) intervened and secured his release, and he only served 10-months in a Botswana prison.

He later served a 15-year sentence (1971-1986): seven months at Leeuwkop Prison and 14 years and 5 months on Robben Island.

April completed a BA on Robben Island and later an Honours degree in Economics at the University of the Western Cape.

April joined the SANDF in 1995 and became a Major-General in the Finance section. He retired in 2004 and lives in Cape Town.

(Source: Interview with James April – 2 November 2024, Cape Town).

Genl.maj.

Izak Smalman

Ek skryf hierdie brief uit dankbaarheid en nederigheid en nie uit aggressie nie.

My argwaan is steeds bytend as ek daaraan dink hoe my oud kollegas behandel is ná die Marikana-voorval waarin 34 mynwerkers doodgeskiet is.

Ek baklei nie meer teen die woordgebruik van die media wat verwys na die "Marikanaslagting" nie, ook nie dat die indruk gewek word dat die polisie op die mynwerkers geskiet het omdat hulle gestaak het nie. Dit is eenvoudig nie waar nie.

Die skietvoorval by Marikana het op 16 Augustus 2012 plaasgevind en later is etlike polisie-beamptes aangekla, dog geen van die geweldenaars (mynwerkers) is ooit aangekla nie.

Voor die skietvoorval is 10 mense vermoor, onder wie twee polisiebeamptes, twee veiligheidswagte en ses private persone.

Hierdie moorddossier is gereed vir verhoor, dog geen stappe word gedoen om daarmee te begin en dit af te handel nie.

Daar is eerder gefokus op klagte teen die beamptes.

'n Jare lange verhoor het begin teen genl.maj. William Mpembe, brig. Kiewiet van Zyl, asook twee ander polisiebeamptes op aanklagte van regsverydeling. Daar was geen getuienis teen hierdie mense nie en hulle is almal op 31 Maart 2022 onskuldig bevind.

Genl.maj. Izak Smalman

Dit was nie die einde van die heksejag op die polisiebeamptes nie.

'n Uitmergelende moordverhoor teen Mpembe, kol. Salmon Vermaak en vyf ander polisiebeamptes het gevolg. Hierdie ongelukkige mense is Maandag almal onskuldig bevind. Die staat se saak was so swak dat die aangeklaagdes nie eens nodig gehad het om te getuig nie.

Die verloop van gebeure sedert die voorval op 16 Augustus 2012, die ondersoek deur die Farlam-kommissie daarna, asook die hofsake teen die polisiebeamptes en hul ontslag in die hof dui daarop dat die verkeerde mense aangekla is.

Wat die vervolging van die polisiebeamptes en die uitslag van hul verhoor betref, het geregtigheid inderdaad geseëvier.

Ek hou egter nie asem op dat die werklike moordenaars ooit sal teregstaan nie.

• Met erkenning aan

“Die Generaal” en luit-genl Johan Ferreira

Genl.maj. Izak Smalman In Beeld: 12 September 2024

SKRIKBEWIND VAN MINIBUS-TAXIVERENIGINGS IN MPUMALANGA KAN NIE LANGER GEDULD WORD

Mediaverklaring uitgereik deur:

Werner Weber

VF Plus-LPW: Mpumalanga 4 November 2024

Die skrikbewind wat minibus-taxiverenigings op openbare paaie in Mpumalanga voer om die absolute monopolie oor vervoerdienste, is skokkend en onaanvaarbaar en die VF Plus eis optrede op die hoogste vlak.

Uit videomateriaal in die party se besit, kan duidelik gesien word hoe persone wat klaarblyklik optree as “sekerheidsdienste” of sterkmanne vir die taxi-verenigings, motoriste intimideer en dreig.

Motors word selfs van die pad gedwing waarna betalings of sogenaamde “boetes” geëis word. Die VF Plus het baie klagtes in dié verband ontvang en die TV-kanaal Newzroom Africa het ook reeds breedvoerig daaroor berig.

Tog blyk dit of die owerhede voete sleep met optrede. Tot op hede het die polisie nog niemand in hegtenis geneem nie en die VF Plus het verlede week die provinsie se LUR vir gemeenskapsveiligheid, mnr. Jackie Macie, in die provinsiale wetgewer versoek om op te tree.

Mnr. Macie het erken dat hy bewus is van die “toenemende probleem” en het onderneem om ŉ dringende ondersoek van stapel te stuur.

Hoe arrogant die oortreders is, blyk uit die uitlatings op TV van die voorsitter van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Taxiraad (Santaco) in Mpumalanga, mnr. Fanyana Sibanyoni, dat die vereniging “die reg het” om enige motoris te stop en te verhinder om saamrygeleenthede te gee indien dit op ŉ taxiroete plaasvind.

Die VF Plus het videomateriaal van ŉ voorval op die N4-hoofweg naby Ogies waar gesien kan word hoe ŉ motoris in ŉ lewensgevaarlike situasie van die pad gedwing word.

ŉ Ander selfoonopname wys hoe dieselfde of ŉ soortgelyke “taxi-patrolliemotor” in nog ŉ voorval probeer om ŉ Chevrolet-motor tot stilstand te dwing.

In ŉ verwante voorval is ŉ persoon wat sy buurman glo ’n saamrygeleentheid gegee het, van sy motor beroof. Die aanvallers het na bewering geëis dat hy ’n “boete” van R2 500 betaal om sy motor terug te kry en hy is gewaarsku om nie weer saamrygeleenthede te gee nie.

Kol. Donald Mdhluli, polisiewoordvoerder in Mpumalanga, het bevestig dat hy wel van sekere voorvalle bewus is en dat 'n saak van kaping in die laaste voorval ondersoek word. Niemand is nog in hegtenis geneem nie.

Dit is vir die VF Plus onaanvaarbaar dat daar nie reeds daadwerklik opgetree is nie. Die polisie het ŉ goeie idee wie die oortreders is, daar is videomateriaal en ooggetuies beskikbaar en Santaco se dreigemente is openlik.

Tog is nog niemand nog aangekeer nie en die LUR beloof eers optrede nadat hy met die feite gekonfronteer word.

Dit is skokkend dat wettelose elemente ŉ skrikbewind op die provinsie se paaie voer terwyl die owerhede dit klaarblyklik swyend gade slaan. Die VF Plus sal die situasie volg om seker te maak daar word opgetree om dié wetteloosheid stop te sit.

POSITIEWE POLISIE-STATISTIEK OOR MISDAAD MOET AS AANSPORING

DIEN OM MISDAAD MEER KRAGDADIG TE BESTRY

Mediaverklaring uitgereik deur:

Heloïse Denner

VF Plus-LP en hoofwoordvoerder: Polisie 25 November 2024

Ná jare van stygende misdaadsyfers is die afgelope twee kwartale se sigbare afname verblydend en goeie nuus vir alle Suid-Afrikaners – veral met die feesseisoen op hande.

Presies waaraan die skielike afplatting te danke is, veral wat geweldsmisdaad aanbetref, is nie seker nie. Dit mag egter nie ŉ valse gevoel van gerustheid onder wetstoepassers skep nie en moet eerder as motivering dien om nog harder te werk.

ŉ Klad op hierdie positiewe statistiek is die toename in moord, poging tot moord en aanranding op vroue en kinders. Geen poging om die land se vroue en kinders te beskerm, werp blykbaar vrugte af nie.

Moord op vroue is met 8,6% op teenoor die ooreenstemmende kwartaal verlede jaar en poging tot moord met 3,5%. Moord op kinders is op met 7,5% en poging tot moord met ŉ skokkende 35,7%.

Dit werp ŉ tragiese refleksie op Suid-Afrika se gemeenskap en sy morele waardes wanneer 957 vroue in net drie maande (Julie tot September) vermoor word met pogings om nóg 1 567 te vermoor.

Uitsprake wat die minister van polisie, Senzo Mchunu, vandag met die uitreiking van die misdaadstatistiek gemaak het oor onder meer onwettige myners, wys dat hy nie hul bedrywighede sal duld nie.

Sulke uitlatings stuur ŉ sterk boodskap aan alle misdadigers dat hulle geen genade kan verwag nie.

Minister Mchunu is duidelik ŉ verbetering op sy voorganger, Bheki Cele. Die VF Plus het lank daarop aangedring dat Cele vervang moet word aangesien hy duidelik nie opgewasse was vir sy taak nie.

Wat die res van die statistiek aanbetref, is geweldsmisdaad feitlik deur die bank minder. Moord is af met 5.8%, roof met 6,2% en roof met verswarende omstandighede met 8,8%.

Verkragting is 3,1% minder en die gevreesde trio-misdade, motorkaping (9,4%), rooftogte by woonhuise (1,3%) en rooftogte elders (21,1%) toon saam ŉ skerp afname.

Transitorooftogte was 24 voorvalle minder as die ooreenstemmende tydperk verlede jaar en vragmotorkapings is af met 15,3%. Verlede kwartaal het dit reeds ŉ gesamentlike afname van 14% getoon.

Vir Jan en Alleman is dit ook goeie nuus dat misdaad soos inbraak by woonhuise (-9,2%), inbraak elders (-15,6%), motor- en motorfietsdiefstal (-10,3%) en diefstal uit ŉ voertuig (-8,9) eweneens skerp afgeneem het. Selfs veediefstal toon ŉ afname van 4,1%.

Suid-Afrikaners was die laaste jare so vuisvoos van misdaad dat enige goeie nuus welkom is. Buiten die lot van vroue en kinders is hierdie wel goeie nuus. Die stryd teen misdaad is egter nog lank nie gewen nie en vereis dat alle vredeliewende Suid-Afrikaners saamstaan om die polisie se hand te sterk in hul taak.

SAPD SE HUIDIGE (NUUTSTE) GETALSTERKTES

Brig Fanie Bouwer

* Generaal - 1

(Nas. kommissaris)

* Lt.-generaals

(Nas. Adj.-kommissarisse - 4)

* Lt.-generaals

(Afdelingskommissarisse - 12)

* Lt.-generaals

(Prov. Kommissarisse - 9)

* Genl-majoors – 156

* Brigadiers – 623

* Kolonelle - 2416

* Lt.-kolonelle - 5965

* Kapteins - 12155

Totaal 26

Totaal 182

Totaal 805 generaals en brigadiers

(Die rang van 'luitenant' en 'majoor' bestaan nie meer nie)

* Konstabels, sersante en Adj.-offisiere - in totaal 123 996 (Onderoffisiere)

* PSA - 34 226 (Siviele personeel)

TOTAL 179 502

(Dit was so 'n paar jaar gelede +- 190 000)

Kommentaar:

In 1996 was die totale getalsterkte van die SAPD 103,333. Dit het nie veel verskil van die laaste dae van 1994 nie.

In die jaar 2000 = 122, 727

Toe 60, 000+ vir die sokkerwêreldbeker 2010 gewerf is, het die getal opgestoot na die nou 197,000+ nadat alle indiensneming kriteria oorboord gegooi is.

Ek hoor deesdae die klaagliedere oor te min polisiemanne oral oor.

Hoe het ons nie in my tyd in die 70's en 80's gesukkel daarmee nie. Kort-kort moes jy ook 'n lid of twee aan grensdiens afstaan.

Ek wil gou hier vergelykings maak van die toé en die noú oor 'n stasie wat se syfers ek nou toevallig ken. En dit is Robertson waar ek vanaf 1977 SB was.

Ek is nie 100% meer seker nie, maar ek dink ons was so tussen 17-20 lede in totaal. Maar vir doeleindes van hierdie pos, kom ek gebruik die syfer 20.

Ek het gister vasgestel dat Robertson nou 122 lede in totaal het. 20 na 122 is 'n styging van 610%.

In die laat 70's het SA 'n bevolking van ongeveer 24 531 000 gehad. Tans is dit ongeveer 61 930 000 - 'n styging van 252,4%.

As mens net met laasgenoemde persentasiesyfer (252.4%) sou werk om 'n getalsterkte te bepaal, behoort Robertson in totaal nou (2022) 51 lede te hê. Daar is natuurlik ander faktore ook soos bv. hierdie Kleinkaroo-dorp se eie bevolkingsyfer wat mens in berekening moet bring, maar dit sou nie die 51-syfer vreeslik opgestoot het nie. Mens kan hierdie argument sekerlik deurtrek na allesstasies.

Ek het 'n DK gehad wat tydens onverwagte inspeksies lief was om die oplossyfer uit te werkwanneer hy die misdaadopgawe (SAP 6) nagesien het. Dit was gewoonlik so in die 80%. Ons het dit soort van as normaal beskou.

Maar wat interessant is, daar was nie speurders nie en het ek net 2 uniformlede as ondersoekers gehad. Verder was dit 'n dubeldoorsituasie waar jy as SB sommer ook takbevelvoerder was en self dossiere nagesien en/of afgesluit het. Tans het Robertson 'n sterk speurtak.

Wat bg. syfers vir ons sê, is dat kwaliteit, eerder as kwantiteit, meesal beter resultate lewer.

Laastens kan mens ook miskien die afleiding maak dat die polisieminister en ander 'eksperte' se gehamer op onvoldoende polisie getalsterktes om wanprestasie te verdoesel, nie die volle waarheid is nie, om dit sag te stel.

POLICE INTERNATIONAL: SHANGHAI POLICE

Shanghai Police Crack Down on Halloween Celebrations, Citing Political Sensitivity

NewsGPT (28 October 2024)

Shanghai police have reportedly been cracking down on Halloween celebrations, with a particular focus on politically sensitive costumes. Despite the absence of an official ban on Halloween, it appears local authorities are taking measures to avoid a repeat of last year’s events. During last year’s Halloween, some participants in China’s financial capital donned hazmat suits, a nod to the COVID-19 pandemic, and others wore costumes made of blank sheets of paper, a symbol of mass protests against the government’s pandemic response that took place in late 2022.

POLICE INTERNATIONAL: KENYA POLICE

Col David Reeve

If you have any info on the Kenya Police, please forward so that we can send it to the Kenya Police Archive in the UK, care of Col David Reeve – HBH.

CORRUPTION IN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES MUST BE ROOTED OUT

Kabelo Kgobisa-Ngcaba

29 October 2024

Preferential treatment allegedly afforded to wealthy inmates at correctional centres, notably in KZN, says party

The corruption at the heart of dysfunction in Correctional Services must be rooted out 29 October 2024

The Democratic Alliance (DA) is calling for an immediate, nationwide investigation into preferential treatment allegedly afforded to wealthy inmates at correctional centres, notably in KwaZulu-Natal. We will formally write to the National Commissioner for Correctional Services, Mr. Makgothi Thobakgale, to request this action.

Additionally, we are urging the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services to convene a meeting during the upcoming committee week for the Department to report on the circumstances surrounding these allegations, the progress of the investigation, and whether criminal charges are being pursued under section 118 of the Correctional Services Act.

This follows reports indicating that inmates at Durban and Pietermaritzburg correctional centres may have received special privileges, including access to private medical treatment in violation of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. Such acts, if confirmed, directly undermine the principle of equality before the law, a core value of our democratic system.

We acknowledge that the National Commissioner has announced an investigation, which we regard as a positive first step. However, limiting this inquiry to a single province fails to address potential systemic issues. Additionally, recent departmental briefings on disciplinary cases suggest that existing sanctions for misconduct may be insufficient to deter similar acts of corruption.

Corruption within the Department of Correctional Services poses a substantial threat to its effective functioning. The DA views this as a grave matter and will closely monitor the progress of this investigation to ensure swift and appropriate action against those involved, both within the Department's processes and through criminal law where applicable.

Issued by Kabelo Kgobisa-Ngcaba, DA Deputy Spokesperson on Correctional Services, 29 October 2024

https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/corruption-in-correctional-services-must-berooted?utm_source=Politicsweb+Daily+Headlines&utm_campaign=75cb65984bEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2024_10_29_09_21&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-75cb65984b%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D

The High Court of Griqualand West, Kimberley.

I had a phone conversation today with a very nice young chap from Pakistan. This is how it went:

"Hello sir, how are you today?"

"I'm very well, thank you for asking. And how are you? And more to the point, WHO are you?"

"Sir, my name is Sanjit, and I'm calling you from Microsoft".

"Microsoft, eh? Is that a city in Pakistan? How's the weather there today?"

" No, sir - MICROSOFT, the computer company. I'm calling to tell you that we have found a problem with your computer and"

"REALLY?? Well, that's quite concerning......"

"Yes sir, it can become very serious indeed, but thankfully I will be able to fix it for you. Now, if you"

"No, I meant it's very concerning because you see I don't HAVE a computer".

"You don't?"

"I don't".

"Ahh, it must be a problem on your laptop sir"

"Don't have one".

"Ipad?"

"Nope".

"Tablet?"

"Nope, I have none of those things. As a matter of fact, I don't even have a telephone".

After a few seconds of silence he said "Ah, sir, you are lying to me now!"

I said "Well, you started it!!" and put the phone down.

Jokes for Seniors - We Luvem All!

BOEKE | BOOKS

DIE BURO

Henning van Aswegen

ROOISAND

Jeremy Vearey

Rooisand - Die verhaal van Dirk Aruseb en die Bondelswarts

Dirk Aruseb was sewentien jaar oud toe Abraham Morris hom uit die Pella-weeshuis kom haal het om by die Bondelswarts aan te sluit. Hy kon nie wag om saam met kaptein Jakob Marengo die Schutztruppe te verower nie. Maar by Schansvlakte diep in Namaland begin die eerste van Dirk se lewenslesse: wees nederig, wees geduldig, wees genadig. Vind jou eland, tem jou janfiskaal. Maar vir Dirk bly die oorlog ’n avontuur. Dit maak nie saak wat Nana Kruiper of Klara Morris hom probeer touwys maak nie: dat die vryheidstryd vir die Bondelswarts gaan oor meer as net ’n bloedsgevoelte vir Namaland, die gelofteland wat ten alle koste beskerm moet word.

Rooisand speel af in Namaland – van Duits-Suidwes-Afrika tot die Kaapkolonie – vanaf 1904 tot 1922, toe duisende Bondelswarts oplaas deur Jan Smuts se vegvliegtuie uitgedelg is. Dit is ’n epiese, panoramiese oorlogsroman wat strek van Tsumeb tot Upington, van Windhuk se interneringskampe tot die droë rivierlope van die skeurvallei van die Visrivier.

Oor die skrywer:

Jeremy Vearey het grootgeword in Elsiesrivier op die Kaapse Vlakte. Hy was lid van die MK, en word eindelik 'n gevangene op Robbeneiland. Vroeër jare was hy eens onderwyser, lyfwag vir Nelson Mandela en polisieoffisier in die SAPS, met die rang majoor-generaal. Sy vorige publikasies sluit in Jeremy vannie Elsies en Into Dark Water

Medianavrae: Lynné Schoeman

Tel: 021 406 3033

Email: lynne.schoeman@nb.co.za

Genl-maj Jeremy Vearey

Rooisand

Human & Rousseau is 'n druknaam van NB-Uitgewers

Tel: +27 (0) 21 406 3033

Webwerf: www.nb.co.za

1907: MARENGO RAID: KALAHARI

Nota: Ek beskik oor twee artikels (1933 en 1947) oor die Bondelswarts

DIE

Genl-maj Chris Botha

Volgens ‘n ooggetuie het Geskiedenis eenvoudig eendag sy pen in sy sak gesteek, opgestaan en uit die skool uit geloop. By die klasdeur uit, stoepie toe, reguit verby Hoof se kantoor en by die hek uit. Ou Topskaal, die veiligheidswag, staan seker nou nog daar met ‘n verdwaasde uitdrukking op sy gesig, koffiebeker halfpad op pad na sy halfoop mond toe … Geskiedenis het nie eens iets gesê nie. Net uitgeloop. Sommer so.

Eers agterna kon ons so stuk-stuk die storie aanmekaarsit. Dit was nie juis ‘n mooi storie nie, maar tog interessant. In ‘n neutedop: Geskiedenis het naamlik sy rugspiertjies in ‘n knop geruk oor hoe Regering hom (dis nou Geskiedenis) hanteer het.

Nou moet ek darem sê: Regering is nie juis bekend daarvoor dat hy almal ewe goed of ewe sleg hanteer nie. Inteendeel, daar is eerder sterk sprake dat Regering in ‘n onkuise ewegoed- verhouding is met En-Dee-Er, ‘n rymkletser wat bekend is vir haar flirtasies met Elite (wat op sy beurt “die kitaar slaan”, volgens Geskiedenis se woorde waarmee hy Regering se eintlike magsbasis verduidelik).

Daarby skryf Kognisie, die beroemde akademikus, gereeld dat Regering tans so dertig of wat jare agter huidige denke is. Regering het ‘n dertig-jaar-plan reeds dertig jaar gelede aanvaar om die skool op ‘n opwindende nuwe pad te plaas. Dertig jaar gelede was hierdie dertig-jaar-plan heel aanvaarbaar vir Geskiedenis. Die plan sou inderdaad goed wees vir die nuwe rigting van vryheid, gelykheid, en saamwees wat Regering gesê het hy inslaan. Vir Historiografie (Geskiedenis se moeder, wat vir Geskiedenis bestudeer en beskryf asof hy nie haar eie seun is nie) was dit uitstekende nuus. Dit sou beteken dat Geskiedenis onbevange sou ontwikkel, vry van ideologiese, populistiese, nasionalistiese en histrioniese oorwegings. Hierdie, het Historiografie geskryf, is tog die soort houding wat die jonge Toekoms (wie se grootword Historiografie met ‘n valkoog dopgehou het) se gesondheid sou bevorder.

Op daardie stadium, dertig jaar gelede, was Toekoms baie opgewonde oor Geskiedenis se wees. Om die waarheid te sê sy (dis nou Toekoms) het heimlik gewonder oor die moontlikheid van ‘n saamwees met Geskiedenis, iets wat tog vir haar (jy weet mos …) goed sou wees.

Maar nou ja, of altemit, dalk desnieteenstaande of omdat, het Regering die gewoonte om dit te sê, maar dat te doen. Hy (dis nou Regering) probeer toe om vir Geskiedenis sover te kry om dat te wees as die waarheid, die enigste waarheid en die volle waarheid. En Geskiedenis vra maar wat dan van dit? Regering vertel toe vir Geskiedenis dat hy (dis nou Regering) die gesag en die mag het om vir Geskiedenis te sê hoe hy sal wees, want hy (alweer Regering) het vir Elite agter hom, en Elite en die invloedryke En-Dee-Er is beste maatjies, al is hulle ietwat onkuis, en hy (dis nou Geskiedenis) behoort eerder te doen wat hy (jy weet mos al teen die tyd …) vir hom sê om te wees.

En toe staan Geskiedenis op ‘n dag eenvoudig op, steek sy pen in sy sak en stap uit die skool uit

Om iewers op ‘n ander plek homself te gaan wees. Onbevange, saam met die ander Ongenooides. (Hartenbos, 25 November 2024)

Die stuk is oorspronklik op 25 November 2024 op die skrywer se Facebook-blad geplaas.

OOR

HBH

• Geskiedenis: “So what?”

Ons land se nasionale veiligheidsgeskiedenis veral van 1652 is vir ons nageslag en vir historici om bepaalde redes baie belangrik. (Ons negeer nie die rol van die Portugese seevaarders om ons kus nie.) Ons dek veral die tydperk 1910 – 1994, maar die tydperk perk ons nie in nie Ons kyk wyer. Ook ontvang ons veral foto’s en nuwe inligting van 1960’s – 1990’s. Daar is altyd iets nuut in die geskiedenis wat na vore gebring word. (Sien Panhard/ Elandpantserkar hier onder.)

Dit is ook belangrik dat Nongqai, as ‘n betroubare platform vir die geskiedenis sal optree, sy bydrae moet billik, eerlik, regverdig en sonder kwaadwilligheid, aangebied word. Nongqai is ook nie ‘n propagandis vir enige faksie nie. Ons probeer om alle oogpunte te belig. Ons feite moet kruisverhoor kan weerstaan. Ons skryf oor die verlede sonder om in die verlede te lewe.

Ons plaas ook bydrae van ons korrespondente presies soos ons dit ontvang. Ons maak net die spelfoute reg. Baie van ons lesers en korrespondente was ooggetuies van beslissende momente in ons geskiedenis. Ons het almal deur die jare verklarings, versugtinge, pleite, krete om hulp, erkennings en konfessies gehoor, ons het op tonele gekom en die toneel beskou en ook geruik hoe die toneel ruik. Ons het dooie mense – ook ons eie lede opgetel – en in die lykswa gelaai. Ons het lykskouings bygewoon. Ons het kledingstukke vir polisiehonde gegee om die beskuldigde of verdagte op te spoor. Ons het soms gelag en soms gehuil. Ons sintuie deel in die geskiedenis.

Ek het met baie mense gesels en baie gesprekke elektronies opgeneem. Genl Johan van der Merwe het my vertel tydens die parlementsopening van 1990 – op 2 Februarie – het genl Jannie Geldenhuys langs hom gesit. Toe hulle die president se aankondiging hoor het genl Geldenhuys vir genl Van der Merwe onthuts gefluister wat gaan nou gebeur ?

Ek het gehoor hoe ‘n minister vir ons vertel dat die polisie verteenwoordigend van die mense van Suid-Afrika MOET wees.... Tans lyk dit nie of dit ‘n goeie beleid is nie..... Misdaad is buite beheer, ondersoek van misdaad is ‘n klaaglike mislukking. Die Afrikaanse media gebruik nou privaat misdaadondersoekers om luisteraars toe te spreek. Is daar nie Afrikaanse skakeloffisiere nie?

Ja, ons het geskiedenis met ons sintuie waargeneem – gehoop en gebid om ons taak tot die einde suksesvol deur te voer.

• WhatsApp: Elande in die SAP

So WhatsApp Tubby Myburgh vir my op 5 November 2024:

“Ons het mos ook paar Elande gehad.”

Hy antwoord: “Ja, toe ek op Umtata gestasioneer was het ons een gehad saam met Saracens.1963.”

Hy antwoord: “So gesê het ons een in Umtata en twee Saracens op Umtata onluseenheid gehad 1964.”

Kommentaar deur HBH

Ek het self as passasier op die Saracens gedurende 1964 gery wat ons te SAP Wentworth gehad het – maar ek het nog nooit gehoor dat ons Elande gehad het nie. Ek vermoed dat dit nie Elande was nie maar die Eland se voorloper, die Panhards.

• Die sg Life Esidimeni tragedie

‘n Honderd-vier-en-veertig (144) psigiatriese pasiënte is dood – dis ‘n vreeslike aanklag teen die owerheid. Historici kla oor die sogenaamde Sharpeville-slagting maar wat van hierdie geweldige menseregteskending?

• Die belangrikheid van Polisie

Vandag verwyt ek die Nasionale Party, mnr PW Botha en die Staatsdienskommissie van die “ou” bedeling. Ons almal was kortsigtig – alles was te wydte aan “groepdenke” tydens die sogenaamde “totale aanslag” en “totale oorlog”. (Elders in die uitgawe is ‘n berig deur brig Fanie Bouwer oor die huidige SAPS-getalsterkte.)

Die rewolusionêre oorlog het op 16 Desember 1961 begin. Ons was destyds in die omgewing van 34 000 lede. Die SAP het die ganse Suid-Afrika, met inbegrip van SWA en die TVBC en nasionale state, gepolisieer.

Toe gedurende 1966 begin die grensoorlog toe gewapende Suid-Afrikaanse burgers dade van insurgensie pleeg – of om meer korrek te wees, Suid-Afrikaners het die land onwettig verlaat en as ‘opgeleide soldate’ die RSA weer onwettig betree. Dade van terreur het gevolg – ons almal was bewus hiervan.

In die tussentyd het mnr PW Botha – minister van verdediging en later staatspresident – ‘n geweldige weermag op die been gebring. Die binnelandse dimensie van nasionale veiligheid was totaal oor die hoof gesien. Die SAP het, wat die begroting betref, aan die agterspeen gesuig. Ek was op ‘n besige polisiestasie ons was een blanke lid in die aanklagtekantoor en een blanke lid op die patrolliewa. Ons was ‘n dun blou, gebroke stippellyn ....

Later lid van die veiligheidstak. Op veiligheidstak het ons voorkeur gekry tov motorvoertuie en mannekrag. (Ons was aanvanklik vier lede per motorvoertuig maar kon ook gratis bus ry.) Daar is ‘baklei’ vir veiligheid – die bekamping was hofgerig en die veiligheidstak is van die nodige wetgewing voorsien om die aanslag af te weer.

As lid van die sekretariaat van die staatsveiligheidsraad het ek baie dinge gesien en gehoor. Dit het vir my voorgekom asof die staatspresident en sy binnekring “weghol-perde” was – hulle het hul eie missie gehad. Intussen is die SAP skandelik verwaarloos. Die SAP – te klein vir sy taak – het sy kant dubbel en dwars gebring.

Kyk ons na die binnelandse dimensie van nasionale veiligheid dan sien ons:

• Die veiligheidstak was puik – kyk na die telkaart.

• Operasie “K” het sy taak volvoer – kyk na die telkaart.

• Die polisie op die grense het hul kant gebring

• Die onluseenhede, later die afdeling binnelandse stabiliteit, was onderbeman veral as mens kyk na die reuse swart woongebiede waar hul ontplooi was. Ons het meer manne op die grond nodig gehad.

• Die speurdiens en gespesialiseerde eenhede het onder baie moeilike omstandighede ook goed presteer.

• Die uniformtak – later sigbare polisiëring was baie afgeskeep. Hopeloos te min manne gehad om sy taak te volvoer. Manne uit die uniformtak moes gereeld na die grense en onluste gestuur

word. Op ‘n stadium waas daar geen werklike hoof van die uniformtak nie. Die tak is in wese geplunder om ander takke van broodnodige personeel te voorsien.

Ek het my oë en my ore oopgehou. Ek het gesien die misdaadsituasie verslag. Wapens is van die “weste” in suidelike Afrika na die “ooste” van Suidelike-Afrika gestuur. Ek het gedink hier kom groot moeilikheid. Ek was reg.

Later is ek die inspekteur-generaal se stafoffisier. Ek het ‘n vraelys opgestel en met die generaal se toestemming dit uitgestuur. In die vraelys het ek bv stasies gevra vir sekere bestuursinligting gevra:

• Hoeveel manne en vroue was op ‘n bepaalde aand diens?

• hoeveel kilo’s is gery?

• hoeveel arrestasies is uitgevoer?

• hoeveel offisiere het stasies besoek?

Ons het te min voete op die grond gehad. Misdadigers het die gaping gevat. Ons het later nie meer ons stasiewyke gedomineer nie. Ons was te besig met die bevordering van binnelandse veiligheid. Ons het nie tyd vir ander take soos sigbare patrollies in ons eie wyke gehad nie. Ons was in die swart woongebiede en op die grense ontplooi – hopeloos onder beman!

Skiet of skik?

Ons was in ‘n politieke oorlog. Daar was in ons politieke aanslag net twee keuses: Skiet of skik? Ons aanslag was ‘n polisie-stryd: (onwettige) politieke ondermyning, intimidasie, terreur, onwettige land verlating en binnekoms. Dit was nie ‘n weermag stryd nie.

Ek dink politiek kan ‘n vuil spel wees. Ek dink aan die sogenaamde “Inligting-skandaal”. Wat ‘n klug was dit nie. Van SAP(V) kant was ek skakel-offisier met mnr Charles More van die Buro van Inligting. Die politici wat na dr Verwoerd circa 1966 die stryd verstaan het was adv BJ Vorster, dr Connie Mulder en dr Hilgard Muller van Buitelandse Sake. Op amptenarevlak het dr Rhoodie en genl Van den Bergh die stryd gevoer – hulle het geweet ons was in ‘n politieke oorlog gewikkel. Hulle was bewus van die skiet- of skik-opsie. (Mens hoef net genl Van den Bergh se ongepubliseerde outobiografie te lees –“”No Ships in the Harbour” Die titel verwys na “ons is hier om te bly” – daar wag geen skepe vir ons nie.

Natuurlik het ons in die verlede by sekere geleenthede totaal verkeerd opgetree maar dit was veral omdat ons te min mense gehad het.

GENL LOUIS BOTHA LEES DIE NONGQAI

BRIEF AAN ONS LESERS

Geagte Vriend /Oud-kollega

Dear Friend / Former Colleague

Please see the attached document / Kyk asb na die aangehegte dokument.

If you no longer wish to receive the Nongqai, please let me know / Indie u nie langer die Nongqai wil ontvang nie, laat my gerus weet.

Baie groete / Kind Regards

HB Heymans

Reaksie

Goeie dag Brig Hennie,

Baie dankie vir julle harde werk om al die stories met ons te deel.

Ek sal graag op u adres lys wil bly want ek vind dit baie insiggewend.

Ek het vir u 'n aparte epos gestuur.

Dit is 'n boodskap wat die Here op my hart geplaas het om met elke lid te deel.

Indien u dit wil aanstuur na u lys is u meer as welkom.

Ek is seker elke oud lid is nog in kontak met dienende lede met wie hul dit kan deel. Blessings en mooi bly

Fanie van Vuuren .

Dear Hennie

As ever with you, thank you for your continued valuable contribution to the understanding of our strange history.

Liewe Brigadier Hennie en Sarie, baie dankie vir julle ongelooflike harde werk.

Ek kan nie dink hoeveel ure hierin gegaan het nie. Dis 'n blessing vir ons almal.

Dankie dat dit so maklik lees.

Ek probeer die woorde kry en uit my loopbaan is dit net, EK SALUEER JULLE!!!!

Dawn Kellerman

Goeienaand Brigadier

Daardie foto van die nagwag op bladsy 11 van die Nongqai het baie herinneringe teruggebring.

Die “Mantshingelane”, met hul jas, pet en knopkierie soos op die foto, waar altyd deel van die lewe in Soweto. Daardie manne was taai! Soweto was 'n gevaarlike plek in die nag en hulle was nou nie juis swaar gewapen nie.

Ek onthou hoe ons die een nag 'n klagte by "Club 707i" bygewoon het. 'n Jong man het probeer inbreek en is deur net so ‘n nagwag betrap. Ek glo hy was nogal jammer dat hy dit probeer het aangesien die Madala met die knopkierie hom goed pak gegee het. Al die kar se bemanning het lekker gelag. Dit was nou nie gereeld dat 'n mens 'n verdagte gearresteer het wat gelukkig was dat die Polisie opgedaag het nie!

Dankie vir die herinneringe.

Groete

Martin de Lange (Oostenryk)

Goeiemôre Hennie,

Vertrou dat dit goed gaan.

Hier goed met groot dankbaarheid.

Vertrou dat die Vader die reent sal bring op Sy tyd. My vrou so pas bevestig dat daar wolkies in die lug is!

Wees verseker dat ek die grootste agting en waardering het vir jou en Logan se bydrae en baie ure se opofferinge vir die samestelling van die Nongqai. Dit is ‘n kosbare verbintenis met oud-kollegas en die verlede waartydens soveel opgeoffer is vir ons geliefde land en sy mense.

Mooi geseënde dag.

Groete,

Dirk Schoeman.

Hallo Hennie.

Dankie vir die berig oor Kings Rest en die spooktreine wat diens gedoen het in die onluste jare.

Groete. Albie.

Goeie middag.

Hennie ek sal graag die Nongqai soos altyd in die verlede wil ontvang.

Beplan jy om die Nongqai te sluit? Hoop nie so nie.

Groete Wolfgang.

BEELD : 2024-10-25 : KABINETSLEDE,

MILJOEN.

Boet Meintjes

Hallo Oom Hennie,

Jammer ek oordonder Oom so met my skrywes, maar dit is alles skrywes wat ek al aan Beeld gerig het met die hoop dat ek antwoorde op my vrae sal kry, dit is egter pure verniet.

Groetnis my Oom.

Boet Meintjes.

• Boet soek Antwoorde by die Regering Beeld : 2024-10-25 : Kabinetslede, LP's skuld openbare werke R4 miljoen.

"Die sowat R4 miljoen wat aan die departement geskuld word, hou verband met huurgeld en munisipale dienste by ministeriële ampswonings in Kaapstad en Pretoria" - aldus Beeld.

Minister Dean Macpherson, die personeel wat verantwoordelik was om die huurgelde en munisipale dienste van die Kabinetslede en LP's te verhaal, het hul plig versuim, is hulle voor stok gekry?

Hoe word dit toegelaat, waar is die toesig en beheer?

Ek was self 'n staatsamptenaar gewees, en was ook woonagtig gewees in staatsbehuising.

Huurgelde was direk van ons salarisse verhaal, hoekom is die gelde nie van die Kabinetslede en LP's se salarisse verhaal nie?

Die personeel het mos hul werk op 'n onbehoorlike wyse verrig, en die opgehoopte skuld van R4 miljoen reflekteer dit, is dit nie 'n departementele oortreding nie?

Ek weet wat gaan gebeur, of ek dink ek weet wat gaan gebeur, die skuldontduikers gaan versoek word om voor een of ander portefeulje komitee te verskyn om te kom verduidelik hoekom hulle agterstallig is met hul huurgelde en munisipale dienste rekeninge.

Dieselfde gaan met die kabinetslede en LP's gebeur as wat tans gebeur het met die minister van Justisie, absoluut niks, sy is nog steeds in haar pos as Minister van Justisie.

Minister Dean Macpherson, na aanleiding van bovermelde ongeruimdhede, is daar nou maatreëls in plek gestel om 'n herhaling van die growwe nalatigheid te voorkom?

Soos reeds vermeld, was ek ook 'n staatsamptenaar gewees, en ek was ook verplig om vir my water en elektrisiteit verbruik te betaal, betaal die kabinetslede en LP's vir hul water en elektrisiteit verbruik?

Die rede hoekom ek dit vra, as die kabinetslede en LP's nie hul huur en munisipale dienste verpligtinge nakom nie, hoekom sal hulle hul water en elektrisiteit verpligtinge nakom, want daar word nêrens in Beeld vermeld dat hulle agterstallig is met hul water en elektrisiteit verbruik nie en dit is verdag, of is dit omdat hulle nie vir dié verbruik betaal nie? As hulle nie vir die vermelde verbruik betaal nie, hoekom is hulle vrygestel van betaling?

Watter voorbeeld stel die politici vir ons gewone Suid-Afrikaners, dis hoekom ons land is waar ons is, want die mense dink hulle is bo die wet verhewe en hoef nie gehoor te gee aan wette en regulasies van die land nie - skande.

Minister, siende ons besig is met skuld, sal ek dit waardeer as u vir Suid-Afrika kan sê wanneer gaan die Regering hul R35 miljoen uitstaande TV lisensies gelde vereffen?

"Netwerk24 : 2024-10-20 : Regte ding om te doen? Staat skuld self R35 miljoen vir TV lisensies" verwys.

Minister Macpherson antwoorde in die verband sal baie waardeer word, mooi dag vir u –Boet Meintjes.

MILITÊRE HISTORIKUS VEREER: PAUL ELS

Kol William Marshall

LETTER TO THE POLICE MINISTER

Boet Meintjes

Boet Meintjes Allen's Nek ROODEPOORT. 2024-11-05

The Minister S A Police.

Honourable Minister E S Mchunu,

As a retired Police Warrant Officer, I feel obligated to write you this email, I have grave concerns regarding the state of affairs of the SAPS and Crime Intelligence.

Here are some thoughts I would like to share with you. If you will indulge me for a moment, please, I thank you Sir.

On the 29th of October 2024 I came across the following article in Protection Web:

Protection Web: “ISS (Institute of Security Studies) BACKS FIVAZ CALL TO COMPLETELY RESTRUCTURE, REPURPOSE DECLINING SAPS (South African Police Service)” (https://www.protectionweb.co.za/police/iss-backs-fivaz-call-to-completely-restructure-re-purposedeclining-saps/)

The reason why this article caught my attention is because I am a retired Police Warrant Officer and any information regarding the South African Police, past and present is close to my heart.

Reading through the articles I have to concur, that I fully agree with General George FIVAZ and Mr Gareth NEWHAM, that the SAPS urgently needs to be restructured and repurposed.

The SAPS is in a downward spiral and if Government and police senior management don't intervene ‘as in now’ I then doubt if the police will ever be turned around to what we citizens expect the SAPS to be, because we expect the SAPS to fulfil its mandate, which is : to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law, but I'm sorry to say, the SAPS is falling way short to all of the above - heartbreaking.

If turnaround cannot be achieved NOW, it can destroy the fabric of our South African society, and we can become a lawless country.

Some days I get chills down my spine and think, what have become of our beloved country when you see the news in all the news outlets, police crime statistics and other institutions that publish crime statistics, and you see the amount of murders, rapes, robberies, house robberies, business robberies, cash in transit heists, housebreakings, assaults common, assaults to do grievous bodily harm, gender based violence etc, etc……..

The other grave concern to me, and General Fivaz and Mr Newham have touched on this point, is all the firearms that are stolen from the police while these firearms are under the protection of the SAPS - what happened to supervision and control?

In my humble opinion regarding the loss of firearms at station level, one of the contributing factors could be that station commanders delegate their responsibilities to subordinates, and furthermore that these station commanders do not do proper inspections on a monthly/quarterly basis, and neglect proper supervision and control - you cannot delegate your responsibilities.

BUSINESSTECH: 2024-11-02: A new type of mafia hitting businesses in South Africa. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/797901/a-new-type-of-mafia-hitting-businesses-insouth-africa/?utm_source=everlytic&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=businesstech

MYBROADBAND : 2024-11-01 : Fearless mafia spreads across South Africa. https://mybroadband.co.za/news/government/567771-fearless-mafia-spreading-across-southafrica.html?utm_source=newsletter

Even the old and vulnerable are not left alone, they are targets of these unscrupulous criminals.

MYBROADBAND: 2024-11-01: Hackers claim to have stolen R175 million after infiltrating SA banking system: “Attackers declaring themselves to be the hacking group N4ughtySec, who previously targeted South Africa’s credit bureaus, say they have stolen over R175 million from the South African Social Security Agency (Sassa)”

https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/567860-hackers-claim-to-have-stolen-r175-million-afterinfiltrating-sa-banking-system.html?utm_source=newsletter

I do not want to be a prophet of doom, but if I analyse the above I would say we are very close to a lawless country, gangs and mafias are the order of the day, no one is safe, the SAPS needs a turnaround sooner than later and without delay.

But, and this is a big BUT, and this is my first question, do the Government of National Unity have the political will to bring change about in the SAPS, my answer is NO, reason being, the VIP Protection Unit received R4, 09 billion, almost as much as the R4,74 billion for Crime Intelligenceseriously.

“This money should be spent on keeping South Africans safe, not providing ministers luxury special services at the cost of the taxpayer” - Action Society’s Juanita Du Preez. https://www.protectionweb.co.za/police/action-society-blasts-r2-billion-police-protection-unit-b

Furthermore according to Eyewitness News (EWN) : Almost R400 million in overtime paid to VIP Protection Unit :(https://www.ewn.co.za/almost-r400m-in-overtime-paid-to-vip-protection-unit-inpast-2-years/)

Clearly an indication that this Government does not have the political will to bring change to the SAPS, except to protect themselves, and if you look at the budget of the VIP Protection Unit, what are these politicians afraid of? do they care about the people of South Africa, I don't think so, if they did they would have pumped more money and resources into the SAPS and not into their protection - disgrace.

Netwerk24: 1 November: Meer intelligensiedienste nodig om konstruksiemafia hok te slaanMchunu. Mr Minster you have identified the problem, second question, what measures have you put in place to strengthen Crime Intelligence. If I may advise, for starters, cut the budget of the VIP Protection Unit, and allocate those funds to Crime Intelligence, immediately and without delay.

And then just for a last thought, and to add insult to injury and to emphasise the decline of the SAPS. Daily Maverick: 2024-11-01: “The Khan and the king power struggle Crime Intelligence deputy Feroz Khan’s battle reflects SAPS decline”https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2024-11-01-the-khan-and-the-king-power-struggle-crimeintelligence-deputy-feroz-khans-battle-reflects-saps-decline/

In this week the Mini-Budget was announced by the Minister of Finance, if I recall correctly, not a word mentioned regarding safety and security - sorry state of affairs.

Many political analysts, security experts, Protection Web, ISS and many other institutions on safety and security matters have taken the time to bring all of the above under the attention of the Government, unfortunately no progress, on the contrary, under Bheki Crete the SAPS became mostly dysfunctional.

My last question to the Government of National Unity, are we going to see a fundamental overhaul of the senior management structures and its systems, to ensure measurable improvements in capability and accountability across the SAPS, in THIS term of the GNU if you please?

I think the above are fair questions, Mr Minister, an answer in this regard will be immensely appreciate.

Kind regards, yours truly

Boet Meintjes.

'PARTYE

VAAR UIT NÁ PHALA-BESLISSING' : OMRUIL VAN AMERIKAANSE DOLLARS NA SUID AFRIKAANSE RANDE

Boet Meintjes

Na aanleiding van Beeld se berig op 2024-10-12 'Partye vaar uit ná Phala-beslissing' - is ek van die opinie, of sal ek sê, ek is oortuig daarvan dat daar twee stelle reëls en regulasies geld in Suid-Afrika, een stel vir die gewone burgers en die ander een vir die invloedrykes en die kabinet Ministers insluitende die Staatspresident.

Die rede hoekom ek so sê, wat het met die ministers gebeur wat in die Zondo Kommissie geïmpliseer is, absoluut niks het met hulle gebeur tot op hede. Gaan daar iets met hulle gebeur in die toekoms, ek twyfel want ons het mos nou 'n Regering van Nasionale Eenheid, en die opposisie partye in die vorige bedeling wat so 'n ophef gemaak het van die Ministers wat in die Zondo Kommissie geïmpliseer is en die Phala Phala-kwessie waar die President in geïmpliseer word, is mos nou opgeneem in dié Regering van Nasionale Eenheid, en daar wil nie nou op tone getrap word nie, so die ongerymdhede sal 'n stille dood sterf terwyl daar oor die R1 miljard spandeer is van belastingbetalers se geld vir die Zondo Kommissie.

Dit bring my by my punt ten opsigte van Phala-Phala. Ek is ook ontevrede met die uitslag, en ek glo baie burgers van Suid-Afrika voel dieselfde, volgens my beskeie mening was 'n oortreding van die Wet deur die President begaan en is daar 'n slang in die gras met die beslissings, soos reeds vermeld, daar is twee stelle reëls en regulasies in Suid-Afrika, en hierdie Phala-Phale beslissings is 'n duidelike bewys daarvan.

Buiten al die vrae wat in die lig hang soos, die Wet op Valuta Beheer, onverklaarde buitelandse valuta, en nie eers te praat van die belasting wette nie, het ek net een vraag.

164

Per geleentheid het ek Amerika toe gereis vir vakansie, met my terugkeer het ek 'n skamele $250 Amerikaanse Dollars in my besit gehad.

Omdat ek nie seker was of ek weer Amerika gaan besoek nie het ek besluit dat ek die Dollars gaan omruil vir Suid Afrikaanse Rande.

Om die Dollars wettig te kon omruil, en dan praat ek nie eers van al die moeite daaraan verbonde om dit wel omgeruil te kry, moes ek die volgende dokumente voorlê:

* bewys van woonadres

* ID kaart

* paspoort

* reisplan

* woonadres in Amerika.

* en die betaling van belasting waar van toepassing.

Nou hier is my vraag aan die President, hoe het hy gedink sal hy die $380, 000, wat in 'n rusbank op Phala-Phale versteek was, wettig gaan omruil sonder om die bovermelde dokumente, bewyse of prosedures na te kom, of is daar ander prosedures of protokolle vir Staatspresidente? - twee stelling reëls dalk?

Of is wette en regulasies sedertdien gewysig dat Dollars na Rande omgeruil kan word sonder enige bewyse van hoe die draer van die Dollars in besit gekom het van daardie Dollars en dit dus nie meer nodig is om bewyse voor te lê nie?

Of om nie meer belasting te betaal, of om die geld te verklaar nie?

Ek sal regtig bly wees as die President my vraag kan beantwoord? - Boet Meintjes.

VEILIGHEIDSMAGTE: WANDELPAD BY DIE VOORTREKKERMONUMENT

Paul Els

Middag Hennie

Net inlig dat ons is besig is met ‘n wandelpad by die Voortrekkermonument en in die gaan verskeie korps of ander gedenkbeelde oprig word.

Soos jy weet is Koevoet, Inf, Dorslandtrekkers en die nuwe een is van diere – honde en perde wat opgerig word. Open Maart volgende jaar.

Ek dink regtig ons moet dink aan Ongulumbashe wat opgerig kan word. Dis waar alles begin het. Johan Visagie kan help daarmee. Onthou oor minder as twee jaar sal dit 60 jaar wees as my sompompie reg werk.

Dis net ‘n gedagte wat ons kan aan dink. As daar samesyn is dan moet ons nou begin want ek en Johan is vinnig op die afdraande. Wat dink jy?

Paul

• Ek dink dis ‘n wonderlike gedagte. Wat dink ons lesers? - HBH

Paul Els

Dankie Hennie

Net mooi skryf want dit nie goed genoeg (geskryf nie) nie.

Ek wil ‘n ander klip gooi waar baie mense my die klip sal terug gooi.

Ons vereer 1 en 2 WO met die poppie-dag.

Wat van ons eie gedenkdag oor van ons bosoorlog die 26ste Aug.

Maak dit ons gedenkdag met parade ens

Wil net ‘n tema of ding soek daarvoor

Amen

Paul DIE SAP & KOOSBERGPAS EN DIE PAMPOENLYS

AP Stemmet

Die Koosbergpas was ‘n monster net soos die ou Rooihoogtepas. ALLE voertuie het gekook teen die laaste lang steilte. Dit was so erg dat daar aan die onderpunt 'n permanente padkamp van die Afdelingsraad (Distriksraad) was, waarvandaan die pas en omgewing se paaie geskraap is. Eendag vertel ek jou van die suikerstelery by daardie padkamp.

Die naam Koosbergpas is glo afgelei van KOO. Almal het glo van die Koo se pas gepraat. Dit het toe Koosbergpas geword.

Pampoenlys? Die polisie moes jaarliks ‘n opnamelys van boere se groenteprodukte vir die Departement van Landbou voltooi. Daarvoor moes hulle by elke plaas lang vorms invul. Die boere en polisie het gou gespot dat die polisie kom vasstel hoeveel pampoene hulle geoes het. Die lang vorm het toe die pampoenlys geword.

So is die polisie misbruik maar tog het hulle deur elke plaas te besoek presies geweet wat in hul polisiewyke gebeur het. Vandag?

Groete

Adamus P. Stemmet

BRIEF UIT OOSTENRYK

Marthinus de Lange

Dit is herfs hier in die Noordelike Halfrond. Die dae is nou baie korter en die son sak net na 16:00. Dis koud en nat, al sneeu dit nog nie. Dit is beslis nie die tyd van die jaar om aan 'n soektog in die woud deel te neem nie. Maar, vir ongeveer 250 Oostenrykse polisiemanne is dit presies wat gebeur het.

Op Maandag die 28ste Oktober het 'n Oostenrykse jagter 'n dubbele moord gepleeg. Hy het eers sy dorp se burgemeester dood geskiet en toe 'n ander jagter ('n afgetrede polisieman) vermoor. Albei die oorledenes het voorheen regsprobleme met die verdagte gehad. Nadat hy die moorde gepleeg het, het die verdagte, gewapen met 'n pistool, 'n haelgeweer en 'n jaggeweer in die woud verdwyn, wat gelei het tot 'n polisiesoektog.

Saterdag die 2de November is die verdagte se lyk naby sy motor gevind. Hy het selfmoord gepleeg met sy haelgeweer.

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/31466601/fugitive-double-killer-roland-drexler-dead/

Die Staatspolisiedirekteur vir die betrokke provinsie het so ver gegaan as om te sê dat hy, na 41 jaar in die polisie, nog nooit iets soortgelyks ervaar het nie.

'n Mens moet die feit in gedagte hou dat in Oostenryk daar nie baie moorde is nie. Daar was verlede jaar altesaam 90 moorde, in 'n land met 'n bevolking van 9,123 miljoen..

Ongelukkig het die hele situasie 'n paar vrae oor die polisiemagte se vaardighede in sulke sake laat ontstaan. Beamptes sweer dat hulle voorheen die gebied waar die verdagte se voertuig ontdek is goed deursoek het. Maar die voertuig is ontdek deur 'n gewone burger wat in die woud gaan draf het vir oefening. Op die ou end begin dit lyk asof die polisie die voertuig op een of ander manier misgekyk of oorgesien het.

Om sake te vererger, wil hulle nie 'n tyd van dood vir die liggaam bekend maak nie. Wat, vir sommige mense, dit laat lyk asof die Staat die polisie se foute probeer toesmeer. Die plaaslike media is natuurlik vol sulke stories.

As oud-polisieman is die saak interessant. En dit het my daartoe gelei om hierdie artikel te skryf, aangesien ander voormalige SAP lede die vergelykings dalk interessant sal vind.

Mens kan sien dat die Oostenrykse polisie baie min ondervinding of opleiding in “boskuns” het. Polisiemanne in donkerblou, swaar koeëlvaste baadjies en helms staan uit in die woud. En hulle maak 'n geraas!

In die SAP het ons mos kamoefleerdrag vir sulke werk gehad. Interessant genoeg het 'n voormalige Oostenrykse polisieman vir my gesê dat, aangesien sy ou wyk baie woud dele ingesluit het, hy altyd

'n ou Russiese kamoefleer “Overall” in sy polisiemotor se kattebak gehou het. Dit laat mens dink aan die ou BSAP in Rhodesië wat altyd Rhodesiese weermag of SAP kamoefleerdrag in die hande probeer kry het.

As mens na die video's kyk, is dit ook duidelik dat soek en opsporing in landelike gebiede nie iets is waarin die Oostenrykse polisie baie ervaring het nie.

48 persent van Oostenryk is woudgebied. Mens sou dink dat ten minste sommige polisielede opleiding en toerusting sou hê om in woude te werk. Maar dit blyk dat sedert die Gendarmerie (Baie jare gelede is die Gendarmerie ook vir TIN-operasies opgelei) by die gewone polisie saamgevoeg is word dit nie meer as belangrik beskou nie.

Hier is wel ‘n tipe polisie “Taakmag”, EKO Cobra, wat deel van die operasie was. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EKO_Cobra Hulle het wel 'n paar pantservoertuie met “turrets” ingespan, maar andersins het hulle nie baie gehelp nie. Cobra word darem met groen uniforms uitgereik en hulle kan beslis 'n huis slaan, maar hul vaardighede is meer stedelik as landelik. Dit blyk dat baie klem op moderne tegnologie geplaas is. Hommeltuie en helikopters met FLIR kameras en so. Niks daarvan het gehelp nie en net miskien sou mens beter af gewees het met goeie spoorsnyers en spoorsnyhonde. Hierdie tyd van die jaar, as dit nie so warm is nie, is goed geskik vir spoorsnyhonde. Ek het al n paar klagtes gehoor oor die opleiding van Oostenrykse polisiehonde van polisiemanne wat saam met hondemanne gewerk het, maar ek wil liewer nie daarop ingaan nie. Daar is 'n paar uitstekende "Mantrailing"-honde in privaat besit in Oostenryk. Die honde-eienaars, sommige met militêre ondervinding, het voorheen hul dienste aan die regering aangebied vir soek- en reddingsoperasies. Waarom het die polisie nie van sulke vaardighede gebruik gemaak nie?

Van spoorsnyers gepraat: Oostenryk het ook geen regte, soos wat ons in SA sou ken, wildbewaarders nie. Op die ou end is die enigste staatsdepartement met enige boskuns of spoorsny vaardighede die weermag, en dit blyk dat die polisie hulle ook nie vir hulp wou vra nie.

Nou ja: As mens na die hele saak kyk, veral vanuit 'n ou SAP oogpunt, kom dit alles nogal onbekwaam voor. Aan die ander kant, soos 'n voormalige Oostenrykse polisieman vir my gesê het, het ons in die ou SAP, en Suid-Afrika in die algemeen, 'n duur prys vir ons boskuns betaal. Miskien is dit beter dat die Oostenrykers nog nooit rêrig, op ‘n groot skaal, sulke vaardighede nodig gehad het nie.

Ek wil nou nie die Oostenrykse polisie beledig nie. Die manne en vroue in blou is goeie mense wat hard werk met wat hulle het. Ek persoonlik vind dit net hartseer om terug te dink aan die polisiemag wat ons in Suid-Afrika gehad het en hoe dinge regoor die wêreld verander het.

Groete uit Oostenryk waar dit nou koud en donker is. Groete, Martin/

RIEF UIT THAILAND

Lt Barry Taylor

Naand Brigadier

Ek het die laaste paar dae hier by die huis gesit en dink aan al die ellende in die wêreld en hoe dit my eintlik raak en kan aan niks dink wat my hier ver weggesteek op ‘n plaas ver van al die lawaai van die stede, die geweld van die stede en die wêreld.

Om my woon eenvoudige mense wat geen begrip het wat in die wêreld aangaan nie en nie een weet eers wie Trump is nie, nog minder van die ander wêreldleiers. Hulle is net begaan oor hulle oorlewing more en wat hulle kinders eendag gaan doen. My vrou het ‘n dame gehad wat vir haar gewerk het vir die afgelope jaar en sy is 57 jaar oud - was haar hele lewe werksaam in masseersalonne in Phuket, Hua Hin en Pattaya Sy het twee dogters en sy en die dogters woon in ‘n huis van my vrou - so 50 tree van ons af ook op die plasie. Die dogters is beide getroud en het kinders - die een twee en die ander een drie. Die vrou het ‘n vriend wat sy al jare ken en die twee woon saam in die huis. Hy is te sleg om te werk en elke oggend so 7 uur loop hy voor my huis verby en koop n bottel Lao kao –‘n witblits van so 35% en drink dit uit. Gewoonlik meng hulle dit met Red Bull wat hulle ook by dieselfde winkel koop en die kos so R5 ‘n bottel Die Lao Kao is in ‘n 300 ml bottel en so begin hulle die dag. Die vrou se een dogter werk in ‘n fabriek so 20 km van hier en het nou ‘n huis gekoop naby die fabriek. Die huis kos haar 1.2 miljoen baht - so R600 K en die afbetaling is oor veertig jaar. Haar salaris is net 9000 Baht per maand vir ses dae skofte en haar man verdien ook soveel in ‘n ander fabriek in die omgewing. Hulle het een seun op skool hy is so 11 jaar oud maar wil ook nie eintlik leer en gaan maar net skool tot hy skool kan verlaat - gewoonlik na std 7 - maar baie na std 3. Dan gaan werk hy op die lande vir 300 baht - R150 per dag - en is dood tevrede met die lewe. Die ma werk vir Jin vir R150 per dag, kook kos, was die skottelgoed en hou die restaurant skoon en sny die ‘prawns’ op tussen al die werk deur. Sy gaan nou by haar dogter in die nuwe huis bly en na die kinders kyk en dan het sy geen inkomste nie maar dit pla haar nie. My vrou kry toe ‘n "cousin" wat ook hier so vier huise van my woon, om haar te kom help Die meisie is 22 jaar oud het reeds ‘n kind waarvan die pa verdwyn het - soos gewoonlik. Die eerste dag toe ek haar by die restaurant sien, vra ek wie is die modepop, en Jin se toe vir my dit is die nuwe werker Sy het darem std 2 op skool geslaag voor sy skool verlaat het en sy kom elke dag aangetrek soos ‘n modepop en sit heeldag daar rond en kyk TV en was so nou en dan skottelgoed maar kan nie kook nie Jin het haar R100 per dag betaal en ek sê toe dis R90 per dag te veel en dan is sy ‘n dag afsiek en dan’ n ander verskoning en dan kla sy oor dit en dat. Nou werk die ouvrou, die masseuse, weer vir drie dae in die restaurant terwyl sy hier by die ander dogter kuier.

Nou moet jy weet as sy std 2 geslaag het kan sy nie lees en skryf nie, want as ‘n onderwyser hier ‘n kind laat druip word die onderwyser afgedank - en dit is nie ‘n storie nie - dit is amptelike beleid. Ek het ‘n vriendin wat hier in Bangkok skoolhou Claudine en sy hou al skool vir sewe jaar hier na ek vir haar werk gekry het. Haar dogter, Chantelle, hou ook hier skool. Ek en Claudine gesels gereeld op Whatsapp en dan vertel sy my al haar probleme. Sy het ook ‘n ander lewe gehad. Sy het in Hannover Park in die Weskaap grootgeword en is na std 8 uit die skool. Sy is nou 55 so dit is ‘n paar jaar gelede Sy het as skoonmaker begin en eendag sê ‘n witvrou vir haar by ‘n fabriek jy sal altyd ‘n skoonmaker bly. Net daar bedank sy en begin ‘n werk soek.

Sy kry toe werk by Astrapak en toe ek haar leer ken het was sy die Wes-Kaapse verkoopsbestuurder en ry ‘n Honda Accord en besit vier huise in Blouberg, Bothasig ens.

Toe ek Thailand toe trek het ons maar so nou en dan kontak gehou en eendag sê sy vir my sy het haar matriek gemaak en ook op Koh SAMui‘n eiland hier in Thailand –‘n TEFL-kursus gedoen om Engels te gee. Sy kom bly toe by my en Jin en sy was een dag hier toe het ek vir haar werk by die Engelse taal afdeling van Cambridge Universiteit kollege hier naby my. Ek het die Sjinese skoolhoof daar voorheen leer ken. Sy praat vlot Engels

Na ‘n maand het sy ‘n woonstel naby die kollege en toe kry sy deur ‘n ander vriend van my in die Wes-Kaap se vriendin, ook ‘n bruin vrou, werk in Bangkok by ‘n skool. Daar word toe vir haar gesê sy moet n graad hé om permanent hier skool te hou en sy het in vier jaar haar graad hier op Universiteit gekry, ‘n B Ed.

Nou het ek deur my kleinseun wat ‘n departementshoof in Guangzhou by ‘n skool is, werk gekry in Sjina waar die salarisse veel beter is en dit klink of sy volgende jaar in Sjina gaan skoolhou. Sy het my vertel van die feite dat ‘n onderwyser nie ‘n kind mag druip nie want dan word jy ontslaan.

Jy moet onthou Thailand is een van die mees ongelyke lande in die wêreld Die top een persent van die bevolking beheer 67% van die land se totale rykdom en die top 10% beheer 85.7% van die rykdom. Die laagste 50% besit 1.7% van die land se rykdom.

Thailand se weermag val darem nie uitmekaar soos die SA Weermag nie maar die polisie is ver meer onbekwaam en korrup

Barry Prachin Buri